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INTRODUCTION TO
CONTEMPORARY
CIVILIZATION
IN THE WEST



A SOURCE BOOK

INTRODUCTION TO

Contemporary Civilization
in the West

A SOURCE BOOK PREPARED BY THE
CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION STAFF OF
COLUMBIA COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Volume II SECOND EDITION

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

VOLUME TWO of this *Source Book*, though designed for the latter part of the first year course in Contemporary Civilization at Columbia, may be used independently, and may be adapted to other and very different needs.

Of the introductions to the individual selections in these volumes, many written by the collaborators on the 1941-3 fascicle edition have been retained and revised, and many have been written by the present editorial committee for the new selections chosen. Introductions for new selections in Volume Two have also been contributed by Frederick de W. Bolman, Jr., J. Bartlet Brebner, Alan W. Brown, George Crothers, Ernest Nagel, John H. Randall, Jr., John A. Scott, Richard C. Snyder, Boris M. Stanfield, and Morton G. White.

The numerous translations made especially for these volumes are the work of the earlier and present committees, and of others whose services were solicited by Columbia College.

The committee wishes to express thanks to Lore L. Kapp, Paul O. Kristeller, and Benjamin N. Nelson, who have contributed aid on special problems; and to Matilda L. Berg and Eugenia Porter of Columbia University Press, who have expedited the production of the book.

The conclusion of this enterprise would not be complete without a reference to those who founded or shaped the course from which the *Source Book* derives. It is impossible to mention all of them, but perhaps they can be represented by the name of the late John J. Coss, who was central in the conception and furtherance of the Contemporary Civilization idea.

In the most literal sense, these volumes have been made possible by the energetic sponsorship of the Dean of Columbia College, Harry J. Carman.

JUSTUS BUCHLER
K. WILLIAM KAPP
ROBERT S. LOPEZ

Columbia College, Columbia University
June, 1946

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

THE SECOND volume of the *Source Book* contains readings in the civilization of the Western world since the French Revolution. Its chapter headings correspond to those of the companion book of background readings, Volume Two of *Chapters in Western Civilization*.

In addition to the general re-editing specified in the Preface to the second edition of Volume One, Volume Two of the *Source Book* has undergone the following changes:

1. New source-readings have been introduced,
 - (a) from authors and documents hitherto unrepresented: Debates on the Corn Laws (The Free Trade Controversy), Bentham, *The Economist* (Owen), Bakunin, de Tocqueville, Buckle, Green, Rathenau, Rhodes, Gide, Shaw (Fabianism), Sorel, Jaurès, The Atomic Bomb;
 - (b) from authors already represented: Disraeli, Santayana.
2. Certain existing source-readings have been amplified, contracted or re-edited for one reason or another—*e.g.*, greater fullness, greater conciseness, better continuity, the insertion of significant passages: Burke, Hegel, M'Culloch, Owen, Carlyle, Duke of Wellington, Comte, Spencer, Pius XI, The Oxford Conference, Fascism in Action.
3. Certain authors and movements represented by selections that did not prove useful in the classroom have been omitted: von Liebig, Considérant, Bagehot, Hobson, Protectionism, Cole, National Minorities.

None of the new pieces has been introduced merely for its intellectual modishness or journalistic contemporaneity. Some, however, notably the Bakunin, de Tocqueville, Sorel, and concluding Santayana selections, are inserted so that certain ironies and ambivalences of Western mind and society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may be more clearly drawn out.

In Volume One the committee has already acknowledged the counsel and assistance of many persons in connection with its work, as well as the kindness of publishers who allowed the use of copyrighted material. For Volume Two new introductions have been written and many old ones revised by Harold Barger, Jacques Barzun, J. Bartlet Brebner, Irwin Edman, Charles

Frankel, Horace L. Friess, Henry L. Roberts, and Paul Seabury, as well as by members of the committee.

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October, 1953

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I

THE ROMANTIC OUTLOOK AND ITS EXPRESSIONS

EDMUND BURKE

EDMUND BURKE (1729-97) was born in Dublin. In 1765 he became secretary to the Marquis of Rockingham, leader of the Whig party, and during the same year he entered Parliament. He was for a generation the most eloquent spokesman of the Whigs.

The conservative reaction to the French Revolution was on the whole either impulsive or merely political. Edmund Burke was not exceptional among conservatives in the fright, almost hysterical in character, which the Revolution engendered in him, but he was exceptional in that this great event stimulated him to reflection, and that his conservatism was made to rest on philosophical principles.

Burke's philosophy of conservatism had its point of departure in his concern with the gospel of natural rights which inspired the revolutionaries. He was ready to admit that society might be "artificial," but he insisted that "art is man's nature," and that natural rights are natural only in being antecedent to the process of political organization. In consequence, a national tradition and political obligation are justified as civilizing agencies, and not simply as protectors of antecedent individual rights. Like Hume, Burke was aware of the force of social conventions, but he went farther than Hume, the philosophic skeptic, and argued that it was pointless to bring custom and tradition to the test of utility, when they were inherently justifiable as the seat of religion and authority.

Burke approached the idea of natural rights with caution for still another reason. Society was not for him merely an aggregation of individuals. In addition to its individual members, society was a complex of habits and loyalties, traditionally recognized authorities and a common historic experience. As much as any individual, it had its own unique personality, and the life of this personality must be held supreme. Consequently, not reason but the prescription of the past is the source of law (Burke relies here upon the Roman legal concept of *Praescriptio*, or long tenure in undisturbed possession). "Our constitution is a prescriptive constitution, . . . whose sole authority is that it has existed time out of mind. . . . Prescription is the most solid of all titles. . . . It is a presumption in favor of any settled scheme of government against any untried project, that a nation has long existed and flourished under it. . . . Because a nation is not an idea only of local extent, and individual momentary aggregation; but it is an idea of continuity, which extends in time as well as in numbers and in space. And this is . . . not a tumultuary and giddy choice; it is a deliberate election of the ages and of generations. . . . The individual is foolish; the multitude, for the moment, is foolish, when they act without deliberation; but the species is wise, and, when time is given to it, as a species it always acts right." Thus, the State is for Burke "a partnership between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born."

The romantic temper, in seeking to vindicate human feeling and passion as guides to truth and rightness, could lend itself either to revolutionary sentiment as in Burke, to patriotic loyalty. Burke, in disagreement with Enlightenment philosophy, felt that the historic experience of a community gives rise to a fund of

wisdom superior to rational individual judgment. What is now in existence reflects the wisdom accumulated in the past. Political insight is to be gained through reflection upon the "divine tactic" of history, and loyalty to a tradition and to the peculiar duties of one's station rests on a securer foundation than does following the lead of one's own judgment. The real basis of political obligation is the natural loyalty and spontaneous reverence felt for institutions which have stood the test of long experience. This is not to say that Burke did not take into account the problems that arise from the convergence upon tradition of new situations. He felt, however, that the primary function of the statesman was to keep the community stable by preserving the institutions which were the repositories of its habits and loyalties, and that consequently it was customary precedent, and not something entirely new, that had to be applied to individual cases.

Burke's general principles were developed in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), from which selections follow. On the whole, however, he distrusted abstract inquiries into political questions. His spiritual father was Montesquieu, and his conservatism rested upon his conviction that society was too massively complex an organism to be subjected to merely rational control. "One sure symptom of an ill-conducted state is the propensity of the people to theories. . . . No rational man ever did govern himself by abstractions and universals."

That this philosopher of conservatism was a Whig is not so strange as it may seem. His opinions on specifically English questions were those of one who looked back to the days of a forceful Whig nobility, and he was concerned, consequently, to save the Constitution of 1689 from the subversive influence of France and from attack at the hands of George III. It was as a Whig that he defended the colonies in the American Revolution, and it was as a Whig that he attacked the abuses of government in India and fought the wealthy "nabobs" whose purchase of English pocket boroughs threatened the continuing balance of power (that is, the power of the gentry).



REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE

IT APPEARS TO ME as if I were in a great crisis, not of the affairs of France alone, but of all Europe, perhaps of more than Europe. All circumstances taken together, the French Revolution is the most astonishing that has hitherto happened in the world. The most wonderful things are brought about in many instances by means the most absurd and ridiculous; in the most ridiculous modes; and, apparently, by the most contemptible instruments. Everything seems out of nature in this strange chaos of levity and ferocity, and of all sorts of crimes jumbled together with all sorts of follies. In viewing this monstrous tragic-comic scene, the most opposite passions necessarily succeed, and sometimes mix with each other in the mind; alternate contempt

and indignation; alternate laughter and tears; alternate scorn and horror.

It cannot, however, be denied, that to some this strange scene appeared in quite another point of view. Into them it inspired no other sentiments than those of exultation and rapture. They saw nothing in what has been done in France, but a firm and temperate exertion of freedom: so consistent, on the whole, with morals and with piety as to make it deserving not only of the secular applause of dashing Machiavelian politicians, but to render it a fit theme for all the devout effusions of sacred eloquence.

On the forenoon of the 4th of November last, Doctor Richard Price, a non-conforming minister of eminence, preached at the dissenting meeting-house of the Old Jewry, to his club or society, a very extraordinary miscellaneous sermon, in which there are some good moral and religious sentiments, and not ill expressed, mixed up in a sort of porridge of various political opinions and reflections; but the Revolution in France is the grand ingredient in the cauldron. . . . His doctrines affect our constitution in its vital parts. He tells the Revolution Society in this political sermon, that his Majesty "is almost the *only* lawful king in the world, because the *only* one who owes his crown to the *choice of his people*." . . .

This doctrine, as applied to the prince now on the British throne, either is nonsense, and therefore neither true nor false, or it affirms a most unfounded, dangerous, illegal, and unconstitutional position. According to this spiritual doctor of politics, if his Majesty does not owe his crown to the choice of his people, he is no *lawful king*. Now nothing can be more untrue than that the crown of this kingdom is so held by his Majesty. Therefore if you follow their rule, the king of Great Britain, who most certainly does not owe his high office to any form of popular election, is in no respect better than the rest of the gang of usurpers, who reign, or rather rob, all over the face of this our miserable world, without any sort of right or title to the allegiance of their people. . . . If you admit this interpretation, how does their idea of election differ from our idea of inheritance? And how does the settlement of the crown in the Brunswick line derived from James the First come to legalize our monarchy, rather than that of any of the neighbouring countries? At some time or other, to be sure, all the beginners of dynasties were chosen by those who called them to govern. There is ground enough for the opinion that all the kingdoms of Europe were, at a remote period, elective, with more or fewer limitations in the objects of choice. But whatever kings might have been here, or elsewhere, a thousand years ago, or in whatever manner the ruling dynasties of England or France may have begun, the king of Great Britain is, at this day, king by a fixed rule of succession, according to the laws of his country; and whilst the legal conditions

of the compact of sovereignty are performed by him (as they are performed), he holds his crown in contempt of the choice of the Revolution Society, who have not a single vote for a king amongst them, either individually or collectively; though I make no doubt they would soon erect themselves into an electoral college, if things were ripe to give effect to their claim. His Majesty's heirs and successors, each in his time and order, will come to the crown with the same contempt of their choice with which his Majesty has succeeded to that he wears.

Whatever may be the success of evasion in explaining away the gross error of *fact*, which supposes that his Majesty (though he holds it in concurrence with the wishes) owes his crown to the choice of his people; yet nothing can evade their full explicit declaration, concerning the principle of a right in the people to choose; which right is directly maintained, and tenaciously adhered to. All the oblique insinuations concerning election bottom in this proposition, and are referable to it. Lest the foundation of the king's exclusive legal title should pass for a mere rant of adulatory freedom, the political divine proceeds dogmatically to assert, that, by the principles of the Revolution, the people of England have acquired three fundamental rights, all which, with him, compose one system, and lie together in one short sentence; namely, that we have acquired a right,

1. "To choose our own governors."
2. "To cashier them for misconduct."
3. "To frame a government for ourselves."

This new, and hitherto unheard-of, bill of rights, though made in the name of the whole people, belongs to those gentlemen and their faction only. The body of the people of England have no share in it. They utterly disclaim it. They will resist the practical assertion of it with their lives and fortunes. They are bound to do so by the laws of their country, made at the time of that very Revolution which is appealed to in favour of the fictitious rights claimed by the society which abuses its name.

These gentlemen of the Old Jewry, in all their reasonings on the Revolution of 1688, have a Revolution which happened in England about forty years before, and the late French Revolution, so much before their eyes, and in their hearts, that they are constantly confounding all the three together. It is necessary that we should separate what they confound. We must recall their erring fancies to the *acts* of the Revolution which we revere, for the discovery of its true *principles*. If the *principles* of the Revolution of 1688 are anywhere to be found, it is in the statute called the *Declaration of Right*. In that most wise, sober, and considerate declaration, drawn up by great lawyers and great statesmen, and not by warm and inexperienced enthusiasts,

not one word is said, nor one suggestion made, of a general right "to choose our own *governors*; to cashier them for misconduct; and to *form* a government for *ourselves*." . . .

You will observe, that from Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right, it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties, as an *entailed inheritance* derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity; as an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom, without any reference whatever to any other more general or prior right. By this means our constitution preserves a unity in so great a diversity of its parts. We have an inheritable crown; an inheritable peerage; and a House of Commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties, from a long line of ancestors.

This policy appears to me to be the result of profound reflection; or rather the happy effect of following nature, which is wisdom without reflection, and above it. A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper and confined views. People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors. Besides, the people of England well know, that the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conservation and a sure principle of transmission; without at all excluding a principle of improvement. It leaves acquisition free; but it secures what it acquires. Whatever advantages are obtained by a state proceeding on these maxims, are locked fast as in a sort of family settlement; grasped as in a kind of mortmain for ever. By a constitutional policy, working after the pattern of nature, we receive, we hold, we transmit our government and our privileges, in the same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives. The institutions of policy, the goods of fortune, the gifts of providence, are handed down to us, and from us, in the same course and order. Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts; wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged, or young, but, in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression. Thus, by preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve, we are never wholly new; in what we retain, we are never wholly obsolete. By adhering in this manner and on those principles to our forefathers, we are guided not by the superstition of antiquarians, but by the spirit of philosophic analogy. In this choice of inheritance we have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood; binding up the constitution of our country with our

dearest domestic ties; adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family affections; keeping inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities, our state, our hearths, our sepulchres, and our altars.

Through the same plan of a conformity to nature in our artificial institutions, and by calling in the aid of her unerring and powerful instincts, to fortify the fallible and feeble contrivances of our reason, we have derived several other, and those no small benefits, from considering our liberties in the light of an inheritance. Always acting as if in the presence of canonized forefathers, the spirit of freedom, leading in itself to misrule and excess, is tempered with an awful gravity. This idea of a liberal descent inspires us with a sense of habitual native dignity, which prevents that upstart insolence almost inevitably adhering to and disgracing those who are the first acquirers of any distinction. By this means our liberty becomes a noble freedom. It carries an imposing and majestic aspect. It has a pedigree and illustrious ancestors. It has its bearings, and its ensigns armorial. It has its gallery of portraits; its monumental inscriptions; its records, evidences, and titles. We procure reverence to our civil institutions on the principle upon which nature teaches us to revere individual men; on account of their age, and on account of those from whom they are descended. All your sophisters cannot produce anything better adapted to preserve a rational and manly freedom than the course that we have pursued, who have chosen our nature rather than our speculations, our breasts rather than our inventions, for the great conservatories and magazines of our rights and privileges.

You might, if you pleased, have profited of our example, and have given to your recovered freedom a correspondent dignity. Your privileges, though discontinued, were not lost to memory. Your constitution, it is true, whilst you were out of possession, suffered waste and dilapidation; but you possessed in some parts the walls, and, in all, the foundations, of a noble and venerable castle. You might have repaired those walls; you might have built on those old foundations. Your constitution was suspended before it was perfected; but you had the elements of a constitution very nearly as good as could be wished. In your old states you possessed that variety of parts corresponding with the various descriptions of which your community was happily composed; you had all that combination, and all that opposition of interests, you had that action and counteraction, which, in the natural and in the political world, from the reciprocal struggle of discordant powers, draws out the harmony of the universe. These opposed and conflicting interests, which you considered as so great a blemish in your old and in our present constitution, interpose a salutary check to all precipitate resolutions. They render

deliberation a matter not of choice, but of necessity; they make all change a subject of *compromise*, which naturally begets moderation; they produce *temperaments* preventing the sore evil of harsh, crude, unqualified reformation; and rendering all the headlong exertions of arbitrary power, in the few or in the many, for ever impracticable. Through that diversity of members and interests, general liberty had as many securities as there were separate views in the several orders; whilst by pressing down the whole by the weight of a real monarchy, the separate parts would have been prevented from warping, and starting from their allotted places.

You had all these advantages in your ancient states; but you chose to act as if you had never been moulded into civil society, and had everything to begin anew. You began ill, because you began by despising everything that belonged to you. You set up your trade without a capital. If the last generations of your country appeared without much lustre in your eyes, you might have passed them by, and derived your claims from a more early race of ancestors. Under a pious predilection for those ancestors, your imaginations would have realized in them a standard of virtue and wisdom, beyond the vulgar practice of the hour: and you would have risen with the example to whose imitation you aspired. Respecting your forefathers, you would have been taught to respect yourselves. You would not have chosen to consider the French as a people of yesterday, as a nation of low-born servile wretches until the emancipating year of 1789. . . .

Compute your gains: see what is got by those extravagant and presumptuous speculations which have taught your leaders to despise all their predecessors, and all their contemporaries, and even to despise themselves, until the moment in which they became truly despicable. By following those false lights, France has bought undisguised calamities at a higher price than any nation has purchased the most unequivocal blessings! France has bought poverty by crime! France has not sacrificed her virtue to her interest, but she has abandoned her interest, that she might prostitute her virtue. All other nations have begun the fabric of a new government, or the reformation of an old, by establishing originally, or by enforcing with greater exactness, some rites or other of religion. All other people have laid the foundations of civil freedom in severer manners, and a system of a more austere and masculine morality. France, when she let loose the reins of regal authority, doubled the licence of a ferocious dissoluteness in manners, and of an insolent irreligion in opinions and practices; and has extended through all ranks of life, as if she were communicating some privilege, or laying open some secluded benefit, all the unhappy corruptions that usually were the disease of wealth and power. This is one of the new principles of equality in France. . . .

Believe me, Sir, those who attempt to level, never equalise. In all societies, consisting of various descriptions of citizens, some description must be uppermost. The levellers therefore only change and pervert the natural order of things; they load the edifice of society, by setting up in the air what the solidity of the structure requires to be on the ground. The associations of tailors and carpenters, of which the republic (of Paris, for instance) is composed, cannot be equal to the situation, into which, by the worst of usurpations, an usurpation on the prerogatives of nature, you attempt to force them.

The Chancellor of France at the opening of the States, said, in a tone of oratorical flourish, that all occupations were honourable. If he meant only, that no honest employment was disgraceful, he would not have gone beyond the truth. But in asserting that anything is honourable, we imply some distinction in its favour. The occupation of a hair-dresser, or of a working tallow-chandler, cannot be a matter of honour to any person—to say nothing of a number of other more servile employments. Such descriptions of men ought not to suffer oppression from the state; but the state suffers oppression, if such as they, either individually or collectively, are permitted to rule. In this you think you are combating prejudice, but you are at war with nature.

I do not, my dear Sir, conceive you to be of that sophistical, captious spirit, or of that uncandid dulness, as to require, for every general observation or sentiment, an explicit detail of the correctives and exceptions, which reason will presume to be included in all the general propositions which come from reasonable men. You do not imagine, that I wish to confine power, authority, and distinction to blood, and names, and titles. No, Sir. There is no qualification for government but virtue and wisdom, actual or presumptive. Wherever they are actually found, they have, in whatever state, condition, profession or trade, the passport of Heaven to human place and honour. Woe to the country which would madly and impiously reject the service of the talents and virtues, civil, military, or religious, that are given to grace and to serve it; and would condemn to obscurity everything formed to diffuse lustre and glory around a state! Woe to that country too, that, passing into the opposite extreme, considers a low education, a mean contracted view of things, a sordid, mercenary occupation, as a preferable title to command! Everything ought to be open; but not indifferently to every man. No rotation; no appointment by lot; no mode of election operating in the spirit of sortition, or rotation, can be generally good in a government conversant in extensive objects. Because they have no tendency, direct or indirect, to select the man with a view to the duty, or to accommodate the one to the other. I do not hesitate to say, that the road to eminence and power from obscure condition, ought not to be made too easy, nor a thing too much of course. If rare merit be the rarest

of all rare things, it ought to pass through some sort of probation. The temple of honour ought to be seated on an eminence. If it be opened through virtue, let it be remembered too, that virtue is never tried but by some difficulty and some struggle.

Nothing is a due and adequate representation of a state, that does not represent its ability, as well as its property. But as ability is a vigorous and active principle, and as property is sluggish, inert, and timid, it never can be safe from the invasions of ability, unless it be, out of all proportion, predominant in the representation. It must be represented too in great masses of accumulation, or it is not rightly protected. The characteristic essence of property, formed out of the combined principles of its acquisition and conservation, is to be *unequal*. The great masses therefore which excite envy, and tempt rapacity, must be put out of the possibility of danger. Then they form a natural rampart about the lesser properties in all their gradations. The same quantity of property, which is by the natural course of things divided among many, has not the same operation. Its defensive power is weakened as it is diffused. In this diffusion each man's portion is less than what, in the eagerness of his desires, he may flatter himself to obtain by dissipating the accumulations of others. The plunder of the few would indeed give but a share inconceivably small in the distribution to the many. But the many are not capable of making this calculation; and those who lead them to rapine never intend this distribution. . . .

It is said, that twenty-four millions ought to prevail over two hundred thousand. True; if the constitution of a kingdom be a problem of arithmetic. This sort of discourse does well enough with the lamp-post for its second: to men who *may* reason calmly, it is ridiculous. The will of the many and their interest must very often differ; and great will be the difference when they make an evil choice. A government of five hundred country attorneys and obscure curates is not good for twenty-four millions of men, though it were chosen by eight-and-forty millions; nor is it the better for being guided by a dozen of persons of quality, who have betrayed their trust in order to obtain that power. At present, you seem in everything to have strayed out of the high road of nature. The property of France does not govern it. Of course property is destroyed, and rational liberty has no existence. All you have got for the present is a paper circulation and a stock-jobbing constitution: and, as to the future, do you seriously think that the territory of France, upon the republican system of eighty-three independent municipalities (to say nothing of the parts that compose them), can ever be governed as one body, or can ever be set in motion by the impulse of one mind? When the National Assembly has completed its work, it will have accomplished its

ruin. These commonwealths will not long bear a state of subjection to the republic of Paris. They will not bear that this one body should monopolize the captivity of the king, and the dominion over the Assembly calling itself national. Each will keep its own portion of the spoil of the church to itself; and it will not suffer either that spoil, or the more just fruits of their industry, or the natural produce of their soil, to be sent to swell the insolence, or pamper the luxury, of the mechanics of Paris. In this they will see none of the equality, under the pretence of which they have been tempted to throw off their allegiance to their sovereign, as well as the ancient constitution of their country. There can be no capital city in such a constitution as they have lately made. They have forgot, that when they framed democratic governments, they had virtually dismembered their country. The person, whom they persevere in calling king, has not power left to him by the hundredth part sufficient to hold together this collection of republics. The republic of Paris will endeavour indeed to complete the debauchery of the army, and illegally to perpetuate the Assembly, without resort to its constituents, as the means of continuing its despotism. It will make efforts, by becoming the heart of a boundless paper circulation, to draw everything to itself; but in vain. All this policy in the end will appear as feeble as it is now violent. . . .

Far am I from denying in theory, full as far is my heart from withholding in practice (if I were of power to give or to withhold), the *real* rights of men. In denying their false claims of right, I do not mean to injure those which are real, and are such as their pretended rights would totally destroy. If civil society be made for the advantage of man, all the advantages for which it is made become his right. It is an institution of beneficence; and law itself is only beneficence acting by a rule. Men have a right to live by that rule; they have a right to do justice, as between their fellows, whether their fellows are in public function or in ordinary occupation. They have a right to the fruits of their industry; and to the means of making their industry fruitful. They have a right to the acquisitions of their parents; to the nourishment and improvement of their offspring; to instruction in life, and to consolation in death. Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself; and he has a right to a fair portion of all which society, with all its combinations of skill and force, can do in his favour. In this partnership all men have equal rights; but not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the partnership, has as good a right to it, as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion. But he has not a right to an equal dividend in the product of the joint stock; and as to the share of power, authority, and direction which each individual ought to have in the management of the state, that I must deny to

be amongst the direct original rights of man in civil society; for I have in my contemplation the civil social man, and no other. It is a thing to be settled by convention.

If civil society be the offspring of convention, that convention must be its law. That convention must limit and modify all the descriptions of constitution which are formed under it. Every sort of legislative, judicial, or executory power are its creatures. They can have no being in any other state of things; and how can any man claim under the conventions of civil society, rights which do not so much as suppose its existence? rights which are absolutely repugnant to it? One of the first motives to civil society, and which becomes one of its fundamental rules, is, *that no man should be judge in his own cause*. By this each person has at once divested himself of the first fundamental right of uncovenanted man, that is, to judge for himself, and to assert his own cause. He abdicates all right to be his own governor. He inclusively, in a great measure, abandons the right of self-defence, the first law of nature. Men cannot enjoy the rights of an uncivil and of a civil state together. That he may obtain justice, he gives up his right of determining what it is in points the most essential to him. That he may secure some liberty, he makes a surrender in trust of the whole of it.

Government is not made in virtue of natural rights, which may and do exist in total independence of it; and exist in much greater clearness, and in a much greater degree of abstract perfection: but their abstract perfection is their practical defect. By having a right to everything they want everything. Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human *wants*. Men have a right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom. Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. Society requires not only that the passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection. This can only be done *by a power out of themselves*; and not, in the exercise of its function, subject to that will and to those passions which it is its office to bridle and subdue. In this sense the restraints on men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among their rights. But as the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and circumstances, and admit of infinite modifications, they cannot be settled upon any abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as to discuss them upon that principle.

The moment you abate anything from the full rights of men, each to govern himself, and suffer any artificial, positive limitation upon those rights, from that moment the whole organization of government becomes a con-

sideration of convenience. This it is which makes the constitution of a state, and the due distribution of its powers, a matter of the most delicate and complicated skill. It requires a deep knowledge of human nature and human necessities, and of the things which facilitate or obstruct the various ends, which are to be pursued by the mechanism of civil institutions. The state is to have recruits to its strength, and remedies to its distempers. What is the use of discussing a man's abstract right to food or medicine? The question is upon the method of procuring and administering them. In that deliberation I shall always advise to call in the aid of the farmer and the physician, rather than the professor of metaphysics.

The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught *à priori*. Nor is it a short experience that can instruct us in that practical science; because the real effects of moral causes are not always immediate; but that which in the first instance is prejudicial may be excellent in its remoter operation; and its excellence may arise even from the ill effects it produces in the beginning. The reverse also happens: and very plausible schemes, with very pleasing commencements, have often shameful and lamentable conclusions. In states there are often some obscure and almost latent causes, things which appear at first view of little moment, on which a very great part of its prosperity or adversity may most essentially depend. The science of government being therefore so practical in itself, and intended for such practical purposes, a matter which requires experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be, it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice, which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again, without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.

These metaphysic rights entering into common life, like rays of light which pierce into a dense medium, are, by the laws of nature, refracted from their straight line. Indeed in the gross and complicated mass of human passions and concerns, the primitive rights of men undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections, that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the simplicity of their original direction. The nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity: and therefore no simple disposition or direction of power can be suitable either to man's nature, or to the quality of his affairs. When I hear the simplicity of contrivance aimed at and boasted of in any new political constitutions, I am at no loss to decide that the artificers are grossly ignorant of their trade, or totally negligent of their duty. The simple governments are fundamentally defective, to say no

worse of them. If you were to contemplate society in but one point of view, all these simple modes of polity are infinitely captivating. In effect each would answer its single end much more perfectly than the more complex is able to attain all its complex purposes. But it is better that the whole should be imperfectly and anomalously answered, than that, while some parts are provided for with great exactness, others might be totally neglected, or perhaps materially injured, by the overcare of a favourite member.

The pretended rights of these theorists are all extremes: and in proportion as they are metaphysically true, they are morally and politically false. The rights of men are in a sort of *middle*, incapable of definition, but not impossible to be discerned. The rights of men in governments are their advantages; and these are often in balances between differences of good; in compromises sometimes between good and evil, and sometimes between evil and evil. Political reason is a computing principle; adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing, morally and not metaphysically, or mathematically, true moral denominations.

By these theorists the right of the people is almost always sophistically confounded with their power. The body of the community, whenever it can come to act, can meet with no effectual resistance; but till power and right are the same, the whole body of them has no right inconsistent with virtue, and the first of all virtues, prudence. Men have no right to what is not reasonable, and to what is not for their benefit. . . .

History will record, that on the morning of the 6th of October, 1789, the king and queen of France, after a day of confusion, alarm, dismay, and slaughter, lay down, under the pledged security of public faith, to indulge nature in a few hours of respite, and troubled, melancholy repose. From this sleep the queen was first startled by the voice of the sentinel at her door, who cried out to her to save herself by flight—that this was the last proof of fidelity he could give—that they were upon him, and he was dead. Instantly he was cut down. A band of cruel ruffians and assassins, reeking with his blood, rushed into the chamber of the queen, and pierced with a hundred strokes of bayonets and poniards the bed, from whence this persecuted woman had but just time to fly almost naked, and, through ways unknown to the murderers, had escaped to seek refuge at the feet of a king and husband, not secure of his own life for a moment.

This king, to say no more of him, and this queen, and their infant children (who once would have been the pride and hope of a great and generous people), were then forced to abandon the sanctuary of the most splendid palace in the world, which they left swimming in blood, polluted by massacre,

and strewed with scattered limbs and mutilated carcases. Thence they were conducted into the capital of their kingdom. Two had been selected from the unprovoked, unresisted, promiscuous slaughter, which was made of the gentlemen of birth and family who composed the king's body guard. These two gentlemen, with all the parade of an execution of justice, were cruelly and publicly dragged to the block, and beheaded in the great court of the palace. Their heads were stuck upon spears, and led the procession; whilst the royal captives who followed in the train were slowly moved along, amidst the horrid yells, and shrilling screams, and frantic dances, and infamous contumelies, and all the unutterable abominations of the furies of hell, in the abused shape of the vilest of women. After they had been made to taste, drop by drop, more than the bitterness of death, in the slow torture of a journey of twelve miles, protracted to six hours, they were, under a guard, composed of those very soldiers who had thus conducted them through this famous triumph, lodged in one of the old palaces of Paris, now converted into a bastille for kings. . . .

It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of France, then the dauphiness, at Versailles; and surely never lighted on this orb, which she hardly seemed to touch, a more delightful vision. I saw her just above the horizon, decorating and cheering the elevated sphere she just began to move in,—glittering like the morning-star, full of life, and splendour, and joy. Oh! what a revolution! and what a heart must I have to contemplate without emotion that elevation and that fall! Little did I dream when she added titles of veneration to those of enthusiastic, distant, respectful love, that she should ever be obliged to carry the sharp antidote against disgrace concealed in that bosom; little did I dream that I should have lived to see such disasters fallen upon her in a nation of gallant men, in a nation of men of honour, and of cavaliers. I thought ten thousand swords must have leaped from their scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened her with insult. But the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished for ever. Never, never more shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom. The unbought grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise, is gone! It is gone, that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness.

This mixed system of opinion and sentiment had its origin in the ancient chivalry; and the principle, though varied in its appearance by the varying state of human affairs, subsisted and influenced through a long succession of generations, even to the time we live in. If it should ever be totally extinguished, the loss I fear will be great. It is this which has given its character to modern Europe. It is this which has distinguished it under all its forms of government, and distinguished it to its advantage, from the states of Asia, and possibly from those states which flourished in the most brilliant periods of the antique world. It was this, which, without confounding ranks, had produced a noble equality, and handed it down through all the gradations of social life. It was this opinion which mitigated kings into companions, and raised private men to be fellows with kings. Without force or opposition, it subdued the fierceness of pride and power; it obliged sovereigns to submit to the soft collar of social esteem, compelled stern authority to submit to elegance, and gave a dominating vanquisher of laws to be subdued by manners.

But now all is to be changed. All the pleasing illusions, which made power gentle and obedience liberal, which harmonized the different shades of life, and which, by a bland assimilation, incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify and soften private society, are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of our naked, shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion.

On this scheme of things, a king is but a man, a queen is but a woman; a woman is but an animal, and an animal not of the highest order. All homage paid to the sex in general as such, and without distinct views, is to be regarded as romance and folly. Regicide, and parricide, and sacrilege, are but fictions of superstition, corrupting jurisprudence by destroying its simplicity. The murder of a king, or a queen, or a bishop, or a father, are only common homicide; and if the people are by any chance, or in any way, gainers by it, a sort of homicide much the most pardonable, and into which we ought not to make too severe a scrutiny.

On the scheme of this barbarous philosophy, which is the offspring of cold hearts and muddy understandings, and which is as void of solid wisdom as it is destitute of all taste and elegance, laws are to be supported only by their own terrors, and by the concern which each individual may find in them

from his own private speculations, or can spare to them from his own private interests. In the groves of *their* academy, at the end of every vista, you see nothing but the gallows. Nothing is left which engages the affections on the part of the commonwealth. On the principles of this mechanic philosophy, our institutions can never be embodied, if I may use the expression, in persons; so as to create in us love, veneration, admiration, or attachment. But that sort of reason which banishes the affections is incapable of filling their place. These public affections, combined with manners, are required sometimes as supplements, sometimes as correctives, always as aids to law. . . . When the old feudal and chivalrous spirit of *fealty*, which, by freeing kings from fear, freed both kings and subjects from the precautions of tyranny, shall be extinct in the minds of men, plots and assassinations will be anticipated by preventive murder and preventive confiscation, and that long roll of grim and bloody maxims, which form the political code of all power, not standing on its own honour, and the honour of those who are to obey it. Kings will be tyrants from policy, when subjects are rebels from principle.

When ancient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot possibly be estimated. From that moment we have no compass to govern us; nor can we know distinctly to what port we steer. Europe, undoubtedly, taken in a mass, was in a flourishing condition the day on which your revolution was completed. How much of that prosperous state was owing to the spirit of our old manners and opinions is not easy to say; but as such causes cannot be indifferent in their operation, we must presume, that, on the whole, their operation was beneficial.

We are but too apt to consider things in the state in which we find them, without sufficiently adverting to the causes by which they have been produced, and possibly may be upheld. Nothing is more certain, than that our manners, our civilization, and all the good things which are connected with manners and with civilization, have, in this European world of ours, depended for ages upon two principles; and were indeed the result of both combined; I mean the spirit of a gentleman, and the spirit of religion. The nobility and the clergy, the one by profession, the other by patronage, kept learning in existence, even in the midst of arms and confusions, and whilst governments were rather in their causes, than formed. Learning paid back what it received to nobility and to priesthood; and paid it with usury, by enlarging their ideas, and by furnishing their minds. Happy if they had all continued to know their indissoluble union, and their proper place! Happy if learning, not debauched by ambition, had been satisfied to continue the instructor, and not aspired to be the master! Along with its natural protectors

and guardians, learning will be cast into the mire, and trodden down under the hoofs of a swinish multitude. . . .

I hear it is sometimes given out in France, that what is doing among you is after the example of England. I beg leave to affirm, that scarcely anything done with you has originated from the practice or the prevalent opinions of this people, either in the act or in the spirit of the proceeding. Let me add, that we are as unwilling to learn these lessons from France, as we are sure that we never taught them to that nation. The cabals here, who take a sort of share in your transactions, as yet consist of but a handful of people. . . .

The whole [frame of our constitution] has been done under the auspices, and is confirmed by the sanctions, of religion and piety. The whole has emanated from the simplicity of our national character, and from a sort of native plainness and directness of understanding, which for a long time characterized those men who have successively obtained authority amongst us. This disposition still remains; at least in the great body of the people.

We know, and what is better, we feel inwardly, that religion is the basis of civil society, and the source of all good and of all comfort. In England we are so convinced of this, that there is no rust of superstition, with which the accumulated absurdity of the human mind might have crusted it over in the course of ages, that ninety-nine in a hundred of the people of England would not prefer to impiety. We shall never be such fools as to call in an enemy to the substance of any system to remove its corruptions, to supply its defects, or to perfect its construction. If our religious tenets should ever want a further elucidation, we shall not call on atheism to explain them. We shall not light up our temple from that unhallowed fire. It will be illuminated with other lights. It will be perfumed with other incense, than the infectious stuff which is imported by the smugglers of adulterated metaphysics. If our ecclesiastical establishment should want a revision, it is not avarice or rapacity, public or private, that we shall employ for the audit, or receipt, or application of its consecrated revenue. Violently condemning neither the Greek nor the Armenian, nor, since heats are subsided, the Roman system of religion, we prefer the Protestant; not because we think it has less of the Christian religion in it, but because, in our judgment, it has more. We are Protestants, not from indifference, but from zeal.

We know, and it is our pride to know, that man is by his constitution a religious animal; that atheism is against, not only our reason, but our instincts; and that it cannot prevail long. But if, in the moment of riot, and in a drunken delirium from the hot spirit drawn out of the alembic of hell, which in France is now so furiously boiling, we should uncover our nakedness, by throwing off that Christian religion which has hitherto been our boast and

comfort, and one great source of civilization amongst us, and amongst many other nations, we are apprehensive (being well aware that the mind will not endure a void) that some uncouth, pernicious, and degrading superstition might take place of it.

For that reason, before we take from our establishment the natural, human means of estimation, and give it up to contempt, as you have done, and in doing it have incurred the penalties you well deserve to suffer, we desire that some other may be presented to us in the place of it. We shall then form our judgment.

On these ideas, instead of quarrelling with establishments, as some do, who have made a philosophy and a religion of their hostility to such institutions, we cleave closely to them. We are resolved to keep an established church, an established monarchy, an established aristocracy, and an established democracy, each in the degree it exists, and in no greater. . . .

Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure—but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primæval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place. This law is not subject to the will of those, who by an obligation above them, and infinitely superior, are bound to submit their will to that law. The municipal corporations of that universal kingdom are not morally at liberty at their pleasure, and on their speculations of a contingent improvement, wholly to separate and tear asunder the bands of their subordinate community, and to dissolve it into an unsocial, uncivil, unconnected chaos of elementary principles. It is the first and supreme necessity only, a necessity that is not chosen, but chooses, a necessity paramount to deliberation, that admits no discussion, and demands no evidence, which alone can justify a resort to anarchy. This necessity is no exception to the rule; because this necessity itself is a part too

of that moral and physical disposition of things, to which man must be obedient by consent or force: but if that which is only submission to necessity should be made the object of choice, the law is broken, nature is disobeyed, and the rebellious are outlawed, cast forth, and exiled, from this world of reason, and order, and peace, and virtue, and fruitful penitence, into the antagonist world of madness, discord, vice, confusion, and unavailing sorrow. . . .

When all the frauds, impostures, violences, rapines, burnings, murders, confiscations, compulsory paper currencies, and every description of tyranny and cruelty employed to bring about and to uphold this Revolution, have their natural effect, that is, to shock the moral sentiments of all virtuous and sober minds, the abettors of this philosophic system immediately strain their throats in a declamation against the old monarchical government of France. . . . Have these gentlemen never heard, in the whole circle of the worlds of theory and practice, of anything between the despotism of the monarch and the despotism of the multitude? Have they never heard of a monarchy directed by laws, controlled and balanced by the great hereditary wealth and hereditary dignity of a nation; and both again controlled by a judicious check from the reason and feeling of the people at large, acting by a suitable and permanent organ? Is it then impossible that a man may be found, who, without criminal ill intention, or pitiable absurdity, shall prefer such a mixed and tempered government to either of the extremes; and who may repute that nation to be destitute of all wisdom and of all virtue, which, having in its choice to obtain such a government with ease, *or rather to confirm it when actually possessed*, thought proper to commit a thousand crimes, and to subject their country to a thousand evils, in order to avoid it? Is it then a truth so universally acknowledged, that a pure democracy is the only tolerable form into which human society can be thrown, that a man is not permitted to hesitate about its merits, without the suspicion of being a friend to tyranny, that is, of being a foe to mankind?

I do not know under what description to class the present ruling authority in France. It affects to be a pure democracy, though I think it in a direct train of becoming shortly a mischievous and ignoble oligarchy. But for the present I admit it to be a contrivance of the nature and effect of what it pretends to. I reprobate no form of government merely upon abstract principles. There may be situations in which the purely democratic form will become necessary. There may be some (very few, and very particularly circumstanced) where it would be clearly desirable. This I do not take to be the case of France, or of any other great country. Until now, we have seen no examples of considerable democracies. The ancients were better acquainted with them. Not

being wholly unread in the authors, who had seen the most of those constitutions, and who best understood them, I cannot help concurring with their opinion, that an absolute democracy, no more than absolute monarchy, is to be reckoned among the legitimate forms of government. They think it rather the corruption and degeneracy, than the sound constitution of a republic. If I recollect rightly, Aristotle observes, that a democracy has many striking points of resemblance with a tyranny. Of this I am certain, that in a democracy, the majority of the citizens is capable of exercising the most cruel oppressions upon the minority, whenever strong divisions prevail in that kind of polity, as they often must; and that oppression of the minority will extend to far greater numbers, and will be carried on with much greater fury, than can almost ever be apprehended from the dominion of a single sceptre. In such a popular persecution, individual sufferers are in a much more deplorable condition than in any other. Under a cruel prince they have the balmy compassion of mankind to assuage the smart of their wounds; they have the plaudits of the people to animate their generous constancy under their sufferings: but those who are subjected to wrong under multitudes, are deprived of all external consolation. They seem deserted by mankind, overpowered by a conspiracy of their whole species. . . .

Corporate bodies are immortal for the good of the members, but not for their punishment. Nations themselves are such corporations. As well might we in England think of waging inexpiable war upon all Frenchmen for the evils which they have brought upon us in the several periods of our mutual hostilities. You might, on your part, think yourselves justified in falling upon all Englishmen on account of the unparalleled calamities brought on the people of France by the unjust invasions of our Henrys and our Edwards. Indeed we should be mutually justified in this exterminatory war upon each other, full as much as you are in the unprovoked persecution of your present countrymen, on account of the conduct of men of the same name in other times.

We do not draw the moral lessons we might from history. On the contrary, without care it may be used to vitiate our minds and to destroy our happiness. In history a great volume is unrolled for our instruction, drawing the materials of future wisdom from the past errors and infirmities of mankind. It may, in the perversion, serve for a magazine, furnishing offensive and defensive weapons for parties in church and state, and supplying the means of keeping alive, or reviving, dissensions and animosities, and adding fuel to civil fury. History consists, for the greater part, of the miseries brought upon the world by pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy,

ungoverned zeal, and all the train of disorderly appetites, which shake the public with the same

troublous storms that toss
The private state, and render life unsweet. . . .

Your citizens of Paris formerly had lent themselves as the ready instruments to slaughter the followers of Calvin, at the infamous massacre of St. Bartholomew. What should we say to those who could think of retaliating on the Parisians of this day the abominations and horrors of that time? They are indeed brought to abhor *that* massacre. Ferocious as they are, it is not difficult to make them dislike it; because the politicians and fashionable teachers have no interest in giving their passions exactly the same direction. Still, however, they find it their interest to keep the same savage dispositions alive. It was but the other day that they caused this very massacre to be acted on the stage for the diversion of the descendants of those who committed it. In this tragic farce they produced the cardinal of Lorraine in his robes of function, ordering general slaughter. Was this spectacle intended to make the Parisians abhor persecution, and loathe the effusion of blood?—No; it was to teach them to persecute their own pastors; it was to excite them, by raising a disgust and horror of their clergy, to an alacrity in hunting down to destruction an order, which, if it ought to exist at all, ought to exist not only in safety, but in reverence. It was to stimulate their cannibal appetites (which one would think had been gorged sufficiently) by variety and seasoning; and to quicken them to an alertness in new murders and massacres, if it should suit the purpose of the Guises of the day. An Assembly, in which sat a multitude of priests and prelates, was obliged to suffer this indignity at its door. The author was not sent to the galleys, nor the players to the house of correction. Not long after this exhibition, those players came forward to the Assembly to claim the rites of that very religion which they had dared to expose, and to show their prostituted faces in the senate, whilst the archbishop of Paris, whose function was known to his people only by his prayers and benedictions, and his wealth only by his alms, is forced to abandon his house, and to fly from his flock (as from ravenous wolves), because, truly, in the sixteenth century, the cardinal of Lorraine was a rebel and a murderer.

Such is the effect of the perversion of history, by those, who, for the same nefarious purposes, have perverted every other part of learning. But those who will stand upon that elevation of reason, which places centuries under our eye, and brings things to the true point of comparison, which obscures

little names, and effaces the colours of little parties, and to which nothing can ascend but the spirit and moral quality of human actions, will say to the teachers of the Palais Royal,—The cardinal of Lorraine was the murderer of the sixteenth century, you have the glory of being the murderers in the eighteenth; and this is the only difference between you. But history in the nineteenth century, better understood, and better employed, will, I trust, teach a civilized posterity to abhor the misdeeds of both these barbarous ages. It will teach future priests and magistrates not to retaliate upon the speculative and inactive atheists of future times, the enormities committed by the present practical zealots and furious fanatics of that wretched error, which, in its quiescent state, is more than punished, whenever it is embraced. It will teach posterity not to make war upon either religion or philosophy, for the abuse which the hypocrites of both have made of the two most valuable blessings conferred upon us by the bounty of the universal Patron, who in all things eminently favours and protects the race of man.

WILLIAM HAZLITT

WILLIAM HAZLITT (1778–1830), literary critic and political writer, was the only notable mind in England to remain unwavering in his devotion to the French Revolution as well as to the principles of the Enlightenment. Many of his contemporaries found it difficult to reconcile this faith with his admiration of Napoleon. But Hazlitt believed Bonaparte to the very end a symbol of the rising power of the people, and a continuing promise that what he considered the conspiratorial power of kings and the tyrannical claims of legitimacy were at last doomed.

His father was a Unitarian minister who, when Hazlitt was six years old, took his family with him to the United States, where for three years he preached in churches in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. Hazlitt never lost the feeling of having been born a Dissenter; and the fact that Unitarians were not only religious innovators but in many cases the leaders of that kind of liberal political activity which was already being called Radical, placed a stamp upon his mind and temper which lasted throughout his life.

He fell under the influence of Wordsworth and Coleridge when these two were at the height of their powers. It is clear from his later writings that although his share in the literary aspects of English Romanticism owes much to both, he never forgave what he considered their abandonment of the spirit of the French Revolution, and their progressive shift of allegiance to political Toryism, the conservatism of the Established Church, and the organic traditionalism of Burke. Hazlitt's own problems of a domestic and amatory nature were, on the other hand, frequently the subject of gossip among his friends and were occasionally cited by his political enemies to illustrate the evils of Jacobinism, and what they irrelevantly judged to be the irresponsibility of his opinions.

Hazlitt's most fruitful period as a political writer lay between 1812 and 1819. The years 1812 to 1815 saw the failure of Napoleon's attack on Russia, his defeat at the hands of the European coalition, his return from Elba, and the dramatic events of the Hundred Days, ending disastrously at Waterloo. Hazlitt, almost alone among Englishmen, regarded these events from the first as symptomatic of the rise and return of political reaction and despotic tyranny. The social and parliamentary history of the next four years bore him out. The Corn Law of 1815 and the consequent rise of agricultural prices led to a demand for parliamentary reform from both the middle and working classes. The end of war-orders from Europe precipitated numerous financial failures and an acute increase in unemployment. The result was a vigorous campaign against the government in the Radical and part of the Liberal press, which called forth a series of repressive acts from timorous Tory leaders and frightened landlords. The suppression of Habeas Corpus in 1817 only accentuated the popular protests. Hazlitt found willing ears for his political tirades, and larger audiences than usual for his lectures on English writers, lectures in which he did not hesitate to introduce political judgments.

The restoration of Habeas Corpus in 1818 only encouraged more open protests against the abuses of government and the restriction of popular liberties.

Hazlitt's political articles of these years were published in daily and weekly newspapers, most of them in the *Morning Chronicle*, the *Courier*, the *Champion*, and Leigh Hunt's famous *Examiner*, to all of which he also contributed literary criticism. But both his literary and political opinions soon earned the enmity of Tory editors and critics like Lockhart, son-in-law of Scott, John Wilson of *Blackwood's*, and William Gifford, editor of the *Quarterly Review*. Only Jeffrey of the *Edinburgh* remained friendly to Hazlitt and hospitable to his ideas. However, no writer of these years was more hated than Hazlitt, because none was so much feared.

Hazlitt's collection of *Political Essays* was published early in August 1819, and was dedicated to John Hunt, the Radical, whom Hazlitt characterized as "a patriot without an eye to himself, who never betrayed an individual or a cause he pretended to serve." On August 16, the terrible events of "Peterloo" gave ironic proof of the truth of all that Hazlitt had been saying for many years, and which he had now just republished. A public meeting, held in St. Peter's Fields outside Manchester, and addressed by Hunt, was broken up by a large contingent of the Manchester Yeomanry Cavalry. Two women, a child, and eight men were killed, one hundred and thirteen women wounded, and almost three hundred men. It was one of the blackest moments in English social history. The public protest was great and widespread, but the government still had much to learn. The Six Acts, passed the following year, continued for three more years a coercive and repressive policy. However, after 1819, Hazlitt's political voice was silent. He felt that he had done his work. His essay "What Is the People?", reprinted in the *Political Essays*, had already appeared in the *Yellow Dwarf* in October, 1817, and in the *Champion* in March, 1818. The reaction to Peterloo showed that the spirit of popular revolt against the tyrannies of government was now again in the air. Hazlitt returned to his literary criticism and to the exposition of liberty and freedom in art.

In his "Preface" (in a part not reprinted here), Hazlitt wrote: "I am no politician and still less of a party-man; but I have a hatred of tyranny, and a contempt for its tools, and this feeling I have expressed as often and as strongly as I could . . ." This temper continued to characterize the remaining work of his life. He lived to see the publication of his four-volume *Life of Napoleon*, and the downfall of the Bourbons in the July Revolution of 1830, a revolution which he and his friend Stendhal had both so clearly foreseen. He died at the age of 52, as did his hero, Bonaparte.



POLITICAL ESSAYS

PREFACE

THIS WAS ONCE a free, a proud, and happy country, when under a constitutional monarchy and a Whig king, it had just broken the chains of tyranny

that were prepared for it, and successfully set at defiance the menaces of an hereditary pretender; when the monarch still felt what he owed to himself and the people, and in the opposite claims which were set up to it, saw the real tenure on which he held his crown; when civil and religious liberty were the watch-words by which good men and true subjects were known to one another, not by the cant of legitimacy; when the reigning sovereign stood between you and the polluted touch of a bigot and a despot who stood ready to seize upon you and yours as his lawful prey; when liberty and loyalty went hand in hand, and the Tory principles of passive obedience and non-resistance were more unfashionable at court than in the country; when to uphold the authority of the throne, it was not thought necessary to undermine the privileges or break the spirit of the nation; when an Englishman felt that his name was another name for independence, "the envy of less happier lands," when it was his pride to be born, and his wish that other nations might become free; before a sophist and an apostate had dared to tell him that he had no share, no merit, no free agency, in the glorious Revolution of 1688, and that he was bound to lend a helping hand to crush all others, that implied a right in the people to chuse their own form of government; before he was become sworn brother to the Pope, familiar to the Holy Inquisition, an encourager of the massacres of his Protestant brethren, a patron of the Bourbons, and jailor to the liberties of mankind! Ah, John Bull! John Bull! thou art not what thou wert in the days of thy friend, Arbuthnot! Thou wert an honest fellow then: now thou art turned bully and coward.

This is the only politics I know; the only patriotism I feel. The question with me is, whether I and all mankind are born slaves or free. . . . The plague-spot has not tainted me quite; I am not leprous all over, the lie of Legitimacy does not fix its mortal sting in my inmost soul, nor, like an ugly spider, entangle me in its slimy folds; but is kept off from me, and broods on its own poison. He who did this for me, and for the rest of the world, and who alone could do it, was Buonaparte. He withstood the inroads of this new Jaggernaut, this foul Blatant Beast, as it strode forward to its prey over the bodies and minds of a whole people, and put a ring in its nostrils, breathing flame and blood, and led it in triumph, and played with its crowns and sceptres, and wore them in its stead, and tamed its crested pride, and made it a laughing-stock and a mockery to the nations. He, one man, did this, and as long as he did this (how, or for what end, is nothing to the magnitude of this mighty question), he saved the human race from the last ignominy, and that foul stain that had so long been intended, and was at last, in an evil hour and by evil hands, inflicted on it. He put his foot upon the neck of kings, who would have put their yoke upon the necks of the people: he

scattered before him with fiery execution, millions of hired slaves, who came at the bidding of their masters to deny the right of others to be free. The monument of greatness and of glory he erected, was raised on ground forfeited again and again to humanity—it reared its majestic front on the ruins of the shattered hopes and broken faith of the common enemies of mankind. If he could not secure the freedom, peace, and happiness of his country, he made her a terror to those who by sowing civil dissension and exciting foreign wars, would not let her enjoy those blessings. They who had trampled upon Liberty could not at least triumph in her shame and her despair, but themselves became objects of pity and derision. . . . I never joined the vile and treacherous cry of spurious humanity in favour of those who have from the beginning of time, and will to the end of it, make a butt of humanity, and its distresses their sport. I knew that shameful was this new alliance between kings and people; fatal this pretended league: that “never can true reconciliation grow where wounds of deadly hate have pierced so deep.” I was right in this respect. I knew my friends from my foes. So did Lord Castlereagh: so did not Benjamin Constant. Did any of the Princes of Europe ever regard Buonaparte as anything more than the child and champion of Jacobinism? Why then should I: for on that point I bow to their judgments as infallible. Passion speaks truer than reason. If Buonaparte was a conqueror, he conquered the grand conspiracy of kings against the abstract right of the human race to be free; and I, as a man, could not be indifferent which side to take. If he was ambitious, his greatness was not founded on the unconditional, avowed surrender of the rights of human nature. But with him, the state of man rose exalted too. If he was arbitrary and a tyrant, first, France as a country was in a state of military blockade, on garrison-duty, and not to be defended by mere paper bullets of the brain; secondly, but chief, he was not, nor he could not become, a tyrant by right divine. Tyranny in him was not sacred: it was not eternal: it was not instinctively bound in league of amity with other tyrannies; it was not sanctioned by all the laws of religion and morality. There was an end of it with the individual: there was an end of it with the temporary causes, which gave it birth and of which it was only the too necessary reaction. But there are persons of that low and inordinate appetite for servility, that they cannot be satisfied with any thing short of that sort of tyranny that has lasted for ever, and is likely to last for ever; that is strengthened and made desperate by the superstitions and prejudices of ages; that is enshrined in traditions, in laws, in usages, in the outward symbols of power, in the very idioms of language; that has struck its roots into the human heart, and clung round the human understanding like a nightshade; that overawes the imagination, and disarms the will to resist it, by the very

enormity of the evil; that is cemented with gold and blood; guarded by reverence, guarded by power; linked in endless succession to the principle by which life is transmitted to the generations of tyrants and slaves, and destroying liberty with the first breath of life; that is absolute, unceasing, unerring, fatal, unutterable, abominable, monstrous. These true devotees of superstition and despotism cried out Liberty and Humanity in their desperate phrenzy at Buonaparte's sudden elevation and incredible successes against their favourite idol, "that Harlot old, the same that is, that was, and is to be," but we have heard no more of their triumph of Liberty and their *douce humanité*, since they clapped down the hatches upon us again, like wretches in a slave-ship who have had their chains struck off and pardon promised them to fight the common enemy; and the poor Reformers who were taken in to join the cry, because they are as fastidious in their love of liberty as their opponents are inveterate in their devotion to despotism, continue in vain to reproach them with their temporary professions, woeful grimaces, and vows made in pain, which ease has recanted; but to these reproaches the legitimate professors of Liberty and Humanity do not even deign to return the answer of a smile at their credulity and folly. Those who did not see this result at the time were, I think, weak; those who do not acknowledge it now are, I am sure, hypocrites.—To this pass have we been brought by the joint endeavours of Tories, Whigs, and Reformers. . . .

WHAT IS THE PEOPLE?

And who are you that ask the question? One of the people. And yet you would be something! Then you would not have the People nothing. For what is the People? Millions of men, like you, with hearts beating in their bosoms, with thoughts stirring in their minds, with the blood circulating in their veins, with wants and appetites, and passions and anxious cares, and busy purposes and affections for others and a respect for themselves, and a desire of happiness, and a right to freedom, and a will to be free. And yet you would tear out this mighty heart of a nation, and lay it bare and bleeding at the foot of despotism: you would slay the mind of a country to fill up the dreary aching void with the old, obscene, drivelling prejudices of superstition and tyranny: you would tread out the eye of Liberty (the light of nations) like "a vile jelly," that mankind may be led about darkling to its endless drudgery, like the Hebrew Sampson (shorn of his strength and blind), by his insulting taskmasters: you would make the throne every thing, and the people nothing, to be yourself less than nothing, a very slave, a reptile, a creeping, cringing sycophant, a court favourite, a pander to Legitimacy—that detestable fiction, which would make you and me and all

mankind its slaves or victims; which would, of right and with all the sanctions of religion and morality, sacrifice the lives of millions to the least of its caprices; which subjects the rights, the happiness, and liberty of nations, to the will of some of the lowest of the species; which rears its bloated hideous form to brave the will of a whole people; that claims mankind as its property, and allows human nature to exist only upon sufferance; that haunts the understanding like a frightful spectre, and oppresses the very air with a weight that is not to be borne; that like a witch's spell covers the earth with a dim and envious mist, and makes us turn our eyes from the light of heaven, which we have no right to look at without its leave: robs us of "the unbought grace of life," the pure delight and conscious pride in works of art or nature; leaves us no thought or feeling that we dare call our own; makes genius its lacquey, and virtue its easy prey; sports with human happiness, and mocks at human misery; suspends the breath of liberty, and almost of life; exenterates us of our affections, blinds our understandings, debases our imaginations, converts the very hope of emancipation from its yoke into sacrilege, binds the successive countless generations of men together in its chains like a string of felons or galley-slaves, lest they should "resemble the flies of a summer," considers any remission of its absolute claims as a gracious boon, an act of royal clemency and favour, and confounds all sense of justice, reason, truth, liberty, humanity, in one low servile deathlike dread of power without limit and without remorse!

Such is the old doctrine of Divine Right, new-vamped up under the style and title of Legitimacy. "Fine word, Legitimate!" We wonder where our English politicians picked it up. Is it an echo from the tomb of the martyred monarch, Charles the First? Or was it the last word which his son, James the Second, left behind him in his flight, and bequeathed with his *abdication*, to his legitimate successors? It is not written in our annals in the years 1688, in 1715, or 1745. It was not sterling then, which was only fifteen years before his present Majesty's accession to the throne. Has it become so since? . . .

When the English Parliament insisted on its right of taxing the Americans without their consent, it was not from an apprehension that the Americans would, by being left to themselves, lay such heavy duties on their own produce and manufactures, as would afflict the generosity of the mother-country, and put the mild paternal sentiments of Lord North to the blush. If any future King of England should keep a wistful eye on the map of that country, it would rather be to hang it up as a trophy of legitimacy, and to "punish the last successful example of a democratic rebellion," than from any yearnings of fatherly goodwill to the American people, or from finding his "large heart" and capacity for good government, "confined in too narrow room" in the united kingdoms of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover. If

Ferdinand VII refuses the South American patriots leave to plant the olive or the vine, throughout that vast continent, it is his pride, not his humanity, that steels his royal resolution. . . .

Mr. Burke contemptuously defines the people to be "any faction that at the time can get the power of the sword into its hands." No: that may be a description of the Government, but it is not of the people. The people is the hand, heart, and head of the whole community acting to one purpose, and with a mutual and thorough consent. The hand of the people so employed to execute what the heart feels, and the head thinks, must be employed more beneficially for the cause of the people, than in executing any measures which the cold hearts, and contriving heads of any faction, with distinct privileges and interests, may dictate to betray their cause. The will of the people necessarily tends to the general good as its end; and it must attain that end, and can only attain it, in proportion as it is guided—First, by popular feeling, as arising out of the immediate wants and wishes of the great mass of the people,—secondly, by public opinion, as arising out of the impartial reason and enlightened intellect of the community. What is it that determines the opinion of any number of persons in things they actually feel in their practical and home results? Their common interest. What is it that determines their opinion in things of general inquiry, beyond their immediate experience or interest? Abstract reason. In matters of feeling and common sense, of which each individual is the best judge, the majority are in the right; in things requiring a greater strength of mind to comprehend them, the greatest power of understanding will prevail, if it has but fair play. These two, taken together, as the test of the practical measures or general principles of Government, must be right, cannot be wrong. It is an absurdity to suppose that there can be any better criterion of national grievances, or the proper remedies for them, than the aggregate amount of the actual, dear-bought experience, the honest feelings, and heart-felt wishes of a whole people, informed and directed by the greatest power of understanding in the community, unbiassed by any sinister motive. Any other standard of public good or ill must, in proportion as it deviates from this, be vitiated in principle, and fatal in its effects. *Vox populi vox Dei*,¹ is the rule of all good Government: for in that voice, truly collected and freely expressed (not when it is made the servile echo of a corrupt Court, or a designing Minister), we have all the sincerity and all the wisdom of the community. . . .

All the objections, indeed, to the voice of the people being the best rule for Government to attend to, arise from the stops and impediments to the expression of that voice, from the attempts to stifle or to give it a false bias,

¹ [*The voice of the people is the voice of God.*]

and to cut off its free and open communication with the head and heart of the people—by the Government itself. The sincere expression of the feelings of the people must be true; the full and free development of the public opinion must lead to truth, to the gradual discovery and diffusion of knowledge in this, as in all other departments of human inquiry. It is the interest of Governments in general to keep the people in a state of vassalage as long as they can—to prevent the expression of their sentiments, and the exercise and improvement of their understandings, by all the means in their power. They have a patent, and a monopoly, which they do not like to have looked into or to share with others. The argument for keeping the people in a state of lasting wardship, or for treating them as lunatics, incapable of self-government, wears a very suspicious aspect, as it comes from those who are trustees to the estate, or keepers of insane asylums. The long minority of the people would, at this rate, never expire, while those who had an interest had also the power to prevent them from arriving at years of discretion: their government-keepers have nothing to do but to drive the people mad by ill-treatment, and to keep them so by worse, in order to retain the pretence for applying the gag, the strait waistcoat, and the whip as long as they please. It is like the dispute between Mr. Epps, the angry shopkeeper in the Strand, and his journeyman, whom he would restrict from setting up for himself. Shall we never serve out our apprenticeship to liberty? Must our indentures to slavery bind us for life? It is well, it is perfectly well. You teach us nothing, and you will not let us learn. You deny us education, like Orlando's eldest brother, and then "styng us" in the den of legitimacy, you refuse to let us take the management of our own affairs into our own hands, or to seek our fortunes in the world ourselves. You found a right to treat us with indignity on the plea of your own neglect and injustice. You abuse a trust in order to make it perpetual. You profit of our ignorance and of your own wrong. You degrade, and then enslave us; and by enslaving, you degrade us more, to make us more and more incapable of ever escaping from your selfish, sordid yoke. There is no end of this. It is the fear of the progress of knowledge and a *Reading Public*, that has produced all the fuss and bustle and cant about Bell and Lancaster's plans, Bible and Missionary, and Auxiliary and Cheap Tract Societies, and that when it was impossible to prevent our reading something, made the Church and State so anxious to provide us with that sort of food for our stomachs, which they thought best. The Bible is an excellent book; and when it becomes the Statesman's Manual, in its precepts of charity—not of beggarly almsgiving, but of peace on earth and good will to man, the people may read nothing else. It reveals the glories of the world to come, and records the preternatural dispensations of Providence

to mankind two thousand years ago. But it does not describe the present state of Europe, or give an account of the measures of the last or of the next reign, which yet it is important the people of England should look to. . . .

The people do not rise up till they are trod down. They do not turn upon their tormentors till they are goaded to madness. They do not complain till the thumbscrews have been applied, and have been strained to the last turn. Nothing can ever wean the affections or confidence of a people from a Government (to which habit, prejudice, natural pride, perhaps old benefits and joint struggles for liberty have attached them) but an excessive degree of irritation and disgust, occasioned either by a sudden and violent stretch of power, contrary to the spirit and forms of the established Government, or by a blind and wilful adherence to old abuses and established forms, when the changes in the state of manners and opinion have rendered them as odious as they are ridiculous. The Revolutions of Switzerland, the Low Countries, and of America, are examples of the former—the French Revolution of the latter: our own Revolution of 1688 was a mixture of the two. As a general rule, it might be laid down, that for every instance of national resistance to tyranny, there ought to have been hundreds, and that all those which have been attempted ought to have succeeded. . . .

The errors of the people are the crimes of Governments. They apply sharp remedies to lingering diseases, and when they get sudden power in their hands, frighten their enemies, and wound themselves with it. They rely on brute force and the fury of despair, in proportion to the treachery which surrounds them, and to the degradation, the want of general information and mutual co-operation, in which they have been kept, on purpose to prevent them from ever acting in concert, with wisdom, energy, confidence, and calmness, for the public good. The American Revolution produced no horrors, because its enemies could not succeed in sowing the seeds of terror, hatred, mutual treachery, and universal dismay in the hearts of the people. The French Revolution, under the auspices of Mr. Burke, and other friends of social order, was tolerably prolific of these horrors. But that should not be charged as the fault of the Revolution or of the people. Timely Reforms are the best preventives of violent Revolutions. If Governments are determined that the people shall have no redress, no remedies for their acknowledged grievances, but violent and desperate ones, they may thank themselves for the obvious consequences. . . . Mr. Burke, in regretting these old institutions as the result of the wisdom of ages, and not the remains of Gothic ignorance and barbarism, played the part of *Crockery*, in the farce of *Exit by Mistake*, who sheds tears of affection over the loss of the old windows and buttresses of the houses that no longer jut out to meet one another, and stop up the way.

JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE

LIKE HIS OWN *Faust*, Goethe (1749–1832), through the extraordinary fullness of his life and the universality of his mind, has always been an outstanding symbol of romanticism. He gives us, says George Santayana, “the turbid flux of sense, the cry of the heart, the first tentative notions of art or science which magic or shrewdness might hit upon.” His largeness made his outlook essentially cosmopolitan, as different from the positive world-views of German romanticists like Fichte and Hegel as it is similar to their impatience with the Enlightenment.

After producing, while still quite young, lyrics and prose narratives that marked an epoch in German literature, Goethe gave himself over for some years to the study of art, philosophy, and science. In his mind met all the great currents of ancient and modern thought—eighteenth century scepticism, Greek epicureanism, medieval and modern mysticism, natural science. For a time even his unusually strong temperament was swamped with conflicting doctrines, and he emerged with a deep distrust of systems. What he found in Spinoza was the notion of an infinite Nature, which man’s mind cannot exhaust, but which man’s will drives him to investigate in order to achieve the calm and peace of natural knowledge.

As a poet, Goethe was not only a thinker and moralist but—like Wordsworth and Hugo—a great visualizer, an observer and recorder of factual detail. This propensity, combined with his philosophic inclination, serves to explain why his scientific work was done in the fields of botany, comparative anatomy, and optics. His theory of color, to which he attached the utmost importance, contains some interesting observations but is in the main discredited. His discovery of the inter-maxillary bone in man was, however, a real contribution to anatomy, as was his insistence on the vertebral origin of the skull. This last idea reflects his ever-present and characteristically romantic sense of the constant transformation of things. He successfully applied the concept of becoming, development, and evolution of forms to plants. With his recorded researches and experiments went jottings, essays, and introductory remarks on the nature of science and the meaning of organic life. An excerpt from the *Fragments on Natural Science* is a good illustration of the half-poetical, half-philosophical character of some of Goethe’s speculation:

“Nature! We are embraced and enclsd by her—powerless to leave her bonds, powerless to go deeper into her realm. Unasked and unwarned, we are seized and thrown into the whirl of her dance. . . . She seems to have no other goal but Individuality, and yet individuals are nothing to her. She builds continually and destroys continually, and her workshop is inaccessible. . . . She is the only artist, creating all from the simplest bit of matter to the most complex forms, without sign of effort reaching the greatest perfection. . . . She is playing a comedy; but whether she herself sees it, we do not know, and yet she plays it for us who are standing in the corner. . . . She is, however, fixed: her steps are measured, her exceptions rare, her laws immutable.”

It has often been said of Goethe that his life, rich in the fundamental human experiences of friendship and love, statesmanship, art, and thought, is his greatest work. Throughout all of his life Goethe strove to achieve a balance between the romantic impulse toward passionate experience and the claims of order. This is apparent in his persistent preoccupation with the power of unconscious, so-called "daemonic" forces in the life of the artist and the actions of men. This concern with the subrational springs in human conduct reappears in subsequent thinkers, notably in Freud. The following selections, from books that exhibit the interplay of his living and thinking, are from the autobiography *Poetry and Truth* (translated from the German by Minna Steele Smith; London, George Bell and Sons, 1908); and from Johann Peter Eckermann's *Conversations with Goethe* (translated from the German by John Oxenford, 1850). The former work was published between 1811 and 1833, the latter in 1836 and 1848.



POETRY AND TRUTH

. . . VOLTAIRE, the wonder of his time, had grown old, along with the literature of which, for nearly a century, he had been the animating and ruling spirit. By his side there still existed many *littérateurs*, vegetating in a more or less active and happy old age, and then disappearing in their turn one by one. The influence of society upon authors increased more and more; for the best society, consisting of persons of birth, rank, and property, chose literature as one of their chief recreations, making it entirely social and genteel in tone. Persons of rank and literary men mutually cultivated and of necessity mutually perverted one another; for the genteel is naturally exclusive; that is what French criticism became, negative, detracting, and fault-finding. The upper classes applied this kind of criticism to authors; the authors, with somewhat less decorum, used the same procedure towards each other, and even towards their patrons. If the public was not to be awed, they endeavoured to take it by surprise, or to persuade it by humility; and thus—apart from the movements which shook church and state to their inmost core—there arose such a literary ferment, that Voltaire himself had to strain to the utmost all the resources of his activity, and of his literary dictatorship, to keep himself afloat above the torrent of universal censure. As it was, he was openly called an old self-willed child; his indefatigable endeavours were regarded as the vain efforts of decrepit age; those principles, for which he had stood all his life, and to the spread of which he had devoted his days, were no longer held in honour or esteem: nay, that very Deity he acknowledged, and so continued to declare himself free from atheism, was discredited; and thus he

himself, the venerable patriarch, was forced, like his youngest competitor, to watch the present moment, to sue for fresh favours—to show too much love to his friends, too much hate to his enemies; and under the appearance of a passionate striving after truth, to act deceitfully and falsely. Was it worth while to have led such a great and active life, if it was to end in greater dependence than it had begun? His high spirit, his delicate sensitiveness, felt only too keenly the galling nature of such a position. He often relieved himself by swift onslaughts, gave the reins to his humour, and exceeded all bounds,—at which both friends and enemies showed themselves indignant; for everyone thought himself capable of gauging him, though none could equal him. A public which hears only the judgment of old men, becomes over-wise too soon; and nothing is more unsatisfactory than a mature judgment adopted by an immature mind.

We young men, with our German love of truth and nature, considered honesty towards ourselves and others as the best guide in life and art; hence Voltaire's factious dishonesty and his consonant perversion of noble subjects became more and more distasteful to us, and our aversion to him grew daily. He seemed never to have done with degrading religion and the Holy Scriptures on which it rests, for the sake of injuring priestcraft, as they called it, and had thereby awakened in me feelings of irritation. But when I now learned that, to weaken the tradition of a deluge, he had denied the existence of all fossilized shells, and admitted them only as *lusus naturæ*,¹ he entirely lost my confidence; for my own eyes had shown me on the Bastberg, plainly enough, that I stood on what had been the floor of an ancient sea, among the *exuvie*² of its original inhabitants. These mountains had certainly been once covered with waves, whether before or during the deluge did not concern me; it was enough that the valley of the Rhine had been one vast lake, a bay extending further than eye could see; no amount of talk could shake me in this conviction. I hoped, rather, to extend my knowledge of lands and mountains, let the result be what it would. . . .

What I have here tried to state connectedly and in a few words was, at the time I speak of, the cry of the moment, a perpetual discord in our ears, unconnected and uninformative. Nothing was heard but the praise of those who had gone before. The demand was continually for something good and new; yet the newest never found favour. . . .

If we heard the encyclopedists mentioned, or opened a volume of their colossal work, we felt as if we were moving amidst the innumerable whirling spools and looms of a great factory, where, what with the mere creaking and rattling—what with all the mechanism, bewildering both to eyes and brain

¹ [*A joke on Nature's part.*]

² [*Remains.*]

—what with the mere impossibility of understanding how the various parts fit in and work with one another—what with the contemplation of all that is necessary to prepare a single piece of cloth, we felt disgusted with the very coat we wore upon our backs.

Diderot was sufficiently akin to us, as, indeed, in all the points for which the French blame him, he is a true German. But even his point of view was too lofty, his range of vision too wide for us to be able to rise to his height and place ourselves at his side. Yet the children of nature he continued to produce and to ennoble by his great rhetorical art delighted us: we were enchanted with his brave poachers and smugglers; and this rabble thrived later only too well on the German Parnassus. He, too, like Rousseau, by diffusing a disgust of social life, unobtrusively paved the way for those monstrous world-wide changes, in which all that had hitherto existed seemed to be swallowed up.

However, we should now put aside these considerations, and observe what influence these two men have had upon art. Here, too, they pointed to nature and urged us to turn from art and follow her.

The highest problem of all art is to produce by illusion the semblance of a higher reality. But it is a false endeavour to push the realization of the illusion so far that at last only a commonplace reality remains. . . .

We had neither desire nor inclination to be enlightened or advanced by the aid of philosophy; on religious subjects we thought we had sufficiently enlightened ourselves, and therefore looked on with comparative indifference at the violent contest between the French philosophers and the priesthood. Prohibited books condemned to the flames, of which so much was heard at the time, produced no effect upon us. I mention as a typical instance, the *Système de la Nature* [of Holbach] which we looked into out of curiosity. We did not understand how such a book could be dangerous. It seemed to us so gloomy, so Cimmerian, so deathlike, that we found it difficult to endure its presence, and shuddered at it as at a spectre. The author fancies he is giving his book a great recommendation, when he declares in his preface, that as a decrepit old man, just sinking into the grave, he is anxious to announce the truth to his contemporaries and to posterity.

We laughed at him; for we thought we had observed that old people are incapable of appreciating whatever is good and loveable in the world. "Old churches have dark windows.—To know how cherries and berries taste, we must ask children and sparrows." These were our gibes and maxims; and so that book, as the very quintessence of senility, seemed to us insipid, or even offensive. "All had of necessity to be," so said the book, "and therefore there was no God." But could not God also exist of necessity? we asked. We did indeed admit, at the same time, that we could not escape from the necessities of day and

night, the seasons, the influence of climate, and from physical and animal conditions; but nevertheless we felt within us something that seemed like perfect freedom of will, and again something which sought to counterbalance this freedom.

We could not give up the hope of becoming more and more rational, of making ourselves more and more independent of external things, and even of ourselves. The word freedom has so fair a sound, that we cannot dispense with it, even though it designates an error.

None of us had read the book through; for it had disappointed the expectation with which we opened it. It had announced a system of nature; and we had, therefore, hoped really to learn something of nature—of this idol of ours. Physics and chemistry, descriptions of heaven and earth, natural history and anatomy, with much besides, had now for years, and up to this very moment, constantly pointed us to the great world and its wealth of beauty; and we would fain have heard more, both in particular and in general, of suns and stars, planets and moons, mountains, valleys, rivers and seas, with all that live and move in them. That in the course of such an exposition much must occur which would appear to the common man as pernicious, to the clergy as dangerous, and to the state as inadmissible, we had no doubt; and we hoped that the small volume had not unworthily undergone the fiery ordeal. But how hollow and empty did we feel this melancholy, atheistic half-night to be, where earth vanished with all its creatures, heaven with all its stars. Matter was supposed to have existed and to have been in motion from all eternity, and to this motion, to right and to left and in every direction, were attributed the infinite phenomena of existence. We might have allowed even so much to pass, if the author, out of his matter in motion, had really built up the world before our eyes. But he seemed to know as little about nature as we did; for, after simply propounding some general ideas, he forthwith disregards them in order to change what seems above nature, or a higher nature within nature, into matter with weight and motion but without aim or shape—and by this he fancies he has gained much.

If this book did us any harm at all, it was in giving us a hearty and lasting dislike to all philosophy, and especially to metaphysics; while, on the other hand, we threw ourselves into living knowledge, experience, action, and poetry, with all the more zeal and ardour.

Thus, on the very borders of France, we had at one blow got rid of everything French about us. The French way of life was too definite and too genteel for us, their poetry cold, their criticism annihilating, their philosophy abstruse, and yet unsatisfying. . . .

In the course of this biography we have shown in detail how the child, the boy, the youth, sought by various ways to approach the supernatural; first, looking with strong inclination to a religion of nature; then, clinging with love to a positive one; and, finally, concentrating himself in the trial of his own powers and joyfully giving himself up to a general faith. Whilst he wandered to and fro, seeking and looking about him, in the intervals which lay between these several phases, he met with much that would not fit into any of them, and he seemed to realize more and more clearly the desirability of turning his thoughts away from the immense and incomprehensible.

He thought he could detect in nature—both animate and inanimate, with soul and without soul—something which manifested itself only in contradictions, and which, therefore, could not be comprehended under any idea, still less under one word. It was not godlike, for it seemed without reason; nor human, for it had no understanding; nor devilish, for it was beneficent; nor angelic, for it often betrayed a malicious pleasure. It resembled chance, for it evinced no succession; it was like Providence, for it hinted at connection. It seemed to penetrate all that limits us; it seemed to deal arbitrarily with the necessary elements of our existence; it contracted time and expanded space. In the impossible alone did it appear to find pleasure, while it rejected the possible with contempt.

To this principle, which seemed to come in between all other principles and separate them, and yet link them together, I gave the name of Daemonic, after the example of the ancients and others with similar experiences. I sought to escape from this terrible principle, by taking refuge, according to my wont, in a creation of the imagination.

Among the parts of history which I had particularly studied, were the events that made the countries which subsequently became the United Netherlands so famous. I had diligently examined the original sources, and had endeavoured, as far as possible, to get my facts at first hand, and to bring the whole period vividly before me. The situations it presented appeared to me to be in the highest degree dramatic, while Count Egmont, whose greatness as a man and a hero most captivated me, seemed to me a suitable central figure round whom the others might be grouped with happiest effect.

But for my purpose it was necessary to convert him into a character marked by such peculiarities as would grace a youth better than a man in years, and an unmarried man better than the father of a family; a man leading an independent life, rather than one, who, however free in thought, is nevertheless restrained by the various relations of life.

Having then, in my conception of Egmont's character, made him youthful,

and freed him from all fettering restraints, I gave him unlimited love of life, boundless self-reliance, a gift of attracting all men, enabling him to win the favour of the people, the unspoken attachment of a princess, the avowed passion of a child of nature, the sympathy of a shrewd politician, and even the loving admiration of the son of his greatest adversary.

The personal courage which distinguishes the hero is the foundation upon which his whole character rests, the ground whence it springs. He knows no danger, and is blind to the greatest peril when it confronts him. When surrounded by enemies, we may, at need, cut our way through them; the meshes of state policy are harder to break. The Daemonic element, which plays a part on both sides, in conflict with which what is loveable falls while what is hated triumphs; further the prospect that out of this conflict will spring a third element, and fulfil the wishes of all men;—this perhaps is what has gained for the piece (not, indeed, on its first appearance, but later and in due time), the favour which it still enjoys. Here, therefore, for the sake of many dear readers, I will forestall myself, and as I do not know when I shall have another opportunity, will express a conviction, which did not become clear to me till a later date.

Although this Daemonic element manifests itself in all corporeal and incorporeal things, and even expresses itself most distinctly in animals, yet it is primarily in its relation to man that we observe its mysterious workings, which represent a force, if not antagonistic to the moral order, yet running counter to it, so that the one may be regarded as the warp, and the other as the woof.

For the phenomena which result there are innumerable names; for all philosophies and religions have sought in prose and poetry to solve this enigma and to read once for all the riddle; and may they still continue to seek.

But the most fearful manifestation of the Daemonic is when it is seen predominating in some individual character. During my life I have observed several instances, either closely or at a distance. Such persons are not always the most eminent men, either in intellect or special gifts, and they are seldom distinguished by goodness of heart; a tremendous energy seems to emanate from them, and they exercise a wonderful power over all creatures, and even over the elements; and, indeed, who shall say how much further such influence may extend? All the moral powers combined are of no avail against them; in vain does the more enlightened portion of mankind attempt to throw suspicion upon them as dupes or as deceivers—the masses are attracted by them. Seldom if ever do they find their equals among their contemporaries; nothing can vanquish them but the universe itself, with which they have begun the fray.

GOETHE

CONVERSATIONS WITH ECKERMANN

March 2, 1831

I dined with Goethe to-day; and, the conversation soon turning again on the Daemonic, he added remarks to define it more closely.

"The Daemonic is that which cannot be explained by Reason or Understanding; it lies not in my nature, but I am subject to it."

"Napoleon," said I, "seems to have been of the daemonic sort."

"He was so, thoroughly and in the highest degree, so that scarce anyone is to be compared with him. Our late Grand Duke, too, was a daemonic nature, full of unlimited power of action and unrest; so that his own dominion was too little for him, and the greatest would have been too little. Daemonic beings of such sort the Greeks reckoned among their demigods."

"Is not the Daemonic," said I, "perceptible in events also?"

"Particularly, and indeed in all that we cannot explain by Reason and Understanding. It manifests itself in the most varied manner throughout nature—in the invisible as in the visible. Many creatures are of a purely daemonic kind; in many, parts of it are effective."

"Has not Mephistopheles," said I, "daemonic traits, too?"

"No, Mephistopheles is much too negative a being. The Daemonic manifests itself in a thoroughly active power. Among artists it is found more among musicians—less among painters. In Paganini, it shows itself in a high degree; and it is thus he produces such great effects." . . .

March 8, 1831

"In poetry," said Goethe, "especially in what is unconscious, before which reason and understanding fall short, and which therefore produces effects far surpassing all conception, there is always something daemonic.

"So it is with music, in the highest degree; for it stands so high that no understanding can reach it, and an influence flows from it which masters all, and for which none can account. Hence, religious worship cannot dispense with it; it is one of the chief means of working upon men miraculously. Thus the Daemonic loves to throw itself into significant individuals, especially when they are in high places, like Frederick and Peter the Great.

"Our late Grand Duke had it to such a degree, that nobody could resist him. He had an attractive influence upon men by his mere tranquil presence, without needing even to show himself good-humoured and friendly. All that I undertook by his advice succeeded; so that, in cases where my own understanding and reason were insufficient, I needed only to ask him what

was to be done; he gave me an answer instinctively, and I could always be sure of happy results.

"He would have been enviable indeed if he could have possessed himself of my ideas and higher strivings; for when the daemonic spirit forsook him, and only the human was left, he knew not how to set to work, and was much troubled at it.

"In Byron, also, this element was probably active in a high degree; so that he possessed great powers of attraction, and women especially could not resist him."

"Into the idea of the Divine," said I, by way of experiment, "this active power which we name the Daemonic would not seem to enter."

"My good friend," said Goethe, "what do we know of the idea of the Divine? and what can our narrow ideas tell of the Highest Being? Should I, like a Turk, name it with a hundred names, I should still fall short, and, in comparison with such boundless attributes, have said nothing." . . .

March, 1832

We talked of the tragic idea of Destiny among the Greeks.

"It no longer suits our way of thinking," said Goethe; "it is obsolete, and is also in contradiction with our religious views. If a modern poet introduces such antique ideas into a drama, it always has an air of affectation. It is a costume long since out of fashion; which, like the Roman toga, no longer suits us.

"It is better for us moderns to say with Napoleon, 'Politics are Destiny.' But let us beware of saying, with our latest *litterati*, that politics are poetry, or a suitable subject for the poet. The English poet Thomson wrote a very good poem on the Seasons, but a very bad one on Liberty; and that not from want of poetry in the poet, but from want of poetry in the subject.

"If a poet would work politically, he must give himself up to a party; and so soon as he does that, he is lost as a poet—he must bid farewell to his free spirit, his unbiased view, and draw over his ears the cap of bigotry and blind hatred.

"The poet, as a man and citizen, will love his native land; but the native land of his *poetic* powers and poetic action is the good, noble, and beautiful, which is confined to no particular province or country, and which he seizes upon and forms wherever he finds it. Therein is he like the eagle, which hovers with free gaze over whole countries, and to whom it is of no consequence whether the hare on which he pounces is running in Prussia or in Saxony.

"And, then, what is meant by love of one's country? what is meant by

patriotic deeds? If the poet has employed a life in battling with pernicious prejudices, in setting aside narrow views, in enlightening the minds, purifying the tastes, ennobling the feelings and thoughts of his countrymen, what better could he have done? how could he have acted more patriotically?

"To make such ungrateful and unsuitable demands upon a poet is just as if we required the captain of a regiment to show himself a patriot by taking part in political innovations and thus neglecting his proper calling. The captain's country is his regiment; and he will show himself an excellent patriot by troubling himself about political matters only so far as they concern him, and bestowing all his mind and all his care on the battalions under him, trying so to train and discipline them that they may do their duty if ever their native land should be in peril.

"I hate all bungling like sin; but, most of all, bungling in state affairs, which produces nothing but mischief to thousands and millions.

"You know that, on the whole, I care little what is written about me; but yet it comes to my ears, and I know well enough that, hard as I have toiled all my life, all my labours are as nothing in the eyes of certain people, just because I have disdained to mingle in political parties. To please such people I must have become a member of a Jacobin club, and preached bloodshed and murder. However, not a word more upon this wretched subject, lest I become unwise in railing against folly."

In the same manner he blamed the political course, so much praised by others, of Uhland.

"Mind," said he, "the politician will devour the poet. To be a member of the States, and to live amid daily jostlings and excitements, is not for the delicate nature of a poet. His song will cease, and that is in some sort to be lamented. Swabia has plenty of men, sufficiently well educated, well meaning, able, and eloquent, to be members of the States; but only one poet of Uhland's class."

FRANÇOIS-RENÉ DE CHATEAUBRIAND

IF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY and the French Revolution saw a lessening of respect for the Middle Ages and of belief in Catholicism among many of the educated, one aspect of nineteenth-century romanticism was a renewed appreciation of medieval culture and the Catholic faith. Among the leading contributors to this development was François-René de Chateaubriand (1768–1848), a French noble who fled the Revolution, returned under Napoleon, and served the restored Bourbon monarchy as ambassador and foreign minister.

Chateaubriand's greatest influence was as a novelist and critic. His *Génie du Christianisme*¹ (1802), a defense of the Catholic religion against the attacks to which it had been subjected by the rationalist writers of the eighteenth century, was one of the great events in the development of romantic literature. His appeal was not based upon scholastic philosophy, but was directed to a human soul seeking for an environment within which it could find true expression and true beauty. The interest in and adulation of nature of the eighteenth-century rationalists found a new and different expression in Chateaubriand; it was not nature as a mechanical system, but as a thing of beauty and a work of God, that he saw.

Two episodes of the *Génie du Christianisme*, stories of love and religious experience, *Atala* and *René*, were famous and influential apart from the major work for which Chateaubriand had written them. They dealt with a theme destined to be one of the main preoccupations of the romantics, the struggle of the individual human for love and his search for a spiritual milieu within which to express it.

The following selection from Chateaubriand's *Mémoires d'outre tombe*² (1849–50) was originally written in 1836–37 and revised in 1846. The translation is by A. T. de Mattos (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1902).



MEMOIRS

WHAT HOPE could I have, I with no name and no extollers, of destroying the influence of Voltaire, which had prevailed for more than half a century, of Voltaire, who had raised the huge edifice completed by the Encyclopaedists and consolidated by all the famous men in Europe? What! were the Diderots, the d'Alemberts, the Duclos, the Dupuis, the Helvétius, the Condorcets minds that carried no authority? What! was the world to return to the Golden Legend, to renounce the admiration it had acquired for masterpieces of science and reason? How could I ever win a case which Rome armed with its

¹ *Genius of Christianity.*

² *Memoirs from beyond the tomb.*

thunders, the clergy with its might, had been unable to save: a case defended in vain by the Archbishop of Paris, Christophe de Beaumont, supported by the decrees of the Parliament and the armed force and name of the King? Was it not as ridiculous as it was rash on the part of an unknown man to set himself against a philosophical movement so irresistible as to have produced the Revolution? It was curious to see a pygmy "toughen his little arms" to stifle the progress of a century, stop civilization, and thrust back the human race! Thank God, a word would be enough to pulverize the madman: wherefore M. Ginguené, when trouncing the *Génie du Christianisme* in the *Décade*, declared that the criticism came too late, since my tautologous production was already forgotten. He said this five or six months after the publication of a work which the attack of the whole French Academy, on the occasion of the decennial prizes, was not able to kill.

It was amid the ruins of our temples that I published the *Génie du Christianisme*. The faithful thought themselves saved: men at that time felt a need of faith, a thirsting for religious consolations, which arose from the want of those consolations experienced since long years. What supernatural strength was required to bear all the adversities undergone! How many mutilated families had to go to the Father of mankind in search of the children they had lost! How many broken hearts, how many solitary souls, were calling for a divine hand to cure them! One threw one's self into the house of God, as one enters a doctor's house on the outbreak of an infection. The victims of our disturbances (and how many different kinds of victims!) saved themselves at the altar: shipwrecked men clinging to the rock on which they seek for salvation.

Bonaparte, at that time hoping to found his power on the first basis of society, had just made arrangements with the Court of Rome: he at first raised no obstacle against the publication of a work calculated to enhance the popularity of his schemes; he had to struggle against the men about him and against the declared enemies of religion; he was glad therefore to be defended from the outside by the opinion called up by the *Génie du Christianisme*. Later, he repented him of his mistake; ideas of regular monarchy had sprung into being together with ideas of religion.

An episode in the *Génie du Christianisme*, which at the time caused less stir than *Atala*, fixed one of the characters of modern literature; but I may say that, if *René* did not exist, I should not now write it: if it were possible for me to destroy it, I would do so. A family of *Renés*, poets and prose-writers, has swarmed into being: we have heard nothing but mournful and desultory phrases; it has been a question of nothing but winds and storms, of unknown words directed to the clouds and the night. No scribbler fresh from college

but has imagined himself the unhappiest of men; no babe of sixteen but has believed himself to have exhausted life and to be tormented by his genius, but has, in the abyss of his thoughts, abandoned himself to the "wave of his passions," struck his pale and dishevelled brow. and astonished stupefied mankind with a misfortune of which he did not know the name, nor they either.

In *René* I had laid bare one of the infirmities of my century; but it was a different madness in the novelists to try to make universal such transcendental afflictions. The general sentiments which compose the basis of humanity, paternal and maternal affection, filial piety, friendship, love, are inexhaustible; but particular ways of feelings, idiosyncrasies of mind and character, cannot be spread out and multiplied over wide and numerous scenes. The small undiscovered corners of the human heart are a narrow field; there is nothing left to gather in that field after the hand which has been the first to mow it. A malady of the soul is not a permanent nor natural state: one cannot reproduce it, make a literature of it, make use of it as of a general passion constantly modified at the will of the artists who handle it and change its form.

Be that as it may, literature became tinged with the colours of my religious paintings, even as public affairs have retained the phraseology of my writings on citizenship: the *Monarchy according to the Charter* has been the rudiment of our representative government, and my article in the *Conservateur*, on "Moral Interests and Material Interests," has bequeathed those two designations to politics.

Writers did me the honour of imitating *Atala* and *René*, in the same way that the pulpit borrowed my accounts of the missions and advantages of Christianity. The passages in which I show that, by driving the pagan divinities from the woods, our broader religion has restored nature to its solitudes; the paragraphs where I discuss the influence of our religion upon our manner of seeing a painting, where I examine the changes wrought in poetry and eloquence; the chapters which I devote to inquiries into the foreign sentiments introduced into the dramatic characters of antiquity contain the germ of the new criticism. Racine's characters, as I have said, both are and are not Greek characters: they are Christian characters; that is what no one had understood.

If the effect of the *Génie du Christianisme* had been only a reaction against doctrines to which the revolutionary misfortunes were attributed, that effect would have ceased so soon as the cause was removed; it would not have been prolonged to the time at which I am writing. But the action of the *Génie du Christianisme* upon public opinion was not confined to the momentary resurrection of a religion supposed to be in its grave: a more lasting metamorphosis was operated. If the work contained innovations of style, it also contained

changes of doctrine; not only the manner, but the matter, was altered; atheism and materialism were no longer the basis of the belief or unbelief of young minds; the idea of God and of the immortality of the soul resumed its empire: whence came an alteration in the chain of ideas linked one to the other. A man was no longer riveted to his place by an antireligious prejudice; he no longer thought himself obliged to remain a mummy of annihilation, wrapped in philosophical swathing-bands; he permitted himself to examine any system, however absurd it might seem to him, *even though it were Christian*.

Besides the faithful who returned at the sound of their shepherd's voice, there were formed, by this right of free examination, other *à priori* faithful. Lay down God as a principle, and the Word will follow. The Son proceeds necessarily from the Father.

The various abstract combinations succeed only in substituting for the Christian mysteries other mysteries still more difficult of comprehension. Pantheism, which, besides, exists in three or four shapes, and which it is the fashion nowadays to ascribe to enlightened intelligences, is the absurdest of Eastern dreams brought back to light by Spinoza. One has but to read the article by the sceptic Bayle on that Jew of Amsterdam. The positive tone in which certain people speak of all these things would be revolting, were it not that it arises from want of study; they take up words which they do not understand, and imagine themselves to be transcendental geniuses. Be assured that Abélard, that St. Bernard, that St. Thomas Aquinas and their fellows brought to bear upon the study of metaphysics a superiority of judgment which we do not approach; that the Saint-Simonian, Phalansterian, Fourieristic, Humanitarian systems were discovered and practised by the different heresies; that what is placed before us as progress and discovery is so much old lumber hawked about for fifteen centuries in the schools of Greece and the colleges of the Middle Ages. The misfortune is that the first sectaries could not succeed in founding their Neo-Platonic Republic, when Gallienus permitted Plotinus to make the experiment in Campania; later, people made the great mistake of burning the sectaries when they proposed to establish the community of goods and to pronounce prostitution holy, by urging that a woman cannot, without sin, refuse a man who asks of her a transient union in the name of Jesus Christ: all that was needed, said they, to accomplish this union was to annihilate one's soul and deposit it for a moment in the bosom of God.

The shock which the *Génie du Christianisme* gave to men's minds caused the eighteenth century to emerge from the old road and flung it for ever out of its path. People began again, or rather they began for the first time to study the sources of Christianity; on re-reading the Fathers (presuming that they had read them before) they were struck at meeting with so many curious

facts, so much philosophical science, so many beauties of style of every kind, so many ideas which, by a more or less perceptible gradation, produced the transition from ancient to modern society: an unique and memorable era of humanity, in which Heaven communicates with earth through the medium of souls set in men of genius.

Beside the crumbling world of paganism there arose, in former times, as though outside society, another world, looking on at those great spectacles, poor, retiring, secluded, taking no part in the business of life except when its lessons or its succour were needed. It was a marvellous thing to see those early bishops, almost all honoured with the name of saints and martyrs, those simple priests watching over the relics and cemeteries; those monks and hermits in their convents or in their caves, laying down laws of peace, morals, charity, when all was war, corruption, barbarism; going between the tyrants of Rome and the leaders of the Tartars and Goths, to prevent the injustice of the former and the cruelty of the latter; stopping armies with a wooden cross and a peaceful word; the weakest of men, and protecting the world against Attila; placed between two universes to be the link that joined them, to console the last moments of an expiring society and support the first steps of a society in its cradle.

It was impossible but that the truths unfolded in the *Génie du Christianisme* should contribute to a change of ideas. Again, it is to this work that the present love for the buildings of the Middle Ages is due: it is I who have called upon the young century to admire the old temples. If my opinion has been misused; if it is not true that our cathedrals approach the Parthenon in beauty; if it is false that those churches teach us unknown facts in their documents of stone; if it is madness to maintain that those granite memories reveal to us things that escaped the learned Benedictines; if by dint of eternally repeating the word Gothic people grow wearied to death of it: that is not my fault. For the rest, with respect to the arts, I know the shortcomings of the *Génie du Christianisme*; that portion of my work is faulty, because, in 1800, I was not acquainted with the arts: I had not seen Italy, nor Greece, nor Egypt. Also, I did not make sufficient use of the lives of the saints and of the legends, although they offered me a number of marvellous instances: by selecting with taste, one could there reap a plentiful harvest. This field of the wealth of mediaeval imagination surpasses the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid and the Milesian fables in fruitfulness. My work, moreover, contains some scanty or false judgments, such as that which I pronounce upon Dante, to whom I have since paid a brilliant tribute. In the serious respect, I have completed the *Génie du Christianisme* in my *Études historiques*, one of my writings that has been least spoken of and most plundered.

The success of *Atala* had delighted me, because my soul was still fresh; that of the *Génie du Christianisme* was painful to me: I was obliged to sacrifice my time to a more or less useless correspondence and to irrelevant civilities. A so-called admiration did not atone to me for the vexations that await a man whose name the crowd remembers. What good can supply the place of the peace which you have lost by admitting the public to your intimacy? Add to that the restlessness with which the Muses love to afflict those who attach themselves to their cult, the worries attendant upon a compliant character, inaptitude for fortune, loss of leisure, an uncertain temper, livelier affections, unreasonable melancholy, groundless joys: who, if he had the choice, would purchase on those conditions the uncertain advantages of a reputation which you are not sure of obtaining, which will be contested during your life, which posterity will refuse to confirm, and which your death will snatch from you for ever?

The literary controversy on innovations of style which *Atala* had aroused was renewed upon the publication of the *Génie du Christianisme*.

A characteristic feature of the imperial school, and even of the republican school, must be noted: while society advanced for better or for worse, literature remained stationary; foreign to the change of the ideas, it did not belong to its own time. In comedy, the squires of the village, the Colins, the Babets, or else the intrigues of the drawing-rooms, which were no longer known, were played, as I have already remarked, before coarse and blood-thirsty men, themselves the destroyers of the manners whose picture was presented to them; in tragedy, a plebeian pit interested itself in the families of nobles and kings.

Two things kept literature at the date of the eighteenth century: the impiety which it derived from Voltaire and the Revolution, and the despotism with which Bonaparte struck it. The head of the State found a profit in those subordinate letters which he had put in barracks, which presented arms to him, which sallied forth at the command of "Turn out, the guard!" which marched in rank, and which went through their evolutions like soldiers. Any form of independence seemed a rebellion against his power; he would no more consent to a riot of words and ideas than he suffered insurrection. He suspended the Habeas Corpus for thought as well as for individual liberty. Let us also recognise that the public, weary of anarchy, was glad to submit again to the yoke of law and order.

The literature which expresses the new era did not commence to reign until forty or fifty years after the time of which it was the idiom. During that half-century, it was employed only by the opposition. It was Madame de Staël, it was Benjamin Constant, it was Lemer cier, it was Bonald, it was

myself, in short, who were the first to speak that language. The alteration in literature of which the nineteenth century boasts came to it from the Emigration and from exile: it was M. de Fontanes who brooded on those birds of a different species from himself, because, by going back to the seventeenth century, he had gained the strength of that fertile period and lost the barrenness of the eighteenth. One portion of the human intelligence, that which treats of transcendental matters, alone advanced with an even step with civilisation; unfortunately, the glory of knowledge was not without stain: the Laplaces, the Lagranges, the Monges, the Chaptals, the Berthollets, all the prodigies, once haughty democrats, became Napoleon's most obsequious servants. Let it be said to the honour of Letters: the new literature was free, science was servile; character did not correspond with genius, and they whose thought had sped to the uppermost sky were not able to raise their souls above the feet of Bonaparte: they pretended to have no need of God, that was why they needed a tyrant.

The Napoleonic classic was the genius of the nineteenth century dressed up in the periwig of Louis XIV, or curled as in the days of Louis XV. Bonaparte had ordained that the men of the Revolution should not appear at Court save in full dress, sword at side. One saw nothing of the France of the moment; it was not order, it was discipline. Nor could anything be more tiresome than that pale resuscitation of the literature of former days. That cold copy, that unproductive anachronism, disappeared when the new literature broke in noisily with the *Génie du Christianisme*. The death of the Duc d'Enghien had for me this advantage that, by causing me to step aside, it left me free in my solitude to follow my own inspiration, and prevented me from enlisting in the regular infantry of old Pindus: I owed my moral to my intellectual liberty.

In the last chapter of the *Génie du Christianisme*, I discuss what would have become of the world if the Faith had not been preached at the time of the invasion of the Barbarians; in another paragraph, I speak of an important work to be undertaken on the changes which Christianity introduced in the laws after the conversion of Constantine.

Supposing religious opinion to exist in its present form, if the *Génie du Christianisme* were yet to be written, I would compose it quite differently: instead of recalling the benefits and the institutions of our religion in the past, I would show that Christianity is the thought of the future and of human liberty; that that redeeming and Messianic thought is the only basis of social equality; that it alone can establish the latter, because it places by the side of that equality the necessity of duty, the corrective and regulator of the democratic instinct. Legality is no sufficient restraint, because it is not perma-

ment; it derives its strength from the law: now, the law is the work of men who pass away and differ. A law is not always obligatory; it can always be changed by another law: as opposed to that, morals are constant; they have their force within themselves, because they spring from the immutable order: they alone, therefore, can ensure permanency.

I would show that, wherever Christianity has prevailed, it has changed ideas, rectified notions of justice and injustice, substituted assertion for doubt, embraced the whole of humanity in its doctrines and precepts. I would try to conjecture the distance at which we still are from the total accomplishment of the Gospel, by calculating the number of evils that have been destroyed and of improvements that have been effected in the eighteen centuries which have elapsed on this side of the Cross. Christianity acts slowly, because it acts everywhere; it does not cling to the reform of any particular society, it works upon society in general; its philanthropy is extended to all the sons of Adam: that is what it expresses with a marvellous simplicity in its commonest petitions, in its daily prayers, when it says to the crowd in the temple:

"Let us pray for every suffering thing upon earth."

What religion has ever spoken in this way? The Word was not made flesh in the man of pleasure, it became incarnate in the man of sorrow, with a view to the enfranchisement of all, to an universal brotherhood and an infinite salvation.

If the *Génie du Christianisme* had only given rise to such investigations, I should congratulate myself on having published it. It remains to be seen whether, at the time of the appearance of the book, a different *Génie du Christianisme*, raised on the new plan the outline of which I have barely indicated, would have obtained the same success. In 1803, when nothing was granted to the old religion, when it was the object of scorn, when none knew the first word of the question, would one have done well to speak of future liberty as descending from Calvary, at a time when people were still bruised from the excesses of the liberty of the passions? Would Bonaparte have suffered such a work to appear? It was perhaps useful to stimulate regrets, to interest the imagination in a cause so misjudged, to call attention to the despised object, to render it endearing before showing how serious it was, how mighty and how salutary.

Now, supposing that my name leaves some trace behind it, I shall owe this to the *Génie du Christianisme*: with no illusion as to the intrinsic value of the work, I admit that it possesses an accidental value; it came just at the right moment. For this reason it caused me to take my place in one of those historic periods which, mixing an individual with things, compel him to be remembered. If the influence of my work was not limited to the change which,

in the past forty years, it has produced among the living generations; if it still served to resuscitate among latecomers a spark of the civilizing truths of the earth; if the slight symptom of life which one seems to perceive was there sustained in the generations to come, I should depart full of hope in the divine mercy. O reconciled Christian, do not forget me in thy prayers, when I am gone; my faults, perhaps, will stop me outside those gates where my charity cried on thy behalf:

“Be ye lifted up, O eternal gates!”

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE

FICHTE (1762–1814) was the son of a ribbon weaver and received an education as a result of the patronage of a neighboring nobleman. He fell under the influence of Kant and an early work, written in 1792, *Critique of All Revelation*, sounded so much like the great philosopher's that Fichte's future was assured. On the strength of it and other writings he was summoned to the chair of philosophy at Jena in 1794.

In his *Addresses to the German Nation*, delivered to an aroused public of German intellectuals during the winter of 1807–8, after the humiliating Treaty of Tilsit, Fichte pleaded for the establishment of a national system of education as the immediate means of unifying the German people. The system of education which he championed was intended to change the character of the Germans by habituating them to love and by creating the freedom and unity of the "fatherland." Fichte argued that the Germans alone among European peoples were capable of creating an integrated free culture for Europe. He transformed the doctrines and ideals of the Enlightenment into romantic nationalism, teaching the Germans to believe that they alone could achieve "perfect" freedom and unity.

Freedom, to Fichte, is the consciousness of one's true vocation, which consists in the struggle for perfection. By identifying his will with that of a greater personality, the Nation, man can lay hold of something infinite and eternal; for a nation is a reflection of the Divine Will. Hence the importance of Fichte's emphasis (in the selections that follow) on "the devouring flame of higher patriotism, which embraces the nation as the vestures of the eternal." A nation or people is to be distinguished from a government: governments, not peoples, change and are conquered. The flavor of Fichte's romanticism emerges vividly in *The Vocation of Man*, and in almost any of its passages: "To stand, cold and unmoved, amid the current of events, a passive mirror of fugitive and passing phenomena,—this existence is insupportable to me; I scorn and detest it. I will love:—I will lose myself in sympathy;—I will know the joy and the grief of life. . . . I will rejoice when I have done right, I will grieve when I have done wrong; and even this sorrow shall be sweet to me, for it is a chord of sympathy,—a pledge of future amendment. In love only there is life; without it is death and annihilation."

The passages reprinted are from the *Addresses*, translated from the German by R. F. Jones and G. H. Turnbull (Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1922).



ADDRESSES TO THE GERMAN NATION

GERMAN CHARACTERISTICS

THE ATTEMPT at complete emancipation from all belief in external authority was the right objective of the strife raging in foreign countries, and this attempt acted as a fresh stimulus to the Germans, from whom it had first proceeded by means of the reformation of the Church. It is true that second-rate and unoriginal minds among us simply repeated this foreign doctrine—better the foreign doctrine, it seems, than the doctrine of their fellow-countrymen, though this was to be had just as easily; the reason being that they took the former to be more distinguished—and these minds tried to convince themselves about it, so far as that was possible. But where the independent German spirit was astir, the sensuous was not enough, and there arose the problem of discovering the supersensuous (which is, of course, not to be believed in on external authority) in the reason itself, and thus of creating for the first time true philosophy by making free thought the source of independent truth, as it should be. To that end Leibniz strove in his conflict with that foreign philosophy; and the end was attained by the true founder of modern German philosophy,¹ not without a confession of having been aroused to it by the utterance of a foreigner, which had, however, been taken more profoundly than it had been intended. Since that time the problem has been completely solved among us, and philosophy has been perfected. One must be content for the present with stating this as a fact, until an age comes which comprehends it. . . .

We have seen how the inhabitants of a foreign country² took up lightly, and with fervent daring, another problem of reason and philosophy for the modern world—the establishment of the perfect State. But, shortly afterwards, they abandoned this task so completely that they are compelled by their present condition to condemn the very thought of the problem as a crime, and they had to use every means to delete, if possible, those efforts from the annals of their history. The reason for this result is as clear as day; the State in accordance with reason cannot be built up by artificial measures from whatever material may be at hand; on the contrary, the nation must first be trained and educated up to it. Only the nation which has first solved in actual practice the problem of educating perfect men will then solve also the problem of the perfect State. . . .

¹ [Kant, who confessed to having been roused from his "dogmatic slumber" by Hume.]

² [The reference is to the French Revolution.]

In what has been said you have a clear conspectus of the whole history of culture in the modern world, and of the never-varying relationship of the different parts of the modern world to the world of antiquity. True religion, in the form of Christianity, was the germ of the modern world; and the task of the latter may be summed up as follows: to make this religion permeate the previous culture of antiquity and thereby to spiritualize and hallow it. The first step on this path was to rid this religion of the external respect of form which robbed it of freedom, and to introduce into it also the free-thinking of antiquity. Foreign countries provided the stimulus to this step; the German took the step. The second step, which is really the continuation and completion of the first, namely, to discover in our own selves this religion, and with it all wisdom—this, too, was prepared by foreign countries and completed by the German. The next step forward that we have to make in the plan of eternity is to educate the nation to perfect manhood. Without this, the philosophy that has been won will never be widely comprehended, much less will it be generally applicable in life. On the other hand, and in the same way, the art of education will never attain complete clearness in itself without philosophy. Hence, there is an interaction between the two, and either without the other is incomplete and unserviceable. If only because the German has hitherto brought to completion all the steps of culture and has been preserved in the modern world for that special purpose, it will be his work, too, in respect of education. But, when education has once been set in order, the same will follow easily with the other concerns of humanity.

This, then, is the actual relationship in which the German nation has hitherto stood with regard to the development of the human race in the modern age. We have still to throw more light upon an observation, which has already been made twice, as to the natural course of development which events have taken with our nation, viz., that in Germany all culture has proceeded from the people. That the reformation of the Church was first brought before the people, and that it succeeded only because it became their affair, we have already seen. But we have further to show that this single case was not an exception; it has, on the contrary, been the rule.

The Germans who remained in the motherland had retained all the virtues of which their country had formerly been the home—loyalty, uprightness, honor, and simplicity; but of training to a higher and intellectual life they had received no more than could be brought by the Christianity of that period and its teachers to men whose dwellings were scattered. This was but little: hence, they were not so advanced as their racial kinsmen who had emigrated. They were in fact good and honest, it is true, but none the less semi-barbarians. There arose among them, however, cities erected by mem-

bers of the people. In these cities every branch of culture quickly developed into the fairest bloom. In them arose civic constitutions and organizations which, though but on a small scale, were none the less of high excellence; and, proceeding from them, a picture of order and a love of it spread throughout the rest of the country. Their extensive commerce helped to discover the world. Their league was feared by kings. The monuments of their architecture are standing at the present day and have defied the ravages of centuries; before them posterity stands in admiration and confesses its own impotence.

It is not my intention to compare these burghers of the German imperial cities in the Middle Ages with the other estates of the same period, nor to ask what was being done at that time by the nobles and the princes. But, in comparison with the other Teutonic nations—leaving out of account some districts of Italy, and in the fine arts the Germans did not lag behind even these, whereas in the useful arts they surpassed them and became their teachers—leaving these out of account, I say that the German burghers were the civilized people, and the others the barbarians. The history of Germany, of German might, German enterprise and inventions, of German monuments and the German spirit—the history of all these things during that period is nothing but the history of those cities; and everything else, for example the mortgaging of petty territories and their subsequent redemption and so on, is unworthy of mention. Moreover, this period is the only one in German history in which this nation is famous and brilliant, and holds the rank to which, as the parent stock, it is entitled. As soon as its bloom is destroyed by the avarice and tyranny of princes, and as soon as its freedom is trodden underfoot, the whole nation gradually sinks lower and lower, until the condition is reached in which we are at present. But, as Germany sinks, the rest of Europe is seen to sink with it, if we regard, not the mere external appearance, but the soul.

The decisive influence of this burgher class, which was in fact the ruling power, upon the development of the German imperial constitution, upon the reformation of the Church, and upon everything that ever characterized the German nation and thence took its way abroad, is everywhere unmistakable; and it can be proved that everything which is still worthy of honor among the Germans has arisen in its midst.

In what spirit did this German burgher class bring forth and enjoy this period of bloom? In the spirit of piety, of honor, of modesty, and of the sense of community. For themselves they needed little; for public enterprises they set no limits to their expenditure. Seldom does the name of an individual stand out or distinguish itself, for they were all of like mind and alike in sacrifice for the common weal. Under precisely the same external conditions as in

Germany, free cities had arisen in Italy also. Compare the histories of both; contrast the continual disorders, the internal conflicts, nay, even wars, the constant change of constitutions and rulers in the latter with the peaceful unity and concord in the former. How could it be more clearly demonstrated that there must have been an inward difference in the disposition of the two nations? The German nation is the only one among the neo-European nations that has shown in practice, by the example of its burgher class for centuries, that it is capable of enduring a republican constitution.

Of the separate and special means of once more raising the German spirit a very powerful one would be in our hands if we had a soul-stirring history of the Germans in that period—one that would become a book for the nation and for the people, just as the Bible and the hymn-book are now, until the time came when we ourselves had again achieved something worthy of record. But such a history should not set forth deeds and events after the fashion of a chronicle; it should transport us by its fascinating power, without any effort or clear consciousness on our part, into the very midst of the life of that time, so that we ourselves should seem to be walking and standing and deciding and acting with them. This it should do, not by means of childish and trumpery fabrications, as so many historical novels have done, but by the truth; and it should make those deeds and events visible manifestations of the life of that time. Such a work, indeed, could only be the fruit of extensive knowledge and of investigations that have perhaps, never yet been made; but the author should spare us the exhibition of this knowledge and these investigations, and simply lay the ripened fruit before us in the language of the present day and in a manner that every German without exception could understand. In addition to this historical knowledge, such a work would command a high degree of philosophical spirit, which should display itself just as little, and above all things a faithful and loving disposition.

That age was the nation's youthful dream, within a narrow sphere, of its future deeds and conflicts and victories, and the prophecy of what it would be once it had perfected its strength. Evil associations and the seductive power of vanity have swept the growing nation into spheres which are not its own; and, because it there sought glory too, it stands to-day covered with shame and fighting for its very life. But has it indeed grown old and feeble? Has not the well of original life continued to flow for it, as for no other nation, since then and until to-day? Can those prophecies of its youthful nations and by the plan of civilization for all humanity—can they remain unfulfilled? Impossible! O, that someone would bring back this nation from its false path, and in the mirror of its youthful dreams show it its true disposition and its true

vocation! There let it stand and ponder, until it develops the power to take up its vocation with a mighty hand. May this challenge be of some avail in bringing out right soon a German man equipped to perform this preliminary task! . . .

PEOPLE AND FATHERLAND

People and fatherland in this sense, as a support and guarantee of eternity on earth and as that which can be eternal here below, far transcend the State in the ordinary sense of the word, viz., the social order as comprehended by mere intellectual conception and as established and maintained under the guidance of this conception. The aim of the State is positive law, internal peace, and a condition of affairs in which everyone may by diligence earn his daily bread and satisfy the needs of his material existence, so long as God permits him to live. All this is only a means, a condition, and a framework for what love of fatherland really wants, viz., that the eternal and the divine may blossom in the world and never cease to become more and more pure, perfect, and excellent. That is why this love of fatherland must itself govern the State and be the supreme, final, and absolute authority. Its first exercise of this be to limit the State's choice of means to secure its immediate object—internal peace. To attain this object, the natural freedom of the individual must, of course, be limited in many ways. If the only consideration and intention in regard to individuals were to secure internal peace, it would be well to limit that liberty as much as possible, to bring all their activities under a uniform rule, and to keep them under unceasing supervision. Even supposing such strictness were unnecessary, it could at any rate do no harm, if this were the sole object. It is only the higher view of the human race and of peoples which extends this narrow calculation. Freedom, including freedom in the activities of external life, is the soil in which higher culture germinates; a legislation which keeps the higher culture in view will allow to freedom as wide a field as possible, even at the risk of securing a smaller degree of uniform peace and quietness, and of making the work of government a little harder and more troublesome.

To illustrate this by an example. It has happened that nations have been told to their face that they do not need so much freedom as many other nations do. It may even be that the form in which the opinion is expressed is considerate and mild, if what is really meant is that the particular nation would be quite unable to stand so much freedom, and that nothing but extreme severity could prevent its members from destroying each other. But when the words are taken as meaning what they say, they are true only on the supposition that such a nation is thoroughly incapable of hav-

ing original life or even the impulse towards it. Such a nation—if a nation could exist in which there were not even a few men of noble mind to make an exception to the general rule—would in fact need no freedom at all, for this is needed only for the higher purposes that transcend the State. It needs only to be tamed and trained, so that the individuals may live peaceably with each other and that the whole may be made into an efficient instrument for arbitrary purposes in which the nation as such has no part. Whether this can be said with truth of any nation at all we may leave undecided; this much is clear, that an original people needs freedom, that this is the security for its continuance as an original people, and that, as it goes on, it is able to stand an ever-increasing degree of freedom without the slightest danger. This is the first matter in respect of which love of fatherland must govern the State itself.

Then, too, it must be love of fatherland that governs the State by placing before it a higher object than the usual one of maintaining internal peace, property, personal freedom, and the life and well-being of all. For this higher object alone, and with no other intention, does the State assemble an armed force. When the question arises of making use of this, when the call comes to stake everything that the State, in the narrow conception of the word, sets before itself as object, viz., property, personal freedom, life, and well-being, nay, even the continued existence of the State itself; when the call comes to make an original decision with responsibility to God alone, and without a clear and reasonable idea that what is intended will surely be attained—for this is never possible in such matters—then, and then only, does there live at the helm of the State a truly original and primary life, and at this point, and not before, the true sovereign rights of government enter, like God, to hazard the lower life for the sake of the higher. In the maintenance of the traditional constitution, the laws, and civil prosperity there is absolutely no real true life and no original decision. Conditions and circumstances, and legislators perhaps long since dead, have created these things; succeeding ages go on faithfully in the paths marked out, and so in fact they have no public life of their own; they merely repeat a life that once existed. In such times there is no need of any real government. But, when this regular course is endangered, and it is a question of making decisions in new and unprecedented cases, then there is need of a life that lives of itself. What spirit is it that in such cases may place itself at the helm, that can make its own decisions with sureness and certainty, untroubled by any hesitation? What spirit has an undisputed right to summon and to order everyone concerned, whether he himself be willing or not, and to compel anyone who resists, to risk everything including his

life? Not the spirit of the peaceful citizen's love for the constitution and the laws, but the devouring flame of higher patriotism, which embraces the nation as the vestures of the eternal, for which the noble-minded man joyfully sacrifices himself, and the ignoble man, who only exists for the sake of the other, must likewise sacrifice himself. It is not that love of the citizen for the constitution; that love is quite unable to achieve this, so long as it remains on the level of the understanding. . . .

In this belief our earliest common forefathers, the original stock of the new culture, the Germans, as the Romans called them, bravely resisted the on-coming world-dominion of the Romans. Did they not have before their eyes the greater brilliance of the Roman provinces next to them and the more refined enjoyments in those provinces, to say nothing of laws and judges' seats and lictors' axes and rods in superfluity? Were not the Romans willing enough to let them share in all these blessings? In the case of several of their own princes, who did no more than intimate that war against such benefactors of mankind was rebellion, did they not experience proofs of the belauded Roman clemency? To those who submitted the Romans gave marks of distinction in the form of kingly titles, high commands in their armies, and Roman fillets; and if they were driven out by their countrymen, did not the Romans provide for them a place of refuge and a means of subsistence in their colonies? Had they no appreciation of the advantages of Roman civilization, e.g., of the superior organization of their armies, in which even an Arminius did not disdain to learn the trade of war? They cannot be charged with ignorance or lack of consideration of any one of these things. Their descendants, as soon as they could do so without losing their freedom, even assimilated Roman culture, so far as this was possible without losing their individuality. Why, then, did they fight for several generations in bloody wars, that broke out again and again with ever renewed force? A Roman writer puts the following expression into the mouth of their leaders: "What was left for them to do, except to maintain their freedom or else to die before they became slaves." Freedom to them meant just this: remaining Germans and continuing to settle their own affairs independently and in accordance with the original spirit of their race, going on with their development in accordance with the same spirit, and propagating this independence in their posterity. All those blessings which the Romans offered them meant slavery to them, because then they would have to become something that was not German, they would have to become half Roman. They assumed as a matter of course that every man would rather die than become half a Roman, and that a true German

could only want to live in order to be, and to remain, just a German and to bring up his children as Germans. . . .

THE PRESERVATION OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

The notorious doctrine of a balance of power was artificially maintained among European states. If Christian Europe had remained one, as it ought to be and as it originally was, there would never have been any occasion to think of such a thing. That which is one rests upon itself and supports itself, and does not split up into conflicting forces which must be brought to an equilibrium. Only when Europe became divided and without a law did the thought of a balance acquire a meaning from necessity. To this Europe, divided and without a law, Germany did not belong. If only Germany at any rate had remained one, it would have rested on itself in the centre of the civilized world like the sun in the centre of the universe; it would have kept itself at peace, and with itself the adjacent countries; and without any artificial measures it would have kept everything in equilibrium by the mere fact of its natural existence. It was only the deceit of foreign countries that dragged Germany into their own lawlessness and their own disputes; it was they who taught Germany the treacherous notion of the balance of power, for they knew it to be one of the most effective means of deluding Germany as to its own true advantage and of keeping it in that state of delusion. This aim is now sufficiently attained, and the result that was intended is now complete before our eyes. Even if we cannot do away with this result, why should we not at any rate extirpate the source of it in our own understanding, which is now almost the only thing over which we still have sovereign power? Why should the old dream still be placed before our eyes, now that disaster has awakened us from sleep? Why should we not now at any rate see the truth and perceive the only means that could have saved us? Perhaps our descendants may do what we see ought to be done, just as we now suffer because our fathers dreamed. Let us understand that the conception of an equilibrium to be artificially maintained might have been a consoling dream for foreign countries amid the guilt and evil that oppressed them; but that this conception, being an entirely foreign product, ought never to have taken root in the mind of a German, and that the Germans ought never to have been so situated that it could take root among them. Let us understand that now at any rate we must perceive the utter worthlessness of such a conception, and must see that the salvation of all is to be found, not in it, but solely in the unity of the Germans among themselves.

Just as foreign to the German is the freedom of the seas, which is so

frequently preached in our days, whether what is intended be real freedom or merely the power to exclude everyone else from it. Throughout the course of centuries, while all other nations were in rivalry, the German showed little desire to participate in this freedom to any great extent, and he will never do so. Moreover, he is not in need of it. The abundant supplies of his own land, together with his own diligence, afford him all that is needed in the life of a civilized man; nor does he lack skill in the art of making his resources serve that purpose. As for acquiring the only true advantage that world-trade brings in its train, viz., the increase in scientific knowledge of the earth and its inhabitants, his own scientific spirit will not let him lack a means of exchange. O, if only his kindly fortune had preserved the German from indirect participation in the booty of other worlds, as it preserved him from direct participation! If only we had not been led by our credulity, and by the craving for a life as fine and as distinguished as that of other peoples, to make necessities of the wares produced in foreign parts which we could do without; if only we had made conditions tolerable for our free fellow-citizen in regard to the wares we can less easily do without, instead of wishing to draw a profit from the sweat and blood of a poor slave across the seas! Then, at any rate, we should not ourselves have furnished the pretext for our present fate; war would not have been waged against us as purchasers, nor would we have been ruined because we are a market-place. Almost ten years ago, before anyone could foresee what has since happened, the Germans were advised³ to make themselves independent of world-trade, and to turn themselves into a closed commercial State. This proposal ran counter to our habits, and especially to our idolatrous veneration of coined metals; it was passionately attacked and thrust aside. Since then we have been learning, in dishonor and under the compulsion of a foreign power, to do without those things, and far more than those things, which we then protested we could not do without, though we might have done so then in freedom and with the greatest honor to ourselves. O, that we might seize this opportunity, since enjoyment at least is not corrupting us, to correct our ideas once for all! O, that we might at last see that all those swindling theories about world-trade and manufacturing for the world-market, though they suit the foreigner and form part of the weapons with which he has always made war on us, have no application to the Germans; and that, next to the unity of the Germans among themselves, their internal autonomy and commercial independence form the second means for their salvation, and through them for the salvation of Europe!

³ [In 1800 by Fichte himself, in *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat* (The Closed Commercial State).]

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

HEGEL (1770-1831), for many years the "court philosopher" of Prussian Germany, was the reigning philosophic genius of his times. He was, during most of his life, professor in the universities of Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin, and it was especially at the last of these institutions that he made his greatest reputation.

The philosophy of Hegel has had repercussions perhaps more far-reaching than that of any other thinker of his time. Hegel was the most outstanding of those who argued that the mechanistic and analytic science of the eighteenth century was inadequate for dealing with facts of change and development. For him, as for many of his romantic contemporaries, the mechanistic and revolutionary program of the *philosophes* seemed incompatible with the emphasis of the prevalent idea of progress on the cumulative and continuous process of learning undergone by the human race. He continued the dominant interest of the Enlightenment in tracing the career of human reason, but he felt it was possible only by explaining this career in such a way as to show the unbroken and continuous unfolding of reason in history. Because the central fact of the universe was this growth of reason it was necessary to explicate its laws in such a way as to explain the process of universal development. In other words, these laws of thinking, which were also the laws of absolute reality, must be "dialectical" and not mechanical. A "thesis" implies an "antithesis," and thinking progresses by bringing these contraries into a new inclusive synthesis. This synthesis becomes in turn a thesis implying its own antithesis, and must again be resolved, the process continuing until the ultimate unity is reached in Absolute Mind.

Since the laws governing the development of thinking are *ipso facto* the laws governing the development of a rational universe, this dialectic is the key to a genuine philosophy, or rationale, of history. As Hegel sees it, reality develops from being "the Idea in itself" (Logic), to being "the Idea for itself" (Nature); thence it becomes "the Idea in and for itself" (Mind). In this way Hegel attempts to bring under rational principles the two kinds of things Hume had maintained were not subject to demonstration—matters of fact and values. The meaning of history is thus the coming of the mind to the consciousness of itself. Furthermore, since this self-realization by the mind of its own rational laws defines what freedom is, it can also be said that history exhibits the progressive manifestation of freedom.

In contrast with the Enlightenment view that history—at least until the promulgation of the method of mechanical science—is a tale of crime and folly, Hegel's view emphasizes that reason may be found in everything. Past events are to be seen as the explications of particular ideals, the results of what had gone before, and the preparations for the higher reason to follow. Change cannot possibly be the revolutionary overthrow of the work of past generations, but can only proceed within a tradition and in accordance with the necessary laws of historical growth. One can know what to do only if one knows the materials with which one is working, and one can only know this if one studies their history. Although

this idea was seized upon by conservatives, the larger importance of its emphasis upon the continuity of tradition was to inform the evolutionary and historical approach which for some generations ruled the social sciences.

With respect to political philosophy, Hegel, who cannot himself be called a conservative, gave a rationale to the conservatism which had been given a tremendous impetus by the "extreme" to which the French Revolution had gone. His principle that a necessary law governs history, and his belief that this law works not so much through individuals as through the general complex of cultural and social conditions was at once an attack upon the individualism of the French Revolution, and an assertion that cosmic powers transcending human decisions were the ultimate forces in history. Furthermore, since bringing a nation to self-consciousness was the function of history as well as philosophy, the national state might well be seen as the consummation of the World Spirit, in its organization of the inchoate impulses of a nation. Thus, Hegel, who was always devoted to the ideal of a constitutional monarchy unifying Germany, could see in the Prussian State of the 1820's (as well as in any other) a manifestation of the World Spirit. "The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth." Freedom is perfect obedience to perfect law, and political freedom for Germany could only exist in a national (and Protestant Christian) state.

Hegel's program, liberal for its time, stood for the modernizing and nationalizing of Germany. Convinced as he was that history is a constantly on-going process, and that the "great men" of history were simply those who obeyed the spirit at work in it, he could hardly have argued for acquiescence in an illusory *status quo*. Nevertheless, his emphasis that the World Spirit far transcends the understanding of any individual, and that history moves by its own power lent itself easily to becoming an argument on behalf of the conservative predisposition to allow events to take their "natural" course. On the other hand, the ease with which Hegel's dialectic could be used for revolutionary ends is demonstrated by the work of Karl Marx. And Hegel's view that freedom realizes itself through the history of civilization embodies one of the major themes in the advance of Western thought—the idealization of the emergence of man from his given condition. Hegel's work on the philosophy of history is designed to articulate the logic and rationale of the progress of this idea of freedom.

The selection that follows is from Hegel's introduction to his *Philosophy of History*, posthumously edited from students' lecture notes in 1837, and translated by J. Sibree in 1857. The translation from the German has been slightly altered in a few places.



INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

THE HISTORY of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness

of Freedom; a progress whose development according to the necessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate. . . .

The destiny of the spiritual World, and,—since this is the *substantial World*, while the physical remains subordinate to it, or, in the language of speculation, has no truth, as *against* the spiritual,—*the final cause of the World at large*. we allege to be the *consciousness* of its own freedom on the part of Spirit, and *ipso facto*, the *reality* of that freedom. But that this term "Freedom," without further qualification, is an indefinite, and incalculable ambiguous term; and that while that which it represents is the *ne plus ultra* of attainment, it is liable to an infinity of misunderstandings, confusions and errors, and to become the occasion for all imaginable excesses,—has never been more clearly known and felt than in modern times. Yet, for the present, we must content ourselves with the term itself without farther definition. Attention was also directed to the importance of that infinite difference between a principle in the abstract, and its realisation in the concrete. In the process before us, the essential nature of freedom—which involves in it absolute necessity,—is to be displayed as coming to a consciousness of itself (for it is in its very nature, self-consciousness) and thereby realising its existence. Itself is its own object of attainment, and the sole aim of Spirit. This result it is, at which the process of the World's History has been continually aiming; and to which the sacrifices that have ever and anon been laid on the vast altar of the earth, through the long lapse of ages, have been offered. This is the only aim that sees itself realised and fulfilled; the only pole of repose amid the ceaseless change of events and conditions, and the sole efficient principle that pervades them. This final aim is God's purpose with the world; but God is the absolutely perfect Being, and can, therefore, will nothing other than himself—his own Will. The Nature of His Will—that is, His Nature itself—is what we here call the Idea of Freedom; translating the language of Religion into that of Thought. The question, then, which we may next put, is: What means does this principle of Freedom use for its realisation? . . .

The question of the *means* by which Freedom develops itself to a World, conducts us to the phenomenon of History itself. Although Freedom is, primarily, an undeveloped idea, the means it uses are external and phenomenal; presenting themselves in History to our sensuous vision. The first glance at history convinces us that the actions of men proceed from their needs, their passions, their interests, their characters, and talents; and impresses us with the belief that such needs, passions and interests are the sole springs of action—the efficient agents in this scene of activity. Among these may, perhaps, be found aims of a liberal or universal kind

—benevolence it may be, or noble patriotism; but such virtues and general views are but insignificant as compared with the world and its doings. We may perhaps see the ideal of Reason actualized in those who adopt such aims, and within the spheres of their influence; but they bear only a trifling proportion to the mass of the human race; and the extent of that influence is limited accordingly. Passions, private aims, and the satisfaction of selfish desires, are on the other hand, most effective springs of action. Their power lies in the fact that they respect none of the limitations which justice and morality would impose on them; and that these natural impulses have a more direct influence over man than the artificial and tedious discipline that tends to order and self-restraint, law and morality. When we look at this display of passions, and the consequences of their violence; the unreason which is associated not only with them, but even (rather we might say *especially*) with *good* designs and righteous aims; when we see the evil, the vice, the ruin that has befallen the most flourishing kingdoms which the mind of man ever created, we can scarce avoid being filled with sorrow at this universal taint of corruption: and, since this decay is not the work of mere nature, but of the human will—a moral embitterment—a revolt of the good spirit (if it have a place within us) may well be the result of our reflections. Without rhetorical exaggeration, a simply truthful combination of the miseries that have overwhelmed the noblest of nations and polities, and the finest exemplars of private virtue,—forms a picture of most fearful aspect, and excites emotions of the profoundest and most hopeless sadness, counter-balanced by no consolatory result. We endure in beholding it a mental torture, allowing no defence or escape but the consideration that what has happened could not be otherwise; that it is a fatality which no intervention could alter. And at last we draw back from the intolerable disgust with which these sorrowful reflections threaten us, into the more agreeable environment of our individual life—the present formed by our private aims and interests. In short we retreat into the selfishness that stands on the quiet shore, and thence enjoy in safety the distant spectacle of “wrecks confusedly hurled.” But even regarding history as the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals have been victimised—the question involuntarily arises—to what principle, to what final aim these enormous sacrifices have been offered. From this point the investigation usually proceeds to that which we have made the general commencement of our enquiry. Starting from this we pointed out those events which made up a picture so suggestive of gloomy emotions and thoughtful reflections—as *the very field* which we, for our part, regard as exhibiting only the means for realising what we assert

to be the essential destiny—the absolute aim, or—which comes to the same thing—the true *result* of the world's history. We have all along purposely eschewed “moral reflections” as a method of rising from the scene of particular historical events to the general principles which they embody. Besides, it is not the interest of such sentimentalities, really to rise above those depressing emotions; and to solve the enigmas of providence which the considerations that occasioned them, present. It is essential to their character to find a gloomy satisfaction in the empty and fruitless sublimities of that negative result. We return then to the point of view which we have adopted; observing that the successive steps (*Momente*) of the analysis to which it will lead us, will also evolve the conditions requisite for answering the enquiries suggested by the panorama of sin and suffering that history unfolds. . . .

We assert then that nothing has been accomplished without interest on the part of the actors; and—if interest be called passion, inasmuch as the whole individuality, to the neglect of all other actual or possible interests and aims, is devoted to an object with every fibre of volition, concentrating all its desires and powers upon it—we may affirm absolutely that *nothing great in the world* has been accomplished without *passion*. Two elements, therefore, enter into the object of our investigation; the first the Idea, the second the complex of human passions; the one the warp, the other the woof of the vast tapestry of universal history. The concrete mean and union of the two is liberty, under the conditions of morality in a state. We have spoken of the idea of freedom as the nature of Spirit, and the absolute goal of history. Passion is regarded as a thing of sinister aspect, as more or less immoral. Man is required to have no passions. Passion, it is true, is not quite the suitable word for what I wish to express. I mean here nothing more than human activity as resulting from private interests—special, or if you will, self-seeking designs—with this qualification, that the whole energy of will and character is devoted to their attainment; that other interests (which would in themselves constitute attractive aims), or rather all things else, are sacrificed to them. The object in question is so bound up with the man's will, that it entirely and alone determines the “hue of resolution,” and is inseparable from it. It has become the very essence of his volition. For a person is a specific existence; not man in general (a term to which no real existence corresponds), but a particular human being. The term “character” likewise expresses this idiosyncrasy of will and intelligence. But *character* comprehends all peculiarities whatever; the way in which a person conducts himself in private relations, &c., and is not limited to his idiosyncrasy in its practical and active phase. I shall, therefore, use the term “*passion*”; understanding thereby the particular bent of character, as far as the

peculiarities of volition are not limited to private interest, but supply the impelling and actuating force for accomplishing deeds shared in by the community at large. Passion is in the first instance the *subjective*, and therefore the *formal* side of energy, will, and activity—leaving the object or aim still undetermined. And there is a similar relation of formality to reality in merely individual conviction, individual views, individual conscience. It is always a question, of essential importance, what is the purport of my conviction, what the object of my passion, in deciding whether the one or the other is of a true and substantial nature. Conversely, if it is so, it will inevitably attain actual existence—be actualized.

From this comment on the second essential element in the historical embodiment of an aim, we infer—glancing at the institution of the state in passing—that a state is then well constituted and internally powerful, when the private interest of its citizens is one with the common interest of the state; when the one finds its gratification and realisation in the other,—a proposition in itself very important. But in a state many institutions must be adopted, much political machinery invented, accompanied by appropriate political arrangements,—necessitating long struggles of the understanding before what is really appropriate can be discovered,—involving, moreover, contentions with private interest and passions, and a tedious discipline of these latter, in order to bring about the desired harmony. The epoch when a state attains this harmonious condition, marks the period of its bloom, its virtue, its vigour, and its prosperity. But the history of mankind does not begin with a *conscious* aim of any kind, as it is the case with the particular circles into which men form themselves of set purpose. The mere social instinct implies a conscious purpose of security for life and property; and when society has been constituted, this purpose becomes more comprehensive. The history of the world begins with its general aim—the realisation of the idea of Spirit—only in an *implicit* form (*an sich*) that is, as nature; an inmost, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of history (as already observed), is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one. Thus appearing in the form of merely natural existence, natural will—that which has been called the subjective side,—physical craving, instinct, passion, private interest, as also opinion and subjective conception,—spontaneously present themselves at the very commencement. This vast congeries of volitions, interests and activities, constitute the instruments and means of the world-spirit for attaining its object; bringing it to consciousness, and realising it. And this aim is none other than finding itself—coming to itself—and contemplating itself in concrete actuality. But that those manifestations of vitality on the part of individuals and peoples, in

which they seek and satisfy their own purposes, are, at the same time, the means and instruments of a higher and broader purpose of which they know nothing,—which they realise unconsciously,—might be made a matter of question; rather has been questioned, and in every variety of form negated, decried and contemned as mere dreaming and “philosophy.” But on this point I announced my view at the very outset, and asserted our hypothesis,—which, however, will appear in the sequel, in the form of a legitimate inference,—and our belief, that Reason governs the world, and has consequently governed its history. In relation to this independently universal and substantial existence—all else is subordinate, subservient to it, and the means for its development. But moreover this Reason is immanent in historical existence and attains to its own perfection in and through that existence. The union of universal abstract existence generally with the individual,—the subjective—that this alone is truth, belongs to the department of speculation, and is treated in this general form in logic.—But in the process of the world’s history itself,—as still incomplete,—the abstract final aim of history is not yet made the distinct object of desire and interest. While these limited sentiments are still unconscious of the purpose they are fulfilling, the universal principle is implicit in them, and is realising itself through them. The question also assumes the form of the union of *freedom and necessity*; the latent abstract process of Spirit being regarded as *necessity*, while that which exhibits itself in the conscious will of men, as their interest, belongs to the domain of *freedom*. . . .

I will endeavour to make what has been said more vivid and clear by examples.

The building of a house is, in the first instance, a subjective aim and design. On the other hand we have, as means, the several substances required for the work,—iron, wood, stones. The elements are made use of in working up this material: fire to melt the iron, wind to blow the fire, water to set wheels in motion, in order to cut the wood, &c. The result is, that the wind, which has helped to build the house, is shut out by the house; so also are the violence of rains and floods, and the destructive powers of fire, so far as the house is made fire-proof. The stones and beams obey the law of gravity,—press downwards,—and so high walls are carried up. Thus the elements are made use of in accordance with their nature, and yet co-operate for a product, by which their operation is limited. Thus the passions of men are gratified; they develop themselves and their aims in accordance with their natural tendencies, and build up the edifice of human society; thus fortifying a position for right and order *against themselves*.

The connection of events above indicated, involves also the fact, that in

history an additional result is commonly produced by human actions beyond that which they aim at and obtain—that which they immediately recognise and desire. They gratify their own interest; but something farther is thereby accomplished, latent in the actions in question, though not present to their consciousness, and not included in their design. An analogous example is offered in the case of a man who, from a feeling of revenge,—perhaps not an unjust one, but produced by injury on the other's part,—burns that other man's house. A connection is immediately established between the deed itself and a train of circumstances not directly included in it, taken abstractedly. In itself it consisted in merely presenting a small flame to a small portion of a beam. Events not involved in that simple act follow of themselves. The part of the beam which was set fire to is connected with its remote portions; the beam itself is united with the woodwork of the house generally, and this with other houses; so that a wide conflagration ensues, which destroys the goods and chattels of many other persons besides his against whom the act of revenge was first directed; perhaps even costs not a few men their lives. This lay neither in the deed abstractedly, nor in the design of the man who committed it. But the action has a further general bearing. In the design of the doer it was only revenge executed against an individual in the destruction of his property, but it is moreover a crime, and that involves punishment also. This may not have been present to the mind of the perpetrator, still less in his intention; but his deed itself, the general principles it calls into play, its substantial content entails it. By this example I wish only to impress on you the consideration, that in a simple act, something further may be implicated than lies in the intention and consciousness of the agent. The example before us involves, however, this additional consideration, that the substance of the act, consequently we may say the act itself, recoils upon the perpetrator,—reacts upon him with destructive tendency. This union of the two extremes—the embodiment of a general idea in the form of direct actuality, and the elevation of a particularity into connection with universal truth—is brought to pass, at first sight, under the conditions of an utter diversity of nature between the two, and an indifference of the one extreme towards the other. The aims which the agents set before them are limited and special; but it must be remarked that the agents themselves are intelligent thinking beings. The purport of their aims is interwoven with *general, essential* considerations of justice, good, duty, &c.; for mere desire—volition in its rough and savage forms—falls not within the scene and sphere of universal history. Those general considerations, which form at the same time a norm for directing aims and actions, have a determinate purport; for such an abstraction as “good for its own sake,” has no place in

living actuality. If men are to act, they must not only intend the good, but must have decided for themselves whether this or that particular thing is a good. What special course of action, however, is good or not, is determined, as regards the ordinary contingencies of private life, by the laws and customs of a state; and here no great difficulty is presented. Each individual has his position; he knows on the whole what a just, honourable course of conduct is. As to ordinary, private relations, the assertion that it is difficult to choose the right and good,—the regarding it as the mark of an exalted morality to find difficulties and raise scruples on that score,—may be set down to an evil or perverse will, which seeks to evade duties not in themselves of a perplexing nature; or, at any rate, to an idly reflective habit of mind—where a feeble will affords no sufficient exercise to the faculties,—leaving them therefore to find occupation within themselves, and to expend themselves on moral self-adulation.

It is quite otherwise with the comprehensive relations that history has to do with. In this sphere are presented those momentous collisions between existing, acknowledged duties, laws, and rights, and those contingencies which are adverse to this fixed system; which assail and even destroy its foundations and existence; whose tenor may nevertheless seem good,—on the large scale advantageous,—yes, even indispensable and necessary. These contingencies realise themselves in history: they involve a general principle of a different order from that on which depends the *permanence* of a people or a state. This principle is an essential phase in the development of the *creating* Idea, of truth striving and urging towards (consciousness of) itself. Historical men—*world-historical individuals*—are those in whose aims such a general principle lies.

Caesar, in danger of losing a position, not perhaps at that time of superiority, yet at least of equality with the others who were at the head of the state, and of succumbing to those who were just on the point of becoming his enemies,—belongs essentially to this category. These enemies—who were at the same time pursuing *their* personal aims—had the form of the constitution, and the power conferred by an appearance of justice, on their side. Caesar was contending for the maintenance of his position, honour, and safety; and, since the power of his opponents included the sovereignty over the provinces of the Roman Empire, his victory secured for him the conquest of that entire empire; and he thus became—though leaving the form of the constitution—the autocrat of the state. That which secured for him the execution of a design, which in the first instance was of negative import—the autocracy of Rome,—was, however, at the same time an independently necessary feature in the history of Rome and of the world. It

was not, then, his private gain merely, but an unconscious impulse that occasioned the accomplishment of that for which the time was ripe. Such are all great historical men,—whose own particular aims involve those large issues which are the will of the world-spirit. They may be called heroes, inasmuch as they have derived their purposes and their vocation, not from the calm, regular course of things, sanctioned by the existing order; but from a concealed fount—one which has not attained to phenomenal, present existence,—from that inner Spirit, still hidden beneath the surface, which, impinging on the outer world as on a shell, bursts it in pieces, because it is another kernel than that which belonged to the shell in question. They are men, therefore, who appear to draw the impulse of their life from themselves; and whose deeds have produced a condition of things and a complex of historical relations which appear to be only *their* interest, and *their* work.

Such individuals had no consciousness of the general Idea they were unfolding, while prosecuting those aims of theirs; on the contrary, they were practical, political men. But at the same time they were thinking men, who had an insight into the requirements of the time—*what was ripe for development*. This was the very truth for their age, for their world; the species next in order, so to speak, and which was already formed in the womb of time. It was theirs to know this nascent principle; the necessary, directly sequent step in progress, which their world was to take; to make this their aim, and to expend their energy in promoting it. World-historical men—the heroes of an epoch—must, therefore, be recognised as its clear-sighted ones; *their* deeds, *their* words are the best of that time. Great men have formed purposes to satisfy themselves, not others. Whatever prudent designs and counsels they might have learned from others, would be the more limited and inconsistent features in their career; for it was they who best understood affairs; from whom *others* learned, and approved, or at least acquiesced in—their policy. For that Spirit which had taken this fresh step in history is the inmost soul of all individuals; but in a state of unconsciousness which the great men in question aroused. Their fellows, therefore, follow these soul-leaders; for they feel the irresistible power of their own inner spirit thus embodied. If we go on to cast a look at the fate of these world-historical persons, whose vocation it was to be the agents of the world-spirit,—we shall find it to have been no happy one. They attained no calm enjoyment; their whole life was labour and trouble; their whole nature was nought else but their master-passion. When their object is attained they fall off like empty hulls from the kernel. They die early, like Alexander; they are murdered, like Caesar; transported to St. Helena, like

Napoleon. This fearful consolation—that historical men have not enjoyed what is called happiness, and of which only private life (and this may be passed under very various external circumstances) is capable,—this consolation those may draw from history, who stand in need of it; and it is craved by envy—vexed at what is great and transcendent,—striving, therefore, to depreciate it, and to find some flaw in it. Thus in modern times it has been demonstrated *ad nauseam* that princes are generally unhappy on their thrones; in consideration of which the possession of a throne is tolerated, and men acquiesce in the fact that not themselves but the personages in question are its occupants. The free man, we may observe, is not envious, but gladly recognises what is great and exalted, and rejoices that it exists. . . .

A world-historical individual is not so unwise as to indulge a variety of wishes to divide his regards. He is devoted to the one aim, regardless of all else. It is even possible that such men may treat other great, even sacred interests, inconsiderately; conduct which is indeed obnoxious to moral reprehension. But so mighty a form must trample down many an innocent flower—crush to pieces many an object in its path. . . .

But though we might tolerate the idea that individuals, their desires and the gratification of them, are thus sacrificed, and their happiness given up to the empire of chance, to which it belongs; and that as a general rule, individuals come under the category of means to an ulterior end,—there is one aspect of human individuality which we should hesitate to regard in that subordinate light, even in relation to the highest; since it is absolutely no subordinate element, but exists in those individuals as inherently eternal and divine. I mean *morality, ethics, religion*. Even when speaking of the realisation of the great ideal aim by means of individuals, the *subjective* element in them—their interest and that of their cravings and impulses, their views and judgments, though exhibited as the merely formal side of their existence,—was spoken of as having an infinite right to be consulted. The first idea that presents itself in speaking of *means* is that of something external to the object, and having no share in the object itself. But merely natural things—even the commonest lifeless objects—used as means, must be of such a kind as adapts them to their purpose; they must possess something in common with it. Human beings least of all, sustain the bare external relation of mere means to the great ideal aim. Not only do they in the very act of realising it, make it the occasion of satisfying personal desires, whose purport is diverse from that aim—but they share in that ideal aim itself; and are for that very reason objects of their own existence; not *formally* merely, as the world of living beings generally is—whose indi-

vidual life is essentially subordinate to that of man, and is properly used *up* as an instrument. Men, on the contrary, are objects of existence to themselves, as regards the intrinsic import of the aim in question. To this order belongs that in them which we would exclude from the category of mere means,—morality, ethics, religion. That is to say, man is an object of existence in himself only in virtue of the divine that is in him,—that which was designated at the outset as *Reason*; which, in view of its activity and power of self-determination, was called *freedom*. And we affirm—without entering at present on the proof of the assertion—that religion, morality, &c. have their foundation and source in that principle, and so are essentially elevated above all alien necessity and chance. And here we must remark that individuals, to the extent of their freedom, are responsible for the depravation and enfeeblement of morals and religion. This is the seal of the absolute and sublime destiny of man—that he knows what is good and what is evil; that his destiny *is* his very ability to will either good or evil,—in one word, that he is the subject of moral imputation, imputation not only of evil, but of good; and not only concerning this or that particular matter, and all that happens *ab extrâ*, but *also* the good and evil attaching to his individual freedom. The brute alone is simply innocent. It would, however, demand an extensive explanation—as extensive as the analysis of moral freedom itself—to preclude or obviate all the misunderstandings which the statement that what is called innocent imports the entire unconsciousness of evil—is wont to occasion.

In contemplating the fate which virtue, morality, even piety experience in history, we must not fall into the litany of lamentations, that the good and pious often—or for the most part—fare ill in the world, while the evil-disposed and wicked prosper. The term *prosperity* is used in a variety of meanings—riches, outward honour, and the like. But in speaking of something which in and for itself constitutes an aim of existence, that so-called well or ill-faring of these or those isolated individuals cannot be regarded as an essential element in the rational order of the universe. With more justice than happiness,—or a fortunate environment for individuals,—it is demanded of the grand aim of the world's existence, that it should foster, nay involve the execution and ratification of good, moral, righteous purposes. What makes men morally discontented (a discontent, by the by, on which they somewhat pride themselves), is that they do not find the present adapted to the realisation of aims which they hold to be right and just (more especially in modern times, ideals of political constitutions); they contrast unfavourably things as they *are*, with their idea of things as they *ought* to be. In this case it is not private interest nor passion that desires

gratification, but reason, justice, liberty; and equipped with this title, the demand in question assumes a lofty bearing, and readily adopts a position not merely of discontent, but of open revolt against the actual condition of the world. To estimate such a feeling and such views aright, the demands insisted upon, and the very dogmatic opinions asserted, must be examined. At no time so much as in our own, have such general principles and notions been advanced, or with greater assurance. If in days gone by, history seems to present itself as a struggle of passions; in our time—though displays of passion are not wanting—it exhibits partly a predominance of the struggle of notions assuming the authority of principles; partly that of passions and interests essentially subjective, but under the mask of such higher sanctions. The pretensions thus contended for as legitimate in the name of that which has been stated as the ultimate aim of Reason, pass accordingly, for absolute aims,—to the same extent as religion, morals, ethics. Nothing, as before remarked, is now more common than the complaint that the *ideals* which imagination sets up are not realised—that these glorious dreams are destroyed by cold actuality. These ideals—which in the voyage of life founder on the rocks of hard reality—may be in the first instance only subjective, and belong to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, imagining himself the highest and wisest. Such do not properly belong to this category. For the fancies which the individual in his isolation indulges, cannot be the model for universal reality; just as *universal* law is not designed for the units of the mass. These as such may, in fact, find their interests decidedly thrust into the background. But by the term “Ideal,” we also understand the ideal of reason, of the good, of the true. Poets, as *e.g.* Schiller, have painted such ideals touchingly and with strong emotion, and with the deeply melancholy conviction that they could not be realised. In affirming, on the contrary, that the universal Reason *does* realise itself, we have indeed nothing to do with the individual empirically regarded. That admits of degrees of better and worse, since here chance and particularity have received authority from the Idea to exercise their monstrous power. Much, therefore, in particular aspects of the grand phenomenon might be found fault with. This subjective fault-finding,—which, however, only keeps in view the individual and its deficiency, without taking notice of Reason pervading the whole,—is easy; and inasmuch as it asserts an excellent intention with regard to the good of the whole, and seems to result from a kindly heart, it feels authorized to give itself airs and assume great consequence. It is easier to discover a deficiency in individuals, in states, and in providence, than to see their real import and value. For in this merely negative fault-finding a proud position is taken,—one which overlooks the object, without having

entered into it,—without having comprehended its positive aspect. Age generally makes men more tolerant; youth is always discontented. The tolerance of age is the result of the ripeness of a judgment which, not merely as the result of indifference, is satisfied even with what is inferior; but, more deeply taught by the grave experience of life, has been led to perceive the substantial, solid worth of the object in question. The insight then to which—in contradistinction from those ideals—philosophy is to lead us, is, that the actual world is as it ought to be—that the truly good—the universal divine reason—is not a mere abstraction, but a vital principle capable of realising itself. This *good*, this *Reason*, in its most concrete form, is God. God governs the world; the actual working of his government—the carrying out of his plan—is the history of the world. This plan philosophy strives to comprehend; for only that which has been developed as the result of it, possesses *bonâ fide* reality. That which does not accord with it, is negative, worthless existence. Before the pure light of this divine Idea—which is no mere ideal—the phantom of a world whose events are an incoherent concourse of fortuitous circumstances, utterly vanishes. Philosophy wishes to discover the substantial purport, the actual side of the divine idea, and to justify the so much despised actuality of things; for Reason is the comprehension of the divine work. But as to what concerns the perversion, corruption, and ruin of religious, ethical and moral purposes, and states of society generally, it must be affirmed, that in their *essence* these are infinite and eternal; but that the forms they assume may be of a limited order, and consequently belong to the domain of mere nature, and be subject to the sway of chance. They are therefore perishable, and exposed to decay and corruption. Religion and morality—in the same way as inherently universal essences—have the peculiarity of being present in the individual soul, in the full extent of their Idea, and therefore truly and really; although they may not manifest themselves in it *in extenso*, and are not applied to fully developed relations. The religion, the morality of a limited sphere of life—that of a shepherd or a peasant, *e.g.*—in its intensive concentration and limitation to a few perfectly simple relations of life,—has infinite worth; the same worth as the religion and morality of extensive knowledge, and of an existence rich in the compass of its relations and actions. This inner focus—this simple region of the claims of subjective freedom,—the home of volition, resolution, and action,—the abstract sphere of conscience,—that which comprises the responsibility and moral value of the individual, remains untouched; and is quite shut out from the noisy din of the world's history—including not merely external and temporal changes, but also those entailed by the absolute necessity inseparable from the realisation of the Idea of free-

dom itself. But as a general truth this must be regarded as settled, that whatever in the world possesses claims as noble and glorious, has nevertheless a higher existence above it. The claim of the world-spirit rises above all special claims. . . .

What is the material in which the ideal of Reason is wrought out? The primary answer would be,—personality itself—human desires—subjectivity generally. In human knowledge and volition, as its material element, Reason attains positive existence. We have considered subjective volition where it has an object which is the truth and essence of a reality, viz. where it constitutes a great world-historical passion. As a subjective will, occupied with limited passions, it is dependent, and can gratify its desires only within the limits of this dependence. But the subjective will has also a substantial life—a reality,—in which it moves in the region of *essential* being and has the essential itself as the object of its existence. This essential being is the union of the *subjective* with the *rational* will: it is the moral whole, the state, which is that form of actuality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the condition of his recognising, believing in and willing that which is common to the whole. And this must not be understood as if the subjective will of the social unit attained its gratification and enjoyment through that common Will; as if this were a means provided for its benefit; as if the individual, in his relations to other individuals, thus limited his freedom, in order that this universal limitation—the mutual constraint of all—might secure a small space of liberty for each. Rather, we affirm, are law, morality, government, and they alone, the positive fact and completion of freedom. Freedom of a low and limited order, is mere caprice; which finds its exercise in the sphere of particular and limited desires.

Subjective volition—passion—is that which sets men in activity, that which effects “practical” actualisation. The Idea is the inner spring of action; the state is the actually existing, realised moral life. For it is the unity of the universal, essential will, with that of the individual; and this is “morality.” The individual living in this unity has a moral life; possesses a value that consists in this substantiality alone. Sophocles in his *Antigone*, says, “The divine commands are not of yesterday, nor of today; no, they have an infinite existence, and no one could say whence they came.” The laws of morality are not accidental, but are the essentially rational. It is the very object of the state that what is essential in the practical activity of men, and in their dispositions, should be duly recognised; that it should have a manifest existence, and maintain its position. It is the absolute interest of Reason that this moral whole should exist; and herein lies the justification and merit of heroes who have founded states,—however rude these may have been. In

the history of the world, only those peoples can come under our notice which form a state. For it must be understood that this latter is the realisation of freedom, *i.e.* of the absolute final aim, and that it exists for its own sake. It must further be understood that all the worth which the human being possesses—all spiritual actuality, he possesses only through the state. For his spiritual actuality consists in this, that his own essence—Reason—is objectively present to him, that it possesses objective immediate existence for him. Thus only is he fully conscious; thus only is he a partaker of morality—of a just and moral social and political life. For truth is the unity of the universal and subjective will; and the universal is to be found in the state, in its laws, its universal and rational arrangements. The state is the divine Idea as it exists on earth. We have in it, therefore, the object of history in a more definite shape than before; that in which freedom obtains objectivity, and lives in the enjoyment of this objectivity. For law is the objectivity of spirit; volition in its true form. Only that will which obeys law, is free; for it obeys itself—it is independent and so free. When the state or our country constitutes a community of existence; when the subjective will of man submits to laws,—the contradiction between liberty and necessity vanishes. The rational has necessary existence, as being the reality and substance of things, and we are free in recognising it as law, and following it as the substance of our own being. The objective and the subjective will are then reconciled, and present one identical homogeneous whole. For the morality (*Sittlichkeit*) of the state is not of that ethical (*moralische*) reflective kind, in which one's own conviction bears sway; this latter is rather the peculiarity of the modern time, while the true antique morality is based on the principle of abiding by one's duty (to the state at large). An Athenian citizen did what was required of him, as it were from instinct; but if I reflect on the object of my activity, I must have the consciousness that my will has been called into exercise. But morality is duty—substantial right—a "*second nature*" as it has been justly called; for the *first* nature of man is his primary merely animal existence.

The development *in extenso* of the Idea of the state belongs to the philosophy of jurisprudence; but it must be observed that in the theories of our time various errors are current respecting it, which pass for established truths, and have become fixed prejudices. We will mention only a few of them, giving prominence to such as have a reference to the object of our history.

The error which first meets us is the direct contradictory of our principle that the state presents the realisation of freedom; the opinion, *viz.*, that man is free by *nature*, but that in *society*, in the state—to which nevertheless he

is irresistibly impelled—he must limit this natural freedom. That man is free by nature is quite correct in one sense; viz., that he is so according to the idea of humanity; but we imply thereby that he is such only in virtue of his destiny—that he has an undeveloped power to become such; for the “nature” of an object is exactly synonymous with its “Idea.” But the view in question imports more than this. When man is spoken of as “free by nature,” the mode of his existence as well as his destiny is implied. His merely natural and primary condition is intended. In this sense a “state of nature” is assumed in which mankind at large are in the possession of their natural rights with the unconstrained exercise and enjoyment of their freedom. This assumption is not indeed raised to the dignity of the historical fact; it would indeed be difficult, were the attempt seriously made, to point out any such condition as actually existing, or as having ever occurred. Examples of a savage state of life can be pointed out, but they are marked by brutal passions and deeds of violence; while, however rude and simple their conditions, they involve social arrangements which (to use the common phrase) *restrain* freedom. That assumption is one of those nebulous images which theory produces; an idea which it cannot avoid originating, but which it fathers upon real existence, without sufficient historical justification.

What we find such a state of nature to be in actual experience, answers exactly to the idea of a *merely* natural condition. Freedom as the *ideal* of that which is original and natural, does not exist *as original and natural*. Rather must it be first sought out and won; and that by an incalculable medial discipline of the intellectual and moral powers. The state of nature is, therefore, predominantly that of injustice and violence, of untamed natural impulses, of inhuman deeds and feelings. Limitation is certainly produced by society and the state, but it is a limitation of the mere brute emotions and rude instincts; as also, in a more advanced stage of culture, of the premeditated self-will of caprice and passion. This kind of constraint is part of the instrumentality by which only the consciousness of freedom and the desire for its attainment, in its true—that is rational and ideal form—can be obtained. To the notion of freedom, law and morality are indispensably requisite; and they are in and for themselves, universal existences, objects and aims; which are discovered only by the activity of thought, separating itself from the merely sensuous, and developing itself, in opposition thereto; and which must on the other hand, be introduced into and incorporated with the originally sensuous will, and that contrarily to its natural inclination. The perpetually recurring misapprehension of freedom consists in regarding that term only in its *formal*, subjective sense, abstracted

from its essential objects and aims; thus a constraint put upon impulse, desire, passion—pertaining to the particular individual as such—a limitation of caprice and self-will is regarded as a fettering of freedom. We should on the contrary look upon such limitation as the indispensable proviso of emancipation. Society and the state are the very conditions in which freedom is realised. . . .

We have considered two aspects of freedom,—the objective and the subjective; if, therefore, freedom is asserted to consist in the individuals of a state all agreeing in its arrangements, it is evident that only the subjective aspect is regarded. The natural inference from this principle is, that no law can be valid without the approval of all. This difficulty is attempted to be obviated by the decision that the minority must yield to the majority; the majority therefore bear the sway. But long ago J. J. Rousseau remarked, that in that case there would be no longer freedom, for the will of the *minority* would cease to be respected. At the Polish Diet each single member had to give his consent before any political step could be taken; and this kind of freedom it was that ruined the state. Besides, it is a dangerous and false prejudice, that the people *alone* have reason and insight, and know what justice is; for each popular faction may represent itself as the people, and the question as to what constitutes the state is one of advanced science, and not of popular decision.

If the principle of regard for the individual will is recognised as the only basis of political liberty, viz., that nothing should be done by or for the state to which all the members of the body politic have not given their sanction, we have, properly speaking, no *constitution*. The only arrangement that would be necessary, would be, first, a centre having no *will* of its own, but which should take into consideration what appeared to be the necessities of the state; and, secondly, a contrivance for calling the members of the state together, for taking the votes, and for performing the arithmetical operations of reckoning and comparing the number of votes for the different propositions, and thereby deciding upon them. The state is an *abstraction*, having its generic existence in its citizens; but it is an actuality, and its simple generic existence must embody itself in individual will and activity. The want of government and political administration in general is felt; this necessitates the selection and separation from the rest of those who have to take the helm in political affairs, to decide concerning them, and to give orders to other citizens, with a view to the execution of their plans. If, *e.g.*, even the people in a democracy resolve on a war, a general must head the army. It is only by a constitution that the *abstraction*—the state—attains life and actuality; but this involves the distinction between

those who command and those who obey.—Yet obedience seems inconsistent with liberty, and those who command appear to do the very opposite of that which the fundamental notion of the state, viz., that of freedom, requires. It is, however, urged that,—though the distinction between commanding and obeying is absolutely necessary, because affairs could not go on without it—and indeed this seems only a compulsory limitation, external to and even contravening freedom in the abstract—the constitution should be at least so framed, that the citizens may obey as little as possible, and the smallest modicum of free volition be left to the commands of the superiors;—that the substance of that for which subordination is necessary, even in its most important bearings, should be decided and resolved on by the people—by the will of many or of all the citizens; though it is supposed to be thereby provided that the state should be possessed of vigour and strength as an actuality—an individual unity.—The primary consideration is, then, the distinction between the governing and the governed, and political constitutions in the abstract have been rightly divided into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; which gives occasion, however, to the remark that monarchy itself must be further divided into despotism and monarchy proper; that in all the divisions to which the leading notion gives rise, only the generic character is to be made prominent,—it being not intended thereby that the particular category under review should be exhausted as a form, order, or kind in its *concrete* development. But especially it must be observed, that the above-mentioned divisions admit of a multitude of particular modifications,—not only such as lie within the limits of those classes themselves,—but also such as are mixtures of several of these essentially distinct classes, and which are consequently misshapen, unstable, and inconsistent forms. In such a collision, the concerning question is, what is the *best constitution*; that is, by what arrangement, organisation, or mechanism of the power of the state its object can be most surely attained. This object may indeed be variously understood; for instance, as the calm enjoyment of life on the part of the citizens, or as universal happiness. Such aims have suggested the so-called ideals of constitutions, and,—as a particular branch of the subject,—ideals of the education of princes (Fénelon), or of the governing body—the aristocracy at large (Plato); for the chief point they treat of is the condition of those subjects who stand at the head of affairs; and in these ideals the concrete details of political organisation are not at all considered. The enquiry into the best constitution is frequently treated as if not only the theory were an affair of subjective independent conviction, but as if the introduction of a constitution recognised as the best,—or as superior to others,—could be the result of a resolve adopted in this

theoretical manner; as if the form of a constitution were a matter of free choice, determined by nothing else but reflection. Of this artless fashion was that deliberation,—not indeed of the Persian *people*, but of the Persian *grandees*, who had conspired to overthrow the pseudo-Smerdis and the Magi, after their undertaking had succeeded, and when there was no scion of the royal family living,—as to what constitution they should introduce into Persia; and Herodotus gives an equally naïve account of this deliberation.

In the present day, the constitution of a country and people is not represented as so entirely dependent on free and deliberate choice. The fundamental but abstractly (and therefore imperfectly) entertained conception of freedom, has resulted in the republic being very generally regarded—in *theory*—as the only just and true political constitution. Many even, who occupy elevated official positions under monarchical constitutions—so far from being opposed to this idea—are actually its supporters; only they see that such a constitution, though the best, cannot be realised under all circumstances; and that—while men are what they are—we must be satisfied with less freedom; the monarchical constitution—under the given circumstances, and the present moral condition of the people—being even regarded as the most advantageous. In this view also, the necessity of a particular constitution is made to depend on the condition of the people in such a way as if the latter were non-essential and accidental. This representation is founded on the distinction which the reflective understanding makes between a notion and the corresponding reality; holding to an abstract and consequently untrue notion; not grasping it in its completeness, or—which is virtually, though not in point of form, the same—not taking a concrete view of a people and a state. We shall have to shew further on, that the constitution adopted by a people makes one substance—one spirit—with its religion, its art and philosophy, or, at least, with its conceptions and thoughts—its culture generally; not to expatiate upon the additional influences, *ab extrâ*, of climate, of neighbours, of its place in the world. A state is an individual totality, of which you cannot select any particular side, although a supremely important one, such as its political constitution; and deliberate and decide respecting it in that isolated form. Not only is that constitution most intimately connected with and dependent on those other spiritual forces; but the form of the entire moral and intellectual individuality—comprising all the forces it embodies—is only a step in the development of the grand whole,—with its place preappointed in the process; a fact which gives the highest sanction to the constitution in question, and establishes its absolute necessity.—The origin of a state involves imperious lordship on the

one hand, instinctive submission on the other. But even obedience—lordly power, and the fear inspired by a ruler—in itself implies some degree of voluntary connection. Even in barbarous states this is the case; it is not the isolated will of individuals that prevails; individual pretensions are relinquished, and the general will is the essential bond of political union. This unity of the general and the particular is the Idea itself, manifesting itself as a *state*, and which subsequently undergoes further development within itself. The abstract yet necessitated process in the development of truly independent states is as follows:—They begin with regal power, whether of patriarchal or military origin. In the next phase, particularity and individuality assert themselves in the form of aristocracy and democracy. Lastly, we have the subjection of these separate interests to a single power; but which can be absolutely none other than one outside of which those spheres have an independent position, viz., the monarchical. Two phases of royalty, therefore, must be distinguished,—a primary and a secondary one. This process is necessitated, so that the form of government assigned to a particular stage of development *must* present itself: it is therefore no matter of choice, but is that form which is adapted to the spirit of the people.

In a constitution the main feature of interest is the self-development of the *rational*, that is, the *political* condition of a people; the setting free of the successive elements of the Idea: so that the several powers in the state manifest themselves as separate,—attain their appropriate and special perfection,—and yet in this independent condition, work together for one object, and are held together by it—*i.e.*, form an organic whole. The state is thus the embodiment of rational freedom, realising and recognising itself in an objective form. For its objective consists in this,—that its successive stages are not merely ideal, but are present in an appropriate reality; and that in their separate and several working, they are absolutely merged in that agency by which the totality—the soul—the individual unity—is produced, and of which it is the result.

The state is the idea of Spirit in the external manifestation of human will and its freedom. It is to the state, therefore, that change in the aspect of history indissolubly attaches itself; and the successive phases of the Idea manifest themselves in it as distinct political *principles*. The constitutions under which world-historical peoples have reached their culmination, are peculiar to them; and therefore do not present a generally applicable political basis. . . . The ancient and the modern have not their essential principle in common. Abstract definitions and dogmas respecting just government,—importing that intelligence and virtue ought to bear sway—are, indeed, common to both. But nothing is so absurd as to look to Greeks,

Romans, or Orientals, for models for the political arrangements of our time. From the East may be derived beautiful pictures of a patriarchal condition, of paternal government, and of devotion to it on the part of peoples; from Greeks and Romans, descriptions of popular liberty. Among the latter we find the idea of a free constitution admitting all the citizens to a share in deliberations and resolves respecting the affairs and laws of the commonwealth. In our times, too, this is its general acceptance; only with this modification, that—since our states are so large, and there are so many of “the many,” the latter,—direct action being impossible,—should by the indirect method of elective substitution express their concurrence with resolves affecting the common weal; that is, that for legislative purposes generally, the people should be represented by deputies. The so-called representative constitution is that form of government with which we connect the idea of a free constitution, and this notion has become a rooted prejudice. On this theory people and government are separated. But there is a perversity in this antithesis; an ill-intentioned *ruse* designed to insinuate that the people are the totality of the state. Besides, the basis of this view is the principle of isolated individuality—the absolute validity of the subjective will—a dogma which we have already investigated. The great point is, that freedom in its ideal conception has not subjective will and caprice for its principle, but the recognition of the universal will; and that the process by which freedom is realised is the free development of its successive stages. The subjective will is a merely formal determination—a *carte blanche*—not including what it is that is willed. Only the *rational* will is that universal principle which independently determines and unfolds its own being, and develops its successive elemental phases as organic members. Of this Gothic-cathedral architecture the ancients knew nothing. . . .

Summing up what has been said of the state, we find that we have been led to call its vital principle, as actuating the individuals who compose it,—morality. The state, its laws, its arrangements, constitute the rights of its members; its natural features, its mountains, air, and waters, are *their* country, their fatherland, their outward material property; the history of this state, *their* deeds; what their ancestors have produced, belongs to them and lives in their memory. All is their possession, just as they are possessed by it; for it constitutes their existence, their being.

Their imagination is occupied with the ideas thus presented, while the adoption of these laws, and of a fatherland so conditioned, is the expression of their will. It is this matured totality which thus constitutes *one* being, the spirit of *one* people. To it the individual members belong; each unit is the son of his nation, and at the same time—in as far as the state to which

he belongs is undergoing development—the son of his age. None remains behind it, still less advances beyond it. This spiritual being (the spirit of his time) is his; he is a representative of it; it is that in which he originated, and in which he lives. Among the Athenians the word Athens had a double import; suggesting primarily, a complex of political institutions, but no less, in the second place, that goddess who represented the spirit of the people and its unity.

This spirit of a people is a *determinate* and particular spirit, and is, as just stated, further modified by the degree of its historical development. This spirit, then, constitutes the basis and substance of those other forms of a nation's consciousness, which have been noticed. For Spirit in its self-consciousness must become an object of contemplation to itself, and objectivity involves, in the first instance, the rise of differences which make up a total of distinct spheres of objective spirit; in the same way as the soul exists only as the complex of its faculties, which in their form of concentration in a simple unity produce that soul. It is thus *One Individuality* which, presented in its essence as God, is honoured and enjoyed in *religion*; which is exhibited as an object of sensuous contemplation in *art*; and is apprehended as an intellectual conception, in *philosophy*. In virtue of the original identity of their essence, purport, and object, these various forms are inseparably united with the spirit of the state. Only in connection with this particular religion, can this particular political constitution exist; just as in such or such a state, such or such a philosophy or order of art.

The remark next in order is, that each particular national genius is to be treated as only one individual in the process of universal history. For that history is the exhibition of the divine, absolute development of Spirit in its highest forms,—that gradation by which it attains its truth and consciousness of itself. The forms which these grades of progress assume are the characteristic “national spirits” of history; the peculiar tenor of their moral life, of their government, their art, religion, and science. To realise these grades is the boundless impulse of the World-Spirit—the goal of its irresistible urging; for this division into organic members, and the full development of each, is its Idea.—Universal history is exclusively occupied with shewing how Spirit comes to a recognition and adoption of the truth: the dawn of knowledge appears; it begins to discover salient principles, and at last it arrives at full consciousness. . . .

The very essence of Spirit is activity; it actualizes its potentiality—makes itself its own deed, its own work—and thus becomes an object to itself; contemplates itself as an objective existence. Thus is it with the Spirit of a people: it is a Spirit having strictly defined characteristics, which erects it-

self into an objective world, that exists and persists in a particular religious form of worship, customs, constitution and political laws,—in the whole complex of its institutions,—in the events and transactions that make up its history. That is its work—that is what this particular nation *is*. Nations are what their deeds are. Every Englishman will say: We are the men who navigate the ocean, and have the commerce of the world; to whom the East Indies belong and their riches; who have a parliament, juries, &c. —The relation of the individual to that Spirit is that he appropriates to himself this substantial existence; that it becomes his character and capability, enabling him to have a definite place in the world—to be *something*. For he finds the being of the people to which he belongs an already established, firm world—objectively present to him—with which he has to incorporate himself. In this its work, therefore—its world—the spirit of the people enjoys its existence and finds its satisfaction.—A nation is moral—virtuous—vigorous—while it is engaged in realising its grand objects, and defends its work against external violence during the process of giving to its purposes an objective existence. The contradiction between its potential, subjective being—its inner aim and life—and its *actual* being is removed; it has attained full actuality, has itself objectively present to it. But this having been attained, the activity displayed by the Spirit of the people in question is no longer needed; it has its desire. The nation can still accomplish much in war and peace at home and abroad; but the living substantial soul itself may be said to have ceased its activity. The essential, supreme interest has consequently vanished from its life, for interest is present only where there is opposition. The nation lives the same kind of life as the individual when passing from maturity to old age,—in the enjoyment of itself,—in the satisfaction of being exactly what it desired and was able to attain. Although its imagination might have transcended that limit, it nevertheless abandoned any such aspirations as objects of *actual endeavour*, if the real world was less than favourable to their attainment—and restricted its aim by the conditions thus imposed. This mere *customary life* (the watch wound up and going on of itself) is that which brings on natural death. Custom is activity without opposition, for which there remains only a formal duration; in which the fulness and zest that originally characterised the aim of life is out of the question,—a merely external sensuous existence which has ceased to throw itself enthusiastically into its object. Thus perish individuals, thus perish peoples by a natural death; and though the latter may continue in being, it is an existence without intellect or vitality; having no need of its institutions, because the need for them is satisfied,—a political nullity and tedium. In order that a truly universal interest may arise, the spirit of a people must

advance to the adoption of some new purpose: but whence can this new purpose originate? It would be a higher, more comprehensive conception of itself—a transcending of its principle—but this very act would involve a principle of a new order, a new national spirit.

Such a new principle does in fact enter into the spirit of a people that has arrived at full development and self-realisation; it dies not a simply natural death,—for it is not a mere single individual, but a spiritual, generic life; in its case natural death appears to imply destruction through its own agency. The reason of this difference from the single natural individual, is that the spirit of a people exists as a *genus*, and consequently carries within it its own negation, in the very generality which characterises it. A people can only die a violent death when it has become naturally dead in itself, as *e.g.*, the German imperial cities, the German imperial constitution.

It is not of the nature of the all-pervading Spirit to die this merely natural death; it does not simply sink into the senile life of mere custom, but—as being a national spirit belonging to universal history—attains to the consciousness of what its work is; it attains to a conception of itself. In fact, it is world-historical only in so far as a *universal principle* has lain in its fundamental element,—in its grand aims: only so far is the work which such a spirit produces, a moral, political organization. If it be mere desires that impel nations to activity, such deeds pass over without leaving a trace; or their traces are only ruin and destruction.

II

COUNTERREVOLUTION AND REACTION

JOSEPH DE MAISTRE

COUNT JOSEPH MARIE DE MAISTRE (1753-1821) was a native of Savoy who served in the senate of his homeland and, for fourteen years, as Sardinian ambassador to the court of the Tsar. His political reflections were provoked by the French Revolution, which he viewed—and feared—as the opening of a new democratic and secular epoch. De Maistre regarded the Revolution as the expression of a tremendously powerful but essentially corrosive force in European culture. As much as Burke, he was convinced that a political system is not to be established *a priori* but is the product of a long historic experience, and he directed the main burden of his argument against the very feature of the Revolution which its protagonists had held to represent its most noteworthy achievement—the establishment of a written constitution. The promulgation of the rights of man and of the citizen was for him an audacious trespassing beyond the proper bounds of human reason, and to attempt to realize Rousseau's ideal of making law the manifestation of the general will was to subvert all foundations of political authority. The French Revolution threatened the dissolution of stable and civilized society because it was founded on the theory of the social contract, on the beliefs that law was properly man made and that allegiance to it was to be accorded voluntarily by individuals. De Maistre felt that a society organized on such principles could expect neither good laws nor adequate obedience on the part of its members. He was convinced, in the first place, that society was an organism greater than the sum of its individual members, and that the political order appropriate to it consequently transcended the reasoning powers of any individual or group of individuals. He believed, in the second place, that the theory of the social contract, in affirming that law is established by men alone, removes the compulsion of political obligation. In this connection it is important to recognize that de Maistre saw no difference between the theory of Locke and that of Hobbes and consequently represented all social-contract theory as affirming that the social contract encouraged a sense of irresponsibility and subjected men to no superior moral law. It was from this point of view that he argued that a social contract could not exercise adequate political authority. De Maistre was primarily concerned in establishing the importance of the sense of shared values among persons in society. He was convinced that no society could endure which encouraged all individuals to question every aspect of their common life. It was this emphasis which endeared de Maistre to Saint-Simon, Comte, the noted French sociologist Emile Durkheim, and the royalist Action Française.

It was in keeping with these principles that de Maistre held up as the only antidote to the revolutionary subversion of all political arrangements the governance of the Catholic Church. Without the aura of antiquity and the sanction of supernatural religion no law could be expected to command adequate respect and no stable society could be founded. De Maistre thus carries to a logical conclusion the belief which Burke had also expressed that an enduring society rests on faith and that a flourishing nation is marked by a pervasive religious quality: where

Burke held up the British Constitution as the bulwark of the nation, de Maistre held up the universal Church as the only visible institution capable of stabilizing the French nation and of saving the nations of Europe from interminable bloodshed.

The political philosophy of de Maistre grew out of a conviction, or attitude, more deep-seated, however, than any of the principles that have been mentioned. Pervasive in his works is an Augustinian *Weltanschauung*,¹ a belief that history is hardly an affair of reason but rather the manifestation of powers far transcending human control. De Maistre was fascinated by the vision of politics as the play of omnipotent and inscrutable powers, and he was a conservative primarily because he could not help but bow down before "the powers that be." The very possibility of a science of government was, in the final analysis, the basic issue which divided de Maistre from the Enlightenment. For de Maistre, a science of government was quite literally a contradiction in terms. Politics was essentially irrational, and a government equipped to endure for any length of time rested on faith rather than on reason.

In so far as it involved special pleading for Catholic and monarchical traditionalism, de Maistre's philosophy exerted but a limited influence, exercising an appeal principally among the Catholic clergy and meeting with little favorable response in Protestant countries. The principles which underlay his program transcended partisan politics, however, and de Maistre's thought was significant in subsequent history for more than its espousal of Catholic Ultramontanism.

The following selections are from a work published in 1810 and translated from the French in 1847.



ESSAY ON THE GENERATIVE PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONS

I. One of the grand errors of an age, which professed them all, was, to believe that a political constitution could be written and created *à priori*; whilst reason and experience unite in establishing, that a constitution is a Divine work, and that that which is most fundamental, and most essentially constitutional, in the laws of a nation, is precisely what cannot be written.

II. It has been often supposed to be an excellent piece of pleasantry upon Frenchmen, to ask them *in what book the Salic law* ² *was written*? But Jérôme Bignon answered, very apropos, and probably without knowing the full truth of what he said, *that it was written in the hearts of Frenchmen*. Let us suppose, in effect, that a law of so much importance existed only because it was written; it is certain that any authority whatsoever which may have written it, will have the right of annulling it; the law will not then have that character

¹ *View of or attitude toward the world.*

² [The rule, observed in France but not in Britain, that only a male might succeed to the throne.]

of sacredness and immutability which distinguishes laws truly constitutional. The essence of a fundamental law, is, that no one has the right to abolish it: now, how can it be above *all*, if *any one* has made it? The agreement of the people is impossible; and even if it should be otherwise, a compact is not a law, and binds nobody, unless there is a superior authority by which it is guaranteed. Locke endeavours to discover the characteristic feature of law in the expression of united wills; but has thus happened to hit upon the characteristic which exactly excludes the idea of *law*. In fact, united wills form the *regulation*, and not the *law*, which manifestly and necessarily supposes a superior will that makes itself to be obeyed. "In the system of Hobbes," (the same that has had such currency in our day, under the pen of Locke,) "the force of civil laws reposes only upon a convention; but if there is no natural law which requires the execution of laws that are made, of what use are they? Promises, engagements, oaths, are mere words: it is as easy to break this frivolous bond as to form it. Without the doctrine of a Divine Lawgiver, all moral obligation is chimerical. Power on one side, weakness on the other, constitutes the whole bond of human societies."³

What a wise and profound theologian has here said on moral obligation, applies with equal truth to political or civil obligation. Law is not properly *law*, nor does it possess the true sanction of law, unless it emanates from a superior will; so that its essential character is, *that it is not the will of all*: otherwise laws, as we have just remarked, will be *only regulations*; and, as the author just cited further observes: "Those who have had the liberty of making these conventions have not taken away from themselves the power of revoking them; and their descendants, who had no part in making them, are still less bound to observe them."

Hence it is that the good sense of antiquity, happily anterior to sophisms, has sought, on every side, the sanction of laws, in a power above man, either in recognizing that sovereignty comes from God, or in revering certain unwritten laws as proceeding from him. . . .

IX. The more we examine the influence of human agency in the formation of political constitutions, the greater will be our conviction that it enters there only in a manner infinitely subordinate, or as a simple instrument; and I do not believe there remains the least doubt of the incontestable truth of the following propositions:—

1. That the fundamental principles of political constitutions exist before all written law.
2. That a constitutional law is, and can only be, the developement or sanction of an unwritten pre-existing right.

³ [Bergier, *Traité historique et dogmatique de la Religion*, III.]

3. That which is most essential, most intrinsically constitutional, and truly fundamental, is never written, and could not be, without endangering the state.

4. That the weakness and fragility of a constitution are actually in direct proportion to the multiplicity of written constitutional articles.

X. We are deceived on this point by a sophism so natural, that it entirely escapes our attention. Because man acts, he thinks he acts alone; and because he has the consciousness of his liberty, he forgets his dependence. In the physical order, he listens to reason; for although he can, for example, plant an acorn, water it, etc., he is convinced that he does not make the oaks, because he witnesses their growth and perfection without the aid of human power; and moreover, that he does not make the acorn: but in the social order, where he is present, and acts, he fully believes that he is really the sole author of all that is done by himself. This is, in a sense, as if the trowel should believe itself the architect. Man is a free, intelligent, and noble being: without doubt; but he is not less an *instrument of God*, according to a happy expression of Plutarch, in a beautiful passage which here introduces itself of its own accord:

We must not wonder [he says] if the most beautiful and greatest things in the world are done by the will and providence of God; seeing that in all the greatest and principal parts of the world there is a soul: for the organ and tool of the soul is the body, and the soul is the INSTRUMENT OF GOD. And as the body has of itself many movements, and as the greater and more noble are derived from the soul, even so it is with the soul; some of its operations being self-moved, while in others it is directed, disciplined, and guided, by God, as it pleases Him; being itself the most beautiful organ and ingenious instrument possible: for it would be a strange thing indeed that the wind, the water, the clouds, and the rains, should be instruments of God, with which He nourishes and supports many creatures, and also destroys many others, and that He should never make use of living beings to perform any of His works. For it is far more reasonable that they, depending entirely on the power of God, should obey His direction, and accomplish all His will, than that the bow should obey the Scythians, the lyre and flute the Greeks.

No one could write better: and I do not believe that these beautiful reflections could be more justly applied, than to the formation of political constitutions, where it may be said, with equal truth, that man does every thing, and does nothing.

XI. If there is any thing well known, it is the comparison of Cicero, on the subject of the Epicurean system, which proposed to build a world with atoms falling at random in space. *I would rather believe*, says the great Orator, *that letters, thrown into the air, would, on falling, arrange themselves in such a manner as to form a poem*. A thousand voices have repeated and com-

mended this thought; yet, so far as I know, it has not occurred to any person to give it the completeness which it wants. Let us suppose that printed characters, scattered plentifully in the air, should, on coming to the ground form the *Athalie* of Racine; what would be the inference? *That an intelligence had directed the fall and the arrangement of the characters.* Good sense will never conclude otherwise.

XII. Let us now consider some one political constitution, that of England, for example. It certainly was not made *à priori*. Her Statesmen never assembled themselves together and said, *Let us create three powers, balancing them in such a manner, etc.* No one of them ever thought of such a thing. The Constitution is the work of circumstances, and the number of these is infinite. Roman laws, ecclesiastical laws, feudal laws; Saxon, Norman, and Dutch customs; the privileges, prejudices, and claims of all orders; wars, revolts, revolutions, the Conquest, Crusades; virtues of every kind, and all vices; knowledge of every sort, and all errors and passions;—all these elements, in short, acting together, and forming, by their admixture and reciprocal action, combinations multiplied by myriads of millions, have produced at length, after many centuries, the most complex unity, and happy equilibrium of political powers that the world has ever seen.

XIII. Now since these elements, thus projected into space, have arranged themselves in such beautiful order, without a single man, among the innumerable multitude who have acted in this vast field, having ever known what he had done relatively to the whole, nor foreseen what would happen, it follows, inevitably, that these elements were guided in their fall by an infallible hand, superior to man. The greatest folly, perhaps, in an age of follies, was in believing that fundamental laws could be written *à priori*, whilst they are evidently the work of a power above man; and whilst the very committing them to writing, long after, is the most certain sign of their nullity.

XIV. It is very remarkable, that God, having condescended to speak to men, has Himself unfolded these truths, in the two revelations which, through His abounding goodness He has given to us. A very able man,⁴ who has made, in my opinion, a kind of epoch in our age, by reason of the desperate conflict which he exhibits in his writings, between the most frightful prejudices of the age, of sect, of habit, etc., and the purest intentions, the most virtuous emotions, and the most valuable knowledge;—this able man, I say, has decided, "*that a teaching coming immediately from God, or given only by His direction, OUGHT primarily to certify to men the existence of this BEING.*" The opposite of this is the truth; for the primary character of this instruction is not to reveal directly the existence or the attributes of God, but to

⁴ [The reference is probably to Rousseau.]

suppose the whole already known, without our understanding why or in what manner. Thus, it says not, *There is*, or *you shall believe in only one God, eternal, almighty*, etc. It says (and it is its first word,) under a form purely narrative, *In the beginning, God created*, etc., which supposes that the dogma is known before the writing.

XV. Let us pass on to Christianity, the greatest of all imaginable institutions, since it is wholly Divine, made for all men and every age: we shall find it subjected to the general law. Its Divine Author was certainly able to write Himself, or to cause His doctrines to be written; yet He did neither one nor the other, at least in a legislative form. The New Testament, posterior to the death of the Law-giver, and even the establishment of His religion, exhibits a narration of admonitions, moral precepts, exhortations, commands, threats, etc.; but in no wise a collection of dogmas expressed in an imperative form. The Evangelists, in describing that last supper where God loved us *EVEN UNTO THE END*, had there a good opportunity of commanding our belief by writing; they guard themselves, however, from declaring or ordaining any thing. We read, indeed, in their admirable history, *Go, teach!* but not at all, *teach this* or *that*. If doctrine appears under the pen of the sacred historian, he simply expresses it as a thing already known.

The symbols, which appeared afterwards, are professions of faith for its own recognition, or for contradicting the errors of the moment. In them, we read, *we believe*; never, *you shall believe*. We recite them individually; we chant them in the temples, on the lyre and organ, as true prayers, because they are formulas of submission, of confidence, and of faith, addressed to God, and not ordinances addressed to men. I should be glad to see the *Confession of Augsburgh*, or the *Thirty-nine Articles*, set to music; this would be diverting.⁵

The first symbols are far from containing the announcement of *all* our dogmas; on the contrary, Christians then would have regarded the announcement of them *all* as a great sin. The same is true of the Holy Scriptures: there never was an idea more shallow than that of seeking in them for the totality of the Christian doctrines; there is not a line in these writings which declares, or even allows us to discover, the design of making from them a code or dogmatic declaration of all the articles of faith.

XVI. More than this: if a people possess one of these *codes of belief*, we may be sure of three things:

1. That the religion of this people is false.

⁵ Reason can only *speak*; it is love which *chants*; therefore we chant our symbols; for *faith* is only a *belief*, *through love*: she resides not merely in the understanding, she penetrates further and takes root in the will. . . .

2. That it has written its religious code in a paroxysm of fever.

3. That this code will be ridiculed in a little while among this very nation, and that it will possess neither power nor durability. Such are, for example, those famous ARTICLES, *which are signed by more than read, and read by more than believe them*. Not only is this catalogue of dogmas counted for nothing, or next to nothing, in the country which gave them birth; but furthermore, it is manifest, even to a foreign eye, that the illustrious possessors of this sheet of paper are greatly embarrassed with it. In fact, they wish themselves well rid of it, because the national mind, enlightened by time, has grown weary of it; and besides it recalls to them an unhappy origin: but the *constitution is written*.

XVII. The English doubtless, would never have asked for the *Great Charter*, had not the privileges of the nation been violated; nor would they have asked for it, if these privileges had not existed before the Charter. What is true of the State, in this respect, is also true of the Church: if Christianity had never been attacked, there never would have been any writings to settle the dogmas; nor would the dogmas have been settled by writing, had they not pre-existed in their natural state, which is the *oral*.

The real authors of the Council of Trent were the two grand innovators of the sixteenth century. Their disciples having become more calm, have since proposed to us to expunge this fundamental law, because it contains some hard words for them; and they have endeavoured to tempt us, by indicating to us the possibility of a reunion, on that condition, which would make us accomplices instead of rendering us friends; but this demand is neither theological nor philosophical. They themselves formerly introduced into religious language those words which now weary them. Let us desire that they should now learn to pronounce them. Faith, if a sophistical opposition had never forced her to write, would be a thousand times more angelic: she weeps over these decisions which revolt extorted from her, and which were always evils, since they all suppose doubt or aggression, and could only arise in the midst of the most dangerous commotions. The state of war raised these venerable ramparts around the truth: they undoubtedly protected her, but at the same time concealed her: they rendered her unassailable; but by that very means less accessible. Ah! this is not what she craves, she who would embrace the whole human race in her arms.

XVIII. I have spoken of Christianity as a system of belief; I will now consider it as a sovereignty, in its most numerous association. There it is monarchical, as all the world know; and this is as it should be, since monarchy becomes, by the very nature of things, the more necessary, in proportion as the association becomes more numerous. We do not forget that an observation

from an impure mouth has met with approval in our day, affirming *that France was geographically monarchical*. It would be difficult indeed to express this incontestable truth in a manner more happy. But if the extent of France repels the very idea of every other form of government, much more this sovereignty, which, by the essential nature of its constitution, will always have subjects on every part of the globe, requires that it should be only monarchical; and experience is found on this point in perfect accordance with theory. This admitted, who would not believe that such a monarchy would be found more strictly defined and circumscribed than all others, in the prerogative of its chief? It is however altogether otherwise. Read the innumerable volumes conceived and brought forth by foreign war, and even by a species of civil war which has its advantages as well as inconveniences, you will see on every side that facts only are cited; and it is a very remarkable thing especially, that the supreme tribunal should constantly allow dispute upon the question which presents itself to every mind as the most fundamental of the constitution, without ever having wished to determine it by a formal law; and thus it should be, if I am not greatly deceived, by reason of the very fundamental importance of the question. Some men without authority, and rash through weakness, attempted to decide it in 1682, in spite of a great man; and it was one of the greatest acts of folly which has ever been committed in the world. Its monument which remains to us, is doubtless to be condemned in every respect; but it is especially so from one feature which has not been considered, although it invites assault from enlightened criticism more than every other. The famous Declaration dared to decide, by writing, without even apparent necessity (which carried the fault to excess,) a question which ought ever to be left to a certain practical wisdom, enlightened by the UNIVERSAL CONSCIENCE. This is the only point of view which at all coincides with the design of this work; but it is altogether worthy of the meditations of every just mind and upright heart.

XXV. . . . We have been witnesses, within the last twenty-five years, of a solemn attempt made for the regeneration of a great nation mortally sick. It was the first experiment in the great work, and the *preface*, if I may be allowed to express myself thus, of the frightful book which we have been since called upon to read. Every precaution was taken. The wise men of the country believed it their duty to consult the modern divinity, in her foreign sanctuary. They wrote to Delphi, and two famous pontiffs answered in due form.⁶ . . .

XXVII. I believe I have read, somewhere, *that there are few sovereignties in a condition to vindicate the legitimacy of their origin*. Admitting the rea-

⁶ [Rousseau and Mably.]

sonableness of the assertion, there will not result from it the least stain to the successors of a chief, whose acts might be liable to some objections; the cloud, which might conceal from view, more or less, the origin of his authority, would be only a disadvantage,—a necessary consequence of a law of the moral world. If it were otherwise, it would follow, that the sovereign could not reign legitimately, except by virtue of a deliberation of all the people, that is to say, *by the grace of the people*; which will never happen: for there is nothing so true, as that which was said by the author of the *Considerations on France*,—*that the people will always accept their masters, and will never choose them*. It is necessary that the origin of sovereignty should manifest itself from beyond the sphere of human power; so that men, who may appear to have a direct hand in it, may be, nevertheless, only the circumstances. As to legitimacy, if it should seem in its origin to be obscure, God explains Himself, by His prime-minister in the department of this world,—TIME. It is true, nevertheless, that certain contemporary signs are not to be mistaken, when we are in a condition to observe them. . . .

XXVIII. Every thing brings us back to the general rule,—*man cannot create a constitution; and no legitimate constitution can be written*. The collection of fundamental laws, which must essentially constitute a civil or religious society, never has been written, and never will be, *à priori*. It is only when society finds itself already constituted, without being able to say how, that it is possible to make known, or explain, in writing, certain special articles; but in almost every case these declarations or explanations are the effect or cause of very great evils, and always cost the people more than they are worth. . . .

XXXII. The most famous nations of antiquity, especially the most serious and wise, such as the Egyptians, Etruscans, Lacedæmonians, and Romans, had precisely the most religious constitutions; and the duration of empires has always been proportioned to the degree of influence which the religious principle had acquired in the political constitution: *the cities and nations most addicted to Divine worship, have always been the most durable, and the most wise; as the most religious ages have also ever been most distinguished for genius*.

XXXIII. Never have nations been civilized, except by religion. No other known instrument has power over savage man. Without recurring to antiquity, which is very decisive on this point, we see a sensible proof of it in America. For three centuries, we have been there with our laws, our arts, our sciences, our civilization, our commerce, and our luxuries; what have we gained over the savage state? Nothing. We destroy these unfortunate beings, with sword and brandy; we drive them gradually into the interior of the

wilderness, until, at last, they disappear entirely, victims of our vices as well as cruel superiority. . . .

XXXVII. I have felt it proper to dwell principally on the formation of Empires, as being the most important object; but all human institutions are subjected to the same rule, and all are equally null or dangerous, unless they repose on the foundation of all existence. This principle being incontestable, what shall we think of a generation, which has cast all to the winds, even to the foundations of the social edifice, by rendering education purely scientific? It was impossible to be deceived in a manner more dreadful; for every system of education that does not rest upon religion, as its basis, will fall in a trice, or will only diffuse poison through the state; *religion being*, as Bacon has well said, *the aromatic which prevents science from becoming corrupt*.

XXXVIII. The question is frequently asked: *why is there a school of theology attached to every University?* The answer is easy: *It is, that the Universities may subsist, and that the instruction may not become corrupt*. Originally, the Universities were only schools of theology, to which other *faculties* were joined, as subjects around their Queen. The edifice of public instruction, placed on such a foundation, has continued even to our day. Those who have subverted it among themselves, will repent it, in vain, for a long time to come. To burn a city, there is needed only a child or a madman; but to rebuild it, architects, materials, workmen, money, and especially time, will be required. . . .

XL. Not only does it not belong to man to create institutions, but it does not appear that his power, *unassisted*, extends even to change for the better institutions already established. If there is anything evident for man, it is the existence in the universe of two opposing forces, which are in continual conflict. There is nothing good, that evil does not sully or alter; there is no evil, that goodness does not repress and attack, by impelling continually all existence towards a more perfect state. These two forces are every where present: we behold them equally in the vegetation of plants, in the generation of animals, in the formation of languages, and of empires (two things inseparable,) etc. Human power extends only perhaps to removing or combatting the evil, in order to disengage the good, and restore to it the power of developing itself according to its nature. The celebrated Zanolotti has said, *It is difficult to alter things for the better*. This thought contains much sound sense, under the guise of extreme simplicity. It accords perfectly with another thought of Origen, which is alone worth a volume. *Nothing*, says he, *can be changed for the better among men, without God*. All men have a consciousness of this truth, without being in a state to explain it to themselves. Hence that instinctive aversion, in every good mind, to innovations. The word *re-*

form, in itself, and previous to all examination, will be always suspected by wisdom, and the experience of every age justifies this sort of instinct. We know too well what has been the fruit of the most beautiful speculations of this kind.

XLI. To apply these general maxims to a particular case, it is from the single consideration of the extreme danger of innovations founded upon simple human theories, that, without believing myself to be in a state to have a decided opinion, in the way of reasoning, upon the great question of parliamentary reform, which has agitated minds in England so powerfully, and for so long a time, I still find myself constrained to believe, that this idea is pernicious, and that if the English yield themselves too readily to it, they will have occasion to repent. *But*, say the partizans of reform (for it is the grand argument,) *the abuses are striking and incontestable: now can a formal abuse, a defect, be constitutional?* Yes, undoubtedly, it can be; for every political constitution has its essential faults, which belong to its nature, and which it is impossible to separate from it; and, that which should make all reformers tremble, is that these faults may be changed by circumstances; so that in showing that they are new, we cannot prove that they are not necessary. What prudent man, then, will not shudder in putting his hand to the work? Social harmony, like musical concord, is subject to the law of *temperament in the general key*. Adjust the *fifths* accurately, and the *octaves* will jar, and conversely. The dissonance being then inevitable, instead of excluding it, which is impossible, it must be *qualified* by distribution. Thus, on both sides, *imperfection is an element of possible perfection*. In this proposition there is only the form of a paradox. *But*, it will perhaps still be said, *where is the rule by which you may distinguish the accidental defect, from that which belongs to the nature of things, and which it is impossible to exclude?*—Men to whom nature has given only ears, ask questions of this kind; and those who have an ear shrug their shoulders.

XLVII. Withdrawn, by his vain sciences, from the single science which truly concerns him, man has believed himself endowed with power *to create*, whilst he does not so much as possess that of *giving names*. He has believed, —he who has not the power of producing a single insect or a sprig of moss, —that he was the immediate author of Sovereignty, the most important, the most sacred, the most fundamental thing in the moral and political world; and that such a family, for example, reigns, because such a people wills it; while there are numerous and incontestable proofs, that every sovereign family reigns because it is chosen by a superior power. If he does not see these proofs, it is because he shuts his eyes, or looks too closely. He has believed, that it was himself who invented languages; while, again, it belongs to him only

to see that every human language is *learned* and never invented, and that no imaginable hypothesis, within the circle of human power, can explain, with the least appearance of probability, either the formation or the diversity of languages. He has believed that he could constitute nations; that is to say, in other terms, *that he could create that national unity, by virtue of which one nation is not another*. Finally, he has believed that, since he had the power of creating institutions, he had, with greater reason, that of borrowing them from other nations, and transferring them to his own country, all complete to his hand, with the name which they bore among the people from whom they were taken, in order, like those people, to enjoy them with the same advantages. . . .

LX. If the formation of all empires, the progress of civilization, and the unanimous agreement of all history and tradition do not suffice still to convince us, the death of empires will complete the demonstration commenced by their birth. As it is the religious principle which has created every thing, so it is the absence of this same principle which has destroyed every thing. The sect of Epicurus, which might be called *ancient incredulity*, corrupted at first, and soon after destroyed every government which was so unfortunate as to give it admission. Everywhere *Lucretius* announced *Caesar*.

But all past experience disappears before the frightful example afforded by the last century. Still intoxicated with its fumes, men are very far from being, at least in general, sufficiently composed to contemplate this example in its true light, and especially to draw from it the necessary conclusions. It is then very important to direct our whole attention to this terrible scene.

LXI. There have always been some forms of religion in the world, and there have been wicked men who have opposed them: impiety also has always been regarded as a crime; for, as there cannot be a false religion without some mixture of the true, so there cannot be any impiety which does not oppose some divine truth more or less disfigured; *but real impiety can only exist in the bosom of the true religion*; and, by a necessary consequence, impiety has never produced in past times, the evils which it has committed in our day; for its guilt is always in proportion to the light by which it is surrounded. It is by this rule that we must judge the eighteenth century; for it is under this point of view that it is unlike every other. We commonly hear it said, *that all ages resemble each other, and that men are ever the same*; but we must be careful not to believe in these general maxims which indolence or levity have invented to save themselves the troubles of reflection. All ages, on the contrary, and all nations, manifest a peculiar and distinctive character which must be attentively considered. Undoubtedly vice has always existed in the world; but it may differ in quantity, in nature, in its ruling quality and in

intensity. Now, though impious men have always existed, there never was, before the eighteenth century, in the heart of Christianity, *an insurrection against God*; never especially had there been seen, before this, a sacrilegious conspiracy of all the faculties against their Author: now, this has been witnessed in our day. The *vaudeville* has blasphemed as well as the tragedy, and romance as well as history and natural philosophy. Men of this age have prostituted genius to irreligion, and according to the admirable expression of the dying St. Louis, *THEY HAVE WAGED WAR AGAINST GOD WITH HIS GIFTS*. Ancient impiety never gives itself trouble; sometimes it reasons; ordinarily it jests, but always without asperity. Lucretius even never comes to insult; and though his sombre and melancholic temperament might lead him to look upon the dark side of things, even when he accuses religion of having produced great evils, he does it with perfect *sang-froid*.⁷ The ancient religions were not considered of sufficient importance for contemporaneous incredulity to quarrel with them.

LXII. When the *good tidings* were first published to the world, the attack became more violent: nevertheless its enemies always observed a certain moderation. They showed themselves in history only at great intervals, and constantly isolated. There never was a union or formal league among them; they never abandoned themselves to the rage of which we have been witnesses. Bayle even, the father of modern incredulity, was wholly unlike his successors. In his most censurable deviations, we do not find in him any great desire for proselyting, still less the tone of irritation or the spirit of party: he denies less than he doubts; he speaks on both sides; oftentimes he is more eloquent for the good cause than the bad.

LXIII. It was then only in the first part of the eighteenth century, that impiety became really a power. We see it at first extending itself on every side with inconceivable activity. From the palace to the cabin, it insinuates itself everywhere, and infests everything; it has invisible ways, a concealed but infallible action, so that the most attentive observer, witness of the effect, is not always able to discover the means. By an inconceivable delusion, it gains the affections of those even of whom it is the most mortal enemy; and the authority which it is on the point of immolating, thoughtlessly embraces it before receiving the blow. Soon a simple system becomes a formal association, which, by a rapid gradation, changes into a confederacy, and at length into a grand conspiracy which covers Europe.

LXIV. Then that character of impiety which belongs only to the eighteenth century, manifests itself for the first time. It is no longer the cold tone of indifference, or at most the malignant irony of scepticism; it is a mortal hatred; it is the tone of anger, and often of rage. The writers of that period, at least

⁷ [Literally, *cold blood*; i.e., *coolness* or *courage*.]

the most distinguished of them, no longer treat Christianity as an immaterial human error; they pursue it as a capital enemy; they oppose it to the last extreme; it is a war to the death: and, what would seem incredible, if we had not sad proofs of it before our eyes, is, that many of those men, who call themselves *philosophers*, advanced from hatred of Christianity to personal hatred of its Divine Author. They hated Him as really as one hates a living enemy. Two men especially, who will forever be covered with anathemas by posterity, distinguished themselves by this form of flagitiousness which would appear to be above the power of the most depraved human nature.

LXV. However, entire Europe having been civilized by Christianity, and its ministers having obtained high political consideration in every country, the civil and religious institutions were blended, and, as it were, amalgamated in a surprising manner; so that it might be said of all the states in Europe, with more or less of truth, what Gibbon has said of France, *that this kingdom was made by the Bishops*. It was then inevitable that the philosophy of the age should unhesitatingly hate the social institutions, from which it was impossible to separate the religious principle. This has taken place: every government, and all the establishments of Europe, were offensive to it, *because* they were Christian; and *in proportion* as they were Christian, an inquietude of opinion, an universal dissatisfaction, seized all minds. In France, especially, the philosophic rage knew no bounds; soon a single formidable voice, forming itself from many voices united, is heard to cry, in the midst of guilty Europe,

LXVI. "Depart from us! Shall we then forever tremble before the priests, and receive from them such instruction as it pleases them to give us? TRUTH, throughout Europe, is concealed by the fumes of the censer; it is high time that she come out of this noxious cloud. We shall speak no more of Thee to our children; it is for them to know, when they shall arrive at manhood, whether there is such a Being as Thyself, and what Thou art, and what Thou requirest of them. Every thing which now exists, displeases us, because Thy name is written upon every thing that exists. We wish to destroy all, and to reconstruct the whole without Thee. Leave our councils, leave our schools, leave our houses: we would act alone: REASON suffices for us. Depart from us!"

How has God punished this execrable madness? He has punished it, as He created the light, by a single word. He spake, LET IT BE DONE!—and the political world has crumbled.

See, accordingly, how the two kinds of demonstration are united, to force conviction upon the least discerning. On the one hand, the religious principle presides at all political creations; and on the other, every thing disappears, as soon as this is withdrawn.

LXVII. Europe is guilty, for having closed her eyes against these great truths; and it is because she is guilty, that she suffers. Yet she still repels the light, and acknowledges not the arm which gives the blow. Few men, indeed, among this material generation, are in a condition to know the *date, nature, and enormity*, of certain crimes, committed by individuals, by nations, and by sovereignties; still less to comprehend the kind of expiation which these crimes demand, and the adorable prodigy which compels Evil to purify, with its own hands, the place which the eternal Architect has already measured by the eye for His marvellous constructions. The men of this age have taken their side. *They are sworn to set their eyes always bowing down to the earth.* But it would be useless, perhaps even dangerous, to go into further details: it is enjoined upon us *to profess the truth in love*. It is necessary, besides, on certain occasions, to profess it only with respect; and, notwithstanding every imaginable precaution, the step would be slippery, even for the most calm and best minded writer. The world, moreover, comprises always an innumerable multitude of men, so perverse, so profoundly corrupt, that if they should bring themselves to suspect the truth of certain things, their wickedness would be redoubled, and they would render themselves, so to speak, as guilty as the rebel angels. Ah! rather than this, let their brutishness become greater still, if it be possible, to the end that they may not become as guilty as even men can be. Blindness is without doubt a terrible chastisement; sometimes, however, we may see love in it: this is all that it can be useful to say at this time.

ADAM MÜLLER

“IT IS SELDOM that the good parts of his writing irritate me, for he seems to me to have them on loan,” a contemporary once wrote of Adam Müller. In the fifty years of his life (1779–1829), Müller turned his supple pen to many political and philosophical fashions. Before Napoleon humbled Prussia at Jena in 1806, Müller tended to be an admirer of the French Revolution and a liberal. The period between Jena and the anti-Napoleonic wars of Liberation found him popularizing, in his colorful and blurred prose, the philosophical fads of the early romantics. In lectures and writings he developed the doctrine of polarity, of opposition as the source of all nature and society. Under the influence of his patron, Friedrich von Gentz, the translator of Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Müller turned to politics, and in 1808–9 produced his *Elements of Statecraft*, which was later to be used as a source book both by the Austrian Catholic school of economists headed by Othmar Spann and by the Nazi ideologists.

This book, deeply influenced by Burke, develops the doctrine of feudal society whose structure is based upon four functional classes or estates (*Stände*): the nobility, clergy, merchant and artisan. “The three functional classes of the Middle Ages . . . show themselves here as springing from three great economic ideas: Land leads to the nobleman, labor to the citizen, and spiritual capital to the clergy. The fourth element [is] management of physical capital, or trade.”

Active in the anti-Napoleonic movement in Berlin in 1810 (as a member of the *Christliche Deutsche Tischgesellschaft*¹ composed of a group of writers and publicists who excluded from their circle “Jews, Frenchmen and Philistines”), Müller became the ideologist of the nobility and the counterrevolutionary groups opposing as “too revolutionary” the policy of Stein and Gneisenau to wage the war of liberation against Napoleon in a democratic, popular way.

When his maneuvers to get a subsidy from the government for journalistic support of the very reform policy he was anonymously attacking in other journals proved fruitless, Müller moved to Vienna where he became a literary assistant to Metternich, in whose service he remained in various posts until his death.

Although Müller had joined the Catholic Church in 1805 during a visit to Austria, he had kept his conversion a secret while in Prussia. Now, however, while in the employ of the Holy Alliance, he began to revise his earlier concepts and political thought in order to base his doctrine upon the tenets of the Church. The present selection, written in 1819, belongs clearly to the political literature of the Catholic Counterrevolution along with the writings of De Maistre.

¹ *Christian German Dining Club.*

ON THE NECESSITY OF A THEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR ALL POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN PARTICULAR

I. *Explanation of the word state.* State (*status, état*) means situation, condition, or station, and is used especially for those activities, conditions, or bodies without which a complete man is inconceivable. To exist, man must have such a station and be in such a station. We must distinguish two stations of a man: material and personal. The personal condition of man is the totality of his relations to his fellowmen; considered from this point of view man exists *in* a station and is bound by it; he is a member of an order or state. The material station of a man is the totality of his relationships to things, i.e., the totality of his property or his properties; in this material sense man *has* a station, is independent because of it, and is the head of an estate or state.

Any thoroughgoing research in the realm of politics must rest upon the recognition of this original concept of the state. The sense in which the theories formerly prevalent used the word state is an improper and figurative one; hence there is no scientific justification for using a word which excludes all the individual political connections of men to each other, and to things, and refers only to the totality of those connections and to their form as a whole.

Every single man, no matter how mean or how great, is the head of an estate or state, as prince, magistrate, master, householder, proprietor or administrator in some, no matter how small, field of activity; he has a station or is a station, a state; *quisque habet suum*,² a realm of individuality or of genuine, actual freedom; each is a bearer of rights.

Just so surely, however, each man in a station or state belongs to an estate or state; he is an owner and is owned by a state and is ascribed to the latter. None is absolutely free, none sovereign. Every man is subject to law; he is obligated insofar as he has rights.

To sum up: man is a state in a state, *status in statu*. None can be in a state, subordinate to it or obligated to it, without being himself a state, i.e., placed at the head of an estate. In other words: everyone is in his own proper and natural, high or low position, a subordinate to the same degree that he is a ruler; he is bound in duty to the same degree that he is free, and vice versa.

Those, who would apply the fixed concept of the state and permit no state within the state, i.e., no state as a system of states, might well be careful in

² [Each man has what belongs to him.]

their discussions of freedom. For their whole thesis aims at the construction of an order which is empowered only but not obligated, and which, therefore, must, insofar as it can be realized, end all the enduring freedom of the individual. The state, as dreamed of in these theories, is a sovereign order completely unlimited, the abstract idea of that arrogance and unrestrained egoism which motivated its conception. Hence the general agreement that this state will tolerate no state within itself, and that all within its bounds must fuse into a single mass.

II. *The chief cause of the approbation which the false concept of the state has won.* How then did it come about that clear thinkers among our contemporaries not only accept this unnatural, insidious and dead concept of the state, but even embrace and piously revere it? How could these free spirits acquiesce when absolute despotism is enthroned above all other thrones, so that all forms of human affairs, all differences and individuality are fused into one mass; how could they acquiesce in the enshrinement of an absolute law to which all other laws are subordinate and before which different kinds of authority and consequently all differences in human existence and activity must disappear? How then was it possible for good philosophers to rage against their own good, for free spirits to rage against freedom, if not because they had already turned from the true God and denied His immediate intervention and revelation in human affairs?

In the general enthusiasm for the chimera of the absolute state, absolute law and absolute reason, I can see nothing but the yearning and striving of an unhappy generation for the personal God from Whom it has turned aside. All the idolatry still practiced this very hour with the ideas of state, law, and reason revealed itself in the first days of the French Revolution as palpable paganism. Today, as then, the sacrilegious lunacy that man created God and not God man, is still dominant; as is also the lunacy that mankind's craving for eternal reason, authoritative legislation, and a universal state in which all states and estates would be dissolved, has in itself the power and strength to achieve these lofty ends.

We crave a flawless and immutable justice, and take the craving itself for the knowledge, for the power to bring it about, even though it is only a faith. Only a faith, I say: the last echo, the dark memory of a former faith, beside which the highest which men recognized in human consciousness and conviction was mere knowledge.

III. *The nonentity of the abstract state.* Where there is no difference, no contrast, no dualism, no opposition, there is no knowledge. We accept as true the opposition of body and soul; we think of a man either in relation to his neighbors, as member of a state, or in relation to things, to property, to his

properties, in other words, as the head of a state; our entire knowledge of man rests on these observations: We know even ourselves only through the contrast it makes with respect to another self; we know the I only through its opposition to a Thou.

Hence human knowledge is but the endless perception of opposition; and we know of knowing itself only to the extent that it appears in opposition to an anti-knowing.

This anti-knowing, without which no step of knowing is possible, is the other and forward foot by which alone inquiry can march ahead. For the heathen of antiquity as well as of our century it is the urge, the longing for unconditional knowledge: for Christians, it is faith. . . .

IV. *Dismemberment of the concrete and positive state.* The concept of a pure state permitting no other state in its domain, a body politic capable of standing still or moving about, creating and guarding all things but itself without members, a surrogate which is supposed to satisfy completely every craving for liberty and justice (though only the Church can do so), we may now leave to rest on its own bottom. We shall take our stand on the concept of the concrete state described above.

We made the positive assertion, based on general observation, that every person stands in two relationships: that he is simultaneously head of a state and member of another state, that he is in one perspective free, and in other bound, that he is ruler in one, servant in the other, that he administers the law and is subordinate to it. . . .

It is evident that [this] description of the natural order of men does not flow from a merely naturalistic view of mankind, but from a higher source. For the so-called natural man, spoiled by greed and vanity, will never succeed, if he undertakes to rule, in holding himself to the prerequisites of power; nor will he succeed, if he desires to be served, in granting his servants freedom, as the necessary prerequisite for their subordination.

These are hard doctrines for the arrogant reason of those who mean by the word rule only not-serving, and by the word serving only not-ruling; and who think that order among men implies only that they be either hammer or anvil. For they can not help thinking of servitude and obedience as evils, and these evils as passive subjection, this subjection then is thought to be a disgrace, destroying their very manhood. How could they, of themselves, rise to a viewpoint from which service and obedience would appear as the inner secret of true rule, suffering would appear as the revelation of the true power and dignity of man, and subjection would appear as the source of the true worth the essence of man? . . .

V. *The positive state can not be realized in a merely natural way.* How

then can these two relationships in which man stands be united in a natural manner? How can his free will as a private person and head of a state be united with his bondage and subjection as a member of a community, corporation or state, and as a servant of a master?

It is evident, from our analysis of both relationships, that nature has provided a mediator for each. The free will of man, as head of a small state, is checked by his economic dependence upon his subordinates and his property, and this dependence grows in relation to the expansion of the state which he directs. The most powerful and most wilful lord is most constrained economically, and contrariwise the subjection of a man as member of a state or as a subordinate is alleviated by his economic influence upon the whole state of which he is a member.

Hence I say: even in a merely natural perspective man can endure the situation in which nature has placed him. In the meanest, as in the most glorious, state there rules a great law of equation, of compensation. As power expands, concomitant wisdom counsels a commensurate restraint. Every wilful overstepping of the natural bounds of activity or of the state can have as its happiest consequence only the same equilibrium of doing and suffering, of license and bondage, which was to be evaded. For the pain of strife is vain.

From the point of view of nature the actual state of the world, the whole vast network of human stations and states, which with their rulings and sufferings seem to coördinate and subordinate each other, can be called right. This configuration of states and property is right because without asking our consent it is the consequence and law of a purely natural order. The right of nature is the right of might; a merely naturalistic analysis leads to the recognition of what is present, and what is given as present is more complete than anything conceivable, possible or not present for the simple reason that it exists. We call the natural application of natural law intelligence; and it always consists of the use of those means of moderation mentioned above, to which we are bound instinctively by the power of nature which reigns in us. So much for nature!

But we possess the power to oppose, if not to resist, this rule of nature. We can choose whether to follow it or, declining, be torn from its course: *liberum arbitrium*,³ freedom.

But the unconscious use of intelligence as if it were instinct and the subjection to tyrannical right here described is repugnant to the feeling of human freedom and the nobility of our nature.

Hence human freedom violates natural right and operates against this natural intelligence. For man is given the capacity for arrogance and inso-

³ [*Freedom of choice.*]

lence along with freedom, and these rebel against natural law; and he is given the capacity for greed, which brings disgrace to natural intelligence.

Hence comes the great contradiction between right and intelligence, between freedom and subjection, in which the kingdom of this world has been entangled since the beginning of time.

No human legislation or politics can dissolve this contradiction, can end this conflict, for at best only a tyranny similar to nature's can be established, against which the spirit of human liberty will forever rebel. Hence help must come from a source higher than nature.

In the concrete state, or human order, there are the two relationships in which man is both head of one state and member of another, bound-free in the first case and free-bound in the second. But there is thus also a state of contradiction and inner strife of such long duration that eventually a third relation joins the two in which natural man finds himself. And this relationship conciliates and mediates the other two, for it is the relationship of man to the living God. And He takes the place of the cold and hollow concept of nature, for He is higher and infinite, all-embracing and lovable. . . .

XI. *Classification of political sciences.* If man is not only to exist in, but also to consist of the two relationships we described at the beginning, i. e., (1) as head of a state or as private citizen, in relation to himself; (2) as a member of a state or estate, in relation to his neighbors, a third relationship must also be involved. This third relationship conciliates the natural conflict of the other two and gives form to their necessary reciprocity; this is (3) the relationship to God.

We have found that in relationship to himself man is obligated both as a legal subject, as a real private citizen and bearer of rights, and as a legal object bound to his property and his subordinates.

In relation to his neighbors he appears both as head and representative of one house among others, and as a member of a larger house.

In relation to God he is, as we know through direct revelation, on the one hand the servant of God and as such bound to obey all His commands. On the other hand he is the child and image of God, and as such bound to the freedom of Love, to administer faithfully the heritage entrusted to him which he rules as God's steward and chosen lord of the earth. Even without further study of this last mentioned relation to God, a natural observation of man would have led us to note that this last relationship combines a certain degree of lordship and service; these elements however would have seemed contradictory and conflicting. The conciliation of these remains a mystery, and human reason by itself could never arrive at the perception which must

be recognized as the key to all political science: that ruling and serving condition each other, that freedom exists only in and through obedience, and obedience only in and through freedom. . . .

Man is, by God's fatherly arrangement, His image, that is, he is likewise the head of an organic union; God has delegated this fatherhood to each of us, and has assigned to each a particular sphere of freedom, an especial state and body politic over which he is head, and of which he can dispose freely, hence there are infinitely varied states and liberties. True freedom (whose caricature is arbitrariness) exists only within the freedom of others, and hence in obedience to these others, and to God who is the apportioner and fountain-head of all freedom. None can be father but he who is a true child; none lord but a subject. . . .

XII. *On the origin of the state and the so-called social contract.* The prevailing theories of political science ignore the third and most essential of man's relationships, namely the relationship to the living God. Instead, they postulate only the vague relation man bears to himself and the binding imposition of a relation he bears to an external, necessary evil called the state.

Man, for all his desire to be wholly unrestrained, cannot deny that a compulsive, external mechanism in part happens to be, in part must be present to regulate human relations. Inasmuch as he is loathe to acknowledge his heavenly Creator as the guardian and supporter of this external coercive force, he cannot rest until he has deduced the existence of this compulsive mechanism from his own will, and has subordinated himself to it as the highest principle of human conduct. That is, such coercion is to them impossible except as human will imposes and sanctions it. Whatever power of this sort actually exists is a wilful usurpation, and those who are subject to it have just as voluntarily permitted this usurpation to prevail. Since the principle of will can never die, it follows that whether such a power is permitted to continue or not depends entirely on human will.

This presents in its nakedness the theory which all must acknowledge who cannot endure to see God's hand in civil affairs. If the compulsive earthly apparatus is present without God's help, then it can only be a creation of human will, and must remain subordinate to its creator. The will of the rulers can exist only so long as it can dominate the will of the subjects: despots and slaves will hence continually be changing places. This is the kingdom of earth and the right of the stronger in the usual sense of the word.

Benevolent spirits cannot bear even the thought of such a situation yet they believe that the cause of the evil does not lie in our withdrawal from God, Who does not intervene directly in political affairs but only through the medium of reason. They believe that it is not the will which is to blame, since

that is part of the divine gift of reason, but only irrational wilfulness, the abuse of will. Man is supposed to stand in three relationships, namely, as an absolutely free will in relation to himself; as a bound member of a compulsive state in relation to his fellow-men, and as a generally rational being, a citizen of the universal reign of reason in relation to God, i.e., in relation to reason, in which God exists. Before the throne of reason, and on the basis of reason it is necessary only that will enter into a mere rational contract with its concomitant will (or coercion), and for reason to abide by this contract, in order that all absolutely free will may be ended and all abuses of such will be made impossible. This is the fantasy which became so famous in the last two centuries as the social contract, and which had revealed itself, though not so clearly, to several heathens of antiquity. When the question arose as to how this dream is to be realized and the sovereign power of reason is to be applied, another false assumption was called upon to answer: God has so ordered the world, they say, that the majority of these wilful heads will always agree on what is rational and will thus be God's voice, if only they are permitted to speak openly in all circumstances and at all times. Hence, only one universally applicable contract based upon reason need be given to the majority of mankind and it will be guarded forever.

That, following this road, the lovers of benevolence reached the same point reached by the malevolent usurpers of whom we spoke earlier, namely, the point at which the right of the majority is the right of the stronger (in the usual sense of the word) and that in general the only reason a coercive power is needed on earth is precisely because raw majorities in most cases will the evil, or at least do not will the reasonable,—this and all the other incontrovertible arguments against this theory can rest on their own merits so far as our present purpose goes. We are concerned only with the *volonté générale*,⁴ that surrogate of the living God, that personification of pure and unconditional reason, which had to be called to the rescue, in order to make possible any contract between two wilful beings.

There are three parts to a contract: the two parties who sign it and a third, a basis, a social bond between them. Just as two numbers that are added must be of the same order, so must the two parties bound by a contract be of the same nature. When you suppose reason to be that third being which enables the contract to be drawn, you maintain that the common nature of the two contracting parties is that they are both reasonable beings.

But which reason do you mean? Presumably not the reason of one party, but that of both; that reason, upon which both are agreed. Hence it must be the eternal reason in which we believe if we are truly human, the reason which must have spoken to us externally or must have revealed itself to us, if

⁴ [General will.]

we are to agree about it; not that individual and finite reason, which we know, which speaks within us, and on which we cannot all agree inasmuch as we are merely finite and mortal men.

Here we can see the unconscious double meaning upon which rests the whole structure of so-called natural rights and the false political wisdom of our century. The spirit of good in man, or his conscience, strives incessantly to accept a third party into all contracts and affairs of men among each other, a third party which is already present independent of these contracts. Our conscience strives to give this third being the power to safeguard and fulfill and maintain the contract. But the arrogance of human nature does not permit us to acknowledge this real, independent, personal and divine being. Hence, instead of recognizing this eternal and vital reason, which is actually felt and believed by the two parties (for it had already been revealed to them when the first contract was drawn up between two free-born, that is, unequal men), only the limited and dead concept of finite reason is recognized. In order to make it intelligible that the contracting parties are subjecting themselves to their own creation, their own idols, the abstract concept of their own wilfulness, they must fabricate the idea of an equality of being and of claims.

Fundamentally considered, the third being which safeguards the so-called original contract is not really a common ground existing above or between both parties, but merely an assumption that there can be no such social bond except the one generated or established by the wills of both parties. Thus the necessary condition of a contract seems to come from the contract itself. All of these peculiar and vain constructions are the pretended rescuers of finite reason, when it cannot bring itself to obey the divine revelations, and yet it is ever driven back to its eternal source by that unknown driver who accompanies it, namely, conscience.

According to the true concept of the state which we have attempted to establish, it follows that the collective community of men consists of innumerable contracts. Every man, as well as every particular union of men, constitutes a state per se, a proper, distinctive, and in this respect, free being. This inequality (and hence freedom), of all nature is the datum from which all political science proceeds: the first fact of politics. These unequal natures exist with, in and beside each other, thus:

(1) In that they are equal before God, that they stand in equal relationship before the eternal power which has assigned each one to his own finite power, and

(2) In that they recognize this equality before God by their own voluntary

obedience which expresses itself only in their contracting among each other endlessly on the basis of the general status quo.

If it is desired to give a common formula to these contracts and call them the social contract or original contract, it should not be overlooked that there must always be the inequality of the contracting parties, and their agreement on a common object of fear or love, and that the living and personal God must also appear in this formula as the founder and goal of the social contract. . . .

XVI. *On the best constitution.* All constitutions are good in the degree that they rest upon the principle that a person is at once the head of a state and member of another, and in the degree that religion is made the guardian of this principle. For this principle cannot be maintained by human frailty alone, but needs God's authority to support it. All the political affairs of our time, considered as a whole, have tended to make serious thinkers desire a state of affairs in which the people's rights and the ruler's rights would mutually guarantee each other. This obscure expression means an order of things in which the rights of those who serve and the rights of those who rule balance each other. Inevitably then they proceed from this notion to set the prince as the sole ruler over against the people, and to this error only the abstract concepts of state and unity can lead. In the same way this abstract concept has come to be accepted as an involuntary surrogate of the visible Church, i.e., of the visible union of people before God. One is led by the simple nature of things to recognize every citizen as a prince in his own small state. It will be perceived that every individual must rule as well as obey, and that all the errors which we ascribe to failures of our great and general constitution really stem from the fact that the individual has overstepped the bounds of his own small constitution, his small state, the natural and God-given limits of his freedom and obedience. It will become clear that the reproaches made against our own idols, the fetish of the abstract state and its constitution, must be turned against ourselves and our inability to endure any sort of constitution, large or small.

When we are brought by various decisive discoveries to the opinion that the seat of the evil is close to us, and that there can be no peace between prince and people so long as the principles of prince and servant cause dissension in every house, and the right to rule and the duty to obey cause discord in every heart—only then can true political discussion begin. And the question to be solved will be whether ruling and serving in general, or whether freedom and obedience in any great or small circumstance can be brought into harmony by their own efforts. Political dis-

cussions on the general form of the state are vain play, a futile luxury of arrogant reason compared to the gravity of this higher question of the disintegration into which all domestic life, small states and members of the larger states have fallen. And in this discussion the true bankruptcy of human ingenuity will be revealed, no trace will remain of the political castles in the air which our century has erected, no cry of the spirit of our times will be heard, no solace remain but the quiet resolve of an immediate return to religion.

When all the wounds of our century have ceased bleeding and all the passions which blinded our judgment have become calm, the future will accept the convulsions of our days as the awakening of religion. The future will understand the clamorous calls for constitutionality which drowned out quiet political investigation; it will recognize that there was only one constitution of merit, the quest for that first and only political constitution the world has known, the Christian. It will see a dynamic, irresistible desire for that natural situation or state of mankind which an obedient heart would recognize as the direct work of God, but which vain reason can never grasp, since it is by nature unable to recognize any constitution whatsoever.

THE HOLY ALLIANCE

WHEN THE ERA of the French Revolution dawned in 1789, all the thrones of Europe began to shake. To the idea of the Divine Right of Kings, the Revolution opposed the idea of the sovereignty of the nation: to the idea of the hereditary government of a dynasty the Revolution opposed the idea of the temporary, conditional rule of the people's elected servants. The French Revolution did not merely threaten crowns; sweeping away the ancient feudal regime in France, it threatened feudal society everywhere in Europe. Napoleon's armies brought about drastic changes in traditional institutions, particularly in Germany and Italy. The force of French example made itself felt in Prussia and Spain.

It may be said that Napoleon's bid for European hegemony was doomed almost from its very start. Destroying in radical fashion the balance of power, the dictator raised up against himself strong enemies in the form of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England; and the peoples of many countries, fired by national ardor, rallied to the coalition in its effort to overthrow the French tyranny. This determination was embodied in the Treaty of Chaumont, March, 1814, when a declaration was made that the Allies would never lay down their arms until Napoleon was finally vanquished. It was agreed that the Quadruple Alliance thus brought into being should last for twenty years.

On the basis thus established the crowned heads of Europe—that is, the heads of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England—set about the task of repairing the breaches made by the Revolution in the walls of the old society. This, however, was not sufficient for the Tsar Alexander I. The Tsar, who in his youth had toyed with liberal ideas, had developed with the passage of time into a rigorous champion of conservatism. He required that the alliance of the Crowns against the Revolution be cemented in the spirit of a reactionary mysticism that invoked God as guide and sanction. The Holy Alliance, as this new agreement was called, was signed by the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia in September, 1815. A vast review of Russian troops gave point to the occasion.

The alliance of the Crowns was not long in being put to the test. Revolutions against restored sovereigns broke out in 1820 in Naples, Spain, Portugal, and France. Meeting at Troppau, the concert of the Powers established the principle that the *status quo* should be maintained by force if necessary; and the reasons believed to justify intervention in the internal affairs of States were set down.

The following selections are taken from the University of Pennsylvania series, "Translations and Reprints," Vol. I (1896); and W. P. Cresson, *The Holy Alliance* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1922).



TEXT OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE, 1815

THEIR MAJESTIES, the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia, in view of the great events which the last three years have brought to pass in Europe and in view especially of the benefits which it has pleased Divine Providence to confer upon those states whose governments have placed their confidence and their hope in Him alone, having reached the profound conviction that the policy of the powers, in their mutual relations, ought to be guided by the sublime truths taught by the eternal religion of God our Saviour, solemnly declare that the present act has no other aim than to manifest to the world their unchangeable determination to adopt no other rule of conduct, either in the government of their respective countries or in their political relations with other governments, than the precepts of that holy religion, the precepts of justice, charity and peace. These, far from being applicable exclusively to private life, ought on the contrary directly to control the resolutions of princes and to guide their steps as the sole means of establishing human institutions and of remedying their imperfections. Hence their majesties have agreed upon the following articles:

Article I. Conformably to the words of Holy Scripture which command all men to look upon each other as brothers, the three contracting monarchs will continue united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity and, regarding themselves as compatriots, they shall lend aid and assistance to each other on all occasions and in all places, viewing themselves, in their relations to their subjects and to their armies, as fathers of families, they shall direct them in the same spirit of fraternity by which they are animated for the protection of religion, peace and justice.

Article II. Hence the sole principle of conduct, be it between the said government or their subjects, shall be that of rendering mutual service, and testifying by unceasing good-will, the mutual affection with which they should be animated. Considering themselves all as members of one great Christian nation, the three allied princes look upon themselves as delegates of Providence called upon to govern three branches of the same family, viz: Austria, Russia and Prussia. They thus confess that the Christian nation, of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other sovereign than He alone to whom belongs by right the power, for in Him alone are to be found all the treasures of love, of knowledge and of infinite wisdom, that is to say God, our Divine Saviour Jesus Christ, the word of the Most High, the word of life. Their majesties recommend, therefore, to their peoples, as

the sole means of enjoying that peace which springs from a good conscience and is alone enduring, to fortify themselves each day in the principles and practice of those duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to men.

Article III. All those powers who wish solemnly to make avowal of the sacred principles which have dictated the present act, and who would recognize how important it is to the happiness of nations, too long agitated, that these truths should hereafter exercise upon human destiny all the influence belonging to them, shall be received into this Holy Alliance with as much cordiality as affection.

Engrossed in three copies and signed at Paris, year of grace, 1815, September 14/26.

Francis,
Signed Frederick William,
Alexander. . . .

DECLARATION OF TROPPAU, 1820

ANY STATE forming part of the European Alliance which may change its form of interior government through revolutionary means, and which might thus become a menace to other states, will automatically cease to form a part of the Alliance, and will remain excluded from its council until its situation gives every guarantee of order and stability.

The Allied Powers not only formally declare the above to be their unalterable policy, but, faithful to the principles which they have proclaimed concerning the authority of legitimate governments, they further agree to refuse to recognize any changes brought about by other than legal means. In the case of states where such changes have already taken place and such action has thereby given cause for apprehension to neighboring states (if it lies within the ability of the powers to take such useful and beneficent action) they will employ every means to bring the offenders once more within the sphere of the Alliance. Friendly negotiations will be the first means resorted to, and if this fails, coercion will be employed, should this be necessary.

CIRCULAR NOTE FROM TROPPAU, 1820

HAVING BEEN INFORMED of the false and exaggerated rumors which have been circulated by ill-intentioned and credulous persons in regard to the results of the conferences at Troppau, the allied courts deem it necessary to transmit authentic explanations to their representatives at foreign courts, in order to enable them to refute the erroneous ideas to which these rumors have given

rise. The brief report here annexed will enable them to do this, and although it is not proposed to make this the subject of a formal communication the contents may be imparted in a confidential manner. They shall arrange the measures to be taken in this matter with the ministers of the two other allied powers. . . .

The events which took place in Spain, March 8, at Naples, July 2, as well as the catastrophe in Portugal, could not but arouse a feeling of the deepest indignation, apprehension and sorrow in those who are called upon to guard the tranquillity of the nations and at the same time, emphasize the necessity of uniting in order to determine in common the means of checking the misfortunes which threaten to envelop Europe. It was but natural that these sentiments should leave a deep impression upon those powers which had but lately stifled revolution and who now beheld it once more raise its head. Nor was it less natural that these powers, in encountering revolution for the third time, should have recourse to the same methods which they had employed with so much success in the memorable struggle which freed Europe from a yoke she had borne for twenty years. Everything encouraged the hope that that alliance formed in the most critical circumstances, crowned with the most brilliant success and strengthened by the conventions of 1814, 1815 and 1818, as it had prepared the way for, established and assured the peace of the world and delivered the European Continent from the military representatives of Revolution, so it would be able to check a new form of oppression, not less tyrannical and fearful, that of revolt and crime.

Such were the motives and the aim of the meeting at Troppau. The motives are too obvious to need further explanation. The aim is so honorable and justifiable that the best wishes of all right minded persons will doubtless accompany the allied courts into the noble arena they are about to enter. This undertaking which is imposed upon them by their most sacred engagements is a grave and difficult one. But an encouraging presentiment leads them to hope that, by invariably maintaining the spirit of the treaties to which Europe is indebted for the peace and union which reigns amongst its various states, they will attain their end.

The Powers are exercising an incontestable right in taking common measures in respect to those states in which the overthrow of the government through a revolt, even if it be considered simply as a dangerous example, may result in a hostile attitude toward all constitutions and legitimate governments. The exercise of this right becomes an urgent necessity when those who have placed themselves in this situation seek to extend to their neighbors the ills which they have brought upon themselves and to promote revolt and confusion around them.

A situation of this kind and such conduct is an obvious infraction of the arrangement which guarantees to all European governments, in addition to the inviolability of their territory, the enjoyment of peaceful relations, which excludes all reciprocal encroachment upon their rights.

This is the incontestable fact which the allied courts have made their point of departure. Hence the ministers, who might be furnished at Troppau even with positive instructions on the part of their monarchs, came to an agreement upon the plan of action to be followed in regard to those states where the governments had been overturned by violence, and upon the pacific or coercive measures which might bring these states once more into the European alliance, in case the allies could succeed in exercising a distinct, salutary influence. The results of their deliberations were transmitted to the courts of Paris and London, in order that these might take them into consideration.

Nothing could menace more directly the tranquillity of the neighboring states than the revolution at Naples, gaining ground as it did daily. In view of the fact that the allied courts could not be attacked so promptly and immediately as these, it was deemed expedient to proceed in regard to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies according to the principles above enunciated.

In order to prepare conciliatory measures toward this end, the monarchs. convened at Troppau, resolved to ask the King of the Two Sicilies to meet them at Laibach, with the single aim of freeing his majesty from all external compulsion and placing this monarch in the position of mediator between his erring people and the states whose tranquillity they threaten. The monarchs, having resolved in no case to recognize governments set up by a revolt, can only negotiate with the king in person, and their ministers and agents in Naples have been instructed to this effect.

France and England have been requested to co-operate in these measures and it is to be anticipated that they will not refuse since the principle upon which the request is based is completely in accord with the treaties which they have entered into, and affords moreover a guarantee of the fairest and most peaceful intentions.

The system pursued in concert by Prussia, Austria and Russia is in no way new. It is based upon the same principles as those upon which the conventions rested which created the alliance of the European states. The intimate union among the courts which form the nucleus of this Confederation, can only gain hereby in strength and permanence. The alliance will be consolidated by the same means which the powers, to whom it owes its origin, used in its formation, and which have caused the system to be adopted by all the other powers, convinced of its advantages which are more incontestable than ever.

Moreover, it is needless to prove that the resolutions taken by the Powers are in no way to be attributed to the idea of conquest, nor to any intention of interfering with the independence of other governments in their internal administration, nor lastly, to the purpose of preventing wise improvements freely carried out and in harmony with the true interest of the people. Their only desire is to preserve and maintain peace, to deliver Europe from the scourge of revolutions and to obviate or lessen the ills which arise from the violation of the precepts of order and morality.

On such terms, these Powers believe that they may, as a reward for their solicitude and exertions, count upon the unanimous approval of the world.

THE CARLSBAD DECREES

AT ONE STAGE of the French Revolution, the war which France fought against the rest of Europe became a struggle to impose upon the reluctant and "benighted" peoples of other lands the blessings of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Before the long wars were over, it had become customary to think of these blessings in terms of practical realities: a declaration of rights of citizens, a written constitution, an elected legislative assembly, a responsible ministry, and the abolition of inherited political privilege. Belief in these things was called liberalism, radicalism, or Jacobinism. Napoleon paid lip service to revolutionary doctrines, and his soldiers and civilian administrators in conquered territories spread these ideas over much of Europe.

The leaders of the Great Powers who defeated Napoleon in the end did so with the idea of relegating the despised revolutionary ideas to oblivion and of restoring the principles of legitimacy, aristocracy, and privilege to their former dignity. It was shortly discovered, however, that although Napoleon's defeat was followed by a revulsion from revolutionary ideas and practices which took form as romantic traditionalism, the revolutionary solution to social and political problems still retained its attraction for many inhabitants of Western Europe.

In France, the Jacobin tradition was so strong that the Great Powers maintained a surveillance of French domestic affairs for several years, through their armies of occupation and their Council of Ambassadors in Paris. In the long run, their efforts failed, as the Revolution of 1830 was to show. In England, the ambitions of the politically unsatisfied industrial classes, both rich and poor, and the desperation of impoverished agricultural laborers soon provided an active challenge to the political dominance of the privileged, landed aristocracy. In order to restrain their agitation, the frightened aristocrats adopted highly repressive measures in 1817 and 1819 withdrawing the traditional right of habeas corpus and the right to bear arms and assemble freely, and severely restricting the free distribution of the press. Eventually, in 1832, they were compelled to yield to the extent of giving at least the propertied class and the industrial capitalists a greater share of government and so compromising their belief in the justice of inherited political privilege and power.

The situation in the Germanies was not dissimilar. Here liberalism was more of an intellectual movement receiving ardent support from instructors and students in the universities. It was particularly popular among the members of the General Youth Society or Students' League (*Burschenschaften*), branches of which had been organized in the universities during the last years of the struggle against Napoleon. Also there was more sympathy for the new ideas in the south and west of Germany, where the cultural affinity to France was greater. In Baden, directly across the Rhine from Alsace, a liberal constitution had actually been adopted. And one article of the constitution of the German Confederation, established in 1815, seems to have anticipated the adoption of similar constitutions by the rest of the German states.

This, however, was not the intention of the leaders of the new Confederation. Neither Frederick William III of Prussia, Francis I of Austria, nor his chancellor, Prince Metternich, had any sympathy with liberalism, and they had no intention of surrendering the principles of aristocratic privilege or of government by monarchical authority.

Seizing upon the occasions of a national meeting of the *Burschenschaften* at the Wartburg in October, 1817 (where certain symbols of oppression were burned in a bonfire), and the murder of a reactionary poet-historian by a demented student of theology shortly thereafter, Metternich invited the more important princes of Germany who were convened at Carlsbad in Bohemia in August, 1819, to consider ways of dealing with the "restless disposition of men's minds" which, he asserted, was the cause of so much provocative and inflammatory literature, of the spread of illegal student associations, and the perpetration of individual acts of terrorism.

In order to "restore peace and order, respect for law, the general welfare, and the undisturbed possession of property," the Austrian Chancellor proposed the adoption of the resolutions printed below. The conference agreed. The resolutions were then presented to the Assembly of the Confederation (the Diet) on September 20, 1819, and adopted. The resolutions were kept on the books for nearly twenty years, and during this time liberalism was silenced everywhere in Germany.

There were four decrees. The first dealt with the technique of enforcing these and other resolutions of the Assembly in the territories of states who were not in sympathy with them, and it provided for the use of military force to be authorized by the Assembly. The other three decrees follow. They have been translated from the *Protokolle der deutschen Bundesversammlung*, Vol. VIII.



RESOLUTION CONCERNING MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED IN REGARD TO THE UNIVERSITIES

Article 1. A special governmental representative, endowed with proper instructions and extensive powers, shall be appointed to each university, and he shall reside in the locality of the university. He may be the existing Curator or any other man whom the government may deem qualified.

The functions of this plenipotentiary shall be: to see to the strictest enforcement of the existing laws and disciplinary regulations, to observe carefully the spirit in which the instructors conduct their public and class-room lectures, to give this spirit salutary guidance with a view to the future attitude of the students, without, however, interfering directly in matters of scholarship or methods of instruction, and finally, to devote unceasing attention to everything that might contribute to the promotion of morality, good order, and propriety among the students.

The relations between these extraordinary agents and the University Senates, as well as all matters pertaining to the definition of their spheres of action and methods of procedure, shall be stipulated as precisely as possible in the instructions which they shall receive from the heads of their governments, and which shall be drawn up with regard to the circumstances that have necessitated their appointment.

Article 2. The Confederated Governments mutually pledge themselves to remove from Universities and other such institutions of learning all university instructors and other public teachers who have shown themselves obviously unfit for the administration of the important office entrusted to them, either by demonstrable deviation from duty or by exceeding the bounds of their profession, by abuse of their legitimate influence upon the minds of youth, or by disseminating pernicious ideas which are dangerous to the public peace and order or are subversive of the basis of existing governmental institutions; saving that, until definitive regulation of this matter shall be decided upon, and as long as the present resolution is in effect, these obligations may not constitute any impediment to the various governments. Moreover, no measure of this sort may be undertaken except upon the fully documented proposal of the appointed governmental representative to the university or upon the basis of a report previously demanded of them.

A teacher who has been expelled in this fashion may not be appointed again to any public institution of learning in any other state of the Confederation.

Article 3. The laws which have existed for some time against secret and unauthorized societies in the universities shall remain in full force and severity; and especially they shall all the more definitely apply to the association established some years since under the name of *Allgemeine Burschenschaft*¹ since this society is based upon the utterly inadmissible conception of lasting fellowship and communication between the universities. In considering this matter the governmental agents shall be obligated to exercise especial vigilance.

The governments agree that no individual who shall be proved to have entered into, or remained in, any such secret or unauthorized association after the publication of the present resolution, may be admitted to any public office.

Article 4. No student who is expelled from a university by a decision of the University Senate which has been approved or proposed by the governmental agent, and no student who leaves the university in order to escape such action, may be admitted to another university; furthermore, no student may be accepted in another university without a certificate of good behavior from the university he has left.

RESOLUTION CONCERNING PRESS LAW

Article 1. As long as the present resolution remains in force, publications which appear in the form of daily newspapers or as periodicals, similarly publications which do not exceed twenty pages of print, may not be sent to press in any state of the German Confederation without the foreknowledge and previous approval of the government officials.

Publications which do not belong to one of the categories here mentioned shall henceforth be treated according to laws already proclaimed or to be proclaimed in the separate Confederate States. If any such publication, however, should give any Confederate State cause for complaint, action shall be taken against the author or publisher of the publication in question, in the name of the government to which the complaint was directed and according to the practice prevailing in the separate states of the Confederation.

Article 2. Precise designation of the measures and provisions required for the enforcement of this resolution is left up to the individual governments. These measures must be of such a nature, however, as to satisfy completely the meaning and purpose of the main provisions of Article 1.

Article 3. Since the present resolution is occasioned by the need for preventative measures against the abuse of the press, which need is recognized by the Confederate Governments under the existing circumstances, the press laws, which apply to classes of publications listed in Article 1, and which provide for the judicial prosecution and punishment of abuses and offenses already committed, cannot be regarded as adequate in any of the Confederate States as long as the present resolution remains in force.

Article 4. For publications appearing within its jurisdiction, and consequently for those included under the provisions of Article 1, in so far as they may injure the honor or safety of another Confederate State or attack its constitution or administration, each State of the Confederation is responsible not only to the offended party itself, but to the entire Confederation.

Article 5. In order that this mutual responsibility, which is basic to the nature of the German Confederation and inseparable from its existence, may not cause any disturbance of the existing friendly relations between the Confederate Governments, all members of the German Confederation mutually accept the solemn obligation to proceed earnestly and vigilantly to the supervision of the newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets published within their jurisdiction and to manage this supervision so as to obviate in every way possible mutual recriminations and unpleasant incidents.

Article 6. In order, however, that the collective and mutual guarantee of

inviolability both of the Confederation as a whole and of the individual members (which is the concern of this resolution) may not be endangered in a single respect, the government of a Confederated State which believes itself to have been injured by any publication appearing within the jurisdiction of another of the Confederated States, and is unable to obtain complete satisfaction and redress by friendly discussion or diplomatic correspondence, shall in any such case have the privilege of complaining of such publications before the Assembly of the Confederation. The latter, thereupon, shall be obliged to provide a commission to investigate the complaints presented and, if these are found to be justified, to provide by a definitive verdict for the immediate suppression of the publication in question as well as further issues of the same if it should belong to the category of periodicals.

The Confederate Assembly shall have the right, moreover, to suppress upon its own authority, without being petitioned, publications included in the provisions of Article 1, in whatever German State they may appear, if, in the opinion of a committee appointed by it, they run counter to the honor of the Confederation, the safety of individual states, or the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in Germany. There shall be no appeal from such decisions, and the governments involved are bound to see that they are put into execution.

Article 7. If a newspaper or periodical is suppressed by order of the Confederate Assembly, the editor thereof may not, within five years, be admitted to the editorship of a similar publication in any state of the Confederation.

The authors, publishers, and dealers of publications included under the provisions of Article 1 shall remain in other respects free of all further responsibility if they have complied with the requirements of this resolution; and the decisions of the Assembly of the Confederation provided for in Article 6 shall be directed exclusively against publications, never against persons.

Article 8. All members of the Confederation undertake to inform the Assembly of the Confederation, within a period of two months, of the decrees and regulations by which they propose to discharge their obligations under Article 1 of this resolution.

Article 9. All publications appearing in Germany, whether or not they are among those designated in this resolution, must be provided with the name of the publisher, and, in so far as they belong to the category of newspapers or periodicals, also with the name of the editor. Publications in which this regulation is not observed may not be put into circulation in any state of the Confederation and, if distributed clandestinely, they must be seized upon their appearance and the distributor of the same must be punished by an appropriate fine or imprisonment, according to the nature of the circumstances.

Article 10. The present provisional resolution shall remain in force for five

years from this day. Before the expiration of this time, the Assembly shall study thoroughly the manner in which the uniform regulations mentioned in Article 18 of the Act of Confederation concerning the freedom of the press may best be provided, and thereupon bring to pass a final resolution concerning the proper limits of the freedom of the press in Germany.

*RESOLUTION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
CENTRAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE
REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES DISCOVERED IN
SEVERAL STATES OF THE CONFEDERATION*

Article 1. Within fourteen days, reckoned from the adoption of the present resolution, a Central Investigation Commission, appointed by the Confederation and consisting of seven members including the chairman, shall meet in the city and federal fortress of Mainz.

Article 2. The purpose of the Commission shall be to investigate jointly, and as thoroughly and extensively as possible, and to establish the facts concerning the origin and manifold ramifications of the revolutionary activity and demagogic associations directed against the existing Constitution and the domestic peace of the entire Confederation as well as of the individual Confederated States, direct or indirect evidence of which is already at hand or may come to light in the course of the investigation.

Article 3. The Assembly of the Confederation shall choose, by a majority vote in the Assembly, the seven members of the Confederation who are to name the members of the Central Investigating Commission.

The seven commissioners, appointed by the members of the Confederation, shall, upon having established themselves as the Central Investigating Commission, elect a chairman from their midst.

Article 4. Only government officials, who hold or have held a judicial office in the state which appoints them, or who have already undertaken important investigations, may be appointed members of the Central Investigating Commission.

Each commissioner shall be provided by his government with an official actuary or secretary who collectively shall form the personnel of the Commission.

The chairman shall apportion the business to be done among the individual members.

After a preliminary report, decisions shall be made by majority vote.

Article 5. In order to achieve their purpose, the Central Investigating Com-

mission shall assume direction of local investigations which have been or may in the future be undertaken in the various Confederate States.

Officials who have hitherto conducted such investigations or may hereafter conduct them, shall be instructed by their governments to forward reports of proceedings which have taken place under their direction to the Central Investigating Commission, either in the original or in copies and as soon as possible. They shall further be ordered to carry out promptly and fully all instructions which they may receive from the said Federal Commission, and to proceed with the necessary investigations with the greatest possible thoroughness and expedition, and to cause the arrest of the accused persons.

Moreover, the local officials shall be ordered by the chiefs of their governments to maintain constant communication with the Central Investigating Commission, as well as with themselves, and to support one another in accordance with Article 2 of the Act of Confederation.

Article 6. All members of the Confederation within whose jurisdiction investigations have already been introduced, pledge themselves to notify the Central Investigating Commission, immediately upon its establishment, of the local officials or commissioners whom they have entrusted with the investigation.

The members of the Confederation, in whose states investigations of this sort have not yet been initiated, but which nonetheless may yet become necessary, are obliged to institute an investigation immediately upon receipt of a request of this import from the Central Investigating Commission, and to signify to the Central Commission the officials who have been assigned to the undertaking.

Article 7. The Central Federal Commission is authorized to examine individuals itself, when it deems this necessary. In order to summon these individuals, it shall apply to the superior state authorities, or to the authorities which have been indicated to them in accordance with Article 6. In cases where the Central Commission believes it to be unavoidably necessary, and upon the demand of the Central Commission directed, as provided above, to the superior state authorities or the local officials already designated, these persons shall be arrested and sent under secure guard to Mainz.

Article 8. The necessary provisions shall be made for the safekeeping of individuals transported to the seat of the Commission.

The expenses of the Commission as well as of the investigation itself, shall be borne by the Confederation.

Article 9. The Central Investigating Commission shall rely upon the present resolutions of the Confederation instead of special instructions.

In all instances where difficulties arise, especially if the Central Investigating Commission feels obliged to obtain additional administrative orders, the Commission shall report to the Assembly of the Confederation, which shall then appoint a commission of three from among its own members to initiate discussion of a resolution and make a report.

Article 10. Moreover, the Central Investigating Commission shall, from time to time, report to the Assembly of the Confederation upon the results of the investigation, which is to be carried out as speedily as possible.

The Assembly of the Confederation shall decide to institute legal proceedings according to individual results or to the outcome of the entire deliberations whenever they shall have been completed.

REACTION IN ENGLAND

WITH THE END of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, the British economy entered a period of depression marked by both falling prices for manufactured goods and consequent unemployment, and higher grain prices owing to poor crops and increased tariffs.

The disfranchised lower middle class and labor began to demand a reform of Parliament that would pave the way for legislation favorable to their interests. Radicals like William Cobbett led the fight against the ruling oligarchy, and an unsophisticated public turned to mass meetings to press for a political reform which they felt would in itself cure their economic ills. Some of the mass meetings produced riots, from the Spa Fields meeting at London in 1816, to the "Peterloo" massacre at Manchester in 1819, when local officials ordered soldiers to attack the crowd.

The government reacted with a series of measures, culminating in the Six Acts of 1819, that dealt a severe blow to such English liberties as habeas corpus, and the freedom of assembly and the press.

The following selections are taken from Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, Jan. 27–April 13, 1818, and Nov. 23, 1819–Feb. 28, 1820.



REPORT OF THE SECRET COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNAL STATE OF THE COUNTRY

THE FIRST OBJECT of Your Committee, in examining the Papers which have been referred to their consideration, has been, to form a just estimate of the internal State of the Country, from the period when the Second Report of the Secret Committee, in the last Session of Parliament, was presented, to the present time.

The Insurrection, which broke out in the night between the 9th and 10th of June, on the borders of Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, shortly before the close of the sitting of that Committee, was the last open attempt to carry into effect the Revolution, which had so long been the object of an extended Conspiracy. The arrest of some of the principal Promoters of these treasonable designs, in different parts of the Country, had deranged the plans, and distracted the councils, of the Disaffected; occasioned delays and hesitation in the appointment of the day for a simultaneous effort; and finally, left none, but the most infatuated, to hazard the experiment of Rebellion.

The suppression of this Insurrection (following the dispersion of the partial rising which had taken place the night before in the neighbourhood of Huddersfield,) the apprehension and committal of the leaders for trial in the regular course of law, under the charge of High Treason, and the detention of several others of the most active delegates and agitators, under the authority of the Act of the last Session, frustrated all further attempts at open violence. But the spirit of disaffection does not appear to have been subdued; disappointment was frequently expressed by the disaffected, at the failure of an enterprize, from the success of which a relief from all distress and grievances had been confidently predicted; and the projected Revolution was considered as not less certain, for being somewhat longer delayed.

In the course of the succeeding month, Bills of Indictment for High Treason were found against forty-six persons, at the Assizes at Derby; which must have tended still further to check the progress of Sedition, by apprizing the wavering of the danger to which they were exposed, and over-awing the remainder of the more determined leaders. On the Trials which took place in October, twenty-three were either convicted by the Verdict of the Jury, or pleaded guilty; against twelve, who were mostly young men, and related to some of the Prisoners already convicted, the Law Officers of the Crown declined offering any evidence. The remaining eleven had succeeded in absconding, and have not yet been apprehended. The result of these Trials, and the examples which followed, seem to have had the effect which might be expected, of striking a terror into the most violent of those engaged in the general conspiracy; whilst the lenity shown to the deluded, was gratefully felt by the individuals themselves, and restored quiet and subordination to the district, which had been the principal scene of disturbance.

In the course of the Autumn, a gradual reduction in the price of provisions, and still more an increased demand for labour, in consequence of a progressive improvement in the state of agriculture, as well as of trade and manufactures in some of their most important branches, afforded the means of subsistence and employment to numbers of those, who had been taught to ascribe all the privations to which they were unfortunately subjected, to defects in the existing Constitution.

Your Committee see fresh cause to be convinced of the truth of the opinion expressed by the first Secret Committee, which sat in the last year, of the general good disposition and loyalty of the great body of the People; and they advert with pleasure to the confirmation afforded by the late Trials at Derby, of the testimony borne in the Report of the last Committee, to the exemplary conduct of the mass of the population, in the Country through which the insurrection passed. They have no doubt, that the numbers of those who were

either pledged, or prepared to engage in actual insurrection, has generally been much exaggerated by the leaders of the disaffected, from the obvious policy, both of giving importance to themselves, and of encouraging their followers. It is, however, impossible to calculate the extent to which any insurrection, not successfully opposed in its outset, might have grown in its progress through a population, in a state of reduced employment, of distress, and of agitation. In such a state of things, opportunity would, no doubt, have been afforded to active and plausible demagogues, for seducing into acts of violence and outrage, persons altogether unaware of the nature and consequences of the measures, to which they were called upon to lend their assistance; that these consequences would have involved the destruction of the lives and property of the loyal and well-affected, in the event of any decided, though temporary, success of the insurgents, is sufficiently evident, from the designs which have in some instances been proved.

It was therefore the duty of the Magistracy, and of the Government, not only to prepare the means of effectual resistance to open force; but, where they had the opportunity, to defeat the danger in its origin, by apprehending the leaders and instigators of conspiracy. Your Committee indulge the hope, that the hour of delusion, among those who have been misled into disaffection, may be passing away; and that some, even of the deluders themselves, may have seen, and repented of their error. But Your Committee would deceive the House, if they were not to state it as their opinion, that it will still require all the vigilance of Government, and of the Magistracy, to maintain the tranquillity, which has been restored. It will no less require a firm determination among the moral and reflecting members of the community, of whatever rank and station they may be, to lend the aid of their influence and example, to counteract the effect of those licentious and inflammatory publications, which are poured forth throughout the Country, with a profusion heretofore unexampled.

Your Committee have hitherto applied their observations to the lately disturbed districts in the Country. In adverting to the state of The Metropolis, during the same period, they have observed, with concern, that a small number of active and infatuated individuals have been unremittingly engaged, in arranging plans of insurrection, in endeavouring to foment disturbances that might lead to it, and in procuring the means of active operations, with the ultimate view of subverting all the existing establishments of the Country, and substituting some form of Revolutionary Government in their stead. Your Committee however, have the satisfaction to find, that, notwithstanding the desperation and confidence of the leaders, the proselytes that have been gained to their cause are not numerous. The sensible improvement in the

comforts and employment of the labouring part of the community, has tended to diminish at once the motives of discontent, and the means of seduction. The mischief does not appear to have extended into any other rank of life, than that of the persons referred to in the First Report of the Secret Committee of last year, nor to have received countenance from any individuals of higher condition.

Eager as these agitators are, to avail themselves of any popular assemblage, still more, of any occasion that might happen to arise of popular discontent, and capable as they appear, from their own declarations, to be of any act of atrocity, Your Committee see no reason to apprehend that the vigilance of the Police, and the unrelaxed superintendence of Government, may not, under the present circumstances of the Country, be sufficient to prevent them from breaking out into any serious disturbance of the public peace.

The attention of Your Committee has next been directed to the Documents, which have been laid before them, relative to the apprehension of the several persons suspected of being engaged in treasonable practices, who have been detained under the authority of the Acts of the last Session. They have examined the charges upon which the several detentions have been founded, and find them, in all instances, substantiated by depositions on oath. Your Committee have no hesitation in declaring, that the discretion thus intrusted to His Majesty's Government, appears to them to have been temperately and judiciously exercised, and that the Government would, in their opinion, have failed in its duty, as Guardian of the Peace, and Tranquillity of the Realm, if it had not exercised, to the extent which it has done, the powers intrusted to it by the Legislature. Of the thirty-seven Persons, which is the whole number of those who were finally committed, one was discharged on the 4th of July, one on the 31st on account of illness, ten on the 12th of November, fourteen on the 3d of December, one on the 22d of December, six on the 29th of December, and three on the 20th of January, and one died in prison. From the circumstances of the Country, as laid before Your Committee, and as publicly notorious during the period in which those imprisonments took place, Your Committee see no reason to doubt that the detention of the several Prisoners, was governed by the same sound discretion, which, as Your Committee have already stated, appears to have been exercised in apprehending them. The whole of the arduous duties confided to the Executive Government, appears to Your Committee to have been discharged with as much moderation and lenity, as was compatible with the paramount object of general security.

*PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE INTERNAL STATE
OF THE COUNTRY*

*Resolutions Passed at the Meeting Held on Hunslet Moor,
near Leeds, 19 July, 1819*

RESOLVED, 1st. That there is no such thing as servitude in nature; and therefore all statutes and enactments that have tendency to injure one part of society for the benefit of the other, is a gross violation of the immutable law of God.

2d. That as our legislators have, in innumerable instances, manifested a cruel and criminal indifference to our truly distressed situation, and treated our petitions with contempt, we therefore make this solemn appeal to our oppressed fellow countrymen, praying them to join us in forming a National Union, the object of which is to obtain an overwhelming majority of the male population, to present such a petition as can scarcely fail to have the desired effect, and to adopt such other constitutional measures as may be deemed most expedient to procure for us the redress of our manifold grievances.

3d. That we are perfectly satisfied that our excellent Constitution, in its original purity, as it was bequeathed to us by our brave ancestors, is fully adequate to all the purposes of good government; we are therefore determined not to rest satisfied with any thing short of the Constitution—the whole Constitution—and nothing but the Constitution.

4th. That as we are perfectly satisfied that annual parliaments and universal suffrage constitute an essential part of our constitution, and are our rightful inheritance—we shall consider our grievances unredressed, and our indisputable rights withheld from us, until we are possessed of such annual parliament and universal suffrage.

5th. That this meeting cannot but view with regret the apathy of our should-be-leaders, that is our men of property, in not supporting our mutual rights, convinced that alienation of the rich from the poor, must, in the end, be the ruin of both; that whenever oppression or despotism militates, or is the ruin of one, it must, in the end, be the destruction of the other; we therefore entreat them, ere it be too late, to stand forward and espouse the constitutional rights of the people, by endeavouring to obtain a radical reform in the system of representation, which can alone save the trading and labouring classes from ruin.

6th. That we believe the distresses we now suffer have originated in boroughmongering system, aided by a depreciated paper currency, which

has involved the nation in one hundred thousand millions of debt, and which has increased taxation to such an extent as has nearly destroyed our manufactures and commerce; and we are perfectly satisfied that nothing but a currency convertible into specie, a rigid economy, and an equal representation, can either put an end to our sufferings, or save our country from ruin.

7th. That the saving bank scheme, which was instituted under a pretence of benefiting the working classes, when nearly three-fourths of them were out of employ, is an insult to common sense and real understanding, and ought to be considered as what it really is,—an engine to work the last shilling out of the pockets of a few old servants and retired tradesmen, to enable the bank and boroughmongers to pay the fractional parts of the dividends, and to create a sort of lesser fund holders of those who know no better than to make a deposit of their hard earnings to fill the pockets of those who are draining them of their last shilling.

8th. That, as distress has become so general and extensive, ^{and to} ~~we apprehend~~ it highly necessary, that deputy meetings should be appointed, and ~~our practice~~ deputy meetings, district meetings, to meet at any place that may be thought proper; that these meetings shall extend throughout the three United Kingdoms, and that they do consist of men discreet and wise, and out of these shall be appointed men to form a National Meeting, that the whole may be brought to one focus, in order that they may devise the best plan of obtaining a Radical Reform, upon the principle of Annual Parliaments, Universal Suffrage, and Election by Ballot.

9th. That no redress can be obtained but from ourselves; that we amply possess the means; and if we fail to adopt them with vigour, and resolutely persevere therein, we shall merit every privation we may have to endure, and deserve the detestation of posterity, to whom we shall leave a greater legacy of tyranny and oppression than ever was bequeathed from one generation to another.

10th. That should the usurpers of our rights, in order to retain their power, proceed to acts of violence against the people, and even succeed in incarcerating individuals, we earnestly entreat our fellow-countrymen not to suffer their exertions to relax, but, on the contrary, persevere in the steady path of duty, looking to the end, even the salvation of our country; and our fellow-countrymen will endeavour to lighten the fetters, and enliven the dungeons of those men who are now suffering, or may hereafter suffer in the sacred cause of liberty.

11th. That we consider it to be the duty of every well-meaning subject, to stand with all his might against oppression and partial law; in doing which,

an individual exposes himself to destruction, but if the whole community act as one man, success must be the result.

12th. That every well-wisher to mankind cannot but consider it to be his duty to endeavour, by every means in his power, to work a thorough reformation in the political and moral state of the country; and the surest mean is to lay aside every sordid maxim of avarice, and abandon the restraints of luxury and false ambition, which are at present so fatal to the nation.

13th. That a very small number of men who have guided the councils, and have plundered the people in order to complete their fraud, have hired the offscouring of society to print and publish newspapers, who have nearly succeeded in making thousands who might have been the leaders and friends of the people, believe the present system was for our good, when they were fattening on our property, and reducing all classes of society, till they have at last brought us to a strait from whence there are no issues but through a radical reform.

14th. That the passing of corn laws in opposition to the express will of the people—the combination act, in order to prevent work people from unitedly attempting to raise their wages in proportion to the advancement of provisions—and the imposing a duty on foreign wool, at a time when the woollen manufacture, and those employed therein, are in the most deplorable condition—appear to this meeting, proof positive, that until the Members of the Commons House are really appointed by the people at large, little improvement is to be expected in the circumstances of the people, or diminution of their distress.

15th. That as soon as an eligible person, who will accept the appointment, can be found to represent the unrepresented part of the inhabitants of Leeds, in the House of Commons, another meeting shall be called for the purpose of electing him to that situation.

My Lord,

Manchester, 16th August 1819,
Quarter past Nine.

Mr. Norris being very much fatigued by the harassing duty of this day, it becomes mine now to inform your Lordship of the proceedings which have been had in consequence of the proposal put forward for a meeting. The Special Committee have been in constant attendance for the last three days, and contented themselves till they saw what the complexion of the meeting might be, or what circumstances might arise, with coming to this determina-

tion only, which they adopted in concurrence with some of the most intelligent gentlemen of the town, not to stop the numerous columns which were from various roads expected to pour in, but to allow them to reach the place of their destination.

The assistance of the military was of course required, and arrangements in consequence made with them, of such description as might be applicable to various circumstances.

About eleven o'clock the Magistrates, who were very numerous, repaired to a house, whence they might see the whole of the proceedings of the meeting. A body of special constables took their ground, about two hundred in number, close to the hustings; from them there was a line of communication to the house where we were. Mr. Trafford Trafford was so good as to take the situation of attending Colonel L'Estrange, the commanding officer.

From eleven till one o'clock, the various columns arrived, attended by flags, each by two or three flags; and there were four, if not more, caps of liberty. The ensigns were of the same description as those displayed on similar occasions, with this addition, that one had a bloody pike represented on it; another, "Equal representation or death." There was no appearance of arms or pikes, but great plenty of sticks and staves; and every column marched in regular files of three or four deep, attended with conductors, music, &c. The most powerful accession was in the last instance, when Hunt and his party came in. But, long before this, the Magistrates had felt a decided conviction that the whole bore the appearance of insurrection; that the array was such as to terrify all the King's subjects, and was such as no legitimate purpose could justify. In addition to their own sense of the meeting, they had very numerous depositions from the inhabitants, as to their fears for the public safety; and at length a man deposed as to the parties who were approaching, attended by the heaviest column. On a barouche-box was a woman in white, who, I believe, was a Mrs. Gant from Stockport, and who, it is believed, had a cap of liberty. In the barouche were Hunt, Johnson, Knight, and Moorhouse of Stockport: as soon as these four parties were ascertained, a warrant issued to apprehend them. The troops were mustered, and Nadin, preceding the Manchester Yeomanry Cavalry, executed it. While the Cavalry was forming, a most marked defiance of them was acted by the reforming part of the mob; however, they so far executed their purpose, as to apprehend Hunt and Johnson on the hustings: Knight and Moorhouse in the moment escaped. They also took on the hustings Saxton, and Sykes, who is the writer to the Manchester Observer, and which Saxton had before been addressing the mob. The parties thus apprehended, were brought to the house where the

Magistrates were. In the mean time the Riot Act was read, and the mob was completely dispersed, but not without very serious and lamentable effects. Hunt, &c. were brought down to the New Bailey; two Magistrates and myself, having promised them protection, preceded them; we were attended by special Constables and some Cavalry. The parties were lodged in the New Bailey; and since that have been added to them Knight and Moorhouse. On inquiry, it appeared that many had suffered from various instances; one of the Manchester Yeomanry, Mr. Holme, was, after the parties were taken, struck by a brick bat; he lost his power over his horse, and is supposed to have fractured his skull by a fall from his horse. I am afraid that he is since dead; if not, there are no hopes of his recovery. A special Constable of the name of Ashworth has been killed—cause unknown; and four women appear to have lost their lives by being pressed by the crowd; these, I believe, are the fatal effects of the meeting. A variety of instances of sabre wounds occurred, but I hope none mortal; several pistols were fired by the mob, but as to their effect, save in one instance deposed to before Colonel Fletcher, we have no account. We cannot but deeply regret all this serious attendant on this transaction; but we have the satisfaction of witnessing the very grateful and cheering countenances of the whole town; in fact, they consider themselves as saved by our exertions. All the shops were shut, and, for the most part, continued so all the evening. The capture of Hunt took place before two o'clock, and I forgot to mention, that all their colours, drums, &c. were taken or destroyed: since that I have been to the Infirmary, and found myself justified in making the report I have; but Mr. Norris now tells me, that one or two more than I have mentioned may have lost their lives. The parties apprehended will have their cases proceeded on to-morrow; but it appears that there may arise difficulties as to the nature of some of their crimes, on which it may be necessary to consult Government. The whole Committee of Magistrates will assemble to-morrow as usual. During the afternoon, and part of the evening, parts of the town have been in a very disturbed state, and numerous applications made for military. These have been supplied, but in some cases have, in the Irish part of the town, been obliged to fire, I trust without any bad effect as to life, in any instance. At present, every thing seems quiet; the reports agree with that, and I hope that we shall have a quiet night. I have omitted to mention, that the active part of the meeting may be said to have come in wholly from the country; and that it did not consist of less than 20,000 men, &c. The flag on which was "Equal representation or death," was a black one; and in addition, on the same side, had "No boroughmongering—unite, and be free;" at the bottom, "Saddleworth, Lees, and Morley Union;" on the reverse, "No

Corn Laws;—Taxation, without representation, is unjust and tyrannical." On the Middleton flag was, "Let us die like men, and not be sold like slaves;" reverse, "Liberty is the birthright of man."

I close my letter at a quarter before eleven; every thing remains quiet—many of the troops have returned to the barracks, with the consent of the Magistrates. I have to apologize to your Lordship for the haste in which this is written, but I trust that the haste will naturally be accounted for.

I have the honour to be, my Lord, with sincere respect,

Your Lordship's faithful and obedient humble servant,

To the Right Hon. Viscount Sidmouth,

W. R. Hay.

One of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, &c. &c. &c.

On my arrival in this county I found that the tone of feeling and proceedings of the vast population of this neighbourhood were of a description calculated to excite the utmost alarm in the well-affected, and that the public mind was considerably agitated by the insidious and too successful promulgation of seditious principles, as well as by the late more open audacious attempts to interrupt the public tranquillity.

In this populous manufacturing district, revolutionary principles have made alarming progress. For a considerable period the utmost pains have been taken to spread a spirit of disaffection in this country by an unexampled spirit of proselytism, to perpetuate the evil by instilling the most pernicious principles into the minds of youth, and to obliterate all religious feeling in this once religious district.

The statutes for repressing seditious clubs and societies have induced the disaffected to conduct all their proceedings by committees, which are appointed at smaller meetings to manage the preparations for the larger; and a system of rapid communication of political intelligence and orders is organized, in which, what are called "Unions," hold a conspicuous place. These "Unions," which are daily becoming more numerous, consist of classes or subdivisions of Reformers, who hire an apartment convenient for their local residence, where they procure newspapers and pamphlets of a seditious tendency. Notwithstanding the distresses of the times there are few operative manufacturers who do not find the means of reading such publications.

The assumed right of mustering from various quarters to the point of meeting, with banners, bearing seditious symbols and inscriptions, or with inscriptions, which, though unexceptionable in the abstract, are made to serve the same purpose, has swelled the ranks of the disaffected, in consequence of the temptations which are thus afforded to idle curiosity: and the impunity

with which this is done has added to the effect which the speeches delivered on such occasions have on the minds of hearers already discontented, and predisposed to listen with eagerness and credulity to the prospects of innovation so confidently held out to them.

Three of these meetings have been held within the last three months in the county of Renfrew. The second of these, held on the 11th of September, was followed by disturbances which continued for three days before they were effectually suppressed. At the last meeting, held on the 1st of November, at a village some miles distant from Paisley, numerous flags were carried in procession, bearing inscriptions calculated to convey alarm into the minds of the well-affected, and inspire those of different dispositions with confidence in an impending Revolution.—There were also at this last meeting, two important features which had not been witnessed in those by which it was preceded—the junction of bands of females as part of the exhibition, and the display of arms. The ostensible arms were chiefly bludgeons, but it is well known that many were prepared both with pistols and other weapons. Both in proceeding to the place of meeting, and in returning from it, there was a striking exhibition of movements executed in the streets of the town by several thousand persons, with military precision, silence and order. The pretence alledged for arming was self defence, and this precautionary measure was said to have reference to the late events at Manchester, and to the exertions of the special constables and military in quelling the riots which commenced at Paisley on the 11th of September.

While these public meetings, thus held with a display of banners and arms, serve to inspire the disaffected with confidence in their numbers, they overawe and intimidate many who would otherwise have disclaimed seditious principles, and have gladly arrayed themselves in aid of the Civil Authority.

Even the special constables who have been enrolled, and provided with batons for the preservation of public tranquillity, feel reluctant to act with that vigour which is necessary.

There is not, at present, in this county, any corps of Yeomanry Cavalry, nor armed association of any description whatever, to counteract these menacing preparations, nor any suitable accommodation for the reception of regular troops, so that they can be kept united when called on by the civil Magistrate, or saved from that contamination of principle, which is also an avowed object among the Reformers.

On the whole I think it my duty explicitly to state to your Lordship, that while the Reformers of this district call out "Order" at their meetings, and can systematically preserve it too when it suits their policy or humour, their public harangues are of the most audacious and revolutionary description: the

expectation of a subversion of the Government is so deeply rooted in their minds, that whenever a leader shall arise, or a favourable moment occur, I fear a considerable portion of the population could not be depended on.

I have been induced to enter more fully into the situation of this county, as I believe the above will not be found an inaccurate representation of the management and proceedings of the Reformers in some other disturbed districts of the West of Scotland.

I have the honour to be,

With the greatest respect,

The Right Honourable

Viscount Sidmouth,

&c. &c.

My Lord, your Lordship's

Most obedient and most humble Servant,

Glasgow.

III
THE INDUSTRIALIZATION
OF SOCIETY

ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE—that is, the fencing of fields and the cultivation of them individually rather than the cooperative cultivation of open fields—has been constantly resorted to as a means of obtaining larger yields from the land by rational methods of agriculture. So long as every plot is sufficiently large to insure the means of sustenance for its owner, the farmer has much to gain and nothing to lose from fencing his field. The Romans, for instance, planned in advance their agricultural colonies as regular checkerboards of large “centuriated” or fenced-in square fields, which they exploited intensively. Medieval settlement, however, was based on an extensive form of cultivation, since there was more land than cultivators, and agricultural technique was not far advanced. Every member of an agrarian community tilled a number of scattered open-field strips and had the right to use the undivided open commons for grazing and fueling. This right was an element of equality, for it was shared by great landowners and small tenants alike. Even those peasants who had no legal right on the commons were generally tolerated there by immemorial custom.

The increase of the population in Tudor England and the ascendancy of businesslike landowners—some of them enriched merchants, others fortunate farmers—brought forth a first enclosure movement in the late fifteenth and the sixteenth century. Open-field strips were consolidated and fenced in, the commons were appropriated by the wealthier landowners, and much arable soil was converted into sheep runs, which were more profitable because of the rise of the English woollens industry. Although enclosures affected only 2.76 percent of the surface of England (about half a million acres), they were assailed by men like Sir Thomas More and Bishop Latimer for the hardships inflicted by them on many peasants who, once they had lost the right to common pastures, could not make a living for their large families on their enclosed plot. They were transformed into beggars or, under the Poor Laws, were forced to accept underpaid positions as industrial and agricultural proletarians.

During the seventeenth century, political disturbances and fluctuations from time to time interfered with or eclipsed the enclosure movement, but it was continuous after 1688. In the eighteenth century the further increase of the population and the oligarchical alliance of great landlords and squires with great and lesser men of business quickened the process. Enclosure was now effected by private Acts of Parliament, usually after the promoters had secured support from a majority of the owners, rather than the users, of the land in a given community. From 1714 to 1801 about six million acres of English land were parceled out anew through 2,183 enclosure acts. Each member of a community received an area equal in size, but not necessarily in quality, to that of his open-field strips, plus a proportional addition in lieu of his undivided right to the commons. Obviously if he was a small landowner the additional area he received was trifling, while the great landowners received the lion's share. The cottagers received no addition at all. Migration to the cities now took tremendous proportions and spilled over

into what became the British Dominions and the United States. Both agriculture and industry ultimately benefited from this painful trek. The former witnessed a rapid technical progress, and the latter was fed by a steady supply of cheap manpower. As a result, the general standard of living improved, though by 1800 landlords, tenant farmers, and wage labor had come to characterize the rural pattern. Towards the end of the nineteenth century there were attempts to revive the small farms. Some progress in this direction was achieved during both World Wars, but it fell far short of creating an agriculture of moderate-sized, owner-worked farms.

There were similar enclosure movements in other European countries. In France the appropriation of commons by great landowners in the eighteenth century was one of the factors which led to the 1789 Revolution. Eventually the fields were fenced everywhere, but small and medium property prevailed. In Italy many enclosures date from Roman times, and others have been carried out ever since the age of the Communes. Small and medium property prevails in the north, but there is an acute problem of landless agricultural workers in many regions. In Russia the open-field system was still widespread in the time of Alexander II. The Soviet collective farms are not "open fields," but the cooperative system of cultivation is adopted. In the lowlands of Scotland the great landowners carried out a rapid and successful enclosure movement, profiting from the English experience. They were less successful when they tried to apply the same methods to the Highlands, which were more suited for sheep grazing. The selection that follows is taken from the *General Report of the Agricultural State, and Political Circumstances of Scotland* (1814) drawn up under the direction of Sir John Sinclair for the British Board of Agriculture and Internal Improvement. Obviously the Board reflected the views of the ruling class of Great Britain as the latter was constituted before the Victorian Compromise.



GENERAL REPORT OF THE AGRICULTURAL STATE, AND POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES, OF SCOTLAND

INTRODUCTION

. . . THE TERM *Inclosure* has very different meanings in the rural and legal languages of Scotland and England. In England, the conversion of lands held in common, either for pasturage or cultivation, into severalty, or exclusive individual property, must in general be accomplished by a separate act of Parliament, which has obtained the name of an *Inclosure Bill*, because the commissioners, appointed for dividing and allocating the lands subjected to their authority, among those having interest, have power to inclose, as well

as to divide or apportion them; and hence they are termed Commissioners of Inclosure.

This matter is far otherwise managed in Scotland, where so expensive an expedient has not been found necessary. The Legislature of this country, above an hundred years ago, provided a general law for that purpose, which has been so universally acted upon, that common-field lands, and common wastes or pastures, have both become very rare in Scotland. In Scotland, common-field lands used to be known by the name of run-rig or run-dale, because the alternate lands or ridges belonging to different proprietors or occupants run alongside of each other; while the term common was restricted to wastes or pastures not occupied in severalty. These are indeed still to be found in various parts of Scotland; but the run-rig or common-field lands have almost entirely disappeared, except in places where the crown has an interest, or in such as belong to royal burghs, which were exempted from the operation of this most salutary law. . . .

GENERAL VIEW OF THE ADVANTAGES OF INCLOSURES

In considering the advantages to be derived from proposed inclosures, a landed proprietor has occasion for the exercise of much attentive observation, and sagacious reflection, before he determines upon any specific plan. In most cases, he ought to take counsel with himself and others, to enable him to ascertain what benefits are most wanted by his lands, and how these are most likely to be effected by inclosures, and then to form his plan upon a mature consideration of all the circumstances combined. It is not enough that he be offered a percentage for the outlay, or a larger money rent in consequence of inclosure, unless convinced that the specific plan is good, and embraces at least the most important advantages that can be effected by inclosures. When this fundamental point is settled, he will next reflect upon the means of its accomplishment, and on the best plan of economy, for saving unnecessary expence, both in the first instance and in future, and for securing the permanence of the fences. When all these have been successively and duly considered, he may enter into engagements for their execution, but not sooner. The advantages of inclosures ought to be considered as connected with climate, soil, and occupancy.

1. A climate that is naturally warm or mild, will hardly require artificial shelter; but if cold, and backward for the production of crops, and hazardous or injurious to live-stock, shelter ought to be one of the first and most important objects held in view.

2. A dry and kindly soil gives encouragement for plans of improvement

by cultivation, and the fences and inclosures ought to be adapted for that purpose, not forgetting what may be necessary in regard to climate. If the soil be wet, a large proportion of the fences ought also to be planned and constructed for the additional purpose of drainage.

3. If the lands to be inclosed are to be occupied in pasture, the plan must be adapted to that end, taking into consideration the particular kind of stock with which it is to be occupied. The same kind of fence that may sufficiently confine cattle, does not answer for sheep; and various breeds of sheep require different kinds of fences. The general objects of consideration on this head are, to save expence in herding and attendance, to arrange the stock, to enable them to pasture quietly, undisturbed by dogs or other violence, and to shelter them, as effectually as may be, from cold and storms.

4. If the lands are to be chiefly occupied under grain, or other cultivated crops, the great objects of inclosure must be, a good arrangement of the fields for easy and correct access and cultivation, and for the effectual protection of the crops from trespass and depredation.

5. When a mixed mode of occupancy is in view, embracing both cultivation and pasturage, a combination of the foregoing considerations must form the basis for a proper plan of inclosure.

ADVANTAGES OF INCLOSURE TO PROPRIETORS

Under many defects in the plan still usually pursued, and in the modes of execution, inclosures are considered so necessary and useful by all practical farmers, that, in consideration of having their land properly inclosed and fenced, they readily agree to pay a liberal percentage to the landlord for the expence, and to uphold the fences at their own charges during the occupancy, providing they have a reasonable time allowed them for reaping the consequent advantages.

Even the appearance of inclosures indicates comfort and security; and landlords never fail to draw very advanced rents from well-inclosed lands, which generally let from 20 to 50, and in some cases, even 70 *per cent.* higher than open lands of the same description in the neighbourhood; the value or rate of rent continuing to advance, as the inclosed soil goes on to improve. By means likewise of inclosure, the landlord often has an opportunity to appropriate many waste spots, and otherwise useless corners, for plantations; to the great embellishment of his property, and the solid emolument of himself or his successors. These patches are of very little value to the occupier, and pay scarcely any rent to the proprietor; and the ultimate value of the plantations may therefore be considered as clear gain after the expences of inclosing and planting are defrayed. Indeed, instead of diminishing the rental, the planta-

tions, after a few years, will render the contiguous farms more valuable, and capable of paying a higher rent than before, when these spots were attached to them. It is the universal and equitable practice in Scotland, that no charge is made upon the farmer for so much of the fencing as is necessary to the protection of young plantations, and these fences are always upheld afterwards by the landlord.

ADVANTAGES OF INCLOSURES TO FARMERS

Farmers derive many important advantages from judiciously disposed and well constructed inclosures. Their value, however, materially differs, under particular circumstances;—owing to errors in the original plan, defects in the formation and upholding of the fences, or improper management of the inclosed live-stock or growing crops; by means of which defects, all inclosures may be rendered comparatively worthless. If, however, the abuse of any thing were to become an argument against its usefulness, no circumstance whatever, in the economy of any country, could escape this mode of objection. It is from the aggregate of all the advantages derivable from judiciously planned, well constructed, and well managed inclosures and fences, that farmers are enabled, at the same time, to pay more liberal rents, to advance the value of their live-stocks and crops, and finally to augment their own individual profits. Of these advantages we propose to take a rapid view, in their order.

In the pasturage of live-stock, the farmer is relieved, by means of inclosures, from the very considerable expence of herding and attendance; which is materially diminished in the management of sheep, and almost entirely saved in that of cattle, when the fences are all good. The farmer has it in his power to arrange his live-stock, according to their age, condition, and other circumstances, by means of his inclosures, without which his management cannot be correct. This arrangement, especially in sheep-stocks, is often absolutely necessary for the preservation of a part, and is almost always important for the prosperity and improvement of the whole. By means of inclosures, the pasturing stock is protected from being perpetually teased, harassed, and interrupted in feeding, by dogs or other violence, and is allowed in peace to eat up the food upon the pastures to its utmost limits; and thus it improves much better and faster on the same extent of land, and of course returns more ample profit to the farmer.

The mere prevention of poaching in wet weather, by the trampling of cattle when chased by dogs, is an advantage of no small importance derived from inclosures or fence divisions. Even the warmth derived from inclosures to the live-stock, in cold and stormy weather, is stated by one intelligent observer, as running from five to eight degrees of the thermometer above that of

bleak unsheltered lands in the same neighbourhood. It is of the utmost importance, to the comfort and consequent thriving of live-stock, that, in inclosures, they can always have a sheltered place in which to sleep or ruminate: and it is well known, that the grass is both earlier and more abundant in inclosures, than in bleak exposed open lands, of similar soils, and in the same neighbourhood.

In the management of his arable lands, the farmer derives other solid advantages from inclosures. The important idea of security against trespass, from his own live-stock and those of his neighbours, gives a stimulus to his exertions towards improvement, enabling him to adopt a correct rotation of crops, to proceed with vigour in their cultivation, and to reap their fruits in safety. The case is widely different on open lands; in which wheat, sown grasses, turnips, and other crops, are constantly exposed to trespass in winter, and cannot therefore be cultivated to advantage.

In addition to the foregoing important advantages, a judiciously planned and well executed fence, often operates as a most useful drain to the land in its neighbourhood. Were the entire advantages, derivable by farmers from good inclosures, capable of being correctly estimated in contrast with uninclosed land, it would probably appear, that an acre of inclosed pasture land, is worth twice as much as an acre of the same kind of land, and in the same climate, if not inclosed. When the whole of a farm is under tillage rotations, as is the case in the Carse of Gowrie, and on the best land of East Lothian, subdivision fences, though still very advantageous, cannot indeed be supposed to add so much to the value of the soil.

ADVANTAGES TO THE LABOURERS

Labourers find a great source of employment, in the first instance, in the execution of plans of inclosure, and afterwards in upholding them; besides which, there is a great extension of work provided for them, in consequence of the various improvements required upon inclosed land, far beyond what is called for in open lands; for the same waste that afforded only the miserable wages and bare subsistence of a herd-boy, and that only for a portion of the year, becomes capable, when inclosed, cultivated, and improved, to give employment and bread to many.

Even from the division of commons in Scotland, there is no injury to be dreaded by the labouring class, as their cottages give no right to keep cows on these wastes; and, where they have a right of fuel, that is always guarded in a process of division. Wherever extensive inclosures are forming, there is always a very considerable source of employment and subsistence for industrious labourers; and the prospective advantages, afforded by the future

improvements on the land when inclosed, are still more considerable and encouraging.

ADVANTAGES OF INCLOSURES TO THE PUBLIC

In regard to the public, the advantages arising from inclosures, are numerous and important. By means of them, the country is, at the same time, partly drained, and considerably sheltered, which latter improvement upon the climate is rendered more extensive and more remarkable, when plantations of trees are formed along with inclosures. No person acquainted with the naturally bleak, moist and ungenial climate of Scotland, can refuse to acknowledge the great improvement it has received from plantations.

Although all inclosures do not add to the ornamental or picturesque appearance of a country; yet all that are judiciously planned and well conducted ought to have this effect, more especially in a country so much diversified with hill and dale. Accordingly, and with few exceptions, inclosures have added much to the ornament of Scotland; and particularly such of them as have been conjoined with plantations. By the latter also, as connected with inclosures, which they always necessarily require to a certain extent, weedings of young trees are procured for various useful purposes, and timber may be furnished hereafter for our wooden walls and commercial ships, together with oak bark for the purposes of the tanner.

From what has been already stated, respecting the wages and subsistence, afforded by means of inclosures, to a numerous set of labourers, and the subsequent great increase of food for mankind, which the inclosed land afterwards produces, it necessarily follows, that the population of the kingdom must be proportionally encouraged, increased, and supported, and that a numerous and hardy peasantry will thereby be trained up in the most productive and most valuable species of labour. As the physical strength of the nation evidently depends on, the numbers of its hardy peasantry, every thing that tends to increase their numbers, and to contribute towards their comfortable subsistence, is deserving of the utmost encouragement.

BENJAMIN DISRAELI

BENJAMIN DISRAELI, first Earl of Beaconsfield (1804-81), sat in Parliament, first as a left-wing Conservative and later as a more orthodox Tory. His conservatism, as his subsequent career illustrates, included an astonishing combination of aristocratic and popular qualities. Above all he wished to maintain what he considered to be England's most valuable traditions: the power of the Crown, the preponderance of a landed aristocracy, and the influence of the Church. At the same time, however, he wished the conservatives to be regarded as defenders of the laboring masses from the exploitation of a self-seeking, individualistic bourgeoisie. In his opinion the Whigs (later the Liberals) were threatening the nation's historic institutions; thus the Reform Bill of 1832, while wearing the appearance of a popular measure, was in reality an attempt of a class to serve its own ends. Disraeli professed to see nothing intrinsically wrong with extensions of the franchise, but he regarded use of the House of Commons for the exclusive benefit of the middle class, or the surrender of its functions to a mere democracy of numbers, as a catastrophic error. He preferred to think of the English government as a carefully balanced set of institutions, none of which should be extended at the expense of the others. In the 1840's he opposed Sir Robert Peel, whose conservatism was aimed in part at gaining the support of the factory owners. Eventually, when Peel was converted to free trade, Disraeli became leader of the anti-Peel faction of the Conservatives, and led the unsuccessful fight against repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. In the period of Liberal ascendancy which followed, the Conservatives appeared to be hopelessly out of date, but Disraeli had seen the need for changing with the times. He attempted to lead his party away from protectionism, which he considered a lost cause, and toward an alliance with the lower classes. Thus, when Gladstone's proposal for a wider suffrage was defeated in 1866, Disraeli did not hesitate to appropriate for the Conservatives the credit for extending the franchise in the successful Reform Bill of 1867, even to the extent of accepting significant alterations in the original terms of the bill.

It is plain that, had he not cared for public life, Disraeli could have enjoyed a successful career as a novelist. Yet *Sybil; or, the Two Nations* was not written purely as a piece of storytelling. In it Disraeli pleads eloquently with the English aristocracy to develop a sense of mission and to realize its natural role as leader of the people. A present-day reader may feel he is asking for a return to feudalism; certainly he believed that much of what was best lay in England's past. He considered that the interests of diverse groups could be reconciled by persuading each of its duty toward society. We may believe this idea is essentially romantic, and that such a harmony of interests—between agriculture and industry, between employer and employee, between rich and poor—is far harder to achieve than Disraeli thought. Yet the novel had an immense success and was widely received as embodying a valid criticism of the mercenary and heartless spirit of the new industrialism. The selections which follow describe the impact of the factory upon the face of England and upon those—especially the handloom weavers—who lost

their livelihood. The book was published in 1845 and has been frequently reprinted.



SYBIL; OR, THE TWO NATIONS

ADVERTISEMENT (1845)

THE GENERAL READER whose attention has not been specially drawn to the subject which these volumes aim to illustrate—the Condition of the People—might suspect that the Writer had been tempted to some exaggeration in the scenes that he has drawn, and the impressions he has wished to convey. He thinks it therefore due to himself to state that the descriptions, generally, are written from his own observation; but while he hopes he has alleged nothing which is not true, he has found the absolute necessity of suppressing much that is genuine. For so little do we know of the state of our own country, that the air of improbability which the whole truth would inevitably throw over these pages, might deter some from their perusal.

Grosvenor Gate: *May-Day, 1845*

THE SITUATION of the rural town of Marney was one of the most delightful easily to be imagined. In a spreading dale, contiguous to the margin of a clear and lively stream, surrounded by meadows and gardens, and backed by lofty hills, undulating and richly wooded, the traveller on the opposite heights of the dale would often stop to admire the merry prospect that recalled to him the traditional epithet of his country.

Beautiful illusion! For behind that laughing landscape, penury and disease fed upon the vitals of a miserable population.

The contrast between the interior of the town and its external aspect was as striking as it was full of pain. With the exception of the dull High Street, which had the usual characteristics of a small agricultural market town, some sombre mansions, a dingy inn, and a petty bourse, Marney mainly consisted of a variety of narrow and crowded lanes formed by cottages built of rubble, or unhewn stones without cement, and, from age or badness of the material, looking as if they could scarcely hold together. The gaping chinks admitted every blast; the leaning chimneys had lost half their original height; the rotten rafters were evidently misplaced; while in many instances the thatch, yawning in some parts to admit the wind and wet, and in all utterly unfit for its original purpose of giving protection from the

weather, looked more like the top of a dunghill than a cottage. Before the doors of these dwellings, and often surrounding them, ran open drains full of animal and vegetable refuse, decomposing into disease, or sometimes in their imperfect course filling foul pits or spreading into stagnant pools, while a concentrated solution of every species of dissolving filth was allowed to soak through, and thoroughly impregnate, the walls and ground adjoining.

These wretched tenements seldom consisted of more than two rooms, in one of which the whole family, however numerous, were obliged to sleep, without distinction of age, or sex, or suffering. With the water streaming down the walls, the light distinguished through the roof, with no hearth even in winter, the virtuous mother in the sacred pangs of childbirth gives forth another victim to our thoughtless civilization; surrounded by three generations whose inevitable presence is more painful than her sufferings in that hour of travail; while the father of her coming child, in another corner of the sordid chamber, lies stricken by that typhus which his contaminating dwelling has breathed into his veins, and for whose next prey is perhaps destined his new-born child. These swarming walls had neither windows nor doors sufficient to keep out the weather, or admit the sun, or supply the means of ventilation; the humid and putrid roof of thatch exhaling malaria like all other decaying vegetable matter. The dwelling-rooms were neither boarded nor paved; and whether it were that some were situate in low and damp places, occasionally flooded by the river, and usually much below the level of the road; or that the springs, as was often the case, would burst through the mud floor; the ground was at no time better than so much clay, while sometimes you might see little channels cut from the centre under the doorways to carry off the water, the door itself removed from its hinges: a resting-place for infancy in its deluged home. These hovels were in many instances not provided with the commonest conveniences of the rudest police; contiguous to every door might be observed the dung-heap on which every kind of filth was accumulated, for the purpose of being disposed of for manure, so that, when the poor man opened his narrow habitation in the hope of refreshing it with the breeze of summer, he was met with a mixture of gases from reeking dunghills.

This town of Marney was a metropolis of agricultural labor, for the proprietors of the neighbourhood having for the last half-century acted on the system of destroying the cottages on their estates, in order to become exempted from the maintenance of the population, the expelled people had flocked to Marney, where, during the war, a manufactory had afforded them some relief, though its wheels had long ceased to disturb the waters of the Mar.

Deprived of this resource, they had again gradually spread themselves over that land which had, as it were, rejected them; and obtained from its churlish breast a niggardly subsistence. Their re-entrance into the surrounding parishes was viewed with great suspicion; their renewed settlement opposed by every ingenious contrivance; those who availed themselves of their labour were careful that they should not become dwellers on the soil; and though, from the excessive competition, there were few districts in the kingdom where the rate of wages was more depressed, those who were fortunate enough to obtain the scant remuneration, had, in addition to their toil, to endure, each morn and even, a weary journey before they could reach the scene of their labour, or return to the squalid hovel which profaned the name of home. To that home, over which malaria hovered, and round whose shivering hearth were clustered other guests besides the exhausted family of toil—Fever, in every form, pale Consumption, exhausting Synochus, and trembling Ague,—returned after cultivating the broad fields of merry England, the bold British peasant, returned to encounter the worst of diseases, with a frame the least qualified to oppose them; a frame that, subdued by toil, was never sustained by animal food; drenched by the tempest, could not change its dripping rags; and was indebted for its scanty fuel to the windfalls of the woods.

The eyes of this unhappy race might have been raised to the solitary spire that sprang up in the midst of them, the bearer of present consolation, the harbinger of future equality; but Holy Church at Marney had forgotten her sacred mission. We have introduced the reader to the vicar, an orderly man, who deemed he did his duty if he preached each week two sermons, and enforced humility on his congregation, and gratitude for the blessings of this life. The High Street and some neighbouring gentry were the staple of his hearers. Lord and Lady Marney, attended by Captain Grouse, came every Sunday morning, with commendable regularity, and were ushered into the invisible interior of a vast pew, that occupied half of the gallery, was lined with crimson damask, and furnished with easy chairs, and, for those who chose them, well-padded stools of prayer. The people of Marney took refuge in conventicles, which abounded; little plain buildings of pale brick with the names painted on them, of Sion, Bethel, Bethesda; names of a distant land, and the language of a persecuted and ancient race; yet such is the mysterious power of their divine quality, breathing consolation in the nineteenth century to the harassed forms and the harrowed souls of a Saxon peasantry. . . .

About half a mile from Marney the dale narrowed, and the river took a winding course. It ran through meads, soft and vivid with luxuriant vegetation, bounded on either side by rich hanging woods, save where occasionally a quarry broke the verdant bosom of the heights with its rugged and tawny

form. Fair stone and plenteous timber, and the current of fresh waters, combined, with the silent and secluded scene screened from every harsh and angry wind, to form the sacred spot that in old days Holy Church loved to hallow with its beauteous and enduring structures. Even the stranger, therefore, when he had left the town about two miles behind him, and had heard the farm and mill which he had since passed called the Abbey farm and the Abbey mill, might have been prepared for the grateful vision of some monastic remains. As for Egremont, he had been almost born amid the ruins of Marney Abbey; its solemn relics were associated with his first and freshest fancies; every footstep was as familiar to him as it could have been to one of the old monks; yet never without emotion could he behold these unrivalled remains of one of the greatest of the great religious houses of the North.

Over a space of not less than ten acres might still be observed the fragments of the great Abbey: these were, towards their limit, in general moss-grown and mouldering memorials that told where once rose the offices, and spread the terraced gardens, of the old proprietors; here might still be traced the dwelling of the lord abbot; and there, still more distinctly, because built on a greater scale and of materials still more intended for perpetuity, the capacious hospital, a name that did not then denote the dwelling of disease, but a place where all the rights of hospitality were practised; where the traveller, from the proud baron to the lonely pilgrim, asked the shelter and the succour that never were denied, and at whose gate, called the Portal of the Poor, the peasants on the Abbey lands, if in want, might appeal each morn and night for raiment and for food. . . .

It was one of those summer days that are so still, that they seem as it were a holiday of Nature. The weary wind was sleeping in some grateful cavern, and the sunbeams basking on some fervent knoll; the river floated with a drowsy unconscious course; there was no wave in the grass, no stir in the branches.

A silence so profound amid these solemn ruins offered the perfection of solitude; and there was that stirring in the mind of Egremont which rendered him far from indisposed for this loneliness.

The slight words that he had exchanged with the farmer and the hind had left him musing. Why was England not the same land as in the days of his lighthearted youth? Why were these hard times for the poor? He stood among the ruins that, as the farmer had well observed, had seen many changes: changes of creeds, of dynasties, of laws, of manners. New orders of men had arisen in the country, new sources of wealth had opened, new dispositions of power to which that wealth had necessarily led. His own house, his own

order, had established themselves on the ruins of that great body, the emblems of whose ancient magnificence and strength surrounded him. And now his order was in turn menaced. And the People—the millions of Toil, on whose unconscious energies during these changeful centuries all rested—what changes had these centuries brought to them? Had their advance in the national scale borne a due relation to that progress of their rulers, which had accumulated in the treasuries of a limited class the riches of the world, and made their possessors boast that they were the first of nations; the most powerful and the most free, the most enlightened, the most moral, and the most religious? Were there any rick-burners in the times of the lord abbots? And if not, why not? And why should the stacks of the Earls of Marney be destroyed, and those of the Abbots of Marney spared?

Brooding over these suggestions, some voices disturbed him, and, looking around, he observed in the cemetery two men: one was standing beside a tomb, which his companion was apparently examining.

The first was of lofty stature, and, though dressed with simplicity, had nothing sordid in his appearance. His garments gave no clue to his position in life: they might have been worn by a squire or by his gamekeeper; a dark velveteen dress and leathern gaiters. As Egremont caught his form, he threw his broad-brimmed country hat upon the ground, and showed a frank and manly countenance. His complexion might in youth have been ruddy, but time and time's attendants, thought and passion, had paled it; his chestnut hair, faded, but not grey, still clustered over a noble brow; his features were regular and handsome, a well-formed nose, the square mouth and its white teeth, and the clear grey eye which befitted such an idiosyncrasy. His time of vigorous manhood, for he was much nearer forty than fifty years of age, perhaps better suited his athletic form than the more supple and graceful season of youth.

Stretching his powerful arms in the air, and delivering himself of an exclamation which denoted his weariness, and which had broken the silence, he expressed to his companion his determination to rest himself under the shade of the yew in the contiguous garden, and, inviting his friend to follow him, he took up his hat and moved away.

There was something in the appearance of the stranger that interested Egremont; and, waiting till he had established himself in his pleasant resting-place, Egremont descended into the cloister garden and determined to address him.

"You lean against an ancient trunk," said Egremont, carelessly advancing to the stranger, who looked up at him without any expression of surprise, and then replied, "They say 'tis the trunk beneath whose branches the monks

encamped when they came to this valley to raise their building. It was their house, till with the wood and stone around them, their labour and their fine art, they piled up their abbey. And then they were driven out of it, and it came to this. Poor men! poor men!"

"They would hardly have forfeited their resting-place had they deserved to retain it," said Egremont.

"They were rich. I thought it was poverty that was a crime," replied the stranger, in a tone of simplicity.

"But they had committed other crimes."

"It may be so; we are very frail. But their history has been written by their enemies; they were condemned without a hearing; the people rose oftentimes in their behalf; and their property was divided with those on whose reports it was forfeited."

"At any rate, it was a forfeiture which gave life to the community," said Egremont; "the lands are held by active men and not by drones."

"A drone is one who does not labour," said the stranger; "whether he wear a cowl or a coronet, 'tis the same to me. Somebody I suppose must own the land; though I have heard say that this individual tenure is not a necessity; but, however this may be, I am not one who would object to the lord, provided he were a gentle one. All agree that the Monastics were easy landlords; their rents were low; they granted leases in those days. Their tenants, too, might renew their term before their tenure ran out: so they were men of spirit and property. There were yeomen then, sir: the country was not divided into two classes, masters and slaves; there was some resting-place between luxury and misery. Comfort was an English habit then, not merely an English word."

"And do you really think they were easier landlords than our present ones?" said Egremont, inquiringly.

"Human nature would tell us that, even if history did not confess it. The Monastics could possess no private property; they could save no money; they could bequeath nothing. They lived, received, and expended in common. The monastery, too, was a proprietor that never died and never wasted. The farmer had a deathless landlord then; not a harsh guardian, or a grinding mortgagee, or a dilatory master in chancery: all was certain; the manor had not to dread a change of lords, or the oaks to tremble at the axe of the squandering heir. How proud we are still in England of an old family, though, God knows, 'tis rare to see one now. Yet the people like to say, We held under him, and his father and his grandfather before him: they know that such a tenure is a benefit. The abbot was ever the same. The monks were, in short, in every district a point of refuge for all who needed succour, counsel, and protection;

a body of individuals having no cares of their own, with wisdom to guide the inexperienced, with wealth to relieve the suffering, and often with power to protect the oppressed."

"You plead their cause with feeling," said Egremont, not unmoved.

"It is my own; they were the sons of the people, like myself."

"I had thought rather these monasteries were the resort of the younger branches of the aristocracy," said Egremont.

"Instead of the pension list," replied his companion, smiling, but not with bitterness. "Well, if we must have an aristocracy, I would rather that its younger branches should be monks and nuns than colonels without regiments, or housekeepers of royal palaces that exist only in name. Besides, see what advantage to a minister if the unendowed aristocracy were thus provided for now. He need not, like a minister in these days, entrust the conduct of public affairs to individuals notoriously incompetent, appoint to the command of expeditions generals who never saw a field, make governors of colonies out of men who never could govern themselves, or find an ambassador in a broken dandy or a blasted favourite. It is true that many of the monks and nuns were persons of noble birth. Why should they not have been? The aristocracy had their share; no more. They, like all other classes, were benefited by the monasteries: but the list of the mitred abbots, when they were suppressed, shows that the great majority of the heads of houses were of the people."

"Well, whatever difference of opinion may exist on these points," said Egremont, "there is one on which there can be no controversy: the monks were great architects."

"Ah! there it is," said the stranger, in a tone of plaintiveness; "if the world but only knew what they had lost! I am sure that not the faintest idea is generally prevalent of the appearance of England before and since the dissolution. Why, sir, in England and Wales alone, there were of these institutions of different sizes—I mean monasteries, and chantries and chapels, and great hospitals—considerably upwards of three thousand; all of them fair buildings, many of them of exquisite beauty. There were on an average in every shire at least twenty structures such as this was; in this great county double that number: establishments that were as vast and as magnificent and as beautiful as your Belvoirs and your Chatsworths, your Wentworths and your Stowes. Try to imagine the effect of thirty or forty Chatsworths in this county, the proprietors of which were never absent. You complain enough now of absentees. The monks were never non-resident. They expended their revenue among those whose labour had produced it. These holy men, too, built and planted, as they did everything else, for posterity: their churches were cathedrals; their schools colleges; their halls and libraries the muniment rooms of

kingdoms; their woods and waters, their farms and gardens, were laid out and disposed on a scale and in a spirit that are now extinct; they made the country beautiful, and the people proud of their country."

"Yet if the monks were such public benefactors, why did not the people rise in their favour?"

"They did, but too late. They struggled for a century, but they struggled against property, and they were beat. As long as the monks existed, the people, when aggrieved, had property on their side. And now 'tis all over," said the stranger; "and travellers come and stare at these ruins and think themselves very wise to moralize over time. They are the children of violence, not of time. It is war that created these ruins, civil war, of all our civil wars the most inhuman, for it was waged with the unresisting. The monasteries were taken by storm, they were sacked, gutted, battered with warlike instruments, blown up with gunpowder; you may see the marks of the blast against the new tower here. Never was such a plunder. The whole face of the country for a century was that of a land recently invaded by a ruthless enemy; it was worse than the Norman Conquest; nor has England ever lost this character of ravage. I don't know whether the union workhouses will remove it. They are building something for the people at last. After an experiment of three centuries, your jails being full, and your treadmills losing something of their virtue, you have given us a substitute for the monasteries."

"You lament the old faith," said Egremont, in a tone of respect.

"I am not viewing the question as one of faith," said the stranger. "It is not as a matter of religion, but as a matter of right, that I am considering it: as a matter, I should say, of private right and public happiness. You might have changed, if you thought fit, the religion of the abbots as you changed the religion of the bishops: but you had no right to deprive men of their property, and property moreover which, under their administration, so mainly contributed to the welfare of the community."

"As for community," said a voice which proceeded neither from Egremont nor the stranger, "with the monasteries expired the only type that we ever had in England of such an intercourse. There is no community in England; there is aggregation, but aggregation under circumstances which make it rather a dissociating than a uniting principle."

It was a still voice that uttered these words, yet one of a peculiar character; one of those voices that instantly arrest attention: gentle and yet solemn, earnest yet unimpassioned. With a step as whispering as his tone, the man who had been kneeling by the tomb, had unobserved joined his associate and Egremont. He hardly reached the middle height; his form slender, but well-proportioned; his pale countenance, slightly marked with the small-pox,

was redeemed from absolute ugliness by a highly intellectual brow, and large dark eyes that indicated deep sensibility and great quickness of apprehension. Though young, he was already a little bald; he was dressed entirely in black; the fairness of his linen, the neatness of his beard, his gloves much worn, yet carefully mended, intimated that his very faded garments were the result of necessity rather than of negligence.

"You also lament the dissolution of these bodies," said Egremont.

"There is so much to lament in the world in which we live," said the younger of the strangers, "that I can spare no pang for the past."

"Yet you approve of the principle of their society; you prefer it, you say, to our existing life."

"Yes; I prefer association to gregariousness."

"That is a distinction," said Egremont, musingly.

"It is a community of purpose that constitutes society," continued the younger stranger; "without that, men may be drawn into contiguity, but they still continue virtually isolated."

"And is that their condition in cities?"

"It is their condition everywhere; but in cities that condition is aggravated. A density of population implies a severer struggle for existence, and a consequent repulsion of elements brought into too close contact. In great cities men are brought together by the desire of gain. They are not in a state of co-operation, but of isolation, as to the making of fortunes; and for all the rest they are careless of neighbours. Christianity teaches us to love our neighbour as ourself; modern society acknowledges no neighbour."

"Well, we live in strange times," said Egremont, struck by the observation of his companion, and relieving a perplexed spirit by an ordinary exclamation, which often denotes that the mind is more stirred than it cares to acknowledge, or at the moment is able to express.

"When the infant begins to walk, it also thinks that it lives in strange times," said his companion.

"Your inference?" asked Egremont.

"That society, still in its infancy, is beginning to feel its way."

"This is a new reign," said Egremont, "perhaps it is a new era."

"I think so," said the younger stranger.

"I hope so," said the elder one.

"Well, society may be in its infancy," said Egremont, slightly smiling; "but, say what you like, our Queen reigns over the greatest nation that ever existed."

"Which nation?" asked the younger stranger, "for she reigns over two."

The stranger paused; Egremont was silent, but looked inquiringly.

"Yes," resumed the younger stranger after a moment's interval. "Two nations; between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws."

"You speak of ——" said Egremont, hesitatingly.

"THE RICH AND THE POOR." . . .

It was a cloudy, glimmering dawn. A cold withering east wind blew through the silent streets of Mowbray. The sounds of the night had died away, the voices of the day had not commenced. There reigned a stillness complete and absorbing.

Suddenly there is a voice, there is movement. The first footstep of the new week of toil is heard. A man muffled up in a thick coat, and bearing in his hand what would seem at the first glance to be a shepherd's crook, only its handle is much longer, appears upon the pavement. He touches a number of windows with great quickness as he moves rapidly along. A rattling noise sounds upon each pane. The use of the long handle of his instrument becomes apparent as he proceeds, enabling him as it does to reach the upper windows of the dwellings whose inmates he has to rouse. Those inmates are the factory girls, who subscribe in districts to engage these heralds of the dawn; and by a strict observance of whose citation they can alone escape the dreaded fine that awaits those who have not arrived at the door of the factory before the bell ceases to sound.

The sentry in question, quitting the streets, and stooping through one of the small archways that we have before noticed, entered a court. Here lodged a multitude of his employers; and the long crook, as it were by some sleight of hand, seemed sounding on both sides, and at many windows at the same moment. Arrived at the end of the court, he was about to touch the window of the upper story of the last tenement, when that window opened, and a man, pale and care-worn, and in a melancholy voice, spoke to him.

"Simmons," said the man, "you need not rouse this story any more; thy daughter has left us."

"Has she left Webster's?"

"No; but she has left us. She has long murmured at her hard lot; working like a slave, and not for herself. And she has gone, as they all go, to keep house for herself."

"That's a bad business," said the watchman, in a tone not devoid of sympathy.

"Almost as bad as for parents to live on their children's wages," replied the man, mournfully.

"And how is your good woman?"

"As poorly as needs be. Harriet has never been home since Friday night. She owes you nothing?"

"Not a halfpenny. She was as regular as a little bee, and always paid every Monday morning. I am sorry she has left you, neighbour."

"The Lord's will be done. It's hard times for such as us," said the man; and, leaving the window open, he retired into his room.

It was a single chamber of which he was the tenant. In the centre, placed so as to gain the best light which the gloomy situation could afford, was a loom. In two corners of the room were mattresses placed on the floor, a check curtain, hung upon a string if necessary, concealing them. In one was his sick wife; in the other, three young children: two girls, the eldest about eight years of age; between them their baby brother. An iron kettle was by the hearth, and on the mantelpiece, some candles, a few lucifer matches, two tin mugs, a paper of salt, and an iron spoon. In a farther part, close to the wall, was a heavy table or dresser; this was a fixture, as well as the form which was fastened by it.

The man seated himself at his loom; he commenced his daily task.

"Twelve hours of daily labour, at the rate of one penny each hour; and even this labour is mortgaged! How is this to end? Is it rather not ended?" And he looked around him at his chamber without resources: no food, no fuel, no furniture, and four human beings dependent on him, and lying in their wretched beds, because they had no clothes. "I cannot sell my loom," he continued, "at the price of old firewood, and it cost me gold. It is not vice that has brought me to this, nor indolence, nor imprudence. I was born to labour, and I was ready to labour. I loved my loom, and my loom loved me. It gave me a cottage in my native village, surrounded by a garden, of whose claims on my solicitude it was not jealous. There was time for both. It gave me for a wife the maiden that I had ever loved; and it gathered my children round my hearth with plenteousness and peace. I was content: I sought no other lot. It is not adversity that makes me look back upon the past with tenderness.

"Then why am I here? Why am I, and six hundred thousand subjects of the Queen, honest, loyal, and industrious, why are we, after manfully struggling for years, and each year sinking lower in the scale, why are we driven from our innocent and happy homes, our country cottages that we loved, first to hide in close towns without comforts, and gradually to crouch into cellars, or find a squalid lair like this, without even the common necessities of exist-

ence; first the ordinary conveniences of life, then raiment, and, at length, food, vanishing from us.

"It is that the capitalist has found a slave that has supplanted the labour and ingenuity of man. Once he was an artisan: at the best, he now only watches machines; and even that occupation slips from his grasp, to the woman and the child. The capitalist flourishes, he amasses immense wealth; we sink, lower and lower; lower than the beasts of burthen; for they are fed better than we are, cared for more. And it is just, for according to the present system they are more precious. And yet they tell us that the interests of Capital and of Labour are identical.

"If a society that has been created by labour suddenly becomes independent of it, that society is bound to maintain the race whose only property is labour, out of the proceeds of that other property, which has not ceased to be productive.

"When the class of the Nobility were supplanted in France, they did not amount in number to one-third of us Hand-Loom weavers; yet all Europe went to war to avenge their wrongs, every State subscribed to maintain them in their adversity, and when they were restored to their own country, their own land supplied them with an immense indemnity. Who cares for us? Yet we have lost our estates. Who raises a voice for us? Yet we are at least as innocent as the nobility of France. We sink among no sighs except our own. And if they give us sympathy—what then? Sympathy is the solace of the Poor; but for the Rich, there is Compensation."

"Is that Harriet?" said his wife, moving in her bed.

The Hand-Loom weaver was recalled from his reverie to the urgent misery that surrounded him.

"No!" he replied in a quick hoarse voice, "it is not Harriet."

"Why does not Harriet come?"

"She will come no more!" replied the weaver; "I told you so last night: she can bear this place no longer; and I am not surprised."

"How are we to get food then?" rejoined his wife; "you ought not to have let her leave us. You do nothing, Warner. You get no wages yourself; and you have let the girl escape."

"I will escape myself if you say that again," said the weaver: "I have been up these three hours finishing this piece which ought to have been taken home on Saturday night."

"But you have been paid for it beforehand. You get nothing for your work. A penny an hour! What sort of work is it, that brings a penny an hour?"

"Work that you have often admired, Mary; and has before this gained a prize. But if you don't like the work," said the man quitting his loom, "let it

alone. There was enough yet owing on this piece to have allowed us to break our fast. However, no matter; we must starve sooner or later. Let us begin at once."

"No, no, Philip! work. Let us break our fast, come what may."

"Twit me no more then," said the weaver, resuming his seat, "or I throw the shuttle for the last time."

"I will not taunt you," said his wife in a kinder tone. "I was wrong; I am sorry; but I am very ill. It is not for myself I speak; I want not to eat; I have no appetite; my lips are so very parched. But the children, the children went supperless to bed, and they will wake soon."

"Mother, we ain't asleep," said the elder girl.

"No, we ain't asleep, mother," said her sister; "we heard all that you said to father."

"And baby?"

"He sleeps still."

"I shiver very much!" said the mother. "It's a cold day. Pray shut the window, Warner. I see the drops upon the pane; it is raining. I wonder if the persons below would lend us one block of coal."

"We have borrowed too often," said Warner.

"I wish there were no such thing as coal in the land," said his wife, "and then the engines would not be able to work; and we should have our rights again."

"Amen!" said Warner.

"Don't you think, Warner," said his wife, "that you could sell that piece to some other person, and owe Barber for the money he advanced?"

"No!" said her husband, fiercely. "I'll go straight."

"And let your children starve," said his wife, "when you could get five or six shillings at once. But so it always was with you. Why did not you go to the machines years ago like other men, and so get used to them?"

"I should have been supplanted by this time," said Warner, "by a girl or a woman! It would have been just as bad!"

"Why there was your friend, Walter Gerard; he was the same as you, and yet now he gets two pound a week; at least I have often heard you say so."

"Walter Gerard is a man of great parts," said Warner, "and might have been a master himself by this time had he cared."

"And why did he not?"

"He had no wife and children," said Warner; "he was not so blessed."

The baby woke and began to cry.

"Ah! my child!" exclaimed the mother. "That wicked Harriet! Here, Amelia, I have a morsel of crust here. I saved it yesterday for baby; moisten it

in water, and tie it up in this piece of calico: he will suck it; it will keep him quiet; I can bear anything but his cry."

"I shall have finished my job by noon," said Warner; "and then, please God, we shall break our fast."

"It is yet two hours to noon," said his wife. "And Barber always keeps you so long! I cannot bear that Barber: I dare say he will not advance you money again, as you did not bring the job home on Saturday night. If I were you, Philip, I would go and sell the piece unfinished at once to one of the cheap shops."

"I have gone straight all my life," said Warner.

"And much good it has done you," said his wife.

"My poor Amelia! How she shivers! I think the sun never touches this house. It is, indeed, a most wretched place."

"It will not annoy you long, Mary," said her husband: "I can pay no more rent; and I only wonder they have not been here already to take the week."

"And where are we to go?" said the wife.

"To a place which certainly the sun never touches," said her husband, with a kind of malice in his misery—"to a cellar." . . .

ANDREW URE

THE RAPID GROWTH of the factory system in England in the first half of the nineteenth century brought with it manifold problems. Critics attacked its consequences from many different points of view, while apologists enthusiastically pointed to the economic progress achieved and defended the factory as the benefactor of humanity. Prominent among the latter was Andrew Ure (1778-1857), a Scottish chemist who turned his talents to the study of industry and to its defense. Ure is chiefly remembered today for his glowing descriptions of the healthful working conditions of the factory operatives, and for his praise of child labor. He wrote, of child workers, that

"They seemed to be always cheerful and alert, taking pleasure in the light play of their muscles—enjoying the mobility natural to their age. The scene of industry, so far from exciting sad emotions in my mind, was always exhilarating. It was delightful to observe the nimbleness with which they pieced the broken ends, as the mule-carriage began to recede from the fixed roller-beam, and to see them at leisure, after a few seconds' exercise of their tiny fingers, to amuse themselves in any attitude they chose, till the stretch and winding-on were once more completed. The work of these lively elves seemed to resemble a sport, in which habit gave them a pleasing dexterity. Conscious of their skill, they were delighted to show it off to any stranger. As to exhaustion by the day's work, they evinced no trace of it on emerging from the mill in the evening; for they immediately began to skip about any neighbouring playground, and to commence their little amusements with the same alacrity as boys issuing from a school. . . ."

And again,

"Of all the common prejudices that exist with regard to factory labour, there is none more unfounded than that which ascribes to it excessive tedium and irksomeness above other occupations, owing to its being carried on in conjunction with the 'unceasing motion of the steam-engine.' . . . Of all manufacturing employments, those are by far the most irksome and incessant in which steam-engines are not employed, as in lace-running and stocking-weaving; and the way to prevent an employment from being incessant, is to introduce a steam-engine into it. These remarks certainly apply more especially to the labour of children in factories. Three-fourths of the children so employed are engaged in piecing at the mules. 'When the carriages of these have receded a foot and a half or two feet from the rollers,' says Mr. Tufnell [Supplementary Report of Factory Commissioners] 'nothing is to be done, not even attention is required from either spinner or piecer.' Both of them stand idle for a time, and in fine spinning particularly, for three-quarters of a minute, or more. Consequently, if a child remains at this business twelve hours daily, he has nine hours of inaction. And though he attends two mules, he has still six hours of non-exertion. Spinners sometimes dedicate these intervals to the perusal of books."

Ure's writings are of interest from another standpoint. They bring to us the reflections of a thoughtful contemporary on the nature and course of industrial development in the first half of the nineteenth century, and valuable observations

on industrial processes. The following selection, like those above, is taken from his *The Philosophy of Manufactures* (1835). This book may be considered a rejoinder to the first effective Factory Act (1833), by which, after a generation of vain effort, the central government laid down and enforced regulations governing the labor of children and, *ipso facto*, of women and men.



THE PHILOSOPHY OF MANUFACTURES

[Book I]

CHAPTER I: GENERAL VIEW OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

. . . THE TERM *Factory System*, in technology, designates the combined operation of many orders of work-people, adult and young, in tending with assiduous skill a series of productive machines continuously impelled by a central power. This definition includes such organizations as cotton-mills, flax-mills, silk-mills, woollen-mills, and certain engineering works; but it excludes those in which the mechanisms do not form a connected series, nor are dependent on one prime mover. Of the latter class, examples occur in iron-works, dye-works, soap-works, brass-foundries, &c. Some authors, indeed, have comprehended under the title *factory*, all extensive establishments wherein a number of people co-operate towards a common purpose of art; and would therefore rank breweries, distilleries, as well as the workshops of carpenters, turners, coopers, &c., under the factory system. But I conceive that this title, in its strictest sense, involves the idea of a vast automaton, composed of various mechanical and intellectual organs, acting in uninterrupted concert for the production of a common object, all of them being subordinated to a self-regulated moving force. If the marshalling of human beings in systematic order for the execution of any technical enterprise were allowed to constitute a factory, this term might embrace every department of civil and military engineering—a latitude of application quite inadmissible.

In its precise acceptation, the Factory system is of recent origin, and may claim England for its birthplace. The mills for throwing silk, or making orgazine, which were mounted centuries ago in several of the Italian states, and furtively transferred to this country by Sir Thomas Lombe in 1718, contained indeed certain elements of a factory, and probably suggested some hints of those grander and more complex combinations of self-acting machines, which were first embodied half a century later in our cotton manufacture by Richard Arkwright, assisted by gentlemen of Derby, well ac-

quainted with its celebrated silk establishment. But the spinning of an entangled flock of fibres into a smooth thread, which constitutes the main operation with cotton, is in silk superfluous; being already performed by the unerring instinct of a worm, which leaves to human art the simple task of doubling and twisting its regular filaments. The apparatus requisite for this purpose is more elementary, and calls for few of those gradations of machinery which are needed in the carding, drawing, roving, and spinning processes of a cotton-mill.

When the first water-frames for spinning cotton were erected at Cromford, in the romantic valley of the Derwent, about sixty years ago, mankind were little aware of the mighty revolution which the new system of labour was destined by Providence to achieve, not only in the structure of British society, but in the fortunes of the world at large. Arkwright alone had the sagacity to discern, and the boldness to predict in glowing language, how vastly productive human industry would become, when no longer proportioned in its results to muscular effort, which is by its nature fitful and capricious, but when made to consist in the task of guiding the work of mechanical fingers and arms, regularly impelled with great velocity by some indefatigable physical power. What his judgment so clearly led him to perceive, his energy of will enabled him to realize with such rapidity and success, as would have done honour to the most influential individuals, but were truly wonderful in that obscure and indigent artisan.

The main difficulty did not, to my apprehension, lie so much in the invention of a proper self-acting mechanism for drawing out and twisting cotton into a continuous thread, as in the distribution of the different members of the apparatus into one co-operative body, in impelling each organ with its appropriate delicacy and speed, and above all, in training human beings to renounce their desultory habits of work, and to identify themselves with the unvarying regularity of the complex automaton. To devise and administer a successful code of factory discipline, suited to the necessities of factory diligence, was the Herculean enterprise, the noble achievement of Arkwright. Even at the present day, when the system is perfectly organized, and its labour lightened to the utmost, it is found nearly impossible to convert persons past the age of puberty, whether drawn from rural or from handicraft occupations, into useful factory hands. After struggling for a while to conquer their listless or restive habits, they either renounce the employment spontaneously, or are dismissed by the overlookers on account of inattention.

If the factory Briareus could have been created by mechanical genius alone, it should have come into being thirty years sooner; for upwards of ninety years have now elapsed since John Wyatt, of Birmingham, not only

invented the series of fluted rollers, (the spinning fingers usually ascribed to Arkwright,) but obtained a patent for the invention, and erected "a spinning engine without hands" in his native town. The details of this remarkable circumstance, recently snatched from oblivion, will be given in our Treatise on the Cotton Manufactures. Wyatt was a man of good education, in a respectable walk of life, much esteemed by his superiors, and therefore favourably placed, in a mechanical point of view, for maturing his admirable scheme. But he was of a gentle and passive spirit, little qualified to cope with the hardships of a new manufacturing enterprise. It required, in fact, a man of a Napoleon nerve and ambition to subdue the refractory tempers of work-people accustomed to irregular paroxysms of diligence, and to urge on his multifarious and intricate constructions in the face of prejudice, passion, and envy. Such was Arkwright, who, suffering nothing to stay or turn aside his progress, arrived gloriously at the goal, and has for ever affixed his name to a great era in the annals of mankind,—an era which has laid open unbounded prospects of wealth and comfort to the industrious, however much they may have been occasionally clouded by ignorance and folly.

Prior to this period, manufactures were everywhere feeble and fluctuating in their development; shooting forth luxuriantly for a season, and again withering almost to the roots, like annual plants. Their perennial growth now began in England, and attracted capital in copious streams to irrigate the rich domains of industry. When this new career commenced, about the year 1770, the annual consumption of cotton in British manufactures was under four millions of pounds weight, and that of the whole of Christendom was probably not more than ten millions. Last year the consumption in Great Britain and Ireland was about two hundred and seventy millions of pounds, and that of Europe and the United States together four hundred and eighty millions. This prodigious increase is, without doubt, almost entirely due to the factory system founded and upreared by the intrepid native of Preston. If, then, this system be not merely an inevitable step in the social progression of the world, but the one which gives a commanding station and influence to the people who most resolutely take it, it does not become any man, far less a denizen of this favoured land, to vilify the author of a benefaction, which, wisely administered, may become the best temporal gift of Providence to the poor,—a blessing destined to mitigate, and in some measure to repeal, the primeval curse pronounced on the labour of man, "in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." Arkwright well deserves to live in honoured remembrance among those ancient master-spirits, who persuaded their roaming companions to exchange the precarious toils of the chase, for the settled comforts of agriculture. In my recent tour, continued during several months, through the manu-

facturing districts, I have seen tens of thousands of old, young, and middle-aged of both sexes, many of them too feeble to get their daily bread by any of the former modes of industry, earning abundant food, raiment, and domestic accommodation, without perspiring at a single pore, screened meanwhile from the summer's sun and the winter's frost, in apartments more airy and salubrious than those of the metropolis in which our legislative and fashionable aristocracies assemble. In those spacious halls the benignant power of steam summons around him his myriads of willing menials, and assigns to each the regulated task, substituting for painful muscular effort on their part, the energies of his own gigantic arm, and demanding in return only attention and dexterity to correct such little aberrations as casually occur in his workmanship. The gentle docility of this moving force qualifies it for impelling the tiny bobbins of the lace-machine with a precision and speed inimitable by the most dexterous hands, directed by the sharpest eyes. Hence, under its auspices, and in obedience to Arkwright's polity, magnificent edifices, surpassing far in number, value, usefulness, and ingenuity of construction, the boasted monuments of Asiatic, Egyptian, and Roman despotism, have, within the short period of fifty years, risen up in this kingdom, to show to what extent capital, industry, and science may augment the resources of a state, while they meliorate the condition of its citizens. Such is the factory system, replete with prodigies in mechanics and political economy, which promises in its future growth to become the great minister of civilization to the terraqueous globe, enabling this country, as its heart, to diffuse along with its commerce the life-blood of science and religion to myriads of people still lying "in the region and shadow of death."

When Adam Smith wrote his immortal elements of economics, automatic machinery being hardly known, he was properly led to regard the division of labour as the grand principle of manufacturing improvement; and he showed, in the example of pin-making, how each handicraftsman, being thereby enabled to perfect himself by practice in one point, became a quicker and cheaper workman. In each branch of manufacture he saw that some parts were, on that principle, of easy execution, like the cutting of pin wires into uniform lengths, and some were comparatively difficult, like the formation and fixation of their heads; and therefore he concluded that to each a workman of appropriate value and cost was naturally assigned. This appropriation forms the very essence of the division of labour, and has been constantly made since the origin of society. The ploughman, with powerful hand and skilful eye, has been always hired at high wages to form the furrow, and the ploughboy at low wages, to lead the team. But what was in Dr. Smith's time a topic of useful illustration, cannot now be used without risk of mis-

leading the public mind as to the right principle of manufacturing industry. In fact, the division, or rather adaptation of labour to the different talents of men, is little thought of in factory employment. On the contrary, wherever a process requires peculiar dexterity and steadiness of hand, it is withdrawn as soon as possible from the *cunning* workman, who is prone to irregularities of many kinds, and it is placed in charge of a peculiar mechanism, so self-regulating, that a child may superintend it. Thus,—to take an example from the spinning of cotton—the first operation in delicacy and importance, is that of laying the fibres truly parallel in the spongy slivers, and the next is that of drawing these out into slender spongy cords, called rovings, with the least possible twist; both being perfectly uniform throughout their total length. To execute either of these processes tolerably by a hand-wheel would require a degree of skill not to be met with in one artisan out of a hundred. But fine yarn could not be made in factory-spinning except by taking these steps, nor was it ever made by machinery till Arkwright's sagacity contrived them. Moderately good yarn may be spun indeed on the *hand-wheel* without any drawings at all, and with even indifferent rovings, because the thread, under the twofold action of twisting and extension, has a tendency to equalize itself.

The principle of the factory system then is, to substitute mechanical science for hand skill, and the partition of a process into its essential constituents, for the division or graduation of labour among artisans. On the handicraft plan, labour more or less skilled was usually the most expensive element of production—*Materiem superabat opus*; but on the automatic plan, skilled labour gets progressively superseded, and will, eventually, be replaced by mere overlookers of machines.

By the infirmity of human nature it happens, that the more skilful the workman, the more self-willed and intractable he is apt to become, and, of course, the less fit a component of a mechanical system, in which, by occasional irregularities, he may do great damage to the whole. The grand object therefore of the modern manufacturer is, through the union of capital and science, to reduce the task of his work-people to the exercise of vigilance and dexterity,—faculties, when concentrated to one process, speedily brought to perfection in the young. In the infancy of mechanical engineering, a machine-factory displayed the division of labour in manifold gradations—the file, the drill, the lathe, having each its different workmen in the order of skill: but the dextrous hands of the filer and driller are now superseded by the planing, the key-groove cutting, and the drilling-machines; and those of the iron and brass turners, by the self-acting slide-lathe. Mr. Anthony Strutt, who conducts the mechanical department of the great cotton factories of Belper and Milford, has so thoroughly departed from the old routine of the schools,

that he will employ no man who has learned his craft by regular apprenticeship; but in contempt, as it were, of the division of labour principle, he sets a ploughboy to turn a shaft of perhaps several tons weight, and never has reason to repent his preference, because he infuses into the turning apparatus a precision of action, equal, if not superior, to the skill of the most experienced journeyman.

An eminent mechanic in Manchester told me, that he does not choose to make any steam-engines at present, because, with his existing means, he would need to resort to the old principle of the division of labour, so fruitful of jealousies and strikes among workmen; but he intends to prosecute that branch of business whenever he has prepared suitable arrangements on the equalization of labour, or automatic plan. On the graduation system, a man must serve an apprenticeship of many years before his hand and eye become skilled enough for certain mechanical feats; but on the system of decomposing a process into its constituents, and embodying each part in an automatic machine, a person of common care and capacity may be intrusted with any of the said elementary parts after a short probation, and may be transferred from one to another, on any emergency, at the discretion of the master. Such translations are utterly at variance with the old practice of the division of labour, which fixed one man to shaping the head of a pin, and another to sharpening its point, with most irksome and spirit-wasting uniformity, for a whole life.

It was indeed a subject of regret to observe how frequently the workman's eminence, in any craft, had to be purchased by the sacrifice of his health and comfort. To one unvaried operation, which required unremitting dexterity and diligence, his hand and eye were constantly on the strain, or if they were suffered to swerve from their task for a time, considerable loss ensued, either to the employer, or the operative, according as the work was done by the day or by the piece. But on the equalization plan of self-acting machines, the operative needs to call his faculties only into agreeable exercise; he is seldom harassed with anxiety or fatigue, and may find many leisure moments for either amusement or meditation, without detriment to his master's interests or his own. As his business consists in tending the work of a well-regulated mechanism, he can learn it in a short period; and when he transfers his services from one machine to another, he varies his task, and enlarges his views, by thinking on those general combinations which result from his and his companions' labours. Thus, that cramping of the faculties that narrowing of the mind, that stunting of the frame, which were ascribed and not unjustly, by moral writers, to the division of labour, cannot, in common circumstances, occur under the equable distribution of industry. How

superior in vigour and intelligence are the factory mechanics in Lancashire, where the latter system of labour prevails, to the handicraft artisans of London, who, to a great extent, continue slaves to the former! The one set is familiar with almost every physico-mechanical combination, while the other seldom knows anything beyond the pin-head sphere of his daily task.

It is, in fact, the constant aim and tendency of every improvement in machinery to supersede human labour altogether, or to diminish its cost, by substituting the industry of women and children for that of men; or that of ordinary labourers for trained artisans. In most of the water-twist, or throstle cotton-mills, the spinning is entirely managed by females of sixteen years and upwards. The effect of substituting the self-acting mule for the common mule, is to discharge the greater part of the men spinners, and to retain adolescents and children. The proprietor of a factory near Stockport states, in evidence to the commissioners, that, by such substitution, he would save 50*l.* a week in wages, in consequence of dispensing with nearly forty male spinners, at about 25*s.* of wages each. This tendency to employ merely children with watchful eyes and nimble fingers, instead of journeymen of long experience, shows how the scholastic dogma of the division of labour into degrees of skill has been exploded by our enlightened manufacturers.

[*Book II*]

CHAPTER II: NATURE, &c. OF A COTTON FACTORY

The art of spinning may be traced to the most remote antiquity, especially that by the distaff; and it is claimed as an honourable discovery by many nations. The Egyptians ascribe it to Isis, the Chinese to their emperor Yao, the Lydians to Arachne, the Greeks to Minerva, the Peruvians to Mamacella, the wife of Manco Capac their first sovereign. The Greek and Roman authors attribute to their own nations respectively the invention of the spindle, as well as the art of weaving. Many writers of different countries give the honour of spinning to the fair sex; and the ancients, in particular, regarded this occupation as unworthy of men. It was under the infatuation of love that Hercules degraded himself by spinning at the feet of Omphale. Modern opinions have undergone a complete revolution with regard to this species of industry. A man is no longer deemed to be deserving of contempt for exercising the functions of a spinner; but what a superior result does he produce to that produced by Hercules! The Grecian demi-god, with all his talent, spun but a single thread at a time, while a Manchester operative spins nearly 2000. This art consists, philosophically speaking, in forming a flexible cylinder of greater or less diameter, and of indeterminate length, out of fine fibrils of

vegetable or animal origin, arranged as equally as possible, alongside and at the ends of each other, so that when twisted together, they may form an uniform continuous thread. Hence with very short filaments, like those of wool, cotton, and cachemire, a thread of the greatest length may be formed by torsion, possessed of nearly the sum of the cohesive forces of its elementary parts. Its size, or number, is measured by the area of the section perpendicular to its length; and this size is known to be variable or untrue, when equal lengths have different weights. Persons accustomed to deal in yarn can discover defects of this kind by mere inspection; but for accurate purposes they generally weigh a certain length of it. Its strength is easily estimated by the weight sustained by it; and this, as already stated, does not depend on the length of the specimen tried.

There is nothing in the history of commerce which can be compared with the wonderful progression of our cotton trade. Fifty years ago, the manufacture of woollens was the great staple of the country. In the year 1780, the whole export of manufactured cotton goods, of every description, amounted in value to only 355,000*l*. In 1785, two years after the American war, and when the commerce of this country had in some measure recovered from the difficulties under which it necessarily laboured during that conflict, the whole extent of our cotton exports, of every description, amounted to no more than 864,000*l*.; whilst, at the same period, the exports of woollen manufactured goods amounted to considerably more than four millions: the proportion between the two commodities being at that time as one to five. From the last year up to 1822, incredible as it may almost appear, the exports alone of manufactured cotton goods rose, by the official estimate, to the enormous amount of 33,337,000*l*., being forty times greater than it was in the year 1785. But with respect to the woollen, the great staple trade of the country in former times, the exports in 1822 did not amount to more than 6,000,000*l*., being not so much as one-fifth of those of cotton. Here we see what pre-eminent advantages arise from the principle of allowing capital to run in an open and unrestrained channel. The official value is no doubt higher than the real, but it is equally so for both branches. Mr. Huskisson stated in the House of Commons, on March 8, 1824, that according to the best information he had been able to obtain on the subject—and he said he had taken some pains to acquire it—he believed he was not overstating the fact, when he affirmed that the real value of cotton goods consumed at home within the last year amounted to 32,000,000*l*. sterling. Of these thirty-two millions worth of goods, not more than six millions were invested in the raw material; and the remaining twenty-six millions went to the profits of the capitalist, and the income of the persons employed in the manufacture.

A great truth is here taught to the rulers of mankind. When they remove the restrictions and burdens from any particular branch of industry, they afford relief not only to the amount of the tax remitted, but lay the foundation for commercial enterprise, to an extent of benefit impossible to foresee. We may ask any man who has attentively considered the resources of this country, whether, if the restrictions had not been removed from the manufacture of cotton, this country could possibly have made the gigantic exertions which it put forth during the late long war with the world, or could now pay the interest of the debt contracted in carrying on that war? We may also ask, whether the number of persons employed in this manufacture, to the amount probably of a million and a half, whose wants are supplied in return for their labour, does not afford more real encouragement to the agriculture of the country, than any regulation for keeping up artificial prices could possibly effect? It is to the increasing wealth of the manufacturing population, and the progress of creative industry, and not to artificial regulations for creating high prices, that this country must look not only for relief from her present burdens, but for the power of making fresh exertions whenever her position may demand them. The relief claimed for agriculture, by the landed aristocracy, cannot be given by any artificial measures, either to it or any other mode of occupation. It can flow only from the undisturbed and increasing industry of the people.

The most remarkable feature in the history of the cotton manufacture is the impetus which it has given to invention, the numerous valuable discoveries which it has brought forth, the ingenuity which it has called into action, the lights it has reflected, and the aids it has lent to the woollen, linen, and silk trades: the tendency and effect of all which have been to produce British goods at the lowest possible rate, and of a quality suited to every market, domestic and foreign. Each of these improvements, each corporeal transformation, so to speak, was attended at the time with some inconvenience to those engaged in the business, who were not in harmony with the movement; but the result has been, that not only has much more capital been beneficially invested in buildings and machinery, but a greater number of hands has been employed to occupy them, in proportion as the prospects of fresh resources were laid open to the manufacturer.

The details of the cotton trade, including a proper analysis of its operations, demand much ampler space than the limits of this volume allow; but such an outline of them may be given as will fill up our general view of the factory system. The perspective picture which fronts the title-page represents a cotton factory, recently erected at Stockport on the most improved plan, and

it will serve perfectly to illustrate the arrangement of the machines and concatenation of the processes.

The building consists of a main body, and two lateral wings; the former being three hundred feet long, and fifty feet wide; the latter projecting fifty-eight feet in front of the body. There are seven stories, including the attics. The moving power consists of two eighty-horse steam-engines, working rectangularly together, which are mounted with their great gearing-wheels on the ground floor, at the end of the body opposite the spectator's right hand, and are separated by a strong wall from the rest of the building. This wall is perforated for the passage of the main horizontal shaft, which, by means of great bevil wheels, turns the main upright shaft, supported at its lower end in an immense pier of masonry, of which the largest stone weighs nearly five tons. The velocity of the piston in each of these unison engines is two hundred and forty feet per minute; which, by the balance beam, and main wheel, is made to give to the first horizontal shaft 44.3 revolutions, and to the main upright shaft 58.84 revolutions per minute. As the one engine works with its maximum force, when the other works with its minimum, the two together cause an uniformity of impulsive power to pervade every arm throughout the factory, devoid of those vibratory alternations so injurious to delicate and finely-poised mechanisms. The engines make sixteen strokes per minute, of seven feet and six-tenths each, and perform their task with chronometric ease and punctuality.

The boilers for supplying steam to the engines, and to the warming-pipes of the building, are erected in an exterior building at the right-hand end of the mill; and transmit the smoke of their furnaces through a subterraneous tunnel to the monumental-looking chimney on the picturesque knoll, shown in the drawing. By this means, a powerful furnace draught is obtained, corresponding to a height of fully three hundred feet.

As this mill spins warp yarn by throstles, weft yarn by mules, and weaves up both by power-looms, it exhibits in the collocation of its members an instructive specimen of the *philosophy of manufactures*. Both systems of spinning, namely, the continuous or by throstles, and the discontinuous or by mules, require the cotton to be prepared on the same system of machines; and therefore they must be both arranged subordinately to the *preparation rooms*. This arrangement has been considered in the true spirit of manufacturing economy by the engineer.

As the looms require the utmost stability, and an atmosphere rather humid than dry, they are placed on the ground-floor of the body of the building, as also in a shed behind it, to the number of about one thousand. The throstle-

frames occupy the first and second stories of the main building; the mules, the fourth and fifth stories; each of these four apartments forming a noble gallery, three hundred feet long by fifty wide, and twelve feet high. The third story is the preparation gallery, intermediate between the throstles and mules, as it is destined to supply both with materials. Towards one end of this floor are distributed the carding-engines; towards the middle, the drawing-machines for arranging the cotton fibres in parallel lines, and forming them into uniform slivers, or soft narrow ribands; and towards the other end, the bobbin and fly-frames, or roving-machines, for converting the said slivers into slender porous cords, called rovings. These rovings are carried downstairs to be spun into warp-yarn on the throstles, and upstairs to be spun into weft (or sometimes warp) yarn on the mules.

The engine occupies an elevation of three stories at the right hand end of the mill. The stories immediately over it are devoted to the cleaning and lapping the cotton for the cards. Here are, 1. The willows for winnowing out the coarser impurities; 2. the blowing-machine for thoroughly opening out the cotton into clean individual fibres; and 3. the lapping-machine, for converting these fibres into a broad soft fleece-like wadding, and coiling the fleece into cylindrical rolls. These laps are carried to the continuous carding-engines, and applied to their feed-aprons. The winding-machines, and a few mules, occupy the remaining apartments in the right wing. The attic story of the main building is appropriated to the machines for warping and dressing the yarn for the power-looms. The other wing of the mill is occupied with the counting-house, store-rooms, and apartments for winding the cotton on the large bobbins used for the warping-frame.

A staircase is placed in the corner of each wing, which has a horse-shoe shape, in order to furnish, in its interior, the tunnel space of the teagle or hoist apparatus, for raising and lowering the work-people and the goods from one floor to another.

The plan and sections of this finished model of mill architecture are replete with the finest lessons of practical mechanics. They will be represented in accurate engravings, and explained with suitable details in our treatise on the cotton trade.

It will not be inexpedient, however, to describe here the American saw-gin, the ingenious invention of Whitney, which has had so great a share in reducing the price of cotton wool, as also the processes of carding and drawing in some measure common to all the textile manufactures. The saw-gin has never, to my knowledge, been fully figured or explained in any work in our language, though if rightly made and applied, it would prove highly useful to our commerce in cleaning the cottons of Hindostan. The attempts made

with it there have hitherto proved abortive from want of knowledge and skill.

The French Minister of Marine, with the view of encouraging the growth of cotton in Senegal, caused experiments to be made in Paris with a Carolina saw-gin imported from New York. In the first experiment twenty-eight pounds of Senegal seed-cotton, in its native state, were used. The filaments of this species adhere loosely to the seeds. The machine was set in motion, first by one man, and then by two men, for three-quarters of an hour, and it yielded a product of eight pounds of picked cotton, and nineteen pounds and a half of seeds. Half a pound of cotton fibres seem to have been dispersed through the apartment, causing an apparent waste, which would not be felt on the great scale. The second experiment was made on a Georgian cotton, which sticks strongly to the seeds. Two workmen cleared out, in a quarter of an hour, seven pounds of native cotton, and obtained five pounds of seeds, and nearly two pounds of cotton wool. The cotton, as it left the machine, appeared in a sound state, and so well opened, that it might have been carded without previous blowing or batting. The commissioners thought, however, that the saw-teeth of the gin, in tearing the fibres from the seeds, broke several of them, and thus injured the staple. The experienced American ginner avoids this evil.

From these experiments, it would appear, that two men, working ten hours a day, would obtain one hundred and six pounds of wool from the first kind of seed-cotton, and only ninety from the second. It may be remarked, also, that while one workman turns the machine, another can feed in the crude cotton, and gather the ginned wool into bags. The commissioners, thinking favourably of this machine, recommended its introduction into the French colonies.

THE LUDDITES

ONE OF THE GREAT problems of modern society is technological unemployment, the elimination of types of employment by the introduction of machinery. This problem became a major one only with the advent of large-scale industrialization in the nineteenth century. It led to resistance on the part of laborers to the introduction of the machinery that threatened their jobs, and in England this took a violent form in the Luddite riots. In 1811 and 1812 workers banded together in variously armed groups and destroyed or tried to destroy their machine enemies, agricultural as well as industrial equipment. They were dealt with severely by a government and society dedicated to the development of industry, and the problem they tried thus crudely and hopelessly to solve reappeared with every new major advance in technology. With industrialization also came cyclical depressions in trade which reduced the displaced worker's chance of finding employment elsewhere; during "hard times," for this reason, feeling against the new machines was especially acute.

The following selection designed to show the attitudes of the state and the middle-class on the one hand, and of the laborers on the other, is taken from the *Proceedings at York Special Commission, January, 1813*.



PROCEEDINGS HELD AT THE CASTLE OF YORK, JANUARY, 1813

MR. BARON THOMSON . . . delivered the following Charge: *Gentlemen of the Grand Inquest*, we are assembled, by virtue of His Majesty's Commission, to exercise the criminal judicature in this county, at this unusual season of the year for the occurrence of such solemnities. None of us, however, can be insensible of the necessity which exists for a speedy investigation of the charges against the very numerous class of prisoners in your calendar. You will perceive I allude to those persons, who are accused of having participated (and several of them in repeated instances) in those daring acts of tumultuous outrage, violence and rapine, by which the public tranquillity has been disturbed throughout that great manufacturing district in the West Riding of this county, for a period comprising, with little intermission, almost the whole of the year which has just elapsed.

Those mischievous Associations, dangerous to the public peace, as well as destructive of the property of individual subjects, and in some instances of their lives, seem to have originated in a neighbouring county, and at first to

have had for their object merely the destruction of machinery invented for the purpose of saving manual labour in manufactures: a notion, probably suggested by evil designing persons, to captivate the working manufacturer, and engage him in tumult and crimes, by persuading him that the use of machinery occasions a decrease of the demand for personal labour, and a consequent decrease of wages, or total want of work. A more fallacious and unfounded argument cannot be made use of. It is to the excellence of our Machinery that the existence probably, certainly the excellence and flourishing state, of our manufactures are owing. Whatever diminishes expense, increases consumption, and the demand for the article both in the home and foreign market; and were the use of machinery entirely to be abolished, the cessation of the manufacture itself would soon follow, inasmuch as other countries, to which the machinery would be banished, would be enabled to undersell us.

The spirit of insubordination and tumult, thus originating, has spread itself into other manufacturing districts; and when large bodies of men are once assembled to act against law, the transition unhappily is too easy from one irregular act to another, even to the highest of crimes against society. And thus we find that the destruction of tools has been succeeded by destroying the houses and the workshops of the manufacturers; it has led to the violent robbery of arms, to protect the tumultuous in their illegal practices, and to enable them to resist or to attack successfully; and from the robbery of arms they have proceeded to the general plunder of property of every description, and even to the murder, the deliberate assassination, of such as were supposed to be hostile to their measures. A temporary impunity (for the law, though sure, is slow) has led on these deluded persons from one atrocious act to another; from the breaking of shears to the stealing of arms, to nightly robberies, to the destruction of property, and of life itself.

The peaceful and industrious inhabitants of the country, where these enormous practices have been committed, have had the misfortune to suffer in their persons and property, from the acts of men confederated against society, and executing the purposes of their association under circumstances carrying with them the utmost terror and dismay. Armed bodies of these men, in some instances several hundred in number, apparently organized under the command of leaders, and generally with their faces blacked or otherwise disguised, have attacked the mills, shops, and houses of manufacturers and others, by day as well as by night, destroyed tools worked by machinery, and in some instances shot at the persons whose property they have thus attacked. But the worst of these misdeeds is yet behind, a most foul Assassination. While such outrages as those mentioned were carrying on

in that part of the country, a person in a respectable station of life, returning from Huddersfield to his residence at Marsden, was fired at and shot from behind the wall of an inclosure near the road, receiving several wounds, of which he died shortly after. . . .

With regard to the guilt, which persons may incur by engaging in any riotous assembly, the Statute of 1 George I. commonly called the Riot Act, has enacted, That if any persons, to the number of twelve or more, who shall be unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously assembled together, to the disturbance of the public peace, shall not disperse, but continue in that state for the space of an hour after such proclamation made as is directed in the Act, they shall be guilty of Felony without benefit of Clergy. And by the same Statute, if any persons, so unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously assembled together, to the disturbance of the public peace, shall unlawfully and with force demolish or pull down any dwelling house or other buildings therein mentioned, they shall also be guilty of Felony without benefit of Clergy.

So also by the Statute of 9 George III. it is made a capital Felony, for persons, being riotously and tumultuously assembled, to pull down or demolish, or to begin to pull down or demolish, any wind saw-mill or other windmill, or any watermill or other mill, or to set fire to the same. In addition to which, the Act of 43 George III. cap. 58. has provided against the maliciously setting fire (among other things) to any mill, warehouse or shop, with intent to injure or defraud any of the King's subjects, by subjecting the offenders, their counsellors, aiders and abettors, to a capital punishment. . . .

The prisoners having been arraigned, and severally pleaded Not Guilty, the Indictment was opened by Mr. Richardson.

Mr. Park.—May it please your Lordships; Gentlemen of the Jury, We are now assembled to try a different species of offence, from either that of yesterday, or those of the preceding days. Gentlemen, this case is one of those, to which allusion has been made; it is connected with the system that has been prevailing in the country, and is one almost of the first of the desperate attacks that were made in this country, before that unfortunate event which deprived Mr. Horsfall of life. And you will find in the course of this, as indeed appeared in the course of that trial, that the irritation produced in the minds of the unfortunate persons who have suffered death for that offence, by what passed at Mr. Cartwright's mill, probably led to that lamentable event. The day that is material for your consideration here, is Saturday the eleventh of April 1812.

The Act of Parliament upon which the prisoners stand indicted, I will first state to you. It was one passed in the 9th year of His present Majesty's reign,

cap. 29. intituled, "An Act for the more effectual punishment of such persons as shall demolish or pull down, burn, or otherwise destroy or spoil any mill or mills." I need not trouble you with any further statement of the title of it. It goes on to enact, "That if any person or persons, unlawfully riotously and tumultuously assembled together, to the disturbance of the public peace, shall unlawfully and with force demolish or pull down or begin to demolish or pull down any wind-saw-mill or other wind-mill, or any water-mill or other mill, which shall have been or shall be erected, or any of the works thereto respectively belonging, that then every such demolishing or pulling down, or beginning to demolish or pull down, shall be adjudged felony without benefit of clergy." This is the law upon which these men stand indicted.

It is well known, that in the manufacturing part of the West Riding of this county, there have been various implements of machinery introduced, and wisely introduced, for the purpose of expediting our manufactures, and bringing them into better use. The advantages to the labourers themselves, if they would have given themselves the patience to understand the thing, would have convinced them of the great utility of such machinery; but unfortunately they took a different course, and would not stay to consider the great mischiefs they would bring on themselves, not only if punishment followed, but the absolute poverty, misery and distress which the destruction of those mills, where such machinery was used, must bring on all the unfortunate persons who were occupied in them. If they had so considered, I think that common prudence, independently of moral obligation, would have prevented their doing what has been done. For if only this devastation, which was intended for Mr. Cartwright's mill, had been effected, a number of families must have been thereby thrown out of bread, at least for a considerable time, till he could erect new works. It must therefore have produced dreadful distress. But that argument did not prevail with these misguided persons; and for a considerable period of time, these deluded, foolish, ignorant, and wicked men, were going round the country, destroying all the obnoxious machinery, and stealing arms; so that previously to the 11th of April, they had collected a considerable quantity of gunpowder, guns, pistols and other weapons.

Mr. Cartwright, whose mill, called Rawfolds mill, was so attacked on the 11th of April, had had previous notice, that among those people he had been denounced, on account of his employing the most improved machinery. In consequence of which notice, this gentleman slept in his mill for upwards of six weeks before the 11th of April, deserting his family (for his dwelling-house was elsewhere); and not only that, but he had beds prepared for five military, and four of his own workmen. He prepared for his defence, as

every prudent man should do; and I have only to lament, that the same spirit Mr. Cartwright displayed, was not displayed by other gentlemen, whose property was threatened. Probably if that spirit had been manifested, their Lordships and you would not have been troubled on the present occasion. I will not go through all that he did with his mill. It seemed almost impossible for any, but a most active military force, to destroy the works he erected there. But there is one thing I must mention, because it affords almost decisive evidence against one of the unfortunate men now at the bar. It seems the different floors (I think there were three above the ground floor) were laid with flags of a considerable size, in a row, which were raised obliquely, so as to make loop-holes; so that if any man should attack the lower windows of the manufactory with hatchets and hammers, those within might fire down upon them; and Mr. Cartwright furnished himself with muskets and gunpowder for that purpose.

On the 11th of April (for I will now state the facts, applying them afterwards to the men at the bar) Mr. Cartwright will state, that he had retired to bed soon after twelve, having previously ascertained that his watchmen were on their posts; two of whom were set on the outside, to give notice of the approach of an enemy; but, like many more of our watchmen, they were surprised, and were actually seized, before any alarm could be given by them. About twenty-five minutes before one, as well as he could ascertain the time, a large dog, which was chained on the ground floor, began to bark furiously. This gentleman, whose feelings were all alive, immediately jumped out of bed, and flew to the stairs; but while he was doing so, being still in his shirt, he was astonished by an immediate heavy fire of musketry poured into his upper windows, and violent hammering at the door next to the road; for you will find by the description, that this mill had a pond on one side, so that it was to a certain degree protected. Mr. Cartwright and his men had piled their arms the night before; he immediately rushed towards them, and met his own men and the soldiers, without any covering but their shirts, having just jumped out of bed. By his orders they commenced a heavy firing from within the mill, and this they continued, as will be proved to you, upwards of twenty minutes. The mob, during that time kept up their fire also; and you will find that it consisted of more than an hundred persons. They broke all the windows, many of the window frames, and one of the doors, calling out, with the most horrible imprecations (which I shall not repeat) "Bang up, lads!—Are you within, lads?—Damn them, keep close." Mr. Cartwright had placed an alarm-bell at the top of his building; this was rung with considerable force, till the bell-rope broke. The mob, upon hearing it ring, called out, "Damn it, silence that bell." But two of Cartwright's men went up,

and rang the bell, by turn firing and ringing. At length, the firing still continuing from within, and probably the ammunition of the mob running short, the assailants began to slacken fire, and at last it entirely ceased, except that one man fired a single shot at the close. Mr. Cartwright heard the people go off towards Huddersfield, and, when their clamour subsided, was able to hear the groans of some who were left behind wounded, but he was afraid of going out, lest it should be said that he had murdered them. It was so dark that nothing could be distinguished by sight. But when assistance came, Mr. Cartwright and his men went out, and found a great number of malls, hammers, muskets and so on, left on the road to Huddersfield. They also found two men, who were too badly wounded to escape, and who afterwards unfortunately died, upon whom the Coroner's Jury sat, and found a verdict (as they were bound to do) of justifiable homicide. . . .

The prisoners capitally convicted being . . . put to the bar, and asked what they had to say, why Sentence of Death should not be passed on them, prayed that their lives might be spared.

Mr. Baron Thomson:

John Swallow, John Batley, Joseph Fisher, John Lumb, Job Hey, John Hill, William Hartley, James Hey, Joseph Crowther, Nathan Hoyle, James Haigh, Jonathan Dean, John Ogden, Thomas Brook, John Walker, you, unhappy prisoners at the bar, stand convicted of various offences, for which your lives are justly forfeited to the injured laws of your Country. You have formed a part of that desperate association of men, who, for a great length of time, have disturbed the peace and tranquillity of the West Riding of this county. You have formed yourselves into bodies; you have proceeded to the most serious extremities against the property of many individuals. The cause of your so associating appears to have been a strange delusion, which you entertained, that the use of machinery in the woollen manufacture was a detriment to the hands that were employed in another way in it; a grosser delusion never could be entertained, proceeding probably from the misrepresentations of artful and designing men, who have turned it to the very worst purpose which riot and sedition could produce. You have proceeded to great extremities. The first object, perhaps, seems to have been that of your procuring arms, in order to carry on your nefarious designs. With that view, it seems that some of you went about inquiring for such arms at different houses, and getting them wherever you could find them.

But not stopping there, and not contenting yourselves with getting what arms you could lay your hands upon, you proceeded to plunder the habitations with a great degree of force, and took from them property of every

description, which you could find in those houses. An offence of that nature is brought home, and sufficiently established against you the prisoners *John Swallow, John Batley, Joseph Fisher, John Lumb, Job Hey, John Hill, William Hartley, James Hey, Joseph Crowther, and Nathan Hoyle.*

You the prisoners, *Job Hey, John Hill, and William Hartley*, did upon the occasion, when you went to the house of your prosecutor, carrying away certainly nothing but arms, but you carried them away with great terror, and under circumstances which were sufficient unquestionably to make him deliver what he had. The other prisoners, whose names I have last recited, have been concerned in breaking a dwelling-house in the night time, some of them getting notes, money, and other things; and the last prisoners, *James Hey, Joseph Crowther, and Nathan Hoyle*, for robbing a person in his dwelling-house.

The evidence, that has been given against you all, was too clear to admit of any doubt; and you have all been convicted of these offences upon the most satisfactory evidence.

You, the other prisoners, *James Haigh, Jonathan Dean, John Ogden, Thomas Brook, and John Walker*, have been guilty of one of the greatest outrages that ever was committed in a civilized country. You had been long armed and organized, you had assembled upon this night, when the mill of Mr. Cartwright was attacked; you had assembled at the dead hour of night in great numbers; you had formed yourselves into companies under the command of different leaders; you were armed with different instruments of offence, with guns, with pistols, with axes, and with other weapons; you marched in military order and array to the mill, which was afterwards in part pulled down; you began there your attack with firearms, discharged into that mill, and kept up a most dreadful fire, and at the same time applied the instruments, which you had brought there, of a description calculated to do the worst of mischief, in beginning to demolish the mill, intending, as it is obvious, to do also mischief to and to demolish the machinery which that mill contained. The cries and exclamations that proceeded from this riotous tumultuous mob thus assembled, of which you formed a very powerful part, were such as were enough to alarm a man of less firmness than that man possessed, who was the owner of the mill so attacked. Your cry was, "Get in, get in, kill them all"; and there is but little doubt, it is to be feared, that if you had made good your entry into that mill, these threats would have been put into execution, and that the mischief done would hardly have been confined to the machinery which was there. The courage and resolution, however, which that individual displayed, had the effect of making you desist at

that time from the attack, and two of your wretched companions paid the forfeit of their lives on that occasion. . . .

In the awful situation in which you, prisoners, stand, let me seriously exhort you to set about the great work of repentance, and to spend the very short time that you must be allowed to remain in this world, in endeavouring to make your peace with your God, and to reconcile him by deep repentance. A full confession of your crime is the only atonement you can make for that which you have committed. Give yourselves up to the pious admonitions of the reverend Clergyman, whose office it will be to prepare you for your awful change; and God grant, that, worthily lamenting your sins, and acknowledging your wretchedness, you may obtain of the God of all mercy perfect remission and forgiveness.

Hear the sentence which the Laws of man pronounce upon your crimes. The sentence of the Law is, and this Court doth adjudge, That you, the several Prisoners at the bar, be taken from hence to the place from whence you came, and from thence to the place of execution, where you shall be severally hanged by the neck until you are dead. The Lord have mercy upon your souls.

THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS

THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS (1766–1835) was the second son of Daniel Malthus, a cultivated English country gentleman. Malthus' father was a friend of David Hume, through whom he became acquainted with Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Though he met Rousseau on only three occasions, Daniel Malthus corresponded with him on the most intimate terms, and it was thus partly owing to the influence of Rousseau's theories (expressed in *Émile*) that Malthus' education in his early years came to be entrusted to private tutors. Malthus subsequently attended Jesus College at Cambridge, where after graduation he was ordained as an Anglican clergyman in 1788.

Malthus' earliest interest in population theory can be traced to his unpublished work, written in 1796, entitled *The Crisis, a View of the Recent Interesting State of Great Britain by a Friend of the Constitution*. In 1798, at the age of thirty-two, he published anonymously *An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it affects the future improvement of Society: with remarks on the speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other writers*. The *Essay* deals with the problem of poverty insofar as it results from the tendency of population, where unchecked, to outstrip the means of subsistence. The subtitle of the *Essay* reflects Malthus' dissent from the confident position of Condorcet, Godwin, and other exponents of the eighteenth-century belief that man's infinite perfectibility was guaranteed by the "laws of nature." Though Condorcet and Godwin were not unaware of the problem of population pressure on the means of subsistence, they considered it a danger so remote as to preclude any serious concern, concluding (as the mercantilists had previously taught) "that the quantity of happiness in any country is best measured by the number of people," and that "an increasing population is the most certain sign of the happiness and prosperity of the state."

There is more than a little irony in the fact that Malthus' writings changed political economy from a cheerful to a "dismal science," for such was not exactly his intention. Nor should he be made responsible for many of the propagandistic uses to which his ideas were put. For Malthus was a generous, warm-hearted humanitarian whose foremost concern was the alleviation of poverty and the betterment of human society. He was a "pessimist" only in the sense that he doubted the realism of theories which assumed the inevitability of social progress, or which taught that it would occur "automatically" in consequence of a supposed "pre-established harmony" of selfish interests guided only by an "invisible hand." His plea for conscious control of human numbers stemmed from his conviction that maximum social well-being would not necessarily come about if "natural" forces were simply allowed to take their "natural" course. Nature was not essentially benevolent, and her bounty was not without limits. Man must measure these limits and must achieve his social happiness through intelligent economy of scarce resources rather than through reckless multiplication of his demands upon them.

To many of his contemporaries it seemed that Malthus' most significant achievement had been to prove that no one was so directly responsible for the existence

of poverty as the poor themselves—that their misery was solely caused by the “improvidence” that led working men to marry early and have large families, thus glutting the labor market and driving wages down. This argument was decisively invoked in 1834 when a draconian Poor Law was enacted by Parliament on the plea that the harshest possible treatment of the poor was actually the most merciful. Another application of Malthus’ ideas which he hardly foresaw has been the effort of labor unions to limit the supply of labor thrown on the market, by one or another kind of artificial control. Modern advocates of birth control through the use of contraceptive methods have come to be known as “Neo-Malthusians,” though Malthus himself was prevented by his religious scruples from approving of any deliberate methods which went beyond the postponement of marriage and the practice of continence—that is, “moral restraint.”

Vast, unpopulated and easily mechanized agricultural areas which were opened up throughout the world after the mid-nineteenth century gave an air of unreality to Malthus’ stern warnings about the inherent limits of the food supply. In more recent times, however, neo-Malthusians have been heard to renew his contentions. They point out that world population, particularly in the most undernourished areas, continues to grow; that man is still dependent upon the soil, directly or indirectly, for his sustenance; that this soil, despite contributions of modern technology, is in the long run “fixed capital”; and that significant portions of this capital have been permanently lost through wasteful exploitation of once-virgin frontiers. It is true that the Malthusian argument today demands a far more subtle and complex formulation than was once the case. But the passion with which its originator’s name is still invoked, by disciples and critics alike, indicates a vitality and insight which many theories of Malthus’ more popular contemporaries seem in retrospect not to have shared.

A second edition of the *Essay* appeared in 1803. It was an extensive revision of the first (1798), containing a great mass of historical evidence in support of Malthus’ thesis. Aside from this accumulation of empirical evidence the second version rested upon essentially the same assumptions as the first. With the exception of the first chapter, the following selections are taken from the seventh edition of the *Essay* (1872). The initial chapter has been taken from the first edition because it contains the most forthright and concise statement of Malthus’ leading principles and because it exhibits so clearly the structure of the argument.



AN ESSAY ON POPULATION

[Book I]

CHAPTER I: . . . OUTLINE OF THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT OF THE ESSAY

THE GREAT and unlooked for discoveries that have taken place of late years in natural philosophy; the increasing diffusion of general knowledge from the extension of the art of printing; the ardent and unshackled spirit of inquiry that prevails throughout the lettered, and even unlettered world; the new and extraordinary lights that have been thrown on political subjects, which dazzle and astonish the understanding; and particularly that tremendous phenomenon in the political horizon the French Revolution, which, like a blazing comet, seems destined either to inspire with fresh life and vigour, or to scorch up and destroy the thinking inhabitants of the earth, have all concurred to lead able men into the opinion, that we were touching upon a period big with the most important changes, changes that would in some measure be decisive of the future fate of mankind.

It has been said, that the great question is now at issue, whether man shall henceforth start forwards with accelerated velocity towards illimitable, and hitherto unconceived improvement; or be condemned to a perpetual oscillation between happiness and misery, and after every effort remain still at an immeasurable distance from the wished-for goal.

Yet, anxiously as every friend of mankind must look forwards to the termination of this painful suspense; and, eagerly as the inquiring mind would hail every ray of light that might assist its view into futurity, it is much to be lamented, that the writers on each side of this momentous question still keep far aloof from each other. Their mutual arguments do not meet with a candid examination. The question is not brought to rest on fewer points; and even in theory scarcely seems to be approaching to a decision.

The advocate for the present order of things, is apt to treat the sect of speculative philosophers, either as a set of artful and designing knaves, who preach up ardent benevolence, and draw captivating pictures of a happier state of society, only the better to enable them to destroy the present establishments, and to forward their own deep-laid schemes of ambition: or, as wild and mad-headed enthusiasts, whose silly speculations, and absurd paradoxes, are not worthy the attention of any reasonable man.

The advocate for the perfectibility of man, and of society, retorts on the defender of establishments a more than equal contempt. He brands him as the slave of the most miserable, and narrow prejudices; or, as the defender of

the abuses of civil society, only because he profits by them. He paints him either as a character who prostitutes his understanding to his interest; or as one whose powers of mind are not of a size to grasp anything great and noble; who cannot see above five yards before him; and who must therefore be utterly unable to take in the views of the enlightened benefactor of mankind.

In this unamicable contest, the cause of truth cannot but suffer. The really good arguments on each side of the question are not allowed to have their proper weight. Each pursues his own theory, little solicitous to correct, or improve it, by an attention to what is advanced by his opponents.

The friend of the present order of things condemns all political speculations in the gross. He will not even condescend to examine the grounds from which the perfectibility of society is inferred. Much less will he give himself the trouble in a fair and candid manner to attempt an exposition of their fallacy.

The speculative philosopher equally offends against the cause of truth. With eyes fixed on a happier state of society, the blessings of which he paints in the most captivating colours, he allows himself to indulge in the most bitter invectives against every present establishment, without applying his talents to consider the best and safest means of removing abuses, and without seeming to be aware of the tremendous obstacles that threaten, even in theory, to oppose the progress of man towards perfection.

It is an acknowledged truth in philosophy, that a just theory will always be confirmed by experiment. Yet so much friction, and so many minute circumstances occur in practice, which it is next to impossible for the most enlarged and penetrating mind to foresee, that on few subjects can any theory be pronounced just, that has not stood the test of experience. But an untried theory cannot be advanced as probable, much less as just, till all the arguments against it have been maturely weighed, and clearly and consistently confuted.

I have read some of the speculations on the perfectibility of man and of society with great pleasure. I have been warmed and delighted with the enchanting picture which they hold forth. I ardently wish for such happy improvements. But I see great, and, to my understanding, unconquerable difficulties in the way to them. These difficulties it is my present purpose to state; declaring, at the same time, that so far from exulting in them, as a cause of triumphing over the friends of innovation, nothing would give me greater pleasure than to see them completely removed.

The most important argument that I shall adduce is certainly not new. The principles on which it depends have been explained in part by Hume, and more at large by Dr. Adam Smith. It has been advanced and applied

to the present subject, though not with its proper weight, or in the most forcible point of view, by Mr. Wallace: ¹ and it may probably have been stated by many writers that I have never met with. I should certainly, therefore, not think of advancing it again, though I mean to place it in a point of view in some degree different from any that I have hitherto seen, if it had ever been fairly and satisfactorily answered.

The cause of this neglect on the part of the advocates for the perfectibility of mankind is not easily accounted for. I cannot doubt the talents of such men as Godwin and Condorcet. I am unwilling to doubt their candour. To my understanding, and probably to that of most others, the difficulty appears insurmountable. Yet these men of acknowledged ability and penetration, scarcely deign to notice it, and hold on their course in such speculations, with unabated ardour and undiminished confidence. I have certainly no right to say that they purposely shut their eyes to such arguments. I ought rather to doubt the validity of them, when neglected by such men, however forcibly their truth may strike my own mind. Yet in this respect it must be acknowledged that we are all of us too prone to err. If I saw a glass of wine repeatedly presented to a man, and he took no notice of it, I should be apt to think that he was blind or uncivil. A juster philosophy might teach me rather to think that my eyes deceived me, and that the offer was not really what I conceived it to be.

In entering upon the argument I must premise that I put out of the question, at present, all mere conjectures; that is, all suppositions, the probable realization of which cannot be inferred upon any just philosophical grounds. A writer may tell me that he thinks man will ultimately become an ostrich. I cannot properly contradict him. But before he can expect to bring any reasonable person over to his opinion, he ought to show that the necks of mankind have been gradually elongating; that the lips have grown harder, and more prominent; that the legs and feet are daily altering their shape; and that the hair is beginning to change into stubs of feathers. And till the probability of so wonderful a conversion can be shown, it is surely lost time and lost eloquence to expatiate on the happiness of man in such a state; to describe his powers, both of running and flying; to paint him in a condition where all narrow luxuries would be contemned; where he would be employed, only in collecting the necessities of life; and where, consequently, each man's share of labour would be light, and his portion of leisure ample.

I think I may fairly make two postulata.

First, That food is necessary to the existence of man.

¹ [Robert Wallace (1697-1771) a minister, wrote various books on the question of population. A passage in his *Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature, and Providence* (1761) is believed to have stimulated Malthus.]

Secondly, That the passion between the sexes is necessary, and will remain nearly in its present state.

These two laws ever since we have had any knowledge of mankind, appear to have been fixed laws of our nature; and, as we have not hitherto seen any alteration in them, we have no right to conclude that they will ever cease to be what they are now, without an immediate act of power in that Being who first arranged the system of the universe; and for the advantage of his creatures, still executes, according to fixed laws, all its various operations.

I do not know that any writer has supposed that on this earth man will ultimately be able to live without food. But Mr. Godwin has conjectured that the passion between the sexes may in time be extinguished. As, however, he calls this part of his work, a deviation into the land of conjecture, I will not dwell longer upon it at present, than to say, that the best arguments for the perfectibility of man are drawn from a contemplation of the great progress that he has already made from the savage state, and the difficulty of saying where he is to stop. But towards the extinction of the passion between the sexes, no progress whatever has hitherto been made. It appears to exist in as much force at present as it did two thousand, or four thousand years ago. There are individual exceptions now as there always have been. But, as these exceptions do not appear to increase in number, it would surely be a very unphilosophical mode of arguing, to infer merely from the existence of an exception, that the exception would, in time, become the rule, and the rule the exception.

Assuming, then, my postulata as granted, I say, that the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man.

Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence only increases in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers will show the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second.

By that law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal.

This implies a strong and constantly operating check on population from the difficulty of subsistence. This difficulty must fall some where; and must necessarily be severely felt by a large portion of mankind.

Through the animal and vegetable kingdoms, nature has scattered the seeds of life abroad with the most profuse and liberal hand. She has been comparatively sparing in the room, and the nourishment necessary to rear them. The germs of existence contained in this spot of earth, with ample food, and ample room to expand it, would fill millions of worlds in the course of a few

thousand years. Necessity, that imperious, all-pervading law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed bounds. The race of plants, and the race of animals shrink under this great restrictive law. And the race of man cannot, by any efforts of reason, escape from it. Among plants and animals its effects are waste of seed, sickness, and premature death. Among mankind, misery and vice. The former, misery, is an absolutely necessary consequence of it. Vice is a highly probable consequence, and we therefore see it abundantly prevail; but it ought not, perhaps, to be called an absolutely necessary consequence. The ordeal of virtue is to resist all temptation to evil.

This natural inequality of the two powers of population, and of production in the earth, and that great law of our nature which must constantly keep their effects equal, form the great difficulty that to me appears insurmountable in the way to perfectibility of society. All other arguments are of slight and subordinate consideration in comparison of this. I see no way by which man can escape from the weight of this law which pervades all animated nature. No fancied equality, no agrarian regulations in their utmost extent, could remove the pressure of it even for a single century. And it appears, therefore, to be decisive against the possible existence of a society, all the members of which should live in ease, happiness, and comparative leisure; and feel no anxiety about providing the means of subsistence for themselves and families.

Consequently, if the premises are just, the argument is conclusive against the perfectibility of the mass of mankind.

I have thus sketched the general outline of the argument; but I will examine it more particularly; and I think it will be found that experience, the true source and foundation of all knowledge, invariably confirms its truth.

CHAPTER II: OF THE GENERAL CHECKS TO POPULATION, AND THE MODE OF THEIR OPERATION

The ultimate check to population appears then to be a want of food, arising necessarily from the different ratios according to which population and food increase. But this ultimate check is never the immediate check, except in cases of actual famine.

The immediate check may be stated to consist in all those customs, and all those diseases, which seem to be generated by a scarcity of the means of subsistence; and all those causes, independent of this scarcity, whether of a moral or physical nature, which tend prematurely to weaken and destroy the human frame.

These checks to population, which are constantly operating with more or less force in every society, and keep down the number to the level of the

means of subsistence, may be classed under two general heads—the preventive and the positive checks.

The preventive check, as far as it is voluntary, is peculiar to man, and arises from that distinctive superiority in his reasoning faculties which enables him to calculate distant consequences. The checks to the indefinite increase of plants and irrational animals are all either positive, or, if preventive, involuntary. But man cannot look around him and see the distress which frequently presses upon those who have large families; he cannot contemplate his present possessions or earnings, which he now nearly consumes himself, and calculate the amount of each share, when with very little addition they must be divided, perhaps, among seven or eight, without feeling a doubt whether, if he follow the bent of his inclinations, he may be able to support the offspring which he will probably bring into the world. In a state of equality, if such can exist, this would be the simple question. In the present state of society other considerations occur. Will he not lower his rank in life, and be obliged to give up in great measure his former habits? Does any mode of employment present itself by which he may reasonably hope to maintain a family? Will he not at any rate subject himself to greater difficulties, and more severe labour, than in his single state? Will he not be unable to transmit to his children the same advantages of education and improvement that he had himself possessed? Does he even feel secure that, should he have a large family, his utmost exertions can save them from rags and squalid poverty, and their consequent degradation in the community? And may he not be reduced to the grating necessity of forfeiting his independence, and of being obliged to the sparing hand of Charity for support?

These considerations are calculated to prevent, and certainly do prevent, a great number of persons in all civilised nations from pursuing the dictate of nature in an early attachment to one woman.

If this restraint do not produce vice, it is undoubtedly the least evil that can arise from the principle of population. Considered as a restraint on a strong natural inclination, it must be allowed to produce a certain degree of temporary unhappiness; but evidently slight, compared with the evils which result from any of the other checks to population; and merely of the same nature as many other sacrifices of temporary to permanent gratification, which it is the business of a moral agent continually to make.

When this restraint produces vice, the evils which follow are but too conspicuous. A promiscuous intercourse to such a degree as to prevent the birth of children seems to lower, in the most marked manner, the dignity of human nature. It cannot be without its effect on men, and nothing can be

more obvious than its tendency to degrade the female character, and to destroy all its most amiable and distinguishing characteristics. Add to which, that among those unfortunate females, with which all great towns abound, more real distress and aggravated misery are, perhaps, to be found than in any other department of human life.

When a general corruption of morals, with regard to the sex, pervades all the classes of society, its effects must necessarily be to poison the springs of domestic happiness, to weaken conjugal and parental affection, and to lessen the united exertions and ardour of parents in the care and education of their children—effects which cannot take place without a decided diminution of the general happiness and virtue of the society; particularly as the necessity of art in the accomplishment and conduct of intrigues, and in the concealment of their consequences, necessarily leads to many other vices.

The positive checks to population are extremely various, and include every cause, whether arising from vice or misery, which in any degree contributes to shorten the natural duration of human life. Under this head, therefore, may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations, severe labour and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine.

On examining these obstacles to the increase of population which I have classed under the heads of preventive and positive checks, it will appear that they are all resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery.

Of the preventive checks, the restraint from marriage which is not followed by irregular gratifications may properly be termed moral restraint.

Promiscuous intercourse, unnatural passions, violations of the marriage bed, and improper arts to conceal the consequences of irregular connections, are preventive checks that clearly come under the head of vice.

Of the positive checks, those which appear to arise unavoidably from the laws of nature, may be called exclusively misery; and those which we obviously bring upon ourselves, such as wars, excesses, and many others which it would be in our power to avoid, are of a mixed nature. They are brought upon us by vice, and their consequences are misery.

The sum of all these preventive and positive checks, taken together, forms the immediate check to population; and it is evident that, in every country where the whole of the procreative power cannot be called into action, the preventive and the positive checks must vary inversely as each other; that is, in countries either naturally unhealthy, or subject to a great mortality, from whatever cause it may arise, the preventive check will prevail very little. In

those countries, on the contrary, which are naturally healthy, and where the preventive check is found to prevail with considerable force, the positive check will prevail very little, or the mortality be very small.

In every country some of these checks are, with more or less force, in constant operation; yet, notwithstanding their general prevalence, there are few states in which there is not a constant effort in the population to increase beyond the means of subsistence. This constant effort as constantly tends to subject the lower classes of society to distress, and to prevent any great permanent melioration of their condition.

These effects, in the present state of society, seem to be produced in the following manner. We will suppose the means of subsistence in any country just equal to the easy support of its inhabitants. The constant effort towards population, which is found to act even in the most vicious societies, increases the number of people before the means of subsistence are increased. The food, therefore, which before supported eleven millions, must now be divided among eleven millions and a half. The poor consequently must live much worse, and many of them be reduced to severe distress. The number of labourers also being above the proportion of work in the market, the price of labour must tend to fall, while the price of provisions would at the same time tend to rise. The labourer therefore must do more work to earn the same as he did before. During this season of distress, the discouragements to marriage and the difficulty of rearing a family are so great that the progress of population is retarded. In the meantime, the cheapness of labour, the plenty of labourers, and the necessity of an increased industry among them, encourage cultivators to employ more labour upon their land, to turn up fresh soil, and to manure and improve more completely what is already in tillage, till ultimately the means of subsistence may become in the same proportion to the population as at the period from which we set out. The situation of the labourer being then again tolerably comfortable, the restraints to population are in some degree loosened; and, after a short period, the same retrograde and progressive movements, with respect to happiness, are repeated.

This sort of oscillation will not probably be obvious to common view; and it may be difficult even for the most attentive observer to calculate its periods. Yet that, in the generality of old states, some alternation of this kind does exist though in a much less marked, and in a much more irregular manner, than I have described it, no reflecting man, who considers the subject deeply, can well doubt.

One principal reason why this oscillation has been less remarked, and less decidedly confirmed by experience than might naturally be expected, is, that the histories of mankind which we possess are, in general, histories only of the

higher classes. We have not many accounts that can be depended upon of the manners and customs of that part of mankind where these retrograde and progressive movements chiefly take place. A satisfactory history of this kind, of one people and of one period, would require the constant and minute attention of many observing minds in local and general remarks on the state of the lower classes of society, and the causes that influenced it; and to draw accurate inferences upon this subject, a succession of such historians for some centuries would be necessary. This branch of statistical knowledge has, of late years, been attended to in some countries, and we may promise ourselves a clearer insight into the internal structure of human society from the progress of these inquiries. But the science may be said yet to be in its infancy, and many of the objects, on which it would be desirable to have information, have been either omitted or not stated with sufficient accuracy. Among these, perhaps, may be reckoned the proportion of the number of adults to the number of marriages; the extent to which vicious customs have prevailed in consequence of the restraints upon matrimony; the comparative mortality among the children of the most distressed part of the community and of those who live rather more at their ease; the variations in the real price of labour; the observable differences in the state of the lower classes of society, with respect to ease and happiness, at different times during a certain period; and very accurate registers of births, deaths, and marriages, which are of the utmost importance in this subject.

A faithful history, including such particulars, would tend greatly to elucidate the manner in which the constant check upon population acts; and would probably prove the existence of the retrograde and progressive movements that have been mentioned; though the times of their vibration must necessarily be rendered irregular from the operation of many interrupting causes; such as, the introduction or failure of certain manufactures; a greater or less prevalent spirit of agricultural enterprise; years of plenty or years of scarcity; wars, sickly seasons, poor laws, emigrations, and other causes of a similar nature.

A circumstance which has, perhaps more than any other, contributed to conceal this oscillation from common view is the difference between the nominal and real price of labour. It very rarely happens that the nominal price of labour universally falls; but we well know that it frequently remains the same while the nominal price of provisions has been gradually rising. This, indeed, will generally be the case if the increase of manufactures and commerce be sufficient to employ the new labourers that are thrown into the market, and to prevent the increased supply from lowering the money-price. But an increased number of labourers receiving the same money-wages will

necessarily, by their competition, increase the money-price of corn. This is, in fact, a real fall in the price of labour; and, during this period, the condition of the lower classes of the community must be gradually growing worse. But the farmers and capitalists are growing rich from the real cheapness of labour. Their increasing capitals enable them to employ a greater number of men; and, as the population had probably suffered some check from the greater difficulty of supporting a family, the demand for labour, after a certain period, would be great in proportion to the supply, and its price would of course rise, if left to find its natural level; and thus the wages of labour, and consequently the condition of the lower classes of society, might have progressive and retrograde movements, though the price of labour might never nominally fall.

In savage life, where there is no regular price of labour, it is little to be doubted that similar oscillations took place. When population has increased nearly to the utmost limits of the food, all the preventive and the positive checks will naturally operate with increased force. Vicious habits with respect to the sex will be more general, the exposing of children more frequent, and both the probability and fatality of wars and epidemics will be considerably greater; and these causes will probably continue their operation till the population is sunk below the level of the food; and then the return to comparative plenty will again produce an increase, and, after a certain period, its further progress will again be checked by the same causes.

But without attempting to establish these progressive and retrograde movements in different countries, which would evidently require more minute histories than we possess, and which the progress of civilization naturally tends to counteract, the following propositions are intended to be proved:—

1. Population is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence.
2. Population invariably increases where the means of subsistence increase, unless prevented by some very powerful and obvious checks.
3. These checks, and the checks which repress the superior power of population, and keep its effects on a level with the means of subsistence, are all resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery.

The first of these propositions scarcely needs illustration. The second and third will sufficiently be established by a review of the immediate checks to population in the past and present state of society.

[Book IV]

CHAPTER III: OF THE ONLY EFFECTUAL MODE OF IMPROVING THE
CONDITION OF THE POOR

He who publishes a moral code, or system of duties, however firmly he may be convinced of the strong obligation on each individual strictly to conform to it, has never the folly to imagine that it will be universally or even generally practised. But this is no valid objection against the publication of the code. If it were, the same objection would always have applied; we should be totally without general rules; and to the vices of mankind arising from temptation would be added a much longer list than we have at present of vices from ignorance.

Judging merely from the light of nature, if we feel convinced of the misery arising from a redundant population on the one hand, and of the evils and unhappiness, particularly to the female sex, arising from promiscuous intercourse, on the other, I do not see how it is possible for any person who acknowledges the principle of utility as the great criterion of moral rules to escape the conclusion that moral restraint, or the abstaining from marriage till we are in a condition to support a family, with a perfectly moral conduct during that period, is the strict line of duty; and when revelation is taken into the question, this duty undoubtedly receives very powerful confirmation. At the same time I believe that few of my readers can be less sanguine than I am in their expectations of any sudden and great change in the general conduct of man on this subject: and the chief reason why in the last chapter I allowed myself to suppose the universal prevalence of this virtue was, that I might endeavour to remove any imputation on the goodness of the Deity, by showing that the evils arising from the principle of population were exactly of the same nature as the generality of other evils which excite fewer complaints: that they were increased by human ignorance and indolence, and diminished by human knowledge and virtue; and on the supposition that each individual strictly fulfilled his duty would be almost totally removed; and this without any general diminution of those sources of pleasure, arising from the regulated indulgence of the passions, which have been justly considered as the principal ingredients of human happiness.

If it will answer any purpose of illustration, I see no harm in drawing the picture of a society in which each individual is supposed strictly to fulfil his duties; nor does a writer appear to be justly liable to the imputation of being visionary unless he make such universal or general obedience necessary to

the practical utility of his system, and to that degree of moderate and partial improvement, which is all that can rationally be expected from the most complete knowledge of our duties.

But in this respect there is an essential difference between that improved state of society, which I have supposed in the last chapter, and most of the other speculations on this subject. The improvement there supposed, if we ever should make approaches towards it, is to be effected in the way in which we have been in the habit of seeing all the greatest improvements effected, by a direct application to the interest and happiness of each individual. It is not required of us to act from motives to which we are unaccustomed; to pursue a general good which we may not distinctly comprehend, or the effect of which may be weakened by distance and diffusion. The happiness of the whole is to be the result of the happiness of individuals, and to begin first with them. No co-operation is required. Every step tells. He who performs his duty faithfully will reap the full fruits of it, whatever may be the number of others who fail. This duty is intelligible to the humblest capacity. It is merely that he is not to bring beings into the world for whom he cannot find the means of support. When once this subject is cleared from the obscurity thrown over it by parochial laws and private benevolence, every man must feel the strongest conviction of such an obligation. If he cannot support his children they must starve; and if he marry in the face of a fair probability that he shall not be able to support his children, he is guilty of all the evils which he thus brings upon himself, his wife, and his offspring. It is clearly his interest, and will tend greatly to promote his happiness, to defer marrying till by industry and economy he is in a capacity to support the children that he may reasonably expect from his marriage; and as he cannot in the meantime gratify his passions without violating an express command of God, and running a great risk of injuring himself, or some of his fellow-creatures, considerations of his own interest and happiness will dictate to him the strong obligation to a moral conduct while he remains unmarried.

However powerful may be the impulses of passion, they are generally in some degree modified by reason. And it does not seem entirely visionary to suppose that, if the true and permanent cause of poverty were clearly explained and forcibly brought home to each man's bosom, it would have some, and perhaps not an inconsiderable influence on his conduct; at least the experiment has never yet been fairly tried. Almost everything that has been hitherto done for the poor has tended, as if with solicitous care, to throw a veil of obscurity over this subject, and to hide from them the true cause of their poverty. When the wages of labour are hardly sufficient to maintain two children, a man marries and has five or six; he of course finds

himself miserably distressed. He accuses the insufficiency of the price of labour to maintain a family. He accuses his parish for their tardy and sparing fulfilment of their obligation to assist him. He accuses the avarice of the rich, who suffer him to want what they can so well spare. He accuses the partial and unjust institutions of society, which have awarded him an inadequate share of the produce of the earth. He accuses perhaps the dispensations of Providence, which have assigned to him a place in society so beset with unavoidable distress and dependence. In searching for objects of accusation, he never adverts to the quarter from which his misfortunes originate. The last person that he would think of accusing is himself, on whom in fact the principal blame lies, except so far as he has been deceived by the higher classes of society. He may perhaps wish that he had not married, because he now feels the inconveniences of it; but it never enters into his head that he can have done anything wrong. He has always been told that to raise up subjects for his king and country is a very meritorious act. He has done this, and yet is suffering for it; and it cannot but strike him as most extremely unjust and cruel in his king and country to allow him thus to suffer, in return for giving them what they are continually declaring that they particularly want.

Till these erroneous ideas have been corrected, and the language of nature and reason has been generally heard on the subject of population, instead of the language of error and prejudice, it cannot be said that any fair experiment has been made with the understandings of the common people; and we cannot justly accuse them of improvidence and want of industry till they act as they do now after it has been brought home to their comprehensions that they are themselves the cause of their own poverty; that the means of redress are in their own hands, and in the hands of no other persons whatever; that the society in which they live and the government which presides over it are without any *direct* power in this respect; and that however ardently they may desire to relieve them, and whatever attempts they may make to do so, they are really and truly unable to execute what they benevolently wish, but unjustly promise; that, when the wages of labour will not maintain a family, it is an incontrovertible sign that their king and country do not want more subjects, or at least that they cannot support them; that, if they marry in this case, so far from fulfilling a duty to society, they are throwing a useless burden on it, at the same time that they are plunging themselves into distress; and that they are acting directly contrary to the will of God, and bringing down upon themselves various diseases, which might all, or the greater part, have been avoided if they had attended to the repeated admonitions which he gives by the general laws of nature to every being capable of reason.

Paley, in his *Moral Philosophy*, observes that in countries "in which sub-

sistence is become scarce, it behoves the state to watch over the public morals with increased solicitude; for nothing but the instinct of nature, under the restraint of chastity, will induce men to undertake the labour, or consent to the sacrifice of personal liberty and indulgence, which the support of a family in such circumstances requires." That it is always the duty of a state to use every exertion likely to be effectual in discouraging vice and promoting virtue, and that no temporary circumstances ought to cause any relaxation in these exertions, is certainly true. The means therefore proposed are always good; but the particular end in view in this case appears to be absolutely criminal. We wish to force people into marriage when from the acknowledged scarcity of subsistence they will have little chance of being able to support their children. We might as well force people into the water who are unable to swim. In both cases we rashly tempt Providence. Nor have we more reason to believe that a miracle will be worked to save us from the misery and mortality resulting from our conduct in the one case than in the other.

The object of those who really wish to better the condition of the lower classes of society must be to raise the relative proportion between the price of labour and the price of provisions, so as to enable the labourer to command a larger share of the necessaries and comforts of life. We have hitherto principally attempted to attain this end by encouraging the married poor, and consequently increasing the number of labourers, and overstocking the market with a commodity which we still say that we wish to be dear. It would seem to have required no great spirit of divination to foretell the certain failure of such a plan of proceeding. There is nothing however like experience. It has been tried in many different countries, and for many hundred years, and the success has always been answerable to the nature of the scheme. It is really time now to try something else.

When it was found that oxygen, or pure vital air, would not cure consumptives as was expected, but rather aggravated their symptoms, trial was made of an air of the most opposite kind. I wish we had acted with the same philosophical spirit in our attempts to cure the disease of poverty; and having found that the pouring in of fresh supplies of labour only tended to aggravate the symptoms, had tried what would be the effect of withholding a little these supplies.

In all old and fully-peopled states it is from this method, and this alone, that we can rationally expect any essential and permanent melioration in the condition of the labouring classes of the people.

In an endeavour to raise the proportion of the quantity of provisions to the number of consumers in any country, our attention would naturally be first

directed to the increasing of the absolute quantity of provisions; but finding that, as fast as we did this, the number of consumers more than kept pace with it, and that with all our exertions we were still as far as ever behind, we should be convinced that our efforts directed only in this way would never succeed. It would appear to be setting the tortoise to catch the hare. Finding, therefore, that from the laws of nature we could not proportion the food to the population, our next attempt should naturally be to proportion the population to the food. If we can persuade the hare to go to sleep, the tortoise may have some chance of overtaking her.

We are not, however, to relax our efforts in increasing the quantity of provisions, but to combine another effort with it; that of keeping the population, when once it has been overtaken, at such a distance behind as to effect the relative proportion which we desire; and thus unite the two grand *desiderata*, a great actual population and a state of society in which abject poverty and dependence are comparatively but little known; two objects which are far from being incompatible.

If we be really serious in what appears to be the object of such general research, the mode of essentially and permanently bettering the condition of the poor, we must explain to them the true nature of their situation, and show them that the withholding of the supplies of labour is the only possible way of really raising its price, and that they themselves, being the possessors of this commodity, have alone the power to do this.

I cannot but consider this mode of diminishing poverty as so perfectly clear in theory, and so invariably confirmed by the analogy of every other commodity which is brought to market, that nothing but its being shown to be calculated to produce greater evils than it proposes to remedy can justify us in not making the attempt to put it into execution.

CHAPTER V: OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF PURSUING THE OPPOSITE MODE

It is an evident truth that, whatever may be the rate of increase in the means of subsistence, the increase of population must be limited by it, at least after the food has once been divided into the smallest shares that will support life. All the children born beyond what would be required to keep up the population to this level must necessarily perish, unless room be made for them by the deaths of grown persons. It has appeared indeed clearly in the course of this work that in all old states the marriages and births depend principally upon the deaths, and that there is no encouragement to early unions so powerful as a great mortality. To act consistently, therefore, we should facilitate, instead of foolishly and vainly endeavouring to impede, the operations of nature in producing this mortality; and if we dread the too

frequent visitation of the horrid form of famine, we should sedulously encourage the other forms of destruction which we compel nature to use. Instead of recommending cleanliness to the poor, we should encourage contrary habits. In our towns we should make the streets narrower, crowd more people into the houses, and court the return of the plague. In the country, we should build our villages near stagnant pools, and particularly encourage settlements in all marshy and unwholesome situations. But above all, we should reprobate specific remedies for ravaging diseases; and those benevolent, but much mistaken men, who have thought they were doing a service to mankind by projecting schemes for the total extirpation of particular disorders. If by these and similar means the annual mortality were increased from 1 in 36 or 40, to 1 in 18 or 20, we might probably every one of us marry at the age of puberty, and yet few be absolutely starved.

If, however, we all marry at this age, and yet still continue our exertions to impede the operations of nature, we may rest assured that all our efforts will be vain. Nature will not, nor cannot, be defeated in her purposes. The necessary mortality must come in some form or other; and the extirpation of one disease will only be the signal for the birth of another perhaps more fatal. We cannot lower the waters of misery by pressing them down in different places, which must necessarily make them rise somewhere else; the only way in which we can hope to effect our purpose is by drawing them off. To this course nature is constantly directing our attention by the chastisements which await a contrary conduct. These chastisements are more or less severe in proportion to the degree in which her admonitions produce their intended effect. In this country at present these admonitions are by no means entirely neglected. The preventive check to population prevails to a considerable degree, and her chastisements are in consequence moderate; but if we were all to marry at the age of puberty they would be severe indeed. Political evils would probably be added to physical. A people goaded by constant distress, and visited by frequent returns of famine, could not be kept down but by a cruel despotism. We should approach to the state of the people in Egypt or Abyssinia; and I would ask whether in that case it is probable that we should be more virtuous?

Physicians have long remarked the great changes which take place in diseases; and that, while some appear to yield to the efforts of human care and skill, others seem to become in proportion more malignant and fatal. Dr. William Heberden published, not long since, some valuable observations on this subject deduced from the London bills of mortality. In his preface, speaking of these bills, he says, "the gradual changes they exhibit in particular diseases correspond to the alterations which in time are known to take place in

the channels through which the great stream of mortality is constantly flowing." In the body of his work, afterwards, speaking of some particular diseases, he observes with that candour which always distinguishes true science; "It is not easy to give a satisfactory reason for all the changes which may be observed to take place in the history of diseases. Nor is it any disgrace to physicians, if their causes are often so gradual in their operation, or so subtle, as to elude investigation."

I hope I shall not be accused of presumption in venturing to suggest that, under certain circumstances, such changes must take place; and perhaps without any alteration in those proximate causes which are usually looked to on these occasions. If this should appear to be true, it will not seem extraordinary that the most skilful and scientific physicians, whose business it is principally to investigate proximate causes, should sometimes search for these causes in vain.

In the country which keeps its population at a certain standard, if the average number of marriages and births be given, it is evident that the average number of deaths will also be given; and, to use Dr. Heberden's metaphor, the channels through which the great stream of mortality is constantly flowing will always convey off a given quantity. Now if we stop up any of these channels it is perfectly clear that the stream of mortality must run with greater force through some of the other channels; that is, if we eradicate some diseases, others will become proportionally more fatal. In this case the only distinguishable cause is the damming up a necessary outlet of mortality. Nature, in the attainment of her great purposes, seems always to seize upon the weakest part. If this part be made strong by human skill, she seizes upon the next weakest part, and so on in succession; not like a capricious deity, with an intention to sport with our sufferings and constantly to defeat our labours; but like a kind, though sometimes severe instructor, with the intention of teaching us to make all parts strong, and to chase vice and misery from the earth. In avoiding one fault we are too apt to run into some other; but we always find Nature faithful to her great object, at every false step we commit ready to admonish us of our errors by the infliction of some physical or moral evil. If the prevalence of the preventive check to population in a sufficient degree were to remove many of those diseases which now afflict us, yet be accompanied by a considerable increase of the vice of promiscuous intercourse, it is probable that the disorders and unhappiness, the physical and moral evils arising from this vice, would increase in strength and degree; and, admonishing us severely of our error, would point to the only line of conduct approved by nature, reason, and religion, abstinence from marriage till we can support our children and chastity till that period arrives.

In the case just stated, in which the population and the number of marriages are supposed to be fixed, the necessity of a change in the mortality of some diseases, from the diminution or extinction of others, is capable of mathematical demonstration. The only obscurity which can possibly involve this subject arises from taking into consideration the effect that might be produced by a diminution of mortality in increasing the population, or in decreasing the number of marriages. That the removal of any of the particular causes of mortality can have no further effect upon population than the means of subsistence will allow, and that it has no certain and necessary influence on these means of subsistence, are facts of which the reader must be already convinced. Of its operation in tending to prevent marriage, by diminishing the demand for fresh supplies of children, I have no doubt; and there is reason to think that it had this effect in no inconsiderable degree on the extinction of the plague, which had so long and so dreadfully ravaged this country. Dr. Heberden draws a striking picture of the favourable change observed in the health of the people of England since this period; and justly attributes it to the improvements which have gradually taken place, not only in London but in all great towns; and in the manner of living throughout the kingdom, particularly with respect to cleanliness and ventilation. But these causes would not have produced the effect observed if they had not been accompanied by an increase of the preventive check; and probably the spirit of cleanliness, and better mode of living, which then began to prevail, by spreading more generally a decent and useful pride, principally contributed to this increase. The diminution in the number of marriages, however, was not sufficient to make up for the great decrease of mortality from the extinction of the plague, and the striking reduction of the deaths in the dysentery. While these and some other disorders became almost evanescent, consumption, palsy, apoplexy, gout, lunacy, and small-pox became more mortal. The widening of these drains was necessary to carry off the population which still remained redundant, notwithstanding the increased operation of the preventive check, and the part which was annually disposed of and enabled to subsist by the increase of agriculture.

Dr. Haygarth, in the Sketch of his benevolent plan for the extermination of the casual small-pox, draws a frightful picture of the mortality which has been occasioned by this distemper, attributes to it the slow progress of population, and makes some curious calculations on the favourable effects which would be produced in this respect by its extermination. His conclusions, however, I fear, would not follow from his premises. I am far from doubting that millions and millions of human beings have been destroyed by the small-pox. But were its devastations, as Dr. Haygarth supposes, many thousand degrees

greater than the plague, I should still doubt whether the average population of the earth had been diminished by them. The small-pox is certainly one of the channels, and a very broad one, which nature has opened for the last thousand years to keep down the population to the level of the means of subsistence; but had this been closed, others would have become wider, or new ones would have been formed. In ancient times the mortality from war and the plague was incomparably greater than in modern. On the gradual diminution of this stream of mortality, the generation and almost universal prevalence of the small-pox is a great and striking instance of one of those changes in the channels of mortality which ought to awaken our attention and animate us to patient and persevering investigation. For my own part I feel not the slightest doubt that, if the introduction of the cow-pox should extirpate the small-pox, and yet the number of marriages continue the same, we shall find a very perceptible difference in the increased mortality of some other diseases. Nothing could prevent this effect but a sudden start in our agriculture; and if this should take place, it will not be so much owing to the number of children saved from death by the cow-pox inoculation, as to the alarms occasioned among the people of property by the late scarcities, and to the increased gains of farmers, which have been so absurdly reprobated. I am strongly however inclined to believe that the number of marriages will not, in this case, remain the same; but that the gradual light which may be expected to be thrown on this interesting topic of human inquiry will teach us how to make the extinction of a mortal disorder a real blessing to us, a real improvement in the general health and happiness of the society.

If, on contemplating the increase of vice which might contingently follow an attempt to inculcate the duty of moral restraint, and the increase of misery that must necessarily follow the attempts to encourage marriage and population, we come to the conclusion not to interfere in any respect, but to leave every man to his own free choice, and responsible only to God for the evil which he does in either way; this is all I contend for; I would on no account do more; but I contend that at present we are very far from doing this.

Among the lower classes of society, where the point is of the greatest importance, the poor-laws afford a direct, constant, and systematical encouragement to marriage, by removing from each individual that heavy responsibility, which he would incur by the laws of nature, for bringing beings into the world which he could not support. Our private benevolence has the same direction as the poor-laws, and almost invariably tends to encourage marriage, and to equalise as much as possible the circumstances of married and single men.

Among the higher classes of people, the superior distinctions which married

women receive, and the marked inattentions to which single women of advanced age are exposed, enable many men, who are agreeable neither in mind nor person, and are besides in the wane of life, to choose a partner among the young and fair, instead of being confined, as nature seems to dictate, to persons of nearly their own age and accomplishments. It is scarcely to be doubted that the fear of being an old maid, and of that silly and unjust ridicule, which folly sometimes attaches to this name, drives many women into the marriage union with men whom they dislike, or at best to whom they are perfectly indifferent. Such marriages must to every delicate mind appear little better than legal prostitutions; and they often burden the earth with unnecessary children, without compensating for it by an accession of happiness and virtue to the parties themselves.

Throughout all the ranks of society the prevailing opinions respecting the duty and obligation of marriage cannot but have a very powerful influence. The man who thinks that, in going out of the world without leaving representatives behind him, he shall have failed in an important duty to society, will be disposed to force rather than to repress his inclinations on this subject; and when his reason represents to him the difficulties attending a family, he will endeavour not to attend to these suggestions, will still determine to venture, and will hope that, in the discharge of what he conceives to be his duty, he shall not be deserted by Providence.

In a civilised country, such as England, where a taste for the decencies and comforts of life prevails among a very large class of people, it is not possible that the encouragements to marriage from positive institutions and prevailing opinions should entirely obscure the light of nature and reason on this subject; but still they contribute to make it comparatively weak and indistinct. And till this obscurity is removed, and the poor are undeceived with respect to the principal cause of their poverty, and taught to know that their happiness or misery must depend chiefly upon themselves, it cannot be said that, with regard to the great question of marriage, we leave every man to his own free and fair choice.

IV

THE DOMINION AND TRIALS OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISM

JOHN RAMSAY M'CULLOCH

JUST AS present-day economists are concerned with such problems as the maintenance of full employment, the implications of a high public debt, the dangers of inflation, and various aspects of economic planning, so the classical economists dealt with highly practical and political issues. When Malthus and David Ricardo (1772–1823) wrote about “poverty” or “the high price of bullion” they had in mind the concrete problems created by the early phases of the industrial revolution and the economic maladjustments and difficulties encountered by British export industries during the period following the Napoleonic wars. When the classical economists praised the beneficial effects of machinery, they dealt in their own way with a social and political problem which found dramatic expression in the Manchester insurrection and the outbreaks of the Luddites. What distinguishes the classical economists is not the subject matter of their writings but rather the methods of their approach to the persistent problems with which economists have been concerned ever since. What they had in common with one another were a number of unquestioned presuppositions and convictions about the existence of a natural and beneficent orderliness in economic and social affairs. In much the same manner in which the natural scientists had discovered the natural laws of the physical world, the classical economists set out to explore the natural laws of the economic order. In harmony with the prevailing aspirations of the bourgeoisie and in full sympathy with the latter’s struggle for political emancipation, the founders of the new discipline of political economy visualized the natural economic order as a system of natural liberty not requiring any purposive direction or planning on the part of government authorities. The great achievement of these economists lies in the fact that they were able to correlate the multitude of detailed phenomena of economic reality (such as price, production, wages, and capital) within a coherent system of knowledge, or, as J. M. Keynes put it with reference to the work of the great English economist Alfred Marshall, within “a whole Copernican system, by which all the elements of the economic universe are kept in their places by mutual counterpoise and interaction.”

John Ramsay M'Culloch (1789–1864) is significant less for his contribution to classical economic theory than for his achievements as a popularizer of the economic doctrines of Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo. As an expounder of the classical system of economic thought, M'Culloch became not only “the most prominent figure in the economic world of the period from 1820 to 1850” (Taussig) but also a scapegoat of most of the attacks directed against economic orthodoxy. Some of the most devastating comments of Karl Marx about the classical school are directed not against Ricardo but against M'Culloch. This was perhaps inevitable because M'Culloch applied the classical doctrines in the most consistent and intransigent fashion to the problems of the day.

The selections given here from the first edition (1825) of M'Culloch's *Principles of Political Economy* are clear examples of the way in which the classical school

made practical use of its theoretical conceptions for the support of the principles of *laissez faire*. This is particularly evident in connection with M'Culloch's treatment of the effects of machinery, the "law of markets," and the classical theory of wages. The selection opens with a definition of production and a restatement of the philosophy underlying the classical labor theory of value. Reflecting the views of such early dissenters as Simonde de Sismondi (1773-1842) and Malthus regarding the possible negative consequences of technological progress upon workers, M'Culloch finally falls back upon Jean-Baptiste Say's famous principle that general overproduction ("a universal glut") is impossible.

The following extended quotation is taken from Chapter xv of Say's *A Treatise on Political Economy*. (This work first appeared in 1803; the fourth edition was translated from the French in 1821 by C. R. Prinsep.)

"It is common to hear adventurers in the different channels of industry assert, that their difficulty lies not in the production, but in the disposal of commodities; that products would always be abundant, if there were but a ready demand, or market for them. When the demand for their commodities is slow, difficult, and productive of little advantage, they pronounce money to be scarce; the grand object of their desire is, a consumption brisk enough to quicken sales and keep up prices. But ask them what peculiar causes and circumstances facilitate the demand for their products, and you will soon perceive that most of them have extremely vague notions of these matters; that their observation of facts is imperfect, and their explanation still more so; that they treat doubtful points as matter of certainty, often pray for what is directly opposite to their interests, and importunately solicit from authority a protection of the most mischievous tendency. . . .

"A man who applies his labour to the investing of objects with value by the creation of utility of some sort, cannot expect such a value to be appreciated and paid for, unless where other men have the means of purchasing it. Now, of what do these means consist? Of other values of other products, likewise the fruits of industry, capital, and land. Which leads us to a conclusion that may at first sight appear paradoxical, namely, that it is production which opens a demand for products.

"Should a tradesman say, 'I do not want other products for my woollens, I want money,' there could be little difficulty in convincing him that his customers could not pay him in money, without having first procured it by the sale of some other commodities of their own. . . . You say, you only want money; I say, you want other commodities, and not money. For what, in point of fact, do you want the money? Is it not for the purchase of raw materials or stock for your trade, or victuals for your support? . . . For, after all, money is but the agent of the transfer of values. Its whole utility has consisted in conveying to your hands the value of the commodities, which your customer has sold, for the purpose of buying again from you; and the very next purchase you make, it will again convey to a third person the value of the products you may have sold to others. So that you will have bought, and everybody must buy, the objects of want or desire, each with the value of his respective products transformed into money for the moment only. . . .

"Thus, to say that sales are dull, owing to the scarcity of money, is to mistake the means for the cause; an error that proceeds from the circumstance, that almost

all produce is in the first instance exchanged for money, before it is ultimately converted into other produce; and the commodity, which recurs so repeatedly in use, appears to vulgar apprehensions the most important of commodities, and the end and object of all transactions, whereas it is only the medium. Sales cannot be said to be dull because money is scarce, but because other products are so. . . .

"It is worth while to remark, that a product is no sooner created, than it, from that instant, affords a market for other products to the full extent of its own value. When the producer has put the finishing hand to his product, he is most anxious to sell it immediately, lest its value should diminish in his hands. Nor is he less anxious to dispose of the money he may get for it; for the value of money is also perishable. But the only way of getting rid of money is in the purchase of some product or other. Thus, the mere circumstance of the creation of one product immediately opens a vent for other products.

"For this reason, a good harvest is favourable, not only to the agriculturist, but likewise to the dealers in all commodities generally. The greater the crop, the larger are the purchases of the growers. A bad harvest, on the contrary, hurts the sale of commodities at large. And so it is also with the products of manufacture and commerce. The success of one branch of commerce supplies more ample means of purchase, and consequently opens a market for the products of all the other branches; on the other hand, the stagnation of one channel of manufacture, or of commerce, is felt in all the rest.

"But it may be asked, if this be so, how does it happen, that there is at times so great a glut of commodities in the market, and so much difficulty in finding a vent for them? Why cannot one of these superabundant commodities be exchanged for another? I answer that the glut of a particular commodity arises from its having outrun the total demand for it in one or two ways; either because it has been produced in excessive abundance, or because the production of other commodities has fallen short.

"It is because the production of some commodities has declined, that other commodities are superabundant. To use a more hackneyed phrase, people have bought less, because they have made less profit; and they have made less profit for one or two causes; either they have found difficulties in the employment of their productive means, or these means have themselves been deficient.

"It is observable, moreover, that precisely at the same time that one commodity makes a loss, another commodity is making excessive profit. And, since such profits must operate as a powerful stimulus to the cultivation of that particular kind of products, there must needs be some violent means, or some extraordinary cause, a political or natural convulsion, or the avarice or ignorance of authority, to perpetuate this scarcity on the one hand, and consequent glut on the other. No sooner is the cause of this political disease removed, than the means of production feels a natural impulse towards the vacant channels, the replenishment of which restores activity to all the others. One kind of production would seldom outstrip every other, and its products be disproportionately cheapened, were production left entirely free."

The practical significance of Say's "law of markets," which was first formulated in 1804 and which most classical economists accepted, lies in the fact that it lends

seemingly objective proof to the belief in the fundamental orderliness of the system of natural liberty. By asserting that production creates its own demand and by thus denying the possibility of serious economic maladjustments under conditions of a free market economy, classical economics tended to block the way to an understanding of the business cycle in modern economic society.

The same confidence in natural orderliness in economic affairs without economic planning is revealed in M'Culloch's restatement of the principles of Ricardo's wage theory. In essence this theory led to the conclusion that the rate of wages depended upon the proportion of capital and population; since the latter was believed with Malthus to have a natural tendency to increase more rapidly than the former, the conditions of the laborers were bound to approach the minimum subsistence level unless the tendency of population to increase was checked by "moral restraints." This was the meaning of Ricardo's iron law of wages, according to which the market price of labor tends to conform to the natural price of labor, the latter being "that price which is necessary to enable the labourers, one with another, to subsist and to perpetuate their race, without either increase or diminution." Again the practical implications of this theory of wages (sometimes referred to as the wages fund theory because it assumed that wages were paid from "capital," that is, the wages fund necessary to give effect to labor) were that any interference with the free labor market, for example by legislation such as poor laws or minimum wage laws, was likely to lead to a more rapid increase of population and thus, in the end, to defeat its objective of improving the conditions of the poor. In the words of Ricardo: "It is a truth which admits not a doubt that the comforts and well-being of the poor cannot be permanently secured without some regard on their part, or some effort on the part of the legislature, to regulate the increase of their numbers, and to render less frequent among them early and improvident marriages. The operation of the system of poor laws has been directly contrary to this. They have rendered restraint superfluous, and have invited imprudence, by offering it a portion of the wages of prudence and industry." Truly, economics had become a dismal science.



THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

Part II: Production of Wealth

SECTION I: DEFINITION OF PRODUCTION—LABOUR THE ONLY SOURCE OF WEALTH

ALL THE OPERATIONS of nature and of art are reducible to, and really consist of *transmutations*,—of changes of form and of place. By production, in the science of Political Economy, we are not to understand the production of matter, for that is the exclusive attribute of Omnipotence, but the production of *utility*, and consequently of exchangeable value, by appropriating and modify-

ing matter already in existence, so as to fit it to satisfy our wants, and to contribute to our enjoyments. The labour which is thus employed is the only source of wealth. Nature spontaneously furnishes the matter of which all commodities are made: but, until labour has been expended in appropriating matter, or in adapting it to our use, it is wholly destitute of value, and is not, nor ever has been, considered as forming wealth. Place us on the banks of a river, or in an orchard, and we shall infallibly perish, either of thirst or hunger, if we do not, *by an effort of industry*, raise the water to our lips, or pluck the fruit from its parent tree. It is seldom, however, that the mere appropriation of matter is sufficient. In the vast majority of cases, labour is required not only to appropriate it, but also to convey it from place to place, and to give it that peculiar figure and shape, without which it may be totally useless, and incapable of either ministering to our necessities or our comforts. The coal used in our fires is buried deep in the bowels of the earth, and is absolutely worthless until the labour of the miner has extracted it from the mine, and brought it into a situation where it can be made use of. The stones and mortar of which our houses are built, and the rugged and shapeless materials from which the various articles of convenience and ornament with which they are furnished have been prepared, were, in their original state, alike destitute of value and utility. And of the innumerable variety of animal, vegetable, and mineral products which forms the materials of our food and clothes, none were originally serviceable, while many were extremely noxious to man. It is his *labour* that has given them utility, that has subdued their bad qualities, and made them satisfy his wants, and minister to his comforts and enjoyments. "Labour was the first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased." (*Wealth of Nations*, Murray's Reprints, p. 1.)

If we observe the progress, and trace the history of the human race in different countries and states of society, we shall find that their comfort and happiness have been always very nearly proportioned to the power which they possessed of rendering their labour effective in appropriating the raw products of nature, and in fitting and adapting them to their use. The savage, whose labour is confined to the gathering of wild fruits, or to the picking up of shellfish on the sea coast, is placed at the very bottom of the scale of civilization, and is, in point of comfort, decidedly inferior to many of the lower animals. The *first* step in the progress of society is made when man learns to hunt wild animals, to feed himself with their flesh, and to clothe himself with their skins. But labour, when confined to the chase, is extremely barren and unproductive. Tribes of hunters, like beasts of prey, whom they are justly said

to resemble closely in their habits and modes of subsistence, are but thinly scattered over the surface of the countries which they occupy; and notwithstanding the fewness of their numbers, any unusual deficiency in the supply of game never fails to reduce them to the extremity of want. The *second* step in the progress of society is made when the tribes of hunters and fishers learn to supply their labour, like the ancient Scythians and modern Tartars, to the domestication of wild animals and the rearing of flocks. The subsistence of herdsmen and shepherds is much less precarious than that of hunters, but they are almost entirely destitute of all those comforts and elegancies which give to civilised life its chief value. The *third* and most decisive step in the progress of civilization—in the great art of producing the necessities and conveniences of life—is made when the wandering tribes of hunters and shepherds renounce their migratory habits, and become agriculturists and manufacturers. It is then, properly speaking, that man, shaking off that indolence which is natural to him, begins fully to avail himself of his productive powers. He then becomes laborious, and, by a necessary consequence, his wants are then, for the first time, fully supplied, and he acquires an extensive command over the articles necessary for his comfort as well as for his subsistence. . . .

It is to labour, therefore, and to labour only, that man owes every thing possessed of exchangeable value. Labour is the talisman that has raised him from the condition of the savage—that has changed the desert and the forest into cultivated fields—that has covered the earth with cities and the ocean with ships—that has given us plenty, comfort, and elegance, instead of want, misery, and barbarism.

This fundamental principle once established, it necessarily follows, that the great practical problem involved in that part of the science of Political Economy which treats of the *production* of wealth, must resolve itself into a discussion of the means whereby labour may be rendered most efficient, or whereby *the greatest amount of necessary, useful, and desirable products may be obtained with the least possible quantity of labour*. Every measure that has any tendency to add to the power of labour, or to reduce the cost of the commodities produced by its agency, must add proportionally to our power of obtaining wealth and riches; while every measure or regulation that has any tendency to waste labour, or to raise the cost of producing commodities, must equally lessen this power. This, then, is the simple and decisive test by which we are to judge of the expediency of every measure affecting the wealth of the country, and of the value of every invention. If they render labour more productive—if they have a tendency to reduce the exchangeable value of commodities, to render them more easily obtainable, and to bring

them within the command of a greater portion of society, they must be advantageous; but if their tendency be different they must as certainly be disadvantageous. Considered in this point of view, that great branch of the science of Political Economy which treats of the *production* of wealth, will be found to be abundantly simple, and easily understood.

Labour, according as it is applied to the raising of raw produce—to the fashioning of that raw produce, when raised, into articles of utility, convenience or ornament—or to the conveyance of raw and wrought produce from one country and place to another—is said to be agricultural, manufacturing, or commercial. An acquaintance with the particular processes, and most advantageous methods, of applying labour in each of these grand departments of industry, forms the peculiar and appropriate study of the agriculturist, manufacturer, and merchant. It is not consistent with the objects of the political economist to enter into the details of particular businesses and professions. He confines himself to an investigation of the means by which labour in general may be rendered most productive, and how its powers may be increased in *all* the departments of industry.

SECTION IV. IMPROVEMENTS IN MACHINERY SIMILAR IN THEIR EFFECTS TO IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SKILL AND DEXTERITY OF THE LABOURER—DO NOT OCCASION A GLUT OF COMMODITIES—SOMETIMES FORCE WORKMEN TO CHANGE THEIR EMPLOYMENTS, BUT HAVE NO TENDENCY TO LESSEN THE EFFECTIVE DEMAND FOR LABOUR—CASE SUPPOSED BY MR. RICARDO, WITH RESPECT TO MACHINERY, POSSIBLE, BUT EXCEEDINGLY UNLIKELY EVER TO OCCUR—THE TRUE CAUSE OF GLUTS

Before proceeding to examine the various bad consequences that have been supposed to result from the indefinite extension and improvement of machinery, it may be observed, that the same consequences would equally result from the continued improvement of the skill and industry of the labourer. If the construction of a machine that would manufacture two pairs of stockings for the same expense that had previously been required to manufacture one pair, be under any circumstances injurious to the labourer, the injury would be equal were the same thing accomplished by increased dexterity and skill on the part of the knitters;—if, for example, the females who have been in the habit of knitting two or three pairs of stockings in the week, should in future be able to knit four or six pairs. There is obviously no difference in these cases. And if the demand for stockings was already sufficiently supplied, M. Sismondi could not, consistently with the principles he has advanced (*Nouveaux Principes*, II, 318) hesitate about condemning such an

improvement as a very great evil—as a means of throwing *half* the people engaged in the stocking manufacture out of employment. The question respecting the improvement of machinery is, therefore, at bottom, the same with the question respecting the improvement of the science, skill, and industry of the labourer. The principles which regulate our decision in the one case, must also regulate it in the other. . . .

In order the better to appreciate the effects resulting either from the increased manual skill and dexterity of the labourer, or from an improvement in the tools or machines used by him, let us suppose that the productive powers of industry are *universally* augmented, and that the workman engaged in every different employment can, with the same exertion, produce *ten* times the quantity of commodities as at present: Is it not evident that this increased facility of production would increase the wealth and enjoyments of every individual in a tenfold proportion? The shoemaker who had formerly only manufactured *one* pair of shoes a day, would now be able to manufacture *ten* pairs. But as an equal improvement would have taken place in every other department of industry, he would be able to obtain ten times the quantity of every other product in exchange for his shoes. In a country thus circumstanced, every workman would have a great quantity of his own work to dispose of, beyond what he had occasion for; and as every other workman would be in the same situation, each would be enabled to exchange his own goods for a great quantity, or, what comes to the same thing, for the price of a great quantity of those of others. The condition of such a society would be happy in the extreme. All the necessities, luxuries, and conveniences of life, would be universally diffused.

It may, however, be asked, would the *demand* be sufficient to take off this increased quantity of commodities?—Would their excessive multiplication not cause such a glut of the market, as to force their sale at a lower price than would be required to repay even the diminished cost of their production? But it is not necessary, in order to render an increase in the productive powers of labour advantageous to society, that these powers should always be fully exerted. If the labourer's command over the necessities and comforts of life were suddenly raised to ten times its present amount, his consumption as well as his savings would doubtless be very greatly increased; but it is not at all likely that he would continue to exert his full powers. In such a state of society workmen would not be engaged twelve or fourteen hours a day in hard labour, nor would children be immured from their tenderest years in a cotton-mill. The labourer would then be able, without endangering his means of subsistence, to devote a greater portion of his time to amusement, and to the cultivation of his mind. It is only where the productive powers of industry

are comparatively feeble—where supplies of food have to be drawn from soils of the fourth or fifth degree of fertility—and where the population is in excess, that workmen are compelled to make these excessive exertions. High wages are only advantageous because of the increased comforts they bring along with them; and of these, an addition to the time which may be devoted to purposes of amusement, is certainly not one of the least. Wherever wages are high, and little subject to fluctuation, the labourers are found to be active, intelligent, and industrious. But they do not prosecute their employments with the same intensity as those who are obliged, by the pressure of the severest necessity, to strain every nerve to the utmost. They are enabled to enjoy their intervals of ease and relaxation; and they would be censurable if they did not enjoy them.

Suppose, however, that the productive powers of industry are increased ten times; nay, suppose they are increased ten thousand times, and that they are exerted to the utmost, still it is easy to see they could not occasion any lasting glut of the market. It is true, that those individuals who are most industrious may produce commodities which those who are less industrious—who prefer indolence to exertion—may not have the means of purchasing, or for which they may not be able to furnish an *equivalent*. But the glut arising from such a contingency must speedily disappear. Every man's object, in exerting his productive powers, must be either directly to consume the produce of his labour himself, or to exchange it for such commodities as he wishes to obtain from others. If he does the last—if he produces commodities, and offers them in exchange to others who are *unable* to furnish him with those he is desirous of obtaining, he is guilty of a miscalculation—he should either have offered them in exchange to others, or he should have applied himself *directly to produce the commodities he wanted*: And if government do not interfere to relieve him from the consequences of his error, he will, if he cannot attain his object by the intervention of an exchange, immediately set about changing his employment, and will produce such commodities only as he means to consume. It is clear, therefore, that an *universally* increased facility of production, can never be the cause of a permanent overloading of the market. Suppose that the amount of capital and industry, engaged in every different employment in this country, is adjusted according to the effectual demand, and that they are *all* yielding the same net profit; if the productive powers of labour were universally increased, the commodities produced would all preserve the same relation to each other. Double or triple the quantity of one commodity would be given for double or triple the quantity of every other commodity. There would be a general augmentation of the wealth of the society; but there would be no excess of commodities in the

market; the increased equivalents on the one side being precisely balanced by the increased equivalents on the other. But if, while one class of producers were industrious, another class chose to be idle, there would undoubtedly be a temporary excess. It is clear, however, that this excess arises entirely from the *deficient* production of the idle class. It is not a consequence of production being too much increased, but of its being too little increased. Increase it more—make the idle class equally productive with the others, and then they will be able to furnish them with equivalents for their commodities, and the surplus will immediately disappear. . . .

. . . Now, the real question comes to be—if a question can be raised on such a subject—Whether it is advantageous that we should be able to produce these commodities cheaply, or not? Foreign trade is beneficial, because a country, by exporting the produce of those branches of industry in which it has some peculiar advantage, is enabled to import the produce of those branches in which the advantage is on the side of the foreigner. But, to insure this benefit, it is not necessary that the *whole* capital of the country should be invested in those particular branches. England can furnish better and cheaper cottons than any other country; but it is not therefore contended, that she ought to produce nothing but cottons. If she were able to furnish the same supply of cottons as at present with a tenth part of the capital and labour, is it not plain that her *means* of producing all other commodities would be prodigiously augmented? . . .

It has, however, been contended, that when machinery is employed to perform work which has previously been performed by means of labourers, the price of the commodity is seldom or never diminished to such an extent as to render the reduction of price equivalent to the wages of the labourers thrown out of employment. The invention of machinery, says M. Sismondi (*Nouveaux Principes*, II, 325), which would produce cottons five per cent. below the present prices, would occasion the dismissal of every cotton-spinner and weaver in England; while the increased demand for other commodities, occasioned by this trifling saving, would barely afford employment for five per cent. or *one twentieth* part of the disengaged hands; so that were an improvement of this kind to take place, the vast majority of these persons must either be starved outright, or provided for in the workhouse. But, in making this statement, M. Sismondi has neglected one most important element—he has not told us how his machines are to be produced. If, as M. Sismondi has tacitly assumed, the machines cost nothing—if, like atmospheric air, they are the free gift of Providence, and do not require any labour to produce them—then, instead of prices falling five per cent., they would fall to *nothing*; and every farthing that had formerly been applied to purchase cottons, would be

set at liberty, and applied to the purchase of other commodities. But if, by stating that the introduction of new machinery has reduced the price of cottons five per cent., M. Sismondi means, as he must do, that £20,000 invested in one of his improved machines, will produce the same quantity of cottons as £21,000 employed as circulating capital, or in the machinery now in use; then it is plain, that $\frac{2}{21}$ parts of all the capital formerly employed in the cotton manufacture will henceforth be employed in the manufacture of machinery, and that the other $\frac{1}{21}$ part will form a fund to support the labourers engaged in producing the commodities for which, owing to the fall of five per cent. in the price of cottons, a proportionally greater demand must be experienced. In this case, therefore, it is plain that, instead of twenty out of every twenty-one labourers employed in the cotton manufacture being turned out of employment, there would not be a single individual in that situation. . . .

It appears, therefore, that no introduction of machines having a tendency to lower the price and to increase the supply of commodities, can possibly diminish the demand for labour, or reduce the rate of wages. The introduction of such machines into one employment, *necessarily occasions an equal or greater demand for the disengaged labourers in some other employment.* The only hardship which they ever impose on the labourer is, that in some cases they force him to change his business. This, however, is not a very material one. A person who had been trained to habits of industry and application, can be easily moved from one employment to another. The various subordinate branches of all the great departments of industry have so many things in common, that an individual who has attained to any considerable proficiency in one, has seldom much difficulty in attaining to a like proficiency in any other. It is easy for a weaver of cotton to become a weaver of woollen cloths, or of linen; and it would require a very limited degree of instruction, to teach the maker of a cart or plough to construct a thrashing machine. . . .

It is certainly true, that the individual who is obliged to transfer his capital from one business to another, will lose all the profit he formerly derived from that portion which cannot be transferred. But, is the introduction of improved machinery to be prevented, because the old clumsy machinery previously used may be superseded, and the capital invested in it lost? A few individuals may lose; but the whole society is always sure to derive a great accession of wealth from the adoption of every device by which labour can be saved. It has been already shown, that neither the power nor the will to *purchase* commodities, is, or can be diminished by the introduction of machines which facilitate production; and as the power to employ labour de-

pendes on the amount of circulating capital, which can be withdrawn without loss, it is plain it could not be diminished. The wages of labour would, therefore, continue as high as before, while the reduction in the price of commodities would enable these wages to exchange for a greater share of the necessaries and comforts of life. It appears, therefore, however much it may be at variance with the common opinions on the subject, that an improvement in machinery is always more advantageous to the labourer than the capitalist. In particular cases, it may reduce the profits of the latter, and destroy a portion of his capital; but it cannot in any case, diminish the wages of the labourer, while it must lower the value of commodities, and thereby improve his condition. . . .

It will be observed, that, in arguing this question, it has been supposed throughout, that the object which the person who constructs a machine has in view, is, to lower the cost of the commodities to be produced by its agency, and, consequently, to increase their quantity. But Mr. Ricardo has supposed (*Prin. of Polit. Econ. and Taxation*, 3d ed., p. 466), that a machine might be introduced, not in the view of reducing the cost of commodities, but because it would give its owner the same, or, at all events, but a very little more, net profit, than he derived from the employment of labour; and in such a case there can be no doubt, that the immediate effect of the introduction of the machine, would be most injurious to the labourer. To render this more intelligible, let us suppose that profits are 10 per cent. and that a capitalist has a capital of £10,000 employed in paying the wages of workmen who produce him as much cloth as sells at the end of the year for £11,000, that is £10,000 to replace his capital, and £1,000 as profits. Mr. Ricardo says, that it will be indifferent to this capitalist, whether he invests his capital of £10,000 in a very durable machine, that will produce only the *one-eleventh* of the cloth, or as much as will yield the £1,000 of profits; though, if he does this, it is obvious, that all the workmen he employed will be turned adrift, and there will no longer be either a demand for their services, or a fund for their maintenance. But though such a case is possible, it may, nevertheless, be safely affirmed, that it has never hitherto actually occurred, and that it is extremely unlikely it ever will. Capitalists never resort to machines, unless when they expect to produce, by their means, the same supply of commodities as before, at a cheaper rate. If they were to act on the principles supposed by Mr. Ricardo, those who had previously been bringing 110,000 yards of cloth to market, of which, 10,000 were profits, would, in future, bring only these 10,000; and under such circumstances, every fresh introduction of machinery would inevitably be followed by *a diminished supply of commodities, and a rise of prices*. But the opposite effects, as every one knows, have hitherto

always followed, and we may confidently predict, will always continue to follow, every introduction of machinery. No man would choose to invest his capital in a machine from which it could not be withdrawn, were it only to yield the same, or but a little more profits, than it did when employed in supporting labourers; for this would be to expose his fortune to very considerable hazard from the caprices of fashion, at the same time that it would greatly lessen his influence and consideration in the country. The case supposed by Mr. Ricardo is barely possible. In the actual business of the world, machines are never introduced to lessen, but always to augment *gross produce*; or, which is the same thing, they are introduced only when it is believed they can supply the existing demand at a cheaper rate than it could be supplied before; and it has been sufficiently proved, that while they do this, they can never occasion the least injury to the labourer, but must, on the contrary, be highly beneficial to him.

It appears, therefore, that the utmost facility of production can never be injurious, but must always be attended with the greatest advantage. "Augmenter la reproduction annuelle, la porter aussi loin qu'elle peut aller, en débarrassant de toute entrave et en animant l'activité des hommes, voila le *grand but* que doit se proposer le gouvernement."¹ (Dignan, *Essai sur l'Econ. Polit.*, p. 134.) An excess of one particular commodity may be occasionally produced; but it is quite impossible that there can be too great a supply of every commodity. The fault is not in producing too much, but in producing commodities which either do not suit the tastes of those with whom we wish to exchange them, or which we cannot ourselves consume. If we attend to these two grand requisites,—if we produce such commodities only as can be taken off by those to whom we offer them for sale, or such as are directly available to our own use, we may increase the power of production a thousand or a million of times, and we shall be just as free of all excess as if we diminished it in the same proportion. . . . An universal glut of all sorts of commodities is . . . impossible: Every excess in one class *must* be balanced by an equal deficiency in some other. It is not the increase, but the *wrong application* of productive power, the *improper adaptation* of means to ends, that is in every case the specific cause of gluts. And it is plain that the real and only effectual remedy for this evil is to be found in the perfect freedom of industry, and in the establishment of a liberal and enlarged system of commercial policy. Were we gradually to recur to the sound principle of free trade, and to renounce every attempt to foster and encourage one branch of industry

¹ ["To increase production to the largest possible extent, overcoming all obstacles and stimulating the activities of men—this is the *great objective* at which government should aim."]

more than another, the chances of injudicious production would be very greatly diminished, and, when it did occur, it would be much sooner rectified. Hitherto, when too much capital has been attracted to one branch of industry, instead of leaving it to find out other channels of investment for itself, Government has generally interfered to prevent the restoration of that natural equilibrium between the price and cost of production which the ardour of speculation may sometimes derange; but which the self-interest of those concerned will, when let alone, infallibly restore. It is to this interference on the part of Government, that nine-tenths of the gluts which now occur may be traced. The restrictive and prohibitive system has wrenched society out of its natural position. It has placed everything on an insecure basis. Our corn laws, for example, by raising the average price of corn in Great Britain to nearly double its price in every other country, prevents all exportation in a year of unusual plenty until the price has sunk 40 or 50 per cent. below the cost of production, or until the agriculturists have been involved in the extreme of misery and ruin. Such is universally the case. Every artificial stimulus, whatever may be its momentary effect on the department of industry to which it is applied, is immediately disadvantageous to others, and ultimately ruinous to that which it was intended to promote. No arbitrary regulation, no act of the Legislature, can add any thing to the capital of the country: it can only force it into artificial channels. Besides, after a sufficiency of capital has flowed into these channels, a reaction *must* commence. There can be no foreign vent for their surplus produce; and whenever any change of fashion, or fluctuation in the taste of the consumers occasions a falling off in the demand, the warehouses are sure to be filled with commodities which, in a state of freedom, would not have been produced. The ignorant and the interested always ascribe such gluts to an excess of productive power. The truth is, however, that they conclusively indicate its diminution; and that they are the necessary and inevitable result of the application of those poisonous nostrums by which the natural and healthy state of the public economy is vitiated and deranged.

Part III: Distribution of Wealth

SECTION VII. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DETERMINE THE RATE OF WAGES—I.

MARKET OR REAL WAGES; DEPEND ON THE PROPORTION BETWEEN CAPITAL AND POPULATION—2. NATURAL OR NECESSARY WAGES; DEPEND ON THE SPECIES AND QUANTITY OF FOOD AND OTHER ARTICLES REQUIRED FOR THE CONSUMPTION OF THE LABOURER; DIFFERENT IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES AND PERIODS—EFFECT OF FLUCTUATIONS IN THE RATE OF

WAGES ON THE CONDITION OF THE LABOURING CLASSES—ADVANTAGE OF A HIGH RATE OF WAGES—ADVANTAGE OF HAVING THE LABOURERS DEPENDENT FOR SUPPORT ON THE CHEAPEST SPECIES OF FOOD—HIGH WAGES NOT A CAUSE OF IDLENESS—EFFECT OF THE POOR LAWS AND OF EDUCATION, ON THE CONDITION OF THE LABOURERS

We have already seen that the wages earned by the labourers engaged in different employments may really, when all things are taken into account, be considered as about equal; and, therefore, without regarding the differences that actually obtain in the amount of money, or of commodities, earned by different sets of workmen, I shall suppose all sorts of labour to be reduced to the same common standard, and shall endeavor to discover the principle that regulates the rate of wages paid for that common labour.

This inquiry will be facilitated by dividing it into three branches; the object in the *first* being to discover the circumstances which determine the *market* or *actual* rate of wages at any given moment; in the *second*, to discover the circumstances which determine the *natural* or *necessary* rate of wages, or the wages required to enable the labourer to subsist and continue his race;—and in the *third*, to discover the circumstances which determine proportional wages, or the share of the produce of his industry, falling to the labourer.

I. *Circumstances which determine the market or actual rate of wages*—The capacity of a country to support and employ labourers is in no degree dependent on advantageousness of situation, richness of soil, or extent of territory. These, undoubtedly, are circumstances of very great importance, and must have a powerful influence in determining the rate at which a people *advances* in the career of wealth and civilization. But it is obviously not on these circumstances, but on the actual amount of the accumulated produce of previous labour, or of capital, devoted to the payment of wages, in the possession of a country, at any given period, that its power of supporting and employing labourers must wholly depend. A fertile soil affords the means of rapidly increasing capital; but that is all. Before this soil can be cultivated, capital must be provided for the support of the labourers employed upon it, just as it must be provided for the support of those engaged in manufactures, or in any other department of industry.

It is a necessary consequence of this principle, that the amount of subsistence falling to each labourer, or the rate of wages, must depend on the proportion which the whole capital bears to the whole amount of the labouring population. If the amount of capital were increased, without a corresponding increase taking place in the population, a larger share of such capital would fall to each individual, or the rate of wages would be augmented: And

if, on the other hand, population were increased faster than capital, a less share would be apportioned to each individual, or the rate of wages would be reduced. . . .

So long as capital and population continue to march abreast, or to increase or diminish in the same proportion, so long will the rate of wages, and consequently the condition of the labourers continue unaffected; and it is only when the proportion of capital to population varies—when it is either increased or diminished, that the rate of wages sustains a corresponding advance or diminution. The well-being and comfort of the labouring classes are, therefore, especially dependent on the relation which their increase bears to the increase of the capital that is to feed and employ them. If they increase faster than capital, their wages will be reduced; and if they increase slower, they will be augmented. In fact, there are no means whatever by which the command of the labouring class over the necessities and conveniences of life can be enlarged, other than by accelerating the increase of capital as compared with population, or by retarding the increase of population as compared with capital: and every scheme for improving the condition of the labourer, which is not bottomed on this principle, or which has not an increase of the ratio of capital to population for its object, must be completely nugatory and ineffectual.

The wages of labour are most commonly either paid or estimated in money; and it may perhaps be thought, that their amount will, in consequence, depend more on the quantity of money in circulation in a country, than on the magnitude of its capital. It is really, however, quite the same to the labourer whether the quantity of money received by him as wages is great or small. He will always receive such a quantity as will suffice to put him in possession of a portion of the national capital falling to his share. Men cannot subsist on coin or paper. Where wages are paid in money, the labourers must exchange it for necessities and conveniences; and it is not the quantity of money they receive, the quantity of necessities and conveniences for which that money will exchange, that is to be considered as really forming their wages. If the quantity of money in Great Britain were reduced a half, the rate of wages, estimated in money, would decline in the same proportion; but, unless some change had, at the same time, taken place in the amount of that portion of the capital of the country which consists of the food, clothes, and other articles that enter into the consumption of the labourer, he would continue in precisely the same situation. He would carry a smaller quantity of pieces of gold and silver to market than formerly, but he would obtain the same quantity of commodities in exchange for them.

Whatever, therefore, may be the state of money wages in a country—

whether they are 1s. or 5s. a day—it is still certain, that if the amount of the national capital and the population continue the same, or increase or diminish in the same proportion, no variation will take place in the rate of wages. Wages never really rise, except when the proportion of capital to population is enlarged; and they never really fall, except when that proportion is diminished. . . .

II. *Circumstances which determine the natural or necessary rate of wages—*

There are obviously limits, however difficult it may be to specify them, to the extent to which a reduction of wages can be carried. *The cost of producing labour*, like that of producing all other articles brought to market, must be paid by the purchasers. The race of labourers would become altogether extinct, were they not to obtain a sufficient quantity of food and other articles required for their own support, and that of their families. This is the lowest amount to which the rate of wages can be permanently reduced; and it is for this reason that it has been defined to be the *natural or necessary rate of wages*. The market or actual rate of wages may sink to the level of this rate; but it is plainly impossible it can continue below it. It is not, as has been already shown, on the quantity of money received by the labourer, but on the quantity of food and other articles necessary for his support, for which that money will exchange, that his ability to maintain himself, and to rear as many children, as may be required to keep up the number of labourers, must depend. The natural or necessary rate of wages must, therefore, be determined by the cost of producing the food and other articles, which enter into the consumption of the labourers. And though a rise in the market or current rate of wages is seldom exactly coincident with a rise in the price of necessaries, they can never, except in the rare case when the market rate of wages greatly exceeds the natural or necessary rate, be very far separated. However high the price of commodities may rise, the labourers must always receive a supply equivalent for their support: if they did not obtain this supply, they would be left destitute; and disease and death would continue to thin the population, until the reduced numbers bore such a proportion to the national capital as would enable them to obtain the means of subsistence.

The opinion of those who contend that the rate of wages is in no degree influenced by the cost of producing the articles consumed by the labourers, has obviously originated in their confounding the principles which determine the market rate of wages at any given period, with those which determine their natural or necessary rate. No proposition can be better established than that the market rate of wages, when reference is made only to a given moment, is exclusively determined by the proportion between capital and population. But in every inquiry of this nature, we ought not only to refer to particular

points of time, but also to periods of *average* duration; and if we do this, we shall immediately perceive that the *average* rate of wages does not depend wholly on this proportion. The price of shoes, at any given instant, to take a parallel case, is plainly dependent on the extent of their supply, compared with the demand of those who have the means of purchasing them; but it is quite obvious, that if this price were to sink below the sum necessary to pay the cost of producing shoes, and bringing them to market, they would no longer be supplied: And such is precisely the case with labourers. They neither will, nor in fact can, be brought to market, unless the rate of wages is such as will, on the *average*, suffice to bring them up and maintain them. From whatever the cost of production is the grand principle to which we must always come at last. It is this cost that determines the natural or necessary rate of wages, just as it determines the average price of commodities. However low the demand for labour may be reduced, still if the price of the articles necessary for the maintenance of the labourer is increased, the natural or necessary rate of wages must be increased also. Let us suppose, to illustrate this principle, that, owing to a scarcity, the price of the quartern loaf rises to 5s. In this case, it is plain, inasmuch as the same number of labourers would be seeking for employment after the rise as before, and as a rise in the price of bread, occasioned by a scarcity, could not increase the demand for labour, that wages would not be increased. The labourers would, in consequence, effect to lessen the consumption of food, and to distribute the pressure equally throughout the year. But suppose that the rise, instead of being occasioned by the accidental occurrence of a scarcity, has been occasioned by an increased difficulty of production, and that it will be *permanent*, the question to be determined is, will the money wages paid the labourer continue at their former elevation, or will they rise? Now, in this case it may be easily shown, that they must rise: for it is abundantly obvious, that the comforts of all classes of labourers would be greatly impaired by this rise in the price of bread: and those who, previously to its taking place, had only enough to subsist upon, would now be reduced to a state of extreme destitution, or rather I should say of absolute famine. Under such circumstances, an increase of mortality could not fail to take place; while the greater difficulty of providing subsistence would interpose a powerful check to the formation of matrimonial connections, and the increase of population. By these means, therefore, either the actual amount of the population, or the ratio of its increase, or both, would be diminished; and this diminution, by lessening the number of labourers, would increase the proportion of capital to population, and thus enable them to obtain higher wages.

The statements now made are not advanced on any arbitrary or supposed grounds, but have been deduced from, and are consistent with the widest

and most comprehensive experience. Those who examine the registers of births, marriages, and deaths, kept in all large and populous cities, will find that there is invariably a diminution of the former, and an increase of the latter, whenever the price of corn or of the principal necessities of life, sustains any material advance. "It will be observed," says Mr. Milne, in his valuable *Treatise on Annuities*, in reference to the prices of wheat in England, "that any material reduction in the price of wheat, is almost always accompanied by an increase both of the marriages and births, and by a decrease in the number of burials; consequently by an increase in the excess of the births above the deaths: also, that any material rise in the price is generally attended by a corresponding decrease in the marriages and births, and by an increase in the burials; therefore, by a decrease in the excess of the births above the deaths. Thus it appears, that an increase in the quantity of food, or in the facility with which the labouring classes can obtain it, accelerates the progress of the population, both by augmenting the number of births and diminishing the rate of mortality; and that a scarcity of food retards the increase of the people, by producing in both ways opposite effects." . . . But in endeavouring to show that the market rate of wages cannot be permanently reduced below their natural or necessary rate, it is not meant to represent the latter as fixed and unvarying. If any given specific quantity of certain articles was absolutely necessary to enable the labourer to subsist and continue his race, then it is clear, no lasting reduction could ever be effected in its amount. But such is not the case. By the natural or necessary rate of wages, is meant only, in the words of Adam Smith, such a rate as will enable the labourer to obtain "not only the commodities that are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without." Now it is plain, from this definition, that there neither is nor can be any absolute standard of natural or necessary wages. It is impossible to say what commodities are indispensable for the support of life; for these, as well as the other articles required for the use of the lower orders, depend essentially on the physical circumstances under which every people is placed, and on custom and habit. The differences of climate, for example, by giving rise to very different physical wants in the inhabitants of different countries, necessarily occasion very considerable variations in the natural or necessary rate of wages. The labourer in cold climates, who must be warmly clad, and whose cottage must be built of solid materials and heated with a fire, could not possibly subsist on the same rate of wages that would suffice to supply all the wants of the labourer inhabiting more genial climates, where clothing, lodging, and fire were of very inferior importance. Humboldt mentions that there is a difference of nearly a third in the cost of maintaining,

and consequently in the necessary wages of a labourer in the hot and temperate districts of Mexico; and there is a still greater difference in the rates of necessary wages in different and distant countries. The food, too, of the labourers in different countries varies extremely. In some it is both expensive and abundant compared to what it is in others. . . .

The natural or necessary rate of wages is not, therefore, a fixed and unvarying quantity; and though it be strictly true that the market rate of wages can never sink permanently below its contemporary natural rate, it is no less true that this natural rate has a tendency to rise when the market rate rises, and to fall when it falls. The reason is, that the number of labourers in the market is a given quantity, which can neither be speedily increased when wages rise, nor speedily diminished when they fall. When wages rise, a period of eighteen or twenty years must plainly elapse before the effect of the increased stimulus that the rise gives to the principle of population can be felt in the market. During all this period, therefore, the labourers have an increased command over the necessities and conveniences of life: In consequence their habits are improved; and as they learn to form more exalted notions with respect to what is required for their comfortable and decent support, the natural or necessary rate of wages is proportionally augmented. But, on the other hand, when the rate of wages declines either in consequence of an actual diminution of the capital of the country, or of a disproportionate increase of population, no corresponding immediate diminution can take place in the number of labourers, unless they have previously been subsisting on the smallest possible quantity of the cheapest species of food required to support mere animal existence. If the labourers have not been placed so very near the extreme limit of subsistence, their numbers will not be immediately reduced when wages fall, by an increase of mortality; but they will be gradually reduced, partly, as has been already shown, in that way, and partly by a diminished number of marriages and births: And in most countries, unless the fall were both sudden and extensive, it would require some years to render the effects of increased mortality, in diminishing the supply of labour in the market, very sensibly felt; while the force of habit, and the universal ignorance of the people with respect to the circumstances which determine the rate of wages, would prevent any effectual check being given to the formation of matrimonial connections, and consequently to the rate at which fresh labourers had previously been coming into market, until the misery occasioned by the restricted demand on the one hand, and the undiminished supply on the other, had been very generally and very widely felt.

It is this circumstance—the impossibility which usually obtains of speedily adjusting the supply of labour proportionally to the variations which oc-

casionaly occur in the rate of wages—that gives to these variations the peculiar and extraordinary influence they exert on the condition of the labouring classes. If the supply of labour could be suddenly increased when wages rise, that rise would be of no advantage to the existing labourers. It would increase their number; but it would not enable them to mount in the scale of society, or to acquire a greater command over the necessities and conveniences of human life: And, on the other hand, if the supply of labourers could be suddenly diminished when wages fall, that fall would merely lessen their number, without having any tendency to degrade their habits, or to lower the condition of those that survived. But, in the vast majority of instances, before a rise of wages can be counteracted by the increased number of labourers it may be supposed to be the means of bringing into the market, time is afforded for the formation of those new and improved tastes and habits, which are not the hasty product of a day, a month, or a year, but the late result of a long series of continuous impressions. After the labourers have once acquired these tastes, population will advance in a slower ratio, as compared with capital, than formerly; and the labourers will be disposed rather to defer the period of marriage, than by entering on it prematurely to depress their own condition and that of their children. But if the number of labourers cannot be suddenly increased when wages rise, neither can it be suddenly diminished when they fall; a fall of wages has, therefore, a precisely opposite effect, and is, in most cases, as injurious to the labourer as their rise is beneficial. In whatever way wages may be restored to their former level after they have fallen, whether it be by a decrease in the number of marriages, or an increase in the number of deaths, or both, it is never, except in the exceedingly rare case already mentioned, suddenly effected. It must, generally speaking, require a considerable time before it can be brought about; and an extreme risk arises in consequence, lest the tastes and habits of the labourers and their opinion respecting what is necessary for their comfortable subsistence, should be degraded in the interim. When wages are considerably reduced, the poor are obliged to economise, or to submit to live on a smaller quantity of necessities and conveniences, and those, too, of an inferior species, than they had previously been accustomed to use; and the danger is, that the coarse and scanty fare which has thus been, in the first instance, forced on them by necessity, should in time become congenial from habit. Should this, unfortunately, be the case, the condition of the poor would be permanently depressed; and no principle would be left in operation, that could raise wages to their former level; for, the labourers could no longer have a motive to lessen the increase of population as compared with that of capital, and, unless they did this, it is quite impossible they could ever emerge from their depressed condition. Under the circumstances supposed, the

cost of raising and supporting labourers would really be reduced; and it is by this cost, that the natural or necessary rate of wages, to which the market rate must generally be proportioned, is always regulated. This lowering of the opinions of the labouring class with respect to the mode in which they ought to live, is perhaps the most serious of all the evils that can befall them. Let them once become contented with a lower species of food and an inferior standard of comfort, and they may bid a long adieu to any thing better. And every reduction in the rate of real wages, which is not of a very transient description, will certainly have this effect, if its debasing influence be not counteracted by the intelligence, forethought, and consideration of the people, producing an increased prevalence of moral restraint, and a diminished supply of labourers. An increase in the proportion of capital to population, is the only means by which a rise of wages can ever be effected; and unless the labourers, who have been reduced from a higher to a lower rate of wages, defer the period of marriage, and thus retard the progress of population, the chances are ten thousand to one, that they will never again attain to the elevation from which they have fallen.

The example of such individuals, or bodies of individuals, as submit quietly to have their wages reduced, and who are content if they get only the mere necessities of life, ought never to be held up for public imitation. On the contrary, every thing should be done to make such apathy be esteemed disgraceful. The best interests of society require that the rate of wages should be elevated as high as possible—that a taste for the comforts, luxuries, and enjoyments of human life, should be widely diffused, and, if possible, interwoven with the national habits and prejudices. A low rate of wages, by rendering it impossible for increased exertions to obtain any considerable increase of comforts and enjoyments, effectually hinders any such exertions from ever being made, and is of all others the most powerful cause of that idleness and apathy that contents itself with what can barely continue animal existence.

The state of the peasantry of Ireland furnishes a striking example of the disastrous effects resulting from having the natural or necessary rate of wages determined by a very low standard. Having no taste for conveniences or luxuries, the labouring classes of Ireland are satisfied if they obtain a sufficient supply of potatoes. But as the potato is raised at less expense than any other species of food hitherto cultivated in Europe, and as the wages of labour, in a country where it forms the main article of subsistence, are necessarily determined chiefly by the cost of its production, it is easy to see that the labourers must be reduced to a state of extreme, and almost irremediable distress, whenever that root happens to be deficient. When the standard of natural or necessary wages is high—when wheat and beef, for example, form the

principal part of the food of the labourer, and porter and beer the principal part of his drink—he can bear to retrench in a period of scarcity. Such a man has room to fall, he can resort to a cheaper species of food—to barley, oats, rice, and potatoes. But he who is habitually and constantly fed on the very cheapest species of food, has plainly nothing to resort to when deprived of it. Labourers placed in this situation are absolutely cut off from every resource. You may take from an Englishman, but you cannot take from an Irishman. The latter is already so low, he can fall no lower: He is placed on the very verge of existence: His wages, being regulated by the price of potatoes, will not buy him wheat, or barley, or oats; and whenever, therefore, the supply of potatoes fails, it is next to impossible he can escape falling a sacrifice to famine. . . .

The influence of the poor laws of England is undoubtedly very unfavourable to the formation of those prudential and economical habits among the labouring classes so essential to their well-being. It is, in most cases, quite impossible to discriminate between that poverty and misery that has been produced by accidental and uncontrollable causes, and that which has originated in the folly or ill-conduct of the individual. But it is obvious that, unless this can be done, the establishment of a legal provision on which every pauper shall have a claim, must, by placing the industrious and the idle, the frugal and the dissipated, on the same footing, have a powerful tendency to weaken all the motives to good conduct in the virtuous part of the community, and to strengthen the vicious propensities in those who are bad. . . .

Perhaps, however, the strongest objection to an established poor rate, is its tendency to derange the natural relation between the supply of labour and the demand for it. Were the Poor Laws abolished, it may be presumed that most tolerably well educated workmen, on finding their wages insufficient for the proper support of a family, would be deterred from marriage; and the check thus given to population, by reducing the supply of labour, would have the effect to raise its real price to the proper level. But this effect can hardly take place under a system of compulsory provision. The Poor Laws suffice for the support of a family or not—that, if they are insufficient, the deficit will be made up from the parish funds, and thus remove the natural and most powerful check to overpopulation. No institution can, however, be so pernicious to the poor, as that which tends to increase the supply of labour beyond the demand. Whenever the market is overstocked with labour, wages decline; and though they cannot fall lower than the sum indispensable for the support of the labourer and his family, they may be reduced to that miserable pittance. This reduction in the rate of wages, is a consequence that ought to be most carefully guarded against; but to this the Poor Laws directly lead. By their means,

a greater supply of labour is brought into the market than there is a real demand for; its price is consequently diminished; and it is by no means true, that the parish provision makes up the difference. The labourer now has been reduced to a total or partial dependence on this resource, receives only what will preserve him from absolute want: His independence is at an end; he no longer treats with his employers on a footing of equality; he must accept what their liberality may offer; and he must bid adieu to those comforts and gratifications which every labourer ought to enjoy, and which they always do enjoy, wherever their numbers are not in excess. . . .

Of all the means for providing for the permanent improvement of the poor hitherto suggested, there does not seem to be any that promises to be so effectual as the establishment of a really useful system of public education. It is no exaggeration to affirm, that nine-tenths of the misery and crime which afflict and disgrace society have their source in ignorance—in the ignorance of the poor with respect to the circumstances that really determine their condition. Those who have laboured to promote the education of the poor seem, generally speaking, to be satisfied, provided they succeed in making them able to read and write. But the education that stops at this point omits those parts that are really the most important. A knowledge of the arts of reading, writing, and arithmetic may, and, indeed, very often does, exist in company with the grossest ignorance of all those principles with respect to which it is most for the interest of the poor themselves, as well as of the community in general, that they should be well informed. To render education productive of all the utility that may be derived from it, the poor ought, in addition to the elementary instruction now communicated to them, to be made acquainted with the duties enjoined by religion and morality, and with the circumstances which occasion that gradation of ranks and inequality of fortunes that usually exist: and they should, above all, be impressed, from their earliest years, with a conviction of the important and undoubted truth, that they are really the arbiters of their own fortune—that what others can do for them is but as the dust of the balance compared with what they can do for themselves—and that the most tolerant and liberal government, and the best institutions, cannot possibly shield them from poverty and degradation, without the exercise of a proper degree of prudence, forethought, frugality, and good conduct on their part. That the ultimate effect of such a system of education would be most advantageous, there can be no doubt; though it would be unreasonable to expect, that it should produce any very immediate effect on the habits of the multitude. If, however, there is but little room for the formation of sanguine hopes of early improvement, there is none for despondency. The harvest of sound instruction may be late, but in the end it will be most luxuriant; and

will amply reward the patriotic efforts of those who are not discouraged in their attempts to make education embrace objects of real utility, by the difficulties they may expect to encounter at the commencement and during the progress of their labours.

DISSENT IN CLASSICAL ECONOMICS

ACCORDING TO the classical interpretation of the operation of the free market economy, little if any room was left for positive action on the part of governments to alleviate economic distress, unemployment, and poverty. Indeed, in the light of this interpretation it appeared that the unhindered interaction of the forces of supply and demand constituted the best safeguard for the smooth functioning of the economy, and that major and prolonged dislocations of the system of production and distribution could be accounted for only in terms of actual interferences by public authority. This was exactly the position taken by most classical economists in their explanation of persistent economic disturbances which followed the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. Among the causes held responsible for the post-war depression in England at this time were the high public debt, high taxes, insufficient capital, and restrictive commercial policies which seemed to impair British export markets by making it impossible for foreigners to sell foodstuffs and other commodities in Britain. If public expenditures were radically cut; if taxes could be reduced and accumulation of capital increased; if finally restrictions of foreign trade were removed, it was argued, production would again pick up and the general state of depression overcome. The views of the classical economists in these matters were shared by the government and its supporters. But they were not shared by all. Members of Parliament and individual economists dissented. Among the latter were primarily Lord Lauderdale in England and Simonde de Sismondi who visited England during the post-war depression. Both these economists advanced the theory that excessive "parsimony" or savings could interrupt the flow of income and make it impossible for producers to sell their total output at profitable prices. If the ideas of Lauderdale and Sismondi could be dismissed as belonging to outsiders, the objections which Malthus formulated came from within the classical school and could hardly be overlooked. More than twenty years after the publication of the *Essay on Population* Malthus published his *Principles of Political Economy* (1820) in which the old pessimist questioned not only the validity of the celebrated law of markets, which he considered "utterly unfounded," but also the general belief in the beneficial effects of parsimony or thrift. In particular, Malthus considered it possible that a too rapid accumulation of capital might diminish effective demand and consumption and thus, by impairing the motives of production, might have the effect of checking, as he called it, the progress of wealth. Malthus thus became one of the first English economists who questioned, at least by implication, the classical faith in the self-equilibrating tendencies of the capitalist economy.

However, Malthus's views met with no response. An extended and famous controversy on the subject with Ricardo led to no result. Ricardo remained adamant and the successors of the classical economists tended, as J. M. Keynes says, "to dismiss the problem from the corpus of economics not by solving it but by not mentioning it." Ricardo's *Notes on Malthus's Principles of Political Economy*, published posthumously, contains the following significant passage, which in-

dicates clearly the practical implications of Malthus's theories to which he objected. "If the people entitled to consume will not consume the commodities produced, themselves, nor cause them to be consumed by others . . . and consequently a general stagnation of trade has ensued we cannot do better than follow the advice of Mr. Malthus, and oblige the government to supply the deficiency of the people. We ought in that case to petition the king to dismiss his present economical ministers, and to replace them by others who would more effectually promote the best interests of the country by promoting public extravagance and expenditure. We are it seems a nation of producers and have few consumers amongst us, and the evil has at last become of that magnitude that we shall be irretrievably miserable if the Parliament or the ministers do not immediately adopt an efficient plan of expenditure." That these were, indeed, the practical implications of Malthus's dissent as he himself understood them, may be seen from the following extracts from the concluding section of Malthus's *Principles*: "It is of importance to know that, in our endeavours to assist the working classes in a period like the present, it is desirable to employ them in those kinds of labor, the results of which do not come for sale into the market, such as roads, and public works. The objection to employing a large sum in this way, raised by taxes, would not be its tendency to diminish the capital employed in productive labor; because this to a certain extent, is exactly what is wanted; but it might, perhaps, have the effect of concealing too much the failure of the national demand for labor, and prevent the population from gradually accommodating itself to a reduced demand. This however might be, in a considerable degree, corrected by the wages given. And altogether I should say that the employment of the poor in roads and public works, and a tendency among landlords and persons of property to build, to improve and beautify their grounds, and to employ workmen and menial servants, are the means most within our power and most directly calculated to remedy the evils arising from that disturbance in the balance of produce and consumption, which has been occasioned by the sudden conversion of soldiers, sailors and various other classes which the war employed, into productive labourers."

The following selections may serve not only to illustrate Malthus's general refutation of the "law of markets" on the grounds of the possibility of excessive savings, but to indicate also the manner in which his doctrine of population had been integrated into the general body of classical economic theory. These selections are from the second edition (1836) of the *Principles*.



*MALTHUS: PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY**[Book II]*

CHAPTER I: ON THE PROGRESS OF WEALTH

Section I.—Statement of the particular Object of Inquiry

THERE IS scarcely any inquiry more curious, or, from its importance, more worthy of attention, than that which traces the causes which practically check the progress of wealth in different countries, and stop it, or make it proceed very slowly, while the power of production remains comparatively undiminished, or at least would furnish the means of a great and abundant increase of produce and population.

In a former work ¹ I endeavoured to trace the causes which practically keep down the population of a country to the level of its actual supplies. It is now my object to shew what are the causes which chiefly influence these supplies, or call the powers of production forth into the shape of increasing wealth.

Among the primary and most important causes which influence the wealth of nations, must unquestionably be placed, those which come under the head of politics and morals. Security of property, without a certain degree of which, there can be no encouragement to individual industry, depends mainly upon the political constitution of a country, the excellence of its laws and the manner in which they are administered. And those habits which are the most favourable to regular exertions as well as to general rectitude of character, and are consequently most favourable to the production and maintenance of wealth, depend chiefly upon the same causes, combined with moral and religious instruction. It is not however my intention at present to enter fully into these causes, important and effective as they are; but to confine myself chiefly to the more immediate and proximate causes of increasing wealth, whether they may have their origin in these political and moral sources, or in any others more specifically and directly within the province of political economy.

It is obviously true that there are many countries, not essentially different either in the degree of security which they afford to property, or in the moral and religious instruction received by the people, which yet, with nearly equal natural capabilities, make a very different progress in wealth. It is the principal object of the present inquiry to explain this; and to furnish some solution of certain phenomena frequently obtruded upon our attention, whenever we take a view of the different states of Europe, or of the world; namely, coun-

¹ Essay on the Principle of Population.

tries with great powers of production comparatively poor, and countries with small powers of production comparatively rich.

If the actual riches of a country not subject to repeated violences and a frequent destruction of produce, be not after a certain period in some degree proportioned to its power of producing riches, this deficiency must have arisen from the want of an adequate stimulus to continued production. The practical question then for our consideration is, what are the most immediate and effective stimulants to the continued creation and progress of wealth.

Section II.—Of the Increase of Population considered as a Stimulus to the continued Increase of Wealth

Many writers have been of opinion that an increase of population is the sole stimulus necessary to the increase of wealth, because population, being the great source of consumption, must in their opinion necessarily keep up the demand for an increase of produce, which will naturally be followed by a continued increase of supply.

That a continued increase of population is a powerful and necessary element of increasing demand, will be most readily allowed; but that the increase of population alone, or, more properly speaking, the pressure of the population hard against the limits of subsistence, does not furnish an effective stimulus to the continued increase of wealth, is not only evident in theory, but is confirmed by universal experience. If want alone, or the desire of the labouring classes to possess the necessaries and conveniences of life, were a sufficient stimulus to production, there is no state in Europe, or in the world, which would have found any other practical limit to its wealth than its power to produce; and the earth would probably before this period have contained, at the very least, ten times as many inhabitants as are supported on its surface at present.

But those who are acquainted with the nature of effectual demand, will be fully aware that, where the right of private property is established, and the wants of society are supplied by industry and barter, the desire of any individual to possess the necessaries, conveniences and luxuries of life, however intense, will avail nothing towards their production, if there be no where a reciprocal demand for something which he possesses. . . .

It will be said perhaps that the increase of population will lower wages, and, by thus diminishing the costs of production, will increase the profits of the capitalists and the encouragement to produce. Some temporary effect of this kind may no doubt take place, but it is evidently very strictly limited. The fall of real wages cannot go on beyond a certain point without not only stopping the progress of the population but making it even retrograde; and before this point is reached, the increase of produce occasioned by the labour

of the additional number of persons will have so lowered its value, and reduced profits, as to determine the capitalist to employ less labour. Though the producers of necessities might certainly be able in this case to obtain the funds required for the support of a greater number of labourers; yet if the effectual demand for necessities were fully supplied, and an adequate taste for unproductive consumption, or personal services had not been established, no motive of interest could induce the producers to make an effectual demand for this greater number of labourers.

It is obvious then in theory that an increase of population, when an additional quantity of labour is not required, will soon be checked by want of employment and the scanty support of those employed, and will not furnish the required stimulus to an increase of wealth proportioned to the power of production.

But, if any doubts should remain with respect to the *theory* on the subject, they will surely be dissipated by a reference to *experience*. It is scarcely possible to cast our eyes on any nation of the world without seeing a striking confirmation of what has been advanced. Almost universally, the actual wealth of all the states with which we are acquainted is very far short of their powers of production; and among those states, the slowest progress in wealth is often made where the stimulus arising from population alone is the greatest, that is, where the population presses the hardest against the actual limits of subsistence. It is quite evident that the only fair way, indeed the only way, by which we can judge of the practical effect of population alone as a stimulus to wealth, is to refer to those countries where, from the excess of population above the funds applied to the maintenance of labour, the stimulus of want is the greatest. And if in these countries, which still have great powers of production, the progress of wealth is very slow, we have certainly all the evidence which experience can possibly give us, that population alone cannot create an effective demand for wealth.

To suppose a great and continued increase of population is to beg the question. We may as well suppose at once an increase of wealth; because such an increase of population cannot take place without a proportionate or nearly proportionate increase of wealth. The question really is, whether encouragements to population, or even the natural tendency of population to increase beyond the funds destined for its maintenance, will, or will not, alone furnish an adequate stimulus to the increase of wealth. And this question, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, Turkey, and many other countries in Europe, together with nearly the whole of Asia and Africa, and the greatest part of America, distinctly answer in the negative.

Section III.—Of Accumulation, or the Saving from Revenue to add to Capital, considered as a Stimulus to the Increase of Wealth

Those who reject mere population as an adequate stimulus to the increase of wealth, are generally disposed to make everything depend upon accumulation. It is certainly true that no permanent and continued increase of wealth can take place without a continued increase of capital; and I cannot agree with Lord Lauderdale in thinking that this increase can be effected in any other way than by saving from the stock which might have been destined for immediate consumption, and adding it to that which is to yield a profit; or in other words, by the conversion of revenue into capital.

But we have yet to inquire what is the state of things which generally disposes a nation to accumulate; and further, what is the state of things which tends to make that accumulation the most effective, and lead to a further and continued increase of capital and wealth. . . .

It has been thought by some very able writers, that although there may easily be a glut of particular commodities, there cannot possibly be a glut of commodities in general; because, according to their view of the subject, commodities being always exchanged for commodities, one half will furnish a market for the other half, and production being thus the sole source of demand, an excess in the supply of one article merely proves a deficiency in the supply of some other, and a general excess is impossible. M. Say, in his distinguished work on political economy, has indeed gone so far as to state that the consumption of a commodity by taking it out of the market diminishes demand, and the production of a commodity proportionably increases it.

This doctrine, however, as generally applied, appears to me to be utterly unfounded, and completely to contradict the great principles which regulate supply and demand.

It is by no means true, as a matter of fact, that commodities are always exchanged for commodities. An immense mass of commodities is exchanged directly, either for productive labour, or personal services: and it is quite obvious, that this mass of commodities, compared with the labour with which it is to be exchanged, may fall in value from a glut just as any one commodity falls in value from an excess of supply, compared either with labour or money. . . .

M. Say, Mr. Mill, and Mr. Ricardo, the principal authors of these new doctrines, appear to me to have fallen into some fundamental errors in the view which they have taken of this subject.

In the first place, they have considered commodities as if they were so

many mathematical figures, or arithmetical characters, the relations of which were to be compared, instead of articles of consumption, which must of course be referred to the numbers and wants of the consumers.

If commodities were only to be compared and exchanged with each other, then indeed it would be true that, if they were all increased in their proper proportions to any extent, they would continue to bear among themselves the same relative value; but, if we compare them, as we certainly ought to do, with the means of producing them, and with the numbers and wants of the consumers, then a great increase of produce with comparatively stationary numbers or with wants diminished by parsimony, must necessarily occasion a great fall of value estimated in labour, so that the same produce, though it might have *cost* the same quantity of labour as before, would no longer *command* the same quantity; and both the power of accumulation and the motive to accumulate would be strongly checked.

It is asserted that effectual demand is nothing more than the offering of one commodity in exchange for another which has cost the same quantity of labour. But is this all that is necessary to effectual demand? Though each commodity may have cost the same quantity of labour in its production, and they may be exactly equivalent to each other in exchange, yet why may not both be so plentiful as not to command more labour, than they have cost, that is, to yield no profit, and in this case, would the demand for them be effectual? Would it be such as to encourage their continued production? Unquestionably not. Their relation to each other may not have changed; but their relation to the wants of the society, and their relation to labour, may have experienced a most important change. . . .

Another fundamental error into which the writers above-mentioned and their followers appear to have fallen is, the not taking into consideration the influence of so general and important a principle in human nature, as indolence or love of ease.

It has been supposed that, if a certain number of farmers and a certain number of manufacturers had been exchanging their surplus food and clothing with each other, and their powers of production were suddenly so increased that both parties could, with the same labour, produce luxuries in addition to what they had before obtained, there could be no sort of difficulty with regard to demand, as part of the luxuries which the farmer produced would be exchanged against part of the luxuries produced by the manufacturer; and the only result would be, the happy one of both parties being better supplied and having more enjoyments.

But in this intercourse of mutual gratifications, two things are taken for granted, which are the very points in dispute. It is taken for granted that lux-

uries are always preferred to indolence, and that an adequate proportion of the profits of each party is consumed as revenue. What would be the effect of a desire to save under such circumstances, shall be considered presently. The effect of a preference of indolence to luxuries would evidently be to occasion a want of demand for the returns of the increased powers of production supposed, and to throw labourers out of employment. The cultivator, being now enabled to obtain the necessities and conveniences to which he had been accustomed, with less toil and trouble, and his tastes for ribands, lace and velvet not being fully formed, might be very likely to indulge himself in indolence, and employ less labour on the land; while the manufacturer, finding his velvets rather heavy of sale, would be led to discontinue their manufacture, and to fall almost necessarily into the same indolent system as the farmer. That an efficient taste for luxuries and conveniences, that is, such a taste as will properly stimulate industry, instead of being ready to appear at the moment it is required, is a plant of slow growth, the history of human society sufficiently shows; and that it is a most important error to take for granted, that mankind will produce and consume all that they have the power to produce and consume, and will never prefer indolence to the rewards of industry, will sufficiently appear from a slight review of some of the nations with which we are acquainted. . . .

It has also been said, that there is never an indisposition to consume, that the indisposition is to produce. Yet, what is the disposition of those master manufacturers, and merchants who produce very largely and consume sparingly? Is their will to purchase commodities for their consumption proportioned to their power? Does not the use which they make of their capital clearly show that their will is to produce, not to consume? and in fact, if there were not in every country some who were indisposed to consume to the value of what they produced, how could the national capital ever be increased?

A third very serious error of the writers above referred to, and practically the most important of the three, consists in supposing that accumulation ensures demand; or that the consumption of the labourers employed by those whose object is to save, will create such an effectual demand for commodities as to encourage a continued increase of produce.

Mr. Ricardo observes, that "If £10,000 were given to a man having £100,000 per annum, he would not lock it up in a chest, but would either increase his expenses by £10,000, employ it himself productively, or lend it to some other person for that purpose; in either case demand would be increased, although it would be for different objects. If he increased his expenses, his effectual demand might probably be for buildings, furniture, or some such

enjoyment. If he employed his £10,000 productively, his effectual demand would be for food, clothing, and raw materials, which might set new labourers to work. But still it would be *demand*."

Upon this principle it is supposed that if the richer portion of society were to forego their accustomed conveniences and luxuries with a view to accumulation, the only effect would be a direction of nearly the whole capital of the country to the production of necessities, which would lead to a great increase of cultivation and population. But this is precisely the case in which Mr. Ricardo distinctly allows that there might be a universal glut; for there would undoubtedly be more necessities produced than would be sufficient for the existing demand. This state of things could not, however, continue; since, owing to the fall which would take place, cultivation would be checked, and accumulation be arrested in its progress. . . .

If, in the process of saving, all that was lost by the capitalist was gained by the labourer, the check to the progress of wealth would be but temporary, as stated by Mr. Ricardo; and the consequences need not be apprehended. But if the conversion of revenue into capital pushed beyond a certain point must, by diminishing the effectual demand for produce, throw the labouring classes out of employment, it is obvious that the adoption of parsimonious habits beyond a certain point, may be accompanied by the most distressing effects at first, and by a marked depression of wealth and population afterwards.

It is not, of course, meant to be stated that parsimony, or even a temporary diminution of consumption,² is not often in the highest degree useful, and sometimes absolutely necessary to the progress of wealth. A state may certainly be ruined by extravagance; and a diminution of the actual expenditure may not only be necessary on this account, but when the capital of a country is deficient, compared with the demand for its products, a temporary economy of consumption is required, in order to provide that supply of capital which can alone furnish the means of an increased consumption in future. All that is contended for is, that no nation can *possibly* grow rich by an accumulation of capital, arising from a permanent diminution of consumption; because such accumulation being beyond what is wanted in order to supply the effectual demand for produce, a part of it would very soon lose both its use and its value, and cease to possess the character of wealth. . . .

Though it may be allowed therefore that the laws which regulate the increase of capital are not quite so distinct as those which regulate the increase of population, yet they are certainly just of the same kind; and it is equally vain, with a view to the permanent increase of wealth, to continue converting

² Parsimony, or the conversion of revenue into capital, may take place without any diminution of consumption, if the revenue increases first.

revenue into capital, when there is no adequate demand for the products of such capital, as to continue encouraging marriage and the birth of children without a demand for labour and an increase of the funds for its maintenance. . . .

Section X.—Application of some of the preceding Principles to the Distresses of the Labouring Classes since 1815, with General Observations.

It has been said that the distresses of the labouring classes since 1815 are owing to a deficient capital, which is evidently unable to employ all that are in want of work.

That the capital of the country does not bear an adequate proportion to the population; that the capital and revenue together do not bear so great a proportion as they did before 1815; and that such a disproportion will at once account for very great distress among the labouring classes, I am most ready to allow. But it is a very different thing to allow that the capital is deficient compared with the population; and to allow that it is deficient compared with the demand for it, and the demand for the commodities procured by it. The two cases are very frequently confounded, because they both produce distress among the labouring classes; but they are essentially distinct. They are attended with some very different symptoms, and require to be treated in a very different manner.

If one fourth of the capital of a country were suddenly destroyed, or entirely transferred to a different part of the world, without any other cause occurring of a diminished demand for commodities, this scantiness of capital would certainly occasion great inconvenience to consumers, and great distress among the working classes; but it would be attended with great advantages to the remaining capitalists. Commodities, in general, would be scarce, and bear a high price on account of the deficiency in the means of producing them. Nothing would be so easy as to find a profitable employment for capital; but it would by no means be easy to find capital for the number of employments in which it was deficient; and consequently the rate of profits would be very high. In this state of things there would be an immediate and pressing demand for capital, on account of there being an immediate and pressing demand for commodities; and the obvious remedy would be, the supply of the demand in the only way in which it could take place, namely, by saving from revenue to add to capital. This supply of capital would, as I have before stated, take place just upon the same principle as a supply of population would follow a great destruction of people on the supposition of there being an immediate and pressing want of labour evinced by the high real wages given to the labourer.

On the other hand, if the capital of the country were diminished by the failure of demand in some large branches of trade, which had before been very prosperous, and absorbed a great quantity of stock; or even if, while capital were suddenly destroyed, the revenue of the landlords was diminished in a greater proportion owing to peculiar circumstances, the state of things, with the exception of the distresses of the poor, would be almost exactly reversed. The remaining capitalists would be in no respect benefited by events which had diminished demand in a still greater proportion than they had diminished the supply. Commodities would be everywhere cheap. Capital would be seeking employment, but would not easily find it; and the profits of stock would be low. There would be no pressing and immediate demand for capital, because there would be no pressing and immediate demand for commodities; and, under these circumstances, the saving from revenue to add to capital, instead of affording the remedy required, would only aggravate the distresses of the capitalists, and fill the stream of capital which was flowing out of the country. The distresses of the capitalists would be aggravated, just upon the same principle as the distresses of the labouring classes would be aggravated if they were encouraged to marry and increase, after a considerable destruction of people, although accompanied by a still greater destruction of capital which had kept the wages of labour very low. There might certainly be a great deficiency of population, compared with the territory and powers of the country, and it might be very desirable that it should be greater; but if the wages of labour were still low, notwithstanding the diminution of people, to encourage the birth of more children would be to encourage misery and mortality rather than population.

Now I would ask, to which of these two suppositions does the present state of this country³ bear the nearest resemblance? Surely to the latter. That a great loss of capital has lately been sustained, is unquestionable. During nearly the whole of the war, owing to the union of great powers of production with a great effectual consumption and demand, the prodigious destruction of capital by the government was much more than recovered. To doubt this would be to shut our eyes to the comparative state of the country in 1792 and 1813. The two last years of the war were, however, years of extraordinary expense, and being followed immediately by a period marked by a very unusual stagnation of effectual demand, the destruction of capital which took place in those years was not probably recovered. But this stagnation itself was much more disastrous in its effects upon the national capital, and still more upon the national revenue, than any previous destruction of stock. It commenced certainly with the extraordinary fall in the value of the raw produce

³ This was written in 1820.

of the land, to the amount, it has been supposed, of nearly one third. When this fall had diminished the capitals of the farmers, and still more the revenues both of landlords and farmers, and of all those who were otherwise connected with the land, their power of purchasing manufactures and foreign products was of necessity greatly diminished. The failure of home demand filled the warehouses of the manufacturers with unsold goods, which urged them to export more largely at all risks. But this excessive exportation glutted all the foreign markets, and prevented the merchants from receiving adequate returns; while, from the diminution of the home revenues, aggravated by a sudden and extraordinary contraction of the currency, even the comparatively scanty returns obtained from abroad found a very insufficient domestic demand, and the profits and consequent expenditure of merchants and manufacturers were proportionably lowered. . . . For the four or five years since the war, on account of the change in the distribution of the national produce, and the want of effectual consumption and demand occasioned by it, a check has been given to the rate of production, and the population, under its former impulse, has increased, not only faster than the demand for labour, but faster than the actual produce; yet this produce, though deficient, compared with the population, is redundant, compared with the effectual demand for it and the revenue which is to purchase it. Though labour is cheap, there is neither the power nor the will to employ it all; because not only has the capital of the country diminished, compared with the number of labourers, but, owing to the diminished revenues of the country, the commodities which those labourers would produce are not in such request as to ensure tolerable profits to the reduced capital.

But when profits are low and uncertain, when capitalists are quite at a loss where they can safely employ their capitals, and when on these accounts capital is flowing out of the country; in short, when all the evidence which the nature of the subject admits, distinctly proves that there is no effective demand for capital at home, is it not contrary to the general principles of political economy, is it not a vain and fruitless opposition to that first, greatest, and most universal of all its principles, the principle of supply and demand, to recommend saving, and the conversion of more revenue into capital? Is it not just the same sort of thing as to recommend marriage when people are starving and emigrating?

I am fully aware that the low profits of stock, and the difficulty of finding employment for it, which I consider as an unequivocal proof that the immediate want of the country is not capital, has been attributed to other causes; but to whatever causes they may be attributed, an increase in the proportion of capital to revenue must aggravate them. With regard to these causes, such

as the cultivation of our poor soils, our restrictions upon commerce, and our weight of taxation, I find it very difficult to admit a theory of our distresses so inconsistent with the theory of our comparative prosperity. While the greatest quantity of our poor lands were in cultivation; while there were more than usual restrictions upon our commerce, and very little corn was imported; and while taxation was at its height, the country confessedly increased in wealth with a rapidity never known before. Since some of our poorest lands have been thrown out of cultivation; since the peace has removed many of the restrictions upon our commerce, and, notwithstanding our corn laws, we have imported a great quantity of corn; and since seventeen millions of taxes have been taken off from the people, we have experienced the greatest degree of distress, both among capitalists and labourers.

I am very far indeed from meaning to infer from these striking facts that restrictions upon commerce and heavy taxation are beneficial to a country. But the facts certainly show that, whatever may be the future effect of the causes above alluded to in checking the progress of our wealth, we must look elsewhere for the immediate sources of our present distresses. How far our artificial system, and particularly the changes in the value of our currency operating upon a large national debt, may have aggravated the evils we have experienced, it would be extremely difficult to say. But I feel perfectly convinced that a very considerable portion of these evils might be experienced by a nation without poor land in cultivation, without taxes, and without any fresh restrictions on trade.

If a large country, of considerable fertility, and sufficient inland communications, were surrounded by an impassable wall, we all agree that it might be tolerably rich, though not so rich as if it enjoyed the benefit of foreign commerce. Now, supposing such a country gradually to indulge in a considerable consumption, to call forth and employ a great quantity of ingenuity in production, and to save only yearly that portion of its revenue which it could most advantageously add to its capital, expending the rest in consumable commodities and personal services, it might evidently, under such a balance of produce and consumption, be increasing in wealth and population with considerable rapidity. But if, upon the principle laid down by M. Say, that the consumption of a commodity is a diminution of demand, the society were greatly and generally to slacken their consumption, and add to their capitals, there cannot be the least doubt, on the principle of demand and supply, that the profits of capitalists would soon be greatly reduced, though there were no poor land in cultivation; and the population would be thrown out of work and would be starving, although without a single tax, or any restrictions on trade.

The state of Europe and America may perhaps be said, in some points, to resemble the case here supposed; and the stagnation which has been so generally felt and complained of since the war, appears to me inexplicable upon the principles of those who think that the power of production is the only element of wealth, and, who consequently infer that if the means of production be increased, wealth will certainly increase in proportion. Now it is unquestionable that the means of production were increased by the cessation of war, and that more people and more capital were ready to be employed in productive labour; but notwithstanding this obvious increase in the means of production, we hear everywhere of difficulties and distresses, instead of ease and plenty. In the United States of America in particular, a country of extraordinary physical resources, the difficulties which have been experienced are very striking, and such certainly as could hardly have been expected. These difficulties, at least, cannot be attributed to the cultivation of poor land, restrictions upon commerce, and excess of taxation. Altogether the state of the commercial world, since the war, clearly shows that something else is necessary to the continued increase of wealth besides an increase in the means of producing.

That the transition from war to peace, of which so much has been said, is a main cause of the effects observed, will be readily allowed, but not as the operation is usually explained. It is generally said that there has not been time to transfer capital from the employments where it is redundant to those where it is deficient, and thus to restore the proper equilibrium. But such a transfer could hardly require so much time as has now elapsed since the war; and I would ask, where are the under-stocked employments, which, according to this theory, ought to be numerous, and fully capable of absorbing all the redundant capital, which is confessedly glutting the markets of Europe in so many different branches of trade? It is well known by the owners of floating capital, that none such are now to be found; and if the transition in question is to account for what has happened, it must have produced some other effects besides that which arises from the difficulty of moving capital. This I conceive to be a diminution of the demand compared with the supply of produce. The necessary changes in the channels of trade would be effected in a year or two; but the general diminution of demand, compared with the supply occasioned by the transition from such a war to a peace, may last for a very considerable time. The returned taxes, and the excess of individual gains above expenditure, which were so largely used as revenue during the war, are now in part, and probably in no inconsiderable part, saved. I cannot doubt, for instance, that in our own country very many persons have taken the opportunity of saving a part of their returned property-tax, par-

ticularly those who have only life-incomes, and who, contrary to the principles of just taxation, had been assessed at the same rate with those whose incomes were derived from realized property. This saving is quite natural and proper, and forms no just argument against the removal of the tax; but still it contributes to explain the cause of the diminished demand for commodities, compared with their supply since the war. If some of the principal governments concerned spent the taxes which they raised in a manner to create a greater and more certain demand for labour and commodities, particularly the former, than the present owners of them, and if this difference of expenditure be of a nature to last for some time, we cannot be surprised at the duration of the effects arising from the transition from war to peace.

DEBATE ON THE FACTORY BILL

MALTHUS had doubtless failed to convert his contemporaries to the realization that positive government action might sometimes be necessary to overcome periodic stagnations of trade. The principles of classical economics and the philosophy of *laissez faire* celebrated their greatest triumph during the first half of the nineteenth century with the defeat of the Corn Laws in 1846. And yet, various forms of government regulation in other fields foreshadowed the ultimate decline of economic liberalism. Scandalous abuses of the confidence of private investors by joint stock companies led to the enactment of a series of incorporation laws (such as the Companies Act of 1845 and the Act of 1855) which extended earlier methods of government supervision and control over the establishment of corporations. Similarly, speculation, inadequate service, discriminatory rates, and other monopolistic practices by railroads led to early government intervention and regulation of the rates, dividends, and service of private carriers. The first steps in this legislation which prepared the ground for later measures placing railroads in the category of public utilities go back to various Parliamentary investigations of the railroads between 1836 and 1840, and the Railway Acts of 1840, 1842, 1844, and 1846.

Abominable working conditions in factories caused a persistent agitation in favor of factory acts, inaugurating the era of government interference in the field of protective labor legislation. The general background of this legislation need be summarized only briefly. The Industrial Revolution had caused far-reaching changes in working conditions. The development of steam power moved manufacturing establishments away from waterways and to towns, where a large supply of child and woman labor could be had for the asking, instead of the more expensive apprentice labor. The displacement of skilled workers by machines together with the unprecedented increase of the labor supply had the effect of lowering wages, which in turn compelled workers to work longer hours if they wished to maintain their family income. In these early days of the Industrial Revolution twelve to sixteen hours of work per day was not uncommon.

The first bill attempting to regulate labor in the factories was carried through by the elder Peel in 1802. The act applied to the labor of "apprentices," pauper children bound out to the cotton mills, and attempted to limit their labor to twelve hours a day and to abolish night work. The act had no teeth in it, however, and the further progress of technology soon outmoded it altogether. In 1815, Peel attempted to regulate the new conditions created by the movement of factories to towns, but succeeded only in having enacted in 1819 an emasculated set of provisions, applying only to cotton mills, abolishing the employment of children under nine, and setting a twelve-hour limit for those under sixteen. In 1831, after intermittent efforts during the intervening years, another act was passed, also applying only to the cotton industry, which limited to twelve hours a day the labor of all persons under eighteen. After the report of the Parliament Committee on Factory Children's Labour, 1831-32, had shocked the public conscience with its

account of conditions, another Factory Act was enacted in 1833 which prohibited the employment in textile factories of children under nine and set a forty-eight-hour week for those ten to thirteen and a sixty-nine-hour week for all those thirteen to eighteen.

In 1842 the report of another Parliamentary Committee resulted in the passing of the Mines Act, which forbade the labor in the mines of women and girls and of boys under ten. The climactic victory for the agitators for factory reform came with the Ten Hour Law of 1847, which summarily restricted the work of women and children in textile factories to ten hours a day. The battle for these reforms set up strange divisions. The Factory Act of 1847 was the product, on the one hand, of years of agitation on the part of the working class, especially in Yorkshire and Lancashire, and, on the other, of the leadership of philanthropic manufacturers such as John Fielden (1784-1849) and benevolent Tory reformers. The leaders in the struggle for the Ten Hour Law were Michael Sadler (1780-1835) and Anthony Ashley Cooper, known as Lord Ashley, who later became seventh Earl of Shaftesbury (1801-85), both Tories. During the crisis of 1848 it was Shaftesbury who remained in constant touch with leaders of the working-class movement, and his appeals for moderation contributed at least in part to tiding London over the emergency. Shaftesbury's ideal of government was a responsible aristocracy legislating in the interest of human welfare, in the light of the teachings of Christianity, and without pressure from below.

The most prominent opponent of the Factory Acts was John Bright, the tireless advocate of the extension of political democracy, who, like other opponents of Shaftesbury, was firmly convinced that the reduction of hours in England's manufacturing establishments would impair the country's competitive position.

The present debate took place on March 15, 1844. It has been selected because it includes one of Shaftesbury's most characteristic speeches and brings out characteristic utterances on the part of his opponents. The crisis of 1842 had brought the Peel government to the recognition of the need for further changes in the factory code. In 1843 a proposal for reform had met with severe criticism and widespread protest from nonconformists, because it included provisions for compulsory education for factory children under the direction of the Established Church. Accordingly, in 1844, the government of Peel and Graham proposed another measure, with the unpopular provisions stricken out. The hours of labor for children were limited to twelve. In order to escape the criticism that such measures were incompatible with Liberal principles, constituting infringements upon the freedom of the individual, it was argued that it applied only to children who were not old enough to be free to sell their labor in the open market, and women were classed as young persons. On March 15 Shaftesbury proposed an amendment in which he attempted to turn the government proposal into a ten-hour bill. Although he was initially successful in getting this amendment accepted, he was outmaneuvered by the government, which finally succeeded in getting accepted a bill of its own formulation, although somewhat different from the first. In this bill the working hours of children were reduced to six and a half a day, and a twelve-hour day was provided for women and young persons. It was this act which was responsible for the difficulty of administering effectively the Factory Act of 1847. This latter act was passed simply in the form of an amend-

ment to the first, but the complicated wording of the first allowed an interpretation by which mill owners, while they could not actually work young persons for more than ten hours, could nevertheless keep them within the confines of the mill and subject to call during the hours it was open.

The debate is reported in Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates* for 1844.



DEBATE ON THE FACTORY BILL

HOUSE OF COMMONS, MARCH 15, 1844

LORD ASHLEY [Tory; Dorsetshire]: Nearly eleven years have now elapsed since I first made the proposition [limiting hours of work] to the House which I shall renew this night. Never, at any time, have I felt greater apprehension or even anxiety; not through any fear of personal defeat, for disappointment is "the badge of all our tribe"; but because I know well the hostility that I have aroused, and the certain issues of indiscretion on my part affecting the welfare of those who have so long confided their hopes and interests to my charge. And here let me anticipate the constant, but unjust accusation that I am animated by a peculiar hostility against factory masters, and I have always selected them as exclusive objects of attack. I must assert that the charge, though specious, is altogether untrue. I began, I admit, this public movement by an effort to improve the condition of the factories; but this I did, not because I ascribed to that department of industry a monopoly of all that was pernicious and cruel, but because it was then before the public eye, comprised the wealthiest and most responsible proprietors, and presented the greatest facilities for legislation. As soon as I had the power, I showed my impartiality by moving the House for the Children's Employment Commission. The curious in human suffering may decide on the respective merits of the several reports; but factory labour has no longer an unquestionable pre-eminence of ill fame; and we are called upon to give relief, not because it is the worst system, but because it is oppressive, and yet capable of alleviation. Sir, I confess that ten years of experience have taught me that avarice and cruelty are not the peculiar and inherent qualities of any one class or occupation—they will ever be found where the means of profit are combined with great, and, virtually, irresponsible power—they will be found wherever interest and selfishness have a purpose to serve, and a favourable opportunity. We are all alike, I fully believe, in the town and in the country, in manufactures and in agriculture—though we have not all of us the same temptations, or the same means of rendering our propensities a

source of profit; and oftentimes, what we will not do ourselves, we connive at in others, if it add in any way to our convenience or pleasure. . . .

And here it is just to state, that if I can recite many examples of unprincipled and griping tyranny, I can quote many also of generous and parental care, and of willing and profuse expenditure for the benefit of the people. If there are prominent instances of bad, there are also prominent instances of good men. I will suppose for the sake of argument, that all are the victims, rather than the causes of the system; but whatever the cause, the condition inflicts a great amount of physical and moral suffering. I know I am arousing a fierce spirit of reply; be it so—"Strike me, but hear me." I shall altogether leave to others that part of the question which belongs to trade and commerce. I am neither unwilling, nor perhaps, unable, to handle it; but I desire to keep myself within the bounds that I have always hitherto observed in the discussion of this matter, and touch only the consideration of the moral and physical effects, produced by the system, on the great body of the work-people. I am spared too the necessity of arguing the propriety or impropriety of interfering to regulate the hours of labour for persons under certain ages; the principle has long been conceded, and acted on by Parliament: our controversy can relate only to the degree in which it shall be carried out. I have never omitted an opportunity of asserting the claim I ventured to put forward nearly eleven years ago; and I return, therefore, this evening, to my original proposition. Sir, I assume as one ground of the argument, that, apart from considerations of humanity, which, nevertheless, should be paramount, the State has an interest and a right to watch over, and provide for the moral and physical well-being of her people: the principle is beyond question; it is recognised and enforced under every form of civilised Government. . . . If foreign powers consider it a matter both of duty and policy thus to interpose on behalf of their people, we, surely, should much more be animated by feelings such as theirs, when we take into our account the vast and progressively increasing numbers who are employed in these departments of industry. See how it stands: in 1818, the total number of all ages, and both sexes, employed in all the cotton factories, was 57,323. In 1835, the number employed in the five departments—cotton, woolen, worsted, flax, and silk, was 354,684. In 1839, the number in the same five departments was 419,500: the total number of both sexes under eighteen years of age, in the same year, was 192,887. Simultaneously, however, with the increase of numbers has been the increase of toil. The labour performed by those engaged in the process of manufacture, is three times as great as in the beginning of such operations. Machinery has executed, no doubt, the work that would demand the sinews of millions of men; but it has also prodigiously multiplied the labour of those who are

governed by its fearful movements. I hope the House will allow me to go through several details connected with this portion of the subject; they are technical, it is true; but, nevertheless, of sufficient importance to be brought under your attention. In 1815, the labour of following a pair of mules spinning cotton yarn of Nos. 40, reckoning twelve hours to the working day, involved a necessity for walking eight miles; that is to say, the piecer, who was employed in going from one thread to another in a day of twelve hours, performed a journey of eight miles. In 1832, the distance travelled in following a pair of mules spinning cotton yarn of the same numbers was twenty miles, and frequently more. But the amount of labour performed by those following the mules, is not confined merely to the distance walked. There is far more to be done. In 1835, the spinner put up daily on each of these mules 820 stretches; making a total of 1,640 stretches in the course of the day. In 1832, the spinner put upon each mule 2,200 stretches, making a total of 4,400. In 1844, according to a return furnished by a practised operative spinner, the person working puts up in the same period 2,400 stretches on each mule, making a total of 4,800 stretches in the course of the day; and in some cases, the amount of labour required is even still greater. . . .

Now, Sir, it is no difficult transition from such a statement of daily toil, passed as it is, in crowded rooms, heated atmospheres, noxious gases, and injurious agencies of various kinds, to the following statement of physical mischiefs to the workers employed. Since 1816, eighty surgeons and physicians, and three medical commissioners in 1833 (one of whom, Doctor Bisset Hawkins, declared that he had the authority of a large majority of the medical men of Lancashire) have asserted the prodigious evil of the system. . . .

There is one more fact to which I wish to call the attention of the House. Those honourable Gentlemen who have been in the habit of perusing the melancholy details of mill accidents, should know that a large proportion of those accidents—particularly those which may be denominated the minor class, such as loss of fingers, and the like, occur in the last hours of the evening, when the people become so tired that they absolutely get reckless of the danger. I state this on the authority of several practical spinners. Hence arise many serious evils to the working classes; none greater than the early prostration of their strength, their premature superannuation, and utter incapacity to sustain their families by the labour of their hands. I will prove my assertions by . . . [a table] from which you will observe that at the very period of life at which in many other departments of industry, men are regarded as in the prime of their strength, those employed in the cotton manufacture are superannuated and set aside, as incapable of earning their livelihood by factory labour. The ages above forty are seldom found in

this employment. . . . In 1839, the returns from certain mills in Stockport and Manchester, showed that the number of hands employed in these mills were 22,094— Now of all that immense multitude, how many does the House suppose were above forty-five years of age? Why, only 143 persons; and of these, sixteen were retained by special favour, and one was doing boy's work. . . .

Now, let this condition of things be contrasted with the condition of agricultural life; and let us see how much longer is the duration of the working powers in that class of labour. In June, 1841, on an estate in Worcestershire . . . of 341 labourers, 180 were above forty years of age. Contrast the condition of these people with that of a multitude of 22,000, of whom only 143 were above the age of forty-five. . . . It will be borne in mind that the present system has prevailed so long, and is of such a nature as completely to have destroyed every idea of thrift and economy. The education both of males and females is such that domestic economy is almost wholly unknown to them; and it very rarely happens that they have the foresight to accumulate savings during the period at which they can work to subsist upon in the days of their old age. It will also be remembered that their strength is so wholly exhausted that they are unable to enter into any different active occupation when discharged from the mill; and that thereafter they sink down into employments, of the nature of which I will give a specimen to the House. In June, 1841, from a return which was presented to me, it appeared that in 11 auction rooms in Manchester, out of 11 common jobbers, as they are called, 9 were discharged factory hands. Of 37 hawkers of nuts and oranges, 32 were factory hands; of 9 sellers of sand, 8 were factory hands; of 28 hawkers of boiled sheep's feet, 22 belonged to the same class; of 14 hawkers of brushes, 11 were factory hands; of 25 sellers of coal, 16 were factory hands—thus out of 113 persons pursuing these miserable occupations, 89 were discharged factory hands. I may add that upon a further examination being made, it was found that of 341 discharged factory hands, 217 were maintained entirely by the earnings of their children. . . . With reference to these men I asked the question, how many may expect to be taken up on a revival of trade? The answer was, scarcely one; that the masters required young hands and unexhausted strength, and that they would rather take men of twenty-five than of thirty-five years of age. . . .

The tendency of the various improvements in machinery is to supersede the employment of adult males, and substitute in its place, the labour of children and females. What will be the effect on future generations, if their tender frames be subjected, without limitation or control, to such destructive agencies? Consider this; in 1835, the numbers stood thus; the females in the five de-

partments of industry, 196,383; in 1839, females, 242,296; of these, the females under eighteen, 112,192. The proportions in each department stood, females in cotton, $56\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.; ditto worsted, $69\frac{1}{2}$ ditto: ditto silk, $70\frac{1}{2}$ ditto; ditto flax, $70\frac{1}{2}$ ditto. Thus while the total amount of both sexes and all ages, in the cotton manufacture, in 1818, were equal only to 57,323, the females alone in that branch, in 1839, were 146,331. Now the following is an extract of a letter from a great mill-owner in 1842:—

The village of — two miles distant, sends down daily to the mills in this town, at least a thousand females, single and married, who have to keep strictly the present long hours of labour. Seven years ago, these persons were employed at their own homes; but now, instead of the men working at the power-looms, none but girls or women are allowed to have it.

But, Sir, look at the physical effect of this system on the women. See its influence on the delicate constitutions and tender forms of the female sex. Let it be recollected that the age at which the “prolonged labour,” as it is called, commences, is at the age of thirteen. That age, according to the testimony of medical men, is the tenderest period of female life. Observe the appalling progress of female labour; and remember that the necessity for particular protection to females against overwork is attested by the most eminent surgeons and physicians. . . .

Where, Sir, under this condition, are the possibilities of domestic life? how can its obligations be fulfilled? Regard the woman as wife or mother, how can she accomplish any portion of her calling? And if she cannot do that which Providence has assigned her, what must be the effect on the whole surface of society? . . .

Many females state, that the labour induces “an intolerable thirst; they can drink, but not eat.” I do not doubt that several of the statements I have read, will create surprise in the minds of many hon. Members; but if they were to converse with operatives who are acquainted with the practical effects of the system, they would cease to wonder at the facts I have detailed. I might detain the House by enumerating the evils which result from the long working of males and females together in the same room. I could show the many and painful effects to which females are exposed, and the manner in which they lament and shrink from the inconveniences of their situation. I have letters from Stockport and Manchester, from various individuals, dwelling on the mischievous consequences which arise from the practice of modest women working so many hours together with men, and not being able to avail themselves of those opportunities which would suggest themselves to every one’s mind without particular mention. . . .

But listen to another fact, and one deserving of serious attention; that the

females not only perform the labour, but occupy the places of men; they are forming various clubs and associations, and gradually acquiring all those privileges which are held to be the proper portion of the male sex. These female clubs are thus described:—Fifty or sixty females, married and single, form themselves into clubs, ostensibly for protection; but, in fact, they meet together, to drink, sing, and smoke; they use, it is stated, the lowest, most brutal, and most disgusting language imaginable. . . .

This will conclude the statement that I have to make to the House—and now, Sir, who will assert that these things should be permitted to exist? Who will hesitate to apply the axe to the root of the tree, or, at least, endeavour to lop off some of its deadliest branches? What arguments from general principles will they adduce against my proposition? What, drawn from peculiar circumstances? They cannot urge that particular causes in England give rise to particular results; the same cause prevails in various countries; and wherever it is found, it produces the same effects. I have already stated its operation in France, in Russia, in Switzerland, in Austria, and in Prussia; I may add also in America; for I perceive by the papers of the 1st of February, that a Bill has been proposed in the Legislature of Pennsylvania, to place all persons under the age of sixteen, within the protection of the “ten hours” limit. I never thought that we should have learned justice from the City of Philadelphia. . . . Let me remind, too, the House, of the mighty change which has taken place among the opponents to this question. When I first brought it forward in 1833, I could scarcely number a dozen masters on my side, I now count them by hundreds. We have had, from the West Riding of Yorkshire, a petition signed by 300 millowners, praying for a limitation of labour to ten hours in the day. Some of the best names in Lancashire openly support me. I have letters from others who secretly wish me well, but hesitate to proclaim their adherence; and even among the members of the Anti-Corn-Law League, I may boast of many firm and efficient friends. Sir, under all the aspects in which it can be viewed, this system of things must be abrogated or restrained—it affects the internal tranquillity of those vast provinces, and all relations between employer and employed—it forms a perpetual grievance and ever comes uppermost among their complaints in all times of difficulty and discontent. It disturbs the order of nature, and the rights of the labouring men, by ejecting the males from the workshop, and filling their places by females, who are thus withdrawn from all their domestic duties, and exposed to insufferable toil at half the wages that would be assigned to males, for the support of their families. It affects—nay, more, it absolutely annihilates, all the arrangements and provisions of domestic economy—thrift and management are altogether impossible; had they twice the amount of

their present wages, they would be but slightly benefited—everything runs to waste; the house and children are deserted; the wife can do nothing for her husband and family; she can neither cook, wash, repair clothes, or take charge of the infants; all must be paid for out of her scanty earnings, and, after all, most imperfectly done. Dirt, discomfort, ignorance, recklessness, are the portion of such households; the wife has no time for learning in her youth, and none for practice in her riper age; the females are most unequal to the duties of the men in the factories; and all things go to rack and ruin, because the men can discharge at home no one of the especial duties that Providence has assigned to the females. . . .

Whose experience is so confined that it does not extend to a knowledge and an appreciation of the maternal influence over every grade and department of society? It matters not whether it be prince or peasant, all that is best, all that is lasting in the character of a man, he has learnt at his mother's knees. Search the records, examine the opening years of those who have been distinguished for ability and virtue, and you will ascribe, with but few exceptions, the early culture of their minds, and above all, the first discipline of the heart, to the intelligence and affection of the mother, or at least of some pious woman, who with the self-denial and tenderness of her sex, has entered as a substitute, on the sacred office. . . . Are you reasonable to impute to me a settled desire, a single purpose, to exalt the landed, and humiliate the commercial aristocracy? Most solemnly do I deny the accusation; if you think me wicked enough, do you think me fool enough, for such a hateful policy? Can any man in his senses now hesitate to believe that the permanent prosperity of the manufacturing body, in all its several aspects, physical, moral, and commercial, is essential, not only to the welfare, but absolutely to the existence of the British Empire? No, we fear not the increase of your political power, nor envy your stupendous riches; "peace be within your walls, and plenteousness within your palaces!" We ask but a slight relaxation of toil, a time to live, and a time to die; a time for those comforts that sweeten life, and a time for those duties that adorn it; and, therefore, with a fervent prayer to Almighty God that it may please him to turn the hearts of all who hear me to thoughts of justice and of mercy, I now finally commit the issue to the judgment and humanity of Parliament.

Sir *J. Graham* [Independent; Dorchester; Home Secretary in Sir Robert Peel's ministry]: . . . There never was a greater subject, as it appears to me, considered in this House—the comfort, the happiness, the physical and moral condition, as my noble Friend has justly put it, of a large portion of the working classes, come under our notice this evening. Their wrongs are entitled to redress,

if we can redress them; their feelings are entitled to indulgent consideration, even though we may be unable to redress their wrongs. . . . On the other hand justice compels me to say, the question of the commercial prosperity and manufacturing industry of this country is to-night materially involved in the question upon which we are deliberating. It was with some astonishment, therefore, that I heard my noble Friend declare, that he would discard all commercial views on this occasion, and treat the question as one purely of morals and of religious obligation. Nay, my noble Friend must excuse me for saying that when I listened to his eloquent appeal, and to his statement of facts as bearing on infantine and female labour, I will not say I thought there was exaggeration—but I could almost have believed that the necessary consequence of that appeal and of that statement of facts must have been to lead to the conclusion at which he arrived with respect to mines and collieries, namely, that females and infants should no longer be employed in factory labour. Now, allow me to beg of the Committee to consider. I have said the matter is most important; but still allow me to recall to the attention of the Committee how narrow comparatively is the question we are called upon to discuss. It is not whether females shall cease to be employed in factories, nor whether children shall cease to labour there—it is whether females shall be employed ten or twelve hours in factories, and whether the period of infantile labour shall be eight hours in each day, or something shorter. . . . It is not, as my noble Friend in the earlier part of his speech justly remarked, a question of principle that we are now called upon to discuss, it is one of degree. I think it clearly unnecessary on the present occasion to enter at length into the principle. It was certainly a violation of principle that the Legislature should interfere in a case of this kind at all. . . .

My noble Friend has dwelt very much upon the improvements which have taken place in machinery, and the consequent increase of labour to the parties so employed. Allow me just to remark, in passing, that although the intention of the Factory Act was humane, and its operation has been partially such, yet I have no doubt whatever its practical effect has been to stimulate in the highest degree the improvement of machinery with a view to the displacement of manual labour. . . . Mark, then, it is as clear as possible, if you reduce the hours of labour by one-eleventh or one-sixth, the machinery will be accelerated to counteract the reduction of the hours of work, and in point of fact the labour will be more intense and severe. My noble Friend refers to early superannuation. Now, in the first place, I decidedly admit, that there was an excess of infantine and female labour injurious to health, and until the Act of 1833 passed there was no legislative restriction. But there are now stringent regulations, and I am not disposed to call upon the House of Commons to increase them, because I believe they are quite sufficient. Just in pro-

portion as by improvement in machinery you increase the speed of that machinery, so you do make a call for increased strength on the part of those you employ, even to the displacement of the labour of aged persons, younger and more active persons being required to perform the duties. . . . My noble Friend drew a comparison between agricultural and manufacturing labourers, and he did not, I am sure, draw that comparison invidiously. I must, however, express some doubt as to the physical fact stated by my noble Friend. I believe, when you take into consideration the exposure to the inclemency of the weather, and other disadvantageous circumstances which fall upon the agricultural labourer, that it may very fairly be doubted, whether on account of the vicissitudes he encounters, the chances are not, upon the whole, against the agricultural labourer, on the score of health, as compared with the manufacturer. But the House will consider whether it be of any practical advantage to discuss that point now. We have arrived at a state of society when without commerce and manufactures this great community cannot be maintained. Let us, as far as we can, mitigate the evils arising out of this highly artificial state of society; but let us take care to adopt no step that may be fatal to commerce and manufactures. . . .

My noble Friend stated that he would not enter into the commercial part of the question; but if I can show that the inevitable result of the abridgement of time will be the diminution of wages to the employed, then I say, with reference to the interests of the working classes themselves, there never was a more doubtful question before Parliament than this. The House will remember that the branches of manufacture affected by this Bill are dependent upon machinery. Such is the rapidity with which improvements are made, that no machinery can last more than twelve or thirteen years without alterations; and master-manufacturers have been obliged to pull down machinery that was perfectly sound and good to make the necessary alterations which competition forces upon them. Well, then, it is necessary to replace machinery in the course of twelve or thirteen years. You are now discussing whether you shall abridge by one-sixth the period of time in which capital is to be replaced, all interest upon it paid, and the original outlay restored. Such an abridgement would render it impossible that capital with interest should be restored. Then in the close race of competition which our manufacturers are now running with foreign competitors, it must be considered what effect this reduction of one-sixth of the hours of labour would have upon them. The question in its bearing upon competition must be carefully considered; and I have been informed that in that respect such a step would be fatal to many of our manufacturers; a feather would turn the scale: an extra pound weight would lose the race. But that would not be the first effect. The first effect would

fall upon the operative. It is notorious that a great part of the power of the mill-owners, a power which alone justifies such legislation as this, arises from the redundant supply of labour. It follows that when a master is pressed upon by your legislation, he will compensate himself by forcing upon those in his employ a decrease of wages. . . . Though I am most anxious to take every precaution with regard to infant labour—though I am as firmly resolved as my noble Friend to urge upon the House to put a limit upon female labour, still, upon the whole, I cannot recommend the House to adopt an enactment which limits the labour of young persons to a shorter period than twelve hours. My noble Friend has referred to foreign countries, but in these countries, if I am not mistaken, there is no limitation, direct or indirect, of adult labour. My noble Friend spoke in decisive terms upon the failure of health in the manufacturing districts, and offered most important considerations to the House bearing upon that part of the subject. But if I am not misinformed, it will be found when there is full work, even to some excess, on the part of adults—when there is full work and good wages, that health in the manufacturing districts is in a satisfactory condition. On the other hand, when there is short time—shorter time than is proposed by my noble Friend—short time caused by the failure of the demand for manufactured articles, and reduced to eight instead of ten hours as occurred about two years ago, then disease is rife in the manufacturing districts; then is the time when immoral habits are generated, and disease is their inevitable result. . . . I believe, moreover, so far from being advantageous to the working classes, my noble Friend's proposition would be ruinous to their interests, and fatal to our commercial prosperity, and though my feelings and wishes are with him, my sense of duty never more clearly pointed out the course I ought to take, in reluctantly, but firmly, resisting his proposition.

Mr. Milner Gibson [Whig; Manchester] said that, . . . With regard to the proposition of the noble Lord, he could not say it was within his knowledge approved of by either masters or operatives. He had made it his business to ascertain to the best of his ability the state of feeling among the labouring people themselves upon this proposition of short hours of labour, and he had been told by many of the most intelligent and thinking operatives—men calculated to have influence with their class, and they considered that it would be an interference with the only property they had to dispose of, namely, their labour, and they could not agree to the proposition, whatever might be the urgency and necessity of working hard to earn a living, that they should be prevented from working twelve hours in a factory, if they found it fit and advantageous so to do. It might be thought that by preventing young persons, and women of

all ages, from working more than ten hours, the labour of male adults was not interfered with. But that was not so. To enact that no young persons or women of any age should work more than ten hours was, in point of fact, to enact that no factory engines should be kept in operation more than ten hours. It was not simply dealing with the labour of women and young persons, but it was an interference with the labour of adults, and an interference also with that fixed capital so eloquently dwelt upon by the right hon. Baronet, the Secretary of State for the Home Department [Sir J. Graham]. What was the cure? They were diminishing in that manner the effective production of all the great staple articles of manufacture no less than 20 per cent. If they destroyed the profit of a manufacture by cutting off two hours of labour, they, in effect, deprived the labourer of the means of earning his subsistence; so that, acting from the most benevolent motives, they might be inflicting the greatest of all possible evils upon the very class they sought to benefit. . . .

He (Mr. Gibson) was for increasing the field of employment, so that the labouring population might be able to take care of themselves, and not be driven to the necessity of working for such protracted hours. That appeared to him to be the right way in which the evil complained of by the noble Lord should be cured. He confessed, when he found hon. Members coming forward in that House, and expressing such great sympathy for the labouring classes, he was not quite ready to give them credit for sincerity on finding them, at the same time, so reluctant in making the least sacrifices on their own parts, in order to afford the people the enjoyment and advantage of a free market for their labour. Nothing was so easy as to sympathise and be generous at the expense of others. If the landed gentry really wished to gain credit for the welfare of the people, and for a desire to place the labourer in a better condition than he was in at present, they should come forward in a truly liberal spirit, and at once consent to a repeal of the Corn Laws. They should do their utmost to give full scope to the exertions of industry by widening the field of manual employment. . . .

Mr. *H. G. Ward* [Whig; Sheffield]: No man in this House has listened with deeper attention to the noble Lord than myself; and certainly I am bound to say, that all my feelings and all my sympathies have been in favour of the course which he has proposed. But when I come to weigh the consequences of that course—when I come to look not only to the interest of the one class whose cause the noble Lord is advocating, but to the interests of the many classes which this measure would materially affect—I feel that I cannot adopt the principle of interference advocated by the noble Lord—above all, to the extent he would carry it, without incurring the greatest possible responsibility as re-

garded the general welfare of the country, and, more especially, as regarded the whole manufacturing interests of the Kingdom. It is impossible to have listened to the argument of the noble Lord, and especially to the description he gave of the state of degradation and misery which existed among the labouring classes in the manufacturing districts, without wishing that it was in the power of Parliament to apply an efficient remedy. But will anybody say, that this House can apply a remedy? Will anybody deny that we may most seriously aggravate the evils by attempting to cure them? The argument of the noble Lord, if legitimately carried out, goes against the system of manufactures by human labour altogether. It is not merely a question between a twelve hours' Bill and a ten hours' Bill, but it is in principle an argument to get rid of the whole system of factory labour. . . . I can show among my own constituents that there are descriptions of labour which are inevitably fatal to those engaged in them within a certain limited period; yet there are persons who feel themselves forced into it, and who incur all the danger, for the sake of the immediate advantages it brings with it, of death being its almost certain result. . . . What is the cause which obliges the people to labour to this excess? There is no inborn love of work within them. No man, except from necessity would devote himself to toil. Their lot, as it happens to be cast in the different ranks of society, does not necessarily deprive them of the love of enjoyment and of leisure. I believe that there is as much natural affection and as much desire to retain the woman in her own proper domestic circle among the working classes, as there exists among ourselves. No, it is not from a difference of nature that men and women and children toil during a long period of hours, but it is necessity that compels them to do so. Such is the pressure of that necessity upon the working classes, more especially, that you find men driven to do things, which, when we come to reflect on the consequences, strikes us as almost criminal, and as casting a blot on the social system; and then it is that we are induced to look to legislation as the means of affording some remedy for the evil. Poverty is enacted by the law, and then other enactments are necessary against the consequences which poverty compels men to resort to! If it be said, as it has been said, that no allusion ought to be made to the Corn Laws, the answer is, that by the admission of all parties they materially affect the demand for labour. It is upon the permanent demand for labour that the wages and the comforts of the operative classes depend. . . .

We may suppose such a state of affairs in a most prosperous community, where a man at the end of his moderate day's labour shall be able to repair to his family circle and spend the evening in the company of his wife and in the education of his children; but I do not know in what part of the world

such a condition of society exists, and I am quite sure that it has never existed in any part of the history of this country. . . . I oppose the Bill from a strong desire to benefit the operative classes, and from a perfect conviction that interference of this kind will be utterly fruitless. No manufacturer can carry on his trade unless he can obtain a remunerative return for his capital; and admitting the truth of what was said by the right hon. Baronet, that a well-regulated self-interest is the great moving principle with the world, you cannot expect manufacturers to neglect it. I believe that the House could not enter upon a task more fraught with danger than to make an attempt unduly to restrict the hours of labour, since it is founded upon a false principle of humanity, which in the end is certain to defeat itself.

Lord *Francis Egerton* [Independent; Lancashire, South; younger son of the Marquis of Stafford]: I shall preface the few observations I intend to make by an avowal that I mean to vote for the Motion of my noble Friend. . . .

My hon. Friend, the Member for Sheffield, says, that if we pass this Bill, it will be necessary to apply a remedy to the evils of other employments more injurious to health than factories. I think we should do so when we can; and the principal reason for a Factory Regulation Bill has been, that you are able to carry it into effect. . . .

My right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Home Department has opposed the Motion with great ability, and upon strong grounds. He has stated what I believe will most probably be the effect of the measure—the diminution of wages. . . . I was prepared to believe that this consideration had been a good deal overlooked by some of the parties who desired the Bill, and I am bound to say that as far as my communications have gone, I have been undeceived upon that point. I never met with more rational or reasonable men than some of those I have seen upon this subject. They admit at once the probability of a reduction of wages; but they had balanced the probabilities, considered the evil, and were prepared to meet the consequences. It is partly upon that ground that I am disposed to consider the question in the light I view it. . . .

At all events, I am not of opinion that it can be said that factory labourers invariably have the advantage: on the contrary, a man in a good position on agricultural property, seems to me to have a better chance of permanent employment than a factory labourer. As to the great question incidentally introduced, I do not wish at all to dwell upon it, though I admit the right of hon. Members, if they think fit, to make this another Corn Law Debate. I do not, however, apprehend that the discussion of this Bill will derive any benefit from the introduction of so wide a question, but with the opinions held by the hon. Members for Manchester and Sheffield, it would certainly be too much

to expect that they should not advert to it. They must act upon their own opinions with respect to the Corn Laws, and I must act upon mine, differing as I do materially from them as to the advantages of Corn Law Repeal. I am not aware that it is necessary for me to say more in explanation of the vote I shall give, and I know that it will be received with great dissatisfaction by some Gentlemen in the part of the country where I live, from whom I differ with great regret; and without undue egotism, I may be allowed to observe that I am not liable to the reproach of being a landed gentleman, standing up to deal with other interests but his own. If a diminution of wages be the consequence of this measure, I believe that nobody will be more directly sensible of the change than I shall be; even in an agricultural point of view, as far as I possess land, I am entirely dependent upon the manufacturing market. I have therefore felt, and shall feel again, any decrease of consumption. I have only indulged in this reference in order to rescue myself from the imputation of being opposed to interests because they are not my own. . . .

Mr. *Bright* [Whig; Durham City] said: . . . I am not one who will venture to say that the manufacturing districts of this country are a paradise; I believe there are in those districts evils great and serious; but whatever evils do there exist are referable to other causes than to the existence of factories and long chimnies. Most of the statements which the noble Lord has read, would be just as applicable to Birmingham, or to this metropolis, as to the northern districts; and as he read them over, with respect to the ignorance and intemperance of the people, the disobedience of children to their parents, the sufferings of mothers, and the privations which the children endure, I felt that there was scarcely a complaint which has been made against the manufacturing districts of the north of England, which might not be urged with at least as much force against the poorest portion of the population of every large city in Great Britain and Ireland. But among the population of Lancashire and Yorkshire, where towns are so numerous as almost to touch each other, these evils are more observable than in a population less densely crowded together. I can prove, however, and I do not wish to be as one-sided as the noble Lord, I can prove from authorities, which are at least as worthy of attention as his, the very reverse in many respects of what he has stated as the true state of those districts. Now the Committee will bear in mind that a large portion of the documents which the noble Lord has quoted, have neither dates nor names. I can give dates and names, . . . and I believe that the authorities I shall cite are worthy of the deepest attention. I must go over the grounds of complaint which the noble Lord has urged, and although I may run the risk of being a little tedious, yet considering that for two hours or more I have listened to the charges which

he has made, I do think that, connected as I am most intimately with the population and the district to which the noble Lord has alluded, I have a right to an audience for the counter-statement which I have to make. Now, with respect to the health of the persons employed: . . .

In conclusion, then, it is proved, by a preponderance of seventy-two witnesses against seventeen, that the health of those employed in cotton mills is nowise inferior to that in other occupations; and, secondly, it is proved by tables drawn up by the secretary of a sick club, and by the more extensive tables of a London actuary, that the health of the factory children is decidedly superior to that of the labouring poor otherwise employed.

. . . I admit there are evils, serious evils, and much distress in the manufacturing districts; many are still out of employment, and in many branches of trade wages are low. We have violent fluctuations in trade, and periods when multitudes endure great suffering and it becomes this House to inquire why do these fluctuations occur, and what is the great cause of their suffering. I attribute much of this to the mistaken and unjust policy pursued by this House, with respect to the trade and industry of the country. Hitherto manufacturers have had no fair chance: you have interfered with their natural progress, you have crippled them by your restrictions, you have at times almost destroyed them by monopolies, you have made them the sources of your public revenue, and the upholders of your rents, but at your hands they have never to this moment received justice and fair dealing. I do not charge the noble Lord with dishonesty, but I am confident if he had looked at this question with as anxious a desire to discover truth, as he has to find materials for his case, he would have found many subjects of congratulation to counterbalance every one which he would have had reason to deplore. The noble Lord and hon. Gentlemen opposite, when they view from their distant eminence the state of the manufacturing districts, look through the right end of the telescope; what they see is thus brought near to them, and is greatly magnified; but when they are asked to look at the rural districts, they reverse the telescope and then everything is thrown to the greatest possible distance and is diminished as much as possible. That great hardships were once practised in the manufactories of this country cannot be denied, but a most gratifying change and improvement has taken place since the time when the respected father of the right-hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel) was so largely connected with them. But this change has not arisen from legislation in this House; it has sprung from that general improvement which is observable throughout all classes of the community. The treatment of children in schools is now rational and humane,—formerly it was irrational and cruel; the treatment of lunatics in our asylums was once a disgrace to humanity,—now, how great is the change; the prisoners in our gaols feel the influence of this growing senti-

ment in favour of gentler treatment; and the spread of civilization and consideration for each other among the people has done infinitely more for the weak and helpless than all the laws which this House has ever passed. I do not charge the noble Lord with being actuated by feelings of malice in his conduct towards the manufacturers of this country, but I do believe him to have been, and to be now, grossly imposed upon by the persons upon whose information he relies. . . .

The labourers employed in the cotton trade are more steadily employed and better paid than in any other trade in this country. I admit this people have suffered severely, but they have struggled manfully with the adversity which has overtaken them, whilst we have been foolish enough to permit the existence of monopolies and injustice, enough to have destroyed for ever the energies and the prosperity of an ordinary people. In addition to these monopolies, we have taxes most oppressive and unequal. The tax on raw cotton alone amounts to 50*l.* to 100*l.* per week on many manufacturing establishments; that with which I am connected being thus burthened to the amount of 75*l.* per week; and as four-fifths of all these manufactures are exported, and compete with foreign manufacturers who pay no such tax, the whole amount of it must come out of the profits and the wages of those engaged in the cotton trade. The noble Lord, the Member for Liverpool, says, he is most anxious to improve the condition of the working classes; he points to more education, a higher state of morals, better food and better clothing, as the result of the adoption of the proposition now before the House. But there is one thing that noble Lord has failed to prove; he has failed to show how working only ten hours will give the people more sugar. The noble Lord is the representative of the sugar monopolists of Liverpool, and, after voting to deprive the people of sugar, he is perfectly consistent in denying them the liberty even to work. The people ask for freedom for their industry, for the removal of the shackles on their trade; you deny it to them, and then forbid them to labour, as if working less would give them more food, whilst your monopoly laws make food scarce and dear. Give them liberty to work, give them the market of the world for their produce, give them the power to live comfortably, and increasing means and increasing intelligence will speedily render them independent enough and wise enough to bring the duration of labour to that point at which life shall be passed with less of irksome toil of every kind, and more of recreation and enjoyment. It is because I am convinced this project is now impracticable, and that under our present oppressive Legislation, it would make all past injustice only more intolerable, that I shall vote against the proposition [limiting hours of work] which the noble Lord, the Member for Dorset, has submitted to the House. . . .

THE FREE TRADE CONTROVERSY

AS SOON AS the war with Napoleon was over, British merchants looked to see in what foreign markets they could sell the products of the new factories. The continent of Europe could once again buy British goods; and the revolt of the Spanish colonies opened trade with South America. Yet if foreigners were to buy, they must also be allowed to sell in Britain. The Navigation Acts and the import restrictions, and even prohibitions, that had been the occasion for the loss of the American colonies were still in effect. Because they traded with foreign parts and were therefore more directly irked by the restrictions than was any other group, the merchants of London were the first to demand the freeing of imports. On May 8, 1820, they presented a *Petition* to Parliament at a time when the agricultural interests were asking even higher protection for "corn" (that is, wheat and other cereals). The *Petition* was tabled after David Ricardo (1772-1823) advised the gradual adoption of its principles, once capital invested in the protected industries had had sufficient time to find new channels. In 1825 William Huskisson (1770-1830), as President of the Board of Trade, liberalized both the Navigation Acts and the tariff on almost everything but corn. Unfortunately Huskisson was run down at the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester railway, and further progress had to be left to others.

The movement for free trade initiated by the London merchants was soon taken up by the manufacturers and by urban workingmen—indeed by almost everybody except the farmers. After 1825 the agitation centered on the duties paid by imported corn. The controversy was for long conducted more or less on party lines. Whigs urged a low duty or none at all; Tories defended the existing tariff as necessary to the farmer. But the Whigs were not finally converted to repeal until after the foundation of the Anti-Corn Law League (1839). By pamphlets, petitions, and great public meetings, partly financed by factory owners but enlisting many idealists, the League fought steadily for seven years. Among other results, the controversy produced widespread discussion and reexamination of economic and political doctrine.

Beginning in 1838 Charles Villiers made it an annual practice to move in the House of Commons the total repeal of the duties on imported grain. On February 18, 1842, he moved his customary motion in the speech printed below. Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850) the Tory Prime Minister of the day of course resisted, and as expected the motion was defeated 393 to 90, on February 24. Four years later the situation had changed sharply. In October, 1845, the failure of the Irish potato crop compelled Peel to suspend the duties on wheat for Ireland, which in practice meant free grain for England also. Peel was convinced it would be politically impossible to restore the duties, and decided to ask the House of Commons for their formal repeal. In doing so he split the Tory party. The main issue was fought out in the Commons during February, 1846, on a technical motion "that the House go into Committee to consider the Corn Laws," and when this was carried 337 to 240 on February 27 all knew that agricultural protection was doomed. Repeal reached the statute book June 26, 1846.

The *Petition of the Merchants of London* was drawn up by Thomas Tooke (1774–1858), a follower of Ricardo and Huskisson who later acquired a degree of note with his lengthy *History of Prices* (1838). The extracts from the debates of 1842 and 1846 that follow are taken from Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, 3d series, Vols. LX and LXXXIII.



PETITION OF THE MERCHANTS OF LONDON (1820)

THAT FOREIGN COMMERCE is eminently conducive to the wealth and prosperity of a country, by enabling it to import the commodities for the production of which the soil, climate, capital, and industry of other countries are best calculated, and to export in payment those articles for which its own situation is better adapted.

That freedom from restraint is calculated to give the utmost extension to foreign trade, and the best direction to the capital and industry of the country.

That the maxim of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest, which regulates every merchant in his individual dealings, is strictly applicable as the best rule for the trade of the whole nation.

That a policy founded on these principles would render the commerce of the world an interchange of mutual advantages, and diffuse an increase of wealth and enjoyments among the inhabitants of each state.

That, unfortunately, a policy the very reverse of this has been, and is, more or less, adopted and acted upon by the government of this and of every other country, each trying to exclude the productions of other countries, with the specious and well-meant design of encouraging its own productions; thus inflicting on the bulk of its subjects, who are consumers, the necessity of submitting to privations in the quantity or quality of commodities; and thus rendering what ought to be the source of mutual benefit and harmony among states, a constantly-recurring occasion of jealousy and hostility.

That the prevailing prejudices in favour of the protective or restrictive system may be traced to the erroneous supposition that every importation of foreign commodities occasions a diminution of our own productions to the same extent: whereas it may be clearly shown that, although the particular description of production which could not stand against unrestrained foreign competition would be discouraged, yet as no importation could be continued for any length of time without a corresponding exportation, direct or indirect, there would be an encouragement, for the purpose of that exportation, of

some other production to which our situation might be better suited; thus affording at least an equal, and probably a greater, and certainly a more beneficial employment to our own capital and labour.

That, of the numerous protective and prohibitory duties of our commercial code, it may be proved, that, while all operate as a very heavy tax on the community at large, very few are of any ultimate benefit to the classes in whose favour they were originally instituted, and none to the extent of the loss occasioned by them to other classes.

That, among the other evils of the restrictive or protective system, not the least is, that the artificial protection of one branch of industry, or source of protection, against foreign competition, is set up as a ground of claim by other branches for similar protection; so that, if the reasoning upon which these restrictive or prohibitory regulations are founded were followed out consistently, it would not stop short of excluding us from all foreign commerce whatsoever. And the same train of argument, which with corresponding prohibitions and protective duties should exclude us from foreign trade, might be brought forward to justify the re-enactment of restrictions upon the interchange of productions (unconnected with public revenue) among the kingdoms composing the union, or among the counties of the same kingdom.

That an investigation of the effects of the restrictive system, at this time, is peculiarly called for, as it may, in the opinion of your petitioners, lead to a strong presumption that the distress which now so generally prevails is considerably aggravated by that system, and that some relief may be obtained by the earliest practicable removal of such of the restraints as may be shown to be the most injurious to the capital and industry of the community, and to be attended with no compensating benefit to the public revenue.

That a declaration against the anti-commercial principles of our restrictive system is of the more importance at the present juncture, inasmuch as, in several instances of recent occurrence, the merchants and manufacturers in foreign states have assailed their respective governments with applications for further protective or prohibitory duties and regulations, urging the example and authority of this country, against which they are almost exclusively directed, as a sanction for the policy of such measures. And certainly, if the reasoning upon which our restrictions have been defended is worth anything, it will apply in behalf of the regulations of foreign states against us. They insist upon our superiority in capital and machinery, as we do upon their comparative exemption from taxation, and with equal foundation.

That nothing would more tend to counteract the commercial hostility of

foreign states than the adoption of a more enlightened and more conciliatory policy on the part of this country.

That although, as a matter of mere diplomacy, it may sometimes answer to hold out the removal of particular prohibitions or high duties, as depending upon corresponding concessions by other states in our favour, it does not follow that we should maintain our restrictions, in cases where the desired concession on their part cannot be obtained. Our restrictions would not be the less prejudicial to our own capital and industry, because other governments persisted in preserving impolitic regulations.

That, upon the whole, the most liberal would prove to be the most politic course on such occasions.

That, independent of the direct benefit to be derived by this country on every occasion of such concession or relaxation, a great incidental object would be gained by the recognition of a sound principle or standard, to which all subsequent arrangements might be referred, and by the salutary influence which a promulgation of such just views by the legislature, and by the nation at large, could not fail to have on the policy of other states.

That in thus declaring, as your petitioners do, their conviction of the impolicy and injustice of the restrictive system, and in desiring every practicable relaxation of it, they have in view only such parts of it as are not connected, or are only subordinately so, with the public revenue. As long as the necessity for the present amount of revenue subsists, your petitioners cannot expect so important a branch of it as the customs to be given up, nor to be materially diminished, unless some substitute, less objectionable, be suggested. But it is against every restrictive regulation of trade not essential to the revenue—against all duties merely protective from foreign competition—and against the excess of such duties as are partly for the purpose of revenue, and partly for that of protection—that the prayer of the present petition is respectfully submitted to the wisdom of parliament.

The petitioners therefore humbly pray that the House will be pleased to take the subject into consideration, and to adopt such measures as may be calculated to give greater freedom to foreign commerce, and thereby to increase the resources of the state.

DEBATES ON THE CORN LAWS (1842, 1846)

HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY 18 TO 24, 1842

Mr. *Villiers* [Whig; Wolverhampton] rose and said, he wished to read a petition signed by the chairman of a conference, lately held in London, con-

sisting of delegates from all parts of England, Scotland, and Wales. The petition was as follows:—

“To the Honourable the Commons of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled.

“The Petition of the undersigned Peter Alfred Taylor, of the City of London,

“Humbly sheweth, that your petitioner was chairman of a conference held at the Crown and Anchor tavern, Strand, on the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th days of February, 1842, of 720 delegates from all parts of England, Scotland, and Wales, appointed by large numbers of their fellow-subjects, to consider of the total and immediate repeal of the corn and provision laws.

“That the delegates at that meeting were appointed from large towns and extensive districts in which all the principal staple manufactures of the country were carried on—viz. cotton, linen, cloth, hosiery, hardware, cutlery, flax, &c.

“That at that conference the following resolution, expressing a desire to forego all protection for their several manufactures, was unanimously passed:—

“That the deputies present connected with the staple manufactures of the country, whilst they demand the removal of all restrictions upon the importation of corn and provisions, declare their willingness to aid in the abolition of all duties imposed for their own protection.

“That this resolution was not passed without previous thought and deep consideration, the same resolution having been passed at large meetings held in the immediate towns and districts where the several branches of manufacture are extensively in operation, viz., at Manchester, at a meeting of those engaged in the cotton trade of Lancashire; at Leeds, by those engaged in the clothing trade of Yorkshire; at Bath, for the West of England clothing trade; at Derby, for the hosiery and other manufactures of the midland counties; at Birmingham, for the hardware of Staffordshire and Warwickshire; at Sheffield, for cutlery and plated ware; at Dundee, for the flax and linen trade.

“That as all the principal branches of manufacturing industrial employment and capital have thus expressed their desire to give up all legislative protection whatever, your petitioner prays your honourable House that all classes of her Majesty’s subjects be placed upon the same footing, and that the trade in corn and provisions be left free and open, as well as in all the productions of manufacturing industry.

“P. A. TAYLOR.”

After reading the petition, Mr. *Villiers* said, that he trusted that that petition would be considered as no inappropriate introduction to the motion of which he had given notice—a motion also which, whatever had been said with respect to the illogical order in which it was now submitted to the House, was brought

forward at a moment that he could only consider as favourable to it, following as it did the discussion in which the greatest ability and ingenuity had been displayed on both sides of the House, in manifesting the evils and difficulties which belonged both to the project proposed by the present Government, and that which was proposed by their predecessors, thus rendering the motion he was about to submit, somewhat in place, for whatever arguments might be urged against it, it was clear of those difficulties and those objections which had been urged against the other measures; he therefore now rose, in pursuance of his notice, to ask the House to condemn *in toto*, and to abolish for ever that law which they were then in committee to consider—a law which had for its avowed purpose to raise the price by limiting the amount of human subsistence—a law which, by the admission of a distinguished Member of the Government, had the effect of raising the price of food, of raising the rate of rent, but not of raising the wages of labour, a law which he must consider, inasmuch as it had those purposes and objects in view, under whatever impression it might have been passed, erroneous if they pleased, or designedly bad as many thought—could only exist in gross and open violation of every principle that ought to regulate the economy and policy of any state, and he would not yet despair of persuading that House of the prudence and importance of abolishing, never to re-enact, such a law.

The Marquess of *Granby*¹ [Tory; Stamford] said it was impossible for an Englishman to consider the distress which prevailed in the manufacturing districts, without most fully and deeply sympathising with it, but he did think, that in proportion to the extent and depth of that sympathy, it was the duty of the House to take care, that by repealing the Corn-laws, they did not increase that distress, by driving the agriculturist to seek for the means of a scanty support in the great manufacturing towns. It had been said, that in the repeal of the Corn-laws, the remedy for that distress would be found. He did not think so. The natural consequence of cheaper food would be a fall in the rate of wages. In all the countries of Europe cheap wages were the consequences of cheap food. Mr. M'Culloch stated, that in Bengal, where the wages of labour were governed by the cost of the food consumed by the labourer, and the labourer was able to subsist on the merest trifle, the consequence was, that the rate of wages in common employments was 2½*d.* a day. He thought that this was sufficient evidence that cheap food was not synonymous with plenty of it. He thought therefore, that the repeal of the Corn-laws would not produce the good effects which hon. Gentlemen opposite seemed to expect.

¹ [Eldest surviving son of the 5th Duke of Rutland, to whose title he succeeded in 1857 as 6th Duke.]

Mr. *Escott* [Tory; Winchester] said . . . that man must be a madman, or something worse, who would attack the principle of a law which has not only answered its purpose better than any other principle which has ever been tried, but under which the owners and occupiers of lands have been taught by this House and the Legislature to believe themselves safe and secure. Six Parliaments have maintained this principle. Talk of public faith indeed! here is the faith of Parliament pledged to the landed property of England—pledged not indeed to particular enactments and clerical details of scales and figures—who could imagine such a folly?—but pledged to the principle of protection—protection without prohibition; but still protection to the home grower. And under this solemn sanction and security, and relying on this faith of Parliament, have they purchased, taken leases, made devises and settlements, laid out vast sums in improvements and expensive systems; married, made plans in life, educated and provided for children in business, and whom they fondly thought were safe under the shelter of that protection beneath which their fathers rested. Is the hon. Gentleman prepared for a system of treachery and confiscation? I know he is not; but I know also that his motion, if carried, would be equivalent to such a system. . . .

Mr. *Cobden* [Whig; Stockport]: . . . I want to know what you will do with the hard-working classes of the community, the labouring artisans, if the price of bread is to be kept up by Act of Parliament. Will you give them a law to keep up the rate of their wages? You will say that you cannot keep up the rate of wages; but that is no reason you should pass a law to mulct the working man one third of the loaf he earns. I know well the way in which the petitions of the hand-loom weavers were received in this House. "Poor, ignorant men," you said, "they know not what they ask, they are not political economists, they do not know that the price of labour, like other commodities, finds its own level by the ordinary law of supply and demand. We can do nothing for them." But I ask, then, why do you pass a law to keep up the price of corn, and at the same time say you cannot pass a law to keep up the price of the poor man's labour? . . . Having patiently waited for twenty-five years, I think we are entitled at last to a clear explanation of the pretext upon which you tax the food of the people for the acknowledged benefit of the landowners. The right hon. Baronet [Sir Robert Peel] tells us we must not be dependent upon foreigners for our supply, or that that dependence must be supplementary, that certain years produce enough of corn for the demand, and that we must legislate for the introduction of corn only when it is wanted. Granted. On that point the right hon. Baronet and I are perfectly agreed. Let us only legislate, if you please, for the introduction of corn, when it is wanted. Exclude it as much as you please when it is not wanted. But all I supplicate

for on the part of the starving people is, that they and not you, shall be the judges of when corn is wanted. By what right do they pretend to gauge the appetites and admeasure the wants of millions of people? Why, there is no despotism that ever dreamed of doing any thing so monstrous as this; yet you sit here, and presume to judge when people want food, dole out your supply when you condescend to think they want it, and stop it when you choose to consider that they have had enough. Are you in a position to judge of the wants of artisans, of hand-loom weavers? you, who never knew the want of a meal in your lives, do you presume to know when the people want bread? . . . It is not merely an extension of the pension list to the landed proprietors, as was said by the *Times* some years ago, when that paper stigmatised the Corn-laws as an extension of the pension list to the whole of the landed aristocracy; it is the worst kind of pauperism; it is the aristocracy submitting to be fed at the expense of the poorest of the poor. If this is to be so, if we are to bow our necks to a landed oligarchy, let things be as they were in ancient Venice; let the nobles inscribe their names in a golden book, and draw their money direct from the Exchequer. It would be better for the people than to suffer the aristocracy to circumscribe our trade, destroy our manufactures, and draw the money from the pockets of the poor by indirect and insidious means. Such a course would be more easy for us, and more honest for you. But have the hon. Gentlemen who maintain a system like this, considered that the people of this country are beginning to understand it a little better than they did? And do they think that the people, with a better understanding of the subject, will allow one class not only to tax the rest of the community for their own exclusive advantage, but to be living in a state of splendour upon means obtained by indirect taxation from the pockets of the poor? . . .

HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEBRUARY 9 TO 27, 1846

Sir *Robert Peel* [Tory; Tamworth; Prime Minister]: . . . This night is to decide between the policy of continued relaxation of restriction, or the return to restraint and prohibition. This night you will select the motto which is to indicate the commercial policy of England. Shall it be "advance" or "recede"? Which is the fitter motto for this great Empire? Survey our position, consider the advantage which God and nature have given us, and the destiny for which we are intended. We stand on the confines of Western Europe, the chief connecting link between the old world and the new. The discoveries of science, the improvement of navigation, have brought us within ten days of St. Petersburg, and will soon bring us within ten days of New York. We have an extent of coast greater in proportion to our population and the area

of our land than any other great nation, securing to us maritime strength and superiority. Iron and coal, the sinews of manufacture, give us advantages over every rival in the great competition of industry. Our capital far exceeds that which they can command. In ingenuity—in skill—in energy—we are inferior to none. Our national character, the free institutions under which we live, the liberty of thought and action, an unshackled press, spreading the knowledge of every discovery and of every advance in science—combine with our natural and physical advantages to place us at the head of those nations which profit by the free interchange of their products. And is this the country to shrink from competition? Is this the country to adopt a retrograde policy? Is this the country which can only flourish in the sickly artificial atmosphere of prohibition? Is this the country to stand shivering on the brink of exposure to the healthful breezes of competition?

Choose your motto. "Advance" or "Recede." Many countries are watching with anxiety the selection you may make. Determine for "Advance," and it will be the watchword which will animate and encourage in every state the friends of liberal commercial policy. Sardinia has taken the lead. Naples is relaxing her protective duties and favouring British produce. Prussia is shaken in her adherence to restriction. The Government of France will be strengthened; and, backed by the intelligence of the reflecting, and by conviction of the real welfare of the great body of the community, will perhaps ultimately prevail over the self-interest of the commercial and manufacturing aristocracy which now predominates in her Chambers. Can you doubt that the United States will soon relax her hostile Tariff, and that the friends of a freer commercial intercourse—the friends of peace between the two countries—will hail with satisfaction the example of England?

This night, then—if on this night the debate shall close—you will have to decide what are the principles by which your commercial policy is to be regulated. Most earnestly, from a deep conviction, founded not upon the limited experience of three years alone, but upon the experience of the results of every relaxation of restriction and prohibition, I counsel you to set the example of liberality to other countries. Act thus, and it will be in perfect consistency with the course you have hitherto taken. Act thus, and you will provide an additional guarantee for the continued contentment, and happiness, and well-being of the great body of the people. Act thus, and you will have done whatever human sagacity can do for the promotion of commercial prosperity.

You may fail. Your precautions may be unavailing. They may give no certain assurance that mercantile and manufacturing prosperity will continue without interruption. It seems to be incident to great prosperity that there

shall be a reverse—that the time of depression shall follow the season of excitement and success. That time of depression must perhaps return; and its return may be coincident with scarcity caused by unfavourable seasons. Gloomy winters, like those of 1841 and 1842, may again set in. Are those winters effaced from your memory? From mine they never can be. Surely you cannot have forgotten with what earnestness and sincerity you re-echoed the deep feelings of a gracious Queen, when at the opening and at the close of each Session, She expressed the warmest sympathy with the sufferings of Her people, and the warmest admiration of their heroic fortitude.

These sad times may recur. "The years of plenteousness may have ended," and "the years of dearth may have come;" and again you may have to offer the unavailing expressions of sympathy, and the urgent exhortations to patient resignation.

Commune with your own hearts and answer me this question: will your assurances of sympathy be less consolatory—will your exhortations to patience be less impressive—if, with your willing consent, the Corn Laws shall have then ceased to exist? Will it be no satisfaction to you to reflect, that by your own act, you have been relieved from the grievous responsibility of regulating the supply of food? Will you not then cherish with delight the reflection that, in this the present hour of comparative prosperity, yielding to no clamour, impelled by no fear—except, indeed, that provident fear, which is the mother of safety—you had anticipated the evil day, and, long before its advent, had trampled on every impediment to the free circulation of the Creator's bounty?

When you are again exhorting a suffering people to fortitude under their privations, when you are telling them, "These are the chastenings of an all-wise and merciful Providence, sent for some inscrutable but just and beneficent purpose—it may be, to humble our pride, or to punish our unfaithfulness, or to impress us with the sense of our own nothingness and dependence on His mercy;" when you are thus addressing your suffering fellow subjects, and encouraging them to bear without repining the dispensations of Providence, may God grant that by your decision of this night you may have laid in store for yourselves the consolation of reflecting that such calamities are, in truth, the dispensations of Providence—that they have not been caused, they have not been aggravated by laws of man restricting, in the hour of scarcity, the supply of food!

Mr. Stafford O'Brien [Tory; Northamptonshire, North] said that, even if he admitted the truth of all the doctrines upon which political economists were agreed they must prove far more before he could assent to the proposed measure of the Government. Hon. Gentlemen opposite were too apt—nay, indeed,

the literature of the day, and the habits of thought which prevailed among them all—were too apt to confound political economy with the science of legislation. He had always understood political economy to be the science which treated of the amassing and of the distribution of wealth. Now, if the accumulation and the distribution of wealth constituted the whole science of legislation, the terms would be—and might be fairly used as—synonymous. But the accumulation and distribution of wealth was one amongst the many elements of which the science of legislation consisted. And if hon. Gentlemen opposite, or the Government, could prove that wealth—in the modern sense of the word, in which it meant money—not in the old sense, in which it meant prosperity—would surely follow from a certain course, they would have established, not the whole, but not even a half of the case they were now setting up. He would take the case of protection to British industry generally. It was said that “labour was the property of the poor man.” That was the dogma given out by the political economists, and supported by the right hon. Baronet [Sir Robert Peel] and Her Majesty’s Government. But, addressing such language to the poor labourers of England, unless he sadly misunderstood the consequences of such teaching, they must not stop there. They must not tell the poor man that his property was not to be protected. If they did tell the poor man so, would he not consider this—that whilst they were blessed with leisure, possessed of wealth, and armed with power, the property of the poor man must protect itself? He would not say that such would be the reflection or consideration of all; but that would be the effect upon the country at large. This question of protection, too, came most unfortunately from a country which boasted of employing the labour of children from seven or eight years old. Having found, however, that interference with labour was difficult, were they prepared to abandon their labouring fellow countrymen, and watch in passive silence whether the Englishmen or the foreigner triumphed? He did not speak of the shopkeeper or the person who did possess some property. His interest was soon to become a convert to that favourite maxim of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest market; but he would take the case of certain of the duties proposed to be reduced by the measure of the right hon. Baronet. They would not better illustrate his argument than any other case of a similar character, but they would be fresh in the remembrance of the House. Supposing, then, that acting upon that axiom of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest market, he, a wealthy man in England, furnished his house with paper-hangings from Paris. Supposing that he travelled in a continental carriage, that he purchased all his hardware from Germany; supposing all this, when he looked out of the window of his gaudy house, or his foreign-built carriage, what would he see? A vast multitude of unemployed starving

Englishmen. And what would they say to him? "We are poor English paper-stainers; we are Birmingham hardwaremen; our trade has been taken away from us—what are we to do?" And what could be his reply? "My good fellows, I have done the best I could to make you idle—to take all employment out of your hands—to leave you starving; but, believe me, I did it not from a bad motive." What consolation would it afford them to be told, that all this happened; because, on the 27th of January, 1846, Sir R. Peel propounded a doctrine in which all political economists were agreed, that labour might protect itself, and that we must buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest; and that the Legislature in abolishing protection was actuated by no consideration of self-interest, but solely with a desire that the great truths of political economy should have fair play? Would any one venture to say, that the feelings in the hearts of these poor people would be the feelings of love, reverence, or attachment to our institutions, or that they could feel that they were living under a paternal government? But it was not only the widespread poverty which such a measure would produce which they had to consider. Let them not forget the amount of alienation and disaffection which would be the result. Equal neglect was not impartial kindness; and instead of propounding this hard clumsy dogma that the property of the poor might be left to protect itself, there never was a time when it behoved them more to reflect on the course pursued by their ancestors, sometimes wisely and sometimes unwisely, but always with the view of doing their best to protect the property of the poor from foreign competition, from domestic tyranny, from the oppression of the rich, and from their own madness.

Mr. *Scrope* [Whig; Stroud]: . . . I take the speech of the hon. Member for Northamptonshire [Mr. O'Brien], who may be considered to represent the pure protectionists, from whom, therefore, if from any one, as the ablest speaker of that class, we might expect to hear the best defence that can be urged of the principle of the law. Now what was the real argument contained in that speech, under cover, I own, of very able and feeling oratory? I appeal to the recollection of the House if the main point of that speech was not an attack on what the hon. Member called a stern dogma of a cold and hard political economy, viz., that "we should buy as cheap and sell as dear as we can"—a maxim which I would venture to call, not a dogma of political economy, but the very first principle of all commerce, the A B C of trade. But perhaps the hon. Member despises trade and its shopkeeping maxims. Perhaps he thinks a trading community should act on the opposite principle of selling cheap and buying dear. But I am much mistaken if his friends and clients, the tenant-farmers, act on any other than this vulgar and cruel mercantile principle themselves. I have

always understood that they were tolerably hard bargainers, at fair and market, for a profit, if any could be made, on their sales and purchases. They would not like to be compelled to act on the opposite principle of buying dear and selling cheap. No; what they really mean, and the hon. Member, too, in railing against the principle of buying cheap and selling dear, is, that the manufacturers should sell cheap to them, the farmers, while they sell dear to the manufacturers; and *vice versa*, that the manufacturers should buy dear of the farmers, and the farmers buy cheap of the manufacturers; and this is in fact the object aimed at by the Corn Laws. But the hon. Member illustrated the cruelty of this flagitious dogma of a cold political economy by pathetic pictures, which were not without their effect on the feelings of the House. The first was that of a crowd of paper-stainers and silk weavers, thrown out of employment by the unpatriotic and anti-national preference of French silks and paper-hangings to those of British manufacture. Every picture has its reverse: and to the hon. Member's picture of an ideal scene resulting from the operation of our mercantile principle, I will oppose a picture of the result of his protective principle, not drawn from the imagination, but one of the real scenes which did occur, in hundreds of instances, but a few years ago, in Paisley, in Stockport, in Manchester, and other places. Let the hon. Member imagine a manufacturer at that time, his warehouses choked with goods which he could not dispose of, his foreign correspondents writing to him that the foreign market was equally glutted; imagine that, after putting his workpeople first on low wages, next on half work, he finally finds himself obliged to discharge them altogether, and to shut up his mill. They crowd in hundreds round him—a melancholy spectacle—men, women, and children, imploring him for work and food. What is his answer? "My friends, my heart bleeds for you. I employed you so long as I possessed the means of doing so; but those means can only be furnished by the sale of the produce of your labour. All my capital lies locked up in yonder warehouses, and I have exhausted my credit likewise. The foreigner can buy no more of the goods you make, because our laws prohibit his paying for them in the only thing he has to sell—his corn, the very food you want; nay, at this moment, while you are starving, there lie hundreds of thousands of quarters of corn in the Queen's warehouses a few miles off, consignments from foreign merchants, who would be glad to take any goods in exchange for it if the law did not interfere. This law, enacted by landowners for their own supposed interest, prevents your feeding on corn that you do not buy of them. Therefore you must starve, and I must be ruined by this unjust landlords' law." I ask the hon. Member what does he think would be, nay, what are the feelings of crowds of starving men, to whom this language—that of truth, be it observed—is necessarily addressed? The hon. Member does not seem to be aware of the

fact that to buy anything from the foreigner we must sell to him something of equal value—that for every quarter of foreign corn, or every piece of foreign silk imported, we must expect to pay for it an equal value of goods the produce of our own manufactures,—and that British or native industry is just as much employed in the one case as in the other; the only difference being (and a great difference it is) that by the free exchange we get more of what we want, or of a better quality, in return for our native industry, than if we attempted to produce it at home. And this is just the benefit which commerce confers. The hon. Member does not seem to be aware that the principle he declaims against as a cold dogma of a stern political economy is the one sole vivifying principle of all commerce—the stimulus to all improvement—the mainspring of civilization—the principle, namely, of obtaining the largest and the best result at the least cost—in other words, to get the most you can of what you want for your money or your labour. . . .

I have placed before the House one form of this argument, and to me a convincing one, to show that whether Corn Laws raise the price of Corn or do not, they are an unjustifiable interference with the freedom of industry. Nor has there been, in my opinion, a single argument of the slightest weight produced in the course of this debate to show that we can be warranted in such interference by any considerations. The onus of proof, if proof there can be, rests upon you who would restrict and fetter the industry of the people. I call on you then no longer to maintain these laws—laws odious in character and questionable in motive. I call on you no longer to interfere between the people and their spontaneous supplies of food—no longer by unwise and unjust laws to prevent the industrious classes of this country from availing themselves of the ample means which God and nature have placed at their disposal for obtaining, by the exercise of their unrivalled skill and energy, an abundant supply of the first necessities of life.

Mr. *Disraeli* [Tory; Shrewsbury]: . . . I say that it is the first duty of the Minister, and the first interest of the State, to maintain a balance between the two great branches of national industry; that is a principle which has been recognised by all great Ministers for the last two hundred years; and the reasons upon which it rests are so obvious, that it can hardly be necessary to mention them. Why we should maintain that balance between the two great branches of national industry, involves political considerations—social considerations, affecting the happiness, prosperity, and morality of the people, as well as the stability of the State. But I go further; I say that in England we are bound to do more—I repeat what I have repeated before, that in this country there are special reasons why we should not only maintain the balance be-

tween the two branches of our national industry, but why we should give a preponderance . . . to the agricultural branch; and the reason is, because in England we have a territorial Constitution. We have thrown upon the land the revenues of the Church, the administration of justice, and the estate of the poor; and this has been done, not to gratify the pride, or pamper the luxury of the proprietors of the land, but because, in a territorial Constitution, you, and those whom you have succeeded, have found the only security for self-government—the only barrier against that centralising system which has taken root in other countries. I have always maintained these opinions: my constituents are not landlords; they are not aristocrats; they are not great capitalists; they are the children of industry and toil; and they believe, first, that their material interests are involved in a system which favours native industry, by insuring at the same time real competition; but they believe also that their social and political interests are involved in a system by which their rights and liberties have been guaranteed; and I agreed with them—I have these old-fashioned notions. I know that we have been told, and by one who on this subject should be the highest authority, that we shall derive from this great struggle, not merely the repeal of the Corn Laws, but the transfer of power from one class to another—to one distinguished for its intelligence and wealth, the manufacturers of England. My conscience assures me that I have not been slow in doing justice to the intelligence of that class; certain I am, that I am not one of those who envy them their wide and deserved prosperity; but I must confess my deep mortification, that in an age of political regeneration, when all social evils are ascribed to the operation of class interests, it should be suggested that we are to be rescued from the alleged power of one class only to sink under the avowed dominion of another. I, for one, if this is to be the end of all our struggles—if this is to be the great result of this enlightened age—I, for one, protest against the ignominious catastrophe. I believe that the monarchy of England, its sovereignty mitigated by the acknowledged authority of the estates of the realm, has its root in the hearts of the people, and is capable of securing the happiness of the nation and the power of the State. But, Sir, if this be a worn-out dream—if, indeed, there is to be a change, I, for one, anxious as I am to maintain the present polity of this country, ready to make as many sacrifices as any man for that object—if there is to be this great change, I, for one, hope, that the foundations of it may be deep, the scheme comprehensive, and that instead of falling under such a thralldom, under the thralldom of Capital—under the thralldom of those, who, while they boast of their intelligence, are more proud of their wealth—if we must find a new force to maintain the ancient throne and immemorial monarchy of England, I, for one, hope, that we may find that novel power in the invigorating energies of an educated and enfranchised people.

FRIEDRICH LIST

THE CLASSICAL DOCTRINE of free trade was an application of the arguments in favor of a free division of labor in the domestic economy to the field of international economic relations. Just as a policy of *laissez faire* within the national economy could be relied upon to bring about the most efficient specialization, so would freedom of international trade lead to an optimum division of labor yielding a maximum of output at a minimum of costs. The foundations for the theory of free trade had been laid by the Physiocrats and Adam Smith. The arguments for free trade found their classical formulation in the famous seventh chapter of Ricardo's *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, just before the *Petition of the Merchants of London* translated these arguments into popular language when it pointed out: "that foreign commerce is eminently conducive to the wealth and prosperity of a country, by enabling it to import the commodities for the production of which the soil, climate, capital, and industry of other countries are best calculated and to export in payment those articles for which its own situation is better adapted."

Friedrich List's *The National System of Political Economy* (1841-44) did not undertake to refute the general validity of the classical arguments. List objected only to what he considered the unhistorical and non-political approach of the classical school to the problem of international trade. He felt that by disregarding the political factors of international relations and especially by denying the reality of international conflicts the classical school had vitiated its main conclusions in favor of a system of international trade which no responsible statesman could be expected to put into practice. More specifically, List argued that only the English could afford the luxury of free trade; indeed, at the stage of development England had attained free trade was not a luxury at all, but a policy that was markedly beneficial so far as the English alone were concerned. At the same time, however, it was a policy that made it impossible for the other nations of the world, including America, to develop their productive forces and especially the power to produce manufactured goods. The development of manufacturing in the less advanced countries depended, according to List, upon the adoption of a policy of protectionism designed to insure "infant industries" against competition by low cost imports from Great Britain. He also felt that since the present highly imperfect state of union among the nations of the world can be shattered by war or, as he said, "by the selfish action of individual nations," it would be dangerous to ignore national and political requirements in the formulation of international economic policies. But the policy of protectionism which List advocated did not preclude the possibility of "a final alliance of nations under the rule of law . . . in the form of a confederation."

As part of this general program List campaigned for a German commercial union (*Zollverein*) that would make a single economic unit out of the various petty German states that survived the Napoleonic wars. It was his advocacy of this latter policy that brought him into conflict with the authorities, and in

1825 he was finally forced to flee from his native Württemberg to the United States. In America also he threw himself into the struggle for economic protectionism when the tariff controversy then going on between Great Britain and the United States gave him an opportunity to air his views, and in 1827 there appeared his *Outlines of American Political Economy*.

List played a not unimportant part in the development of an American philosophy of economic nationalism, and he was among the first to apply the experience of the New World to European conditions. The only chapter that was ever published of his projected major work, "The American Economist," he sent to Andrew Jackson, whose friend he was and whom he had supported in the presidential campaign of 1828. List wanted Jackson to send him to a diplomatic post in France from which he believed he could attack English monopoly and promote Franco-American commerce. He received only an unpaid consulship at Leipzig in 1832, which, however, gave him the chance to remain on the Continent and continue his struggle. By 1844 he found German officialdom far more favorably disposed toward his views than it once had been, and the last years of his life were spent in campaigning for a German policy that would combat England's repeal of the Corn Laws. His constant labors undermined his health, however, and he died by his own hand in 1846.

The selection from the Introduction to the *National System* is taken from M. E. Hirst, *The Life of Friedrich List and Selections from His Writings* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.) The selections from the *National System* are taken from the Sampson S. Lloyd translation which appeared in 1885.



THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

Introduction

IN NO BRANCH of political economy is there such a divergence of opinions between theorists and practical men as in regard to international commerce and commercial policy. At the same time, there is no question within the scope of this science which is of so much importance, not only for the prosperity and civilization of nations, but also for their independence, power, and continued existence. Poor, weak, and barbarous countries have become, mainly as a result of wise commercial policy, empires abounding in wealth and power, while other countries, for opposite reasons, have sunk from a high level of national importance into insignificance. Nay, in some instances nations have forfeited their independence and political existence mainly on account of a commercial policy which was unfavourable to the development and encouragement of their nationality. In our own days, more than ever

before, these questions have awakened an interest far greater than that felt in any other economic problems. For the more rapid the growth of a spirit of industrial invention and improvement, of social and political reform, the wider becomes the gap between stationary and progressive nations, and the more dangerous it is to remain on the further side. If in the past centuries were required for Great Britain to succeed in monopolizing the most important manufacture of those days, the wool industry, later decades were sufficient in the case of the far more important cotton industry, and in our own time a few years' start enabled her to annex the whole linen industry of the Continent.

And at no former date has the world seen a manufacturing and commercial supremacy like that which in our own day, endowed with such immense power, has followed so systematic a policy, and has striven so hard to monopolize all manufactures, all commerce, all shipping, all the chief colonies, all the ocean, and to make the rest of the world, like the Hindus, its serfs in all industrial and commercial relations.

Alarmed at the effects of this policy, nay, rather forced by the convulsions which it produced, we have lately seen a country whose civilization seemed little adapted for manufacturing, we have seen Russia seek her salvation in the system of prohibition so much abhorred by orthodox theory. What has been the result? National prosperity.

On the other hand, North America, which was attaining a high position under protection, was attracted by the promises of the theory, and induced to open her ports again to English goods. What was the fruit of free competition? Convulsion and ruin.

Such experiences are well fitted to awake doubts whether the theory is so infallible as it pretends to be; whether the common practice is so insane as it is depicted by the theory; to arouse fears lest our nationality might be in danger of perishing at last from an error in the theory, like the patient who followed a printed prescription and died of a misprint; and to produce a suspicion that this much-praised theory may be built like the old Greek horse, with vast womb and lofty sides, only to conceal men and weapons and to induce us to pull down our walls of defence with our own hands.

This much at least is certain, that although the great questions of commercial policy have been discussed by the keenest brains of all nations in books and legislative assemblies, yet the gulf between theory and practice which has existed since the time of Quesnay and Smith is not only not filled up, but gapes wider and wider each year. And of what use is a science to us, if it throws no light on the path which practice ought to follow. Is it rational to suppose that the intellect of the one party is so immeasurably great that

it can apprehend the nature of things perfectly in all cases, while that of the other party is so weak that it is unable to grasp the truths which its opponents have discovered and brought to light, so that through whole generations it considers manifest errors as truths? Should we not rather suppose that practical men, even if they are as a rule too much inclined to keep to the beaten track, still could not oppose the theory so long and so stubbornly if the theory were not opposed to the nature of things?

In fact, we believe that we can prove the responsibility for the divergence between the theory and practice of commercial policy to rest as much with the theorists as with the practical men. In questions of international trade, political economy must derive its teaching from experience, must adapt its measures to the needs of the present and to the particular circumstances of each nation, without neglecting the claims of the future and of mankind as a whole. Accordingly it founds itself upon philosophy, politics, and history.

Philosophy demands, in the interests of the future and of mankind, an even closer friendship among nations, avoidance of war as far as possible, the establishment and development of international law, the change of what we call the law of nations into the law of federated states, freedom of international intercourse, both in intellectual and material things; and, finally, the alliance of all nations under the rule of law—that is, a universal union.

But politics demands, in the interests of each separate nation, guarantees for its independence and continued existence, special regulations to help its progress in culture, prosperity, and power, to build its society into a perfectly complete and harmoniously developed body politic, self-contained and independent. History, for its part, speaks unmistakably in favour of the claims of the future, since it teaches how the material and moral welfare of mankind has grown at all times with the growth of their political and commercial unity. But it also supports the claims of the present and of nationality when it teaches how nations which have not kept in view primarily the furtherance of their own culture and power have gone to ruin; how unrestricted trade with more advanced nations is certainly an advantage to every nation in the early stages of its development, but how each reaches a point when it can only attain to higher development and an equality with more advanced nationalities through certain restrictions on its international trade. Thus history points out the middle course between the extreme claims of philosophy and politics.

But the practice and theory of political economy in their present forms each takes sides with a faction, the one supporting the special claims of nationality, the other the one-sided demands of cosmopolitanism.

Practice, or, in other words, the so-called mercantile system, commits the great error of maintaining the absolute and universal advantage and neces-

sity of restriction, because it has been advantageous and beneficial to certain nations at certain periods of their development. It does not see that restriction is only the means, and freedom is the end. Looking only at the nation, never at the individual, only at the present, never at the future, it is exclusively political and national in thought, and is devoid of philosophical outlook or cosmopolitan feeling. The ruling theory, on the contrary, founded by Adam Smith on the dreams of Quesnay, has in view only the cosmopolitan claims of the future, indeed of the most distant future. Universal union and absolute freedom of international trade, which at the present time are a cosmopolitan dream only to be realized perhaps after the lapse of centuries, can (according to the theory) be realized at the present time. It does not understand the needs of the present and the meaning of nationality—in fact, it ignores national existence, and with it the principle of national independence. In its exclusive cosmopolitanism, it considers mankind only as a whole, and the welfare of the whole race, not caring for the nation or national welfare, it shudders at the teachings of politics, and condemns theory and practice as mere worthless routine. It only pays attention to history when the latter agrees with its own one-sided view, but ignores or distorts its teaching when it conflicts with the system. Indeed, it is forced even to deny the influence of the English Navigation Acts, the Methuen Treaty, and English commercial policy in general, and to maintain a view entirely contrary to truth—that England has reached wealth and power not by means, but in spite of, its commercial policy.

When we realize the one-sided nature of each system we can no longer wonder that the practice, in spite of serious errors, was unwilling and unable to be reformed by the theory. We understand why the theory did not wish to learn anything from history or experience, from politics or nationality. If this baseless theory is preached in every alley and from every house-top, and with the greatest fervour among those nations whose national existence it most endangers, the reason is to be found in the prevailing tendency of the age towards philanthropic experiments and the solution of philosophical problems.

But for nations as for individuals, there are two efficacious remedies against the illusions of ideology—experience and necessity. If we are not mistaken, all those states which have recently hoped to find their salvation in free trade with the ruling commercial and manufacturing power, are on the point of learning valuable truths by experience.

It is a sheer impossibility that the free states of North America can attain even a mediocre economic position by the maintenance of existing commercial conditions. It is absolutely necessary that they should revert to their earlier tariff. Even if the slave states resist and are supported by the party in power, the force of circumstances must be stronger than party politics. Nay, we

fear that cannons will sooner or later cut the gordian knot which the legislature has been unable to untie. America will pay her debt to England in powder and shot, the effective prohibition of war will correct the errors of American tariff legislation, and the conquest of Canada will put a stop for ever to the vast system of contraband foretold by Huskisson.

May we be mistaken! But in case our prophecy should be fulfilled, we wish to lay on the free trade theory the responsibility of this war. Strange irony of Fate, that a theory based on the great idea of perpetual peace should kindle a war between two Powers which, according to the theorists, are absolutely fitted for reciprocal trade! Almost as strange as the result of the philanthropic abolition of the slave trade, in consequence of which thousands of negroes have been sunk in the depths of the sea.

France, in the course of the past fifty years (or, rather, of the past twenty-five years, for the times of the Revolution and the Napoleonic War can hardly be reckoned), in spite of all mistakes, excrescences, and exaggerations, has made a great experiment in the restrictive system. Its success must strike every unbiassed observer. Consistency, however, demands that the theory should deny this success. Since it has already been capable of uttering the desperate assertion (and convincing the world of its truth), that England did not become rich and powerful by means, but in spite of her commercial policy, why should it hesitate to make the less startling statement that the manufactures of France without protection would have been much more flourishing than they are now? . . .

We thus see of what great practical importance the question of international free trade is at present, and how necessary it is that a thorough and unbiassed inquiry should at last be undertaken to see whether and how far theory and practice are guilty of error in this matter. Thus the problem of harmonizing the two might be solved, or, at least, a serious attempt made to solve it. In very truth the author must explain (not from mock modesty, but from a real and deep-rooted mistrust of his powers) that it is only after a mental struggle of many years' standing, after he has a hundred times questioned the correctness of his views and a hundred times found them true, only after he has a hundred times tested the views and principles opposed to his own and a hundred times realized their error, that he has determined to venture the solution of this problem. This is no vain attempt to contradict ancient authorities and to found new theories. If he had been an Englishman he would scarcely have doubted the main principles of Adam Smith's system.

It was the state of his own country which more than twenty years ago roused in him the first doubts in its infallibility. It has been the state of his own country which has induced him since then, in many unsigned articles,

and, finally, in longer essays under his own name, to develop views opposed to the prevailing theory. And to-day it is still mainly the interests of Germany which have emboldened him to come forward with this book, although he cannot deny that a personal consideration has also influenced him. This is, the obligation he feels to make clear through a work of some length that he is not entirely unqualified to speak a word on questions of political economy. In direct antagonism to the theory, the author first seeks the lessons of history, deduces from them his fundamental principles, develops them, subjects previous systems to a critical examination, and finally (since his aim throughout is practical) explains the present position of commercial policy. For the sake of clearness, here follows an outline of the main results of his researches and reflections.

Union of individual faculties in pursuit of a common end is the most effective means of obtaining individual happiness. Alone and apart from his fellows the individual is weak and helpless. The greater the number of those to whom he is socially united and the more complete the union, the greater and more complete is the resulting moral and physical welfare of the individual members.

The highest union of individuals realized up to the present under the rule of law is in the State and the nation. The highest imaginable is the union of all mankind. Just as in the State and nation the individual can attain his special end to a much higher extent than when he is isolated, so all nations would attain their ends to a much greater extent if they were united by the rule of law, perpetual peace, and free intercourse. Nature herself gradually urges nations to this highest union, since through varieties of climate, soil, and products she forces them to barter, and through excess of population, capital, and talent to emigrate and found colonies. International trade is one of the mightiest levers of civilization and prosperity, for by the awakening of new wants it incites men to activity and exertion and passes on new ideas, inventions, and faculties from one nation to another.

But at present the union of nations which arises from international trade is still very imperfect, since it can be shattered, or at least weakened, by war, or by the selfish action of individual nations. By war a nation can be robbed of its independence, property, freedom, laws, and constitution, its national character, and, still worse, of the culture and well-being to which it has attained. It can, in a word, be reduced to a state of servitude. By the selfish measures of foreign countries a nation can be hindered or impaired in the completeness of its economic development.

Maintenance, development, and perfecting of national spirit at present is, and must be, a chief object of national endeavour. It is no wrong and selfish

aim, but a rational one, in perfect harmony with the true interests of mankind in general. It leads naturally to a final alliance of nations under the rule of law, the universal union, which can only contribute to the well-being of the human race if it is realized in the form of a confederation. A union proceeding from the overwhelming political strength and wealth of a single nation, and thus basing itself upon the subjection and dependence of all other nations, would, on the contrary, result in the destruction of all national characteristics and all international emulation; it is opposed both to the interest and sentiment of nations, since they all feel themselves destined to independence and the attainment of a high level of wealth and political importance. Such a union would only be a repetition of the former attempt by Rome, carried out indeed by means of manufactures and commerce instead of by cold steel as in former times, but none the less leading back to barbarism. The civilization, political development, and strength of nations are mainly dependent on their economic circumstances; and the converse is also true. The more its economy is developed and perfected, the more civilized and powerful is the nation; the higher the level of its civilization and power, the higher the level of its economic development.

In national economic development we must distinguish the following stages: the savage, the pastoral, the agricultural, the agricultural and manufacturing, the agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial. Obviously the nation which, possessing an extensive territory endowed with many natural resources, combines with a large population, agriculture, manufactures, shipping, and home and foreign trade, is incomparably more civilized, politically advanced and powerful than a merely agricultural state. Manufactures are the basis of internal and external trade, of shipping, of improvements in agriculture, and consequently of civilization and political power. Any nation must of necessity attain to universal dominion which succeeded in monopolizing the whole manufacturing power of the world, and in keeping other nations at such a point of economic development that they produced only food and raw materials and carried on merely the most necessary local industries.

Every nation, which attaches any value to its independence and continued existence, must strive to pass with all speed from a lower stage of culture to a higher, and to combine within its own territory agriculture, manufactures, shipping, and commerce. The transition from savagery to the pastoral state, and from the latter to the agricultural state, are best effected by free trade with civilized, that is, manufacturing and commercial nations. The transition from an agricultural community into the class of agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing nations could only take place under free trade if the same process of development occurred simultaneously in all nations destined

to manufactures, if nations put no hindrance in the way of one another's economic development, if they did not check one another's progress through war and tariffs. But since individual nations, through specially favourable circumstances, gained an advantage over others in manufactures, trade, and shipping, and since they early understood the best means of getting and maintaining through these advantages political ascendancy, they have accordingly invented a policy which aimed, and still aims, at obtaining a monopoly in manufactures and trade, and at checking the progress of less advanced nations. The combination of the details of this policy (prohibition of imports, import duties, restrictions on shipping, bounties on exports) is known as the tariff system.

Less advanced nations were forced by the earlier progress of other nations, by foreign tariff systems, and by war, to seek in themselves the means by which they could effect the transition from agriculture to manufactures, and to restrict the trade with more advanced countries aiming at a manufacturing monopoly (in so far as this trade was a hindrance to the transition) by the help of a customs tariff. Customs tariffs, then, are not, as is asserted, the invention of some theorist, they are the natural result of a nation's endeavours to secure its existence and well-being, or to obtain supreme power. But this endeavour is only legitimate and rational when it is not a hindrance but a help to the nation which pursues it and is not in opposition to the higher aim of mankind, the future federation of the world. Just as human society can be regarded from two points of view—the cosmopolitan, which considers mankind as a whole; and the political, which pays attention to particular national interests and conditions, so both the economy of the individual and of society can be regarded from two main aspects, as we look at the personal, social, and material forces by which wealth is produced, or the exchange value of material goods.

Hence there is a cosmopolitan and a political economy, a theory of exchange values and a theory of productive powers, two doctrines which are essentially distinct and which must be developed independently. The productive powers of a nation are not only limited by the industry, thrift, morality, and intelligence of its individual members, and by its natural resources or material capital, but also by its social, political, and municipal laws and institutions, and especially by the securities for the continued existence, independence, and power of the nationality. However industrious, thrifty, enterprising, moral, and intelligent the individuals may be, without national unity, national division of labour, and national co-operation of productive powers the nation will never reach a high level of prosperity and power, or ensure to itself the lasting possession of its intellectual, social, and material goods. The

principle of division of labour has not been fully grasped up to the present. Productivity depends not only on the division of various manufacturing operations among many individuals, but still more on the moral and physical co-operation of these individuals for a common end.

Thus the principle is applicable not merely to single factories or estates, but to the whole agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial forces of a nation. Division of labour and co-operation of productive powers exist where the intellectual activity of a nation bears a proper ratio to its material production, where agriculture, industry, and trade are equally and harmoniously developed.

In a purely agricultural nation, even when it enjoys free trade with manufacturing and commercial nations, a great part of its productive powers and natural resources lies idle and unused. Its intellectual and political development and its powers of defence are hampered. It can have no shipping of importance, no extensive trade. All its prosperity, so far as it results from international trade, can be interrupted, injured, or ruined by foreign regulations or by war.

Manufacturing power, on the contrary, promotes science, art, and political development, increases the well-being of the people, the population, national revenue, and national power, provides the country with the means of extending its commerce to all quarters of the world and of founding colonies, and nourishes the fishing industry, shipping and the navy. Through it alone can home agriculture be raised to a high pitch of development. Agriculture and manufactures in one and the same nation, united, that is, under one political authority, live in perpetual peace. Their mutual relations cannot be disturbed by war or foreign measures, consequently they ensure to the nation continued advance in well-being, civilization, and power. Nature lays down certain conditions for the existence of agriculture and manufactures, but these conditions are not always the same.

As far as natural resources are concerned the lands of the temperate zone are peculiarly fitted for the development of a manufacturing power, since a temperate climate is the natural home of physical and mental effort. Yet although the lands of the tropics are ill-suited for manufactures, they possess a natural monopoly of valuable agricultural products which are much in request by the inhabitants of temperate countries. In the exchange of the manufactures of the temperate zone for the products of the tropics ("colonial goods") we find the best example of cosmopolitan division of labour and co-operation of powers, of international trade on a large scale.

Any attempt to found a native manufacturing power would be most injurious to the tropics. Unfitted by nature for such a course, they will make

far greater advances in national wealth and civilization if they continue to exchange their products for the manufactures of temperate countries. This policy, of course, leaves the tropics in a state of dependence. But this dependence will be harmless, indeed it will disappear, when more of the nations of the temperate zone are upon an equality in manufactures, commerce, shipping, and political power; when it is both advantageous and possible for several manufacturing countries to prevent any of their number from misusing their power over the weaker nations of the tropics. Such power would only be dangerous and harmful if all manufactures, commerce, shipping, and sea-power were monopolized by one country.

Then take the case of nations in the temperate zone possessing large territories full of natural resources. They would neglect one of the richest springs of prosperity, civilization, and power if they did not, as soon as they gained the necessary economic, intellectual, and social resources, attempt to realize on a national scale division of labour and co-operation of productive powers.

By economic resources we mean a fairly advanced state of agriculture which cannot be helped appreciably by any further export of its products. By intellectual resources we mean a good system of education. By social resources we mean laws and institutions which secure to the citizen safety for his person and property and free scope for his intellectual and physical powers. We include also well-managed facilities for transport, and the absence of all institutions, such as the feudal system, which are destructive of industry, freedom, intelligence, and morality.

It is the interest of such a nation, first of all, to endeavour to provide its own market with its own manufactured goods, and then to come more and more into direct intercourse with tropical countries, so that it can export manufactured goods to them in its own ships and take from them their own products in return. In comparison with this intercourse between the manufacturing countries of the temperate zone and the agricultural countries of the tropics, all other international trade, with the exception of a few articles, such as wine, is of little importance.

For great nations of the temperate zone the production of raw materials and food stuffs is only of importance as far as their internal trade is concerned. Through the export of corn, wine, flax, hemp, or wool, a rude and poor country gets a great initial impulse towards agriculture, but a great nation has never attained riches, civilization, and power through such a course.

We may lay it down as a general principle, that a nation is rich and powerful in the proportion in which it exports manufactures, imports raw materials, and consumes tropical products.

To manufacturing nations tropical products are not merely food or the raw

materials of industry, but before all things incentives to the cultivation of agriculture and manufactures. We shall always find that among the nations which consume the greatest quantity of tropical products a correspondingly large quantity of their own manufactures and raw material is produced and consumed.

Four distinct periods can be recognized in the economic development of nations by means of international trade: In the first, home agriculture is fostered by the importation of foreign manufactured goods and the export of agricultural products and raw materials. In the second, home manufactures arise by the side of foreign imports. In the third, home manufactures supply the greater part of the home-market. In the fourth, large quantities of home-manufactured goods are exported and raw materials and agricultural products imported from abroad.

The tariff system, as a means of advancing the economic development of the nation by regulation of its foreign trade, must constantly follow the principle of national industrial *education*.

It is madness to attempt to help home agriculture by protection, since home agriculture can only be advanced on economic principles by the development of home manufactures, and the exclusion of foreign raw materials and agricultural products can only depress home manufactures.

The economic betterment of a nation which is at a low level of intelligence and culture, or in which the population is small in relation to the extent and productivity of its territory, is best accomplished through free trade with highly cultivated, rich, and industrious nations. In the case of such a country every restriction of trade, intended to plant manufacturing industry within its borders, is premature and injurious, not only to the welfare of mankind in general, but to the progress of the nation itself. Only when the intellectual, political, and economic education of the nation has so far advanced as a result of free trade that its further progress would be checked and hindered by the import of foreign manufactures and the lack of a sufficient market for its own goods, can protective measures be justified.

The territory of some nations is not of great extent nor supplied with many natural resources, the mouths of its rivers are not within its boundaries, and it does not form a homogeneous whole. Such a nation cannot apply the protective system at all, or only with imperfect success until it has first supplied its deficiencies by conquest or treaty.

Manufacturing power embraces so many branches of science and knowledge, and presupposes so much experience, skill, and practice, that national industrial development can only be gradual. Any exaggeration or hastening of protection punishes itself by diminished national prosperity. The most in-

injurious and objectionable course is the sudden and complete isolation of the country by prohibition. Yet even this can be justified if, separated from other countries by a long war, it has suffered from an involuntary prohibition of foreign manufactures, and has been forced to supply itself. In this case a gradual transition from prohibition to protection should be effected by deciding beforehand upon a system of gradually diminishing duties. But a nation which desires to pass from a non-protective policy to protection must, on the contrary, begin with low taxes, which increase gradually upon a pre-determined scale. Taxes pre-determined in this way must be maintained intact by statesmen. They must not lower the taxes before the time, though they may raise them if they seem insufficient.

Excessively high import duties, which entirely cut off foreign competition, injure the country which imposes them, since its manufacturers are not forced to compete with foreigners, and indolence is fostered. If home manufactures do not prosper under moderate and gradually increasing duties, this is a proof that the country has not the necessary qualifications for the development of its own manufacturing system. Duties in a branch of industry that is already protected should not fall so low, that the existence of the industry is endangered by foreign competition. Support of existing manufactures, and protection for the essentials of national industry must be unalterable principles. Foreign competition, accordingly, can be allowed only a share in the yearly increase of consumption. The duties must be raised as soon as the foreigner gains the greater part or the whole of the yearly increase.

A nation like England, whose manufacturing power has a long start of all other countries, best maintains and extends its industrial and commercial supremacy by the freest possible trade. In its case cosmopolitan and political principles are identical. This explains the preference of distinguished English statesmen for absolute free trade and the unwillingness of wise financiers in other countries to apply this principle under the existing conditions of the world. For the last quarter of a century the system of prohibition and protection has worked to the disadvantage of England and the advantage of her rivals. Most disadvantageous of all are its restrictions on the importation of foreign raw materials and food stuffs.

Commercial unions and commercial treaties are the most effective means of facilitating intercourse between different nations. But commercial treaties are only legitimate and valuable when they involve mutual benefits. They are injurious and illegitimate when the development of a manufacturing power in one country is sacrificed in order to gain concessions for the exports of its agricultural products to another country. . . . All the offers which England has made since then to France and other countries are of the same character.

Even if protection temporarily enhances prices, yet it ensures cheapness in the future as a result of home competition. For a perfectly developed industry can fix a much lower price for its products than the cost of transport and of trader's profits allow when raw materials and food must be exported and manufactures imported.

The loss which a nation incurs by protection is only one of *values*, but it gains *powers* by which it is enabled to go on producing permanently inestimable amounts of value. This loss in value should be regarded merely as the price paid for the industrial education of the nation.

Protection to manufactures does not injure the agriculturists of the protected nation. Through the growth of a home manufacturing power, wealth, population, and with them the demand for agricultural products will vastly increase. Consequently there will be a considerable rise in the rents and selling prices of landed property, while as time goes by the manufactured products required by agriculturists will fall in price. These gains will outweigh the losses sustained by the agriculturists through the temporary rise in the prices of manufactured goods.

Similarly, both home and foreign trade gain from protection, since both are of importance only in the case of countries which can supply their own markets with manufactures, consume their own agricultural products; and exchange their own manufacturing surplus for foreign raw materials and food stuffs. Merely agricultural nations of the temperate zone have an insignificant home and foreign trade; foreign trade in such cases is generally in the hands of the manufacturing and commercial nations who hold intercourse with them.

Moderate protection does not grant a monopoly to home manufactures, only a guarantee against loss for those individuals who have devoted their capital, talent, and labour to new and untried industries. There can be no monopoly since home competition takes the place of foreign, and it is open to each member of the state to share in the benefits it offers to individuals. There is merely a monopoly for the inhabitants of one country against those of foreign countries, who themselves possess at home a similar monopoly. But this monopoly is useful, not only because it wakes productive forces lying idle and dormant in the nation, but because it attracts to the country foreign productive forces (material and intellectual capital, *entrepreneurs*, skilled and unskilled workmen).

In the case of many nations of long standing culture the export of raw materials and agricultural products, and the import of foreign manufactures, can no longer benefit their powers of production. Such nations suffer many serious evils if they do not foster their own manufactures. Their agriculture

must necessarily be crippled, since, if important home manufacturers arose, the increased population would find employment there, and the consequent great demand for agricultural products would make agriculture on a large scale very profitable and favour its development. But in the case supposed the surplus population could only be employed in agriculture. The result would be a subdivision of land and increase of small cultivators which would be most injurious to the power, civilization, and wealth of the nation.

An agricultural population consisting for the most part of peasant proprietors can neither contribute large quantities of products to the home trade nor exercise an important demand for manufacturers. In such a case the consumption of each individual is limited for the most part to what he himself produces. Under these conditions the nation can never develop any satisfactory system of transport, and can never possess the incalculable advantages arising from such a system. The inevitable result is national weakness, moral and material, individual and political. These consequences are the more dangerous when neighbouring nations pursue the opposite course, when they advance as we fall back, when yonder the hope of better things to come increases the courage, power, and enterprise of the citizens, while here courage and spirit are more and more depressed by the outlook into a hopeless future. History affords striking examples of whole nations falling into ruin because they did not know how to undertake at the right moment the great task of planting their own manufactures, and a powerful industry and commerce, by which they could insure to themselves intellectual, economic, and political independence.

[Book II]

CHAPTER XIV: PRIVATE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL ECONOMY

We have proved historically that the unity of the nation forms the fundamental condition of lasting national prosperity; and we have shown that only where the interest of individuals has been subordinated to those of the nation, and where successive generations have striven for one and the same object, the nations have been brought to harmonious development of their productive powers, and how little private industry can prosper without the united efforts both of the individuals who are living at the time, and of successive generations directed to one common object. We have further tried to prove in the last chapter how the law of union of powers exhibits its beneficial operation in the individual manufactory, and how it acts with equal power

on the industry of whole nations. In the present chapter we have now to demonstrate how the popular school has concealed its misunderstanding of the national interests and of the effects of national union of powers, by confounding the principles of private economy with those of national economy.

"What is prudence in the conduct of every private family," says Adam Smith, "can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom." Every individual in pursuing his own interests necessarily promotes thereby also the interests of the community. It is evident that every individual, inasmuch as he knows his own local circumstances best and pays most attention to his occupation, is far better able to judge than the statesman or legislator how his capital can most profitably be invested. He who would venture to give advice to the people how to invest their capital would not merely take upon himself a useless task, but would also assume to himself an authority which belongs solely to the producer, and which can be entrusted to those persons least of all who consider themselves equal to so difficult a task. Adam Smith concludes this: "Restrictions on trade imposed on the behalf of the internal industry of a country, are mere folly; every nation, like every individual, ought to buy articles where they can be procured the cheapest; in order to attain to the highest degree of national prosperity, we have simply to follow the maxim of letting things alone (*laissez faire et laisser aller*)."

Smith and Say compare a nation which seeks to promote its industry by protective duties, to a tailor who wants to make his own boots, and to a bootmaker who would impose a toll on those who enter his door, in order to promote his prosperity. As in all errors of the popular school, so also in this one does Thomas Cooper go to extremes in his book which is directed against the American system of protection. "Political economy," he alleges, "is almost synonymous with the private economy of all individuals; *politics* are no essential ingredient of *political economy*; it is folly to suppose that the community is something quite different from the individuals of whom it is composed. Every individual knows best how to invest his labour and his capital. The wealth of the community is nothing else than the aggregate of the wealth of all its individual members; and if every individual can provide best for himself, that nation must be the richest in which every individual is most left to himself." The adherents of the American system of protection had opposed themselves to this argument, which had formerly been adduced by importing merchants in favour of free trade; the American navigation laws had greatly increased the carrying trade, the foreign commerce, and fisheries of the United States; and for the mere protection of their mercantile marine millions had been

annually expended on their fleet; according to his theory those laws and this expense also would be as reprehensible as protective duties. "In any case," exclaims Mr. Cooper, "no commerce by sea is worth a naval war; the merchants may be left to protect themselves."

Thus the popular school, which had begun by ignoring the principles of nationality and national interests, finally comes to the point of altogether denying their existence, and of leaving individuals to defend them as they may solely by their own individual powers.

How? Is the wisdom of private economy, also wisdom in national economy? Is it in the nature of individuals to take into consideration the wants of future centuries, as those concern the nature of the nation and the State? Let us consider only the first beginning of an American town; every individual left to himself would care merely for his own wants, or at the most for those of his nearest successors, whereas all individuals united in one community provide for the convenience and the wants of the most distant generations; they subject the present generation for this object to privations and sacrifices which no reasonable person could expect from individuals. Can the individual further take into consideration in promoting his private economy, the defence of the country, public security, and the thousand other objects which can only be attained by the aid of the whole community? Does not the State require individuals to limit their private liberty according to what these objects require? Does it not even require that they should sacrifice for these some part of their earnings, of their mental and bodily labour, nay, even their own life? We must first root out, as Cooper does, the very ideas of "State" and "nation" before this opinion can be entertained.

No; that may be wisdom in national economy which would be folly in private economy, and *vice versa*; and owing to the very simple reason, that a tailor is no nation and a nation no tailor, that one family is something very different from a community of millions of families, that one house is something very different from a large national territory. Nor does the individual merely by understanding his own interests best, and by striving to further them, if left to his own devices, always further the interests of the community. We ask those who occupy the benches of justice, whether they do not frequently have to send individuals to the tread-mill on account of their excess of inventive power, and of their all too great industry. Robbers, thieves, smugglers, and cheats know their own local and personal circumstances and conditions extremely well, and pay the most active attention to their business; but it by no means follows therefrom, that society is in the best condition where such individuals are least restrained in the exercise of their private industry.

In a thousand cases the power of the State is compelled to impose restrictions on private industry. It prevents the shipowner from taking on board slaves on the west coast of Africa, and taking them over to America. It imposes regulations as to the building of steamers and the rules of navigation at sea, in order that passengers and sailors may not be sacrificed to the avarice and caprice of the captains. In England certain rules have recently been enacted with regard to shipbuilding, because an infernal union between assurance companies and shipowners has been brought to light, whereby yearly thousands of human lives and millions in value were sacrificed to the avarice of a few persons. In North America millers are bound under a penalty to pack into each cask not less than 198 lbs. of good flour, and for all market goods market inspectors are appointed, although in no other country is individual liberty more highly prized. Everywhere does the State consider it to be its duty to guard the public against danger and loss, as in the sale of necessities of life, so also in the sale of medicines, &c.

But the cases which we have mentioned (the school will reply) concern unlawful damages to property and to the person, not the honourable exchange of useful objects, not the harmless and useful industry of private individuals; to impose restrictions on these latter the State has no right whatever. Of course not, so long as they remain harmless and useful; that which, however, is harmless and useful in itself, in general commerce with the world, can become dangerous and injurious in national internal commerce, and *vice versa*. In time of peace, and considered from a cosmopolitan point of view, privateering is an injurious profession; in time of war, Governments favour it. The deliberate killing of a human being is a crime in time of peace, in war it becomes a duty. Trading in gunpowder, lead, and arms in time of peace is allowed; but whoever provides the enemy with them in time of war, is punished as a traitor.

For similar reasons the State is not merely justified in imposing, but bound to impose, certain regulations and restrictions on commerce (which is in itself harmless) for the best interests of the nation. By prohibitions and protective duties it does not give directions to individuals how to employ their productive powers and capital (as the popular school sophistically alleges); it does not tell the one, "You must invest your money in the building of a ship, or in the erection of a manufactory"; or the other, "You must be a naval captain or a civil engineer"; it leaves it to the judgment of every individual how and where to invest his capital, or to what vocation he will devote himself. It merely says, "It is to the advantage of our nation that we manufacture these or the other goods ourselves; but as by free competition with foreign countries we can never obtain possession of this advantage, we have im-

posed restrictions on that competition, so far as in our opinion is necessary, to give those among us who invest their capital in these new branches of industry, and those who devote their bodily and mental powers to them, the requisite guarantees that they shall not lose their capital and shall not miss their vocation in life; and further to stimulate foreigners to come over to our side with their productive powers. In this manner, it does not in the least degree restrain private industry; on the contrary, it secures to the personal, natural, and moneyed powers of the nation a greater and wider field of activity. It does not thereby do something which its individual citizens could understand better and do better than it; on the contrary, it does something which the individuals, even if they understood it, would not be able to do for themselves."

The allegation of the school, that the system of protection occasions unjust and anti-economical encroachments by the power of the State against the employment of the capital and industry of private individuals, appears in the least favourable light if we consider that it is the *foreign* commercial regulations which allow such encroachments on *our* private industry to take place, and that only by the aid of the system of protection are we enabled to counteract those injurious operations of the foreign commercial policy. If the English shut out our corn from their markets, what else are they doing than compelling our agriculturists to grow so much less corn than they would have sent out to England under systems of free importation? If they put such heavy duties on our wool, our wines, or our timber, that our export trade to England wholly or in great measure ceases, what else is thereby effected than that the power of the English nation restricts proportionately our branches of production? In these cases a direction is evidently given by *foreign legislation* to *our* capital and *our* personal productive powers, which but for the regulations made by it they would scarcely have followed. It follows from this, that were we to disown giving, by means of *our* own legislation, a direction to our own national industry in accordance with our own national interests, we could not prevent foreign nations from regulating our national industry after a fashion which corresponds with their own real or presumed advantage, and which in any case operates disadvantageously to the development of our own productive powers. But can it possibly be wiser on our part, and more to the advantage of those who nationally belong to us, for us to allow our private industry to be regulated by a foreign national Legislature, in accordance with foreign national interests, rather than regulate it by means of our own Legislature and in accordance with our own interests? Does the German or American agriculturist feel himself less restricted if he has to study every year the English Acts of

Parliament, in order to ascertain whether that body deems it advantageous to encourage or to impose restrictions on his production of corn or wool, than if his own Legislature imposes certain restrictions on him in respect of foreign manufactured goods, but at the same time insures him a market for all his products, of which he can never again be deprived by foreign legislation?

If the school maintains that protective duties secure to the home manufacturers a monopoly to the disadvantage of the home consumers, in so doing it makes use of a weak argument. For as every individual in the nation is free to share in the profits of the home market which is thus secured to native industry, this is in no respect a private monopoly, but a privilege, secured to all those who belong to our nation, as against those who nationally belong to foreign nations, and which is the more righteous and just inasmuch as those who nationally belong to foreign nations possess themselves the very same monopoly, and those who belong to us are merely thereby put on the same footing with them. It is neither a privilege to the exclusive advantage of the producers, nor to the exclusive disadvantage of the consumers; for if the producers at first obtain higher prices, they run great risks, and have to contend against those considerable losses and sacrifices which are always connected with all beginnings in manufacturing industry. But the consumers have ample security that these extraordinary profits shall not reach unreasonable limits, or become perpetual, by means of the competition at home which follows later on, and which, as a rule, always lowers prices further than the level at which they had steadfastly ranged under the free competition of the foreigner. If the agriculturists, who are the most important consumers to the manufacturers, must also pay higher prices, this disadvantage will be amply repaid to them by increased demands for agricultural products, and by increased prices obtained for the latter.

It is a further sophism, arrived at by confounding the theory of mere values with that of the powers of production, when the popular school infers from the doctrine, "*that the wealth of the nation is merely the aggregate of the wealth of all individuals in it, and that the private interest of every individual is better able than all State regulations to incite to production and accumulation of wealth,*" the conclusion that the national industry would prosper best if only every individual were left undisturbed in the occupation of accumulating wealth. That doctrine can be conceded without the conclusion resulting from it at which the school desires thus to arrive; for the point in question is not (as we have shown in a previous chapter) that of immediately increasing by commercial restrictions the amount of *the values of exchange* in the nation, but of increasing *the amount of its productive powers*. But that the aggregate of the productive powers of the nation is not synonymous with

the aggregate of the productive powers of all individuals, each considered separately—that the total amount of these powers depends chiefly on social and political conditions, but especially on the degree in which the nation has rendered effectual the division of labour and the confederation of the powers of production within itself—we believe we have sufficiently demonstrated in the preceding chapters. . . .

The school recognises no distinction between nations which have attained a higher degree of economical development, and those which occupy a lower stage. Everywhere it seeks to exclude the action of the power of the State; everywhere, according to it, will the individual be so much better able to produce, the less the power of the State concerns itself for him. In fact, according to this doctrine savage nations ought to be the most productive and wealthy of the earth, for nowhere is the individual left more to himself than in the savage state, nowhere is the action of the power of the State less perceptible. . . .

CHAPTER XV: NATIONALITY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE NATION

The system of the school suffers, as we have already shown in the preceding chapters, from three main defects: firstly, from boundless *cosmopolitanism*, which neither recognises the principle of nationality, nor takes into consideration the satisfaction of its interests; secondly, from a dead *materialism*, which everywhere regards chiefly the mere exchangeable value of things without taking into consideration the mental and political, the present and the future interests, and the productive powers of the nation; thirdly, from a *disorganising particularism and individualism*, which, ignoring the nature and character of social labour and the operation of the union of powers in their higher consequences, considers private industry only as it would develop itself under a state of free interchange with society (i.e. with the whole human race) were that race not divided into separate national societies.

Between each individual and entire humanity, however, stands THE NATION, with its special language and literature, with its peculiar origin and history, with its special manners and customs, laws and institutions, with the claims of all these for existence, independence, perfection, and continuance for the future, and with its separate territory; a society which, united by a thousand ties of mind and of interests, combines itself into one independent whole, which recognises the law of right for and within itself, and in its united character is still opposed to other societies of a similar kind in their national liberty, and consequently can only under existing conditions of the world maintain self-existence and independence by its own power and resources. As the individual chiefly obtains by means of the nation and in the nation mental

culture, power of production, security, and prosperity, so is the civilisation of the human race only conceivable and possible by means of the civilisation and development of the individual nations.

Meanwhile, however, an infinite difference exists in the condition and circumstances of the various nations: we observe among them giants and dwarfs, well-formed bodies and cripples, civilised, half-civilised, and barbarous nations; but in all of them, as in the individual human being, exists the impulse of self-preservation, the striving for improvement which is implanted by nature. It is the task of politics to civilise the barbarous nationalities, to make the small and weak ones great and strong, but, above all, to secure to them existence and continuance. It is the task of national economy to accomplish *the economical development of the nation*, and to prepare it for admission into the universal society of the future.

A nation in its normal state possesses one common language and literature, a territory endowed with manifold natural resources, extensive, and with convenient frontiers and a numerous population. Agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and navigation must be all developed in it proportionately; arts and sciences, educational establishments, and universal cultivation must stand in it on an equal footing with material production. Its constitution, laws, and institutions must afford to those who belong to it a high degree of security and liberty, and must promote religion, morality, and prosperity; in a word, must have the well-being of its citizens as their object. It must possess sufficient power on land and at sea to defend its independence and to protect its foreign commerce. It will possess the power of beneficially affecting the civilisation of less advanced nations, and by means of its own surplus population and of their mental and material capital to found colonies and beget new nations.

A large population, and an extensive territory endowed with manifold national resources, are essential requirements of the normal nationality; they are the fundamental conditions of mental cultivation as well as of material development and political power. A nation restricted in the number of its population and in territory, especially if it has a separate language, can only possess a crippled literature, crippled institutions for promoting art and science. A small State can never bring to complete perfection within its territory the various branches of production. In it all protection becomes mere private monopoly. Only through alliances with more powerful nations, by partly sacrificing the advantages of nationality, and by excessive energy, can it maintain with difficulty its independence.

A nation which possesses no coasts, mercantile marine, or naval power, or has not under its dominion and control the mouths of its rivers, is in its foreign commerce dependent on other countries; it can neither establish colo-

nies of its own nor form new nations; all surplus population, mental and material means, which flows from such a nation to uncultivated countries, is lost to its own literature, civilisation and industry, and goes to the benefit of other nationalities.

A nation not bounded by seas and chains of mountains lies open to the attacks of foreign nations, and can only by great sacrifices, and in any case only very imperfectly, establish and maintain a separate tariff system of its own.

Territorial deficiencies of the nation can be remedied either by means of hereditary succession, as in the case of England and Scotland; or by purchase, as in the case of Florida and Louisiana; or by conquests, as in the case of Great Britain and Ireland.

In modern times a fourth means has been adopted, which leads to this object in a manner much more in accordance with justice and with the prosperity of nations than conquest, and which is not so dependent on accidents as hereditary succession, namely, the union of the interests of various States by means of conventions.

By its Zollverein, the German nation first obtained one of the most important attributes of its nationality. But this measure cannot be considered complete so long as it does not extend over the whole coast, from the mouth of the Rhine to the frontier of Poland, including *Holland* and *Denmark*. A natural consequence of this union must be the admission of both these countries into the German Bund, and consequently into the German nationality, whereby the latter will at once obtain what it is now in need of, namely, fisheries and naval power, maritime commerce and colonies. Besides, both these nations belong, as respects their descent and whole character, to the German nationality. The burden of debt with which they are oppressed is merely a consequence of their unnatural endeavours to maintain themselves as independent nationalities, and it is in the nature of things that this evil should rise to a point when it will become intolerable to those two nations themselves, and when incorporation with a larger nationality must seem desirable and necessary to them.

Belgium can only remedy by means of confederation with a neighbouring larger nation her needs which are inseparable from her restricted territory and population. *The United States* and *Canada*, the more their population increases, and the more the protective system of the United States is developed, so much the more will they feel themselves drawn towards one another, and the less will it be possible for England to prevent a union between them.

V

SOCIAL CRITICISM AND PROGRAMS
OF REFORM

JEREMY BENTHAM

ONE OF THE most articulate and persuasive spokesmen for the Enlightenment was the indefatigable Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), whose life spanned the era between the publication of Rousseau's *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* and England's first Reform Bill. Hume, Joseph Priestley, and Helvétius, in a sense all precursors of the utilitarianism of Bentham, made their impact upon him in his earlier writings. But Bentham, hardly a slave to any intellectual tradition, converted these inspirations into his own distinctive contribution to moral philosophy and social reform. Perhaps his precocious childhood was already indicative of his later prodigious efforts. Bentham early renounced the practice of law, a profession to which his father had consigned him, and turned his energies to writing on moral and legal philosophy. His life work represents an achievement impressive not only for its prolific scope and quantity but also for its suggestive power. Bentham's writings traversed such areas as civil law, criminal law, constitutional law, international law, political economy, colonialism, procedure and evidence, moral philosophy, language, and religion. All of this was done in a rather self-imposed seclusion and isolation from the active social world of his admirers.

Bentham, through his version of utilitarianism, insisted upon a realistic appraisal of man's nature as a prerequisite for moral philosophy. Thus the goal most clearly evidenced in human striving was that of the "greatest happiness" or "greatest felicity." Only those actions in conformity with this end could rightfully be endowed with the meanings of "right," "ought," or "should." However, the successful realization of this ideal of happiness was, for Bentham, to be determined by the appropriate guiding principles for human action. Here the function of the philosopher was to set before others "a sketch of the probable future more correct and complete" than the consensus of feeling and opinion. Bentham saw the need for a careful formulation of the norms of action which would not be dependent upon "false methods of reasoning"—those logical "fictions" adduced to favor established patterns of conduct. His "moral arithmetic" or "calculus" of pleasures and pains was designed not merely as a classificatory schematism, nor was it simply a reduction of these qualitative distinctions to quantitative terms. It represented for Bentham a more consistent set of rational norms than the arbitrary appeals to sentiment, duty, moral sense, common sense, tradition, and feeling—something which John Stuart Mill, in his critique of Bentham's utilitarianism, failed to recognize.

With this emphasis upon the consequences of human conduct, Bentham's moral theory was ripe for translation into a *raison d'être* for social action. Bentham's assault upon the bulwarks of moral complacency and self-contentment was further accented in his works on legal and social reform. In a sense, the development of his moral philosophy became subservient to the needs for institutional reconstruction and reform. In a world of increasing complexity and challenge Bentham's decisive words could not for long remain neglected. In France, Étienne Dumont, a Swiss pastor, helped to organize Bentham's manuscripts and propagate them in

French for a wider audience. Though their association for many years was a sympathetic one, it evoked in Bentham certain misgivings. Dumont took liberties with these ever-multiplying manuscripts, excising much of their suggestiveness and subtlety of argument for the purposes of propaganda. In short time Bentham's works on legal reforms reached out influentially to France, Russia, the Latin American republics, Portugal, Spain, and Germany. Bentham maintained interested relations with the United States, as well as turning his attentions to suggested reforms for India, Egypt, and Poland.

Bentham was finally to infiltrate the lethargy of English political life. With the departure from his earlier Tory leanings Bentham came into closer association with James Mill and his circle of "philosophical radicals," inspiring them to a more decisive and articulate expression for English social reform. In 1824 Bentham founded the *Westminster Review* as an organ for the promotion and publication of the views of the "philosophical radicals." They held up to effective criticism cumbersome and outmoded political and legal institutions and set before the public eye the standard of a good and economical government aware of its limitations. This program won its major victories in the Reform Bill of 1832 and the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. G. M. Young makes this estimate of the Benthamite contribution: "The Philosophical Radicals . . . came into a world where medieval prejudice, Tudor Law, Stuart Economics, and Hanoverian patronage still luxuriated in wild confusion, and by the straight and narrow paths they cut we are walking still. . . . It would be hard to find any corner of our public life where the spirit of Bentham is not working today." Bentham's impact upon English society can hardly be overstated. A recent source has summarized this contribution in the following words:

"The reform of the representative system in Parliament; municipal reform; the mitigation of the terrible criminal law, the abolition of transportation, the improvement of prisons (for which he spent many thousands eventually repaid to him by a grateful Government), the removal of defects in the jury system, the abolition of grand juries (though he believed that the proper Court of Appeal is a jury), the abolition of imprisonment for debt, the sweeping away of the usury laws, reform of the law of evidence, the repeal of religious tests; the reform of the Poor Law, the training of pauper children, the establishment of a national system of education; an extension of the idea of savings banks and friendly societies, cheap postage without the object of national profit coupled with post office money orders; a complete and uniform Register of Births, Marriages, and Deaths, a Code for Merchant Shipping, full Census returns, the circulation of Parliamentary papers, protection of inventors; local Courts, uniform and scientific methods of drafting Acts of Parliament, a general register of real property, of deeds and all transactions, and the passing of public health legislation."

And all of this in addition to the changes in legal procedure which Bentham effected.

The readings that follow are from Bentham's "Principles of Legislation" in *The Theory of Legislation* (1931 edition). This work first appeared in Étienne Dumont's French version (*Traité de législation civile et pénale*, 1802) and was trans-

lated into English by Richard Hildreth in 1864. Prior to Hildreth's translation there were German, Russian, Spanish, and Hungarian renditions of the *Traité*s. It has also been translated into Polish and Portuguese.



PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION

CHAPTER I: THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

THE PUBLIC GOOD ought to be the object of the legislator; GENERAL UTILITY ought to be the foundation of his reasonings. To know the true good of the community is what constitutes the science of legislation; the art consists in finding the means to realize that good.

The principle of *utility*, vaguely announced, is seldom contradicted; it is even looked upon as a sort of commonplace in politics and morals. But this almost universal assent is only apparent. The same ideas are not attached to this principle; the same value is not given to it; no uniform and logical manner of reasoning results from it.

To give it all the efficacy which it ought to have, that is, to make it the foundation of a system of reasonings, three conditions are necessary.

First,—To attach clear and precise ideas to the word *utility*, exactly the same with all who employ it.

Second,—To establish the unity and the sovereignty of this principle, by rigorously excluding every other. It is nothing to subscribe to it in general; it must be admitted without any exception.

Third,—To find the processes of a moral arithmetic by which uniform results may be arrived at.

The causes of dissent from the doctrine of utility may all be referred to two false principles, which exercise an influence, sometimes open and sometimes secret, upon the judgments of men. If these can be pointed out and excluded, the true principle will remain in purity and strength.

These three principles are like three roads which often cross each other, but of which only one leads to the wished-for destination. The traveller turns often from one into another, and loses in these wanderings more than half his time and strength. The true route is however the easiest; it has mile-stones which cannot be shifted, it has inscriptions, in a universal language, which cannot be effaced; while the two false routes have only contradictory directions in enigmatical characters. But without abusing the language of allegory, let us seek to give a clear idea of the true principle, and of its two adversaries.

Nature has placed man under the empire of *pleasure* and of *pain*. We owe

to them all our ideas; we refer to them all our judgments, and all the determinations of our life. He who pretends to withdraw himself from this subjection knows not what he says. His only object is to seek pleasure and to shun pain, even at the very instant that he rejects the greatest pleasures or embraces pains the most acute. These eternal and irresistible sentiments ought to be the great study of the moralist and the legislator. The *principle of utility* subjects everything to these two motives.

Utility is an abstract term. It expresses the property or tendency of a thing to prevent some evil or to procure some good. *Evil* is pain, or the cause of pain. *Good* is pleasure, or the cause of pleasure. That which is conformable to the utility, or the interest of an individual, is what tends to augment the total sum of his happiness. That which is conformable to the utility, or the interest of a community, is what tends to augment the total sum of the happiness of the individuals that compose it.

A *principle* is a first idea, which is made the beginning or basis of a system of reasonings. To illustrate it by a sensible image, it is a fixed point to which the first link of a chain is attached. Such a principle must be clearly evident—to illustrate and to explain it must secure its acknowledgment. Such are the axioms of mathematics; they are not proved directly; it is enough to show that they cannot be rejected without falling into absurdity.

The *logic of utility* consists in setting out, in all the operations of the judgment, from the calculation or comparison of pains and pleasures, and in not allowing the interference of any other idea.

I am a partisan of the *principle of utility* when I measure my approbation or disapprobation of a public or private act by its tendency to produce pleasure or pain; when I employ the words *just, unjust, moral, immoral, good, bad*, simply as collective terms including the ideas of certain pains or pleasures; it being always understood that I use the words *pain* and *pleasure* in their ordinary signification, without inventing any arbitrary definition for the sake of excluding certain pleasures or denying the existence of certain pains. In this matter we want no refinement, no metaphysics. It is not necessary to consult Plato, nor Aristotle. *Pain* and *pleasure* are what everybody feels to be such—the peasant and the prince, the unlearned as well as the philosopher.

He who adopts the *principle of utility*, esteems virtue to be a good only on account of the pleasures which result from it; he regards vice as an evil only because of the pains which it produces. Moral good is *good* only by its tendency to produce physical good. Moral evil is *evil* only by its tendency to produce physical evil; but when I say *physical*, I mean the pains and pleasures of the soul as well as the pains and pleasures of sense. I have in view man, such as he is, in his actual constitution.

If the partisan of the *principle of utility* finds in the common list of virtues an action from which there results more pain than pleasure, he does not hesitate to regard that pretended virtue as a vice; he will not suffer himself to be imposed upon by the general error; he will not lightly believe in the policy of employing false virtues to maintain the true.

If he finds in the common list of offences some indifferent action, some innocent pleasure, he will not hesitate to transport this pretended offence into the class of lawful actions; he will pity the pretended criminals, and will reserve his indignation for their persecutors.

CHAPTER II: THE ASCETIC PRINCIPLE ¹

This principle is exactly the rival, the antagonist of that which we have just been examining. Those who follow it have a horror of pleasures. Everything which gratifies the senses, in their view, is odious and criminal. They found morality upon privations, and virtue upon the renouncement of one's self. In one word, the reverse of the partisans of utility, they approve everything which tends to diminish enjoyment, they blame everything which tends to augment it.

This principle has been more or less followed by two classes of men, who in other respects have scarce any resemblance, and who even affect a mutual contempt. The one class are philosophers, the other, devotees. The ascetic philosophers, animated by the hope of applause, have flattered themselves with the idea of seeming to rise above humanity, by despising vulgar pleasures. They expect to be paid in reputation and in glory, for all the sacrifices which they seem to make to the severity of their maxims. The ascetic devotees are foolish people, tormented by vain terrors. Man, in their eyes, is but a degenerate being, who ought to punish himself without ceasing for the crime of being born, and never to turn off his thoughts from that gulf of eternal misery which is ready to open beneath his feet. Still, the martyrs to these absurd opinions have, like all others, a fund of hope. Independent of the worldly pleasures attached to the reputation of sanctity, these atrabilious pietists flatter themselves that every instant of voluntary pain here below will procure them an age of happiness in another life. Thus, even the ascetic principle reposes upon some false idea of utility. It acquired its ascendancy only through mistake.²

¹ Ascetic, by its etymology, signifies *one who exercises*. It was applied to the monks, to indicate their favorite practices of devotion and penitence.

² This mistake consists in representing the Deity in words, as a being of infinite benevolence, yet ascribing to him prohibitions and threats which are the attributes of an implacable being, who uses his power only to satisfy his malevolence.

We might ask these ascetic theologians what life is good for, if not for the pleasures it procures us?—and what pledge we have for the goodness of God in another life. if he has forbidden the enjoyment of this?

The devotees have carried the ascetic principle much further than the philosophers. The philosophical party has confined itself to censuring pleasures; the religious sects have turned the infliction of pain into a duty. The stoics said that pain was not an evil; the Jansenists maintained that it was actually a good. The philosophical party never reproved pleasures in the mass, but only those which it called gross and sensual, while it exalted the pleasures of sentiment and understanding. It was rather a preference for the one class, than a total exclusion of the other. Always despised, or disparaged under its true name, pleasure was received and applauded when it took the titles of *honour, glory, reputation, decorum, or self-esteem*.

Not to be accused of exaggerating the absurdity of the ascetics, I shall mention the least unreasonable origin which can be assigned to their system.

It was early perceived that the attraction of pleasure might seduce into pernicious acts; that is, acts of which the good was not equivalent to the evil. To forbid these pleasures, in consideration of their bad effects, is the object of sound morals and good laws. But the ascetics have made a mistake, for they have attacked pleasure itself; they have condemned it in general; they have made it the object of a universal prohibition, the sign of a reprobate nature; and it is only out of regard for human weakness that they have had the indulgence to grant some particular exemptions.

CHAPTER III: THE ARBITRARY PRINCIPLE; OR THE PRINCIPLE OF SYMPATHY AND ANTIPATHY

This principle consists in approving or blaming by sentiment, without giving any other reason for the decision except the decision itself. *I love, I hate*; such is the pivot on which this principle turns. An action is judged to be good or bad, not because it is conformable, or on the contrary, to the interest of those whom it affects, but because it pleases or displeases him who judges. He pronounces sovereignly; he admits no appeal; he does not think himself obliged to justify his opinion by any consideration relative to the good of society. "It is my interior persuasion; it is my intimate conviction; I feel it; sentiment consults nobody; the worse for him who does not agree with me—he is not a man, he is a monster in human shape." Such is the despotic tone of these decisions.

But, it may be asked, are there men so unreasonable as to dictate their particular sentiments as laws, and to arrogate to themselves the privilege of infallibility? What you call the *principle of sympathy and antipathy* is not a principle of reasoning; it is rather the negation, the annihilation of all principle. A true anarchy of ideas results from it; since every man having an

equal right to give *his* sentiments as a universal rule, there will no longer be any common measure, no ultimate tribunal to which we can appeal.

Without doubt the absurdity of this principle is sufficiently manifest. No man, therefore, is bold enough to say openly, "I wish you to think as I do, without giving me the trouble to reason with you." Every one would revolt against a pretension so absurd. Therefore, recourse is had to diverse inventions of disguise. Despotism is veiled under some ingenious phrase. Of this the greater part of philosophical systems are a proof.

One man tells you that he has in himself something which has been given him to teach what is good and what is evil; and this he calls either his *conscience* or his *moral sense*. Then, working at his ease, he decides such a thing to be good, such another to be bad. Why? Because my moral sense tells me so; because my conscience approves or disapproves it.

Another comes and the phrase changes. It is no longer the moral sense,—it is *common sense* which tells him what is good and what is bad. This common sense is a sense, he says, which belongs to everybody; but then he takes good care in speaking of everybody to make no account of those who do not think as he does.

Another tells you that this moral sense and this common sense are but dreams; that the *understanding* determines what is good and what is bad. His understanding tells him so and so; all good and wise men have just such an understanding as he has. As to those who do not think in the same way, it is a clear proof that their understandings are defective or corrupt.

Another tells you that he has an *eternal and immutable rule of right*, which rule commands this and forbids that; then he retails to you his own particular sentiments, which you are obliged to receive as so many branches of the eternal rule of right.

You hear a multitude of professors, of jurists, of magistrates, of philosophers, who make the *law of nature* echo in your ears. They all dispute, it is true, upon every point of their system; but no matter—each one proceeds with the same confident intrepidity, and utters his opinions as so many chapters of the *law of nature*. The phrase is sometimes modified, and we find in its place, *natural right*, *natural equity*, *the rights of man*, etc.

One philosopher undertakes to build a moral system upon what he calls *truth*; according to him, the only evil in the world is lying. If you kill your father, you commit a crime, because it is a particular fashion of saying that he is not your father. Everything which this philosopher does not like, he disapproves under the pretext that it is a sort of falsehood—since it amounts to asserting that we ought to do what ought not to be done. . . .

To sum up;—the *ascetic principle* attacks utility in front. The *principle of sympathy* neither rejects it nor admits it; it pays no attention to it; it floats at hazard between good and evil. The ascetic principle is so unreasonable, that its most senseless followers have never attempted to carry it out. The principle of sympathy and antipathy does not prevent its partisans from having recourse to the principle of utility. This last alone neither asks nor admits any exceptions. *Qui non sub me contra me*; that which is not under me is against me; such is its motto. According to this principle, to legislate is an affair of observation and calculation; according to the ascetics, it is an affair of fanaticism; according to the principle of sympathy and antipathy, it is a matter of humour, of imagination, of taste. The first method is adapted to philosophers; the second to monks; the third is the favourite of wits, of ordinary moralists, of men of the world, of the multitude.

CHAPTER IV: OPERATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES UPON LEGISLATION

. . . The principle which has exercised the greatest influence upon governments, is that of sympathy and antipathy. In fact, we must refer to that principle all those specious objects which governments pursue, without having the general good for a single and independent aim; such as good morals, equality, liberty, justice, power, commerce, religion; objects respectable in themselves, and which ought to enter into the views of the legislator; but which too often lead him astray, because he regards them as ends, not as means. He substitutes them for public happiness, instead of making them subordinate to it.

Thus, a government, entirely occupied with wealth and commerce, looks upon society as a workshop, regards men only as productive machines, and cares little how much it torments them, provided it makes them rich. The customs, the exchanges, the stocks, absorb all its thoughts. It looks with indifference upon a multitude of evils which it might easily cure. It wishes only for a great production of the means of enjoyment, while it is constantly putting new obstacles in the way of enjoying.

Other governments esteem power and glory as the sole means of public good. Full of disdain for those states which are able to be happy in a peaceful security, they must have intrigues, negotiations, wars and conquests. They do not consider of what misfortunes this glory is composed, and how many victims these bloody triumphs require. The *éclat* of victory, the acquisition of a province, conceal from them the desolation of their country, and make them mistake the true end of government.

Many persons do not inquire if a state be well administered; if the laws protect property and persons; if the people are happy. What they require, without giving attention to anything else, is political liberty—that is, the most

equal distribution which can be imagined of political power. Wherever they do not see the form of government to which they are attached, they see nothing but slaves; and if these pretended slaves are well satisfied with their condition, if they do not desire to change it, they despise and insult them. In their fanaticism they are always ready to stake all the happiness of a nation upon a civil war, for the sake of transporting power into the hands of those whom an invincible ignorance will not permit to use it, except for their own destruction. . . .

CHAPTER VII: PAINS AND PLEASURES CONSIDERED AS SANCTIONS

The will cannot be influenced except by motives; but when we speak of *motives*, we speak of *pleasures* or *pains*. A being whom we could not effect either by painful or pleasurable emotions would be completely independent of us.

The pain or pleasure which is attached to a law form what is called its sanction. The laws of one state are not laws in another because they have no sanction there, no obligatory force.

Pleasures and pains may be distinguished into four classes:

- 1st. Physical.
- 2nd. Moral.
- 3rd. Political.
- 4th. Religious.

Consequently, when we come to consider pains and pleasures under the character of punishments and rewards, attached to certain rules of conduct, we may distinguish four sanctions.

1st. Those pleasures and pains which may be expected from the ordinary course of nature, acting by itself, without human intervention, compose the *natural or physical sanction*.

2nd. The pleasures or pains which may be expected from the action of our fellow-men, in virtue of their friendship or hatred, of their esteem or their contempt—in one word, of their spontaneous disposition towards us, compose the *moral sanction*; or it may be called the *popular sanction*, *sanction of public opinion*, *sanction of honour*, *sanction of the pains and pleasures of sympathy*.

3rd. The pleasures or pains which may be expected from the action of the magistrate, in virtue of the laws, compose the *political sanction*; it may also be called the *legal sanction*.

4th. The pleasures or pains which may be expected in virtue of the threats or promises of religion, compose the *religious sanction*.

A man's house is destroyed by fire. Is it in consequence of his imprudence?—It is a pain of the natural sanction. Is it by the sentence of a judge?—It is a

pain of the political sanction. Is it by the malice of his neighbours?—It is a pain of the popular sanction. Is it supposed to be the immediate act of an offended Divinity?—In such a case it would be a pain of the religious sanction, or vulgarly speaking, a judgment of God.

It is evident from this example that the same sort of pains belong to all the sanctions. The only difference is in the circumstances which produce them.

This classification will be very useful in the course of this work. It is an easy and uniform nomenclature, absolutely necessary to distinguish and describe the different kinds of moral powers, those intellectual levers which constitute the machinery of the human heart.

These four sanctions do not act upon all men in the same manner, nor with the same degree of force. They are sometimes rivals, sometimes allies, and sometimes enemies. When they agree, they operate with an irresistible power; when they are in opposition, they mutually enfeeble each other; when they are rivals, they produce uncertainties and contradictions in the conduct of men.

Four bodies of laws may be imagined, corresponding to these four sanctions. The highest point of perfection would be reached if these four codes constituted but one. This perfection, however, is as yet far distant, though it may not be impossible to attain it. But the legislator ought always to recollect that he can operate directly only by means of the political sanction. The three others must necessarily be its rivals or its allies, its antagonists or its ministers. If he neglects them in his calculations, he will be deceived in his results; but if he makes them subservient to his views, he will gain an immense power. There is no chance of uniting them, except under the standard of utility.

The natural sanction is the only one which always acts; the only one which works of itself; the only one which is unchangeable in its principal characteristics. It insensibly draws all the others to it, corrects their deviations, and produces whatever uniformity there is in the sentiments and the judgments of men.

The popular sanction and the religious sanction are more variable, more dependent upon human caprices. Of the two, the popular sanction is more equal, more steady, and more constantly in accordance with the principle of utility. The force of the religious sanction is more unequal, more apt to change with times and individuals, more subject to dangerous deviations. It grows weak by repose, but revives by opposition.

In some respects the political sanction has the advantage of both. It acts upon all men with a more equal force; it is clearer and more precise in its precepts; it is surer and more exemplary in its operations; finally, it is more susceptible of being carried to perfection. Its progress has an immediate influence upon the progress of the other two; but it embraces only actions of a

certain kind; it has not a sufficient hold upon the private conduct of individuals; it cannot proceed except upon proofs which it is often impossible to obtain; and secrecy, force, or stratagem are able to escape it. It thus appears, from considering what each of these sanctions can effect, and what they cannot, that neither ought to be rejected, but that all should be employed and directed towards the same end. They are like magnets, of which the virtue is destroyed when they are presented to each other by their contrary poles, while their power is doubled when they are united by the poles which correspond.

It may be observed, in passing, that the systems which have most divided men have been founded upon an exclusive preference given to one or the other of these sanctions. Each has had its partisans, who have wished to exalt it above the others. Each has had its enemies, who have sought to degrade it by showing its weak side, exposing its errors, and developing all the evils which have resulted from it, without making any mention of its good effects. Such is the true theory of all those paradoxes which elevate nature against society, politics against religion, religion against nature and government, and so on.

Each of these sanctions is susceptible of error, that is to say, of some applications contrary to the principle of utility. But by applying the nomenclature above explained, it is easy to indicate by a single word the seat of the evil. Thus, for example, the reproach which after the punishment of a criminal falls upon an innocent family is an error of the popular sanction. The offence of usury, that is, of receiving interest above the legal interest, is an error of the political sanction. Heresy and magic are errors of the religious sanction. Certain sympathies and antipathies are errors of the natural sanction. The first germ of mistake exists in some single sanction, whence it commonly spreads into the others. It is necessary, in all these cases, to discover the origin of the evil before we can select or apply the remedy.

CHAPTER VIII: THE MEASURE OF PLEASURES AND PAINS

The sole object of the legislator is to increase pleasures and to prevent pains; and for this purpose he ought to be well acquainted with their respective values. As pleasures and pains are the only instruments which he employs, he ought carefully to study their power.

If we examine the *value* of a pleasure, considered in itself, and in relation to a single individual, we shall find that it depends upon four circumstances,—

- 1st. *Its intensity.*
- 2nd. *Its duration.*
- 3rd. *Its certainty.*
- 4th. *Its proximity.*

The value of a pain depends upon the same circumstances.

But it is not enough to examine the value of pleasures and pains as if they were isolated and independent. Pains and pleasures may have other pains and pleasures as their consequences. Therefore, if we wish to calculate the *tendency* of an act from which there results an immediate pain or pleasure, we must take two additional circumstances into the account, viz.—

5th. *Its productiveness.*

6th. *Its purity.*

A *productive pleasure* is one which is likely to be followed by other pleasures of the same kind.

A *productive pain* is one which is likely to be followed by other pains of the same kind.

A *pure pleasure* is one which is not likely to produce pains.

A *pure pain* is one which is not likely to produce pleasures.

When the calculation is to be made in relation to a collection of individuals, yet another element is necessary,—

7th. *Its extent.*

That is, the number of persons who are likely to find themselves affected by this pain or pleasure.

When we wish to value an action, we must follow in detail all the operations above indicated. These are the elements of moral calculation; and legislation thus becomes a matter of arithmetic. The *evil* produced is the outgo, the *good* which results is the income. The rules of this calculation are like those of any other. This is a slow method, but a sure one; while what is called sentiment is a prompt estimate, but apt to be deceptive. It is not necessary to recommence this calculation upon every occasion. When one has become familiar with the process; when he has acquired the justness of estimate which results from it; he can compare the sum of good and of evil with so much promptitude as scarcely to be conscious of the steps of the calculation. It is thus that we perform many arithmetical calculations, almost without knowing it. The analytical method, in all its details, becomes essential, only when some new or complicated matter arises; when it is necessary to clear up some disputed point, or to demonstrate a truth to those who are yet unacquainted with it.

This theory of moral calculation, though never clearly explained, has always been followed in practice; at least, in every case where men have had clear ideas of their interest. What is it, for example, that makes up the value of a landed estate? Is it not the amount of pleasure to be derived from it? and does not this value vary according to the length of time for which the estate is to be enjoyed; according to the nearness or the distance of the moment when the

possession is to begin; according to the certainty or uncertainty of its being retained?

Errors, whether in legislation or the moral conduct of men, may be always accounted for by a mistake, a forgetfulness, or a false estimate of some one of these elements, in the calculation of good and evil.

CHAPTER IX: CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT SENSIBILITY

All causes of pleasure do not give the same pleasure to all; all causes of pain do not always produce the same pain. It is in this that *difference of sensibility* consists. This difference is in degree, or in kind: in degree, when the impression of a given cause upon many individuals is unform, but unequal; in kind, when the same cause produces opposite sensations in different individuals.

This difference of sensibility depends upon certain circumstances which influence the physical or moral condition of individuals, and which, being changed, produce a corresponding change in their feelings. This is an experimental fact. Things do not affect us in the same manner in sickness and in health, in plenty and in poverty, in infancy and old age. But a view so general is not sufficient; it is necessary to go deeper into the human heart. Lyonet wrote a quarto volume upon the anatomy of the caterpillar; morals are in need of an investigator as patient and philosophical. I have not courage to imitate Lyonet. I shall think it sufficient if I open a new point of view—if I suggest a surer method to those who wish to pursue this subject.

The foundation of the whole is *temperament*, or the original constitution. By this word I understand that radical and primitive disposition which attends us from our birth, and which depends upon physical organization, and the nature of the soul.

But although this radical constitution is the basis of all the rest, this basis lies so concealed that it is very difficult to get at it, so as to distinguish those varieties of sensibility which it produces from those which belong to other causes.

It is the business of the physiologist to distinguish these temperaments; to follow out their mixtures; and to trace their effects. But these grounds are as yet too little known to justify the moralist or legislator in founding anything upon them. . . .

CHAPTER X: ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL GOOD AND EVIL.—HOW THEY ARE DIFFUSED THROUGH SOCIETY

It is with government as with medicine; its only business is the choice of evils. Every law is an evil, for every law is an infraction of liberty. Government,

I repeat it, has but the choice of evils. In making that choice, what ought to be the object of the legislator? He ought to be certain of two things: 1st, that in every case, the acts which he undertakes to prevent are really evils; and, 2nd, that these evils are greater than those which he employs to prevent them.

He has then two things to note—the evil of the offence, and the evil of the law; the evil of the malady, and the evil of the remedy.

An evil seldom comes alone. A portion of evil can hardly fall upon an individual, without spreading on every side, as from a centre. As it spreads, it takes different forms. We see an evil of one kind coming out of an evil of another kind; we even see evil coming out of good, and good out of evil. . . .

The propagation of good is less rapid and less sensible than that of evil. The seed of good is not so productive in hopes as the seed of evil is fruitful in alarms. But this difference is abundantly made up, for good is a necessary result of natural causes which operate always; while evil is produced only by accident, and at intervals.

Society is so constituted that, in labouring for our particular good, we labour also for the good of the whole. We cannot augment our own means of enjoyment without augmenting also the means of others. Two nations, like two individuals, grow rich by a mutual commerce; and all exchange is founded upon reciprocal advantages.

It is fortunate also that the effects of evil are not always evil. They often assume the contrary quality. Thus, juridical punishments applied to offences, although they produce an evil of the first order, are not generally regarded as evils, because they produce a good of the second order. They produce alarm and danger,—but for whom? Only for a class of evil-doers, who are voluntary sufferers. Let them obey the laws, and they will be exposed neither to danger nor alarm.

We should never be able to subjugate, however imperfectly, the vast empire of evil, had we not learned the method of combatting one evil by another. It has been necessary to enlist auxiliaries among pains, to oppose other pains which attack us on every side. So, in the art of curing pains of another sort, poisons well applied have proved to be remedies.

CHAPTER XII: THE LIMITS WHICH SEPARATE MORALS FROM LEGISLATION

Morality in general is the art of directing the actions of men in such a way as to produce the greatest possible sum of good.

Legislation ought to have precisely the same object.

But although these two arts, or rather sciences, have the same end they differ greatly in extent. All actions, whether public or private, fall under the jurisdiction of morals. It is a guide which leads the individual, as it were, by

the hand through all the details of his life, all his relations with his fellows. Legislation cannot do this; and, if it could, it ought not to exercise a continual interference and dictation over the conduct of men.

Morality commands each individual to do all that is advantageous to the community, his own personal advantages included. But there are many acts useful to the community which legislation ought not to command. There are also many injurious actions which it ought not to forbid, although morality does so. In a word, legislation has the same centre with morals, but it has not the same circumference.

There are two reasons for this difference: 1st. Legislation can have no direct influence upon the conduct of men, except by punishments. Now these punishments are so many evils, which are not justifiable, except so far as there results from them a greater sum of good. But, in many cases in which we might desire to strengthen a moral precept by a punishment, the evil of the punishment would be greater than the evil of the offence. The means necessary to carry the law into execution would be of a nature to spread through society a degree of alarm more injurious than the evil intended to be prevented.

2nd. Legislation is often arrested by the danger of overwhelming the innocent in seeking to punish the guilty. Whence comes this danger? From the difficulty of defining an offence, and giving a clear and precise idea of it. For example, hardheartedness, ingratitude, perfidy, and other vices which the popular sanction punishes, cannot come under the power of the law, unless they are defined as exactly as theft, homicide, or perjury.

But, the better to distinguish the true limits of morals and legislation, it will be well to refer to the common classification of moral duties.

Private morality regulates the actions of men, either in that part of their conduct in which they alone are interested, or in that which may affect the interests of others. The actions which affect a man's individual interest compose a class called, perhaps improperly, *duties to ourselves*; and the quality or disposition manifested in the accomplishment of those duties receives the name of *prudence*. That part of conduct which relates to others composes a class of actions called *duties to others*. Now there are two ways of consulting the happiness of others: the one negative, abstaining from diminishing it; the other positive, labouring to augment it. The first constitutes *probity*; the second is *beneficence*.

Morality upon these three points needs the aid of the law; but not in the same degree, nor in the same manner.

I. The rules of prudence are almost always sufficient of themselves. If a man fails in what regards his particular private interest, it is not his will which is in fault, it is his understanding. If he does wrong, it can only be through

mistake. The fear of hurting himself is a motive of repression sufficiently strong; it would be useless to add to it the fear of an artificial pain.

Does any one object, that facts show the contrary? That excesses of play, those of intemperance, the illicit intercourse between the sexes, attended so often by the greatest dangers, are enough to prove that individuals have not always sufficient prudence to abstain from what hurts them?

Confining myself to a general reply, I answer, in the first place, that, in the greater part of these cases, punishment would be so easily eluded, that it would be inefficacious; secondly, that the evil produced by the penal law would be much beyond the evil of the offence.

Suppose, for example, that a legislator should feel himself authorized to undertake the extirpation of drunkenness and fornication by direct laws. He would have to begin by a multitude of regulations. The first inconvenience would therefore be a complexity of laws. The easier it is to conceal these vices, the more necessary it would be to resort to severity of punishment, in order to destroy by the terror of examples the constantly recurring hope of impunity. This excessive rigour of laws forms a second inconvenience not less grave than the first. The difficulty of procuring proofs would be such that it would be necessary to encourage informers, and to entertain an army of spies. This necessity forms a third inconvenience, greater than either of the others. Let us compare the results of good and evil. Offences of this nature, if that name can be properly given to imprudences, produce no alarm; but the pretended remedy would spread a universal terror; innocent or guilty, every one would fear for himself or his connexions; suspicions and accusations would render society dangerous; we should fly from it; we should involve ourselves in mystery and concealment; we should shun all the disclosures of confidence. Instead of suppressing one vice, the laws would produce other vices, new and more dangerous.

It is true that example may render certain excesses contagious; and that an evil which would be almost imperceptible, if it acted only upon a small number of individuals, may become important by its extent. All that the legislator can do in reference to offences of this kind is, to submit them to some slight punishment in cases of scandalous notoriety. This will be sufficient to give them a taint of illegality, which will excite the popular sanction against them.

It is in cases of this kind that legislators have governed too much. Instead of trusting to the prudence of individuals, they have treated them like children, or slaves. They have suffered themselves to be carried away by the same passion which has influenced the founders of religious orders, who, to signalize their authority, and through a littleness of spirit, have held their subjects in

the most abject dependence, and have traced for them, day by day, and moment by moment, their occupations, their food, their rising up, their lying down, and all the petty details of their life. There are celebrated codes, in which are found a multitude of clogs of this sort; there are useless restraints upon marriage; punishments decreed against celibacy; sumptuary laws regulating the fashion of dress, the expense of festivals, the furniture of houses, and the ornaments of women; there are numberless details about aliments, permitted or forbidden; about ablutions of such or such a kind; about the purifications which health or cleanliness require; and a thousand similar puerilities, which add, to all the inconveniences of useless restraint, that of besotting the people, by covering these absurdities with a veil of mystery, to disguise their folly.

Yet more unhappy are the States in which it is attempted to maintain by penal laws a uniformity of religious opinions. The choice of their religion ought to be referred entirely to the prudence of individuals. If they are persuaded that their eternal happiness depends upon a certain form of worship or a certain belief, what can a legislator oppose to an interest so great? It is not necessary to insist upon this truth—it is generally acknowledged; but, in tracing the boundaries of legislation, I cannot forget those which it is the most important not to overstep.

As a general rule, the greatest possible latitude should be left to individuals, in all cases in which they can injure none but themselves, for they are the best judges of their own interests. If they deceive themselves, it is to be supposed that the moment they discover their error they will alter their conduct. The power of the law need interfere only to prevent them from injuring each other. It is there that restraint is necessary; it is there that the application of punishments is truly useful, because the rigour exercised upon an individual becomes in such a case the security of all.

II. It is true that there is a natural connection between prudence and probity; for our own interest, well understood, will never leave us without motives to abstain from injuring our fellows. . . .

A man enlightened as to his own interest will not indulge himself in a secret offence through fear of contracting a shameful habit, which sooner or later will betray him; and because the having secrets to conceal from the prying curiosity of mankind leaves in the heart a sediment of disquiet, which corrupts every pleasure. All he can acquire at the expense of security cannot make up for the loss of that; and, if he desires a good reputation, the best guarantee he can have for it is his own esteem.

But, in order that an individual should perceive this connection between the interests of others and his own, he needs an enlightened spirit and a heart

free from seductive passions. The greater part of men have neither sufficient light, sufficient strength of mind, nor sufficient moral sensibility to place their honesty above the aid of the laws. The legislator must supply the feebleness of this natural interest by adding to it an artificial interest, more steady and more easily perceived.

More yet. In many cases morality derives its existence from the law; that is, to decide whether the action is morally good or bad, it is necessary to know whether the laws permit or forbid it. It is so of what concerns property. A manner of selling or acquiring, esteemed dishonest in one country, would be irreproachable in another. It is the same with offences against the state. The state exists only by law, and it is impossible to say what conduct in this behalf morality requires of us before knowing what the legislator has decreed. There are countries where it is an offence to enlist into the service of a foreign power, and others in which such a service is lawful and honourable.³

III. As to beneficence some distinctions are necessary. The law may be extended to general objects, such as the care of the poor; but, for details, it is necessary to depend upon private morality. Beneficence has its mysteries, and loves best to employ itself upon evils so unforeseen or so secret that the law cannot reach them. Besides, it is to individual free-will that benevolence owes its energy. If the same acts were commanded, they would no longer be benefits, they would lose their attractions and their essence. It is morality and especially religion, which here form the necessary complement to legislation, and the sweetest tie of humanity.

However, instead of having done too much in this respect, legislators have not done enough. They ought to erect into an offence the refusal or the omission of a service to humanity when it would be easy to render it, and when some distinct ill clearly results from the refusal; such, for example, as abandoning a wounded man in a solitary road without seeking any assistance for him; not giving information to a man who is ignorantly meddling with poisons; not reaching out the hand to one who has fallen into a ditch from which he cannot extricate himself; in these, and other similar cases, could any fault be found with a punishment, exposing the delinquent to a certain degree of shame, or subjecting him to a pecuniary responsibility for the evil which he might have prevented? . . .

³ Here we touch upon one of the most difficult of questions. If the law is not what it ought to be; if it openly combats the principle of utility; ought we to obey it? Ought we to violate it? Ought we to remain neuter between the law which commands an evil, and morality which forbids it? The solution of this question involves considerations both of prudence and benevolence. We ought to examine if it is more dangerous to violate the law than to obey it; we ought to consider whether the probable evils of obedience are less or greater than the probable evils of disobedience.

CHAPTER XIII: FALSE METHODS OF REASONING ON THE SUBJECT OF LEGISLATION

It has been the object of this introduction to give a clear idea of the principle of utility, and of the method of reasoning conformable to that principle. There results from it a legislative logic, which can be summed up in a few words. What is it to offer a *good reason* with respect to a law? It is to allege the good or evil which the law tends to produce: so much good, so many arguments in its favour; so much evil, so many arguments against it; remembering all the time that good and evil are nothing else than pleasure and pain.

What is it to offer a *false reason*? It is the alleging for or against a law something else than its good or evil effects.

Nothing can be more simple, yet nothing is more new. It is not the principle of utility which is new; on the contrary, that principle is necessarily as old as the human race. All the truth there is in morality, all the good there is in the laws, emanate from it; but utility has often been followed by instinct, while it has been combatted by argument. If in books of legislation it throws out some sparks here and there, they are quickly extinguished in the surrounding smoke. BECCARIA is the only writer who deserves to be noted as an exception; yet even in his work there is some reasoning drawn from false sources.

It is upwards of two thousand years since Aristotle undertook to form, under the title of *Sophisms*, a complete catalogue of the different kinds of false reasoning. This catalogue, improved by the information which so long an interval might furnish, would here have its place and its use. But such an undertaking would carry me too far. I shall be content with presenting some heads of error on the subject of legislation. By means of such a contrast, the principle of utility will be put into a clearer light.

1. *Antiquity Is Not a Reason.* The antiquity of a law may create a prejudice in its favour; but in itself, it is not a reason. If the law in question has contributed to the public good, the older it is, the easier it will be to enumerate its good effects, and to prove its utility by a direct process.

2. *The Authority of Religion Is Not a Reason.* Of late, this method of reasoning has gone much out of fashion, but till recently its use was very extensive. The work of Algernon Sidney is full of citations from the *Old Testament*; and he finds there the foundation of a system of Democracy, as Bossuet had found the principle of absolute power. Sidney wished to combat the partisans of divine right and passive obedience with their own weapons.

If we suppose that a law emanates from the Deity, we suppose that it

emanates from supreme wisdom, and supreme bounty. Such a law, then, can only have for its object the most eminent utility; and this utility, put into a clear light, will always be an ample justification of the law.

3. *Reproach of Innovation Is Not a Reason.* To reject innovation is to reject progress; in what condition should we be, if that principle had been always followed? All which exists had had a beginning; all which is established has been innovation. Those very persons who approve a law to-day because it is ancient, would have opposed it as new when it was first introduced.

4. *An Arbitrary Definition Is Not a Reason.* Nothing is more common, among jurists and political writers, than to base their reasonings, and even to write long works, upon a foundation of purely arbitrary definitions. This artifice consists in taking a word in a particular sense, foreign from its common usage; in employing that word as no one ever employed it before; and in puzzling the reader by an appearance of profoundness and of mystery.

Montesquieu himself has fallen into this fault in the very beginning of his work. Wishing to give a definition of law, he proceeds from metaphor to metaphor; he brings together the most discordant objects—the Divinity, the material world, superior intelligences, beasts and men. We learn, at last, that *laws are relations; and eternal relations*. Thus the definition is more obscure than the thing to be defined. The word *law*, in its proper sense, excites in every mind a tolerably clear idea, the word *relation* excites no idea at all. The word *law*, in its figurative sense, produces nothing but equivocations; and Montesquieu, who ought to have dissipated the darkness has only increased it. . . .

5. *Metaphors Are Not Reasons.* I mean either metaphor properly so called, or allegory, used at first for illustration or ornament, but afterwards made the basis of an argument.

Blackstone, so great an enemy of all reform, that he has gone so far as to find fault with the introduction of the English language into the reports of cases decided by the courts, has neglected no means of inspiring his readers with the same prejudice. He represents the law as a castle, as a fortress, which cannot be altered without being weakened. I allow that he does not advance this metaphor as an argument; but why does he employ it? To gain possession of the imagination; to prejudice his readers against every idea of reform; to excite in them an artificial fear of all innovation in the laws. There remains in the mind a false image, which produces the same effect with false reasoning. He ought to have recollected that this allegory might be employed against himself. When they see the law turned into a castle, is it not natural for ruined suitors to represent it as a castle inhabited by robbers?

A man's house, say the English, is his castle. This poetical expression is

certainly no reason; for if a man's house be his castle by night, why not by day? If it is an inviolable asylum for the owner, why is it not so for every person whom he chooses to receive there? The course of justice is sometimes interrupted in England by this puerile notion of liberty. Criminals seem to be looked upon like foxes; they are suffered to have their burrows, in order to increase the sports of the chase.

A church in Catholic countries is the *House of God*. This metaphor has served to establish asylums for criminals. It would be a mark of disrespect for the Divinity to seize by force those who had taken refuge in his house.

The *balance of trade* has produced a multitude of reasonings founded upon metaphor. It has been imagined that in the course of mutual commerce nations rose and sank like the scales of a balance loaded with unequal weights; people have been terribly alarmed at what appeared to them a want of equilibrium; for it has been supposed that what one nation gained the other must lose, as if a weight had been transferred from one scale to the other.

The word *mother-country* has produced a great number of prejudices and false reasonings in all questions concerning colonies and the parent state. Duties have been imposed upon colonies, and they have been accused of offences, founded solely upon the metaphor of their filial dependence.

6. *A Fiction Is Not a Reason*. I understand by fiction an assumed fact notoriously false, upon which one reasons as if it were true. . . .

Blackstone, in the seventh chapter of his first book, in speaking of the royal authority, has given himself up to all the puerility of fiction. The king, he tells us, is everywhere present; he can do no wrong; he is immortal.

These ridiculous paradoxes, the fruits of servility, so far from furnishing just ideas of the prerogatives of royalty, only serve to dazzle, to mislead, and to give to reality itself an air of fable and of prodigy. . . .

But there are fictions more bold and more important, which have played a great part in politics, and which have produced celebrated works: these are *contracts*.

The *Leviathan* of Hobbes, a work now-a-days but little known, and detested through prejudice and at second-hand as a defence of despotism, is an attempt to base all political society upon a pretended contract between the people and the sovereign. The people by this contract have renounced their natural liberty, which produced nothing but evil; and have deposited all power in the hands of the prince. All opposing wills have been united in his, or rather annihilated by it. That which he *wills* is taken to be the will of all his subjects. . . .

Locke, whose name is as dear to the friends of liberty as that of Hobbes is odious, has also fixed the basis of government upon a contract. He agrees that

there is a contract between the prince and the people; but according to him the prince takes an engagement to govern according to the laws, and for the public good; while the people, on their side, take an engagement of obedience so long as the prince remains faithful to the conditions in virtue of which he receives the crown.

Rousseau rejects with indignation the idea of this bilateral contract between the prince and the people. He has imagined a *social contract*, by which all are bound to all, and which is the only legitimate basis of government. Society exists only by virtue of this free convention of associates.

These three systems—so directly opposed—agree, however, in beginning the theory of politics with a fiction, for these three contracts are equally fictitious. They exist only in the imagination of their authors. Not only we find no trace of them in history, but everywhere we discover proofs to the contrary. . . .

It is not necessary to make the happiness of the human race dependent on a fiction. It is not necessary to erect the social pyramid upon a foundation of sand, or upon a clay which slips from beneath it. Let us leave such trifling to children; men ought to speak the language of truth and reason.

The true political tie is the immense interest which men have in maintaining a government. Without a government there can be no security, no domestic enjoyments, no property, no industry. It is in this fact that we ought to seek the basis and the reason of all governments, whatever may be their origin and their form; it is by comparing them with their object that we can reason with solidity upon their rights and their obligations, without having recourse to pretended contracts which can only serve to produce interminable disputes.

7. *Fancy Is Not a Reason.* Nothing is more common than to say, *reason decides, eternal reason orders, etc.* But what is this reason? If it is not a distinct view of good or evil, it is mere fancy; it is a despotism, which announces nothing but the interior persuasion of him who speaks. Let us see upon what foundation a distinguished jurist has sought to establish the paternal authority. A man of ordinary good sense would not see much difficulty in that question; but your learned men find a mystery everywhere.

"The right of a father over his children," says Coccejii, "is founded in reason;—for, 1st, Children are born in a house, of which the father is the master; 2nd, They are born in a family of which he is the chief; 3rd, They are of his seed, and a part of his body." These are the reasons from which he concludes, among other things, that a man of forty ought not to marry without the consent of a father, who in the course of nature must by that time be in his dotage. What there is common to these three reasons is, that none of them has any relation to the interests of the parties. The author consults neither the welfare of father nor that of the children.

The right of a father is an improper phrase. The question is not of an unlimited, nor of an indivisible right. There are many kinds of rights which may be granted or refused to a father, each for particular reasons. . . .

And here we may remark an essential difference between false principles and the true one. The principle of utility, applying itself only to the interests of the parties, bends to circumstances, and accommodates itself to every case. False principles, being founded upon things which have nothing to do with individual interests, would be inflexible if they were consistent. Such is the character of this pretended right founded upon birth. The son naturally belongs to the father, because the matter of which the son is formed once circulated in the father's veins. No matter how unhappy he renders his son;—it is impossible to annihilate his right, because we cannot make his son cease to be his son. The corn of which your body is made formerly grew in my field; how is it that you are not my slave?

8. *Antipathy and Sympathy Are Not Reasons.* Reasoning by antipathy is most common upon subjects connected with penal law; for we have antipathies against actions reputed to be crimes; antipathies against individuals reputed to be criminals; antipathies against the ministers of justice; antipathies against such and such punishments. This false principle has reigned like a tyrant throughout this vast province of law. Beccaria first dared openly to attack it. His arms were of celestial temper; but if he did much towards destroying the usurper, he did very little towards the establishment of a new and more equitable rule.

It is the principle of antipathy which leads us to speak of offences as *deserving* punishment. It is the corresponding principle of sympathy which leads us to speak of certain actions as *meriting* reward. This word *merit* can only lead to passion and to error. It is *effects*, good or bad, which we ought alone to consider.

But when I say that *antipathies and sympathies are no reason*, I mean those of the legislator; for the antipathies and sympathies of the people may be reasons, and very powerful ones. However odd or pernicious a religion, a law, a custom may be, it is of no consequence, so long as the people are attached to it. To take away an enjoyment or a hope, chimerical though it may be, is to do the same injury as if we took away a real hope, a real enjoyment. In such a case the pain of a single individual becomes, by sympathy, the pain of all. . . .

But ought the legislator to be a slave to the fancies of those whom he governs? No. Between an imprudent opposition and a servile compliance there is a middle path, honourable and safe. It is to combat these fancies with the only arms that can conquer them—example and instruction. He must enlighten

the people, he must address himself to the public reason; he must give time for error to be unmasked. Sound reasons, clearly set forth, are of necessity stronger than false ones. But the legislator ought not to show himself too openly in these instructions, for fear of compromising himself with the public ignorance. Indirect means will better answer his end.

It is to be observed, however, that too much deference for prejudices is a more common fault than the contrary excess. The best projects of laws are for ever stumbling against this common objection—"Prejudice is opposed to it; the people will be offended!" But how is that known? How has public opinion been consulted? What is its organ? Have the whole people but one uniform notion on the subject? Have all the individuals of the community the same sentiments, including perhaps nine out of ten, who never heard the subject spoken of? Besides, if the people are in error, are they compelled always to remain so? Will not an influx of light dissipate the darkness which produces error? Can we expect the people to possess sound knowledge, while it is yet unattained by their legislators, by those who are regarded as the wise men of the land? Have there not been examples of other nations who have come out of a similar ignorance, and where triumphs have been achieved over the same obstacles?

After all, popular prejudice serves oftener as a pretext than as a motive. It is a convenient cover for the weakness of statesmen. The ignorance of the people is the favourite argument of pusillanimity and of indolence; while the real motives are prejudices from which the legislators themselves have not been able to get free. The name of the people is falsely used to justify their leaders.

9. *Begging the Question Is Not a Reason.* The *petitio principii*, or begging the question, is one of the sophisms which is noted by Aristotle; but it is a Proteus which conceals itself artfully, and is reproduced under a thousand forms.

Begging the question, or rather assuming the question, consists in making use of the very proposition in dispute, as though it were already proved.

This false procedure insinuates itself into morals and legislation, under the disguise of *sentimental* or *impassioned* terms; that is, terms which, beside their principal sense, carry with them an accessory idea of praise or blame. *Neuter* terms are those which simply express the thing in question, without any attending presumption of good or evil; without introducing any foreign idea of blame or approbation.

Now it is to be observed that an impassioned term envelops a proposition not expressed, but understood, which always accompanies its employment, though in general unperceived by those who employ it. This concealed proposi-

tion implies either blame or praise; but the implication is always vague and undetermined.

Do I desire to connect an idea of utility with a term which commonly conveys an accessory idea of blame? I shall seem to advance a paradox, and to contradict myself. For example, should I say that such a piece of *luxury* is a good thing? The proposition astonishes those who are accustomed to attach to this word *luxury* a sentiment of disapprobation.

How shall I be able to examine this particular point without awakening a dangerous association? I must have recourse to a neuter word; I must say, for example, *such a manner of spending one's revenue* is good. This turn of expression runs counter to no prejudice, and permits an impartial examination of the object in question. When Helvetius advanced the idea that all actions have *interest* for their motive, the public cried out against his doctrine without stopping to understand it. Why? Because the word *interest* has an odious sense; a common acceptance, in which it seems to exclude every motive of pure attachment and of benevolence.

How many reasonings upon political subjects are founded upon nothing but impassioned terms! People suppose they are giving a reason for a law, when they say that it is conformable to the principles of monarchy or of democracy. But that means nothing. If there are persons in whose minds these words are associated with an idea of approbation, there are others who attach contrary ideas to them. Let these two parties begin to quarrel, the dispute will never come to an end, except through the weariness of the combatants. For, before beginning a true examination, we must renounce these impassioned terms, and calculate the effects of the proposed law in good and evil. . . .

If we attempt a theory upon the subject of *national representation*, in following out all that appears to be a natural consequence of that abstract idea, we come at last to the conclusion that *universal suffrage* ought to be established; and to the additional conclusion that the representatives ought to be re-chosen as frequently as possible, in order that the national representation may deserve to be esteemed such.

In deciding these same questions according to the principle of utility, it will not do to reason upon words; we must look only at effects. In the election of a legislative assembly, the right of suffrage should not be allowed except to those who are esteemed by the nation fit to exercise it; for a choice made by men who do not possess the national confidence will weaken the confidence of the nation in the assembly so chosen.

Men who would be thought fit to be electors, are those who cannot be presumed to possess political integrity, and a sufficient degree of knowledge. Now we cannot presume upon the political integrity of those whom want

exposes to the temptation of selling themselves; nor of those who have no fixed abode; nor of those who have been found guilty in the courts of justice of certain offences forbidden by the law. We cannot presume a sufficient degree of knowledge in women, whom their domestic condition withdraws from the conduct of public affairs; in children and adults beneath a certain age; in those who are deprived by their poverty of the first elements of education, etc. etc.

It is according to these principles, and others like them, that we ought to fix the conditions necessary for becoming an elector; and it is in like manner, upon the advantages and disadvantages of frequent elections, without paying any attention to arguments drawn from abstract terms, that we ought to reason in establishing the duration of a legislative assembly. . . .

10. *An Imaginary Law Is Not a Reason.* *Natural law, natural rights* are two kinds of fictions or metaphors, which play so great a part in books of legislation that they deserve to be examined by themselves.

The primitive sense of the word *law*, and the ordinary meaning of the word, is—the will or command of a legislator. The *law of nature* is a figurative expression, in which nature is represented as a being; and such and such a disposition is attributed to her, which is figuratively called a law. In this sense, all the general inclinations of men, all those which appear to exist independently of human societies, and from which must proceed the establishment of political and civil law, are called *laws of nature*. This is the true sense of the phrase.

But this is not the way in which it is understood. Authors have taken it in a direct sense; as if there had been a real code of natural laws. They appeal to these laws; they cite them, and they oppose them, clause by clause, to the enactments of legislators. They do not see that these natural laws are laws of their own invention; that they are all at odds among themselves as to the contents of this pretended code; that they affirm without proof; that systems are as numerous as authors; and that, in reasoning in this manner, it is necessary to be always beginning anew, because every one can advance what he pleases touching laws which are only imaginary, and so keep on disputing for ever.

What is natural to man is sentiments of pleasure or pain, what are called inclinations. But to call these sentiments and these inclinations *laws*, is to introduce a false and dangerous idea. It is to set language in opposition to itself; for it is necessary to make *laws* precisely for the purpose of restraining these inclinations. Instead of regarding them as laws, they must be submitted to laws. It is against the strongest natural inclinations that it is necessary to have laws the most repressive. If there were a law of nature which directed all men towards their common good, laws would be useless; it would be employing a

creeper to uphold an oak; it would be kindling a torch to add light to the sun. . . .

The word *rights*, the same as the word *law*, has two senses; the one a proper sense, the other a metaphorical sense. *Rights*, properly so called, are the creatures of *law* properly so called; real laws give birth to real rights. *Natural rights* are the creatures of natural law; they are a metaphor which derives its origin from another metaphor.

What there is natural in man is means,—faculties. But to call these means, these faculties, *natural rights*, is again to put language in opposition to itself. For *rights* are established to insure the exercise of means and faculties. The right is the *guarantee*; the faculty is the thing guaranteed. How can we understand each other with a language which confounds under the same term things so different? Where would be the nomenclature of the arts, if we gave to the *mechanic* who makes an article the same name as to the article itself?

Real rights are always spoken of in a legal sense; natural rights are often spoken of in a sense that may be called anti-legal. When it is said, for example, that *law cannot avail against natural rights*, the word rights is employed in a sense above the law; for, in this use of it, we acknowledge rights which attack the law; which overturn it, which annul it. In this anti-legal sense, the word *right* is the greatest enemy of reason, and the most terrible destroyer of governments.

There is no reasoning with fanatics, armed with *natural rights*, which each one understands as he pleases, and applies as he sees fit; of which nothing can be yielded, nor retrenched; which are inflexible, at the same time that they are unintelligible; which are consecrated as dogmas, from which it is a crime to vary. Instead of examining laws by their effects, instead of judging them as good or bad, they consider them in relation to these pretended natural rights; that is to say, they substitute for the reasoning of experience the chimeras of their own imaginations. . . .

Is not this arming every fanatic against all governments? In the immense variety of ideas respecting natural and Divine law, cannot some reason be found for resisting all human laws? Is there a single state which can maintain itself a day, if each individual holds himself bound in conscience to resist the laws, whenever they are not conformed to his particular ideas of natural or Divine law? What a cut-throat scene of it we should have between all the interpreters of the code of nature, and all the interpreters of the law of God!

"The pursuit of happiness is a natural right." The pursuit of happiness is certainly a natural inclination; but can it be declared to be a right? That depends on the way in which it is pursued. The assassin pursues his happiness, or what he esteems such, by committing an assassination. Has he a right to

do so? If not, why declare that he has? What tendency is there in such a declaration to render men more happy or more wise? . . .

I propose a treaty of conciliation with the partisans of natural rights. If *nature* has made such or such a law, those who cite it with so much confidence, those who have modestly taken upon themselves to be its interpreters, must suppose that nature had some reasons for her law. Would it not be surer, shorter and more persuasive, to give us those reasons directly, instead of urging upon us the will of this unknown legislator, as itself an authority? . . .

All these false methods of reasoning can always be reduced to one or the other of the two false principles. This fundamental distinction is very useful in getting rid of words, and rendering ideas more clear. To refer such or such an argument to one or another of the false principles, is like tying weeds into bundles, to be thrown into the fire.

I conclude with a general observation. The language of error is always obscure and indefinite. An abundance of words serves to cover a paucity and a falsity of ideas. The oftener terms are changed, the easier it is to delude the reader. The language of truth is uniform and simple. The same ideas are always expressed by the same terms. Everything is referred to pleasures or to pains. Every expression is avoided which tends to disguise or intercept the familiar idea, that *from such and such actions result such and such pleasures and pains*. Trust not to me, but to experience, and especially your own. *Of two opposite methods of action, do you desire to know which should have the preference? Calculate their effects in good and evil, and prefer that which promises the greater sum of good.*

ROBERT OWEN

UNTIL 1815 ROBERT OWEN (1771-1858) was known as "Mr. Owen the Philanthropist," the benevolently disposed manager of a factory in New Lanarck, Scotland, who had been more than expectably successful in making philanthropy pay. He had published in 1813 a book entitled *A New View of Society; or, Essays on the Formation of Character*. Like many other manufacturers, Owen was aware of the responsibility involved in organizing industrial communities for an uprooted rural population; and he seemed only more than ordinarily sensitive to the dislocations implicit in the mushroom growth of towns organized around the factory. The critical years following 1815, however, brought Owen into widespread public notice as the advocate of a "plan of amelioration and reform without revolution." The "nation of shopkeepers" had won the war against Napoleon principally through economic means, and the peace found them with an overexpanded industrial machine and without the excuse for working-class conditions which the war had presented. In addition, the functioning of the Speenhamland system of subsidies and the pressure of the factory system for more child labor had contributed to making the Malthusian prophecy seem close to fulfillment. In this emergency Owen proposed that a capital sum be set aside by the government for the founding of so-called "Villages of Co-operation"—his own New Lanarck was a model—organized around scientific agriculture and based on the principles of "co-operation" and "united labor." The Tory government, not unmindful of the actual distress of the poorer classes and not unnaturally pleased at the prospect of a manufacturer criticizing his fellows, exhibited some degree of interest in Owen's proposals when they were first initiated, but the rising manifestations of discontent in the years leading up to 1820 brought about a stiffer policy, in which plans for reform took second place to such repressive measures as the Six Acts.

Owen's most thoughtful and comprehensive work, the *Report to the County of Lanarck* (1821), part of which is given as the first selection which follows, marks his transition from reformer to advocate of a system of communities founded upon the openly socialist principles of united labor and expenditure, common property, and equality of privilege, which would in a short space of time supersede the existing system of production and distribution. He proposed a revolution in the fundamental standard of value of his society, the substitution of industriousness for gold, so that production for wealth—not the perilous system of "buying cheap and selling dear"—would become the main business of society.

Between 1824 and 1829 Owen attempted to put his plan of a largely self-sufficient community of cooperating producers into practice in the village of New Harmony, which he set up in Indiana, in the United States. Internal dissension wrecked the scheme, however, and he returned to England convinced that "the habits of the individual system were so powerful" that a communal effort for the general good was impracticable without previous moral training.

After his return to England, Owen took up the struggle for his plan through

direct participation in the incipient working-class movement. Although his one direct appeal to the workers (*Address to the Working Classes*, 1819) was an attempt to dissuade them from independent class action, he found that the young trade unions had set up a number of cooperatives on the Owenite model and that his objections to competitive and acquisitive society on the grounds that it exploited the true producers articulated the discontent of large numbers who were growing increasingly conscious of their distinctive class allegiance. Especially after the Reform Bill of 1832 had disillusioned many who had put their faith in political action, Owen, who had never shared this faith, became the acknowledged leader of a movement arrayed against both the traditional governing class of Great Britain and the relatively younger manufacturing interest. In 1832 Owen headed the National Equitable Labour Exchange, the central market for the various cooperative groups founded by the trade unions. In 1833 he was behind the attempt of the Builders' Union to take over direct control of the building industry through the Grand National Guild of Builders, and he formed the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union, an association seeking to bring about a revolutionary change in the industrial system by the threat of a general strike by all producers. By 1834, however, the movement had collapsed under the direct attack of the newly entrenched industrial interests.

Owen had little faith that political measures were adequate to a crisis which was fundamentally economic and cultural. Throughout his life he emphasized that not even thoroughgoing economic change is stable unless it is founded upon a previous revolution in the character, especially the moral character, of the community involved in it. His educational proposals, however, envisaged education, not as an attempt to cut all men to a single pattern, but as an attempt to impart to a community a common bent toward moral cooperation on the basis of which individual qualities might be fostered.

Owen's thought was similar in a number of ways to that of other philosophers of his time. His notions on education are somewhat reminiscent of those in Rousseau's *Emile*. He resembled Godwin in his demand that labor be compensated in proportion to its role as the sole creator of value and in his distrust of centralized government. And he shared the faith of such continental Utopians as the Saint-Simonians in men of good will as the makers of the new moral world; his paternalistic attitude was like that of Fourier, who spent every noon hour for twelve years waiting for philanthropists to call on him and finance his scheme.

On the whole, it was probably the representatives of the landed gentry who were most sympathetic to Owen's proposals, and these he alienated in 1817 by an attack upon established religion which seemed to be a subversion of the entire structure of Church and State. For the most part he met with unmitigated opposition. The political economists could not accept his attack upon the Malthusian principle. The middle-class radicals traced the prevailing economic distress to the high rate of taxation, in opposition to his unorthodox view that the rise of machine production was responsible. And such working-class radicals as William Cobbett referred to Owen contemptuously.

Owen's disinclination for political agitation removed him from the mainstream of the workers' movement, and after the collapse of his Trades Union, in 1834, the energies of that movement were directed into such political channels as

Chartism. In addition, Owen's antidemocratic propensities alienated many who might otherwise have followed his lead. William Lovett, the Chartist leader, reports a remark by Owen to the effect that his followers "must consent to be ruled by despots till they have acquired sufficient knowledge to govern themselves."

Despite this practical failure, Owen made a number of significant contributions. He was active in the rise of British trade unionism as an independent force. His educational reforms are still influential. He is credited with being the first to use the word "socialism," and his plan for independent socialist communities based upon the principle of voluntary association does not seem today as "utopian" as it then did, for modern apartment houses, workers' communities, and regional planning embody many of the features for which he contended.

The second selection which follows is from a prospectus to *The Economist*, a weekly paper devoted to the propagation of Owen's views. It first appeared on January 27, 1821, and was discontinued in January, 1822, written by its editor, George Mudie, a confirmed and passionate Owenite. It promised to dedicate itself "to the development of principles calculated assuredly to banish poverty from society, and to the discussion of all questions connected with the amelioration of the condition of mankind." Mudie's views, as projected in *The Economist*, inspired the printers of London to establish a plan for a cooperative community, under the name of the "Economical and Cooperative Society." Lack of sufficient funds compelled the Society to abandon its efforts.



REPORT TO THE COUNTY OF LANARCK

THE EVIL for which your Reporter has been required to provide a remedy, is the general want of employment, at wages sufficient to support the family of a working man beneficially for the community. After the most earnest consideration of the subject, he has been compelled to conclude, that such employment cannot be procured through the medium of trade, commerce, or manufactures, or even of agriculture, until the Government and the Legislature, cordially supported by the country, shall previously adopt measures to remove obstacles, which, without their interference, will now permanently keep the working classes in poverty and discontent, and gradually deteriorate all the resources of the empire. . . .

Your Reporter has been impressed with the truth of this conclusion, by the following considerations:—

1st, That manual labour, properly directed, is the source of all wealth, and of national prosperity.

2nd, That, when properly directed, labour is of far more value to the community than the expense necessary to maintain the labourer in considerable comfort.

3d, That manual labour, properly directed, may be made to continue of this value in all parts of the world, under any supposable increase of its population, for many centuries to come.

4th, That, under a proper direction of manual labour, Great Britain and its dependencies may be made to support an incalculable increase of population, most advantageously for all its inhabitants.

5th, That, when manual labour shall be so directed, it will be found that population cannot for many years, be stimulated to advance, as rapidly as society might be benefited by its increase.

These considerations, deduced from the first and most obvious principles of the science of political economy, convinced your Reporter, that some formidable artificial obstacle intervened to obstruct the natural improvement and progress of society. . . .

It is admitted that, under the present system, no more hands can be employed advantageously in agriculture or manufactures; and that both interests are on the eve of bankruptcy. It is also admitted, that the prosperity of the country, or rather that which ought to create prosperity, the improvement in mechanical and chemical science, has enabled the population to produce more than the present system permits to be consumed. In consequence, new arrangements become necessary, by which *consumption* may be made to keep pace with *production*; and the following are recommended:

1st, To cultivate the soil with the spade instead of the plough.

2nd, To make such changes as the spade cultivation requires, to render it easy and profitable to individuals, and beneficial to the country.

3d, To adopt a standard of value, by means of which, the exchange of the products of labour may proceed without check or limit, until wealth shall become so abundant, that any further increase to it will be considered useless, and will not be desired.

We proceed to give the reasons for recommending these arrangements in preference to all others. And first, those for preferring the spade to the plough for the universal cultivation of the soil. . . .

The action of the plough upon the soil is the reverse of that of the spade, in these important particulars:

Instead of *loosening* the subsoil, it *hardens* it; the heavy smooth surface of the plough, and the frequent trampling of the horses' feet, tend to form a surface on the subsoil, well calculated to prevent the water from penetrating below it; and in many soils, after a few years ploughing, it is there retained to drown the seed or plant in rainy seasons, and to be speedily evaporated when it would be the most desirable to retain it. Thus the crop is injured, and often

destroyed, in dry weather, for the want of that moisture, which, under a different system, might have been retained in the subsoil.

It is evident, therefore, that the plough conceals from the eye its own imperfections, and deceives its employers, being in truth, a *mere surface implement*, and extremely defective in principle; that the spade, on the contrary, makes a good subsoil, as well as a superior surface, and the longer it is used on the same soil, the more easily will it be worked; and by occasional trenching, where there is sufficient depth of soil, new earth will be brought into action, and the benefits to be derived from a well prepared subsoil will be increased.

These facts being incontrovertible, few perhaps will hesitate to admit them. But it may be said, that admitting the statement to be true to the full extent, yet the plough, with a pair of horses and one man, performs so much work in a given time, that, with all its imperfections, it may be a more economical instrument for the purpose required. Such has been the almost universal impression for ages past, and, in consequence, the plough has superseded the spade, and is considered to be an improved machine for ordinary cultivation.

All this is plausible, and is sanctioned by the old prejudices of the world; but your Reporter maintains, that it is not true that the plough is, or has ever been, in any stage of society, the most economical instrument for the cultivation of the soil. It has been so in appearance only, not in reality. . . .

Agriculture, instead of being, as heretofore, the occupation of the mere peasant and farmer, with minds as defective in their cultivation as their soils, will then become the delightful employment of a race of men, trained in the best habits and dispositions; familiar with the most useful practice in the arts and sciences; and with minds fraught with the most valuable information, and extensive general knowledge,—capable of forming and conducting combined arrangements in agriculture, trade, commerce, and manufactures, far superior to those which have yet existed in any of these departments, as they have been hitherto disjoined, and separately conducted. It will be readily perceived, that this is an advance in civilization and general improvement, that is to be effected solely *through the science of the influence of circumstances over human nature, and the knowledge of the means by which those circumstances may be easily controlled.*

Closet theorists, and inexperienced persons, suppose, that to exchange the plough for the spade, would be to turn back in the road of improvement,—to give up a superior for an inferior implement of cultivation. Little do they imagine, that the introduction of the spade, with the scientific arrangements which it requires, will produce far greater improvements in agriculture, than

the steam engine has effected in manufactures. Still less do they imagine, that the change from the plough to the spade, will prove to be a far more extensive and beneficial innovation, than that which the invention of the spinning machine has occasioned, by the introduction of which, instead of the single wheel in a corner of a farm house, we now see thousands of spindles, revolving with the noise of a water-fall, in buildings palace-like for their cost, magnitude, and appearance.

Yet this extraordinary change is at hand. It will immediately take place; for the interest and well-being of all classes require it. Society cannot longer proceed another step in advance without it, and until it is adopted, civilization must retrograde, and the working classes starve for want of employment.

The introduction of the steam engine, and the spinning machine, added, in an extraordinary manner, to the powers of human nature. In their consequences they have, in half a century, multiplied the productive power, or the means of creating wealth, among the population of these islands, more than 12 fold, besides giving a great increase to the means of creating wealth in other countries.

The steam engine and spinning machines, with the endless mechanical inventions to which they have given rise, have, however, inflicted evils on society, which now greatly overbalance the benefits which are derived from them. They have created an aggregate of wealth, and placed it in the hands of a few, who, by its aid, continue to absorb the wealth produced by the industry of the many. Thus the mass of the population are become mere slaves to the ignorance and caprice of these monopolists, and are far more truly helpless and wretched than they were before the names of WATT and ARKWRIGHT were known. Yet these celebrated and ingenious men have been the instruments of preparing society for the important beneficial changes which are about to occur.

All now know and feel, that the good which these inventions are calculated to impart to the community, has not yet been realized. The condition of society, instead of being improved, has been deteriorated, under the new circumstances to which they have given birth; and is now experiencing a retrograde movement.

"Something," therefore, "must be done," as the general voice exclaims, to give to our suffering population, and to society at large, the means of deriving from these inventions the advantages which all men of science expect from them.

In recommending the change from the plough to the spade cultivation, your Reporter has in view such scientific arrangements, as, he is persuaded, will, upon due examination, convince every intelligent mind, that they offer

the only means by which Great Britain can be enabled to maintain in future her rank among nations. They are the only effectual remedy for the evils which the steam engine and the spinning machine have, by their misdirection, created, and are alone capable of giving a real and substantial value to these and other late scientific inventions. Of all our splendid improvements in art and science, the effect has hitherto been, to demoralize society, through the misapplication of the new wealth created. The arrangements to which your Reporter now calls the attention of the Public, present the certain means of renovating the moral character, and of improving, to an unlimited extent, the general condition of the population, and while they lead to a far more rapid multiplication of wealth than the present system permits to take place, they will effectually preclude all the evils with which wealth is now accompanied.

It is estimated, that, in Great Britain and Ireland, there are now under cultivation upwards of 60 millions of acres; and of these, 20 millions are arable, and 40 millions in pasture;—that, under the present system of cultivation by the plough, and of pasturing, about 2 millions at most of *actual labourers* are employed on the soil, giving immediate support to about three times that number, and supplying food for a population of about 18 millions. Sixty millions of acres, under a judicious arrangement of spade cultivation, with manufactures as an appendage, might be made to give healthy advantageous employment to 60 millions of labourers at the least, and support, in high comfort, a population greatly exceeding 100 millions. But, in the present low state of population in these islands, not more than 5 or 6 millions of acres could be properly cultivated by the spade, although all the operative manufacturers were to be chiefly in this mode of agriculture. Imperfect, therefore, as the plough is for the cultivation of the soil, it is probable, that, in this country, for want of an adequate population, many centuries will elapse before it can be entirely superseded by the spade; yet, under the plough system, Great Britain and Ireland are even now supposed to be greatly overpeopled.

It follows from this statement, that we possess the means of supplying the labouring poor, however numerous they may be, with permanent beneficial employment for many centuries to come. . . .

Having given the outline of the considerations, which show the superiority in principle of the spade over the plough, as a scientific and economical instrument of cultivation; having also described, briefly, the objects to be attended to in forming economical arrangements for the change proposed;—it now remains that the principle should be generally explained by which an advantageous interchange and exchange may be made of the greatly in-

creased products of labour, which will be created by the spade cultivation, aided by the improved arrangements now contemplated.

These incalculably increased products will render gold, the old artificial standard of value, far more unfit for the task which is to be performed than it was in 1797, when it ceased to be the British legal standard of value, or than it is now, when wealth has so much increased.

Your Reporter is of opinion, that the natural standard of human labour, fixed to represent its natural worth, or power of creating new wealth, will alone be found adequate to the purposes required.

To a mind coming first to this subject, innumerable and apparently insurmountable difficulties will occur; but by the steady application of that fixed and persevering attention, which is alone calculated successfully to contend against and overcome difficulties, every obstacle will vanish, and the practice will prove simple and easy.

That which can create new wealth, is of course worth the wealth which it creates. Human labour, whenever common justice shall be done to human beings, can now be applied to produce, advantageously for all ranks in society, many times the amount of wealth that is necessary to support the individual in considerable comfort. Of this new wealth so created, the labourer who produces it is justly entitled to his fair proportion; and the best interests of every community require that the producer should have a fair and fixed proportion of all the wealth which he creates. This can be assigned to him on no other principle, than by forming arrangements by which the *natural* standard of value shall become the *practical* standard of value. To make labour the standard of value, it is necessary to ascertain the amount of it in all articles to be bought and sold. This is, in fact, already accomplished, and is denoted, by what in commerce is technically termed, "the prime cost," or the net value of the whole labour contained in any article of value,—the material contained in, or consumed by, the manufacture of the article, forming a part of the whole labour.

The great object of society is, to obtain wealth, and to enjoy it.

The genuine principle of barter was, to exchange the supposed prime cost of, or value of labour, in one article, against the prime cost of, or amount of labour contained in any other article. This is the only equitable principle of exchange; but, as inventions increased, and human desires multiplied, it was found to be inconvenient in practice. Barter was succeeded by commerce, the principle of which is, to produce or procure every article at the lowest, and to obtain for it in exchange, the *highest* amount of labour. To effect this, an artificial standard of value was necessary; and the metals were, by common consent among nations, permitted to perform the office. This

principle, in the progress of its operation, has been productive of important advantages, and of very great evils; but, like barter, it has been suited to a certain stage of society. It has stimulated invention; it has given industry and talent to the human character, and secured the future exertion of those energies which otherwise might have remained dormant and unknown. But it has made man ignorantly, individually selfish; placed him in opposition to his fellows; engendered fraud and deceit; blindly urged him forward to create, but deprived him of the wisdom to enjoy. In striving to take advantage of others, he has overreached himself. The strong hand of necessity will now force him into the path which conducts to that wisdom in which he has been so long deficient. He will discover the advantages to be derived from uniting in practice the best parts of the principles of barter and commerce, and dismissing those which experience has proved to be inconvenient and injurious. This substantial improvement in the progress of society, may be easily effected by exchanging all articles with each other at their prime cost, or with reference to the amount of labour in each, which can be equitably ascertained, and by permitting the exchange to be made through a convenient medium, to represent this value, and which will thus represent a real and unchanging value, and be issued only as substantial wealth increases. The profit of production will arise, in all cases, from the value of the labour contained in the article produced, and it will be for the interest of society that this profit should be most ample. Its exact amount will depend upon what, by strict examination, shall be proved to be the present real value of a day's labour; calculated with reference to the amount of wealth, in the necessities and comforts of life, which an average labourer may, by temperate exertions, be now made to produce. . . .

It has been, and still is, a received opinion among theorists in political economy, that man can provide better for himself, and more advantageously for the public, when left to his own individual exertions, opposed to, and in competition with his fellows, than when aided by any social arrangement, which shall unite his interests individually and generally with society. This principle of individual interest, opposed, as it is perpetually, to the public good, is considered, by the most celebrated political economists, to be the corner stone of the social system, and without which, society could not subsist. Yet when they shall know themselves, and discover the wonderful effects, which combination and unity can produce, they will acknowledge that the present arrangement of society is the most antisocial, impolitic, and irrational, that can be devised; that under its influence, all the superior and valuable qualities of human nature are repressed from infancy, and that the most unnatural means are used to bring out the most injurious propensities;

in short, that the utmost pains are taken to make that which by nature is the most delightful compound for producing excellence and happiness, absurd, imbecile, and wretched. Such is the conduct now pursued by those who are called the best and wisest of the present generation, although there is not one rational object to be gained by it. From this principle of individual interest have arisen all the divisions of mankind, the endless errors and mischiefs of class, sect, party, and of national antipathies, creating the angry and malevolent passions, and all the crimes and misery with which the human race has been hitherto afflicted. In short, if there be one closet doctrine more contrary to truth than another, it is the notion that individual interest, as the term is now understood, is a more advantageous principle on which to found the social system, for the benefit of all, or of any, than the principle of union and mutual cooperation. The former acts like an immense weight to repress the most valuable faculties and dispositions, and to give a wrong direction to all the human powers. It is one of those magnificent errors (if the expression may be allowed) that when enforced in practice, brings ten thousand evils in its train. The principle on which these economists proceed, instead of adding to the wealth of nations or of individuals, is itself the sole cause of poverty; and but for its operation, wealth would long ago have ceased to be a subject of contention in any part of the world. If, it may be asked, experience has proved that union, combination, and extensive arrangement among mankind, are a thousand times more powerful to *destroy*, than the efforts of an unconnected multitude, where each acts individually for himself,—would not a similar increased effect be produced by union, combination, and extensive arrangement, to *create and conserve*? Why should not the result be the same in the one case as in the other? But it is well known that a combination of men and of interests, can effect that which it would be futile to attempt, and impossible to accomplish, by individual exertions and separate interests. Then why, it may be inquired, have men so long acted individually, and in opposition to each other?

This is an important question, and merits the most serious attention.

Men have not yet been trained in principles that will permit them to *act in unison*, except to defend themselves or to destroy others. For self-preservation, they were early compelled to unite for these purposes in war. A necessity, however, equally powerful will now compel men to be trained to act together, to *create and conserve*, that in like manner they may preserve life in peace. Fortunately for mankind, the system of individual opposing interests, has now reached the extreme point of error and inconsistency;—in the midst of the most ample means to create wealth, all are in

poverty, or in imminent danger, from the effects of poverty upon others.

The reflecting part of mankind, have admitted in theory, that the characters of men are formed chiefly by the circumstances in which they are placed; yet the science of the influence of circumstances, which is the most important of all the sciences, remains unknown for the great practical business of life. When it shall be fully developed, it will be discovered, that to unite the mental faculties of men, for the attainment of pacific and civil objects, will be a far more easy task than it has been to combine their physical powers to carry on extensive warlike operations.

The discovery of the distance and movements of the heavenly bodies; of the time-pieces; of a vessel to navigate the most distant parts of the ocean; of the steam engine, which performs, under the easy control of one man, the labour of many thousands; and of the press, by which knowledge and improvements may be speedily given to the most ignorant, in all parts of the earth;—these have, indeed, been discoveries of high import to mankind; but important as these and others have been in their effects, on the condition of human society, their combined benefits in practice, will fall far short of those which will be speedily attained by the new intellectual power, which men will acquire through the knowledge of “the science of the influence of circumstances over the whole conduct, character, and proceedings of the human race.” By this latter discovery, more shall be accomplished in one year, for the well-being of human nature, including, without any exceptions, all ranks and descriptions of men, than has ever yet been effected in one or in many centuries. Strange as this language may seem to those whose minds have not yet had a glimpse of the real state in which society now is, it will prove to be not more strange than true.

Are not the mental energies of the world at this moment in a state of high effervescence. Is not society at a stand, incompetent to proceed in its present course, and do not all men cry out that “something must be done?” That “something,” to produce the effect desired, must be a complete renovation of the whole social compact; one not forced on prematurely, by confusion and violence; not one to be brought about by the futile measures of the Radicals, Whigs, or Tories, of Britain,—the Liberals or Royalists of France,—the Illuminati of Germany, or the mere party proceedings of any little local portion of human beings, trained as they have hitherto been, in almost every kind of error, and without any true knowledge of themselves. No! The change sought for, must be preceded by the clear development of a great and universal principle which shall unite in one, all the petty jarring interests, by which, till now, nature has been made a most inveterate enemy to itself. No! extensive, nay, rather, universal as the re-arrangement of so-

ciety must be, to relieve it from the difficulties with which it is now overwhelmed, it will be effected in peace and quietness, with the good will and hearty concurrence of all parties, and of every people. It will necessarily commence by common consent, on account of its advantages, almost simultaneously among all civilized nations; and, once begun, will daily advance with an accelerating ratio, unopposed, and bearing down before it the existing systems of the world. The only astonishment then will be that such systems could so long have existed. . . .

Under the present system, there is the most minute division of mental power and manual labour in the individuals of the working classes; private interests are placed perpetually at variance with the public good, and, in every nation, men are purposely trained from infancy to suppose, that their well-being is incompatible with the progress and prosperity of other nations. Such are the means by which old society seeks to obtain the desired effects of life. The details now to be submitted, have been devised upon principles which will lead to an opposite practice; to the combination of extensive mental and manual powers in the individuals of the working classes; to a complete identity of private and public interest, and to the training of nations to comprehend that their power and happiness cannot attain their full and natural development, but through an equal increase of the power and happiness of all other states. These, therefore, are the real points at variance between that which *is*, and that which *ought to be*.

It is upon these principles that arrangements are now proposed for the new agricultural villages, by which the food of the inhabitants may be prepared in one establishment, where they will eat together as one family. Various objects have been urged against this practice, but they have come from those only, who, whatever may be their pretensions in other respects, are mere children in the knowledge of the principle and economy of social life. By such arrangements, the members of these new associations may be supplied with food at far less expense, and with much more comfort, than by any individual or family arrangements; and when the parties have been once trained and accustomed, as they easily may be, to the former mode, they will never afterwards feel any inclination to return to the latter. If a saving in the quantity of food,—the obtaining of a superior quality of prepared provisions from the same materials,—and the operation of preparing them being effected in much less time, with far less fuel, and with greater ease, comfort, and health, to all the parties employed,—be advantages, these will be obtained in a remarkable manner by the new arrangements proposed. And if, to partake of viands so prepared, served up with every regard to comfort, in clean, spacious, well-lighted, and pleasantly-ventilated apart-

ments, and in the society of well-dressed, well-trained, well-educated, and well-informed associates, possessing the most benevolent dispositions, and desirable habits, can give zest and proper enjoyment to meals, then will the inhabitants of the proposed villages experience all this in an eminent degree. When the new arrangements shall become familiar to the parties, this superior mode of living may be enjoyed at far less expense, and with much less trouble, than are necessary to procure such meals as the poor are now compelled to eat, surrounded by every object of discomfort and disgust, in the cellars and garrets of the most unhealthy courts, alleys and lanes, in London, Dublin, and Edinburgh, or Glasgow, Manchester, Leeds, and Birmingham. Striking, however, as the contrast is in description, and although the actual practice will far exceed what words can convey, yet there are many closet theorists, and inexperienced persons, probably, who will contend for individual arrangements and interests, in preference to that which they cannot comprehend. These individuals must be left to be convinced by the facts themselves.

We now proceed to describe the interior accommodations of the private lodging-houses which will occupy three sides of the parallelogram. As it is of essential importance that there should be abundance of space within the line of the private dwelling, the parallelogram, in all cases, whether the association is intended to be near the maximum or minimum in numbers, should be of large dimensions; and to accommodate a greater or less population, the private dwelling should be of one, two, three, or four storeys, and the interior arrangements formed accordingly. This will be very simple; no kitchen will be necessary, as the public arrangements for cooking will supersede the necessity for any. The apartments will be always well ventilated, and, when necessary, heated or cooled on the improved principles lately introduced in the Derby Infirmary. The expense and trouble, to say nothing of the superior health and comforts which these improvements will give, will be very greatly less than attach to the present practice. To heat, cool, and ventilate their apartments, the parties will have no further trouble than to open or shut two slides, or valves, in each room, the atmosphere of which, by this simple contrivance, may be always kept temperate and pure. One stove of proper dimensions, judiciously placed, will supply the apartments of several dwellings with little trouble, and at a very light expense, when the buildings are originally adapted for this arrangement. Thus will all the inconveniences and expense of separate fires and fireplaces, and their appendages, be avoided, as well as the trouble and disagreeable effects of mending fires and removing ashes, &c. &c. Good sleeping apartments looking over the gardens into the country, and sitting-rooms of proper dimensions, front-

ing the square, will afford as much lodging-accommodation, as, with the other public arrangements, can be useful to, or desired by, these associated cultivators. . . .

A paper representative of the value of labour, manufactured on the principle of the new notes of the Bank of England, will serve for every purpose of their domestic commerce or exchanges, and will be issued only for intrinsic value received and in store. It has been mentioned already, that all motives to deception will be effectually removed from the minds of the inhabitants of these new villages, and of course, forgeries, though not guarded against by this new improvement, would not have any existence among them; and as this representative would be of no use in the old society, no injury could come from that quarter.

But these associations must contribute their fair quota to the exigencies of the state. This consideration leads your Reporter to the next general head, or, The connection of the new establishments with the government of the country, and with old society.

Under this head are to be noticed, the amount and collection of the revenue, and the public or legal duties of the association in peace and war.

Your Reporter concludes, that whatever taxes are paid from land, capital, and labour, under the existing arrangements of society, the same amount for the same proportion of each may be collected with far more ease under those now proposed. The government would of course require its revenue to be paid in the legal circulating medium, to obtain which, the associations would have to dispose of as much of their surplus produce to common society for the legal coin or paper of the realm, as would discharge the demands of government. In time of peace, these associations would give no trouble to government, their internal regulations being founded on principle of prevention, not only with reference to public crimes, but to the private evils and errors which so fatally abound in common society. Courts of law, prisons, and punishments, would not be required. These are requisite only where human nature is greatly misunderstood; where society rests on the demoralizing system of individual rewards and punishments;—they are necessary only in a stage of existence previous to the discovery of the science of the certain and overwhelming influence of circumstances, over the whole character and conduct of mankind. Whatever courts of law, prisons, and punishments, have yet effected for society, the influence of other circumstances which may now be easily introduced, will accomplish infinitely more, for they will effectually prevent the growth of those evils, of which our present Institutions do not take cognizance, till they are already full formed, and in baneful activity.

In time of peace, therefore, these associations will save much charge and trouble to government. In reference to war also, they will be equally beneficial. Bodily exercises, adapted to improve the dispositions, and increase the health and strength of the individual, will form part of the training and education of the children. In these exercises they may be instructed to acquire facility in the execution of combined movements, a habit which is calculated to produce regularity and order in time of peace, as well as to aid defensive and offensive operations in war. The children therefore, at an early age, will acquire *through their amusements* those habits which will render them capable of becoming, in a short time, at any future period of life, the best defenders of their country, if necessity should again arise to defend it, since they would in all probability be far more to be depended upon than those whose physical, intellectual, and moral training, had been less carefully conducted. In furnishing their quotas for the militia or common army, they would probably adopt the pecuniary alternative; by which means they would form a reserve, that, in proportion to their numbers, would be a great security for the nation's safety. They would prefer this alternative, to avoid the demoralizing effects of recruiting.

But the knowledge of the science of the influence of circumstances over mankind, will speedily enable all nations to discover, not only the evils of war, but the folly of it. Of all modes of conduct adopted by mankind to obtain advantages in the present stage of society, this is the most certain to defeat its object. It is, in truth, a system of demoralization and of destruction, while it is the highest interest of all individuals, and of all countries, to *remoralize and conserve*. Men surely cannot with truth be termed rational beings, until they shall discover and put in practice the principles which shall enable them to conduct their affairs without war. The arrangement we are considering, would speedily show how easily these principles and practices may be introduced into general society. . . .

Possessing, in human nature, a soil capable of yielding abundantly the product which man most desires, we have in our ignorance, planted the thorn instead of the vine. The evil principle, which has been instilled into all minds from infancy, "that the character is formed *by* the individual," has produced, and so long as it shall continue to be cherished, will ever produce, the unwelcome harvest of evil passions,—hatred, revenge, and all uncharitableness, and the innumerable crimes and miseries to which they have given birth; for these are the certain and necessary effects of the institutions which have arisen among mankind, in consequence of the universally received, and long coerced belief in this erroneous principle.

"That the character is formed *for* and not *by* the individual," is a truth

to which every fact connected with man's history bears testimony, and of which the evidence of our senses affords us daily and hourly proof. It is also a truth which, when its practical application shall be fully understood, will be of inestimable value to mankind. Let us not, therefore, continue to act as if the reverse of this proposition were true. Let us cease to do violence to human nature; and having at length discovered the vine, or the good principle, let us henceforward substitute it for the thorn. The knowledge of this principle will necessarily lead to the gradual and peaceful introduction of other institutions and improved arrangements, which will preclude all the existing evils, and permanently secure the well-being and happiness of mankind.

THE ECONOMIST

THE COLLECTIVE AFFAIRS OF MEN have hitherto been very grossly mismanaged.

The true Principles of Society have been very little, if at all, understood.

The real causes of the vice, poverty, and wretchedness, which have scourged the great mass of every people, and have finally consigned the mightiest empires to destruction, have, till very lately, been overlooked, or entirely unknown.

The powers acquired by mankind, for the production and distribution of wealth, the diffusion of knowledge, the growth of virtue, the reduction of human labour, the enjoyment of comfort, and the establishment of security, have been rendered, with relation to the great majority of every people, nearly useless, but the influence of counteracting principles, inherent in, and nearly coeval with, the frame of society itself.

The ECONOMIST undertakes to PROVE these assertions, by a few self-evident, intelligible, common-sense statements, as plain, as simple, and as palpable, as they are true.

He will take England as the portion of the globe on which his proofs are to be exhibited: England, with all her means, with all her power, all her glory, all her wealth, all her learning, all her beneficence,—England (strange, and hitherto unaccountable anomaly) with all her wretchedness, all her vice, all her poverty, all her ignorance, all her dissensions and degradation.

England possesses the means and the power of creating more Manufactured Goods than the world can consume; and her soil is capable of furnishing several times the number of her present population with food.

Notwithstanding this power, and this inalienable source of superabundant subsistence, millions of her own people are but imperfectly supplied with

some, and are entirely destitute of most, of the necessities and comforts of life, and of the numberless articles of convenience or of elegance which inventive skill has contrived for the accommodation or embellishment of society.

Here, then, is a source of wealth which is not sufficiently opened, and a power of production which is not exerted;—and, here, on the other hand, are unsatisfied wants, which the inert power, if we remove the causes that now restrain its activity, is much more than adequate to supply.

The sphere of wretchedness (to state the case again) enlarges; the wants of the people increase; yet the power, which is able almost immediately to satisfy these wants, and in a short time to pour a superabundance upon the whole nation, becomes more and more inert.

The manufacturer, the merchant, and all who have not yet looked to the bottom of this long-perplexing subject, are in the habit of remarking, or rather complaining, that there is *no demand for goods*; that the *market is over-stocked*; and that *the times are bad*; because, say they, *more goods are produced than can be consumed*.

The ECONOMIST utterly denies the truth of these allegations. He hesitates not to declare, That the parties advancing them are mistaken; nor to pronounce that they have deceived themselves, and are guilty, however unintentionally, of deceiving the public, on a question of the highest importance: a question involving our very *existence*, as individuals and as a nation.

For what description of goods is there *no demand*? With what commodities is the world *over-stocked*? Of what articles, the product of land or of industry, does there exist a *greater quantity* than can be *consumed*.

Is it of *bread*, or any other necessary of life, the product of the soil?

I will show the landholder, even in this rich and flourishing land, hundreds of thousands of half-starved wretches, whose cry of distress, whose clamorous *demand for bread*, has at length penetrated the palaces and the breasts of their astonished and alarmed superiors.

Does the complaint come from the clothier, the hatter, the hosier, the tanner, the cutler, the potter, the joiner, the upholsterer, the founder, the builder, or even the scholar, the teacher, and the moralist?

I will take the first four through the streets of London; and I will show them, in London alone, a multitude in abject poverty and squalid attire, the supply of whom, with comfortable apparel, would empty their full warehouses, and for a season exhaust their stores.

I will carry the cutler, the potter, the joiner, the upholsterer, the bedding-maker, the founder, &c. into the miserable abodes of millions of Britons; and I will exhibit to them an almost endless succession of bare and dreary dwellings, the equipment of which with the necessities and comforts, to say nothing

ing of the elegancies of life, would, for a time, engross all their means and employ all their industry.

I will expose to the builder multitudes of human beings, crowded together in filthy, incommodious, and unhealthful hovels, languishing in garrets, and expiring in damp and dismal cellars, in workhouses, in hospitals, in jails. I will even show him thousands of houseless and unsheltered wretches, inhaling their mortal malady with the distillations of the night, or perhaps breathing their last sigh on the inhospitable threshold, which is closed upon the pleading eloquence of Nature and Humanity, and repels the heartbreaking *demand* of silent Misery; and I will ask him, If he does not think there is ample scope for the extended consumption of our inexhaustible materials for building, and for the increased employment of him and all his labourers. . . .

That, though Vice and Crime (the progeny of Political Errors) are rapidly decomposing the elements of society, and preparing the volcanic mass of conflicting principles for an explosion that shall level the proud institutions and distinctions of civilization with the ground, and bury in their ruins all the graces, the charities, the intelligence, which ages of assiduous culture have brought to their present growth,—we, nevertheless, possess the certain means of averting the catastrophe which threatens us, and of almost instantly allaying those portentous grumblings, which too plainly indicate the approach of a terrible convulsion, that would hurl mankind back into barbarism:

That, though hundreds of thousands of English families are inadequately supplied with food, and though this country even depends upon Foreign Nations for a portion of the first necessities of life; yet, that our own soil, and our vast unemployed powers of production are capable of immediately furnishing a superabundance of produce for the satisfaction of the first urgent and indispensable demand of nature:

That, though we have an immense population, not only ill-instructed, and ill-fed, but inadequately lodged, uncomfortably clothed, and wholly unfurnished with innocent pleasures, with healthful and agreeable recreations, with all the articles and arrangements of convenience or of comfort which engage the minds, cheer the spirits, adorn the persons, and embellish the abodes of mankind,—yet we have materials,—we have the command of means,—we have hands,—above all, we have science and mechanism, capable of surrounding each individual with more of all these goods than his utmost wishes can desire. . . .

The measures which are calculated to effect this great change, may be commenced almost without an effort.

All the persons who at present have employment, may instantly begin to

climb the ascent without soliciting a helping hand from those who stand above them.

The utterly destitute will require less aid to render them and their descendants happy and independent, than that which must, under the present system, be afforded them for the prolongation of a miserable existence, from public and private charity.

The poor will be relieved from their wretchedness, and the rich will be benefited by the process.

The ignorant will be instructed, while the learned will derive vast accessions to the sum of human knowledge and wisdom.

The vicious will be reclaimed, while the virtuous will, in great measure, be withdrawn from temptation.

The humble will be placed in a situation of safety, and of gradual elevation, while the great will gain in security.

Land and labour will become of greatly increased value, and will always command their true worth.

Of the latter (labour) there will for a long time be too little for the demand, though there is at present so great a scarcity of employment.

The present *money* wealth of the country will become many times more valuable, active, and useful, than it now is;—so truly and obviously so, indeed, that the effect will be the same as if foreign nations were suddenly to pay us a tribute, equal to several times the amount of our present money wealth; and as if that vast accession of wealth were equally divided among the population.

Plenty will overspread the land!—Knowledge will increase!—Virtue will flourish!—Happiness will be recognized, secured, and enjoyed. . . .

[The ECONOMIST] has already shown that there are almost boundless wants, and that we possess equally boundless powers of production, for the creation of all the goods by which those wants are to be satisfied. He hopes we shall at least hear no more, therefore, of their being *no market* for our produce,—of there being *no demand* for our commodities,—of the necessity of looking into every corner of the globe for customers, while we have so many millions of ill-supplied consumers at home. He trusts that mankind, at length convinced of this great truth, will set about emancipating themselves from the thralldom of ignorance, which has hitherto rendered all their energies nearly nugatory;—that they will now complain, not of the want of goods, of means, or of power, but of the errors which prevent the exercise of their power, the command of their means, and the distribution of their goods;—that, having at length discovered that their multifarious evils arise, not from the absence of markets,—not from the limited extent of the demand,—not from the paucity

of consumers,—but from the prevalence of erroneous principles, which continually interpose between the consumers and the producers, and which tend perpetually to close the channels of circulation;—they will set themselves seriously to remove the real causes of all their calamities,—to break down the barriers which have shut out man from man,—and so to open, renovate, and enlarge the channels through which alone their boundless treasures can be circulated, as to afford an easy passage to the full-swelling tide of their wealth, knowledge, and happiness.

THOMAS CARLYLE

ANYONE WHO READS the Parliamentary debates at the time of the passing of the Ten Hour Factory Act will notice that they express a growing concern with welfare at the expense of wealth. Not the least of those who contributed to changing the climate of opinion was Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881). The son of a Scottish stonemason, Carlyle had originally been intended for the Calvinist ministry, but his early reading of the French rationalists, and then of Gibbon, convinced him "that Christianity was not true." He abandoned the ministry, but not Calvinism. The conclusions of rationalism seemed to be unavoidable, but he felt them inadequate without a religious support. Reading in the works of the Germans—Schiller, Goethe, Kant, and Fichte—revived his belief in a moral order. Skepticism he now considered to be the consequence of an uncritically exclusive dependence upon "understanding," rather than upon the higher faculty of "reason," which alone could pronounce "the Everlasting Yea."

It was characteristic of Carlyle to refer social ills to the deep-lying moral error of his times—its thoroughgoing "mechanism." Political activity that went on within parliamentary halls without any regard for the deeply social and moral forces on which it was based seemed to him to be frivolous; Chartism was for him merely a symptom, a tremendously significant one, the function of which was to point to a more fundamental issue—"the Condition-of-England question." This fundamental social problem revolved for Carlyle around the growing division between the working classes on the one hand and the privileged and propertied classes on the other. His *French Revolution* was, at least in part, the attempt to teach the historical lesson that an irresponsible ruling class could expect only to be swept under in the revolutionary uprising of the masses—a revolution that would be purely negative.

Carlyle saw the cure for this disease in the "gospel of work." The notion of a place for every man and every man in his place was one that was obviously similar to the functionally organized medieval society. And in *Past and Present*, the most developed expression of his social philosophy, Carlyle criticized the materialism, the egoism, and the irreligion of his age in the light of a society which had been founded on the opposite ideals. Like Saint-Simon, he recognized the similarity of the industrial factory to the centralized and disciplined medieval group life; but he recognized that without the gospel of work the individual worker could get no sense of participation in the common mission of society, and that without the spirit of chivalry the new masters of society, the "Captains of Industry," could exercise only coercive authority. In more positive terms, the ideal society delineated by Carlyle was one in which those naturally superior would rule righteously. His belief in Providence led him to feel that such men were providentially sent when the need arose.

Although Carlyle was radical in his antagonism to what James Mill called "the Sinister Interest of Privilege," he thus differed from the utilitarians in his disregard for the forms of politics and his disaffection for democracy. "Benthamite

Radicalism" seemed to him to epitomize the spirit of the age—its egoism, its leveling downward, its "mammonism." The attempt of the multitude, through universal suffrage, to be ruled by the multitude seemed to him to contravene the basic law of nature which sets men in a hierarchy of leaders and led. In place of an appeal for the pursuit of happiness such as Bentham's, his appeal was for a higher sense of justice. His influence permeated the thought of many thinkers of his generation and those following. In his emphasis upon the functional organization of society there is one of the roots of later Fabianism; in his emphasis upon immaterial values and upon the worker's active participation in society we find the background of Ruskin's *Political Economy of Art* and the elements of the "welfare economics" of men like J. A. Hobson; and in his cult of the Hero we find background for present-day anti-democratic tendencies and the contemporary deification of the Leader.

The following selections are taken from *Past and Present* (1843).



PAST AND PRESENT

Proem

MIDAS

THE CONDITION of England, on which many pamphlets are now in the course of publication, and many thoughts unpublished are going on in every reflective head, is justly regarded as one of the most ominous, and withal one of the strangest, ever seen in this world. England is full of wealth, of multifarious produce, supply for human want in every kind; yet England is dying of inanition. With unabated bounty the land of England blooms and grows; waving with yellow harvests; thick-studded with workshops, industrial implements, with fifteen millions of workers, understood to be the strongest, the cunningest and the willingest our Earth ever had; these men are here; the work they have done, the fruit they have realized is here, abundant, exuberant on every hand of us: and behold, some baleful fiat as of Enchantment has gone forth, saying, "Touch it not, ye workers, ye master-workers, ye master-idlers; none of you can touch it, no man of you shall be the better for it; this is enchanted fruit!" On the poor workers such fiat falls first, in its rudest shape; but on the rich master-workers too it falls; neither can the rich master-idlers, nor any richest or highest man escape, but all are like to be brought low with it, and made "poor" enough, in the money sense or a far fataler one.

Of these successful skilful workers some two millions, it is now counted,

sit in Workhouses, Poor-law Prisons; or have "out-door relief" flung over the wall to them,—the workhouse Bastille being filled to bursting, and the strong Poor-law broken asunder by a stronger. They sit there, these many months now; their hope of deliverance as yet small. In workhouses, pleasantly so-named, because work cannot be done in them. Twelve-hundred-thousand workers in England alone; their cunning right-hand lamed, lying idle in their sorrowful bosom; their hopes, outlooks, share of this fair world, shut-in by narrow walls. They sit there, pent up, as in a kind of horrid enchantment; glad to be imprisoned and enchanted, that they may not perish starved. The picturesque Tourist, in a sunny autumn day, through this bounteous realm of England, describes the Union Workhouse on his path.

Passing by the Workhouse of St. Ives in Huntingdonshire, on a bright day last autumn [says the picturesque Tourist], I saw sitting on wooden benches, in front of their Bastille and within their ring-wall and its railings, some half-hundred or more of these men. Tall robust figures, young mostly or of middle age; of honest countenance, many of them thoughtful and even intelligent-looking men. They sat there, near by one another; but in a kind of torpor, especially in a silence, which was very striking. In silence: for, alas, what word was to be said? An Earth all lying round, crying, Come and till me, come and reap me;—yet we here sit enchanted! In the eyes and brows of these men hung the gloomiest expression, not of anger, but of grief and shame and manifold inarticulate distress and weariness; they returned my glance with a glance that seemed to say, "Do not look at us. We sit enchanted here, we know not why. The Sun shines and the Earth calls; and, by the governing Powers and Impotences of this England, we are forbidden to obey. It is impossible, they tell us!" There was something that reminded me of Dante's Hell in the look of all this; and I rode swiftly away. . . .

HERO-WORSHIP

To the present editor, not less than to Bobus, a Government of the Wisest, what Bobus calls an Aristocracy of Talent, seems the one healing remedy: but he is not so sanguine as Bobus with respect to the means of realizing it. He thinks that we have at once missed realizing it, and come to need it so pressingly, by departing far from the inner eternal Laws, and taking-up with the temporary outer semblances of Laws. He thinks that "enlightened Egoism," never so luminous, is not the rule by which man's life can be led. That "Laissez-faire," "Supply-and-demand," "Cash-payment for the sole nexus," and so forth, were not, are not and will never be, a practicable Law of Union for a Society of Men. That Poor and Rich, that Governed and Governing, cannot long live together on any such Law of Union. Alas, he thinks that man has a soul in him, *different* from the stomach in any sense of this word; that if said soul be asphyxied, and lie quietly forgotten, the man and his affairs are in a bad way. He thinks that said soul will have to be resuscitated from its

asphyxia; that if it prove irresuscitable, the man is not long for this world. In brief, that Midas-eared Mammonism, double-barrelled Dilettantism, and their thousand adjuncts and corollaries, are *not* the Law by which God Almighty has appointed this His Universe to go. That, once for all, these are not the Law: and then farther that we shall have to return to what *is* the Law,—not by smooth flowery paths, it is like, and with “tremendous cheers” in our throat; but over steep untrodden places, through stormclad chasms, waste oceans, and the bosom of tornadoes; thank Heaven, if not through very Chaos and the Abyss! The resuscitating of a soul that has gone to asphyxia is no momentary or pleasant process, but a long and terrible one.

To the present Editor, “Hero-worship,” as he has elsewhere named it, means much more than an elected Parliament, or stated Aristocracy, of the Wisest; for in his dialect it is the summary, ultimate essence, and supreme practical perfection of all manner of “worship,” and true worthships and noblenesses whatsoever. Such blessed Parliament and, were it once in perfection, blessed Aristocracy of the Wisest, god-honored and man-honored, he does look for, more and more perfected,—as the topmost blessed practical apex of a whole world reformed from sham-worship, informed anew with worship, with truth and blessedness! He thinks that Hero-worship, done differently in every different epoch of the world, is the soul of all social business among men; that the doing of it well, or the doing of it ill, measures accurately what degree of well-being or of ill-being there is in the world’s affairs. . . .

“Hero-worship,” if you will,—yes, friends; but, first of all, by being ourselves of heroic mind. A whole world of Heroes; a world not of Flunkies, where no Hero-King *can* reign: that is what we aim at! We, for our share, will put away all Flunkyism, Baseness, Unveracity from us; we shall then hope to have Noblenesses and Veracities set over us; never till then. Let Bobus and Company sneer, “That is your Reform!” Yes, Bobus, that is our Reform; and except in that, and what will follow out of that, we have no hope at all. Reform, like Charity, O Bobus, must begin at home. Once well at home, how will it radiate outwards, irrepressible, into all that we touch and handle, speak and work; kindling ever new light, by incalculable contagion, spreading in geometric ratio, far and wide,—doing good only, wheresoever it spreads, and not evil.

By Reform Bills, Anti-Corn-Law Bills, and thousand other bills and methods, we will demand of our Governors, with emphasis, and for the first time not without effect, that they cease to be quacks, or else depart; that they set no quackeries and blockheadisms anywhere to rule over us, that they utter or act no cant to us,—it will be better if they do not. For we shall now

know quacks when we see them; cant, when we hear it, shall be horrible to us! . . .

Yes friends: Hero-kings, and a whole world not unheroic,—there lies the port and happy haven, towards which, through all these stormtost seas, French Revolutions, Chartisms, Manchester Insurrections, that make the heart sick in these bad days, the Supreme Powers are driving us. On the whole, blessed be the Supreme Powers, stern as they are! Towards that haven will we, O friends; let all true men, with what of faculty is in them, bend valiantly, incessantly, with thousand-fold endeavor, thither, thither! There, or else in the Ocean-abysses, it is very clear to me, we shall arrive. . . .

The Modern Worker

GOSPEL OF MAMMONISM

True, it must be owned, we for the present, with our Mammon-Gospel, have come to strange conclusions. We call it a Society; and go about professing openly the totalest separation, isolation. Our life is not a mutual helpfulness; but rather, cloaked under the due laws-of-war, named "fair competition" and so forth, it is a mutual hostility. We have profoundly forgotten everywhere that *Cash-payment* is not the sole relation of human beings; we think, nothing doubting, that *it* absolves and liquidates all engagements of man. "My starving workers?" answers the rich mill-owner: "Did not I hire them fairly in the market? Did I not pay them, to the last sixpence, the sum covenanted for? What have I to do with them more?"—Verily Mammon-worship is a melancholy creed. When Cain, for his own behoof, had killed Abel, and was questioned, "Where is thy brother?" he too made answer, "Am I my brother's keeper?" Did I not pay my brother *his* wages, the thing he had merited from me?

O sumptuous Merchant-Prince, illustrious game-preserving Duke, is there no way of "killing" thy brother but Cain's rude way! . . .

One of Dr. Alison's Scotch facts struck us much. A poor Irish Widow, her husband having died in one of the Lanes of Edinburgh, went forth with her three children, bare of all resource, to solicit help from the Charitable Establishments of that City. At this Charitable Establishment and then at that she was refused; referred from one to the other, helped by none;—till she had exhausted them all; till her strength and heart failed her: she sank down in typhus-fever; died, and infected her Lane with fever, so that "seventeen other persons" died of fever there in consequence. The humane Physician asks there-upon, as with a heart too full for speaking, Would it not have been *economy* to help this poor Widow? She took typhus-fever, and killed seventeen of you!—

Very curious. The forlorn Irish Widow applies to her fellow-creatures, as if saying, "Behold I am sinking, bare of help: ye must help me! I am your sister, bone of your bone; one God made us: ye must help me!" They answer, "No, impossible; thou art no sister of ours." But she proves her sisterhood; her typhus-fever kills *them*: they actually were her brothers, though denying it! Had human creature ever to go lower for a proof? . . .

HAPPY

Does not the whole wretchedness, the whole *Atheism* as I call it, of man's ways, in these generations, shadow itself for us in that unspeakable Life-philosophy of his: The pretension to be what he calls "happy"? . . .

We construct our theory of Human Duties, not on any Greatest-Nobleness Principle, never so mistaken; no, but on a Greatest-Happiness Principle. "The word *Soul* with us, as in some Slavonic dialects, seems to be synonymous with *Stomach*." We plead and speak, in our Parliaments and elsewhere, not as from the Soul, but from the Stomach;—wherefore indeed our pleadings are so slow to profit. We plead not for God's Justice; we are not ashamed to stand clamoring and pleading for our own "interests," our own rents and trade-profits; we say, They are the "interests" of so many; there is such an intense desire in us for them! We demand Free-Trade, with much just vociferation and benevolence, That the poorer classes, who are terribly ill-off at present, may have cheaper New-Orleans bacon. Men ask on Free-trade platforms, How can the indomitable spirit of Englishmen be kept up without plenty of bacon? We shall become a ruined Nation!—Surely, my friends, plenty of bacon is good and indispensable: but, I doubt, you will never get even bacon by aiming only at that. You are men, not animals of prey, well-used or ill-used! Your Greatest-Happiness Principle seems to me fast becoming a rather unhappy one. . .

The only happiness a brave man ever troubled himself with asking much about was, happiness enough to get his work done. Not "I can't eat!" but "I can't work!" that was the burden of all wise complaining among men. It is, after all, the one unhappiness of a man, That he cannot work; that he cannot get his destiny as a man fulfilled. Behold, the day is passing swiftly over, our life is passing swiftly over; and the night cometh, wherein no man can work. The night once come, our happiness, our unhappiness,—it is all abolished, vanished, clean gone; a thing that has been: "not of the slightest consequence" . . . ! Brief brawling Day, with its noisy phantasms, its poor paper-crowns tinsel-gilt, is gone; and divine everlasting Night, with her star-diadems, with her silences and her veracities, is come! What hast thou done, and how? Happiness, unhappiness: all that was but the *wages* thou hadst; thou hast spent

all that, in sustaining thyself hitherward; not a coin of it remains with thee, it is all spent, eaten: and now thy work, where is thy work? Swift, out with it; let us see thy work!

Of a truth, if man were not a poor hungry dastard, and even much of a blockhead withal, he would cease criticising his victuals to such extent; and criticise himself rather, what he does with his victuals!

THE ENGLISH

And yet, with all thy theoretic platitudes, what a depth of practical sense in thee, great England! A depth of sense, of justice, and courage; in which, under all emergencies and world-bewilderments, and under this most complex of emergencies we now live in, there is still hope, there is still assurance! . . .

Bull is a born Conservative; for this too I inexpressibly honor him. All great Peoples are conservatives; slow to believe in novelties; patient of much error in actualities; deeply and forever certain of the greatness that is in Law, in Custom once solemnly established, and now long recognized as just and final.—True, O Radical Reformer, there is no Custom that can, properly speaking, be final; none. And yet thou seest *Customs* which, in all civilized countries, are accounted final; nay, under the Old-Roman name of *Mores*, are accounted *Morality*, Virtue, Laws of God Himself. Such, I assure thee, not a few of them are; such almost all of them once were. And greatly do I respect the solid character,—a blockhead, thou wilt say; yes, but a well-conditioned blockhead, and the best-conditioned,—who esteems all “Customs once solemnly acknowledged” to be ultimate, divine, and the rule for a man to walk by, nothing doubting, not inquiring farther. . . .

O my Conservative friends, who still specially name and struggle to approve yourselves “Conservative,” would to Heaven I could persuade you of this world-old fact, than which Fate is not surer, That Truth and Justice ~~alone~~ are *capable* of being “conserved” and preserved! The thing which is unjust, which is *not* according to God’s Law, will you, in a God’s Universe, try to conserve that? It is so old, say you. Yes, and the hotter haste ought *you*, of all others, to be in, to let it grow no older! If but the faintest whisper in your hearts intimate to you that it is not fair,—hasten, for the sake of Conservatism itself, to probe it rigorously, to cast it forth at once and forever if guilty. How will or can you preserve *it*, the thing that is not fair? “Impossibility” a thousandfold is marked on that. And ye call yourselves Conservatives, Aristocracies:—ought not honor and nobleness of mind, if they had departed from all the Earth elsewhere, to find their last refuge with you? Ye unfortunate! . . .

If I were the Conservative Party of England (which is another bold figure of speech), I would not for a hundred thousand pounds an hour allow those

Corn-Laws to continue! Potosi and Golconda put together would not purchase my assent to them. Do you count what treasuries of bitter indignation they are laying up for you in every just English heart? Do you know what questions, not as to Corn-prices and Sliding-scales alone, they are *forcing* every reflective Englishman to ask himself? Questions insoluble, or hitherto unsolved; deeper than any of our Logic-plummets hitherto will sound: questions deep enough,—which it were better that we did not name even in thought! You are forcing us to think of them, to begin uttering them. The utterance of them is begun; and where will it be ended, think you? When two millions of one's brother-men sit in Workhouses, and five millions, as is insolently said, "rejoice in potatoes," there are various things that must be begun, let them end where they can.

UNWORKING ARISTOCRACY

. . . What looks maddest, miserablest in these mad and miserable Corn-Laws is independent altogether of their "effect on wages," their effect on "increase of trade," or any other such effect: it is the continual maddening proof they protrude into the faces of all men, that our Governing Class, called by God and Nature and the inflexible law of Fact, either to do something toward government, or to die and be abolished,—have not yet learned even to sit still and do no mischief! For no Anti-Corn-Law League yet asks more of them than this;—Nature and Fact, very imperatively, asking so much more of them. Anti-Corn-Law League asks not, Do something; but, Cease your destructive misdoing, Do ye nothing!

Nature's message will have itself obeyed: messages of mere Free-Trade, Anti-Corn-Law League and Laissez-faire, will then need small obeying!—Ye fools, in name of Heaven, work, work, at the Ark of Deliverance for yourselves and us, while hours are still granted you! No: instead of working at the Ark, they say, "We cannot get our hands kept rightly warm"; and *sit obstinately burning the planks*. No madder spectacle at present exhibits itself under this Sun.

The Working Aristocracy; Mill-owners, Manufacturers, Commanders of Working Men: alas, against them also much shall be brought in accusation; much,—and the freest Trade in Corn, total abolition of Tariffs, and uttermost "Increase of Manufactures" and "Prosperity of Commerce," will permanently mend no jot of it. The Working Aristocracy must strike into a new path; must understand that money alone is *not* the representative either of man's success in the world, or of man's duties to man; and reform their own selves from top to bottom, if they wish England reformed. England will not be habitable long, unreformed.

The Working Aristocracy— Yes, but on the threshold of all this, it is again and again to be asked, What of the Idle Aristocracy? Again and again, What shall we say of the Idle Aristocracy, the Owners of the Soil of England; whose recognized function is that of handsomely consuming the rents of England, shooting the partridges of England, and as an agreeable amusement (if the purchase-money and other conveniences serve), dilettante-ing in Parliament and Quarter-Sessions for England? We will say mournfully, in the presence of Heaven and Earth,—that we stand speechless, stupent, and know not what to say! That a class of men entitled to live sumptuously on the marrow of the earth; permitted simply, nay entreated, and as yet entreated in vain, to do nothing at all in return, was never heretofore seen on the face of this Planet. That such a class is transitory, exceptional, and, unless Nature's Laws fall dead, cannot continue. That it has continued now a moderate while; has, for the last fifty years, been rapidly attaining its state of perfection. That it will have to find its duties and do them; or else that it must and will cease to be seen on the face of this Planet, which is a Working one, not an Idle one.

Alas, alas, the Working Aristocracy, admonished by Trades-unions, Chartist conflagrations, above all by their own shrewd sense kept in perpetual communion with the fact of things, will assuredly reform themselves, and a working world will still be possible:—but the fate of the Idle Aristocracy, as one reads its horoscope hitherto in Corn-Laws and suchlike, is an abyss that fills one with despair. Yes, my rosy fox-hunting brothers, a terrible *Hippocratic look* reveals itself (God knows, not to my joy) through those fresh buxom countenances of yours. Through your Corn-Law Majorities, Sliding-Scales, Protecting-Duties, Bribery-Elections, and triumphant Kentish-fire, a thinking eye discerns ghastly images of ruin, too ghastly for words; a handwriting as of MENE, MENE. Men and brothers, on your Sliding-Scale you seem sliding, and to have slid,—you little know whither! Good God! did not a French Donothing Aristocracy, hardly above half a century ago, declare in like manner, and in its featherbed believe in like manner, “We cannot exist, and continue to dress and parade ourselves, on the just rent of the soil of France; but we must have farther payment than rent of the soil, we must be exempted from taxes too,”—we must have a Corn-Law to extend our rent? This was in 1789: in four years more— Did you look into the Tanneries of Meudon, and the long-naked making for themselves breeches of human skins! May the merciful Heavens avert the omen; may we be wiser, that so we be less wretched. . . .

REWARD

All true work is sacred; in all true work, were it but true hand-labor, there is something of divineness. Labor, wide as the Earth, has its summit in Heaven. Sweat of the brow; and up from that to sweat of the brain, sweat of the heart; which includes all Kepler calculations, Newton meditations, all Sciences, all spoken Epics, all acted Heroisms, Martyrdoms,—up to that “Agony of bloody sweat,” which all men have called divine! O brother, if this is not “worship,” then I say, the more pity for worship; for this is the noblest thing yet discovered under God’s sky. Who art thou that complainest of thy life of toil? Complain not. Look up, my wearied brother; see thy fellow Workmen there, in God’s Eternity; surviving there, they alone surviving: sacred Band of the Immortals, celestial Bodyguard of the Empire of Mankind. Even in the weak Human Memory they survive so long, as saints, as heroes, as gods; they alone surviving; peopling, they alone, the unmeasured solitudes of Time! To thee Heaven, though severe, is *not* unkind; Heaven is kind,—as a noble Mother; as that Spartan Mother, saying while she gave her son his shield, “With it, my son, or upon it!” Thou too shalt return *home* in honor; to thy far-distant Home, in honor; doubt it not,—if in the battle thou keep thy shield! Thou, in the Eternities and deepest Death-kingdoms, are not an alien; thou everywhere art a denizen! Complain not; the very Spartans did not *complain*. . . .

On the whole, we do entirely agree with those old Monks, *Laborare est Orare*. In a thousand senses, from one end of it to the other, true Work is Worship. He that works, whatsoever be his work, he bodies forth the form of Things Unseen; a small Poet every Worker is. The idea, were it but of his poor Delf Platter, how much more of his Epic Poem, is as yet “seen,” half-seen, only by himself; to all others it is a thing unseen, impossible; to Nature herself it is a thing unseen, a thing which never hitherto was;—very “impossible,” for it is as yet a No-thing! The Unseen Powers had need to watch over such a man; he works in and for the Unseen. Alas, if he look to the Seen Powers only, he may as well quit the business; his No-thing will never rightly issue as a Thing, but as a Deceptivity, a Sham-thing,—which it had better not do! . . .

Horoscope

CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY

The leaders of industry, if Industry is ever to be led, are virtually the Captains of the World! if there be no nobleness in them, there will never be an Aristocracy more. But let the Captains of Industry consider: once again, are

they born of other clay than the old Captains of Slaughter; doomed forever to be no Chivalry, but a mere gold-plated *Doggery*,—what the French well name *Canaille*, “*Doggery*” with more or less gold carrion at its disposal? Captains of Industry are the true Fighters, henceforth recognizable as the only true ones: Fighters against Chaos, Necessity and the Devil and Jötuns; and lead on Mankind in that great, and alone true, and universal warfare; the stars in their courses fighting for them, and all Heaven and all Earth saying audibly, Well done! Let the Captains of Industry retire into their own hearts, and ask solemnly, If there is nothing but vulturous hunger, for fine wines, valet reputation and gilt carriages, discoverable there? Of hearts made by the Almighty God I will not believe such a thing. Deep-hidden under wretchedest god-forgetting Cants, Epicurisms, Dead-Sea Apisms; forgotten as under foulest fat Lethe mud and weeds, there is yet, in all hearts born into this God’s-World, a spark of the Godlike slumbering. Awake, O nightmare sleepers; awake, arise, or be forever fallen! This is not playhouse poetry; it is sober fact. Our England, our world cannot live as it is. It will connect itself with a God again, or go down with nameless throes and fire-consummation to the Devils. Thou who feelest aught of such a Godlike stirring in thee, any faintest intimation of it as through heavy-laden dreams, follow *it*, I conjure thee. Arise, save thyself, be one of those that save thy country. . . .

Love of men cannot be bought by cash-payment; and without love men cannot endure to be together. You cannot lead a Fighting World without having it regimented, chivalried: the thing, in a day, becomes impossible; all men in it, the highest at first, the very lowest at last, discern consciously, or by a noble instinct, this necessity. And can you any more continue to lead a Working World unregimented, anarchic? I answer, and the Heavens and Earth are now answering, No! The thing becomes not “in a day” impossible; but in some two generations it does. Yes, when fathers and mothers, in Stockport hunger-cellars, begin to eat their children, and Irish widows have to prove their relationship by dying of typhus-fever; and amid Governing “Corporations of the Best and Bravest,” busy to preserve their game by “bushing,” dark millions of God’s human creatures start up in mad Chartisms, impracticable Sacred-Months, and Manchester Insurrections;—and there is a virtual Industrial Aristocracy as yet only half-alive, spell-bound amid money-bags and ledgers; and an actual Idle Aristocracy seemingly near dead in somnolent delusions, in trespasses and double-barrels; “sliding,” as on inclined-planes, which every new year they *soap* with new Hansard’s-jargon under God’s sky, and so are “sliding,” ever faster, toward a “scale” and balance-scale whereon is written *Thou art found Wanting*:—in such days, after a generation or two, I say, it does become, even to the low and simple, very palpably impossible! . . .

PERMANENCE

Standing on the threshold, nay as yet outside the threshold, of a "Chivalry of Labor," and an immeasurable Future which it is to fill with fruitfulness and verdant shade; where so much has not yet come even to the rudimental state, and all speech of positive enactments were hazardous in those who know this business only by the eye,—let us here hint at simply one widest universal principle, as the basis from which all organization hitherto has grown up among men, and all henceforth will have to grow: The principle of Permanent Contract instead of Temporary. . . .

A question arises here: Whether, in some ulterior, perhaps some not far-distant stage of this "Chivalry of Labor," your Master-Worker may not find it possible, and needful, to grant his Workers permanent *interest* in his enterprise and theirs? So that it become, in practical result, what in essential fact and justice it ever is, a joint enterprise; all men, from the Chief Master down to the lowest Overseer and Operative, economically as well as loyally concerned for it?—Which question I do not answer. The answer, near or else far, is perhaps, Yes;—and yet one knows the difficulties, despotism is essential in most enterprises; I am told, they do not tolerate "freedom of debate" on board a Seventy-four! Republican senate and *plebiscita* would not answer well in Cotton-Mills. And yet observe there too: Freedom, not nomad's or ape's Freedom, but man's Freedom; this is indispensable. We must have it, and will have it! To reconcile Despotism with Freedom:—well, is that such a mystery? Do you not already know the way? It is to make your Despotism *just*. Rigorous as Destiny; but just too, as Destiny and its Laws. The Laws of God: all men obey these, and have no "Freedom" at all but in obeying them. The way is already known, part of the way;—and courage and some qualities are needed for walking on it!

PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON

IN THE LATER nineteenth century, when many of the disinherited of industrial society were being swept up in the currents of "scientific" socialism, the chief claim to a hearing for Proudhon (1809-65) lay in his intense faith in a people's future to be based upon a new lay morality for the individual and society. He spoke out sharply against the threat of collective tyranny, which he thought could only be checked by political decentralization and by the application of mutual credit, mutual exchange, and the whole scheme of his mutualism to economic relations.

In many respects a child of eighteenth-century rationalism, Proudhon was also somewhat indebted to Kant for his emphasis on moral duty, and to Hegel for a smattering of the dialectic, to all of which he added an unusual intellectual individualism. The criterion with which he measured everything was that of justice, justice conceived of as immanent in humanity and not stemming from God. Freedom was second only to justice in importance as a human ideal, for without it justice could not be realized. One must also record his emphasis upon equality which, very often, becomes interchangeable with justice. His idea of Revolution was closely bound up with the furthering of these human ideals.

In one respect, however, the Declaration of Rights of 1793 and the Code Napoleon appear to Proudhon to have introduced the shocking innovation of the Roman concept of absolute property. Proudhon could not accept the view of property without its contingent responsibilities. Even classical economists were somewhat puzzled to explain property's special privilege and found the answer now in nature, now in labor, and again in utility. The slogan, "Property Is Theft" was that of another; but Proudhon certainly popularized it.

Proudhon constantly affirmed his faith in the working man for whom he envisioned a distant but not an apocalyptic better future. Most importantly, he saw this future as one to be realized through the awakening to consciousness of the workers themselves. He wrote: "To free the worker from the oppression in which barbarism holds his potentialities prisoner, he must be disciplined by education, ennobled through well-being, raised up by virtue." He feared the dangers confronting an ignorant proletariat and dreaded the possibility of their being led into some Promised Land where they would in reality be enslaved and not freed. This was only too obvious in communist solutions. But the danger also lay hidden in democracy (a presentiment which Proudhon shared with de Tocqueville) in that, just as kings continued to reign but no longer ruled, so too, under the centralized democratic state, the people might reign but not rule. For him true democracy was synonymous with popular education. And he valued free discussion as highly as did John Stuart Mill. His facetious reason for recoiling at the thought of heaven was simply that there everyone had the same opinion. Certainly his "order in anarchy," if it means anything, means that the individual, disciplined by education or Proudhonian moral fervor, has nothing to fear save himself, ever the potential victim, through ignorance, of an authoritarian appeal for order at any price.

The following selection from Proudhon's *First Memoir on Property* (1840) has been taken, with some changes, from Benjamin Tucker's undated translation from the French.



WHAT IS PROPERTY? OR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT AND OF GOVERNMENT

First Memoir

CHAPTER I

IF I WERE ASKED to answer the following question: *What is slavery?* and I should answer in one word, *It is murder*, my meaning would be understood at once. No extended argument would be required to show that the power to take from a man his thought, his will, his personality, is a power of life and death, and that to enslave a man is to kill him. Why, then, to this question: *What is property?* may I not likewise answer, *It is theft*, without the certainty of being misunderstood; the second proposition being nothing more than a transformation of the first?

I undertake to discuss the vital principle of our government and of our institutions, property. I am in my right. I may be mistaken in the conclusion which shall result from my investigations. I am in my right. I think best to place the last thought of my book first. I am still in my right.

One author teaches that property is a civil right born of occupation and sanctioned by law. Another maintains that it is a natural right, originating in labor. Both these doctrines, totally opposed as they may seem, are encouraged and applauded. I contend that neither labor, nor occupation, nor law, can create property. It is an effect without a cause. Am I censurable?

But murmurs arise!

Property is theft! That is the war-cry of '93! That is the signal of revolutions!

Reader, calm yourself. I am no agent of discord, no fire-brand of sedition. I anticipate history by a few days. I disclose a truth whose development we may try in vain to arrest. I write the preamble of our future constitution. This proposition which seems to you blasphemous, *property is theft*, would, if our prejudices allowed us to consider it, be recognized as the lightning-rod to shield us from the coming thunderbolt. But only interests, only prejudices

stand in the way! Alas, philosophy will not change the course of events. Destiny will fulfill itself regardless of prophecy. Besides, must not justice be done and our education be finished?

Property is theft! What a revolution in human ideas! *Proprietor* and *thief* have been at all times expressions as contradictory as the beings whom they designate are hostile! All languages have perpetuated this opposition. On what authority, then, do you venture to attack universal consent and give the lie to the human race? Who are you that you should question the judgment of the nations and the ages?

Of what consequence to you, reader, is my wretched individuality? I live, like you, in a century in which reason submits only to fact and to evidence. My name, like yours, is TRUTHSEEKER. My mission is written in these words of the law: *Speak without hatred and without fear; tell that which thou knowest!* The work of our species is to build the temple of science, and this science includes man and nature. Now truth reveals itself to all. . . .

Disregard then, reader, my title and my character, and attend only to my arguments. It is in accordance with universal consent that I undertake to correct universal error. From the opinion of the human race I appeal to its faith. Have the courage to follow me. And, if your will is unfettered, if your conscience is free, if your mind can unite two propositions and deduce a third therefrom, my ideas must inevitably become yours. . . . The things of which I am to speak are so simple and clear that you will be astonished at not having perceived them before. You will say: "I have neglected to think." Others offer you the spectacle of genius wresting nature's secrets from her, and unfolding before you her sublime oracles. You will find here only a series of experiments upon *justice* and *right*, a sort of verification of the weights and measures of your conscience. The operations shall be conducted under your very eyes, and you shall weigh the result.

Nevertheless, I build no system. I ask an end to privilege, the abolition of slavery, the equality of rights, and the reign of law. Justice, nothing else. That is the substance of my argument. To others I leave the business of governing the world.

One day I asked myself: Why is there so much sorrow and misery in society? Must man always be miserable? And not satisfied with the explanations given by the reformers—some attributing the general distress to governmental cowardice and incapacity, others to conspiracies and uprisings, still others to ignorance and general corruption—and weary of the interminable quarrels of the tribune and the press, I sought to fathom the matter myself. I have consulted the masters of science. I have read a hundred volumes of philosophy, law, political economy, and history. Would to God I had lived

in a century in which so much reading had been useless! I have made every effort to obtain exact information, comparing doctrines, replying to objections, continually constructing equations and reductions from arguments, and weighing thousands of syllogisms in the scales of the most scrupulous logic. In this laborious work, I have collected many interesting facts which I shall share with my friends and the public as soon as I have leisure. But I must say that I recognized at once that we had never understood the meaning of these words, so common and yet so sacred: *justice, equity, liberty*. And that concerning each of these principles our ideas have been utterly obscure. And, in fact, that this ignorance was the sole cause, both of the poverty that devours us, and of all the calamities that have ever afflicted the human race. . . .

CHAPTER II

The Roman law defined property as the right to use and abuse one's own within the limits of the law. . . .

According to the Declaration of Rights, published as a preface to the Constitution of 1793, property "is the right to enjoy and dispose at will of one's goods, one's income, and the fruit of one's labor and industry."

Code Napoleon, article 544: "Property is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided we do not overstep the limits prescribed by the laws and regulations."

These two definitions do not differ from that of the Roman law. All give the proprietor an absolute right over a thing. As for the restriction imposed by the code, "provided we do not overstep the limits prescribed by the laws and regulations," its object is not to limit property but to prevent the domain of one proprietor from interfering with that of another. That is a confirmation of the principle, not a limitation of it.

There are different kinds of property: 1. Property pure and simple, the dominial and seigniorial power over a thing or, as they term it, *naked property*. 2. *Possession*. . . . The tenant, the farmer, the shareholder, the usufructuary, are possessors. The owner who lets and lends for use, the heir who is to come into possession on the death of a usufructuary, are proprietors. If I may venture the comparison, a lover is a possessor, a husband is a proprietor.

This double definition of property, of domain and possession, is of the highest importance. It must be clearly understood in order to comprehend what is to follow.

From the distinction between possession and property arise two sorts of rights: the *jus in re*, the right in a thing, the right by which I may reclaim the

property which I have acquired, in whatever hands I find it; and the *jus ad rem*, the right *to* a thing, which gives me a claim to become a proprietor. Thus the right of husband and wife over each other's persons is the *jus in re*; that of two who are betrothed is only the *jus ad rem*. In the first, possession and property are united. The second includes only *naked* property. As a laborer, I have a right to the possession of the products of nature and my own industry and yet, as a member of the proletariat, I enjoy none of them. It is by virtue of the *jus ad rem* that I demand admittance to the *jus in re*. . . .

The Declaration of Rights has placed property in its list of the natural and inalienable rights of man, four in all: *liberty, equality, property, security*. What rule did the legislators of 1793 follow in compiling this list? None. They laid down principles, just as they discussed sovereignty and the laws, from a general point of view and according to their own opinion. They did everything gropingly or impetuously. . . .

If property is a natural, absolute, imprescriptible, and inalienable right, why, in all ages, has there been so much speculation as to its origin? For that is one of its distinguishing characteristics. The origin of a natural right! Good God! who ever inquired into the origin of the rights of liberty, security, or equality? They exist by the same right that we exist. They are born with us. They live and die with us. With property it is very different, indeed. By law, property can exist without a proprietor, like a quality without a subject. It exists for the human being who as yet is not, and for the octogenarian who is no more. And yet, in spite of these wonderful prerogatives which seem to depend on the eternal and the infinite, they have never found the origin of property. The doctors still disagree. On one point only are they in harmony, namely, that the validity of the right of property depends upon the authenticity of its origin. But this harmony is their condemnation. Why have they acknowledged the right before settling the question of origin? . . .

The titles on which they claim to base the right of property are reducible to two, *occupation* and *labor*. I shall determine them successively under all their aspects and in complete detail. And I remind the reader that, to whatever authority we appeal, I shall prove conclusively that property, to be just and possible, must necessarily have equality for its condition. . . .

Not only does occupation lead to equality, it *prevents* property. For, since every man, from the fact of his existence, has the right of occupation and, in order to live, must have material for cultivation and working, and since, on the other hand, the number of occupants varies continually with the births and deaths, it follows that the quantity of material which each laborer may claim varies with the number of occupants. Consequently, it follows that

occupation is always subordinate to population. Finally, it follows that, inas-much as possession, in right, can never remain fixed, it is impossible, in fact, that it can ever become property.

Every occupant is, then, necessarily a possessor or usufructuary, a capacity which excludes proprietorship. Now, this is the right of the usufructuary: he is responsible for the thing entrusted to him; he must use it in conformity with general utility, with a view to its preservation and development; he has no power to transform it, to diminish it, or to change its nature; he cannot so divide the usufruct that another shall perform the labor while he receives the product. In a word, the usufructuary is under the supervision of society, subjected to the condition of labor, and the law of equality.

Thus is annihilated the Roman definition of property, *the right of use and abuse*, an immorality born of violence, the most monstrous pretension that the civil laws ever sanctioned. Man receives his usufruct from the hands of society which alone is the permanent possessor. The individual passes away, society is deathless.

What a profound disgust fills my soul while discussing such simple truths! Do we doubt these things today? Will it be necessary to take arms again for their triumph? And can force, in default of reason, alone introduce them into our laws?

All have an equal right of occupancy.

The amount occupied being measured, not by the will, but by the variable conditions of space and number, property cannot arise.

This no code has ever expressed. This no constitution can admit! These are axioms which the civil law and the law of nations deny!

But I hear the exclamations of the partisans of another system: "Labor, labor! that is the basis of property!"

Reader, do not be deceived. This new basis of property is worse than the first, and I shall soon have to ask your pardon for having demonstrated things clearer, and refuted pretensions more unjust than any which we have yet considered.

CHAPTER III

. . . The isolated man can supply but a very small portion of his needs. All his power lies in society and in the intelligent combination of universal effort. The division and co-operation of labor multiply the quantity and the variety of products. The specialization of functions improves the quality of consumers' goods.

There is not a man, then, but lives upon the products of several thousand

different industries, not a laborer but receives from society at large the things which he consumes, and with these, the power to reproduce. . . .

The various articles of consumption are given to each by all. Consequently, the production of each involves the production of all. One product cannot exist without another. An isolated industry is an impossible thing. . . . All industries are united by mutual relations in a single bundle. All parts of production serve one another reciprocally as means and end. All varieties of talent are but a series of changes from the inferior to the superior.

Now, this undisputed and indisputable fact of the general participation in every kind of product makes all individual productions common so that every product, coming from the hands of the producer, is mortgaged in advance by society. The producer himself is entitled to only that portion of his product which is expressed by a fraction whose denominator is equal to the number of individuals of which society is composed. It is true that in return this same producer has a share in all the products of others so that he has a claim upon all, just as all have a claim upon him. But is it not clear that this reciprocity of mortgages, far from authorizing property, destroys even possession? The laborer is not even possessor of his product. Scarcely has he finished it, when society claims it.

"But," it will be answered, "even if that is so, even if the product does not belong to the producer, still society gives each laborer an equivalent for his product. And this equivalent, this wage, this reward, this allowance, becomes his property. Do you deny that this property is legitimate? And if the laborer, instead of consuming his entire wages, chooses to economize, who dare question his right to do so?"

The laborer is not even proprietor of the price of his labor, and cannot absolutely control its disposition. Let us not be blinded by a spurious justice. That which is given the laborer in exchange for his product is not given him as a reward for past labor, but to provide the means and an advance for future labor. We consume before we produce. The laborer may say at the end of the day, "I have paid yesterday's expenses; tomorrow I shall pay those of to-day." At every moment of his life the member of society is in debt. He dies with the debt unpaid. How is it possible for him to accumulate?

They talk of saving, the proprietor's hobby. Under a system of equality all saving which does not aim at subsequent reproduction or enjoyment is impossible. Why? Because the thing saved, from the moment that it cannot be converted into capital, has no object, and is without a *final cause*. . . .

To conclude: the laborer, in his relation to society, is a debtor who of necessity dies insolvent; the proprietor is an unfaithful guardian who denies the

receipt of the deposit committed to his care, and wishes to be paid for his guardianship down to the last day. . . .

CHAPTER V

. . . I ought not to conceal the fact that property and communism have always been considered the only possible forms of society. This deplorable error has been the life of property. The disadvantages of communism are so obvious that its critics never have needed to employ much eloquence to thoroughly disgust men with it. The irreparability of the injustice which it causes, the violence which it does to attractions and repulsions, the yoke of iron which it fastens upon the will, the moral torture to which it subjects the conscience, the debilitating effect which it has upon society, and, to sum it all up, the sanctimonious and stupid uniformity which it enforces upon the free, active, reasoning, unsubmissive personality of man, have shocked common sense, and condemned communism by an irrevocable decree. . . .

Singularly enough, systematic communism, the deliberate negation of property, is conceived under the direct influence of the proprietary prejudice. And property is the basis of all communistic theories.

The members of a community, it is true, have no private property. But the community is proprietor, and proprietor not only of the goods, but of the persons and wills. In consequence of this principle of absolute property, labor, which should be only a condition imposed upon man by nature, becomes in all communities a human commandment, and therefore odious. Passive obedience, irreconcilable with a reflecting will, is strictly enforced. Fidelity to regulations, which are always defective, however wise they may be thought, allows of no complaint. Life, talent, and all the human faculties are the property of the State, which has the right to use them as it pleases for the common good. Private associations are sternly prohibited in spite of the likes and dislikes of different natures because to tolerate them would be to introduce small communities within the large one, and consequently private property. The strong work for the weak, although this ought to be left to benevolence, and not enforced; sought after and not commanded. The industrious work for the lazy though this is unjust. The clever work for the foolish although this is absurd. And, finally, man, casting aside his personality, his spontaneity, his genius, and his affections, humbly annihilates himself at the feet of the majestic and inflexible Commune!

Communism is inequality, but in a sense contrary to property. Property is the exploitation of the weak by the strong. Communism is the exploitation of the strong by the weak. In property, inequality of conditions is the result of

force, under whatever name it be disguised: physical and mental force; force of events, chance, *fortune*; force of accumulated property, etc. In communism, inequality springs from the mediocrity of talent and work, glorified equally with force. This damaging equation is repellent to the conscience, and causes merit to complain. For although it may be the duty of the strong to aid the weak, they prefer to do it out of generosity. They never will endure a comparison. Give them equal opportunities of labor and equal wages, but never allow their jealousy to be awakened by mutual suspicion of unfaithfulness in the performance of the common task.

Communism is oppression and slavery. Man is very willing to obey the law of duty, serve his country, and oblige his friends, but he wishes to labor when he pleases. He wishes to dispose of his own time, to be governed only by necessity, to choose his friendships, his recreation, and his discipline; to act from judgment, not by command; to sacrifice himself through egoism, not through servile obligation. Communism is essentially opposed to the free exercise of our faculties, to our noblest desires, to our deepest feelings. Any plan which could be devised for reconciling it with the demands of the individual reason and will would end only in changing the thing while preserving the name. Now, if we are honest truth-seekers, we shall avoid disputes about words.

Thus communism violates the sovereignty of the conscience and equality, the first by restricting spontaneity of mind and heart, and freedom of thought and action, the second, by placing labor and laziness, skill and stupidity, and even vice and virtue on an equality in point of comfort. Besides, if property is impossible on account of the desire to accumulate, communism would soon become so through the desire to shirk.

Property in its turn violates equality, by the rights of exclusion and increase, and freedom, by despotism. The former effect of property having been sufficiently developed in the last three chapters, I will content myself here with the establishing by a final comparison, its perfect identity with theft. . . .

Theft is committed in a variety of ways which have been very cleverly distinguished and classified by legislators according to their heinousness or merit, to the end that some robbers may be honored while others are punished.

We rob: 1. By murder on the highway. 2. Alone, or in a band. 3. By breaking into buildings, or scaling walls. 4. By abstraction. 5. By fraudulent bankruptcy. 6. By forgery of the handwriting of public officials or private individuals. 7. By manufacture of counterfeit money. . . . 8. By cheating. 9. By swindling. 10. By abuse of trust. 11. By games and lotteries. . . . 12. By usury. . . . 13. By all forms of rent, ground-rent, house-rent, and leases. . . . 14.

By commerce, when the profit of the merchant exceeds his legitimate return. . . . 15. By making profit on our product, by accepting sinecures, and by exacting exorbitant wages. . . .

From the law of guile sprang the profits of manufactures, commerce and banking; mercantile frauds and the pretensions of all those things which are honored with the beautiful names of *talent* and *genius* which ought to be regarded as the last degree of knavery and deception; and, finally, all sorts of social inequalities.

In those forms of theft which are prohibited by law, force and trickery are employed alone and undisguised. In the authorized forms, they conceal themselves within a useful product which they use as a tool to plunder their victim.

The direct use of violence and stratagem was early and universally condemned but no nation has yet got rid of that kind of theft which is united with talent, labor, and possession, and which is the source of all the dilemmas of casuistry and the innumerable contradictions of jurisprudence. . . .

The development of right has followed the same order in its various expressions that property has in its forms. Everywhere we see justice driving robbery before it and confining it within narrower and narrower limits. Hitherto the victories of justice over injustice, and of equality over inequality, have been won by instinct and the simple force of things. But the final triumph of our social nature will be due to our reason or else we shall fall back into another feudal chaos. Either this glorious height is reserved for our intelligence or this miserable depth for our baseness.

The second effect of property is despotism. Now since despotism is inseparably connected with the idea of legitimate authority, in explaining the natural causes of the first, the principle of the second will appear.

What form of government do we prefer? I hear some of my younger readers reply: "Why, how can you ask such a question? You are a republican." "A republican! Yes. But that word specifies nothing. *Res publica*, that is, the public thing. Now, whoever is interested in public affairs, no matter under what form of government, may call himself a republican. Even kings are republicans." "Well you are a democrat." "No." "What! you would have a monarchy?" "No." "A constitutionalist?" "God forbid!" "You are then an aristocrat?" "Still less." "What are you, then?" "I am an anarchist."

"Oh! I understand you. You speak satirically. This is a slap at the government." "By no means. I have just given you my serious and well considered profession of faith. Although a firm friend of order, I am, in the full force of the term, an anarchist. Listen to me." . . .

Sociable animals follow their chief by *instinct*. But take notice of the fact . . . that the function of the chief is altogether one of *intelligence*. The chief

does not teach the others to associate, to unite under his lead, to reproduce their kind, to take to flight, or to defend themselves. Concerning each of these particulars, his subordinates are as well-informed as he. But it is the chief who, by his accumulated experience, provides against accidents. It is he whose private intelligence supplements, in difficult situations, the general instinct. It is he who deliberates, decides, and leads. It is he, in short, whose enlightened prudence regulates the public routine to the greatest advantage of all.

Man, naturally a sociable being, naturally follows a chief. . . . Those philosophers who carry into morals and into history their gloomy, demagogic moods and affirm that the human race originally had neither chiefs nor kings know nothing of the nature of man. Royalty, and absolute royalty, is as truly and more truly than democracy a primitive form of government. . . . Royalty may always be good when it is the only possible form of government. Legitimate, it is never. Neither heredity, nor election, nor universal suffrage, nor the excellence of the sovereign, nor the consecration of religion and of time can make royalty legitimate. Whatever form it takes, monarchic, oligarchic, or democratic, royalty, or the government of man by man, is illegal and absurd. . . .

In proportion as society becomes enlightened, royal authority diminishes. That is a fact to which all history bears witness. At the birth of nations, men reflect and reason in vain. Without methods, without principles, not knowing how to use their reason, they cannot judge of the justice of their conclusions. Then the authority of kings is immense, no knowledge having been acquired with which to contradict it. But, little by little, experience produces habits, which develop into customs. Then the customs are formulated in maxims, laid down as principles, in short, transformed into laws, to which the king, the living law, has to bow. There comes a time when customs and laws are so numerous that the will of the prince is, so to speak, entangled by the public will; and that, on taking the crown, he is obliged to swear that he will govern in conformity with established customs and usages; and that he is but the executive power of a society whose laws are made independently of him.

Up to this point, all is done instinctively, and, as it were, unconsciously. But see where this movement must end.

By means of self-instruction and the acquisition of ideas, man finally acquires the idea of *science*, that is, of a system of knowledge in harmony with the reality of things and inferred from observation. He searches for the science, or the system, of inanimate bodies, the system of organic bodies, the system of the human mind, and the system of the universe. Why should he not also search for the system of society? But, having reached this point, he comprehends that political truth, or the science of politics, exists quite inde-

pendently of the will of sovereigns, the opinion of majorities, and popular beliefs, and that kings, ministers, magistrates, and nations, as wills, have no connection with the science, and are worthy of no consideration. He comprehends, at the same time, that, if man is born a sociable being, the authority of his father over him ceases on the day when, his mind being formed and his education finished, he becomes the associate of his father; that his true chief and his king is the demonstrated truth; that politics is a science, not a stragem; and that the function of the legislator is reduced, in the last analysis, to the methodical search for truth.

Thus, in a given society, the authority of man over man is inversely proportional to the stage of intellectual development which that society has reached. And the probable duration of that authority can be calculated from the more or less general desire for a true government, that is, for a scientific government. And just as the law of force and the law of guile retreat before the steady advance of justice, and must finally be extinguished in equality, so the sovereignty of the will yields to the sovereignty of the reason and must at last be lost in a scientific socialism. Property and royalty have been crumbling to pieces ever since the world began. As man seeks justice in equality, so society seeks order in anarchy.

Anarchy, the absence of a master, of a sovereign,¹ such is the form of government toward which we are every day drawing closer, and which our inveterate habit of taking man for our rule, and his will for law, leads us to regard as the height of disorder and the expression of chaos. The story is told that a citizen of Paris in the seventeenth century having heard it said that in Venice there was no king, the good man could not recover from his astonishment and thought he would die laughing at the mere mention of so ridiculous a thing. So strong is our prejudice! As long as we live we want a chief or chiefs. At this very moment I hold in my hand a brochure whose author, a zealous communist, dreams, like a second Marat, of the dictatorship. The most advanced among us are those who wish the greatest possible number of sovereigns. Their most ardent wish is for the royalty of the National Guard. Soon, undoubtedly, someone jealous of the citizen militia will say, "Everybody is king." But when he has spoken, I will say in my turn, "Nobody is king; we are, whether we like it or not, associated." Every question of domestic politics must be decided by the statistics of the *département*. Every question of foreign politics is an affair of international statistics. The science of government rightly belongs to one of the sections of the Academy of Sciences, whose permanent secretary is necessarily prime minister. And since

¹ The meaning ordinarily attached to the word "anarchy" is absence of principle, absence of rule; consequently, it has been regarded as synonymous with "disorder."

every citizen may address a memoir to the Academy, every citizen is a legislator. But, as the opinion of no one is of any value until its truth has been proven, no one can substitute his will for reason—nobody is king.

All questions of legislation and politics are matters of science, not of opinion. The legislative power belongs only to the reason, methodically recognized and demonstrated. To attribute to any power whatever the right of veto or of sanction is the height of tyranny. Justice and legality are two things as independent of our approval as is mathematical truth. To compel, they need only to be known. To be known they need only to be meditated upon and studied. What, then, is the people if it is not the sovereign, if it is not the source of the legislative power? The guardian of the law, the executive power—it is the people. Every citizen may assert: "This is true; that is just"; but his opinion controls no one but himself. Before the truth which he proclaims may become a law, it must be recognized. Now, what is it to recognize a law? It is to verify a mathematical or a metaphysical calculation. It is to repeat an experiment, to observe a phenomenon, to establish a fact. To say "Be it known and decreed," is a right belonging only to the people.

I confess that this is an overturning of received ideas and that I seem to be attempting to revolutionize our political system, but I beg the reader to consider that, having begun with a paradox, I must, if I reason correctly, meet with paradoxes at every step, and must end with paradoxes. For the rest, I do not see how the liberty of citizens would be endangered by entrusting to their hands the sword of the law, instead of the pen of the legislator. The executive power, belonging properly to the will, cannot be confided to too many proxies. That is the true sovereignty of the people.

The proprietor, the thief, the hero, the sovereign, for all these titles are synonymous, imposes his will as law, and accepts neither contradiction nor control. That is, he pretends to be the legislative and the executive power at the same time. Accordingly, the substitution of the scientific and true law for the royal will is accomplished only by a terrible struggle. And this constant substitution is, after property, the most potent element in history, the most prolific source of political change. Examples are too numerous and too striking to require enumeration.

Now property necessarily engenders despotism, government of caprice, and the reign of libidinous pleasure. That is so clearly the essence of property that, to be convinced of it, one need only remember what it is, and observe what happens around him. Property is the right to *use* and *abuse*. If, then, government is economy, if its sole object is production and consumption, and the distribution of labor and products, how is government possible while property exists? And if goods are property, why should not the proprietors

be kings, and despotic kings, kings in proportion to their economic power? And if each proprietor is sovereign lord within the sphere of his property, absolute king throughout his own domain, how could a government of proprietors be anything but chaos and confusion?

Then, no government, no public economy, no administration is possible, which is based upon property.

Communism seeks *equality* and *law*. Property, born of the autonomy of the reason and the sense of personal merit, wishes above all things *independence* and *proportionality*.

But communism, accepting uniformity as law, and levelism as equality, becomes tyrannical and unjust. Property, by its despotism and encroachments, soon proves itself oppressive and anti-social.

The objects of communism and property are good. Their results are bad. And why? Because both are exclusive and each disregards two elements of society. Communism rejects independence and proportionality. Property does not satisfy equality and law.

Now if we imagine a society based upon these four principles, equality, law, independence, and proportionality, we find that:

1. *Equality*, consisting only in *equality of conditions*, that is, *of means*, and not in *equality of comfort*—which it is the business of the laborers to achieve for themselves, when provided with equal means—in no way violates justice and *equity*.

2. *Law*, resulting from the knowledge of facts, and consequently based upon necessity itself, never clashes with independence.

3. Individual *independence*, or the autonomy of the private reason, originating in the difference in talents and capacities, can exist without danger within the limits of the law.

4. *Proportionality*, being admitted only in the sphere of intelligence and sentiment, and not as regards material objects, may be observed without violating justice or social equality.

This third form of society, the synthesis of communism and property, we will call *liberty*. . . .

Liberty is equality, because liberty exists only in society. And in the absence of equality there is no society.

Liberty is anarchy, because it does not admit the government of the will, but only the authority of the law, that is, of necessity.

Liberty is infinite variety, because it respects all wills within the limits of the law.

Liberty is proportionality, because it allows the utmost latitude to the ambition for merit and the rivalry for glory. . . .

Man's social nature becoming *justice* through reflection, *equity* through the bringing into play of capacities, and having *liberty* for its formula, is the true basis of morality, the principle and regulator of all our actions. This is the universal motive force which philosophy is searching for, which religion strengthens, which egotism supplants, and whose place pure reason never can fill. *Duty* and *right* are born of *need*, which, when considered in connection with others, is a *right*, and when considered in connection with ourselves, a *duty*. . . .

Liberty is essentially an organizing force. To insure equality between men and peace among nations both agriculture and industry, and the centers of education, business, and storage, must be distributed according to the climate and the geographical position of each country, the nature of the products, the character and natural talents of the inhabitants, etc., in proportions so just, so wise, so harmonious, that in no place shall there ever be either an excess or a lack of population, consumption, and production. There commences the science of public and private right, the true political economy. It is for the writers on jurisprudence, henceforth unembarrassed by the false principle of property, to describe the new laws, and bring peace upon earth. Knowledge and genius they do not lack. The foundation is now laid for them.

I have accomplished my task. Property is conquered, never again to arise. . . . What sophisms, indeed, what prejudices, however obstinate, can stand before the simplicity of the following propositions:

I. Individual *possession* is the condition of social life. Five thousand years of property demonstrate it. *Property* is the suicide of society. Possession is in the right; property is against right. Suppress property while maintaining possession, and, by this simple modification of the principle, you will revolutionize law, government, economy, and institutions. You will drive evil from the face of the earth.

II. All having an equal right of occupancy, possession varies with the number of possessors. Property cannot establish itself.

III. The effect of labor being the same for all, property perishes through its alien exploitation and rent.

IV. All human labor being the result of collective force, all property becomes, in consequence, collective and indivisible. To speak more exactly, labor destroys property.

V. Every capacity for labor being, like every instrument of labor, an accumulated capital and a collective property, inequality of wages and fortunes based on the pretext of inequality of capacities is, therefore, injustice and theft.

VI. The necessary conditions of commerce are the liberty of the contracting parties and the equivalence of the products exchanged. Now, value being

expressed by the amount of time and outlay which each product costs, and liberty being inviolable, the wages of laborers, like their rights and duties, should be equal.

VII. Products are bought only by products. Now the condition of all exchanges being equivalence of products, profit is impossible and unjust. Observe this most elementary principle of economy, and pauperism, luxury, oppression, vice, crime, and hunger will disappear from our midst.

VIII. Men are associated by the physical and mathematical law of production before they are voluntarily associated by choice. Therefore, equality of conditions is demanded by justice, that is, by strict social law. Esteem, friendship, recognition, admiration, all fall within the domain of *equitable* or *proportional* law only.

IX. Free association, liberty—whose sole function is to maintain equality in the means of production and equivalence in exchanges—is the only possible, the only just, the only true form of society.

X. Politics is the science of liberty. The government of man by man, under whatever name it be disguised, is oppression. Society finds its highest perfection in the union of order with anarchy.

The old civilization has run its race. A new sun is rising and will soon renew the face of the earth. Let the present generation perish, let the old prevaricators die in the desert! The holy earth shall not cover their bones. Young man, exasperated by the corruption of the age and absorbed in your zeal for justice!—if your country is dear to you, and if you have the interests of humanity at heart, have the courage to espouse the cause of liberty. Cast off your old selfishness and plunge into the rising flood of popular equality! There your regenerate soul will acquire new life and vigor. Your enervated genius will recover an indomitable energy, and your heart, perhaps already withered, will be rejuvenated! Everything will wear a different look to your illuminated vision. New sentiments will engender new ideas within you. Religion, morality, poetry, art, language will appear before you in nobler and fairer forms. Thenceforth, sure of your faith and thoughtfully enthusiastic, you will hail the dawn of universal regeneration! . . .

O God of liberty! God of equality! Thou who didst place in my heart the sentiment of justice before my reason could comprehend it, hear my ardent prayer! Thou hast dictated all that I have written. Thou hast shaped my thought. Thou hast directed my studies. Thou hast weaned my mind from curiosity and my heart from attachment that I might publish Thy truth to the master and the slave. I have spoken with what force and talent Thou hast given me. It is Thine to finish the work. Thou knowest whether I seek my welfare or Thy glory, O God of liberty! Ah! perish my memory, and let

humanity be free! Let me see from my obscurity the people at last instructed. Let noble teachers enlighten them. Let generous spirits guide them. Abridge, if possible, the time of our trial, stifle pride and avarice in equality, annihilate this love of glory which enslaves us; teach these poor children that in the bosom of liberty there are neither heroes nor great men! Inspire the powerful man, the rich man, him whose name my lips shall never pronounce in Thy presence, with a horror of his crimes. Let him be the first to apply for admission to the redeemed society. Let the promptness of his repentance be the ground of his forgiveness! Then, great and small, wise and foolish, rich and poor, will unite in an ineffable fraternity; and, singing in unison a new hymn, will rebuild Thy altar, O God of liberty and equality.

KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS

KARL MARX (1818–83) came from a well-to-do Jewish family in Rhenish Prussia. Originally intending to pursue an academic career, Marx studied at Bonn and then at the University of Berlin, where he came under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy and associated himself with the group known as the “Left Hegelians.” However, because of the difficulties which men like Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach had with the existing regime, he gave up the idea of becoming a teacher and went into journalism instead. In 1843 he was forced to flee to Paris because of his liberal revolutionary activities. During the two years he spent in Paris his ideas underwent marked development when he came into contact and conflict with Louis Blanc, Proudhon, and the Saint-Simonians, and when he moved to Brussels in 1845 the main outlines of his thought had already taken shape. In 1847 he joined a secret workingmen’s society, the *Communist League*, and it was as a program for this group that *The Communist Manifesto* appeared, in 1848. At the time of the Liberal revolutions Marx returned to Germany, but the setback of 1849 forced him into exile again, and he finally went to London, where he spent the rest of his days.

Marx was always concerned with working out a program of action for the working class, and he intended the systematic development of his philosophy to perform this primary function. The characteristic that distinguished his brand of socialism from that of men like Owen and Fourier was its foundation in what he took to be the fundamental laws of capitalistic economy and in the consequently revolutionary nature of the emergent industrial proletariat. It was the coming to independent social and political action of this class that he regarded as the decisive historical development of his day. In London he spent a great deal of his time in the politics of revolutionary organization and agitation. In 1864 he was the moving spirit in the formation of the First International—the International Workingmen’s Association, consisting of representatives of the various revolutionary and reformist movements with foundations in the labor movement, such as Mazzinians, anarchists, liberal trade unionists, and partisans of the Social Democrat Lassalle. The International was weakened by a number of factors, however—principally the defeat of the Paris Commune in 1871, the nationalist dissension attendant upon the Franco-Prussian War, and the controversy between the anarchists and Marx’s partisans—and was formally dissolved in 1876. Before he died, however, Marx helped to form the nucleus of what was to be the Second International. In 1875 his followers united with the socialist organization of Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–64) in the Social Democratic Party, which became a model for similar parties that grew up elsewhere as the progressive enfranchisement of the working class in England, Germany, and France brought the possibilities of political action within the parliamentary form into the foreground.

Despite Marx’s dominant concern with practical politics, the ripest product of his years of exile in London was undoubtedly his systematic critique of capitalist economy, *Das Kapital* (*Capital*), a book as significant for the nineteenth century

as was Rousseau's *Social Contract* for the eighteenth. This book would never have been completed had it not been for the financial assistance advanced to Marx by his closest friend and perennial collaborator, Friedrich Engels (1820-95). Indeed, it was Engels who, after Marx's death, completed the last two volumes of *Capital* upon the basis of Marx's notes. Sent to England by his father, a wealthy Rhenish Prussian industrialist, to take charge of a branch factory near Manchester, Engels was revolted by working-class conditions and took part in the Chartist agitation. After his meeting with Marx in 1844 he remained his constant co-worker, joining the Communist League with him and collaborating in the writing of *The Communist Manifesto*. Engels did most of the writing on themes of a more purely philosophical order, although, by his own admission, he got the main lines of his thought from Marx.

The Communist Manifesto is the classic work of Marxian socialism. It is a thoroughgoing statement of what is admitted on all sides to be the core of Marxian doctrine—the economic interpretation of history. Professed Marxists view it as the outline of “a new conception of the world; it represents consistent materialism extended also to the realm of social life; it proclaims dialectics as the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development; it advances the theory of the class struggle and of the world-historic revolutionary role of the proletariat as the creator of a new Communist society.” Its central principle has had wide influence even among those without commitments to the Marxist movement. There is hardly a contemporary historian or social scientist who does not employ the idea of economic causation in some way.

The *Manifesto* was entitled “Communist” by Marx and Engels in order to differentiate it from programs of mere reform and from the paternalistic kind of socialism attached to the names of Owen and Fourier and in order to attach it to working-class movements. “Socialism was, in 1847, a middle-class movement, Communism a working class movement.” Part III of the *Manifesto*, dealing with criticisms of other types of socialistic programs of reform, is omitted here. The translation from the German is the authorized English version done by Samuel F. Moore under the supervision of Engels. The notes are those supplied by Engels in 1888.



MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

A SPECTRE is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre; Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.

Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as communistic by its opponents in power? Where the Opposition that has not hurled

back the branding reproach of Communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?

Two things result from this fact.

I. Communism is already acknowledged by all European Powers to be itself a Power.

II. It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with a Manifesto of the party itself.

To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London, and sketched the following manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.

I. BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIANS ¹

The history of all hitherto existing society ² is the history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master ³ and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold graduation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the middle ages, feudal lords, vassals, guildmasters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.

The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society, has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.

Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this dis-

¹ By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern Capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage-labor. By proletariat, the class of modern wage-laborers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor-power in order to live.

² That is, all written history. In 1847, the pre-history of society, the social organization existing previous to recorded history, was all but unknown. Since then, Haxthausen discovered common ownership of land in Russia, Maurer proved it to be the social foundation from which all Teutonic races started in history, and by and by village communities were found to be, or to have been, the primitive form of society everywhere from India to Ireland. The inner organization of this primitive Communistic society was laid bare, in its typical form, by Morgan's crowning discovery of the true nature of the gens and its relation to the tribe. With the dissolution of these primeval communities society begins to be differentiated into separate and finally antagonistic classes. I have attempted to retrace this process of dissolution in "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State."

³ Guildmaster, that is, a full member of a guild, a master within, not a head of, a guild.

tinctive feature; it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.

From the serfs of the middle ages sprang the chartered burghers of the earliest towns. From these burgesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie were developed.

The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonization of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development.

The feudal system of industry, under which industrial production was monopolized by close guilds, now no longer sufficed for the growing wants of the new markets. The manufacturing system took its place. The guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle-class; division of labor between the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of division of labor in each single workshop.

Meantime the markets kept ever growing, the demand, ever rising. Even manufacture no longer sufficed. Thereupon, steam and machinery revolutionized industrial production. The place of manufacture was taken by the giant, Modern Industry, the place of the industrial middle-class, by industrial millionaires, the leaders of whole industrial armies, the modern bourgeois.

Modern industry has established the world-market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages.

We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange.

Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class. An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing association in the mediaeval commune,⁴ here independent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany), there taxable "third estate" of the monarchy (as in France), after-

⁴ "Commune" was the name taken, in France, by the nascent towns even before they had conquered from their feudal lords and masters, local self-government and political rights as "the Third Estate." Generally speaking, for the economical development of the bourgeoisie, England is here taken as the typical country, for its political development, France.

wards, in the period of manufacture proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility, and, in fact, corner stone of the great monarchies in general, the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world-market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honored and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-laborers.

The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.

The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of vigor in the Middle Ages, which Reactionists so much admire, found its fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades.

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated be-

fore they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures there arises a world-literature.

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i. e., to become bourgeois themselves. In a word, it creates a world after its own image.

The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.

The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralized means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralization. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments and systems of taxation, became lumped together in one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier and one customs-tariff.

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?

We see then: the means of production and of exchange on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organization of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to burst asunder; they were burst asunder.

Into their places stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economical and political sway of the bourgeois class.

A similar movement is going on before our own eyes. Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on its trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epi-

demic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity—the epidemic of over-production. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented.

The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.

But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons—the modern working-class—the proletarians.

In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i. e., capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working-class, developed, a class of laborers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labor increases capital. These laborers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.

Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labor, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack that is required of him. Hence, the cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he requires for his maintenance, and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a commodity, and also of labor, is equal to its cost of production. In proportion, therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage decreases. Nay more, in proportion as the use of machinery and division of labor in-

creases, in the same proportion the burden of toil also increases, whether by prolongation of the working hours, by increase of the work enacted in a given time, or by increased speed of the machinery, etc.

Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of laborers, crowded into the factory, are organized like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they the slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State, they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the over-looker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.

The less the skill and exertion or strength implied in manual labor, in other words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the labor of men superseded by that of women. Differences of age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are instruments of labor, more or less expensive to use, according to their age and sex.

No sooner is the exploitation of the laborer by the manufacturer, so far at an end, that he receives his wages in cash, than he is set upon by the other portions of the bourgeoisie, the landlord, the shopkeeper, the pawnbroker, etc.

The lower strata of the middle class—the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants—all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialized skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production. Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.

The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual laborers, then by the workpeople of a factory, then by the operatives of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploits them. They direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labor, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages.

At this stage the laborers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition. If anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the consequence of their own active union, but of the union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in order to attain its own political ends, is compelled to set the whole proletariat in motion, and is moreover yet, for a time, able to do so. At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie. Thus the whole historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.

But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number, it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalized, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labor, and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level. The growing competition among the bourgeois, and the resulting commercial crises, make the wages of the workers ever more fluctuating. The unceasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more and more precarious; the collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations ('Trades' Unions) against the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there the contest breaks out into riots.

Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry, and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years.

This organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier.

It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself. Thus the ten-hour bill in England was carried.

Altogether collisions between the classes of the old society further, in many ways, the course of development of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a constant battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on, with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, whose interests have become antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all times, with the bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all these battles it sees itself compelled to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for its help, and thus, to drag it into the political arena. The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat with its own elements of political and general education, in other words, it furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie.

Further, as we have already seen, entire sections of the ruling classes are, by the advance of industry, precipitated into the proletariat, or are at least threatened in their conditions of existence. These also supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress.

Finally, in times when the class-struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact, within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movements as a whole.

Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.

The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are, therefore, not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so, only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat, they thus defend not their present, but their future interests, they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat.

The "dangerous class," the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here and there, be swept into

the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.

In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already virtually swamped. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois family-relations; modern industrial labor, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.

All the preceding classes that got the upper hand, sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation. They have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.

All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air.

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.

In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.

Hitherto, every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under the yoke of feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern laborer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than

population and wealth. And here it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an over-riding law. It is unfit to rule, because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.

The essential condition for the existence, and for the sway of the bourgeois class, is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage-labor. Wage-labor rests exclusively on competition between the laborers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the laborers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

II. PROLETARIANS AND COMMUNISTS

In what relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians as a whole?

The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties.

They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.

They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement.

The Communists are distinguished from the other working class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.

The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.

The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all the

other proletarian parties; formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat.

The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer.

They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes. The abolition of existing property relations is not at all a distinctive feature of Communism.

All property relations in the past have continually been subject to historical change consequent upon the change in historical conditions.

The French Revolution, for example, abolished feudal property in favor of bourgeois property.

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonism, on the exploitation of the many by the few.

In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.

We Communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man's own labor, which property is alleged to be the ground work of all personal freedom, activity and independence.

Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property! Do you mean the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it daily.

Or do you mean modern bourgeois private property?

But does wage-labor create any property for the laborer? Not a bit. It creates capital, i. e., that kind of property which exploits wage-labor, and which cannot increase except upon condition of getting a new supply of wage-labor for fresh exploitation. Property, in its present form, is based on the antagonism of capital and wage-labor. Let us examine both sides of this antagonism.

To be a capitalist, is to have not only a purely personal, but a social status in production. Capital is a collective product, and only by the united action of many members, nay, in the last resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion.

Capital is therefore not a personal, it is a social power.

When, therefore, capital is converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby transformed into social property. It is only the social character of the property that is changed. It loses its class-character.

Let us now take wage-labor.

The average price of wage-labor is the minimum wage, i. e., that quantum of the means of subsistence, which is absolutely requisite to keep the laborer in bare existence as a laborer. What, therefore, the wage-laborer appropriates by means of his labor, merely suffices to prolong and reproduce a bare existence. We by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the products of labor, an appropriation that is made for the maintenance and reproduction of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to command the labor of others. All that we want to do away with is the miserable character of this appropriation, under which the laborer lives merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so far as the interest of the ruling class requires it.

In bourgeois society, living labor is but a means to increase accumulated labor. In communist society, accumulated labor is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the laborer.

In bourgeois society, therefore, the past dominates the present; in communist society, the present dominates the past. In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality.

And the abolition of this state of things is called by the bourgeois, abolition of individuality and freedom! And rightly so. The abolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois freedom is undoubtedly aimed at.

By freedom is meant, under the present bourgeois conditions of production, free trade, free selling and buying.

But if selling and buying disappears, free selling and buying disappears also. This talk about free selling and buying, and all the other "brave words" of our bourgeoisie about freedom in general, have a meaning, if any, only in contrast with restricted selling and buying, with the fettered traders of the Middle Ages, but have no meaning when opposed to the Communistic abolition of buying and selling, of the bourgeois conditions of production, and of the bourgeoisie itself.

You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its

non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is, the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society.

In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend.

From the moment when labor can no longer be converted into capital, money, or rent, into a social power capable of being monopolized, i. e., from the moment when individual property can no longer be transformed into bourgeois property, into capital, from that moment, you say, individuality vanishes.

You must, therefore, confess that by "individual" you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property. This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and made impossible.

Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society: all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labor of others by means of such appropriation.

It has been objected, that upon the abolition of private property all work will cease, and universal laziness will overtake us.

According to this, bourgeois society ought long ago to have gone to the dogs through sheer idleness; for those of its members who work, acquire nothing, and those who acquire anything, do not work. The whole of this objection is but another expression of the tautology: that there can no longer be any wage-labor when there is no longer any capital.

All objections urged against the Communistic mode of producing and appropriating material products, have, in the same way, been urged against the Communistic modes of producing and appropriating intellectual products. Just as, to the bourgeois, the disappearance of class property is the disappearance of production itself, so the disappearance of class culture is to him identical with the disappearance of all culture.

That culture, the loss of which he laments, is, for the enormous majority, a mere training to act as a machine.

But don't wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois property, the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom, culture, law, etc. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will, whose essential character and direction are determined by the economic conditions of existence of your class.

The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal

laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property—historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production—this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.

Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.

On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.

The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital.

Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? To this crime we plead guilty.

But, you will say, we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we replace home education by social.

And your education! Is not that also social, and determined by the social conditions under which you educate, by the intervention, direct or indirect, of society by means of schools, etc.? The Communists have not invented the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the character of that intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class.

The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-relation of parent and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labor.

But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams the whole bourgeoisie in chorus.

The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion, than that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women.

He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production.

For the rest, nothing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of

our bourgeois at the community of women which, they pretend, is to be openly and officially established by the Communists. The Communists have no need to introduce community of women; it has existed almost from time immemorial.

Our bourgeois, not content with having the wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each other's wives.

Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the Communists might possibly be reproached with, is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalized community of women. For the rest, it is self-evident, that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from that system, i. e., of prostitution both public and private.

The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationalities.

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

National differences, and antagonisms between peoples, are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilized countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.

The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical, and generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination.

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views, and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?

What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual produc-

tion changes in character in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.

When people speak of ideas that revolutionize society, they do but express the fact, that within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.

When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the 18th century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death-battle with the then revolutionary bourgeoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience, merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.

"Undoubtedly," it will be said, "religious, moral, philosophical and juridical ideas have been modified in the course of historical development. But religion, morality, philosophy, political science, and law, constantly survived this change.

"There are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of society. But Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience."

What does this accusation reduce itself to? The history of all past society has consisted in the development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs.

But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms.

The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property-relations; no wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas.

But let us have done with the bourgeois objections to Communism.

We have seen above, that the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.

The proletariat will use its political supremacy, to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in

the hands of the State, i. e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.

Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production.

These measures will of course be different in different countries.

Nevertheless in the most advanced countries the following will be pretty generally applicable:

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of waste lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal liability of all to labor. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of population over the country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labor in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc., etc.

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps

away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms, and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

IV. POSITION OF THE COMMUNISTS IN RELATION TO THE VARIOUS EXISTING OPPOSITION PARTIES

Section II has made clear the relations of the Communists to the existing working class parties, such as the Chartists in England and the Agrarian Reformers in America.

The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement. In France the Communists ally themselves with the Social-Democrats,⁵ against the conservative and radical bourgeoisie, reserving, however, the right to take up a critical position in regard to phrases and illusions traditionally handed down from the great Revolution.

In Switzerland they support the Radicals, without losing sight of the fact that this party consists of antagonistic elements, partly of Democratic Socialists, in the French sense, partly of radical bourgeois.

In Poland they support the party that insists on an agrarian revolution, as the prime condition of national emancipation, that party which fomented the insurrection of Cracow in 1846.

In Germany they fight with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie.

But they never cease, for a single instant, to instill into the working class the clearest possible recognition of the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, in order that the German workers may straightway use, as so many weapons against the bourgeoisie, the social and political conditions that the bourgeoisie must necessarily introduce along with its supremacy, and in order that, after the fall of the reactionary classes in Germany, the fight against the bourgeoisie itself may immediately begin.

The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that

⁵ The party then represented in parliament by Ledru-Rollin, in literature by Louis Blanc, in the daily press by the *Reforme*. The name of Social Democracy signified, with these its inventors, a section of the Democratic or Republican party more or less tinged with Socialism.

country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution, that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European civilization, and with a more developed proletariat, than that of England was in the seventeenth, and of France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution.

In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things.

In all these movements they bring to the front, as the leading question in each, the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the time.

Finally, they labor everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries.

The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

Working men of all countries, unite!

MIKHAIL ALEXANDROVICH BAKUNIN

MIKHAIL ALEXANDROVICH BAKUNIN is symptomatic of many eminent nineteenth-century figures who, for personal and environmental reasons, were unable to give lucid, self-consistent utterance to their social attitudes and programs. Literature, philosophy, and politics all produced such figures. Whether as nihilists, as visionaries, or as masters of irony and paradox they seem in retrospect to have registered certain stubborn antinomies of the industrial world more prophetically than their reputable contemporaries.

Bakunin was born in 1814 to a cultured family of Central Russia's landed, serf-holding gentry. The eldest of ten children, he continually led his brothers and sisters in "conspiracies" against their parents, and the bent for destruction which typified his life he later attributed to the despotic character of his mother, who inspired him, to use his own words, "with an insensate hatred of every restriction on liberty." Just as this early home forced upon him inhibitions (including a permanent sexual one) and compensatory fantasies, so the autocratic Russia of Nicholas I moved Bakunin to find self-expression in speculative philosophy and eventually in conspiratorial activity. At the age of twenty-one he ended an uncongenial term of military service under the Tsar and, five years later, moved to Berlin, where a group of radical Hegelians turned his attention to matters of political and economic immediacy. The keynote to his subsequent career was sounded in an article he published in 1842, entitled "Reaction in Germany." It was in this high-flown philosophic apology for revolution that he delivered his famous cry: "The desire to destroy is also a creative desire!"

In the 1840's Bakunin traveled from city to city—Zurich, Brussels, Paris, Breslau, Prague—becoming deeply involved in the passions, secret plots and frustrations of the Plan-Slav movement. He eagerly assimilated the philosophic anarchism of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the materialistic Hegelianism then being worked out by Karl Marx. Formally analyzed, Bakunin's attitudes seem to reflect elements from both of these thinkers. But the spirit of his life and utterances—his perplexing blend of brotherhood and nihilism, of idyllic anarchy and vindictive autocracy—must be understood in the light of his ironic personal situation. For the fact was that an expatriate with dreams and compulsions such as his found it more troublesome than did most of his contemporaries, respectable and otherwise, to cloak himself in one of the nationalistic crusades or militantly rational ideologies of the era.

In 1849 Bakunin was imprisoned for his share in an abortive revolt in Dresden. After eight harrowing years in the dungeons of Saxony, Austria, and Russia he was shipped to Siberia. Though only forty-three, he was by now an old man, flabby, toothless, and disfigured by scurvy. Yet the genie, to use Edmund Wilson's words, was out of his bottle. In 1861 he escaped from Russia and returned to Europe via Yokohama, San Francisco, Panama, and New York.

From this time until his death in 1876 he once again traveled back and forth across Europe. Gradually abandoning his faith in Pan-Slavism and other nationalist movements, Bakunin organized a society of International Brothers, which soon

became the conspiratorial core of an International Alliance of Socialist Democracy. Of Bakunin's oratory a contemporary wrote: "His speech had neither logical sequence nor richness in ideas, but consisted of thrilling phrases and rousing appeals. It was something elemental and incandescent—a raging storm with lightning flashes and thunderclaps, and a roaring as of lions. . . . The revolution was his natural being. . . . If he had asked his hearers to cut each other's throats, they would have cheerfully obeyed him." Bakunin's spellbinding, his allusions to a mystical "invisible dictatorship" of the revolutionary future, and his wily attempts to infiltrate Marx's International Workingmen's Association (the "First International") for a short time threatened to prejudice the future of Marxian communism. At length, however, Bakuninism was undermined by its inconsistencies and impracticability, and gave way before the more sober and ostensibly logical formulae of Marxism. Disillusioned both with the masses and with "Jesuitical trickery," Bakunin retired before his death to Italy. There in his villa, according to a disciple, "the hard cunning light would go out of his eyes, and sadness would contract his features and lie like a shadow about his lips."

In retrospect, however, the triumph of Marxism seems partly illusory. Bakunin's ideal stateless society of federated communes may now have the appearance, to be sure, of another relic in the showcase of discarded utopias. But the promulgation of this vision of peace and freedom by a scheming, secretive, and tyrannically disciplined band of conspirators is an irony of a sort generic to modern political life. In many ways the accents of Bakunin's *Catechism of the Revolutionist* have become more urgent than the somewhat pedantic, "scientific" dialectics of Marxism. Max Nomad in fact asserts that "basically most of Leninism was merely Bakuninism clothed in Marxist verbiage." The heirs of Bakunin have been legion. But the secret cadres of twentieth-century communism both inside and outside of imperial Russia, and subsequently of the Soviet Union, are the most conspicuous among them.

The *Catechism* is one of the most notorious of all revolutionary documents. It was drawn up in cipher by Bakunin in 1869 and was taken into Russia by his treacherous protégé, Sergei Nechayev, the apostle of terrorism whose example was to inspire so many of the "activists" among the Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks. There the *Catechism*, which had been designed as a conspirator's handbook, was seized by the Russian police and printed in an official gazette to expose the perniciousness of revolutionism. Anarchists were dismayed by this disclosure of the *Catechism's* anti-libertarian principles and were for over half a century successful in disavowing Bakunin's authorship. The document presents Bakunin primarily as a theoretician of the conspiratorial party and only secondarily in his rôle as an anarchist. It also—like such novels as Stendhal's *The Charterhouse of Parma*, Henry James' *The Princess Casamassima* and Joseph Conrad's *The Secret Agent*—conveys the flavor of conspiratorial Europe from the days of Metternich down to our own time. And—like Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons* and Dostoevski's *The Possessed*—it prophetically depicts the ambivalences of terrorism which have become so prominently a part of the modern conscience.

Bakuninism was merely one of nineteenth-century Europe's most dramatic instances of an allegedly enlightened, humanitarian crusade being carried out under auspices of opportunism and rabid fanaticism. The society and prevailing thought of the times broadly exhibited such discontinuities, and, if one excepts a few

discerning critics like Kierkegaard, de Tocqueville and Nietzsche, they went largely unperceived.

The *Catechism* appears in Max Nomad's *Apostles of Revolution* (pp. 228-33; Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1939) and is reprinted here with the permission of Mr. Nomad, who translated it from the Russian.



CATECHISM OF THE REVOLUTIONIST

THE REVOLUTIONIST'S ATTITUDE TOWARD HIMSELF

1. The revolutionist is a doomed man. He has no personal interests, no affairs, sentiments, attachments, property, not even a name of his own. Everything in him is absorbed by one exclusive interest, one thought, one passion—the revolution.

2. In the very depth of his being, not merely in word but in deed, he has broken every connection with the social order and with the whole educated world, with all the laws, appearances, and generally accepted conventions and moralities of that world which he considers his ruthless foe. Should he continue to live in it, it will be solely for the purpose of destroying it the more surely.

3. The revolutionist despises every sort of doctrinairism and has renounced the peaceful scientific pursuits, leaving them to future generations. He knows only one science, the science of destruction. For this and only for this purpose he makes a study of mechanics, physics, chemistry, and possibly medicine. For this purpose he studies day and night the living science of human beings, their characters, situations, and all the conditions of the present social system in its various strata. The object is but one—the quickest possible destruction of that ignoble system.

4. He despises public opinion. He despises and hates the present day code of morals with all its motivations and manifestations. To him whatever aids the triumph of the revolution is ethical; all that which hinders it is unethical and criminal.

5. The revolutionist is a doomed man. He is merciless toward the State and toward the entire system of privileged educated classes; he need in turn expect no mercy from them. Between him and them there is a continuous and irreconcilable war to the bitter end—whether it be waged openly or secretly. He must be ready to die at any moment. He must train himself to stand torture.

6. Rigorous towards himself, he must also be severe towards others. All tender, softening sentiments of kinship, friendship, love, gratitude, and even honor itself must be snuffed out in him by the one cold passion of the revolutionary cause. For him there is only one satisfaction, consolation and delight—the success of the revolution. Day and night he must have one thought, one aim—inexorable destruction. Striving coldly and unfalteringly towards this aim, he must be ready to perish himself and to destroy with his own hands everything that hinders its realization.

7. The nature of a real revolutionist precludes every bit of sentimentality, romanticism, of infatuation and exaltation. It precludes even personal hatred and revenge. Revolutionary passion having become a normal phenomenon, it must be combined with cold calculation. At all times and places the revolutionist must not be that towards which he is impelled by personal impulses, but that which the general interests of the revolution dictate.

THE RELATIONS OF THE REVOLUTIONIST TOWARD HIS COMRADES IN THE CAUSE

8. A revolutionist may feel friendship or attachment only for those who have proven themselves by their actions to be revolutionists like himself. The measure of friendship, devotion, and other obligations towards such a comrade is determined solely by the degree of his usefulness to the cause of the all-destructive revolution.

9. Solidarity of the revolutionists goes without saying. The whole strength of the revolutionary cause is based on it. The fellow revolutionists who stand on the same plane of revolutionary understanding and ardor must, as far as possible, discuss all important matters jointly and decide them unanimously. In the execution of a plan thus decided upon, however, everyone must, as far as possible, count upon himself. In carrying out acts of destruction each one must act alone and resort to the counsel and aid of comrades only when this is necessary for success.

10. Each comrade must have at hand several revolutionists of the second and third degree, *i.e.* such as are not entirely initiated. He must consider them as part of the common revolutionary capital placed at his disposal. He must spend his portion of the capital economically, always striving to extract the greatest possible use from it. He is to consider himself as capital, fated to be spent for the triumph of the revolutionary cause; however, he has no right personally and alone to dispose of that capital, without the consent of the aggregate of the fully initiated.

11. When a comrade comes to grief, in deciding the question whether or not to save him, the revolutionists must take into consideration not his per-

sonal feelings, but solely the interests of the revolutionary cause. Therefore, he must weigh on the one hand the useful work contributed by the comrade, and, on the other, the expenditure of revolutionary forces necessary to rescue him, and he is to decide according to which side outweighs the other.

THE REVOLUTIONIST'S RELATIONS WITH SOCIETY

12. The admission into the organization of a new member, who has proven himself not in words but in deeds, can be effected only by unanimous agreement.

13. The revolutionist enters the world of the State and of the educated privileged classes and lives in it only for the purpose of its fullest and quickest destruction. He is not a revolutionist if he is attached to anything in this world, if he can stop before the annihilation of any situation,¹ relation, or person belonging to this world—everybody and everything must be equally hateful to him. All the worse for him if he has any relations of kinship, friendship or love; he is not a revolutionist if they can stop his hand.

14. For the purpose of ruthless destruction, the revolutionist may and frequently must live in society, pretending to be something entirely different from what he is. The revolutionist must penetrate everywhere, into all the higher and middle classes, the merchant's store, the church, the nobleman's home, the bureaucratic world and military circles, into literature, into the Third Department [Secret Police], and even into the Tsar's Winter Palace.

15. The whole ignoble social system must be divided into several categories. In the first category are those who are condemned to die without delay. The association should draw up a list of persons thus condemned in the order of their relative harmfulness to the success of the cause so that the preceding numbers may be removed before the subsequent ones.

16. In making up such lists and for the purpose of establishing the above-mentioned order, one should by no means be guided by the personal villainy of the individual, nor even by the hatred which he calls forth in the association or among the people. This villainy and this hatred may even be partly useful by helping to arouse the masses to revolt. It is necessary to be guided by the measure of usefulness which would result, from his death, to the revolutionary cause. Thus, first of all, those men must be destroyed who are particularly harmful to the revolutionary organization and also those whose sudden and violent death may fill the government with the greatest fear and shake its power by depriving it of its clever and energetic men.

17. The second category must consist of persons whose lives would be

¹ [Our translation follows closely the original, which is somewhat carelessly worded.—Trans.]

spared only temporarily so that, by a series of brutal acts, they may bring the people to the point of inevitable revolt.

18. To the third category belong a great many brutes in high positions not distinguished either by any particular intellect or energy, but—due to their position—enjoying riches, connections, influence and power. It is necessary to exploit them in every possible way; trap them, confound them, and, getting hold of their dirty secrets as far as possible, turn them into one's slaves. Their power, influence, connections, riches and strength will thus become the inexhaustible treasury and support of various revolutionary enterprises.

19. The fourth category consists of ambitious officeholders and liberals of various shades. One may conspire with them in accordance with their programs, making them believe that one follows them blindly and at the same time one should take hold of them, get possession of all their secrets, compromise them to the utmost, so that no avenue of escape may be left to them, and use them as instruments for stirring up disturbances in the State.

20. The fifth category—doctrinaires [refers to Bakunin's opponents within the revolutionary camp], conspirators, revolutionists talking idly in groups and on paper. They must be continually pushed and pulled forward, towards practical neck-breaking statements, the result of which would be the complete destruction of the majority and the real revolutionary training of a few.

21. The sixth and very important category includes women who should be classified under three main divisions: some—empty-headed, stupid, soulless, who may be used like the third and fourth categories of men; others—ardent, devoted, capable, but not with us because they have not yet worked themselves up to the real phraseless and genuine revolutionary understanding; they are to be made use of like the men of the fifth category; finally, women, entirely ours, *i.e.* fully initiated and having completely accepted our program. They are our comrades. We must look upon them as our most precious treasure, without the aid of which we cannot get along.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE ASSOCIATION TOWARD THE PEOPLE

22. The Association has no aim other than the complete liberation and happiness of the masses, *i.e.* of the people who live by manual labor. But, convinced that this liberation and the achievement of this happiness is possible only through an all-destroying popular revolution, the Association will by all its means and all its power further the development and extension of those evils and those calamities which must at last exhaust the patience of the people and drive them to a general uprising.

23. By Revolution the Association does not understand a regulated movement after the classical western model—a movement which, always bowing to

the property rights and the traditions of the social systems of so-called civilization and morality, has until now limited itself everywhere to the overthrow of one political form in order to replace it by another and striven to create a so-called revolutionary state. Only that revolution will be beneficial to the people which will destroy at the very root every vestige of statehood and will annihilate all of Russia's state traditions, institutions and classes.

24. The Association therefore does not intend to foist on the people any organization from above. The future organization will no doubt evolve out of the popular movement and out of life itself. But this is the business of future generations. Our business is destruction, terrible, complete, universal, and merciless.

25. Therefore, in getting closer to the people, we must first of all join those elements of the masses which, since the foundation of the Moscow State powers, have never ceased to protest, not in words alone but in deed as well, against everything which is directly or indirectly connected with the State: against the nobility, the bureaucracy, the clergy, the guilds [meaning the merchants and capitalists in general] and against the parasitic kulak. Let us join hands with the bold world of bandits—the only genuine revolutionists in Russia.

26. To consolidate this world into one invincible, all-destroying force is the sole object of our organization; this is our conspiracy, our task.

VI

POLITICAL LIBERALISM IN A CLIMATE OF NATIONALISM: I

DUKE OF WELLINGTON ON THE REFORM BILL

NO MAN STANDS TRUER to type than the Duke of Wellington (1769-1852) the perfect British Tory. Soldier, statesman, landed gentleman of noble birth, profoundly loyal to the Crown, the Iron Duke served his country for over fifty years with a rigid devotion and a stern sense of duty. He was no blind reactionary, incapable of accepting the least modification in things to which he was accustomed. His Toryism, which rose from his entire life and career, rested on a sense of Britain's achievements, and on his belief that these, in turn, rested on the institutions which had developed over centuries and taken form in the Glorious Revolution. Thus he was quick to accept the July Revolution in France, holding that the preservation of the peace of Europe far outweighed the maintenance of the structure which he had helped to build in 1815. He led some of his unwilling Tory followers, while losing others, into passage of the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829, declaring that the only alternative was revolution and civil war.

But Wellington would not tolerate the actions of mobs or threats to the cautious balance of the British Constitution. On both these scores, and because his principles of government were at stake, he steadfastly opposed Parliamentary Reform by means of reapportionment and the extension of the suffrage. Reform petitions had been pouring into Parliament for a number of years; "Political Unions" were meeting throughout the country; the middle class were striving for their share of power; and the masses joined them in the hope that they would benefit from an extended suffrage, even though they were not included. Economic depression stimulated unrest, and continental revolutions inspired British agitation. But the Tories, while admitting that there were irregularities and imperfections, held to Edmund Burke's belief that the nation was "virtually represented" by the traditional system. They maintained that the well-to-do would be guided by community interest to act for the good of all. The Duke of Wellington accordingly took an irretrievable stand against Reform in the debate on the Address in Answer to the King's Speech opening Parliament in the fall of 1830. When he resumed his seat he turned to Lord Aberdeen, the Foreign Secretary, and asked "I have not said too much, have I?" Aberdeen was acquainted with the temper of Commons and country, and later remarked that the Duke had ". . . said that we are going out." And shortly thereafter his government fell.

The Whigs, under Earl Grey, took office, and introduced a reform measure. A dissolution of Parliament resulted, and the Whigs emerged strengthened from the election. A second bill was introduced, passed the Commons and was rejected by the Lords. A third time the measure was passed by the House of Commons. When the House of Lords rejected the bill once more, Grey called upon King William IV to name enough Whig Peers to override the Tory majority in the upper house. The King refused, Grey resigned, and Wellington was summoned to resume the office of Prime Minister. He tried to form a Tory Cabinet, with the intention of

passing a moderate Reform Bill and thereby drawing the sting from the reform movement. Wellington was not much concerned with parties. He was guided by his conception of his duties as the King's servant, not by party regularity. But the Tory party rejected the political inconsistency of voting for reform, and the country was severely disturbed by the impending return to power of the Tory Duke, whose motives were not generally understood. Wellington was forced to inform the King of his failure, and advise him to recall Earl Grey and the Whigs, with the promise to create the necessary number of new peers. The House of Lords retreated before this final blow, Tory peers abstained from voting, and the Reform Bill was passed in 1832.

This law redistributed one hundred forty-three seats in the House of Commons, removing some of the most glaring inequalities of representation, and reduced property requirements for voting. It was the first of a series of measures, followed by those of 1867, 1884, 1885, 1918, and 1928, which brought England universal suffrage for both sexes.

The following selections were taken from Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, 3d series, Vol. III.



DEBATE ON THE REFORM BILL

HOUSE OF LORDS, MARCH 28, 1831

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON must say, in the outset, that up to the present moment he had heard nothing like an answer to the able address of his noble friend (Lord Wharncliffe) near him; and he had not, therefore, wished to address their Lordships until he heard the speech of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack.¹ That noble and learned Lord had only done him justice in supposing that his opinions had undergone no change since the declaration he had made to their Lordships at the opening of the Session. In his opinion, the state of the Representation ought not to be changed. In his opinion they could, on principle, no more deprive one of these boroughs of their franchise, without delinquency being proved, than they could deprive him of his seat in that House, or of his title, or the noble Lord on the Woolsack of his estate. The right in both cases was the same, and he contended that that argument had been held over and over again in that House, and would be held again, if the case of Liverpool should ever be brought forward. That House had always required proof of delinquency before it would consent to any act of disfranchisement. He admitted that there were circumstances of necessity, which would get rid of this strict letter of the law, as they

¹ [Lord Brougham, Whig Lord Chancellor, who presided by sitting on the "Woolsack."]

would get rid of the strict letter of the law in other cases; but he contended, that no circumstances of necessity, upon this subject, had, till this moment, been made out. Even the eloquent speech of the noble and learned Lord had done nothing to establish it. At the close of his speech, indeed, the noble and learned Lord had talked of the people who laboured by the sweat of their brow, and who shed their blood in our armies; but these were not the persons to whom this Bill gave the elective franchise—it was given to altogether another class of persons. On all this, the noble and learned Lord went upon the principle of expediency, as well as he did. But the noble and learned Lord, and his noble friend near him, had both left out of consideration, that it was the creation of a legislative assembly they were to look to, and not what the voters were to be—that they were to consider what a House of Commons ought to be, and not what the constituents ought to be. This, he contended, it was the duty of the Government to consider in framing a measure of this kind. But he had not yet done with the matter of principle. The noble and learned Lord had admitted that he would have preferred to keep some of the rotten boroughs in the place of other boroughs, but what then became of the noble and learned Lord's principle? The principle was at once given up here. Well, but he had said that they were to look more to the formation of a House of Commons, than to the formation of an elective body upon the principle of population. Now he thought that the present House of Commons was as complete a one as could be formed. He contended that the House of Commons, particularly since the peace, had shown itself to be the most efficient legislative body in the world, without any exception. It had rendered more services than any other House of Commons in this country during the same length of time. He contended that it had continued to render those services till the close of last Session; that it was prepared to continue them still in this Session; and that it was only interrupted by the introduction of the discussion of this subject of Reform. He would refer to the opinion of the noble Marquis (Lansdown) opposite, whom he always heard with great delight, whose opinions he believed did not much differ from his own, and who had said, that if he had to form a House of Commons, he would form one like the present, giving a large preponderance to property, and the most to landed property. . . . [It] was said that it became necessary for the Government to propose some plan of Reform in the representative system. Now, he must say here, that some observations which had fallen from the noble Lord, the Privy Seal, and from the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, were not quite correct as to facts; and upon those observations he felt himself called upon to make some remarks. It was quite true, that when the late Government brought forward the Catholic question, they were sup-

ported by many noble Lords who were generally in opposition to the Government. He had the misfortune on that occasion to lose the support and regard of a great number of friends, both there and in the other House of Parliament. That was a misfortune which he should never cease to lament; yet he had the consolation of knowing, that what he then did was no more than his public duty required of him. Believing, as he did, that civil war must be the consequence of continuing to refuse the settlement of that question, he thought that he should have been wanting in his duty, both as a man and as a minister, if he had hesitated to give up his former views with regard to that measure. Certainly the part he had taken on that occasion had lost him the confidence of many of his former friends, and the noble Lords who supported him in that measure were not willing to lend him the same support on the other measures which he thought necessary for the good of the country. Nevertheless, he thought he was bound to remain in the position he then occupied, as long as he enjoyed the confidence of his Sovereign, and the support of the House of Commons. He might, he believed, have continued in that position, but the late revolution in France had occurred at a critical period. Like former revolutions, such as those in Spain and Naples, it certainly did create a very great sensation in this country, and a strong desire was excited by speeches in various places, and by the spirit developed at the elections for Parliamentary Reform,—a desire more strong on the part of the people than had been displayed for many years with respect to any political object. But he did not then, nor did he now, think that desire irresistible—to be sure it would be irresistible if Parliament thought proper to make the alterations demanded in our representative system,—but if it should decide otherwise, he believed the country would in this, as in other instances, submit to the decision of Parliament. He admitted that there had been a growing wish for Parliamentary Reform in the country, but he thought that if the question were fairly discussed in Parliament, and if, after a fair hearing of the case, Parliament should decide against it, the country would submit without a murmur. The fashion resulting from the example of the French and Belgian revolutions had now subsided—people saw the consequences of revolution to be distress and ruin; and his belief was, if Parliament in its wisdom decided that Reform was not to be carried, that the country would submit to the decision. . . . He came now to the circumstance of the members of the present Government taking office, and he found the noble Earl ² stating, on the first opportunity after having occupied office, the three principles of his Government; and these were,—Retrenchment, Peace and Reform. As for Retrenchment, and Peace, he maintained that there existed no difference between the noble Earl and himself. . . . Parliamentary Reform

² [Earl Grey, then Whig Prime Minister, who speaks later in the debate.]

was the remaining question,—for the introduction of that it appeared Ministers had obtained the consent of his Majesty, and certainly it appeared that his Majesty's name had been used upon the subject, and, he believed, frequently by persons who were by no means authorised to use it, and also upon occasions when it ought not to have been used. It was true Government had the sanction of his Majesty to bring forward the question of Reform—perhaps this measure of Reform; but to say his Majesty had taken a more active part in the matter than was implied in taking the advice of his Ministers, was not constitutional; and such being the case, he could not consider the assertion as being founded in fact. Let their Lordships look at what such a measure ought to be, and let them see what the measure was which had been brought forward by the Ministers. A measure of Parliamentary Reform brought forward by Government ought to be a measure which should enable Government to carry on the King's service in Parliament according to the Constitution as it was established at the Revolution, and as it had since proceeded. How had the public service been carried on since the Revolution? By persons of talent, property, and knowledge—scientific, political, commercial, and manufacturing,—men connected with or representing all the great interests of the country,—men noted for great abilities, who on all occasions had been a conservative party in the State, and who had supported the power and glory of the country in war, and had promoted her prosperity in peace during the last 140 years. If the country were to lose such a Parliament, Ministers were bound to see that their new system of election should be such as would secure the King's Government the support of this other Parliament when formed upon the new principle. Look at the new system. His noble friend, who had addressed the House earlier in the debate, stated with great clearness what would be the result of the Bill in certain respects. His noble friend stated, that throughout the towns of England and Wales many existing interests would be interfered with, and he also stated the effect of giving votes to £10 householders for counties. His noble friend's statements well deserved the attention of their Lordships. He himself had examined the Bill with reference to its effects on the county of Southampton. In that county were several towns—Winchester, Christchurch, Portsmouth, Southampton, and the borough of Lymington. Several boroughs in this county were struck out of the Representation by the Bill, and there were besides a number of considerable towns left unrepresented; but the voters of these places were to come into the county constituency. According to the old system, only the freeholders had votes for the county, but according to the new system the inhabitants of these unrepresented towns would have votes for the county. Now copyholders and £50 lease-holders were to vote for the county. In the towns those two classes were for the most part shopkeepers.

He was convinced that there were not less than 4,000 or 5,000 such inhabitants of towns in Hampshire, who would come to have votes for the county as well as for the freeholders. Now, of whom did this class of electors consist? As he had before stated, they were shopkeepers—respectable shopkeepers—in towns. He begged to ask, were they fit persons to be the only electors to return county Members to a Parliament which was to govern the affairs of this great nation, consisting of 100,000,000 of subjects, and so many various relations, foreign, domestic, colonial, commercial, and manufacturing? Men of the description he had mentioned, with their prejudices and peculiar interests, however respectable as a body, could not be fit to be the only electors of Members of the House of Commons. But he begged to say, that however respectable this or any other class of electors might be, there was a strong reason against any uniformity of system in the Representation of the country. He had heard already of the establishment in this town of a Committee formed for the purpose of recommending candidates for the Representation to the different towns throughout the country. Now, considering the means of combination, and the facilities of communication which existed, he thought such a body dangerous. Associations of a like kind had been found effectual in other countries to put down the Government. Was it fit to establish such a uniform system of election (he cared not in whose hands placed), that any Committee sitting in London could guide the determination of the entire country with respect to the Representation? He wanted to know what security there would be for their Lordships' seats in that House if such a Committee existed at the first general election of a Reformed Parliament? He was in France at the period when the law of elections was passed in 1817, at that period there were in each department 300 persons, who, paying the highest amount of taxes, were chosen to manage the Representation. The King and Government altered this, and gave the power of choosing representatives to persons paying taxes to the amount of 300 francs. Two years afterwards they were obliged to alter the law again, and form two classes of electors. Since then there had been two general elections, one more unfavourable than the other to the Government, and the matter ended in the formation of a Parliament, the spirit of which rendered it impossible for a Government to act. . . . He was not the apologist of Prince Polignac; but things had been brought to that state in France, that it was impossible there should not be a revolution. When he saw a similar mode of election recommended in this country—when he saw the adoption of a uniform system of election—when he saw the election placed in the hands of shopkeepers in towns and boroughs all over the country—he thought that we incurred considerable danger, and did put the country in that situation that no Minister could be certain that any

one measure which he brought forward would succeed, or that he would be enabled to carry on the Government. The circumstances of France and England were in many particulars alike, and we ought to take warning by the dangers of the neighbouring country. He wished the House to advert to what the business of the King's Government in Parliament was. It was the duty of that Government to manage every thing. He had heard the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, in a speech of admirable eloquence and knowledge, propose a new judicial system at the commencement of the Session; but he maintained that it would be impossible for the Government ultimately to decide on that question, and he told the noble and learned Lord this—that if a Parliament were constructed on the new plan, it would be too strong for Government on that and many similar questions. So, also, in matters affecting commerce and manufactures, Government would depend entirely upon Parliament. He wanted to know how Government was to carry any measure on the appointment of a new Parliament. There was a great question now before the House of Commons on the subject of tithes. A Government might submit to the will of a majority opposed to its own views on other questions, but on the questions of Tithes and the Church, its duty was clearly pointed out, the King's Coronation Oath, and the acts of Union with Scotland and Ireland, guaranteeing the integrity of the Church establishment. But he wanted to know how Government was to maintain the safety of the Established Church, after placing Parliament on the footing proposed. He did not wish to carry this argument farther than it would safely go; but he inferred from every thing he could see, that the Government of the country could not be carried on as hitherto, if this plan were adopted. In such an event we must alter the Constitution. He did not say the Crown could not be preserved: the King's power might be limited and confined to the management of the Army, Navy, &c.; but that would not be the English Constitution,—the country could no longer go on as before—it would not be the same England. Assuming that the concession of the Catholic question, and that the Union with Ireland were great alterations, as the noble and learned Lord stated, in the Constitution, still they were both resorted to on the principle of expediency, which was clearly made out, and he could not admit that the expediency of the present measure had been demonstrated. On the contrary, all experience warranted him in saying, that the present Legislature had answered its purposes remarkably well, and that there must arise great danger, if not irreparable mischief, from altering its composition. The great difference, therefore, between those departures from the Constitution and the present measure was, that they were warranted by expediency, and it is not. He regretted being compelled to differ from many of his political friends with respect to Reform,

but duty obliged him to do so. He had no desire for any thing, except to be useful for the service of the public in any way that might be required. He had no personal reasons for communicating his opinions; he spoke them broadly and openly, with a view to the country benefitting by their expression. He wished to God he could convince the noble Earl and his colleagues of the error into which they had fallen on the subject of Reform, being convinced that they would place the country in the greatest possible peril if they passed the Bill in its present shape. . . .

EARL GREY⁸ found it impossible to remain silent after listening to the speech of the noble Duke opposite, though if he had consulted his own case, he certainly should not have addressed their Lordships at that late hour. He would begin by expressing the same wish towards the noble Duke, as the noble Duke had expressed with respect to him. He wished to God he could cure the noble Duke of the error into which he thought his Grace had fallen. The noble Duke thought him in error; he thought the noble Duke mistaken—which was right, time would show. He believed there was hardly one man in the House, and but a very small proportion of persons in the country, who concurred with the noble Duke in opinion, that there was nothing in the state of the Representation of the people in Parliament, or in the circumstances and character of the times, which required any alteration to be made in those laws by which the Representation of the people in Parliament was at present constituted. This opinion the noble Duke was pledged to,—that the system was perfect as it stood—that all those things which others called abuses, had contributed to the glory and welfare of the country,—that the abuses were an essential part of the system,—and that, if we attempted to correct them, we at once put an end to the glory, power, and prosperity of the empire. This was a bold doctrine, which few men could be brought to concur in; even the noble Duke himself did not say that one of those generally united with him in political principles agreed with him in this opinion. In all the discussions on the subject, he had hardly heard one person venture to say, that situated as this country was, and in the present state of public opinion, it was impossible to proceed safely without some attempt to restore the satisfaction and confidence of the people, by giving them a share in the right of Representation to which they considered themselves (and he thought justly considered themselves) entitled. The noble Duke had stated the circumstances under which he thought the question arose, and it was a satisfaction to him to hear, not only from his noble friend who opened the Debate, but also from the noble Duke, statements that relieved him from a charge under which he felt a good deal of uneasiness—namely, that to him and his colleagues was owing

⁸ [Whig; Prime Minister.]

that state of excitement at present existing in the country, which alone seemed to make some change necessary. . . . He gathered from the noble Duke's own account of the matter, that there was existing in the country—the thing was manifested at the general election—a strong desire (whether augmented, as the noble Duke supposed, by the Belgian or French Revolution, or occasioned by some other cause), a strong desire among the people to procure parliamentary Reform. Nay, the noble Duke had gone farther; he acknowledged that this inclination was so far indulged in by the House of Commons itself, that if he had remained much longer in office, he apprehended the question might have been carried against him. The noble Duke had admitted then that there existed in the country, and in the House of Commons, at the time the present Government came into office, so strong a feeling in favour of Parliamentary Reform that it was impossible for the Government to avoid taking that subject into its earliest consideration. . . . A complaint had been made which, he thought, was reiterated by the noble Duke, of the use which had been made of the King's name on this occasion. The noble Duke admitted that the question could not have been introduced to Parliament by Ministers without the King's consent; but declared that nothing should have been said with respect to his Majesty for the purpose of influencing the votes of Members of Parliament. The noble Duke was quite correct in his position. The House, however, was frequently informed, by a Message from the Crown itself, that the Monarch was aware of particular measures recommended to him by his Ministers. This course was pursued with respect to the Catholic Question, when a noble Duke advised his Majesty to recommend to Parliament, in a Speech from the Throne to adopt measures on the subject. He could not but recollect the strong and emphatic manner in which the noble Duke, in introducing the Catholic Relief Bill into the House, stated that he had the cordial support of his late Majesty to that measure. He did not mean to instance one wrong act as an excuse for another, but when such complaints were made from such quarters, he might plead example by way of mitigation of censure. It had also been said, that he had resorted to threats. He had held out no threat, and he meant to hold out none—he was not authorised to hold out any, and he hoped that he knew his duty too well as a Minister of the Crown to say anything until he had received his Majesty's sanction. He would only repeat what he stated on a former occasion, that he thought the measure of Reform now recommended by the Ministers of the Crown was of the greatest importance to the well-being of the country; to that measure he was committed heart and soul, and he would not shrink from giving his advice to his Majesty to adopt every constitutional means to carry it into effect. The noble Duke said, that if the measure should become a law, it would be impossible

that the business of the Government should be carried on. He did not understand how the noble Duke made out that proposition. The noble Duke said, rather curiously, that it should have been the object of Ministers to look rather to the constitution of the assembly than to the qualification of the voters. What Ministers had looked to, certainly, was the composition of the legislative assembly. It was an error to suppose that the consideration of the two things could be separated. The noble Duke said, the effect of the measure would be to add 5,000 voters to the constituent body in Hampshire. He could hardly believe it possible that the noble Duke was correctly informed upon this point, because the whole constituent body in Hampshire at the present moment was only 8,000 or 9,000. The noble Duke said, that after the Bill should pass, it would be impossible for Government to carry any questions relating to finance, colonial policy, and other intricate subjects. What was this but saying that the Government need no longer have the power of dictating what the decision of the House of Commons should be? The noble Duke shook his head, but that was really the result of his argument. He believed that the Government would continue to possess all the influence which it ought to have, and that, relying on the confidence of the people, there was no fear of the salutary measures which it might propose not being carried into effect. The noble Duke had endeavoured to excite alarm by dwelling on the subject of tithes. The people of England were attached to the national church establishment, and a free Representation of the people would, however they might correct the abuses, which were not the strength but the weakness of the Church, never countenance any attempt to invade the just rights of the establishment. There were several points to which he should have wished to call their Lordships' attention but for the lateness of the hour: but there was one point which he could not pass over. It was objected to the measure, that it was not a resting-place; that it would necessarily lead to ulterior consequences, which would be fatal to the peace and security of the empire. "Give," it was said, "to those who clamour for Reform, the measure you now propose, and they will force you to go forward to extremes which you would wish in vain to avoid." He believed that the result would be the very reverse. The prospect of the measure had given almost universal satisfaction, and he had no doubt that it would unite all those who were at present in a state of discontent in attachment to the Government. But supposing, which he did not, that such might be the consequences, how would it be remedied by not granting Reform? The noble Lord saw that Reform was irresistible; that, whatever Government was at the head of affairs, it could not exist, if it did not do something to satisfy the expectations of the people. No paltry, no half measure would do; there must be something, he admitted, substantial and effective.

Then what he (Earl Grey) wished, with his noble and learned friend on the Woolsack, was to bring those persons who held his opinion to state what was the measure they meant to propose. If he knew what that substantial and effective measure was, he should then be able to give an opinion. Short of this measure it must be less satisfactory to the people, and then would be more likely to lead to those extremes which his noble friend wished to avoid. The difference between his noble friend and himself was this—his noble friend was for an extension of the right of voting, and for the extinction of boroughs, for he admitted that not only was Reform necessary, but he admitted the principle of disfranchisement; he would go a certain length, but he would not go the whole length of this measure, and he would consequently leave discontent behind. The measure would be an imperfect measure, founded on admitted principles. It could not give satisfaction, and therefore all the consequences predicted from the present measure,—but which he did not expect,—would certainly flow from the partial Reform alluded to by his noble friend. With respect to the measure of Reform, he had considered himself pledged to it when out of office, and still more when in office, from a sense of public duty. He thought the state of the country required that the question should be looked at, and he asked himself what was to be done? Should he bring forward a short measure, that should “keep the word of promise to the ear and break it to the hope?” or should he bring forward a measure that would afford a reasonable hope of satisfying the people, and would put an end to the agitation by which the country was disturbed? He had been represented as if he had gone further than the intention he had at first held out. Undoubtedly he had said moderate Reform, but at the same time effective Reform, such as would produce the effect of satisfying the country. The first disposition of his mind undoubtedly was to limit the Reform within a much narrower compass; but after full consideration, and discussing the subject with his colleagues, he was convinced that nothing short of the present measure would tend to the desired result of satisfying the country, and give to the Government security and respect. Founded upon these principles the measure had been introduced, and had received the general approbation of the country. It had operated like oil on troubled water; agitation had subsided, and he had every expectation, that if the measure was suffered to pass into a law there would be a season of peace and tranquility, of improvement to the wealth and prosperity of the country, and an addition of strength to the Government, such as had not been witnessed for years past. Some persons had expressed a surprise that no opposition was made to it, but the current of opinion set too strong the other way. It would not do, at the present day, to talk of county meetings as farces, or to say they

were not attended by a large proportion of the freeholders. Look at the meetings in Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Cheshire, counties which had hitherto been most adverse to Reform; look at the respectable names of the persons who attended those meetings, and then let their Lordships say if the question had not been favourably received by persons of all parties, and even by persons who were eminently Tories. There never had been a measure regarding which public opinion had so nearly approached to unanimity. He would refer to a criterion upon this head, sanctioned by an authority which even the noble Duke would think entitled to respect. In the discussion on the Catholic Question, a right hon. Gentleman had stated the proportion of counties and principal towns for and against that measure. He stated that there were nineteen counties for, and seventeen against the measure of Catholic Emancipation; of principal towns, twenty-six were for and nineteen against the measure. Assuming that as a practical and correct mode of estimating public opinion, let their Lordships see how that opinion was expressed upon this Question. Taking the same counties and towns, he found that twenty-seven counties were for, and nine against the measure; of principal towns, there were thirty-seven for, and eight against it. The noble Duke had said that if Parliament should reject the measure, he was satisfied the country would submit without a murmur. He would admit that, if the measure were rejected, there might be no opposition to the authority of the law or a throwing off attachment or allegiance to the Government and he trusted and hoped such would be the result; but that there would not be a murmur, let not the noble Duke "lay that flattering unction to his soul." That there would be a general attempt, by legal and constitutional means, to urge on Parliament the adoption of the measure, he had no doubt; there would be discontent and agitation throughout the country, which would be kept in alarm and irritation; and the consequence would be, a state of things similar to that which preceded Catholic Emancipation in Ireland. The very persons who now reject the measure would then find themselves obliged to agree to it. He had supported Catholic Emancipation for more than thirty years, through good report and evil report; he had been driven from office by an endeavour to make a slight step towards it; and it was a sacrifice he willingly made for that object. In all the discussions he had heard on that question, it had been contended that Catholic Emancipation must produce the subversion of the Constitution and the separation of the two countries. No man had argued more strongly against that measure than the noble Duke. He remembered the noble Duke saying that it was not Catholic Emancipation that Ireland wanted; adding—for the words sank deep into his ear—that Ireland had never been more than half conquered. These opinions had been uttered as

confidently by the same persons who opposed Catholic Emancipation, as they now predicted similar results from Reform. But at the end of a few years these persons found the error they laboured under in resisting those claims, and the measure of Emancipation was proposed by those very men. Had the discovery been made sooner, the evils which now oppressed Ireland would perhaps have disappeared. The same would be the case in the event of the rejection of the proposition for Reform. Granted at the present moment, the people would consider it as an act of grace; refused, who could predict the consequences of the rejection? It was a rejection which might destroy the present Administration; but how would it operate on their successors? The people, disappointed of their just expectations, would be inflamed with resentment; and would eventually demand, with a voice of thunder, that which it would be found impossible longer to deny; but the granting of which would not only be unattended with the advantages that would now accompany its concession, but, in the strong excitement that would then exist, might be productive of evils which no man could foresee—evils that might throw the whole country into irremediable disorder. He was firmly convinced that the present measure would satisfy the people, and as firmly convinced that, without some large and liberal measure of Reform, the Government could not possibly be carried on advantageously for the country.

CHARTISM

AFTER THE COLLAPSE of the Owenite movement in 1834 the energies of radical reformers and of discontented British workingmen during the following two decades found political channels in "Chartism." In 1838 William Lovett (1800-77) and Francis Place (1771-1854) drew up a bill to be presented to Parliament which was widely circulated in London and the provinces as *The People's Charter*. It embodied six demands: equality of representation, universal suffrage, vote by ballot, annual meetings of Parliament, no property qualifications for members of Parliament, and payment to members of Parliament. The *Charter* was presented to Parliament in 1839 where it was rejected, and its rejection led to a series of disorders. In 1842 and again, anticlimactically, in 1848 the *Charter* was vainly laid before the Parliament.

Basically, Chartism was a movement arising among the disaffected who hoped to find in a victory for political democracy a step toward a more generous social democracy. However, agreement on the principle of universal suffrage did not constitute an adequate basis for common action, and the movement was divided between those who would have put aside all other matters until the struggle for political democracy was won and those who saw in Chartism simply another way of registering fundamental economic discontents.

The selections included here give in a concise manner the gist of the demands included in *The People's Charter*. The first selection is the petition authorized at the "Crown and Anchor" meeting on February 28, 1837, and is described in the following words by Lovett: "In February, 1837, our Association [The London Working Men's Association] convened a public meeting at the Crown and Anchor in the Strand for the purpose of petitioning Parliament. . . . The prayer of that petition formed the nucleus of the far-famed *People's Charter*, which may be said to have had its origin at this meeting."

The second selection brings out the economic issues involved in the struggle of the Chartists. It was the first "National Petition" and was presented with the first *People's Charter* along with a list of 1,283,000 signatures. It was written by R. K. Douglas, editor of the *Birmingham Journal*, for the Birmingham Political Union, which was one of the fountainheads in the stream of Chartist agitation.



PETITION AGREED TO AT THE "CROWN AND ANCHOR" MEETING, FEBRUARY 28TH, 1837

TO THE HONORABLE the Commons of Great Britain and Ireland. The Petition of the undersigned Members of the Working Men's Association and others sheweth—

That the only *rational use* of the institutions and laws of society is justly to protect, encourage, and support all that can be made to contribute *to the happiness of all the people*.

That, as the object to be obtained is mutual benefit, so ought the enactment of laws to be by mutual consent.

That obedience to laws can only be *justly enforced* on the certainty that those who are called on to obey them have had, either personally or by their representatives, the power to enact, amend, or repeal them.

That all those who are excluded from this share of political power are not justly included within the operation of the laws; to them the laws are only despotic enactments, and the legislative assembly from whom they emanate can only be considered parties to an unholy compact, devising plans and schemes for taxing and subjecting the many.

That the universal political right of every human being is superior and stands apart from all customs, forms, or ancient usage; a fundamental right not in the power of man to confer, or justly to deprive him of.

That to take away this sacred right from the *person* and to vest it in *property*, is a wilful perversion of justice and common sense, as the creation and security of property *are the consequences of society*—the great object of which is human happiness.

That any constitution or code of laws, formed in violation of men's political and social rights, are not rendered sacred by time nor sanctified by custom.

That the ignorance which originated, or permits their operation, forms no excuse for perpetuating the injustice; nor can aught but force or fraud sustain them, when any considerable number of people perceive and feel their degradation.

That the intent and object of your petitioners are to present such facts before your Honorable House as will serve to convince you and the country at large that you do not represent the people of these realms; and to appeal to your sense of right and justice as well as to every principle of honour, for directly making such legislative enactments as shall cause the mass of the people to be represented; with the view of securing *the greatest amount of happiness to all classes of society*.

Your Petitioners find, by returns ordered by your Honourable House, that the whole people of Great Britain and Ireland are about 24 millions, and that the males above 21 years of age are 6,023,752, who, in the opinion of your petitioners, are justly entitled to the elective right.

That according to S. Wortley's return (ordered by your Honourable House) the number of registered electors, who have the power to vote for members of Parliament, are only 839,519, and of this number only $8\frac{1}{2}$ in 12 give their votes.

That on an analysis of the constituency of the United Kingdom, your petitioners find that 331 members (being a *majority* of your Honourable House) are returned by *one hundred and fifty-one thousand four hundred and ninety-two* registered electors!

That comparing the whole of the male population above the age of 21 with the 151,492 electors, it appears that 1-40 of them, or 1-160 of the entire population, have the power of passing all the laws in your Honourable House.

And your petitioners further find on investigation, that this majority of 331 members are composed of 163 Tories or Conservatives, 134 Whigs and Liberals, and only 34 who call themselves Radicals; and out of this limited number it is questionable whether 10 can be found who are truly the representatives of the wants and wishes of the producing classes.

Your petitioners also find that 15 members of your Honourable House are returned by electors under 200; 55 under 300; 90 under 400; 121 under 500; 150 under 600; 196 under 700; 214 under 800; 240 under 900; and 256 under 1,000; and that many of these constituencies are divided between two members.

They also find that your Honourable House, which is said to be exclusively the people's or the Commons House, contains *two hundred and five persons who are immediately or remotely related to the Peers of the Realm*.

Also that your Honourable House contains 1 marquess, 7 earls, 19 viscounts, 32 lords, 25 right honourables, 52 honourables, 63 baronets, 13 knights, 3 admirals, 7 lord-lieutenants, 42 deputy and vice-lieutenants, 1 general, 5 lieutenant-generals, 9 major-generals, 32 colonels, 33 lieutenant-colonels, 10 majors, 49 captains in army and navy, 10 lieutenants, 2 cornets, 58 barristers, 3 solicitors, 40 bankers, 33 East India proprietors, 13 West India proprietors, 52 place-men, 114 patrons of church livings having the patronage of 274 livings between them; the names of whom your petitioners can furnish at the request of your Honourable House.

Your petitioners therefore respectfully submit to your Honourable House that these facts afford abundant proofs that you do not represent the numbers or the interests of the millions; but that the persons composing it have interests for the most part foreign or directly opposed to the true interests of the great body of the people.

That perceiving the tremendous power you possess over the lives, liberty and labour of the unrepresented millions—perceiving the *military* and *civil forces* at your command—the *revenue* at your disposal—the *relief of the poor* in your hands—the *public press* in your power, by enactments expressly excluding the working classes alone—moreover, the power of delegating to others the whole control of the *monetary arrangements* of the Kingdom, by which the labouring classes may be silently plundered or suddenly suspended from

employment—seeing all these elements of power wielded by your Honourable House as at present constituted, and fearing the consequences that may result if a thorough reform is not speedily had recourse to, your petitioners earnestly pray your Honourable House *to enact the following as the law of these realms*, with such other essential details as your Honourable House shall deem necessary:—

A LAW FOR EQUALLY REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND IRELAND

Equal Representation

That the United Kingdom be divided into 200 electoral districts; dividing, as nearly as possible, an equal number of inhabitants; and that each district do send a representative to Parliament.

Universal Suffrage

That every person producing proof of his being 21 years of age, to the clerk of the parish in which he has resided six months, shall be entitled to have his name registered as a voter. That the time for registering in each year be from the 1st of January to the 1st of March.

Annual Parliaments

That a general election do take place on the 24th of June in each year, and that each vacancy be filled up a fortnight after it occurs. That the hours for voting be from six o'clock in the morning till six o'clock in the evening.

No Property Qualifications

That there shall be no property qualification for members; but on a requisition, signed by 200 voters, in favour of any candidate being presented to the clerk of the parish in which they reside, such candidate shall be put in nomination. And the list of all the candidates nominated throughout the district shall be stuck on the church door in every parish, to enable voters to judge of their qualification.

Vote by Ballot

That each voter must vote in the parish in which he resides. That each parish provide as many balloting boxes as there are candidates proposed in the district; and that a temporary place be fitted up in each parish church for the purpose of *secret voting*. And, on the day of election, as each voter passes orderly on to the ballot, he shall have given to him, by the officer in attendance, a balloting ball, which he shall drop into the box of his favourite candi-

date. At the close of the day the votes shall be counted, by the proper officers, and the numbers stuck on the church doors. The following day the clerk of the district and two examiners shall collect the votes of all the parishes throughout the district, and cause the name of the successful candidate to be posted in every parish of the district.

Sittings and Payments to Members

That the members do take their seats in Parliament on the first Monday in October next after their election, and continue their sittings every day (Sundays excepted) till the business of the sitting is terminated, but not later than the 1st of September. They shall meet every day (during the Session) for business at 10 o'clock in the morning, and adjourn at 4. And every member shall be paid quarterly out of the public treasury £400 a year. That all electoral officers shall be elected by universal suffrage.

By passing the foregoing as the law of the land, you will confer a great blessing on the people of England; and your petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

NATIONAL PETITION

Unto the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled, the Petition of the undersigned, their suffering countrymen,

Humbly Sheweth,

That we, your petitioners, dwell in a land whose merchants are noted for enterprise, whose manufacturers are very skilful, and whose workmen are proverbial for their industry.

The land itself is goodly, the soil rich, and the temperature wholesome; it is abundantly furnished with the materials of commerce and trade; it has numerous and convenient harbours; in facility of internal communication it exceeds all others.

For three-and-twenty years we have enjoyed a profound peace.

Yet, with all these elements of national prosperity, and with every disposition and capacity to take advantage of them, we find ourselves overwhelmed with public and private suffering.

We are bowed down under a load of taxes; which, notwithstanding, fall greatly short of the wants of our rulers; our traders are trembling on the verge of bankruptcy; our workmen are starving; capital brings no profit and labour no remuneration; the home of the artificer is desolate, and the warehouse of

the pawnbroker is full; the workhouse is crowded, and the manufactory is deserted.

We have looked on every side, we have searched diligently in order to find out the causes of a distress so sore and so long continued.

We can discover none in nature, or in Providence.

Heaven has dealt graciously by the people; but the foolishness of our rulers has made the goodness of God of none effect.

The energies of a mighty kingdom have been wasted in building up the power of selfish and ignorant men, and its resources squandered for their aggrandisement.

The good of a party has been advanced to the sacrifice of the good of the nation; the few have governed for the interest of the few, while the interest of the many has been neglected, or insolently and tyrannously trampled upon.

It was the fond expectation of the people that a remedy for the greater part, if not for the whole, of their grievances, would be found in the Reform Act of 1832.

They were taught to regard that Act as a wise means to a worthy end; as the machinery of an improved legislation, when the will of the masses would be at length potential.

They have been bitterly and basely deceived.

The fruit which looked so fair to the eye has turned to dust and ashes when gathered.

The Reform Act has effected a transfer of power from one domineering faction to another, and left the people as helpless as before.

Our slavery has been exchanged for an apprenticeship to liberty, which has aggravated the painful feeling of our social degradation, by adding to it the sickening of still deferred hope.

We come before your Honourable House to tell you, with all humility, that this state of things must not be permitted to continue; that it cannot long continue without very seriously endangering the stability of the throne and the peace of the kingdom; and that if by God's help and all lawful and constitutional appliances, an end can be put to it, we are fully resolved that it shall speedily come to an end.

We tell your Honourable House that the capital of the master must no longer be deprived of its due reward; that the laws which make food dear, and those which by making money scarce, make labour cheap, must be abolished; that taxation must be made to fall on property, not on industry; that the good of the many, as it is the only legitimate end, so must it be the sole study of the Government.

As a preliminary essential to these and other requisite changes; as means by which alone the interests of the people can be effectually vindicated and secured, we demand that those interests be confided to the keeping of the people.

When the State calls for defenders, when it calls for money, no consideration of poverty or ignorance can be pleaded in refusal or delay of the call.

Required as we are, universally, to support and obey the laws, nature and reason entitle us to demand, that in the making of the laws, the universal voice shall be implicitly listened to.

We perform the duties of freemen; we must have the privileges of freemen.

WE DEMAND UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE.

The suffrage to be exempt from the corruption of the wealthy, and the violence of the powerful, must be secret.

The assertion of our right necessarily involves the power of its uncontrolled exercise.

WE DEMAND THE BALLOT.

The connection between the representatives and the people, to be beneficial must be intimate.

The legislative and constituent powers, for correction and for instruction, ought to be brought into frequent contact.

Errors, which are comparatively light when susceptible of a speedy popular remedy, may produce the most disastrous effects when permitted to grow inveterate through years of compulsory endurance.

To public safety as well as public confidence, frequent elections are essential.

WE DEMAND ANNUAL PARLIAMENTS.

With power to choose, and freedom in choosing, the range of our choice must be unrestricted.

We are compelled, by the existing laws, to take for our representatives, men who are incapable of appreciating our difficulties, or who have little sympathy with them; merchants who have retired from trade, and no longer feel its harassings; proprietors of land who are alike ignorant of its evils and their cure; lawyers, by whom the honours of the senate are sought after only as means of obtaining notice in the courts.

The labours of a representative, who is sedulous in the discharge of his duty, are numerous and burdensome.

It is neither just, nor reasonable, nor safe, that they should continue to be gratuitously rendered.

We demand that in the future election of members of your Honourable House, the approbation of the constituency shall be the sole qualification; and that to every representative so chosen shall be assigned, out of the public

taxes, a fair and adequate remuneration for the time which he is called upon to devote to the public service.

Finally, we would most earnestly impress on your Honourable House, that this petition has not been dictated by any idle love of change; that it springs out of no inconsiderate attachment to fanciful theories; but that it is the result of much and long deliberation, and of convictions, which the events of each succeeding year tend more and more to strengthen.

The management of this mighty kingdom has hitherto been a subject for contending factions to try their selfish experiments upon.

We have felt the consequences in our sorrowful experience—short glimmerings of uncertain enjoyment swallowed up by long and dark seasons of suffering.

If the self-government of the people should not remove their distresses, it will at least remove their repining.

Universal suffrage will, and it alone can, bring true and lasting peace to the nation; we firmly believe that it will also bring prosperity.

May it therefore please your Honourable House to take this our petition into your most serious consideration; and to use your utmost endeavours, by all constitutional means, to have a law passed, granting to every male of lawful age, sane mind, and unconvicted of crime, the right of voting for members of Parliament; and directing all future elections of members of Parliament to be in the way of secret ballot; and ordaining that the duration of Parliaments so chosen shall in no case exceed one year; and abolishing all property qualifications in the members; and providing for their due remuneration while in attendance on their Parliamentary duties.

And your petitioners, etc.

JOHN STUART MILL

JOHN STUART MILL (1806-73) was one of the most representative and versatile British thinkers of the nineteenth century, who made important contributions to logic, ethics, economics, and politics. During the greater part of his life Mill was employed by the East India Company in a position which afforded him financial security and political experience as well as leisure. In 1865 he was elected to Parliament, and he supported the Reform Bill of 1867. Until his defeat for re-election in 1868 he championed a number of the more liberal causes—Irish home rule and extension of the suffrage to the working classes and to women.

His father, James Mill, was the center of the utilitarian circle and designed an education for his son that was to develop in him a penetrating and logical mind. The education of John Mill, doctrinaire though it was, made him an incisive critic of liberalism as well as its greatest exponent. Although he waited until after his father's death in 1836 to give a forthright declaration of independence, he early showed signs of defection from the position of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), one of the great champions of liberal reform. Bentham had redefined the standard of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," which he took over from Priestley's *Essay on Government*, in terms of an elaborate calculus of pleasure and pain. His attempt to make vice nothing more than "false moral arithmetic" was one in a long line of attempts inspired by the success of the mathematical method in physics.

Mill brought new qualities of imagination and temperament to the utilitarian position. A period of emotional depression in his twentieth year led him to suspect that Bentham's ideal of human happiness was a purely negative one and that the habit of intellectual analysis has the tendency to undermine the passions and the virtues, which, as Wordsworth put it, it "murders to dissect." Mill's thought was influenced by the idealistic philosophy imported into England by men like Coleridge, and he readily adopted for his own use Goethe's criterion of "many-sidedness." Thus, while Mill remained the outstanding exponent of utilitarianism during the century, he subjected the philosophy of Bentham to penetrating criticism, holding against it its lack of an historical perspective, its narrow view of human nature and its tendency toward an unbridled individualism. He remained, however, in fundamental harmony with the principal themes of utilitarian thought and continued to be regarded as a representative of the Benthamites.

Although the main force of Bentham's criticism of traditional theories had been directed against such assumptions, utilitarian theory, in his hands, never wholly freed itself from a belief in natural law and in the inexorable harmony of nature. Bentham continued to believe that the greatest happiness of the greatest number could be promoted by permitting separate individuals to pursue happiness along separate ways. James Mill persisted in this individualistic and hedonistic

nistic tradition. The thought of John Stuart Mill represents a stage in the movement of liberal theory away from such preconceptions.

The selection reprinted below is taken from Mill's *Considerations on Representative Government*, first published in 1861. The edition here used is that of 1865.



CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER II: THE CRITERION OF A GOOD GOVERNMENT

GOVERNMENT consist of acts done by human beings; and if the agents, or those who choose the agents, or those to whom the agents are responsible, or the lookers-on whose opinion ought to influence and check all these, are mere masses of ignorance, stupidity, and baleful prejudice, every operation of government will go wrong: while, in proportion as the men rise above this standard, so will the government improve in quality; up to the point of excellence, attainable but nowhere attained, where the officers of government, themselves persons of superior virtue and intellect, are surrounded by the atmosphere of a virtuous and enlightened public opinion.

The first element of good government, therefore, being the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the community, the most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves. The first question in respect to any political institutions is, how far they tend to foster in the members of the community the various desirable qualities, moral and intellectual; or rather (following Bentham's more complete classification) moral, intellectual, and active. The government which does this the best, has every likelihood of being the best in all other respects, since it is on these qualities, so far as they exist in the people, that all possibility of goodness in the practical operations of the government depends.

We may consider, then, as one criterion of the goodness of a government, the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and individually; since, besides that their well-being is the sole object of government, their good qualities supply the moving force which works the machinery. This leaves, as the other constituent element of the merit of a government, the quality of the machinery itself; that is, the degree in which it is adapted to take advantage of the amount of good quali-

ties which may at any time exist, and make them instrumental to the right purposes. Let us again take the subject of judicature as an example and illustration. The judicial system being given, the goodness of the administration of justice is in the compound ratio of the worth of the men composing the tribunals, and the worth of the public opinion which influences or controls them. But all the difference between a good and a bad system of judicature lies in the contrivances adopted for bringing whatever moral and intellectual worth exists in the community to bear upon the administration of justice, and making it duly operative on the result. The arrangements for rendering the choice of the judges such as to obtain the highest average of virtue and intelligence; the salutary forms of procedure; the publicity which allows observation and criticism of whatever is amiss; the liberty of discussion and censure through the press; the mode of taking evidence, according as it is well or ill adapted to elicit truth; the facilities, whatever be their amount, for obtaining access to the tribunals; the arrangements for detecting crimes and apprehending offenders;—all these things are not the power, but the machinery for bringing the power into contact with the obstacle: and the machinery has no action of itself, but without it the power, let it be ever so ample, would be wasted and of no effect. A similar distinction exists in regard to the constitution of the executive departments of administration. Their machinery is good, when the proper tests are prescribed for the qualifications of officers, the proper rules for their promotion; when the business is conveniently distributed among those who are to transact it, a convenient and methodical order established for its transaction, a correct and intelligible record kept of it after being transacted; when each individual knows for what he is responsible, and is known to others as responsible for it; when the best-contrived checks are provided against negligence, favouritism, or jobbery, in any of the acts of the department. But political checks will not more act of themselves, than a bridle will direct a horse without a rider. If the checking functionaries are as corrupt or as negligent as those whom they ought to check and if the public, the main-spring of the whole checking machinery, are too ignorant, too passive, or too careless and inattentive, to do their part, little benefit will be derived from the best administrative apparatus. Yet a good apparatus is always preferable to a bad. It enables such insufficient moving or checking power as exists, to act at the greatest advantage; and without it, no amount of moving or checking power would be sufficient. Publicity, for instance, is no impediment to evil nor stimulus to good if the public will not look at what is done; but without publicity, how could they either check or encourage what they were not permitted to see? The ideally perfect constitution of a public office is that in which the interest of the functionary is entirely coincident with his duty. No *mère*

system will make it so, but still less can it be made so without a system, aptly devised for the purpose. . . .

CHAPTER III: THAT THE REALLY BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

There is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community; every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government, by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general.

To test this proposition, it has to be examined in reference to the two branches into which, as pointed out in the last chapter, the inquiry into the goodness of a government conveniently divides itself, namely, how far it promotes the good management of the affairs of society by means of the existing faculties, moral, intellectual, and active, of its various members, and what is its effect in improving or deteriorating those faculties.

The ideally best form of government, it is scarcely necessary to say, does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilization, but the one which, in the circumstances in which it is practicable and eligible, is attended with the greatest amount of beneficial consequences, immediate and prospective. A completely popular government is the only polity which can make out any claim to this character. It is pre-eminent in both the departments between which the excellence of a political constitution is divided. It is both more favourable to present good government, and promotes a better and higher form of national character, than any other polity whatsoever.

Its superiority in reference to present well-being rests upon two principles, of as universal truth and applicability as any general propositions which can be laid down respecting human affairs. The first is, that the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded, when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them. The second is, that the general prosperity attains a greater height, and is more widely diffused, in proportion to the amount and variety of the personal energies enlisted in promoting it. . . .

From these accumulated considerations it is evident, that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state, is one in which the whole people participate; that any participation, even in the smallest public function, is useful; that the participation should everywhere be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable, than the admission of all to a

share in the sovereign power of the state. But since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative.

CHAPTER V: OF THE PROPER FUNCTIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE BODIES

Instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government: to throw the light of publicity on its acts: to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and, if the men who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfil it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them from office, and either expressly or virtually appoint their successors. This is surely ample power, and security enough for the liberty of the nation. In addition to this, the Parliament has an office, not inferior even to this in importance; (to be at once the nation's Committee of Grievances, and its Congress of Opinions; an arena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it, and as far as possible of every eminent individual whom it contains, can produce itself in full light and challenge discussion); where every person in the country may count upon finding somebody who speaks his mind, as well or better than he could speak it himself—not to friends and partisans exclusively, but in the face of opponents, to be tested by adverse controversy; where those whose opinion is overruled, feel satisfied that it is heard, and set aside not by a mere act of will, but for what are thought superior reasons, and commend themselves as such to the representatives of the majority of the nation; where every party or opinion in the country can muster its strength, and be cured of any illusion concerning the number or power of its adherents; where the opinion which prevails in the nation makes itself manifest as prevailing, and marshals its hosts in the presence of the government, which is thus enabled and compelled to give way to it on the mere manifestation, without the actual employment, of its strength; where statesmen can assure themselves, far more certainly than by any other signs, what elements of opinion and power are growing, and what declining, and are enabled to shape their measures with some regard not solely to present exigencies, but to tendencies in progress. Representative assemblies are often taunted by their enemies with being places of mere talk and *bavardage*. There has seldom been more misplaced derision. I know not how a representative assembly can more usefully employ itself than in talk, when the subject of talk is the great public interests of the country, and every sentence of it represents the opinion either of some important body of persons in the nation, or of an

individual in whom some such body have reposed their confidence. A place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded, in the face of the government and of all other interests and opinions, can compel them to listen, and either comply, or state clearly why they do not, is in itself, if it answered no other purpose, one of the most important political institutions that can exist anywhere, and one of the foremost benefits of free government. Such "talking" would never be looked upon with disparagement if it were not allowed to stop "doing"; which it never would, if assemblies knew and acknowledged that talking and discussion are their proper business, while *doing*, as the result of discussion, is the task not of a miscellaneous body, but of individuals specially trained to it; that the fit office of an assembly is to see that those individuals are honestly and intelligently chosen, and to interfere no further with them, except by unlimited latitude of suggestion and criticism, and by applying or withholding the final seal of national assent. It is for want of this judicious reserve, that popular assemblies attempt to do what they cannot do well—to govern and legislate—and provide no machinery but their own for much of it, when of course every hour spent in talk is an hour withdrawn from actual business. But the very fact which most unfits such bodies for a Council of Legislation, qualifies them the more for their other office—namely, that they are not a selection of the greatest political minds in the country, from whose opinions little could with certainty be inferred concerning those of the nation, but are, when properly constituted, a fair sample of every grade of intellect among the people which is at all entitled to a voice in public affairs. Their part is to indicate wants, to be an organ for popular demands, and a place of adverse discussion for all opinions relating to public matters, both great and small; and, along with this, to check by criticism, and eventually by withdrawing their support, those high public officers who really conduct the public business, or who appoint those by whom it is conducted. Nothing but the restriction of the function of representative bodies within these rational limits, will enable the benefits of popular control to be enjoyed in conjunction with the no less important requisites (growing ever more important as human affairs increase in scale and in complexity) of skilled legislation and administration. There are no means of combining these benefits, except by separating the functions which guarantee the one from those which essentially require the other; by disjoining the office of control and criticism from the actual conduct of affairs, and devolving the former on the representatives of the Many, while securing for the latter, under strict responsibility to the nation, the acquired knowledge and practised intelligence of a specially trained and experienced Few.

CHAPTER VI: OF THE INFIRMITIES AND DANGERS TO WHICH
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IS LIABLE

The defects of any form of government may be either negative or positive. It is negatively defective if it does not concentrate in the hands of the authorities, power sufficient to fulfil the necessary offices of a government; or if it does not sufficiently develop by exercise the active capacities and social feelings of the individual citizens.

The *positive* evils and dangers of the representative, as of every other form of government, may be reduced to two heads: first, general ignorance and incapacity, or, to speak more moderately, insufficient mental qualifications, in the controlling body; secondly, the danger of its being under the influence of interests not identical with the general welfare of the community. . . .

One of the greatest dangers, therefore, of democracy, as of all other forms of government, lies in the sinister interest of the holders of power: it is the danger of class legislation; of government intended for (whether really effecting it or not) the immediate benefit of the dominant class, to the lasting detriment of the whole. And one of the most important questions demanding consideration, in determining the best constitution of a representative government, is how to provide efficacious securities against this evil.

If we consider as a class, politically speaking, any number of persons who have the same sinister interest,—that is, whose direct and apparent interest points towards the same description of bad measures; the desirable object would be that no class, and no combination of classes likely to combine, should be able to exercise a preponderant influence in the government. A modern community, not divided within itself by strong antipathies of race, language, or nationality, may be considered as in the main divisible into two sections, which, in spite of partial variations, correspond on the whole with two divergent directions of apparent interest. Let us call them (in brief general terms) labourers on the one hand, employers of labour on the other: including however along with employers of labour, not only retired capitalists, and the possessors of inherited wealth, but all that highly paid description of labourers (such as the professions) whose education and way of life assimilate them with the rich, and whose prospect and ambition it is to raise themselves into that class. With the labourers, on the other hand, may be ranked those smaller employers of labour, who by interests, habits, and educational impressions, are assimilated in wishes, tastes, and objects to the labouring classes; comprehending a large proportion of petty tradesmen. In a state of society thus composed, if the representative system could be made ideally perfect, and if it were pos-

sible to maintain it in that state, its organization must be such, that these two classes, manual labourers and their affinities on one side, employers of labour and their affinities on the other, should be, in the arrangement of the representative system, equally balanced, each influencing about an equal number of votes in Parliament: since, assuming that the majority of each class, in any difference between them, would be mainly governed by their class interests, there would be a minority of each in whom that consideration would be subordinate to reason, justice, and the good of the whole; and this minority of either, joining with the whole of the other, would turn the scale against any demands of their own majority which were not such as ought to prevail. The reason why, in any tolerably constituted society, justice and the general interest mostly in the end carry their point, is that the separate and selfish interests of mankind are almost always divided; some are interested in what is wrong, but some, also, have their private interest on the side of what is right: and those who are governed by higher considerations, though too few and weak to prevail against the whole of the others, usually after sufficient discussion and agitation become strong enough to turn the balance in favour of the body of private interests which is on the same side with them. The representative system ought to be so constituted as to maintain this state of things: it ought not to allow any of the various sectional interests to be so powerful as to be capable of prevailing against truth and justice and the other sectional interests combined. There ought always to be such a balance preserved among personal interests, as may render any one of them dependent for its successes, on carrying with it at least a large proportion of those who act on higher motives, and more comprehensive and distant views.

CHAPTER VII: OF TRUE AND FALSE DEMOCRACY; REPRESENTATION OF ALL, AND REPRESENTATION OF THE MAJORITY ONLY

It has been seen, that the dangers incident to a representative democracy are of two kinds: *danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body, and in the popular opinion which controls it; and danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority*, these being all composed of the same class. We have next to consider, how far it is possible so to organize the democracy, as, without interfering materially with the characteristic benefits of democratic government, to do away with these two great evils, or at least to abate them, in the utmost degree attainable by human contrivance.

The common mode of attempting this is by limiting the democratic character of the representation, through a more or less restricted suffrage. But there is a previous consideration which, duly kept in view, considerably modifies the circumstances which are supposed to render such a restriction necessary.

A completely equal democracy, in a nation in which a single class composes the numerical majority, cannot be divested of certain evils; but those evils are greatly aggravated by the fact, that the democracies which at present exist are not equal, but systematically unequal in favour of the predominant class. Two very different ideas are usually confounded under the name democracy. The pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented. Democracy as commonly conceived and hitherto practised, is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively represented. The former is synonymous with the equality of all citizens; the latter, strangely confounded with it, is a government of privilege, in favor of the numerical majority, who alone possess practically any voice in the State. This is the inevitable consequence of the manner in which the votes are now taken, to the complete disfranchisement of minorities.

The confusion of ideas here is great, but it is so easily cleared up, that one would suppose the slightest indication would be sufficient to place the matter in its true light before any mind of average intelligence. It would be so, but for the power of habit; owing to which the simplest idea, if unfamiliar, has as great difficulty in making its way to the mind as a far more complicated one. That the minority must yield to the majority, the smaller number to the greater, is a familiar idea; and accordingly men think there is no necessity for using their minds any further, and it does not occur to them that there is any medium between allowing the smaller number to be equally powerful with the greater, and blotting out the smaller number altogether. In a representative body actually deliberating, the minority must of course be overruled; and in an equal democracy (since the opinions of the constituents, when they insist on them, determine those of the representative body) the majority of the people, through their representatives, will outvote and prevail over the minority and their representatives. But does it follow that the minority should have no representatives at all? Because the majority ought to prevail over the minority, must the majority have all the votes, the minority none? Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard? Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, there is not equal government, but a government of inequality and privilege: one part of the people rule over the rest: there is a part whose fair and equal share of influ-

ence in the representation is withheld from them; contrary to all just government, but above all, contrary to the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very root and foundation.

The injustice and violation of principle are not less flagrant because those who suffer by them are a minority; for there is not equal suffrage where every single individual does not count for as much as any other single individual in the community. But it is not only a minority who suffer. Democracy, thus constituted, does not even attain its ostensible object, that of giving the powers of government in all cases to the numerical majority. It does something very different: it gives them to a majority of the majority; who may be, and often are, but a minority of the whole. All principles are most effectually tested by extreme cases. Suppose then, that, in a country governed by equal and universal suffrage, there is a contested election in every constituency, and every election is carried by a small majority. The Parliament thus brought together represents little more than a bare majority of the people. This Parliament proceeds to legislate, and adopts important measures by a bare majority of itself. What guarantee is there that these measures accord with the wishes of a majority of the people? Nearly half the electors, having been outvoted at the hustings, have had no influence at all in the decision; and the whole of these may be, a majority of them probably are, hostile to the measures, having voted against those by whom they have been carried. Of the remaining electors, nearly half have chosen representatives who, by supposition, have voted against the measures. It is possible, therefore, and not at all improbable, that the opinion which has prevailed was agreeable only to a minority of the nation, though a majority of that portion of it, whom the institutions of the country have erected into a ruling class. If democracy means the certain ascendancy of the majority, there are no means of insuring that, but by allowing every individual figure to tell equally in the summing up. Any minority left out, either purposely or by the play of the machinery, gives the power not to the majority, but to a minority in some other part of the scale.

CHAPTER VIII: OF THE EXTENSION OF THE SUFFRAGE

No arrangement of the suffrage, therefore, can be permanently satisfactory, in which any person or class is peremptorily excluded; in which the electoral privilege is not open to all persons of full age who desire to obtain it.

There are, however, certain exclusions, required by positive reasons, which do not conflict with this principle, and which, though an evil in themselves, are only to be got rid of by the cessation of the state of things which requires them. I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage, without being able to read, write, and, I will add, perform the

common operations of arithmetic. Justice demands, even when the suffrage does not depend on it, that the means of attaining these elementary acquirements should be within the reach of every person, either gratuitously, or at an expense not exceeding what the poorest, who earn their own living, can afford. If this were really the case, people would no more think of giving the suffrage to a man who could not read, than of giving it to a child who could not speak; and it would not be society that would exclude him, but his own laziness. When society has not performed its duty, by rendering this amount of instruction accessible to all, there is some hardship in the case, but it is a hardship that ought to be borne. If society has neglected to discharge two solemn obligations, the more important and more fundamental of the two must be fulfilled first: universal teaching must precede universal enfranchisement. No one but those in whom an *a priori* theory has silenced common sense, will maintain, that power over others, over the whole community, should be imparted to people who have not acquired the commonest and most essential requisites for taking care of themselves; for pursuing intelligently their own interests, and those of the persons most nearly allied to them. This argument, doubtless, might be pressed further, and made to prove much more. It would be eminently desirable that other things besides reading, writing, and arithmetic, could be made necessary to the suffrage; that some knowledge of the conformation of the earth, its natural and political divisions, the elements of general history, and of the history and institutions of their own country, could be required from all electors. But these kinds of knowledge, however indispensable to an intelligent use of the suffrage, are not, in this country, nor probably anywhere save in the Northern United States, accessible to the whole people; nor does there exist any trustworthy machinery for ascertaining whether they have been acquired or not. The attempt, at present, would lead to partiality, chicanery, and every kind of fraud. It is better that the suffrage should be conferred indiscriminately, or even withheld indiscriminately, than that it should be given to one and withheld from another at the discretion of a public officer. In regard, however, to reading, writing, and calculating, there need be no difficulty. It would be easy to require from every one who presented himself for registry, that he should, in the presence of the registrar, copy a sentence from an English book, and perform a sum in the rule of three; and to secure, by fixed rules and complete publicity, the honest application of so very simple a test. This condition, therefore, should in all cases accompany universal suffrage; and it would, after a few years, exclude none but those who cared so little for the privilege, that their vote, if given, would not in general be an indication of any real political opinion.

It is also important, that the assembly which votes the taxes, either general

or local, should be elected exclusively by those who pay something towards the taxes imposed. Those who pay no taxes, disposing by their votes of other people's money, have every motive to be lavish, and none to economize. As far as money matters are concerned, any power of voting possessed by them is a violation of the fundamental principle of free government; a severance of the power of control, from the interest in its beneficial exercise. It amounts to allowing them to put their hands into other people's pockets, for any purpose which they think fit to call a public one; which in some of the great towns of the United States is known to have produced a scale of local taxation onerous beyond example, and wholly borne by the wealthier classes. That representation should be co-extensive with taxation, not stopping short of it, but also not going beyond it, is in accordance with the theory of British institutions. But to reconcile this, as a condition annexed to the representation, with universality, it is essential, as it is on many other accounts desirable, that taxation, in a visible shape, should descend to the poorest class. In this country, and in most others, there is probably no labouring family which does not contribute to the indirect taxes, by the purchase of tea, coffee, sugar, not to mention narcotics or stimulants. But this mode of defraying a share of the public expenses is hardly felt: the payer, unless a person of education and reflection, does not identify his interest with a low scale of public expenditure, as closely as when money for its support is demanded directly from himself; and even supposing him to do so, he would doubtless take care that, however lavish an expenditure he might, by his vote, assist in imposing upon the government, it should not be defrayed by any additional taxes on the articles which he himself consumes. It would be better that a direct tax, in the simple form of a capitation, should be levied on every grown person in the community; or that every such person should be admitted an elector, on allowing himself to be rated *extra ordinem* to the assessed taxes; or that a small annual payment, rising and falling with the gross expenditure of the country, should be required from every registered elector; that so every one might feel that the money which he assisted in voting was partly his own, and that he was interested in keeping down its amount.

However this may be, I regard it as required by first principles, that the receipt of parish relief should be a peremptory disqualification for the franchise. He who cannot by his labour suffice for his own support, has no claim to the privilege of helping himself to the money of others. By becoming dependent on the remaining members of the community for actual subsistence, he abdicates his claim to equal rights with them in other respects. Those to whom he is indebted for the continuance of his very existence, may justly claim

the exclusive management of those common concerns, to which he now brings nothing, or less than he takes away. As a condition of the franchise, a term should be fixed, say five years previous to the registry, during which the applicant's name has not been on the parish books as a recipient of relief. To be an uncertified bankrupt, or to have taken the benefit of the Insolvent Act, should disqualify for the franchise until the person has paid his debts, or at least proved that he is not now, and has not for some long period been, dependent on eleemosynary support. Non-payment of taxes, when so long persisted in that it cannot have arisen from inadvertence, should disqualify while it lasts. These exclusions are not in their nature permanent. They exact such conditions only as all are able, or ought to be able, to fulfil if they choose. They leave the suffrage accessible to all who are in the normal condition of a human being; and if any one has to forego it, he either does not care sufficiently for it, to do for its sake what he is already bound to do, or he is in a general condition of depression and degradation in which this slight addition, necessary for the security of others, would be unfelt, and on emerging from which, this mark of inferiority would disappear with the rest.

In the long run, therefore (supposing no restrictions to exist but those of which we have now treated), we might expect that all, except that (it is to be hoped) progressively diminishing class, the recipients of parish relief, would be in possession of votes, so that the suffrage would be, with that slight abatement, universal. That it should be thus widely expanded, is, as we have seen, absolutely necessary to an enlarged and elevated conception of good government. Yet in this state of things, the great majority of voters, in most countries, and emphatically in this, would be manual labourers; and the twofold danger, that of too low a standard of political intelligence, and that of class legislation, would still exist, in a very perilous degree. It remains to be seen whether any means exist by which these evils can be obviated.

They are capable of being obviated, if men sincerely wish it; not by any artificial contrivance, but by carrying out the natural order of human life, which recommends itself to every one in things in which he has no interest or traditional opinion running counter to it. In all human affairs, every person directly interested, and not under positive tutelage, has an admitted claim to a voice, and when his exercise of it is not inconsistent with the safety of the whole, cannot justly be excluded from it. But though every one ought to have a voice—that every one should have an equal voice is a totally different proposition. When two persons who have a joint interest in any business, differ in opinion, does justice require that both opinions should be held of exactly equal value? If with equal virtue, one is superior to the other in knowledge and

intelligence—or if with equal intelligence, one excels the other in virtue—the opinion, the judgment, of the higher moral or intellectual being, is worth more than that of the inferior: and if the institutions of the country virtually assert that they are of the same value, they assert a thing which is not. One of the two, as the wiser or better man, has a claim to superior weight: the difficulty is in ascertaining which of the two it is; a thing impossible as between individuals, but, taking men in bodies and in numbers, it can be done with a certain approach to accuracy. There would be no pretence for applying this doctrine to any case which could with reason be considered as one of individual and private right. In an affair which concerns only one of two persons, that one is entitled to follow his own opinion, however much wiser the other may be than himself. But we are speaking of things which equally concern them both; where, if the more ignorant does not yield his share of the matter to the guidance of the wiser man, the wiser man must resign his to that of the more ignorant. Which of these modes of getting over the difficulty is most for the interest of both, and most conformable to the general fitness of things? If it be deemed unjust that either should have to give way, which injustice is greatest? that the better judgment should give way to the worse, or the worse to the better?

Now, national affairs are exactly such a joint concern, with the difference, that no one needs ever be called upon for a complete sacrifice of his own opinion. It can always be taken into the calculation, and counted at a certain figure, a higher figure being assigned to the suffrages of those whose opinion is entitled to greater weight. There is not, in this arrangement, anything necessarily invidious to those to whom it assigns the lower degrees of influence. Entire exclusion from a voice in the common concerns, is one thing: the concession to others of a more potential voice, on the ground of greater capacity for the management of the joint interests, is another. The two things are not merely different, they are incommensurable. Every one has a right to feel insulted by being made a nobody, and stamped as of no account at all. No one but a fool, and only a fool of a peculiar description, feels offended by the acknowledgment that there are others whose opinion, and even whose wish, is entitled to a greater amount of consideration than his. To have no voice in what are partly his own concerns, is a thing which nobody willingly submits to; but when what is partly his concern is also partly another's, and he feels the other to understand the subject better than himself, that the other's opinion should be counted for more than his own, accords with his expectations, and with the course of things which in all other affairs of life he is accustomed to acquiesce in. It is only necessary that this superior influence should be assigned on

grounds which he can comprehend, and of which he is able to perceive the justice.

I hasten to say, that I consider it entirely inadmissible, unless as a temporary makeshift, that the superiority of influence should be conferred in consideration of property. I do not deny that property is a kind of test; education in most countries, though anything but proportional to riches, is on the average better in the richer half of society than in the poorer. But the criterion is so imperfect; accident has so much more to do than merit with enabling men to rise in the world; and it is so impossible for any one, by acquiring any amount of instruction, to make sure of the corresponding rise in station, that this foundation of electoral privilege is always, and will continue to be, supremely odious. To connect plurality of votes with any pecuniary qualification would be not only objectionable in itself, but a sure mode of discrediting the principle, and making its permanent maintenance impracticable. The Democracy, at least of this country, are not at present jealous of personal superiority, but they are naturally and most justly so of that which is grounded on mere pecuniary circumstances. The only thing which can justify reckoning one person's opinion as equivalent to more than one, is individual mental superiority; and what is wanted is some approximate means of ascertaining that. If there existed such a thing as a really national education, or a trustworthy system of general examination, education might be tested directly. In the absence of these, the nature of a person's occupation is some test. An employer of labour is on the average more intelligent than a labourer; for he must labour with his head, and not solely with his hands. A foreman is generally more intelligent than an ordinary labourer, and a labourer in the skilled trades than in the unskilled. A banker, merchant, or manufacturer, is likely to be more intelligent than a tradesman, because he has larger and more complicated interests to manage. In all these cases it is not the having merely undertaken the superior function, but the successful performance of it, that tests the qualifications; for which reason, as well as to prevent persons from engaging nominally in an occupation for the sake of the vote, it would be proper to require that the occupation should have been persevered in for some length of time (say three years). Subject to some such condition, two or more votes might be allowed to every person who exercises any of these superior functions. The liberal professions, when really and not nominally practised, imply, of course, a still higher degree of instruction; and wherever a sufficient examination, or any serious conditions of education, are required before entering on a profession, its members could be admitted at once to a plurality of votes. The same rule might be applied to graduates of universities; and even to those who bring satisfactory certificates

of having passed through the course of study required by any school at which the higher branches of knowledge are taught, under proper securities that the teaching is real, and not a mere pretence.

CHAPTER XIV: OF THE EXECUTIVE IN A REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

As a general rule, every executive function, whether superior or subordinate, should be the appointed duty of some given individual. It should be apparent to all the world, who did everything, and through whose default anything was left undone. Responsibility is null, when nobody knows who is responsible. Nor, even when real, can it be divided without being weakened. To maintain it at its highest, there must be one person who receives the whole praise of what is well done, the whole blame of what is ill. There are, however, two modes of sharing responsibility: by one it is only enfeebled, by the other, absolutely destroyed. It is enfeebled, when the concurrence of more than one functionary is required to the same act. Each one among them has still a real responsibility; if a wrong has been done, none of them can say he did not do it; he is as much a participant, as an accomplice is in an offence: if there has been legal criminality they may all be punished legally, and their punishment needs not be less severe than if there had been only one person concerned. But it is not so with the penalties, any more than with the rewards, of opinion: these are always diminished by being shared. Where there has been no definite legal offence, no corruption or malversation, only an error or an imprudence, or what may pass for such, every participator has an excuse to himself and to the world, in the fact that other persons are jointly involved with him. There is hardly anything, even to pecuniary dishonesty, for which men will not feel themselves almost absolved, if those whose duty it was to resist and remonstrate have failed to do it, still more if they have given a formal assent.

In this case, however, though responsibility is weakened, there still is responsibility: every one of those implicated has in his individual capacity assented to, and joined in, the act. Things are much worse when the act itself is only that of a majority—a Board, deliberating with closed doors, nobody knowing, or, except in some extreme case, being ever likely to know, whether an individual member voted for the act or against it. Responsibility in this case is a mere name. "Boards," it is happily said by Bentham, "are screens." What "the Board" does is the act of nobody; and nobody can be made to answer for it. The Board suffers, even in reputation, only in its collective character; and no individual member feels this, further than his disposition leads him to identify his own estimation with that of the body—a feeling often very strong when the body is a permanent one, and he is wedded to it for better, for worse; but the fluctuations of a modern official career give no time for the formation of

such an *esprit de corps*; which, if it exists at all, exists only in the obscure ranks of the permanent subordinates. Boards, therefore, are not a fit instrument for executive business; and are only admissible in it, when, for other reasons, to give full discretionary power to a single minister would be worse.

On the other hand, it is also a maxim of experience, that in the multitude of counsellors there is wisdom; and that a man seldom judges right, even in his own concerns, still less in those of the public, when he makes habitual use of no knowledge but his own, or that of some single adviser. There is no necessary incompatibility between this principle and the other. It is easy to give the effective power, and the full responsibility, to one, providing him when necessary with advisers, each of whom is responsible only for the opinion he gives.

In general, the head of a department of the executive government is a mere politician. He may be a good politician, and a man of merit; and unless this is usually the case, the government is bad. But his general capacity, and the knowledge he ought to possess of the general interests of the country, will not, unless by occasional accident, be accompanied by adequate, and what may be called professional, knowledge of the department over which he is called to preside. Professional advisers must therefore be provided for him. Wherever mere experience and attainments are sufficient—wherever the qualities required in a professional adviser may possibly be united in a single well-selected individual (as in the case, for example, of a law officer), one such person for general purposes, and a staff of clerks to supply knowledge of details, meet the demands of the case. But, more frequently, it is not sufficient that the minister should consult some one competent person, and, when himself not conversant with the subject, act implicitly on that person's advice. It is often necessary that he should, not only occasionally but habitually, listen to a variety of opinions, and inform his judgment by the discussions among a body of advisers. This, for example, is emphatically necessary in military and naval affairs. The military and naval ministers, therefore, and probably several others, should be provided with a Council, composed, at least in those two departments, of able and experienced professional men. As a means of obtaining the best men for the purpose under every change of administration, they ought to be permanent: by which I mean, that they ought not, like the Lords of the Admiralty, to be expected to resign with the ministry by whom they were appointed: but it is a good rule that all who hold high appointments to which they have risen by selection, and not by the ordinary course of promotion, should retain their office only for a fixed term, unless reappointed; as is now the rule with Staff appointments in the British army. This rule renders appointments somewhat less likely to be jobbed, not being a provision for life, and at the same time affords a means, without affront to any one, of getting rid of those who are least

worth keeping, and bringing in highly qualified persons of younger standing, for whom there might never be room if death vacancies, or voluntary resignations, were waited for.

The Councils should be consultative merely, in this sense, that the ultimate decision should rest undividedly with the minister himself: but neither ought they to be looked upon, or to look upon themselves, as ciphers, or as capable of being reduced to such at his pleasure. The advisers attached to a powerful and perhaps self-willed man, ought to be placed under conditions which make it impossible for them, without discredit, not to express an opinion, and impossible for him not to listen to and consider their recommendations, whether he adopts them or not. The relation which ought to exist between a chief and this description of advisers is very accurately hit by the constitution of the Council of the Governor-General and those of the different Presidencies in India. These Councils are composed of persons who have professional knowledge of Indian affairs, which the Governor-General and Governors usually lack, and which it would not be desirable to require of them. As a rule, every member of Council is expected to give an opinion, which is of course very often a simple acquiescence: but if there is a difference of sentiment, it is at the option of every member, and is the invariable practice, to record the reasons of his opinion: the Governor-General, or Governor, doing the same. In ordinary cases the decision is according to the sense of the majority; the Council, therefore, has a substantial part in the government: but if the Governor-General, or Governor, thinks fit, he may set aside even their unanimous opinion, recording his reasons. The result is, that the chief is individually and effectively responsible for every act of the Government. The members of Council have only the responsibility of advisers; but it is always known, from documents capable of being produced, and which if called for by Parliament or public opinion always are produced, what each has advised, and what reasons he gave for his advice: while, from their dignified position, and ostensible participation in all acts of government, they have nearly as strong motives to apply themselves to the public business, and to form and express a well-considered opinion on every part of it, as if the whole responsibility rested with themselves.

This mode of conducting the highest class of administrative business is one of the most successful instances of the adaptation of means to ends, which political history, not hitherto very prolific in works of skill and contrivance, has yet to show. It is one of the acquisitions with which the art of politics has been enriched by the experience of the East India Company's rule; and, like most of the other wise contrivances by which India has been preserved to this country, and an amount of good government produced which is truly won-

derful considering the circumstances and the materials, it is probably destined to perish in the general holocaust which the traditions of Indian government seem fated to undergo, since they have been placed at the mercy of public ignorance, and the presumptuous vanity of political men. Already an outcry is raised for abolishing the Councils, as a superfluous and expensive clog on the wheels of government: while the clamour has long been urgent, and is daily obtaining more countenance in the highest quarters, for the abrogation of the professional civil service, which breeds the men that compose the Councils, and the existence of which is the sole guarantee for their being of any value.

A most important principle of good government in a popular constitution, is that no executive functionaries should be appointed by popular election: neither by the votes of the people themselves, nor by those of their representatives. The entire business of government is skilled employment; the qualifications for the discharge of it are of that special and professional kind, which cannot be properly judged of except by persons who have themselves some share of those qualifications, or some practical experience of them. The business of finding the fittest persons to fill public employments—not merely selecting the best who offer, but looking out for the absolutely best, and taking note of all fit persons who are met with, that they may be found when wanted—is very laborious, and requires a delicate as well as highly conscientious discernment; and as there is no public duty which is in general so badly performed, so there is none for which it is of greater importance to enforce the utmost practicable amount of personal responsibility, by imposing it as a special obligation on high functionaries in the several departments. All subordinate public officers who are not appointed by some mode of public competition, should be selected on the direct responsibility of the minister under whom they serve. The ministers, all but the chief, will naturally be selected by the chief; and the chief himself, though really designated by Parliament, should be, in a regal government, officially appointed by the Crown. The functionary who appoints should be the sole person empowered to remove any subordinate officer who is liable to removal; which the far greater number ought not to be, except for personal misconduct; since it would be vain to expect that the body of persons by whom the whole detail of the public business is transacted, and whose qualifications are generally of much more importance to the public than those of the minister himself, will devote themselves to their profession, and acquire the knowledge and skill on which the minister must often place entire dependence, if they are liable at any moment to be turned adrift for no fault, that the minister may gratify himself, or promote his political interest, by appointing somebody else.

To the principle which condemns the appointment of executive officers by

popular suffrage, ought the chief of the executive, in a republican government, to be an exception? Is it a good rule, which, in the American constitution, provides for the election of the President once in every four years by the entire people? The question is not free from difficulty. There is unquestionably some advantage, in a country like America, where no apprehension needs be entertained of a *coup d'état*, in making the chief minister constitutionally independent of the legislative body, and rendering the two great branches of the government, while equally popular both in their origin and in their responsibility, an effective check on one another. The plan is in accordance with that sedulous avoidance of the concentration of great masses of power in the same hands, which is a marked characteristic of the American Federal Constitution. But the advantage, in this instance, is purchased at a price above all reasonable estimate of its value. It seems far better that the chief magistrate in a republic should be appointed avowedly, as the chief minister in a constitutional monarchy is virtually, by the representative body. In the first place, he is certain, when thus appointed, to be a more eminent man. The party which has the majority in Parliament would then, as a rule, appoint its own leader; who is always one of the foremost, and often the very foremost person in political life: while the President of the United States, since the last survivor of the founders of the republic disappeared from the scene, is almost always either an obscure man, or one who has gained any reputation he may possess in some other field than politics. And this, as I have before observed, is no accident, but the natural effect of the situation. The eminent men of a party, in an election extending to the whole country, are never its most available candidates. All eminent men have made personal enemies, or have done something, or at the lowest professed some opinion, obnoxious to some local or other considerable division of the community, and likely to tell with fatal effect upon the number of votes; whereas a man without antecedents, of whom nothing is known but that he professes the creed of the party, is readily voted for by its entire strength. Another important consideration is the great mischief of unintermitted electioneering. When the highest dignity in the State is to be conferred by popular election once in every few years, the whole intervening time is spent in what is virtually a canvass. President, ministers, chiefs of parties, and their followers, are all electioneers: the whole community is kept intent on the mere personalities of politics, and every public question is discussed and decided with less reference to its merits than to its expected bearing on the presidential election. If a system had been devised to make party spirit the ruling principle of action in all public affairs, and create an inducement not only to make every question a party question, but to raise questions for the purpose of founding parties upon them, it would have been difficult to contrive any means better adapted to the purpose.

BENJAMIN DISRAELI

DISRAELI'S EARLY CAREER, and how he came to lead the Conservative (formerly Tory) party, have already been described in the introduction to a previous selection. His opinions concerning imperial and foreign affairs, like those of Gladstone, underwent change as the century progressed. In 1852, true to the climate of opinion of the times, he spoke of "those wretched colonies" as "a millstone around our necks." Yet the Tories could and did accuse the Whigs of cold-blooded desertion of Britons overseas, to which many replied that the maturity and independence of colonies was a natural law of politics. The response of the more far-sighted Whigs was reiteration of a faith which Benjamin Franklin and others had expressed before the American Revolution and which Lord Durham and Lord Elgin argued afresh in connection with Canadian demands of the 1830's and 1840's. This was the belief that the concession of self-government to colonies would produce a voluntary association on their part with the mother country which would be infinitely stronger than any relationship of authority and subordination of the old imperial type. Disraeli changed his attitude toward colonies as he had his views on protectionism and the suffrage. He saw the political advantages of appealing to the newly enfranchised Britons by teaching them pride in their empire and in a bold foreign policy, and such an attitude readily matched the Conservative desire to respect and cherish things British. Thus he found it easy to condemn the Liberals for what he called their "cosmopolitan" indifference to England's colonial empire. His own preference would have been for an empire closely united by a tariff union, an organized system of defense, and some form of continuous representation of the dominions in London. This proved impossible, but Disraeli, as Prime Minister from 1874 to 1880, was able to raise Britain's prestige in international affairs and to strike several telling blows for the cause of empire.

In 1875 the Khedive of Egypt, pressed by numerous creditors, was forced to offer for sale his 177,000 shares in the Suez Canal, which had been built by the French. In order to grasp this opportunity to acquire a substantial interest in the all-important water route to India, Disraeli borrowed four million pounds from the Rothschilds in the name of the Cabinet and then asked Parliament to sanction his action. There was some grumbling about the size of the Rothschild commission, but the bargain was undeniably good, and Parliament voted the money. Thus the way was paved for later British imperialism in Egypt. In 1876 Disraeli obtained the passage of the Royal Titles Bill, which made Queen Victoria "Empress of India" and emphasized the importance of India to the British Empire. Concerning the Irish question, he refused to make any concessions which would weaken the union of Ireland with Great Britain. By taking an equally firm stand on the "Eastern Question" and risking war by supporting Turkey as a barrier against Russian control of the eastern Mediterranean, Disraeli raised British prestige in the capitals of Europe. Playing off Turkey, the "sick man of Europe," against its vast neighbor was a dangerous game, especially after Russia

had defeated Turkey in 1877-78, but England was able to force the convocation of a European congress to reconsider the harsh terms of the Treaty of San Stefano. After secret negotiations with Russia, Disraeli was able to announce on his return from the Congress of Berlin that he had obtained for England both "peace and honor" and the island of Cyprus. Disraeli's work to salvage European Turkey was largely undone by the triumph of the Balkan national states in 1913, but Cyprus has remained a British colony to our day, in spite of the protests of its Greek population.

Disraeli's speech on the Berlin Treaty, delivered in the House of Lords, July 18, 1878, is to be found in *Selected Speeches of the Late Right Honorable the Earl of Beaconsfield* (edited by T. E. Kebbel, 12 vols., London, 1882).



THE BERLIN TREATY

MY LORDS, in laying on the table of your lordships' House, as I am about to do, the protocols of the Congress of Berlin, I have thought I should be only doing my duty to your lordships' House, to Parliament generally, and to the country, if I made some remarks on the policy which was supported by the representatives of Her Majesty at the Congress, and which is embodied in the Treaty of Berlin and in the convention which was placed on your lordships' table during my absence.

My lords, you are aware that the treaty of San Stefano was looked on with much distrust and alarm by Her Majesty's Government—that they believed it was calculated to bring about a state of affairs dangerous to European independence and injurious to the interests of the British Empire. Our impeachment of that policy is before your lordships and the country, and is contained in the circular of my noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in April last. Our present contention is, that we can show that, by the changes and modifications which have been made in the treaty of San Stefano by the Congress of Berlin and the Convention of Constantinople, the menace to European independence has been removed, and the threatened injury to the British Empire has been averted. Your lordships will recollect that by the treaty of San Stefano about one half of Turkey in Europe was formed into a State called Bulgaria—a State consisting of upwards of 50,000 geographical square miles, and containing a population of 4,000,000, with harbours on either sea—both on the shores of the Euxine and of the Archipelago. That disposition of territory severed Constantinople and the limited district which was still spared to the possessors of that city—severed it from the provinces of Macedonia and Thrace by Bulgaria descending to the very shores of the Ægean; and, alto-

gether, a State was formed, which, both from its natural resources and its peculiarly favourable geographical position, must necessarily have exercised a predominant influence over the political and commercial interests of that part of the world. The remaining portion of Turkey in Europe was reduced also to a considerable degree by affording what was called compensation to previous rebellious tributary principalities, which have now become independent States—so that the general result of the treaty of San Stefano was, that while it spared the authority of the Sultan so far as his capital and its immediate vicinity, it reduced him to a state of subjection to the great Power which had defeated his armies, and which was present at the gates of his capital. Accordingly, though it might be said that he still seemed to be invested with one of the highest functions of public duty—the protection and custody of the Straits—it was apparent that his authority in that respect could be exercised by him in deference only to the superior Power which had vanquished him, and to whom the proposed arrangements would have kept him in subjection.

My lords, in these matters, the Congress of Berlin have made great changes. They have restored to the Sultan two-thirds of the territory which was to have formed the great Bulgarian State. They have restored to him upwards of 30,000 geographical square miles, and 2,500,000 of population—that territory being the richest in the Balkans, where most of the land is rich, and the population one of the wealthiest, most ingenious, and most loyal of his subjects. The frontiers of his State have been pushed forward from the mere environs of Salonica and Adrianople to the lines of the Balkans and Trajan's pass; the new principality, which was to exercise such an influence, and produce a revolution in the disposition of the territory and policy of that part of the globe, is now merely a State in the Valley of the Danube, and both in its extent and its population is reduced to one-third of what was contemplated by the treaty of San Stefano. . . .

My lords, in consequence of that arrangement cries have been raised against our "partition of Turkey." My lords, our object has been directly the reverse, our object has been to prevent partition. The question of partition is one upon which, it appears to me, very erroneous ideas are in circulation. Some two years ago—before, I think, the war had commenced, but when the disquietude and dangers of the situation were very generally felt—there was a school of statesmen who were highly in favour of what they believed to be the only remedy, what they called the partition of Turkey. Those who did not agree with them were those who thought we should, on the whole, attempt the restoration of Turkey. Her Majesty's Government at all times have resisted the partition of Turkey. They have done so because, exclusive of the high moral considerations that are mixed up with the subject, they believed an attempt, on

a great scale, to accomplish the partition of Turkey, would inevitably lead to a long, a sanguinary, and often recurring struggle, and that Europe and Asia would both be involved in a series of troubles and sources of disaster and danger of which no adequate idea could be formed.

These professors of partition—quite secure, no doubt, in their own views—have freely spoken to us on this subject. We have been taken up to a high mountain and shown all the kingdoms of the earth, and they have said, "All these shall be yours if you will worship Partition." But we have declined to do so for the reasons I have shortly given. And it is a remarkable circumstance that after the great war, and after the prolonged diplomatic negotiations, which lasted during nearly a period of three years, on this matter, the whole Powers of Europe, including Russia, have strictly, and as completely as ever, come to the unanimous conclusion that the best chance for the tranquility and order of the world is to retain the Sultan as part of the acknowledged political system of Europe. My lords, unquestionably after a great war—and I call the late war a great war, because the greatness of a war now must not be calculated by its duration, but by the amount of the forces brought into the field, and where a million of men have struggled for supremacy, as has been the case recently, I call that a great war—but, I say, after a great war like this, it is utterly impossible that you can have a settlement of any permanent character without a redistribution of territory and considerable changes. But that is not partition. My lords, a country may have lost provinces, but that is not partition. We know that not very long ago a great country—one of the foremost countries of the world—lost provinces; yet is not France one of the great Powers of the world, and with a future—a commanding future?

Austria herself has lost provinces—more provinces even than Turkey, perhaps; even England has lost provinces—the most precious possessions—the loss of which every Englishman must deplore to this moment. We lost them from bad government. Had the principles which now obtain between the metropolis and her dependencies prevailed then, we should not, perhaps, have lost those provinces, and the power of this Empire would have been proportionally increased. It is perfectly true that the Sultan of Turkey has lost provinces; it is true that his armies have been defeated; it is true that his enemy is even now at his gates; but all that has happened to other Powers. But a sovereign who has not yet forfeited his capital, whose capital has not yet been occupied by his enemy—and that capital one of the strongest in the world—who has armies and fleets at his disposal, and who still rules over 20,000,000 of inhabitants, cannot be described as a Power whose dominions have been partitioned. My lords, it has been said that no limit has been fixed to the occupation of Bosnia by Austria. Well, I think that was a very wise step. The mo-

ment you limit an occupation you deprive it of half its virtue. All those opposed to the principles which occupation was devised to foster and strengthen, feel that they have only to hold their breath and wait a certain time, and the opportunity for their interference would again present itself. Therefore, I cannot agree with the objection which is made to the arrangement with regard to the occupation of Bosnia by Austria on the question of its duration. . . .

Now, my lords, I have touched upon most of the points connected with Turkey in Europe. My summary is that at this moment—of course, no longer counting Servia or Roumania, once tributary principalities, as part of Turkey; not counting even the New Bulgaria, though it is a tributary principality, as part of Turkey; and that I may not be taunted with taking an element which I am hardly entitled to place in the calculation, omitting even Bosnia—European Turkey still remains a dominion of 60,000 geographical square miles, with a population of 6,000,000, and that population in a very great degree concentrated and condensed in the provinces contiguous to the capital. My lords, it was said, when the line of the Balkans was carried—and it was not carried until after long and agitating discussions—it was said by that illustrious statesman who presided over our labours, that “Turkey in Europe once more exists.” My lords, I do not think that, so far as European Turkey is concerned, this country has any right to complain of the decisions of the Congress, or, I would hope, of the labours of the plenipotentiaries. You cannot look at the map of Turkey as it had been left by the treaty of San Stefano, and as it has been rearranged by the Treaty of Berlin, without seeing that great results have accrued. If these results had been the consequences of a long war—if they had been the results of a struggle like that we underwent in the Crimea—I do not think they would have been even then unsubstantial or unsatisfactory. My lords, I hope that you and the country will not forget that these results have been obtained without shedding the blood of a single Englishman; and if there has been some expenditure, it has been an expenditure which, at least, has shown the resources and determination of this country. Had you entered into that war—for which you were prepared—and well prepared—probably in a month you would have exceeded the whole expenditure you have now incurred.

My lords, I now ask you for a short time to quit Europe and to visit Asia, and consider the labours of the Congress in another quarter of the world. My lords, you well know that the Russian arms met with great success in Asia, and that in the treaty of San Stefano considerable territories were yielded by Turkey to Russia. . . . The Congress have so far approved the treaty of San Stefano that they have sanctioned the retention by Russia of Kars and Batoum. . . . Now is that a question for which England would be justified in going to war

with Russia? My lords, we have, therefore, thought it advisable not to grudge Russia those conquests which have been made—especially after obtaining the restoration of the town of Bayazid and its important district. . . .

But I must make this observation to your lordships. We have a substantial interest in the East; it is a commanding interest, and its behest must be obeyed. But the interest of France in Egypt, and her interest in Syria, are, as she acknowledges, sentimental and traditionary interests; and, although I respect them, and although I wish to see in the Lebanon and Egypt the influence of France fairly and justly maintained, and although her officers and ours in that part of the world—and especially in Egypt—are acting together with confidence and trust, we must remember that our connection with the East is not merely an affair of sentiment and tradition, but that we have urgent and substantial and enormous interests which we must guard and keep. Therefore, when we find that the progress of Russia is a progress which, whatever may be the intentions of Russia, necessarily in that part of the world produces such a state of disorganisation and want of confidence in the Porte, it comes to this—that if we do not interfere in vindication of our own interests, that part of Asia must become the victim of anarchy, and ultimately become part of the possessions of Russia.

Now, my lords, I have ventured to review the chief points connected with the subject on which I wished to address you—namely, what was the policy pursued by us, both at the Congress of Berlin and in the Convention of Constantinople? I am told, indeed, that we have incurred an awful responsibility by the Convention into which we have entered. My lords, a prudent minister certainly would not recklessly enter into any responsibility; but a minister who is afraid to enter into any responsibility is, to my mind, not a prudent minister. We do not, my lords, wish to enter into any unnecessary responsibility; but there is one responsibility from which we certainly shrink; we shrink from the responsibility of handing to our successors a weakened or a diminished Empire. Our opinion is, that the course we have taken will arrest the great evils which are destroying Asia Minor and the equally rich countries beyond. We see in the present state of affairs the Porte losing its influence over its subjects; we see a certainty, in our opinion, of increasing anarchy, of the dissolution of all those ties which, though feeble, yet still exist and which have kept society together in those countries. We see the inevitable result of such a state of things, and we cannot blame Russia for availing herself of it. But, yielding to Russia what she has obtained, we say to her—"Thus far, and no farther." Asia is large enough for both of us. There is no reason for these constant wars, or fears of wars, between Russia and England. Before the circumstances which led to the recent disastrous war, when none of those events which we have

seen agitating the world had occurred, and when we were speaking in "another place" of the conduct of Russia in Central Asia, I vindicated that conduct, which I thought was unjustly attacked, and I said then—what I repeat now—there is room enough for Russia and England in Asia.

But the room that we require we must secure. We have, therefore, entered into an alliance—a defensive alliance—with Turkey, to guard her against any further attack from Russia. We believe that the result of this Convention will be order and tranquility. And then it will be for Europe—for we ask no exclusive privileges or commercial advantages—it will then be for Europe to assist England in availing ourselves of the wealth which has been so long neglected and undeveloped in regions once so fertile and so favoured. We are told, as I have said before, that we are undertaking great responsibilities. From those responsibilities we do not shrink. We think that, with prudence and discretion, we shall bring about a state of affairs as advantageous for Europe as for ourselves; and in that conviction we cannot bring ourselves to believe that the act which we have recommended is one that leads to trouble and to warfare. No, my lords, I am sure there will be no jealousy between England and France upon this subject. In taking Cyprus the movement is not Mediterranean, it is Indian. We have taken a step there which we think necessary for the maintenance of our Empire and for its preservation in peace. . . .

My lords, I have now laid before you the general outline of the policy we have pursued, both in the Congress of Berlin and at Constantinople. They are intimately connected with each other, and they must be considered together. I only hope that the House will not misunderstand—and I think the country will not misunderstand—our motives in occupying Cyprus, and in encouraging those intimate relations between ourselves and the Government and the population of Turkey. They are not movements of war; they are operations of peace and civilisation. We have no reason to fear war. Her Majesty has fleets and armies which are second to none. England must have seen with pride the Mediterranean covered with her ships; she must have seen with pride the discipline and devotion which have been shown to her and her Government by all her troops, drawn from every part of her Empire. I leave it to the illustrious duke, in whose presence I speak, to bear witness to the spirit of imperial patriotism which has been exhibited by the troops from India, which he recently reviewed at Malta. But it is not on our fleets and armies, however necessary they may be for the maintenance of our imperial strength, that I alone or mainly depend in that enterprise on which this country is about to enter. It is on what I most highly value—the consciousness that in the Eastern nations there is confidence in this country, and that, while they know we can enforce our policy, at the same time they know that our Empire is an Empire of liberty, of truth, and of justice.

FRANÇOIS GUIZOT

IN JULY, 1830, the barricades rose in the streets of Paris and the reactionary régime of King Charles X was driven from France. The middle class had led the revolt against the Bourbons, with the masses giving their support to the uprising. France had to decide between republic and constitutional monarchy. The upper bourgeoisie favored the latter, and the aged Lafayette and the republicans who formed with him the provisional government of the Paris City Hall finally agreed. The new king was to be Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, son of Philippe Egalité. This very respectable gentleman of fifty-seven seemed the perfect answer to the demands of what was hailed as France's Glorious Revolution—a Bourbon who had fought under the Tricolor.

The new régime had hardly been organized when many of the most ardent supporters of the July Revolution found themselves deceived. The new monarchy was bourgeois—upper bourgeois—conservative, and unattractive. As time went by, its policy of the "just mean" discontented everybody but the wealthy industrialists and bankers whose number and power were constantly growing as the Industrial Revolution progressed in France. The opposition included since the beginning the radical republicans, who had hoped to revive the Jacobin tradition of 1789 in 1830, and the ultra-conservative, ultra-clerical legitimists, who had remained faithful to the ousted Bourbons. Defeat in 1815 had caused the collapse of the Bonapartists, and Louis Napoleon, the nephew of the great Emperor, ludicrously failed in two attempts at starting a revolution (1836, 1840). Nevertheless the star of the Bonapartists, who might reconcile the Jacobin tradition with the principle of order, steadily rose as the sufferings of the Napoleonic wars were forgotten and as the inglorious foreign policy of the "bourgeois" monarchy brought humiliation upon France. Furthermore, the Industrial Revolution created in Paris that mass of proletarian laborers which had been wanting in 1795-96 when Babeuf organized the Conspiracy of the Equals. Now these workers began to listen to the socialist propaganda of Louis Blanc and to the anarchist doctrines of Proudhon.

The supporters of the régime soon divided into two groups. The party of "Movement" supported the new dynasty, the Charter, and sound business principles, but they asked for an extension of the suffrage, a diminution of corruption, and a strong nationalistic policy to restore France's prestige among the powers. The party of "Resistance" likewise stood for dynasty, Charter, and sound business principles, but it felt that the constitution—a French adaptation of the British model—was perfect, that the suffrage should not be extended, and that peace at any price was the best economic policy to be followed. Internal order was another essential precept of the party of "Resistance" and under Casimir-Périer, who headed the ministry in 1831 and 1832, armed force was used freely against any signs of dissidence and against strikes. But Périer's death in 1832 was followed

by coalition governments representing both major groups in Parliament, and firm leadership was lacking. Freedom of the press, guaranteed by the Charter of 1830, fell into abuse, unrest grew, attempts on the king's life occurred, and rioting broke loose in 1834 and 1835. In the fall of the latter year repressive measures, especially the September Laws on the press, restored order. The July monarchy entered a new era of party government. The parties of "Resistance" and "Movement" by turn held the ministry, under Guizot and Thiers respectively. This situation enabled the king to strengthen his own hand. He wished to govern, not merely to reign. He took advantage of political squabbles to name Count Molé prime minister, a king's man, a conservative, but one who stood for no particular party.

A coalition of Guizot's and Thiers' parties with the republicans overthrew Molé. France had now completely recovered from the tremendous losses of twenty-four years of revolutionary and Napoleonic campaigns—except for the important, but still inconspicuous fact that her population was not growing as fast as that of neighboring states. Thiers was an admirer of Napoleon and an ardent nationalist. He nearly plunged his country into what would have been a disastrous war against England, Russia, and Austria to support France's protégé, the pasha of Egypt. But the king dismissed Thiers and called the latter's pro-British rival, Guizot.

The July Monarchy thereupon entered its final phase. From 1840 to the Revolution in February, 1848, Guizot and the king governed France according to the letter of the Charter, but contrary to the spirit of the country. Bribery, patronage, electoral fraud were used widely to assure parliamentary majorities. The people of France as a whole, who had been apathetic to the political parade of the July Monarchy, renewed their interest in their government and opposition became general. The attack against Guizot and the king concentrated on: foreign policy, where France had suffered repeated losses of face at the hands of the irrepressible Palmerston; the corruption which helped maintain Guizot's majority; and the restriction of suffrage through property qualifications, which prevented the government's overthrow.

In 1846 the government won the expected and, given the conditions of election, inevitable electoral victory. In 1847 many Frenchmen sat at banquet tables to eat well and condemn Guizot, for this was a pleasant and effective way of circumventing restrictions on the freedom of press and assembly. But the "Dynastic" and Republican oppositions at first refused to drink toasts together. As the banquet movement grew, these two parties joined. And when a banquet of the Paris National Guard was forbidden in February, 1848, the protest against the régime moved from the dining hall to the streets. The barricades rose once more, and Louis Philippe left the throne, as he had ascended it, to the sound of gunfire in the streets of Paris.

François Guizot (1787-1874) retired from public life after 1848, returned to his studies and devoted himself to his *Memoirs*. Guizot was the perfect expression of the later years of the July Monarchy, but his policies, narrow as they may have seemed, were dictated by larger considerations. He is a striking example of the scholar turned statesman, of the statesman influenced by historical rather than rationalist analysis. As a historian, he was a tireless collector and editor of docu-

ments and a careful, effective narrator. His investigation of the past and his deep, self-righteous Calvinistic training (he belonged to the surviving Protestant minority in France) confirmed him in his belief in a constitutional monarchy, administered by and for the middle classes as representative of the best in the nation and the best interests of the nation. He was much impressed by the enduring structure England had built on the Revolution of 1688. It had combined tradition and liberty, progress and stability, and he felt that the July Monarchy was striving for these ends in France. Thus he saw no need for change, and failed to realize that once the principle of popular sovereignty is admitted an oligarchy such as his was doomed.

The following selection is translated from the eighth and last volume of his *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps*, Leipzig, 1867, and illustrates his uncompromising attitude, as well as his clear understanding of his opponents' positions.



MEMOIRS

THE CABINET and its political friends had an idea and a plan firmly decided upon. They hoped to close the era of Revolution in France by establishing that free government which France had promised herself in 1789 as the consequence and political guarantor of the social revolution she was then achieving. We considered the policy which had prevailed in France, aside from passing incidents, since the ministry of M. Casimir Périer, to be the only effective and sure means of attaining this end. This policy was both truly liberal and truly anti-revolutionary. Anti-revolutionary, without as within, for it desired the maintenance of European peace without, and that of the constitutional monarchy within. Liberal, for it accepted and respected fully the essential conditions of free government, the decisive intervention of the country in its undertakings, constant and lively discussion, in the press as in the Chambers, of the ideas and acts of the administration. In fact, this double aim was achieved. Externally, peace was maintained, and I believe today as I believed twenty years ago, that neither the influence nor the reputation of France in Europe lost anything thereby. Internally, between 1830 and 1848, political liberty was firm and strong; it flourished especially between 1840 and 1848 with no new legal limit being imposed upon it. Were I to speak my mind without reserve, I should say that not only impartial spectators but most of the then opponents of our policy would admit today, in their private thoughts, the truth of this double fact.

The policy which we upheld and practiced had its principle support in the preponderant influence of the middle classes: an influence recognized and accepted in the general interest of the country, and submitted to all the tests, to all the influences of general liberty. I am not discussing the system here; I am stating the fact, and I do not minimize its importance or character. The middle classes, with no special privilege or limit in the civil sphere, and always open, in the political sphere, to the upward movement of the nation as a whole, were, to our minds, the best organs and the best guardians of the principles of 1789, of the social order as of constitutional government, of liberty as of order, of civil liberties as of political liberty, of progress as of stability.

Following several general elections whose freedom and legality cannot be seriously questioned, and under the lash of serious, continually renewed debates, the preponderant influence of the middle classes had led, in the Chambers and in the country, to the formation of a majority which approved the policy whose elements I have just recalled, desired to maintain it and upheld it through the difficulties and ordeals, interior or exterior, which events imposed on it. This majority was steadily renewed, recruited, strengthened, practiced in public life, and from day to day more closely united to the ministry as the ministry was to it. In accordance with the natural tendency of free and representative government, it became the Conservative party, the party of the anti-revolutionary and liberal policy the success of which, since 1831, it had desired and supported.

Parliamentary government, the practical form of free government under a constitutional monarchy; the preponderant influence of the middle classes, the effective guarantee of constitutional monarchy and of political liberties under this form of government; the Conservative party, as natural representative of the influence of the middle classes and necessary instrument of parliamentary government: such were, according to our profound conviction, the means of action and the conditions of existence of the liberal and anti-revolutionary policy which we deeply resolved to practise and maintain.

It was this policy, as we conceived it and practised it with the harmonious support of the Crown, of the Chambers and the voters, that the opposition wished to change, and it was in order to change it that it demanded electoral and parliamentary reforms. These reforms were less an end than a means: provoked by the internal nature of parliament much more than by the need and demand of the country, they were to destroy the prevailing majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and the Conservative party which formed it, either by expelling some of the public office-holders who held seats, by extending the principle of ineligibility, or by calling upon new elements of uncertain character, through extending the right of suffrage. In principle, and to a cer-

tain degree, we had no absolute and permanent objection to such reforms. The extension of the right of suffrage and the incompatibility of certain official positions with the mission of the deputy could and should be the natural and legitimate consequences of the upward movement of society and the extended practice of political liberty. But at that time, according to us, these innovations were neither necessary nor opportune. Not necessary, because for thirty years events had proved that under the existing laws and institutions, the intervention of the country in public affairs was not lacking in liberty and vigor. Not opportune, because they would bring new ordeals and new difficulties into what was, to our mind, the closest and most pressing interest of the country, the practice and consolidation of free government, itself so new among us. These were both the cause and limit of our resistance to the immediate innovations that were asked.

The opposition, as I have already said, did not have the advantage of being animated by a single spirit and conducting itself according to a single plan, as did the cabinet and the Conservative party. It contained elements differing profoundly in their principles and in their aims; and each time a major question concerning political institutions was raised, these differences were revealed in their true nature and seriousness. They appeared clearly, despite compromise and discretion, as soon as electoral and parliamentary reforms became the order of the day. Since 1840—and that was one sign of our progress—uprisings and conspiracies for the overthrow of the monarchy of 1830 had ceased. From time to time attempts to assassinate the king recurred, as odious and underhanded protests against the established régime. Aside from these individual crimes, the parties restricted their struggles and hopes to the parliamentary arena, but even there they took care that there should be no misunderstanding of their true thoughts and the true import of their actions. We were faced with an opposition which declared itself loyally monarchic and dynastic, and with an opposition which, under a transparent veil, disclosed itself, even avowed itself as republican. Outside of the Chambers and the electorate, these two oppositions each had their public and their army, very diverse and divided, like the two general staffs, but actively united against the cabinet, the Conservative party and its policy.

United in its general aims, the monarchic and dynastic opposition was not so in those tendencies which are more intuitive than voluntary, which are at the root of the spirit and which rule it almost unbeknown. It included in its rank men who, since 1830, had several times approved, upheld, themselves practised, the policy to which the cabinet of October 29, 1840 fell heir. With them sat and voted men who had constantly criticized and fought this policy, whether it was in the hands of Mr. Casimir Périer, M. Thiers, M. Molé, or in

mine. Among the first group, whether because of higher intelligence and understanding gained through experience, or moderation and prudence of character, the spirit of government had taken its place beside the love of free institutions. They understood the conditions [of governing] and desired, at heart, the success of the conservative policy. They reproached us with pressing this policy too far, with proclaiming it too loudly, and not making enough concessions to popular tastes and the national imagination, and with making too many to foreigners. The second group, while desiring the maintenance of the monarchy of 1830, were still deeply imbued with the very slightly monarchical maxims and traditions of 1791, acknowledged them at all times, and accused the government of the king of having betrayed the Revolution of 1830 by deceiving its hope of a republican monarchy. Individually, the first were the most enlightened and capable among our adversaries. As a party, the second were the stronger and more dangerous, for it was they who found, in the involuntarily revolutionary instincts of a considerable part of the country, most sympathy and support.

The republican opposition was no less united in principle, no less united in composition than the monarchic opposition. It included doctrinaire republicans who repudiated demagogic follies as the crime of our revolution, and found the examples for their republic in the United States of America. Beside them marched the fanatical republicans, unshaken admirers of the republic of 1793, one and indivisible, men enslaved to the traditions of the National Convention, and who persisted in hailing the odious and blind tyrants of that period as the greatest men and the saviors of France. After these two groups came every sort of daring and ingenious dreamer who aspired, not only to reform the government, but to transform society itself, its civil and domestic organization as well as its political institutions, socialists, communists, apostles of economic theories, some despotic, some anarchic, all eager to hurl popular passions and hopes into an unknown future. However diverse were these elements of the party, they all rallied under the same flag, and in a common effort toward a common end, universal suffrage and the republic.

Despite the tactfulness of language and attitude with which they treated each other, these two oppositions did not pretend to conceal their profound differences. They understood that each would serve as an instrument to the other, and that within their alliance each would pursue its own aim: for one, the maintenance of the constitutional monarchy, reforming it slightly in accordance with the wishes of the other; and, for this other, the aim was the triumph of the republic, and under cover of reforms they prepared the revolution which was to usher in their new order.

ALPHONSE DE LAMARTINE

IF GUIZOT, the Puritan "bourgeois" liberal, knew exactly what he wanted—and thereby deserved to be called a doctrinaire—Lamartine belonged to that larger group of French romantic liberals who were somewhat bewildered by the frequent changes taking place in the first half of the nineteenth century, and who were unable to define exactly their political program. In retrospect we can say that both Thiers and the moderate leaders of the Second Republic, Arago, Marie, or Crémieux, stood for a liberal representative government, based on the middle class as a whole, and not solely on the upper bourgeoisie. Since they held that the great guarantee for the working masses was their ability to rise individually into the bourgeoisie, they were unmoved by the socialist and anarchist demands for collective economic improvement of the conditions of the laborers. Alphonse de Lamartine (1790–1869) belonged to no party, and yet, in a strange way, through the vagaries of his political career, he stood for the dream of national unity and conciliation in order and progress that was in the hearts of most Frenchmen.

Lamartine, the great and charming lyric poet of the Romantic Period, was a descendant of the old nobility. He held diplomatic posts under the Restoration, and had great faith in the constitutional government of the traditional House of Bourbon. But he accepted the July Monarchy, which had forestalled the formation of a republic, and saw in it the hope of ordered liberty. In 1834 he entered the Chamber of Deputies, but rejected all party affiliations, for he considered the parties agents of weakness, self-interest and national disunity. Instead he formed the Social party, of which he was the only member. He believed that the ideals of liberty, order, and moderation, which he preached with great eloquence, would attract the unselfish, patriotic support of all Frenchmen, that the Deputies would leave their petty parties and flock to the ideas for which he stood. But the deputies of France represented themselves rather than the people, and Lamartine's program was too vague to appeal to the unrepresented majority of the country.

Lamartine supported the ministry of Count Molé, the king's man, against the coalition of Guizot, Barrot and others. He disdained the parliamentary chiefs and their squabbles, and hoped that Molé would lead the nation in the path of popular reform and conciliation. But the poet failed to gain the leadership of the conservative group that supported Molé. He stood with them in opposition to the coalition, but against them in his demands for a more popular basis of government. Guizot eventually returned to power. Lamartine gradually relinquished his beliefs in monarchy and turned more and more, like the people of France, toward concepts of liberal democracy. Distrusted by all groups in the Chamber, by the right as a traitor, by the left as a former monarchist, he fought a battle in the name of his principles rather than of any party, and gradually the country, if not its deputies, began to look to Lamartine as its spokesman.

In 1847 appeared his *History of the Girondins*, an eloquent if unscientific record of the great Revolution. It appealed to the underlying revolutionary tradition of the French people, it revived discussion of the glorious days of democracy, and was a

call to arms as much as it revealed the great change in Lamartine. He had broken with his past and turned to the people instead of to monarchy as the rallying principle of order. Now he gave all his energies to a bitter campaign against the government of Guizot and Louis Philippe, and prepared for Revolution. When the banquet campaign grew, he joined it, and defied, forbade, and prevented concession to the ministry. Finally the revolution came, on February 24, 1848, and Lamartine, at a crucial moment, threw his influence against a regency of the Duchess of Orleans and for a republic. He became a member and chief spokesman of the Provisional Government which was created at the Paris City Hall, the traditional home of revolutionary governments.

Now Lamartine's individualism, his somewhat starry belief in principles rather than parties, called him to play a difficult rôle. He opposed with infinite skill the efforts of socialists like Louis Blanc and Blanqui to capture the Revolution and create a Socialist dictatorship. The principles of democracy in which he strongly believed led him to insist on an immediate election, to restore the power to the people, to forestall further *coups d'état* and factional maneuvers. But he felt that the moderates of the government, Arago, Garnier-Pagès, Crémieux, were too devoted to the ideals of the bourgeoisie, were not sufficiently democratic, and he aided Ledru-Rollin and the left in granting the mobs the principle of "the right to work" as a basis of republican government. At the same time he supported the strategy which made Louis Blanc's National Workshops an innocent device rather than the skeleton of a revolutionary army. He fought the adoption of the red flag, but preached conciliation with the left-wing leaders.

Naturally his course brought down on him the distrust of both left and moderates, and he had long since estranged the conservative elements of the population. While he received 1,600,000 votes in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, an expression of support to the party that had fought the socialists, he received only 7,900 votes for the Presidency of the Second Republic, after the provinces had spoken against the radicalism of Paris. A new star had risen, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, and Lamartine was forgotten. At first he fought this incarnation of a legend, for he hated the military despotism of the Emperor, which was the substance behind that legend of Napoleonic glory. But later, when the Prince-President, the beneficiary and advocate of universal suffrage, fought with the representatives of the bourgeoisie in the Assembly, he came to his support, wishing only that he would be more ardent in his defense of the Republic. Lamartine was bitterly disappointed by Napoleon's *coup d'état*, and while he resigned himself to the new order he retired to private life, disappointed and poor.

Lamartine had remained the poet in politics. He had the strength, but also the weakness, of devotion to lofty ideals often too tenuous for the popular mind to grasp. It is fair to say, however, that he gave this popular mind its most eloquent expression in those moments when it was reaching for lasting principles and higher concepts, rather than worrying about the daily transactions of the administration of a state.

The following selection is translated from Lamartine's "Déclaration de principes," which appeared in his paper, *Le Bien Public*, October 21, 1847. The text used appears in *La France parlementaire (1834-1851)*, *Oeuvres oratoires et écrits politiques par Alphonse de Lamartine*, edited by Louis Ulbach, Vol. V, 1865.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

AT THE BEGINNING of a new political year, and at the commencement of a new editorial year, it is perhaps well to glance back briefly at our principles, to remove the dust or rust which may have gathered, through our fault, in the minds of our readers, and to state clearly who we are to our friends and to our enemies. We have said it a thousand times; but this century has a stubborn ear; let us not grow tired of reiterating it, since we are always asked to do so.

We know full well besides, that we cannot be understood in a single word. These times are times of chaos; opinions are a scramble; parties are a jumble; the language of new ideas has not yet been created; nothing is more difficult than to give a good definition of oneself in religion, in philosophy, in politics. One feels, one knows, one lives, and at need, dies for one's cause, but one cannot name it. It is the problem and the task of this time to classify things and men. When they are classified, some will be called by one name, others by another; sides will be taken, and counted, and there will be light. While waiting for this, there are always a few shadows on the clearest viewpoints and on the most sincere consciences. Let us now try to throw more light on the matter.

Tacitus said that in time of revolution, the greatest difficulty for an honourable man was not so much to do his duty as to know it. Therein he was describing our situation. Indeed, today it is no longer sufficient to say, as it was in the good old days when two well defined concepts struggled hand to hand for the dominion of the world, I am a royalist, or a republican, aristocrat or democrat, Guelph or Ghibelline, blue or white. There isn't a single thinking man who isn't a bit of all these at once, whose thought isn't a complex compound of all the portions of error and all the portions of truth which each of these party names recalls. The world has jumbled its catalog. Political truth no longer lies in a single word. Why? Here is the reason:

Politically, we are in shifting sands. We are heirs to revolutions, reactions, fugitive efforts at government which haven't allowed a whole idea to prevail in the mind of man. The *ancien régime*, the republic, Jacobinism, the military and praetorian government of the consulate, the Empire, the Revolution of 1830 have left behind them on our soil a jumble of prejudices, passions, ideas, memories, regrets, resentments, confused and contradictory systems, through which it is prodigiously difficult to discern political truth by intelligence; above which it is yet more difficult to rise by character, to discover the real horizon of the future, and march straight toward it, now with the government, and

now against it, now with the opposition groups, now against them, today popular, tomorrow disowned and discredited.

And yet, tell us in a word, you men of good faith, who accuse us of confusion, where is this political truth? Is it political truth to follow the *ancien régime*, the trinity of three tyrannies, Church, Nobility and Throne, where each of these three powers detested and continually dreamed of destroying the other, but where all joined at need for the intellectual and material enslavement of the people? . . . Is it political truth to believe in the republican demagoguery of 1793, spreading its ideas sword in hand, by proscription and terror, repressing anarchy only with the scaffold? . . . Is it political truth, the truth of the Consulate, dispersing national sovereignty before its bayonettes, treating the liberty of a great people like a barracks meeting and giving to the hand of the Constituent Assembly the government of a military camp? Is it political truth, that of the Restoration, first granting a Charter, a leaf torn from the splendid book of the Revolution of '89, then trembling before its own handiwork, conquered by the spirit of the Court and by the spirit of the Church, and hurling itself, from fear, into the abyss of a *coup d'état* against common sense? . . . Finally is it political truth, the work of the government of July, begun as a kingdom of liberty, charged with creating and strengthening by regular practice the yet weak organs of democracy, with extending national sovereignty to all citizens, with giving each his rôle, his voice, his right in the government of reason and the will of all; and instead of fulfilling its charge, restricting, intimidating, binding, mutilating its organs ever more from day to day; throughout, substituting itself, and a narrow oligarchy, for the action of thirty-five million souls, daring to distinguish in the people a legal country and a nation apparently outside the law, reducing the entire mechanism of democratic institutions to a reigning bourgeoisie, in place of a crowned democracy?

No, none of all these is political truth. Political truth, for us, is neither the throne, nor the dynasty, nor the aristocracy, nor the clergy, nor the army, nor the bourgeoisie, nor democracy, nor parliament; it is the people. It is the reason, the right, the interest, the will of these thirty-five million people, with none excluded, none preferred and none privileged, bringing with them their title of moral sovereignty signed in heaven in their title of man, countersigned on earth in their title of citizen, and whose right, ability and will, expressed and regularized, form or should form what is called government. In a word, we are democrats, like nature and the Gospels. Truth is for us democracy organized in civil society and political government. All else is fiction, sophistry, lies, tyranny. Fiction has only an appearance, sophistry only a veneer, lies only

a time, tyranny only a weapon, which will sooner or later be broken in its hand. Truly stable governments can exist only upon a complete truth. Democratic government will be the eternal government of the future, toward which we march: such is our faith.

But, you will ask, does democracy or a government of right, expressing the will and interest of the entire people exclude the unitary form at the head and the whole category of monarchical tradition, concentration or embellishment, in a land of popular sovereignty. In a word, are we ideological fanatics breaking with the institutions of the country, declaring hatred and war against the government of the day, instead of bringing it strength, wisdom and cooperation as to the form desired, accepted or imposed by the nation of which we are citizens? We are anything but ideological fanatics; we can deal with men; we can accommodate ourselves to the times; we can comply with customs; we can calculate the force of traditions; we know that the force of the customs of fourteen centuries weighs against the strength of an absolute truth in the mind of a people; we know that the political language of a country cannot be remade in three days; we know, lastly, that transitions are the arches of the bridge of the human spirit, to pass from one order of things to another over the abyss of revolutions without falling in; we know, above all, that the name and machinery of governments are a matter of indifference to the wise, provided that these governments really accomplish the work they should accomplish; that there are free monarchies and despotic republics; that popular sovereignty can maintain a hereditary magistracy at the highest degree of its pyramid of elective powers, without thereby renouncing its nature; that it can allow this magistracy the name of representative royalty, by a condescension of principles toward customs which reassures the eye of the timid, without disturbing the spirit of the strong. What did J. J. Rousseau himself, the prophet of modern democracy, say in his view of political theory? He said: "For me what is essential is that just laws reign; the fundamentals of the state are the same in all forms of government. I prefer that of my country; I exclude none; on the contrary, each has its *raison d'être* which can make it preferable to all others according to times, places, men, circumstances." We agree with Rousseau. If representative monarchy wishes to serve human reason, advance the thought of God and liberty, work for the happiness of the people, make democracy prosper and rule under its name, we ourselves will loyally and religiously serve representative monarchy. It has its dangers, we are aware of them; but it has its advantages, it depends only on it to convince us of them. In a word, if we are republicans as philosophers, we could be monarchists as citizens.

What then do we ask of this government, at this time, in order to give it sincere support? We ask of it what the Revolution, of which it is the product, required that a government should give in the form of laws for France and in the form of an example to the world, under pain of treason and apostasy:

Sovereignty exercised by the people

Electoral rights extended to all citizens

Primary assemblies naming electors for a temporary function

Electors naming representatives for a limited time

Representatives not at the mercy of corruption by ministers, but salaried by the people, to remove all excuse for servility

Functionaries at their posts, and not in the Chambers, where they play two incompatible rôles, that of superintendents and superintended. No other laws to exclude them, this is adequate:

A national assembly

Ministers named in the ballot box by the majority which the Chamber gives them or takes away

The dynasty with no other privilege than the throne

The king inviolable

The princes simple citizens

Real freedom of religion through separation of church and state, freedom of association, and voluntary contribution in religious matters as the only budget of liberated consciences

Absolute freedom of teaching with this condition, that exception be made of the guardianship of morals which the state should never renounce

Freedom of the press through the revocation of the Laws of September

Security for the meeting place of national assembly, guaranteed by a prudent law against the misuse of the fortifications of Paris

A standing army and a reserve army which should be the whole military population on call

A just law to spread equally the burden of recruitment

Peace, but France at her [proper] rank in peace as she was in war

France the natural and avowed ally of freedom of thought and of peoples in all the world

The abolition of slavery, wherever flies the French flag, which either signifies a principle or signifies nothing

The organization of free instruction for the people on the widest base

Social fraternity in principles and institutions

Progressive freeing of commerce and trade

Low cost of living through the reduction of taxes on foodstuffs

A poor rate despite the calumnies with which the egoism of the economists seeks to discredit this institution

Foundlings adopted by the state, and not put away to die by the inquest on births and by the closing of the *tours* ¹

Extinction of vagabondage; retreats for the sickly, workshops for the able-bodied

Social charity promulgated in numerous laws in aid of all needs, sufferings, all miseries of the people

A budget based on the liberality of the state

A ministry of public welfare

A ministry arising from the life of the people, etc., etc., etc.

Let the government enter on these paths and we shall follow it without asking whether it wears a crown, a tiara, or a hat.

But if the government, in order to be supported, honored, loved, served by us, must be the instrument of national sovereignty, of the dignity of the country, of the honesty of laws, of the well doing of the state toward all its members, let us speak our thought in its entirety. All this is still not enough for us; the government must be before all and above all the instrument of God and the active promoter and initiator of human reason.—What does that mean?—That means that to our mind the government of a nation like France, on the morrow of a revolution destined to change the face of the earth, should not be a simple mechanism charged with procuring security, liberty, equality, work and bread to one nation; but that it should be a great and active apostle of light, truth and reason for France and for mankind. Order, peace, liberty, wealth, life, are good things, no doubt, but there are things above all these, and which give them all in surplus to the nations, as saith the Gospel: those things are ideas! The government of France in 1789 and 1830, the government of the nineteenth century has its primary duties toward the ideas for the service and security of which it was founded. Let us explain:

We are anti-materialists in politics, that is to say that as in the individual we place the interests of the soul well above those of the body, so we place the soul of peoples well above their material organization. We believe that peoples have a soul which civilization and governments have the mission to illuminate, to develop, to increase, to strengthen, to ennoble, to sanctify ever more from century to century by the adoption and by the continuous propagation of ideas, the moral and intellectual product, the ceaselessly accumulated patrimony, splendor, grandeur, strength, truth, dignity, holiness of the human spirit. What follows? It follows that the government of France, of the philo-

¹ [Device in the walls of foundling homes into which infants could be placed unobserved.]

sophic moral, religious and political revolution of '89, must be the expression of these principles, or dishonor itself, and dishonor the nation and the Revolution, by hurling France into the most sordid and the most abject materialism of the heart, and saying to God and to the peoples: "Let ideas perish, provided that I live!"

But what matters it to God and to men that you live, if you live and if you make the people live with false ideas which it was your providential mission to remove from the mind and soul of men? What matters it to God and to men if you live, if you buy each day of this precarious life, like the shipwrecked in a hurricane, at the cost of one of these philosophic, social, political truths which you throw overboard, to relieve your government of a few difficulties? What matters it to God and to men if you live, if human reason does not live with you, in you and by you? What matters it to God and to men if you live only in the spirit of the past, instead of living and making France and Europe live in the spirit of the future—that spirit which stirred at the end of the last century to give life to the new century? Make your choice between the Middle Ages and the nineteenth century; let it be the government of philosophy or the government of prejudice; recognize the Revolution as your mother, or repudiate her name. Do not make the nation retrace its steps; it will only find fictions and shadows. Do not continue this natural but overlong reaction of fear against the bursting forth in the Constituent Assembly of the most brilliant truths that have ever enlightened the world. These truths, inscribed on the banner of '89, are pure enough for you not to blush to profess and defend them. Emancipation of the human spirit by freedom of thought; emancipation of the individual soul by the freedom to examine and believe; the individual conscience returned to God by the civil authority; reciprocal liberation of the state by the church and of the church by the state; suppression of privileges; equality of the rights of man; a national family without primogeniture among its children; ennobling of the entire people by the title of citizen; sovereignty of each citizen by the right to elect; single and universal representation; the people king; opinion ruling, royalty executive; policies founded on the renunciation of conquests and on peace; respect for the blood of men; religion of humanity, general fraternity of people; coming of mankind to the age of reason; authority strong in its justice; government elevated to the dignity of public virtue; true political Christianity in action; here is the philosophy which should give sense and soul to your institutions! Here is the Jacobinism of Fénelon! It is ours; it is by this text that we shall continue to judge, act by act, the government of 1830. If it returns to it, support; if it departs from it, warning and opposition; if it denies it, war!

Such is our faith, such are our principles, such will be our acts.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE

ONE OF THE MOST thoughtful and perceptive observers of the nineteenth-century political scene, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–59) achieved fame with the publication of his profound and prophetic study, *Democracy in America*, in 1835. During a visit to the United States in 1831–32 he had investigated at first hand, and with a good deal of sympathy, the first vigorous manifestations of Jacksonian Democracy. He had returned to Europe, however, somewhat dismayed by his conclusion that “we are heading toward this unlimited democracy. What I see in this country [America] convinces me that it will work out badly in France; but we are pushed toward it by an irresistible force.” His book, therefore, was intended “to diminish the ardor of those who thought democracy easy and brilliant, [and] to diminish the terror of those who thought it menacing and unworkable.” The judicious tone of his book, the absence of strong conclusions, and the author’s relative aloofness from partisan politics contributed to the almost universally enthusiastic reception of his book which had a very large sale, and which one critic called “the greatest work of its kind since Montesquieu’s *Esprit des lois*.”

De Tocqueville’s characteristic independence of mind made it difficult for him to play much part in politics under the July Monarchy. Although not fundamentally opposed to the government of Louis-Philippe, he refused an easy opportunity to enter the Chamber in 1837 because he was unwilling to stand for election as an “official candidate.” Two years later he managed to secure a deputy’s mandate on his own terms, and he maintained a position of critical neutrality between the government and the opposition down to the Revolution of 1848, the outbreak of which he was almost alone in predicting.

During the revolutionary months de Tocqueville continued to plead for moderation and conciliation; he hoped that the new Republic could avoid the two great pitfalls in its path—the rule of the mob and Caesarism, to which he feared the former would inevitably lead. He approved of Cavaignac’s drastic crushing of the June insurrection and as a member of the Constituent Assembly argued unsuccessfully for the adoption of a bicameral legislature and for the American system of indirect election of the President by an electoral college because he correctly foresaw that the alternative (direct election by all adult males) would open the way to the dictatorship of a popular demagogue like Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte. For several months he served as foreign minister of the Second Republic. He was imprisoned for two days after Bonaparte’s *coup d’état* of December 2, 1851, against which he had publicly protested.

After the proclamation of the Second Empire had ended his political career, de Tocqueville turned again to the study of political institutions. Convinced that the Great French Revolution of 1789 had marked the decisive emergence of the new democratic order, he sought to see how the society of the Old Regime had given birth to the forces impelling the modern world in the direction of ever-greater mass participation in government. The central—and at that time novel—thesis of his

last major work, *The Ancien Regime and the Revolution* (unfinished at his death, though Part I had appeared in 1856), was that Robespierre and Napoleon I had merely continued and intensified the process of political centralization which the Bourbon kings of France had been carrying forward for three centuries prior to 1789. His broader conclusion, that liberty and democracy—though often thought of as interchangeable terms—may well prove to be incompatible with one another under modern conditions, emerges as the distillation of his lifetime of observation and experience, and represents one of his most original and influential contributions to contemporary political philosophy.

In his *Recollections* de Tocqueville writes of events in which he was personally concerned with extraordinary detachment, and brings to bear on them the superlative analytical powers that distinguished his more theoretical writings. The manuscript was written at intervals during his retirement, was first published in French in 1893 and was translated in 1896 by Alexander Teixeira de Mattos. The following selections are from *The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville*, edited, with additions and an introduction by J. P. Mayer (London, The Harvill Press, 1948).



RECOLLECTIONS

ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF THESE RECOLLECTIONS—GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE PERIOD PRECEDING THE REVOLUTION OF 1848—FIRST SYMPTOMS OF THE REVOLUTION

. . . OUR HISTORY from 1789 to 1830, viewed from a distance and as a whole, affords as it were the picture of a struggle to the death between the Ancien Régime, its traditions, memories, hopes, and men, as represented by the aristocracy, and the New France led by the Middle Class. The year 1830 closed the first period of our revolutions, or rather of our revolution: for there is but one, which has remained always the same in the face of varying fortunes, of which our fathers witnessed the beginning, and of which we, in all probability, shall not live to see the end. In 1830 the triumph of the middle class had been definite and so thorough that all political power, every franchise, every prerogative, and the whole government was confined and, as it were, heaped up within the narrow limits of this one class, to the statutory exclusion of all beneath them and the actual exclusion of all above. Not only did it thus rule society, but it may be said to have formed it. It entrenched itself in every vacant place, prodigiously augmented the number of places and accustomed itself to live almost as much upon the Treasury as upon its own industry.

No sooner had the Revolution of 1830 become an accomplished fact, than there ensued a great lull in political passion, a sort of general subsidence, accom-

panied by a rapid increase in public wealth. The particular spirit of the middle class became the general spirit of the government; it ruled the latter's foreign policy as well as affairs at home: an active, industrious spirit, often dishonourable, generally orderly, occasionally reckless through vanity or egoism, but timid by temperament, moderate in all things except in its love of ease and comfort, and last but not least mediocre. It was a spirit which, mingled with that of the people or of the aristocracy, can do wonders; but which, by itself, will never produce more than a government shorn of both virtue and greatness. Master of everything in a manner that no aristocracy has ever been or may ever hope to be, the middle class, when called upon to assume the government, took it up as an industrial enterprise; it entrenched itself behind its power, and before long, in their egoism, each of its members thought much more of his private business than of public affairs; of his personal enjoyment than of the greatness of the nation.

Posterity, which sees none but the more dazzling crimes, and which loses sight, in general, of mere vices, will never, perhaps, know to what extent the government of that day, towards its close, assumed the ways of an industrial enterprise, which conducts all its transactions with a view to the profits accruing to the shareholders. These vices were due to the natural instincts of the dominant class, to its absolute power, and also to the character of the time. King Louis-Philippe had contributed much to their growth. He was the accident which made the malady mortal. This prince was a singular medley of qualities, and one would have to have known him longer and more nearly than I did to be able to portray him in detail. But his main traits were easily seen even when one was far away or one was only passing by.

Though he came from one of the noblest families in Europe, he concealed all hereditary pride deeply in his soul; nevertheless he certainly believed that there was no other human being like him. All the same he had most of the qualities and defects which belong more particularly to the subaltern orders of society. He had regular habits and wanted those around him to have them too. He was orderly in his conduct, simple in his habits, his tastes were tempered; he was a born friend of the law, an enemy of all excesses, sober in his ways except in his desires. He was human without being sentimental, greedy and soft. He had no flaming passions, no ruinous weaknesses, no striking vices, and only one kingly virtue: courage. He was extremely polite, but without choice or greatness, a politeness of a merchant rather than of a Prince. He hardly appreciated literature or art, but he passionately loved industry. His memory was prodigious and capable of keeping the minutest detail. His conversation was prolix, diffuse, original and trivial, anecdotal, full of small facts, of salt and meaning; it gave all satisfaction which one may find in

intellectual pleasures when delicacy and elevation are absent. His mind was distinguished, but withdrawn and embarrassed for his soul was neither high nor profound. He was enlightened, subtle, flexible; as he was only open to that which was useful, he was full of profound disdain for the truth, and he did so little believe in virtue that his sight was darkened. Thus he did not see the beauty which truth and decency show, he did not even understand any more their usefulness which they so often have. He had a profound knowledge of human beings, but he knew them only through their vices. He was unbeliever in religious matters as the eighteenth century and sceptical in politics as the 19th; having no belief himself, he did not believe in the belief of others. He was, as it were, naturally fond of power and of dishonest, mediocre, facile, and plain courtiers to be really born for the throne. His ambition only, limited by prudence, never satisfied, nor did it ever carry him away; it always kept him near to the ground.

There have been several princes who resemble this portrait, but the special case of Louis-Philippe was his analogy or rather kind of parentship and consanguinity which bound his faults to those of his time; this made him for his contemporaries and particularly for the class which held the power such an attractive, singularly dangerous and corruptive prince. Chief of the bourgeoisie,—he pushed them towards their natural bent which they had only too much inclination to follow. They married their vices, and this family union first made each of them strong, singly, then accomplished the demoralisation of the other, and finished by making them both perish. . . .

In this political world thus constituted and conducted, what was most wanting, particularly towards the end, was political life itself. It could neither come into being nor be maintained within the legal circle which the Constitution had traced for it: the old aristocracy was vanquished, the people excluded. As all business was discussed among members of one class, in the interest and in the spirit of that class, there was no battlefield for contending parties to meet upon. This singular homogeneity of position, of interests, and consequently of views, reigning in what M. Guizot had once called the legal country, deprived the parliamentary debates of all originality, of all reality, and therefore of all genuine passion. I have spent ten years of my life in the company of truly great minds, who were in a constant state of agitation without succeeding in heating themselves, and who spent all their perspicacity in vain endeavours to find subjects upon which they could seriously disagree.

On the other hand, the preponderating influence which King Louis-Philippe had acquired in public affairs, which never permitted the politicians to stray very far from that Prince's ideas, lest they should at the same time be removed from power, reduced the different colours of parties to the merest shades, and

debates to the splitting of straws. I doubt whether any parliament (not excepting the Constituent Assembly, I mean the true one, that of 1789) ever contained more varied and brilliant talents than did ours during the closing years of the Monarchy of July. Nevertheless, I am able to declare that these great orators were bored to death of listening to one another, and, what was worse the whole country was bored of listening to them. France grew unconsciously accustomed to look upon the debates in the Chambers as exercises of the intellect rather than as serious discussions, and upon all the differences between the various parliamentary parties—the majority, the left centre, or the dynastic opposition—as domestic quarrels between children of one family trying to trick one another. A few glaring instances of corruption, discovered by accident, led the country to presuppose a number of hidden cases, and convinced it that the whole of the governing class was corrupt; whence it conceived for the latter a silent contempt, which was generally taken for confiding and contented submission.

The country was at that time divided into two unequal parts, or rather zones: in the upper, which alone was intended to contain the whole of the nation's political life, there reigned nothing but languor, impotence, stagnation, and boredom; in the lower, on the contrary, political life began to make itself manifest by means of feverish and irregular signs, of which the attentive observer was easily able to seize the meaning.

I was one of these observers; and although I was far from imagining that the catastrophe was so near at hand and fated to be so terrible, I felt a distrust springing up and insensibly growing in my mind, and the idea taking root more and more that we were making strides towards a fresh revolution. This denoted a great change in my thoughts; since the general appeasement and flatness that followed the Revolution of July had led me to believe for a long time that I was destined to spend my life amid an enervated and peaceful society. Indeed, anyone who had only examined the inside of the governmental fabric would have had the same conviction. Everything there seemed combined to produce with the machinery of liberty a preponderance of Royal power which verged upon despotism; and, in fact, this result was produced almost without effort by the regular and tranquil movement of the machine. King Louis-Philippe was persuaded that, so long as he did not himself lay hand upon that fine instrument, and allowed it to work according to rule, he was safe from all peril. His only occupation was to keep it in order, and to make it work according to his own views, forgetful of society, upon which this ingenious piece of mechanism rested; he resembled the man who refused to believe that his house was on fire, because he had the key to it in his pocket. I could neither have the same interests nor the same cares, and this

permitted me to see through the mechanism of institutions and the agglomeration of petty every-day facts, and to observe the state of morals and opinions in the country. There I clearly saw the appearance of several of the portents that usually denote the approach of revolutions, and I began to believe that in 1830 I had taken for the end of the play what was nothing more than the end of an act.

A short unpublished document which I composed at the time, and a speech which I delivered early in 1848, will bear witness to these pre-occupations of my mind.

Several of my friends in Parliament met together in October 1847, to decide upon the policy to be adopted during the next session. It was agreed that we should issue a program in the form of a manifesto, and the task of drawing it up was deputed to me. Later, the idea of this publication was abandoned, but I had already written the document. I have discovered it among my papers, and I give the following extracts. After commenting on the symptoms of languor in Parliament, I continued:

. . . The time will come when the country will find itself once again divided between two great parties. The French Revolution which abolished all privileges and destroyed all exclusive rights, has allowed one to remain, that of property. Let not the proprietors deceive themselves as to the strength of their position, nor think that the rights of property form an insurmountable barrier because they have not as yet been surmounted; for our times are unlike any others. When the rights of property were merely the origin and commencement of a number of other rights, they were easily defended, or rather, they were never attacked; they then formed the surrounding wall of society, of which all other rights were the outposts; no blows reached them; no serious attempt was ever made to touch them. But to-day, when the rights of property are nothing more than the last remnants of an overthrown aristocratic world; when they alone are left intact, isolated privileges amid the universal levelling of society; when they are no longer protected behind a number of still more controversial and odious rights, the case is altered, and they alone are left daily to resist the direct and unceasing shock of democratic opinion.

. . . Before long, the political struggle will be restricted to those who have and those who have not; property will form the great field of battle; and the principal political questions will turn upon the more or less important modifications to be introduced into the right of property. We shall then have once more among us great public agitations and great political parties.

How is it that these premonitory symptoms escape the general view? Can anyone believe that it is by accident, through some passing whim of the human mind, that we see appearing on every side these curious doctrines, bearing different titles, but all characterized in their essence by their denial of the rights of property, and all tending, at least, to diminish and weaken the exercise of these rights? Who can fail here to recognise the final symptom of the old democratic disease of the time, whose crisis would seem to be at hand?

I was still more urgent and explicit in the speech which I delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on the 29th of January 1848, and which appeared in the *Moniteur* of the 30th.

The principal passages may be quoted here:

. . . I am told that there is no danger because there are no riots; I am told that, because there is no visible disorder on the surface of society, there is no revolution at hand.

Gentlemen, permit me to say that I believe you are mistaken. True, there is no actual disorder; but it has entered deeply into men's minds. See what is preparing itself amongst the working classes, who, I grant, are at present quiet. No doubt they are not disturbed by political passions, properly so-called, to the same extent that they have been; but can you not see that their passions, instead of political, have become social? Do you not see that they are gradually forming opinions and ideas which are destined not only to upset this or that law, ministry, or even form of government, but society itself, until it totters upon the foundations on which it rests to-day? Do you not listen to what they say to themselves each day? Do you not hear them repeating unceasingly that all that is above them is incapable and unworthy of governing them; that the distribution of goods prevalent until now throughout the world is unjust; that property rests on a foundation which is not an equitable one? And do you not realize that when such opinions take root, when they spread in an almost universal manner, when they sink deeply into the masses, they are bound to bring with them sooner or later, I know not when or how, a most formidable revolution?

This, gentlemen, is my profound conviction: I believe that we are at this moment sleeping on a volcano. I am profoundly convinced of it . . .

. . . I was saying just now that this evil would sooner or later, I know not how or whence it will come, bring with it a most serious revolution: be assured that that is so.

When I come to investigate what, at different times, in different periods, among different peoples, has been the effective cause that has brought about the downfall of the governing classes, I perceive this or that event, man, or accidental or superficial cause; but, believe me, the real reason, the effective reason which causes men to lose political power is, that they have become unworthy to retain it.

Think, gentlemen, of the old Monarchy: it was stronger than you are, stronger in its origin; it was able to lean more than you do upon ancient customs, ancient habits, ancient beliefs; it was stronger than you are, and yet it has fallen to dust. And why did it fall? Do you think it was by particular mischance? Do you think it was by the act of some man, by the deficit, the oath in the Tennis Court, La Fayette, Mirabeau? No, gentlemen; there was another reason: the class that was then the governing class had become, through its indifference, its selfishness and its vices, incapable and unworthy of governing the country.

That was the true reason.

Well, gentlemen, if it is right to have this patriotic prejudice at all times, how much more is it not right to have it in our own? Do you not feel, by some intuitive instinct which is not capable of analysis, but which is undeniable, that the earth is quaking once again in Europe? Do you not feel—what shall I say?—as it

were a gale of revolution in the air? This gale, no one knows whence it springs, whence it blows, nor, believe me, whom it will carry with it; and it is in such times as these that you remain calm before the degradation of public morality—for the expression is not too strong. . . .

THE BANQUETS—SENSE OF SECURITY ENTERTAINED BY THE GOVERNMENT
—ANXIETY OF THE LEADERS OF THE OPPOSITION—ARRAIGNMENT OF
MINISTERS

I refused to take part in the affair of the banquets. I had both serious and petty reasons for abstaining. What I call petty reasons I am quite willing to describe as bad reasons, although they were consistent with honour, and would have been unexceptionable in a private matter. They were the irritation and disgust aroused in me by the character and the tactics of the leaders of this enterprise. Nevertheless, I confess that the private prejudice which we entertain with regard to individuals is a bad guide in politics. . . .

It will be remembered that, at the opening of the session of 1848, King Louis-Philippe, in his speech from the Throne, had described the authors of the banquets as men excited by blind or hostile passions. This was bringing Royalty into direct conflict with more than one hundred members of the Chamber. This insult, which added anger to all the ambitious passions which were already disturbing the hearts of the majority of these men, ended by making them lose their reason. A violent debate was expected, but did not take place at once. The earlier discussions on the Address were calm: the majority and the Opposition both restrained themselves at the beginning, like two men who feel that they have lost their tempers, and who fear lest while in their condition, they should perpetrate some folly in word or deed.

But the storm of passion broke out at last, and continued with unaccustomed violence. The extraordinary heat of these debates was already redolent of civil war for those who knew how to scent revolutions from afar. . . .

The debates on the Address were closed, if I remember rightly, on the 12th of February, and it is really from this moment that the revolutionary movement burst out. The Constitutional Opposition, which had for many months been constantly pushed on by the Radical party, was from this time forward led and directed not so much by the members of that party who occupied seats in the Chamber of Deputies (the greater number of these had become lukewarm and, as it were, enervated in the Parliamentary atmosphere), as by the younger, bolder, and more irresponsible men who wrote for the demagogic press. This change was especially apparent in two principal facts which had an overwhelming influence upon events—the program of the banquet and the arraignment of Ministers.

On the 20th of February, there appeared in almost all the Opposition newspapers, by way of program of the approaching banquet, what was really a proclamation, convoking the schools and inviting the National Guard itself to attend the ceremony as a body. It read like a decree emanating from the Provisional Government which was to be set up three days later. The Cabinet, which had already been blamed by many of its followers for tacitly authorising the banquet, considered that it was justified in retracing its steps. It officially announced that it forbade the banquet, and that it would prevent it by force.

It was this declaration of the Government which provided the field for the battle. I am in a position to state, although it sounds hardly credible, that the program which thus suddenly turned the banquet into an insurrection was resolved upon, drawn up and published without the participation or the knowledge of the members of Parliament who considered themselves to be still leading the movement which they had called into existence. The program was the hurried work of a nocturnal gathering of journalists and Radicals, and the leaders of the Dynastic Opposition heard of it at the same time as the public, by reading it in the papers in the morning.

And see by what counter-strokes human affairs are pushed on! M. Odilon Barrot, who disapproved of the program as much as anyone, dared not disclaim it for fear of offending the men, who, till then, had seemed to be moving with him; and then, when the Government, alarmed by the publication of this document, prohibited the banquet, M. Barrot, finding himself brought face to face with civil war, drew back. He himself gave up this dangerous demonstration; but at the same time that he was making this concession to the men of moderation, he granted to the extremists the impeachment of Ministers. He accused the latter of violating the Constitution by prohibiting the banquet, and thus furnished an excuse to those who were about to take up arms in the name of the violated Constitution.

Thus the principal leaders of the Radical Party, who thought that a revolution would be premature, and who did not yet desire it, had considered themselves obliged, in order to differentiate themselves from their allies in the Dynastic Opposition, to make very revolutionary speeches and fan the flame of insurrectionary passion. On the other hand, the Dynastic Opposition, which had had enough of the banquets, had been forced to persevere in this bad course so as not to present an appearance of retreating before the defiance of the Government. And finally the mass of the Conservatives, who believed in the necessity of great concessions and were ready to make them, were driven by the violence of their adversaries and the passions of some of their chiefs to deny even the right of meeting in private banquets and to refuse the country any hopes of reform.

One must have lived long amid political parties, and in the very whirlwind in which they move, to understand to what extent men mutually push each other away from their respective plans, and how the destinies of this world proceed as the result, but often as the contrary result, of the intentions that produce them, similarly to the kite which flies by the antagonistic action of the wind and the cord.

MY EXPLANATION OF THE 24TH OF FEBRUARY, AND MY THOUGHTS AS TO ITS EFFECTS UPON THE FUTURE

. . . The Revolution of February, in common with all other great events of this class, sprang from general causes, impregnated, if I am permitted the expression, by accidents; and it would be as superficial a judgment to ascribe it necessarily to the former or exclusively to the latter.

The industrial revolution which, during the past thirty years, had turned Paris into the principal manufacturing city of France and attracted within its walls an entire new population of workmen (to whom the works of the fortifications had added another population of labourers at present deprived of work), together with the excess in material pleasures fostered by the government itself, tended more and more to inflame this multitude. Add to this the democratic disease of envy, which was silently permeating it; the economical and political theories which were beginning to make their way and which strove to prove that human misery was the work of laws and not of Providence, and that poverty could be suppressed by changing the conditions of society; the contempt into which the governing class, and especially the men who led it, had fallen, a contempt so general and so profound that it paralyzed the resistance even of those who were most interested in maintaining the power that was being overthrown; the centralization which reduced the whole revolutionary movement to the overmastering of Paris and the seizing of the machinery of government; and lastly, the mobility of all this, institutions, ideas, men and customs, in a fluctuating state of society which had, in less than sixty years, undergone the shock of seven great revolutions, without numbering a multitude of smaller, secondary upheavals. These were the general causes without which the Revolution of February would have been impossible. The principal accidents which led to it were the passions of the dynastic Opposition, which brought about a riot in proposing a reform; the suppression of this riot, first over-violent and then abandoned; the sudden disappearance of the old Ministry, unexpectedly snapping the threads of power, which the new ministers, in their confusion, were unable either to seize upon or to reunite; the mistakes and disorder of mind of these ministers, so powerless to re-establish that which they had been strong enough to over-

throw; the vacillation of the generals; the absence of the only princes who possessed either personal energy or popularity; and above all, the senile imbecility of King Louis-Philippe, his weakness, which no one could have foreseen, and which still remains almost incredible, after the event has proved it.

I have sometimes asked myself what could have produced this sudden and unprecedented depression in the King's mind. Louis-Philippe had spent his life in the midst of revolutions, and certainly lacked neither experience, courage, nor readiness of mind, although these qualities all failed him so completely on that day. In my opinion, his weakness was due to his excessive surprise; he was overwhelmed with consternation before he had grasped the meaning of things. The Revolution of February was *unforeseen* by all, but by him more than any other; he had been prepared for it by no warning from the outside, for since many years his mind had withdrawn into that sort of haughty solitude into which in the end the intellect almost always settles down of princes who have long lived happily, and who, mistaking luck for genius, refuse to listen to anything, because they think that there is nothing left for them to learn from anybody. Besides, Louis-Philippe had been deceived, as I have already said that his ministers were, by the misleading light cast by antecedent facts upon present times. One might draw a strange picture of all the errors which have thus been begotten, one by the other, without resembling each other. We see Charles I driven to tyranny and violence at the sight of the progress which the spirit of opposition had made in England during the gentle reign of his father; Louis XVI determined to suffer everything because Charles I had perished by refusing to endure anything; Charles X provoking the Revolution, because he had with his own eyes beheld the weakness of Louis XVI; and lastly, Louis-Philippe, who had more perspicacity than any of them, imagining that, in order to remain on the Throne, all he had to do was to observe the letter of the law while violating its spirit, and that, provided he himself kept within the bounds of the Charter, the nation would never exceed them. To warp the spirit of the Constitution without changing the letter; to set the vices of the country in opposition to each other; gently to drown revolutionary passion in the love of material enjoyment: such was the idea of his whole life. Little by little, it had become, not his leading, but his sole idea. He had wrapped himself in it, he had lived in it; and when he suddenly saw that it was a false idea, he became like a man who is awakened in the night by an earthquake, and who, feeling his house crumbling in the darkness, and the very ground seeming to yawn beneath his feet, remains distracted amid this unforeseen and universal ruin.

I am arguing very much at my ease to-day concerning the causes that brought about the events of the 24th of February; but on the afternoon of that

day I had many other things in my head: I was thinking of the events themselves, and sought less for what had produced them than for what was to follow.

I returned slowly home. I explained in a few words to Madame de Tocqueville what I had seen, and sat down in a corner to think. I cannot remember ever feeling my soul so full of sadness. It was the second revolution I had seen accomplish itself, before my eyes, within seventeen years!

On the 30th of July, 1830, at daybreak, I had met the carriages of King Charles X on the outer boulevards of Versailles, with damaged escutcheons, proceeding at a foot pace, in Indian file, like a funeral, and I was unable to restrain my tears at the sight. This time my impressions were of another kind, but even keener. Both revolutions had afflicted me; but how much more bitter were the impressions caused by the last! I had until the end felt a remnant of hereditary affection for Charles X; but that King fell for having violated rights that were dear to me, and I had every hope that my country's freedom would be revived rather than extinguished by his fall. But now this freedom seemed dead; the Princes who were fleeing were nothing to me, but I felt that the cause I had at heart was lost.

I had spent the best days of my youth amid a society which seemed to increase in greatness and prosperity as it increased in liberty; I had conceived the idea of a balanced, regulated liberty, held in check by religion, custom and law; the attractions of this liberty had touched me; it had become the passion of my life; I felt that I could never be consoled for its loss, and that I must renounce all hope of its recovery.

I had gained too much experience of men to be able to content myself with empty words; I knew that, if one great revolution is able to establish liberty in a country, a number of succeeding revolutions make all regular liberty impossible for very many years.

I could not yet know what would issue from this last revolution, but I was already convinced that it could give birth to nothing that would satisfy me; and I foresaw that, whatever might be the lot reserved for our posterity, our own fate was to drag on our lives miserably amid alternate reactions of licence and oppression.

I began to pass in review the history of our last sixty years, and I smiled bitterly when I thought of the illusions formed at the conclusion of each period in this long revolution; the theories on which these illusions had been fed; the sapient dreams of our historians, and all the ingenious and deceptive systems by the aid of which it had been endeavoured to explain a present which was still incorrectly seen, and a future which was not seen at all.

The Constitutional Monarchy had succeeded the *Ancien Régime*; the Re-

public, the Monarchy; the Empire, the Republic; the Restoration, the Empire; and then came the Monarchy of July. After each of these successive changes it was said that the French Revolution, having accomplished what was presumptuously called its work, was finished; this had been said and it had been believed. Alas! I myself had hoped it under the Restoration, and again after the fall of the Government of the Restoration; and here is the French Revolution beginning over again, for it is still the same one. As we go on, its end seems farther off and shrouded in greater darkness. Shall we ever—as we are assured by other prophets, perhaps as delusive as their predecessors—shall we ever attain a more complete and more far-reaching social transformation than our fathers foresaw and desired, and than we ourselves are able to foresee; or are we not destined simply to end in a condition of intermittent anarchy, the well-known chronic and incurable complaint of old peoples? As for me, I am unable to say; I do not know when this long voyage will be ended; I am weary of seeing the shore in each successive mirage, and I often ask myself whether the *terra firma* we are seeking does really exist, and whether we are not doomed to rove upon the seas for ever! . . .

PARIS ON THE MORROW OF THE 24TH OF FEBRUARY AND THE NEXT DAYS
—THE SOCIALISTIC CHARACTER OF THE NEW REVOLUTION

. . . For a year past the dynastic Opposition and the republican Opposition had been living in fallacious intimacy, acting in the same way from different motives. The misunderstanding which had facilitated the revolution tended to mitigate its after effects. Now that the Monarchy had disappeared, the battle-field seemed empty; the people no longer clearly saw what enemies remained for them to pursue and strike down; the former objects of their anger, themselves, were no longer there; the clergy had never been completely reconciled to the new dynasty, and witnessed its ruin without regret; the old nobility were delighted at it, whatever the ultimate consequences might be: the first had suffered through the system of intolerance of the middle classes, the second through their pride: both either despised or feared their government.

For the first time in sixty years, the priests, the old aristocracy and the people met in a common sentiment—a feeling of revenge, it is true, and not of affection; but even that is a great thing in politics, where a community of hatred is almost always the foundation of friendships. The real, the only vanquished were the middle class; but even this had little to fear. Its reign had been exclusive rather than oppressive; corrupt, but not violent; it was despised rather than hated. Moreover, the middle class never forms a compact body in the heart of the nation, a part very distinct from the whole; it always

participates a little with all the others, and in some places merges into them. This absence of homogeneity and of exact limits makes the government of the middle class weak and uncertain, but it also makes it intangible, and, as it were, invisible to those who desire to strike it when it is no longer governing.

From all these united causes proceeded that languor of the people which had struck me as much as its omnipotence, a languor which was the more discernible, in that it contrasted strangely with the turgid energy of the language used and the terrible recollections which it evoked. The truth is that never was a greater change in the government, and even in the very condition of a nation, brought about by citizens who were themselves so little moved. The *History of the Revolution* by M. Thiers, *The Girondins* by M. Lamartine, as well as other works, particularly plays, which are less well known, had rehabilitated the period of the Terror and brought it to some extent into fashion. The lukewarm passions of the time were made to speak in the bombastic periods of '93, and one heard cited at every moment the name and example of the illustrious ruffians whom no one possessed either the energy or even a sincere desire to resemble.

It was the Socialistic theories which I have already described as the philosophy of the Revolution of February that later kindled genuine passion, embittered jealousy, and ended by stirring up war between the classes. If the actions at the commencement were less disorderly than might have been feared, on the very morrow of the Revolution there was displayed an extraordinary agitation, an unequalled disorder, in the ideas of the people.

From the 25th of February onwards, a thousand strange systems came issuing pell-mell from the minds of innovators, and spread among the troubled minds of the crowd. Everything still remained standing except Royalty and Parliament; yet it seemed as though the shock of the Revolution had reduced society itself to dust, and as though a competition had been opened for the new form that was to be given to the edifice about to be erected in its place. Everyone came forward with a plan of his own: this one printed it in the papers, that other on the placards with which the walls were soon covered, a third proclaimed his loud-mouthed in the open air. One aimed at destroying inequality of fortune, another inequality of education, a third undertook to do away with the oldest of all inequalities, that between man and woman. Specifics were offered against poverty, and remedies for the disease of work which has tortured humanity since the first days of its existence.

These theories were of very varied natures, often opposed and sometimes hostile to one another; but all of them, aiming lower than the government and striving to reach society itself, on which government rests, adopted the common name of Socialism.

Socialism will always remain the essential characteristic and the most redoubtable remembrance of the Revolution of February. The Republic will only appear to the on-looker to have come upon the scene as a means, not as an end.

It does not come within the scope of these Recollections that I should seek for the causes which gave a socialistic character to the Revolution of February, and I will content myself with saying that the discovery of this new facet of the French Revolution was not of a nature to cause so great surprise as it did. Had it not been long perceived that the people had continually been improving and raising its condition, that its importance, its education, its desires, its power had been constantly increasing? Its prosperity had also grown greater, but less rapidly, and was approaching the limit which it hardly ever passes in old societies, where there are many men and but few places. How should the poor and humbler and yet powerful classes not have dreamt of issuing from their poverty and inferiority by means of their power, especially in an epoch when our view into another world has become dimmer, and the miseries of this world become more visible and seem more intolerable? They had been working to this end for the last sixty years. The people had first endeavoured to help itself by changing every political institution, but after each change it found that its lot was in no way improved, or was only improving with a slowness quite incompatible with the eagerness of its desire. Inevitably, it must sooner or later discover that that which held it fixed in its position was not the constitution of the government but the unalterable laws that constitute society itself; and it was natural that it should be brought to ask itself if it had not both the power and the right to alter those laws, as it had altered all the rest. And to speak more specially of property, which is, as it were, the foundation of our social order—all the privileges which covered it and which, so to speak, concealed the privilege of property having been destroyed, and the latter remaining the principal obstacle to equality among men, and appearing to be the only sign of inequality—was it not necessary, I will not say that it should be abolished in its turn, but at least that the thought of abolishing it should occur to the minds of those who did not enjoy it?

This natural restlessness in the minds of the people, this inevitable perturbation of its thoughts and its desires, these needs, these instincts of the crowd formed in a certain sense the fabric upon which the political innovators embroidered so many monstrous and grotesque figures. Their work may be regarded as ludicrous, but the material on which they worked is the most serious that it is possible for philosophers and statesmen to contemplate.

Will Socialism remain buried in the disdain with which the Socialists of 1848 are so justly covered? I put the question without making any reply. I

do not doubt that the laws concerning the constitution of our modern society will in the long run undergo modification; they have already done so in many of their principal parts. But will they ever be destroyed and replaced by others? It seems to me to be impracticable. I say no more, because—the more I study the former condition of the world and see the world of our own day in greater detail, the more I consider the prodigious variety to be met with not only in laws, but in the principles of law, and the different forms even now taken and retained, whatever one may say, by the rights of property on this earth—the more I am tempted to believe that what we call necessary institutions are often no more than institutions to which we have grown accustomed, and that in matters of social constitution the field of possibilities is much more extensive than men living in their various societies are ready to imagine.

THE FIRST SITTING OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY—THE APPEARANCE OF THIS ASSEMBLY

. . . There have certainly been more wicked revolutionaries than those of 1848, but I doubt if there were ever any more stupid; they neither knew how to make use of universal suffrage nor how to do without it. If they had held the elections immediately after the 24th of February, while the upper classes were still bewildered by the blow they had just received, and the people more amazed than discontented, they would perhaps have obtained an Assembly after their hearts; if, on the other hand, they had boldly seized the dictatorship, they might have been able for some time to retain it. But they trusted themselves to the nation, and at the same time did all that was most likely to set the latter against them; they threatened it while placing themselves in its power; they alarmed it by the recklessness of their proposals and the violence of their language, while inviting it to resistance by the feebleness of their actions; they pretended to lay down the law to it at the very time that they were placing themselves at its disposal. Instead of opening out their ranks after the victory, they jealously closed them up, and seemed, in one word, to be striving to solve this insoluble problem, namely, how to govern through the majority and yet against its inclination.

Following the examples of the past without understanding them, they foolishly imagined that to summon the crowd to take part in political life was sufficient to attach it to their cause; and that to popularise the Republic, it was enough to give the public rights without offering them any profits. They forgot that their predecessors, when they gave every peasant the vote, at the same time did away with tithes, abolished statute labour and the other seignorial privileges, and divided the property of the nobles among the

peasants; whereas they were not in a position to do anything of the kind. In establishing universal suffrage they thought they were summoning the people to the assistance of the Revolution: they were only giving them arms against it. Nevertheless, I am far from believing that it was impossible to arouse revolutionary passions, even in the country districts. In France, every agriculturist owns some portion of the soil, and most of them are more or less involved in debt; it was not, therefore, the landlords that should have been attacked, but the creditors; not the abolition promised of the rights of property, but the abolition of debts. The demagogues of 1848 did not think of this scheme; they showed themselves much clumsier than their predecessors, but no less dishonest, for they were as violent and unjust in their desires as the others in their acts. Only, to commit violent and unjust acts, it is not enough for a government to have the will, or even the power; the habits, ideas, and passions of the time must lend themselves to the committal of them.

As the party which held the reins of government saw its candidates rejected one after the other, it displayed great vexation and rage, complaining now sadly and now rudely of the electors, whom it treated as ignorant, ungrateful blockheads, and enemies of their own good; it lost its temper with the whole nation; and, its impatience exhausted by the latter's coldness, it seemed ready to say with Molière's Arnolfe, when he addresses Agnès: "*Pourquoi ne m'aimer pas, madame l'impudente?*"¹

One thing was not ridiculous, but really ominous and terrible; and that was the appearance of Paris on my return. I found in the capital a hundred thousand armed workmen formed into regiments, out of work, dying of hunger, but with their minds crammed with vain theories and visionary hopes. I saw society cut into two; those who possessed nothing, united in a common greed; those who possessed something, united in a common terror. There were no bonds, no sympathy between these two great sections; everywhere the idea of an inevitable and immediate struggle seemed at hand. Already the *bourgeois* and the *peuple* (for the old nicknames had been resumed) had come to blows, with varying fortunes, at Rouen, Limoges, Paris; not a day passed but the owners of property were attacked or menaced in either their capital or income: they were asked to employ labour without selling the produce; they were expected to remit the rents of their tenants when they themselves possessed no other means of living. They gave way as long as they could to this tyranny, and endeavoured at least to turn their weakness to account by publishing it. I remember reading in the papers of that time this advertisement, among others, which still strikes me as a model of vanity, poltroonery, and stupidity harmoniously mingled:

¹ ["*Why not love me, impudent lady?*"]

"Mr. Editor," it read, "I make use of your paper to inform my tenants that, desiring to put into practice in my relations with them the principles of fraternity that should guide all true democrats, I will hand to those of my tenants who apply for it a formal receipt for their next quarter's rent."

Meanwhile, a gloomy despair had overspread this bourgeoisie thus threatened and oppressed, and imperceptibly this despair was changing into courage. I had always believed that it was useless to hope to settle the movement of the Revolution of February peacefully and gradually, and that it could only be stopped suddenly, by a great battle fought in the streets of Paris. I had said this immediately after the 24th of February; and what I now saw persuaded me that this battle was not only inevitable but imminent, and that it would be well to seize the first opportunity to deliver it. . . .

The Revolution of 1792, when striking the upper classes, had cured them of their irreligiousness; it had taught them, if not the truth, at least the social usefulness of belief. This lesson was lost upon the middle class, which remained their political heir and their jealous rival; and the latter had even become more sceptical in proportion as the former seemed to become more religious. The Revolution of 1848 had just done on a small scale for our tradesmen what that of 1792 had done for the nobility: the same reverses, the same terrors, the same conversion; it was the same picture, only painted smaller and in less bright and, no doubt, less lasting colours. The clergy had facilitated this conversion by separating itself from all the old political parties, and entering into the old, true spirit of the Catholic clergy, which is that it should belong only to the Church. It readily, therefore, professed republican opinions, while at the same time it gave to long established interests the guarantee of its traditions, its custom and its hierarchy. It was accepted and made much of by all. The priests sent to the Assembly were treated with very great consideration, and they deserved it, through their good sense, their moderation and their modesty. Some of them endeavoured to speak from the tribune, but they were never able to learn the language of politics. They had forgotten it too long ago, and all their speeches turned imperceptibly into homilies.

For the rest, the universal franchise had shaken the country from top to bottom without bringing to light a single new man worthy of coming to the front. I have always held that, whatever method be followed in a general election, the great majority of the exceptional men whom the nation possesses definitively succeed in getting elected. The system of election adopted exercises a great influence only upon the class of ordinary individuals in the Assembly, who form the ground-work of every political body. These belong to very different orders and are of very diverse natures, according to the system

upon which the election has been conducted. Nothing confirmed me in this belief more than did the sight of the Constituent Assembly. Almost all the men who played the first part in it were already known to me, but the bulk of the rest resembled nothing that I had seen before. They were imbued with a new spirit, and displayed a new character and new manners.

I will say that, in my opinion, and taken all round, this Assembly compared favourably with those which I had seen. One met in it more men who were sincere, disinterested, honest and, above all, courageous than in the Chambers of Deputies among which I had lived. . . .

MY RELATIONS WITH LAMARTINE—HIS SUBTERFUGES

Lamartine was now at the climax of his fame: to all those whom the Revolution had injured or alarmed, that is to say, to the great majority of the nation, he appeared in the light of a saviour. He had been elected to the Assembly by the city of Paris and no fewer than eleven departments; I do not believe that ever anybody inspired such keen enthusiasm as that to which he was then giving rise; one must have seen love thus stimulated by fear to know with what excess of idolatry men are capable of loving. The transcendental favour which was shown him at this time was not to be compared with anything except, perhaps, the excessive injustice which he shortly afterwards received. All the deputies who came to Paris with the desire to put down the excesses of the Revolution and to combat the demagogic party regarded him beforehand as their only possible leader, and looked to him unhesitatingly to place himself at their head to attack and overthrow the Socialists and demagogues. They soon discovered that they were deceived, and that Lamartine did not see the part he was called upon to play in so simple a light. It must be confessed that his was a very complex and difficult position. It was forgotten at the time, but he could not himself forget, that he had contributed more than any other to the success of the Revolution of February. Terror effaced this remembrance for the moment from the public mind; but a general feeling of security could not fail soon to restore it. It was easy to foresee that, so soon as the current which had brought affairs to their present pitch was arrested, a contrary current would set in, which would impel the nation in the opposite direction, and drive it faster and further than Lamartine could or would go. The success of the Montagnards would involve his immediate ruin; but their complete defeat would render him useless and must, sooner or later, remove the government from his hands. He saw, therefore, that for him there was almost as much danger and loss in triumph as in defeat.

As a matter of fact, I believe that, if Lamartine had resolutely, from the first, placed himself at the head of the immense party which desired to

moderate and regulate the course of the Revolution, and had succeeded in leading it to victory, he would before long have been buried beneath his own triumph; he would not have been able to stop his army in time, and it would have left him behind and chosen other leaders.

I doubt whether, whatever line of conduct he had adopted, he could have retained his power for long. I believe his only remaining chance was to be gloriously defeated while saving his country. But Lamartine was the last man to sacrifice himself in this way. I do not know that I have ever, in this world of selfishness and ambition in which I lived, met a mind so void of any thought of the public welfare as his. I have seen a crowd of men disturbing the country in order to raise themselves: that is an everyday perversity; but he is the only one who seemed to me always ready to turn the world upside down in order to divert himself. Neither have I ever known a mind less sincere, nor one that had a more thorough contempt for the truth. When I say he despised it, I am wrong: he did not honour it enough to heed it in any way whatever. When speaking or writing, he spoke the truth or lied, without caring which he did, occupied only with the effect he wished to produce at the moment. . . .

THE COMMITTEE FOR THE CONSTITUTION

I now change my subject, and am glad to leave the scenes of the civil war and to return to the recollections of my parliamentary life. I wish to speak of what happened in the Committee for the Constitution, of which I was a member. . . .

All were unanimous in the opinion that the Executive Power should be entrusted to one man alone. But what prerogatives and what agents should he be given, what responsibilities laid upon him? Clearly, none of these questions could be treated in an arbitrary fashion: each of them was necessarily in connection with all the others, and could, above all, be only decided by taking into special account the habits and customs of the country. These were old problems, no doubt; but they were made young again by the novelty of the circumstances.

. . . I first proposed to limit in various directions the sphere of the Executive Power; but I soon saw that it was useless to attempt anything serious on that side. I then fell back upon the method of election itself, and raised a discussion on that portion of Cormenin's clause which treated of it. The clause, as I said above, laid down that the President should be elected directly, by a relative majority, the minimum of this majority being fixed at two million votes. This method had several very serious drawbacks.

Since the President was to be elected directly by the citizens, the enthusiasm

and infatuation of the people was very much to be feared; and moreover, the prestige and moral power which the newly elected would possess would be much greater. Since a relative majority was to be sufficient to make the election valid, it might be possible that the President should only represent the wishes of a minority of the nation. I asked that the President might not be elected directly by the citizens, but that this should be entrusted to delegates whom the people would elect.

In the second place, I proposed to substitute an actual for a relative majority; if an absolute majority was not obtained at the first vote, it would fall to the Assembly to make a choice. These ideas were, I think, sound, but they were not new; I had borrowed them from the American Constitution. I doubt whether anyone would have suspected this, had I not said so; so little was the Committee prepared to play its great part.

The first part of my amendment was rejected. I expected this: our great men were of opinion that this system was not sufficiently simple, and they considered it tainted with a touch of aristocracy. The second was accepted, and is part of the actual Constitution.

Beaumont proposed that the President should not be re-eligible; I supported him vigorously, and the proposal was carried. On this occasion we both fell into a great mistake which will, I fear, lead to very sad results. We had always been greatly struck with the dangers threatening liberty and public morality at the hands of a re-eligible president, who in order to secure his re-election would infallibly employ beforehand the immense resources of constraint and corruption which our laws and customs allow to the head of the Executive Power. Our minds were not supple or prompt enough to turn in time or to see that, so soon as it was decided that the citizens themselves should directly choose the President, the evil was irreparable, and that it would be only increasing it rashly to undertake to hinder the people in their choice. This vote, and the great influence I brought to bear upon it, is my most unpleasant memory of that period. . . .

ASPECT OF THE CABINET—ITS FIRST ACTS UNTIL AFTER THE INSURRECTIONARY ATTEMPTS OF THE 13TH OF JUNE

. . . I did not believe then, any more than I do now, that the republican form of government is the best suited to the needs of France. What I mean when I say the republican form of government, is the Executive Power. With a people among whom habit, tradition, custom have assured so great a place to the Executive Power, its instability will always be, in periods of excitement, a cause of revolution, and, in peaceful times, a cause of great uneasiness. Moreover, I have always considered the Republic an ill-balanced form of govern-

ment, which always promised more, but gave less, liberty than the Constitutional Monarchy. And yet I sincerely wished to maintain the Republic; and although there were, so to speak, no Republicans in France, I did not look upon the maintenance of it as absolutely impossible.

I wished to maintain it because I saw nothing ready or fit to set in its place. The old Dynasty was profoundly antipathetic to the majority of the country. Amid this flagging of all political passion, which was the result of the fatigue of the revolutions and their vain promises, one genuine passion remained alive in France: hatred of the Ancien Régime and mistrust of the old privileged classes who represented it in the eyes of the people. This sentiment passes through revolutions without dissolving in them, like the water of those marvellous fountains which, according to the ancients, passed across the waves of the sea without mixing with or disappearing in them. As to the Orleans Dynasty, the experience the people had had of it did not particularly incline them to return to it so soon. It was bound once more to throw into Opposition all the upper classes and the clergy, and to separate itself from the people, as it had done before, leaving the cares and profits of government to those same middle classes whom I had already seen during eighteen years so inadequate for the good government of France. Moreover, nothing was ready for its triumph.

Louis Napoleon alone was ready to take the place of the Republic, because he already held the power in his hands. But what could come of his success, except a bastard Monarchy, despised by the enlightened classes, hostile to liberty, governed by intriguers, adventurers and valets? Not one of these results would justify a new revolution. . . .

Louis Napoleon plays so great a part in the rest of my narrative that he seems to me to deserve a special portrait amid the host of contemporaries of whom I have been content to sketch the features. Of all his ministers, and perhaps of all the men who refused to take part in his conspiracy against the Republic, I was the one who was most advanced in his good graces, who saw him closest, and who was best able to judge him.

He was vastly superior to what his preceding career and his mad enterprises might very properly have led one to believe of him. This was my first impression on conversing with him. In this respect he deceived his adversaries, and perhaps still more his friends, if this term can be applied to the politicians who patronised his candidature. The greater part of these, in fact, elected him, not because of his merits, but because of his presumed mediocrity. They expected to find him an instrument which they could handle as they pleased, and which it would always be lawful for them to break when they wished to. In this they were greatly deceived.

As a private individual, Louis Napoleon possessed certain attractive qualities: an easy and kindly humour, a mind which was gentle, and even tender, without being delicate, great confidence in his intercourse, perfect simplicity, a certain personal modesty amidst the immense pride derived from his origin. He was capable of showing affection, and able to inspire it in those who approached him. His conversation was brief and unsuggestive. He had not the art of drawing others out or of establishing intimate relations with them; nor any facility in expressing his views. He had the writer's habit, and a certain amount of the author's self-love. His dissimulation, which was the deep dissimulation of a man who has spent his life in plots, was assisted in a remarkable way by the immobility of his features and his want of expression: for his eyes were dull and opaque, like the thick glass used to light the cabins of ships, which admits the light but cannot be seen through. Careless of danger, he possessed a fine, cool courage in days of crisis; and at the same time—a common thing enough—he was very vacillating in his plans. He was often seen to change his direction, to advance, hesitate, draw back, to his great detriment: for the nation had chosen him in order to dare all things, and what it expected from him was audacity and not prudence. It was said that he had always been greatly addicted to pleasures, and not very delicate in his choice of them. This passion for vulgar enjoyment and this taste for luxury had increased still more with the facilities offered by his position. Each day he wore out his energy in indulgence, and deadened and degraded even his ambition. His intelligence was incoherent, confused, filled with great but ill-assorted thoughts, which he borrowed now from the examples of Napoleon, now from socialistic theories, sometimes from recollections of England, where he had lived: very different, and often very contrary, sources. These he had laboriously collected in his solitary meditations, far removed from the contact of men and facts, for he was naturally a dreamer and a visionary. But when he was forced to emerge from these vague, vast regions in order to confine his mind to the limits of a piece of business, it showed itself to be capable of justice, sometimes of subtlety and compass, and even of a certain depth, but never sure, and always prepared to place a grotesque idea by the side of a correct one.

Generally, it was difficult to come into long and very close contact with him without discovering a little vein of madness running through his better sense, the sight of which always recalled the escapades of his youth, and served to explain them.

It may be admitted, for that matter, that it was his madness rather than his reason which, thanks to circumstances, caused his success and his force: for the world is a strange theatre. There are moments in it when the worst plays

are those which succeed best. If Louis Napoleon had been a wise man, or a man of genius, he would never have become President of the Republic.

He trusted in his star; he firmly believed himself to be the instrument of destiny and the necessary man. I have always believed that he was really convinced of his right, and I doubt whether Charles X was ever more infatuated with his legitimism than he with his. Moreover, he was quite as incapable of alleging a reason for his faith; for, although he had a sort of abstract adoration for the people, he had very little taste for liberty. The characteristic and fundamental feature of his mind in political matters was his hatred of and contempt for assemblies. The rule of the Constitutional Monarchy seemed to him even more insupportable than that of the Republic. His unlimited pride in the name he bore, which willingly bowed before the nations, revolted at the idea of yielding to the influence of a parliament.

Before attaining power he had had time to strengthen his natural taste for the footman class, which is always displayed by mediocre princes, by the habits of twenty years of conspiracy spent amid low-class adventurers, men of ruined fortunes or blemished reputations, and young debauchees, the only persons who, during all this time, could have consented to serve him as go-betweens or accomplices. He himself, in spite of his good manners, allowed a glimpse to pierce through of the adventurer and the prince of fortune. He continued to take pleasure in this inferior company after he was no longer obliged to live in it. I believe that his difficulty in expressing his thoughts otherwise than in writing attached him to people who had long been familiar with his current of thought and with his dreamings, and that his inferiority in conversation rendered him generally averse to contact with clever men. Moreover, he desired above all things to meet with devotion to his person and his cause, as though his person and his cause were such as to be able to arouse devotion: merit annoyed him when it displayed ever so little independence. He wanted believers in his star, and vulgar worshippers of his fortune. One could not approach him except through a group of special, intimate friends and servants, of whom General Changarnier told me that all could be described by these two words which go together: cheats and scoundrels. Nothing was more base than these intimates, except perhaps his family, which consisted, for the most part, of rogues and *femmes galantes*.

This was the man whom the need of a chief and the power of a memory had placed at the head of France, and with whom we would have to govern.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

. . . It was especially in the conduct of foreign affairs that he [Louis Napoleon] showed how badly prepared he still was for the great part to which

blind fortune had called him. I was not slow in perceiving that this man, whose pride aimed at leading everything, had not yet taken the smallest steps to inform himself of anything. I proposed to have an analysis drawn up every day of all the despatches and to submit it to his inspection. Before this, he knew what happened in the world only by hearsay, and only knew what the Minister for Foreign Affairs had thought fit to tell him. The solid basis of facts was always lacking to the operations of his mind, and this was easily seen in all the dreams with which the latter was filled.

I was sometimes frightened at perceiving how much there was in his plans that was vast, chimerical, unscrupulous, and confused; although it is true that, when explaining the real state of things to him, I easily made him recognize the difficulties which they presented, for discussion was not his strong point. He was silent, but never yielded.

One of his myths was an alliance with one of the two great powers of Germany, of which he proposed to make use to alter the map of Europe and erase the limits which the treaties of 1815 had traced for France. As he saw that I did not believe it possible to find either of these powers inclined for an alliance of this sort, and with such an object, he undertook himself to sound their ambassadors in Paris. One of them came to me one day in a state of great excitement to tell me that the President of the Republic had asked him if, in consideration of an equivalent, his Court would not consent to allow France to seize Savoy. On another occasion, he conceived the idea of sending a private agent, one of his own men, as he called them, to come to a direct understanding with the German Princes. He chose Persigny, and asked me to give him his credentials; and I consented, knowing well that nothing could come of a negotiation of this sort. I believe that Persigny had a two-fold mission: it was a question of facilitating the usurpation at home and an extension of territory abroad. He went first to Berlin and then to Vienna; as I expected, he was very well received, handsomely entertained, and politely bowed out.

But I have spoken enough of individuals; let us come to politics.

At the time when I took up office, Europe was, as it were, on fire, although the conflagration was already extinguished in certain countries.

Sicily was conquered and subdued; the Neapolitans had returned to their obedience and even to their servitude; the battle of Novara had been fought and lost; the victorious Austrians were negotiating with the son of Charles Albert, who had become King of Piedmont by his father's abdication; their armies, issuing from the confines of Lombardy, occupied Parma, a portion of the Papal States, Placentia, and Tuscany, which they had entered unasked, and in spite of the fact that the Grand Duke had been restored by his subjects, who have been but ill rewarded since for their zeal and fidelity.

But Venice still resisted, and Rome, after repelling our first attack, was calling all the demagogues of Italy to its assistance and exciting all Europe with its clamour. Never, perhaps, since February, had Germany seemed more divided or disturbed. Although the dream of German unity had been dispelled, the reality of the old Teutonic organization had not yet resumed its place. Reduced to a small number of members, the National Assembly, which had till then endeavoured to promote this unity, fled from Frankfort and hawked round the spectacle of its impotence and its ridiculous fury. But its fall did not restore order; on the contrary, it left a freer field for anarchy.

The moderate, one may say the innocent, revolutionaries, who had cherished the belief that they would be able, peacefully, and by means of arguments and decrees, to persuade the peoples and princes of Germany to submit to a single government, made way for the violent revolutionaries, who had always maintained that Germany could only be brought to a state of unity by the complete ruin of its old systems of government, and the entire abolition of the existing social order. Riots therefore followed in every land upon parliamentary discussion. Political rivalries turned into a war of classes; the natural hatred and jealousy entertained by the poor for the rich developed into socialistic theories in many quarters, but especially in the small states of Central Germany and in the great Rhine Valley. Wurtemberg was in a state of agitation; Saxony had just experienced a terrible insurrection, which had only been crushed with the assistance of Prussia; insurrections had also occurred in Westphalia; the Palatinate was in open revolt; and Baden had expelled its Grand Duke, and appointed a Provisional Government. And yet the final victory of the Princes, which I had foreseen when travelling through Germany, a month before, was no longer in doubt; the very violence of the insurrections hastened it. The larger monarchies had recaptured their capitals and their armies. Their heads had still difficulties to conquer, but no more dangers; and themselves masters, or on the point of becoming so, at home, they could not fail soon to triumph in the second-rate States. By thus violently disturbing public order, the insurgents gave them the wish, the opportunity and the right to intervene.

Prussia had already commenced to do so. The Prussians had just suppressed the Saxon insurrection by force of arms; they now entered the Rhine Palatinate, offered their intervention to Wurtemberg, and prepared to invade the Grand-Duchy of Baden, thus occupying almost the whole of Germany with their soldiers or their influence.

Austria had emerged from the terrible crisis which had threatened its existence, but it was still in great travail. Its armies, after conquering in Italy, were being defeated in Hungary.

Despairing of mastering its subjects unaided, it had called Russia to its assistance and the Tsar, in a manifesto dated 13 May, had announced to Europe that he was marching against the Hungarians. The Emperor Nicholas had till then remained at rest amid his uncontested might. He had viewed the agitation of the nations from afar in safety, but not with indifference. Thenceforward, he alone among the great powers of Europe represented the old state of society and the old traditional principle of authority. He was not only its representative: he considered himself its champion. His political theories, his religious belief, his ambition and his conscience, all urged him to adopt this part. He had, therefore, made for himself out of the cause of authority throughout the world a second empire yet vaster than the first. He encouraged with his letters and rewarded with his honours all those who, in whatever corner of Europe, gained victories over anarchy and even over liberty, as though they were his subjects and had contributed to strengthening his own power. He had thus sent, to the extreme South of Europe, one of his orders to Filangieri, the conqueror of the Sicilians, and had written that general an autograph letter to show to him that he was satisfied with his conduct. From the lofty position which he occupied, and whence he peacefully watched the various incidents of the struggle which shook Europe, the Emperor judged freely, and followed with a certain tranquil disdain, not only the follies of the revolutionaries whom he pursued, but also the vices and the faults of the parties and princes whom he assisted. . . .

In the midst of this Europe which I have depicted, the position of France was one of weakness and embarrassment. Nowhere had the Revolution succeeded in establishing a regular and stable system of liberty. On every side, the old powers were rising up again from amid the ruins which it had made—not, it is true, the same as when they fell, but very similar. We could not assist the latter in establishing themselves nor ensure their victory, for the system which they were setting up was antipathetic, I will say not only to the institutions created by the Revolution of February, but, at the root of our ideas, to all that was most permanent and unconquerable in our new habits. They, on their side, distrusted us, and rightly. The great part of restorers of the general order in Europe was therefore forbidden us. This part, moreover, was already played by another: it belonged by right to Russia, and only the second remained for us. As to placing France at the head of the innovators, this was to be still less thought of, for two reasons: first, that it would have been absolutely impossible to advise these latter or to hope to lead them, because of their extravagance and their detestable incapacity; secondly, that it was not possible to support them abroad without falling beneath their blows at home. The contact of their passions and doctrines would have put all

France in flame, revolutionary doctrines at that time dominating all others. Thus we were neither able to unite with the nations, who accused us of urging them on and then betraying them, nor with the princes, who reproached us with shaking thrones. We were reduced to accepting the sterile good-will of the English: it was the same isolation as before February, with the Continent more hostile to us and England more lukewarm. It was therefore necessary, as it had been then, to reduce ourselves to leading a small life, from day to day; but this was difficult. The French Nation, which had made and, in a certain way, still made so great a figure in the world, kicked against this necessity of the time: it had remained haughty while it ceased to be preponderant; it feared to act and tried to talk loudly; and it also expected its Government to be proud, without, however, permitting it to run the risks which such conduct entailed. . . .

. . . The struggles of the nations against the Governments were followed by quarrels of the princes among themselves. I followed this new phase of the Revolution with a very attentive gaze and a very perplexed mind.

The Revolution in Germany had not proceeded from a simple cause, as in the rest of Europe. It was produced at once by the general spirit of the time and by the unitarian ideas peculiar to the Germans. The democracy was now beaten, but the idea of German unity was not destroyed; the needs, the memories, the passions that had inspired it survived. The King of Prussia had undertaken to appropriate it and make use of it. This Prince, a man of intelligence but of very little sense, had been wavering for a year between his fear of the Revolution and his desire to turn it to account. He struggled as much as he could against the liberal and democratic spirit of the age; yet he favoured the German unitarian spirit, a blundering game in which, if he had dared to go to the length of his desires, he would have risked his Crown and his life. For, in order to overcome the resistance which existing institutions and the interests of the Princes were bound to oppose to the establishment of a central power, he would have had to summon the revolutionary passions of the peoples to his aid, and of these Frederic William could not have made use without soon being destroyed by them himself.

So long as the Frankfort Parliament retained its *prestige* and its power, the King of Prussia entreated it kindly and strove to get himself placed by it at the head of the new Empire. When the Parliament fell into discredit and powerlessness, the King changed his behaviour without changing his plans. He endeavoured to obtain the legacy of this Assembly and to combat the Revolution by realizing the chimera of German unity, of which the democrats had made use to shake every throne. With this intention, he invited all the German Princes to come to an understanding with him to form a new Con-

federation, which should be closer than that of 1815, and to give him the government of it. In return he undertook to establish and strengthen them in their States. These Princes, who detested Prussia, but who trembled before the Revolution, for the most part accepted the usurious bargain proposed to them. Austria, which the success of this proposal would have driven out of Germany, protested, being not yet in a position to do more. The two principal monarchies of the South, Bavaria and Wurtemberg, followed its example, but all North and Central Germany entered into this ephemeral Confederation, which was concluded on the 26th of May, 1849 and is known in history by the name of the Union of the Three Kings.

Prussia then suddenly became the dominating power in a vast stretch of country, reaching from Memel to Basle, and at one time saw twenty-six or twenty-seven million Germans marching under its orders. All this was completed shortly after my arrival in office.

I confess that, at the sight of this singular spectacle, my mind was crossed with strange ideas, and I was, for a moment tempted to believe that the President was not so mad in his foreign policy as I had at first thought him. That union of the great Courts of the North, which had so long weighed heavily upon us, was broken. Two of the great Continental monarchies, Prussia and Austria, were quarrelling and almost at war. Had not the moment come for us to contact one of those intimate and powerful alliances which we have been compelled to forego for sixty years, and perhaps in a measure to repair our losses of 1815? France, by platonically assisting Frederic William in his enterprises which England did not oppose, could divide Europe and bring on one of those great crises which entail a redistribution of territory. . . .

I quickly realized that Prussia was neither able nor willing to give us anything worth having in exchange for our good offices; that its power over the other German States was very precarious, and was likely to be ephemeral; that no reliance was to be placed in its King, who at the first obstacle would have failed us and failed himself; and, above all, that such extensive and ambitious designs were not suited to so ill-established a state of society and to such troubled and dangerous times as ours, nor to transient powers such as that which chance had placed in my hands.

I put a more serious question to myself, and it was this—I recall it here because it is bound constantly to crop up again: Is it to the interest of France that the bonds which hold together the German Confederation should be strengthened or relaxed? In other words, ought we to desire that Germany should in a certain sense become a single nation, or that it should remain an ill-joined conglomeration of disunited peoples and princes? There is an old

tradition in our diplomacy that we should strive to keep Germany divided among a large number of independent powers; and this in fact, was self-evident at the time when there was nothing behind Germany except Poland and a semi-savage Russia; but is the case the same in our days? The reply to this question depends upon the reply to another: What is really the peril with which in our days Russia threatens the independence of Europe? For my part, believing as I do that our West is threatened sooner or later to fall under the yoke, or at least under the direct and irresistible influence of the Tsars, I think that our first object should be to favour the union of all the German races in order to oppose it to that influence. The conditions of the world are new; we must change our old maxims and not fear to strengthen our neighbours, so that they may one day be in a condition with us to repel the common enemy.

The Emperor of Russia, on his side, saw how great an obstacle an United Germany would prove in his way. [Ambassador] Lamoricière, in one of his private letters, informed me that the Emperor had said to him with his ordinary candour and arrogance:

"If the unity of Germany, which doubtless you wish for no more than I do, ever becomes a fact, there will be needed, in order to manage it, a man capable of what Napoleon himself was not able to do; and if this man were found, if that armed mass developed into a menace, it would then become your affair and mine."

But when I put these questions to myself, the time had not come to solve them nor even to discuss them, for Germany was of its own accord irresistibly returning to its old constitution and to the old anarchy of its powers. The Frankfort Parliament's attempt in favour of unity had fallen through. That made by the King of Prussia was destined to meet with the same fate.

It was the dread of the Revolution which alone had driven the German Princes into Frederic William's arms. In the measure that, thanks to the efforts of the Prussians, the Revolution was on all sides suppressed and ceased to make itself feared, the allies (one might almost say the new subjects) of Prussia, aimed at recovering their independence. The King of Prussia's enterprise was of that unfortunate kind in which success itself interferes with triumph, and to compare large things with smaller, I would say that his history was not unlike ours, and that, like ourselves, he was doomed to strike upon a rock so soon as, and for the reason that, he had re-established order. The princes who had adhered to what was known as the Prussian hegemony seized the first opportunity to renounce it. Austria supplied this opportunity, when, after defeating the Hungarians, she was able to re-appear upon the scene of German affairs with her material power and that of the memories which attached

to her name. This is what happened in the course of September 1849. When the King of Prussia found himself face to face with that powerful rival, behind whom he caught sight of Russia, his courage suddenly failed him, as I expected, and he returned to his old part. The German Constitution of 1815 resumed its empire, the Diet its sittings; and soon, of all that great movement of 1848, there remained but two traces visible in Germany: a greater dependence of the small States upon the great monarchies, and an irreparable blow struck at all that remains of feudal institutions: their ruin, consummated by the nations, was sanctioned by the Princes. From one end of Germany to the other, the perpetuity of ground-rents, baronial tithes, forced labour, rights of mutation, of hunting, of justice, which constituted a great part of the riches of the nobility, remained abolished. The Kings were restored, but the aristocracies did not recover from the blow that had been struck them.²

² I had foreseen from the commencement that Austria and Prussia would soon return to their former sphere and fall back in each case within the influence of Russia. I find this provision set forth in the instructions which I gave to one of our ambassadors to Germany on the 24th of July, before the events which I have described had taken place. These instructions are drawn up in my own hand, as were all my more important despatches. I read as follows:

"I know that the malady which is ravaging all the old European society is incurable, that in changing its symptoms it does not change in character, and that all the old powers are, to a greater or lesser extent, threatened with modification or destruction. But I am inclined to believe that the next event will be the strengthening of authority throughout Europe. It would not be impossible that, under the pressure of a common instinct of defence or under the common influence of recent occurrences, Russia should be willing and able to bring about harmony between North and South Germany and to reconcile Austria and Prussia, and that all this great movement should merely resolve itself into a new alliance of principles between the three monarchies at the expense of the secondary governments and the liberty of the citizens. Consider the situation from this point of view, and give me an account of your observations."

JULES FERRY

IN 1877 LÉON GAMBETTA (1838-82), leader of the republican group in favor of the newly formed Third Republic, coined what was to become a famous phrase, "Clericalism, there is the enemy," and thereby pointed to the conviction that the most pressing problem facing the Third Republic was that of its relations with the clergy. For most partisans of the Republic the terms "clerical" and "monarchist" were to become practically synonymous during the ensuing years.

From the time of Condorcet the hope of establishing the secular goods of liberty and equality and especially of fraternity were founded largely upon a faith in education. And education was therefore conceived largely in terms of cultivating not only the reason but also a secular community fused by the allegiance to common principles. The first and perhaps most fundamental source of friction between clerical and anticlerical revolved around proposals for educational reform, and the man who bore the brunt of the conflict was Jules Ferry (1832-93). Lawyer and journalist, Ferry incurred the enmity of the Right with his "laic laws," and the enmity of the Radical Socialist Left with his imperialism. Guided by the principles worked out by Condorcet in connection with his own experience with the administration of a secular system of education, and believing in the principles of the positivists, Ferry proposed through the "laic laws," which have since become known under his name, to establish the compulsory school attendance of all children. The choice between a church school and one maintained by the state was to be left to the discretion of the individual family, but only the non-religious school was to be supported by state funds. At these schools only laymen were to be allowed to teach and no religious instruction was to be allowed. In addition, members of unauthorized religious orders were forbidden to teach even in private schools and all such orders were dissolved.

From 1879 to 1882, Ferry was several times premier of France. In addition, he was minister of public instruction and from 1883 to 1885 he took over the ministry of foreign affairs, working in a single-minded fashion on behalf of French colonial expansion. The exaggerated report of reverses to his policy in China led to his overthrow by Clemenceau and the Radical Socialists in 1885.

Ferry was anything but a popular public official. Nevertheless, he laid the foundations for the modern French Empire. And in addition, his attempt to establish the "moral unity" of France through a program of "neutral" education was the basis for the centralized system of French education which persisted through the entire history of the Third Republic.

The following selections are taken from Ferry's speeches in the Chamber of Deputies. The first was delivered in 1870 at the beginning of the Republic and the second in 1879.

[ON EDUCATION]

THE RETARDING of the progress of natural inequalities is, as I see it, the very basis and justification of society. Humanity has made this conquest; the advantage of physical force is already annulled, or almost so. But at the same time, isn't it true that modern society, which has done away with that kind of inequality, has preserved another and perhaps more formidable one, which results from wealth? It is true, gentlemen. Nevertheless, consider how in the present this inequality, which results from wealth, is attenuated, enfeebled, and moderated by the progress of time. For a long time here in France wealth has conferred no special rights. The possession of land, in the last century, was still a source of social power, of public right. . . .

That state of things has disappeared; the Revolution has come to grips with these outrages to human conscience; but, a little after the Revolution—and several of those here can remember—the possession of land, the enjoyment of a certain amount of capital still brought a privilege: the right to vote, the right to contribute to the formation of public powers; twenty years ago they still existed; happily these times are gone.

Even the right to work, the most essential of all rights, was eighty years ago, in a sense, a privilege of birth; craftsmen were organized in guilds; guilds recruited under certain conditions; the sons of masters had a right of priority, of preference over those who had the misfortune to be born outside the bounds of the guild; the Revolution came and swept away this inequality, this privilege of birth, just as it had caused other privileges and inequalities to disappear.

In sum, these are the two great victories of this century: the freedom of labor and universal suffrage; henceforth, neither the right to work nor the right to vote, that is to say of contributing to the formation of public powers, are attached to the accident of birth: they are the inheritance of all men coming into the world.

That being so, our century can say to itself that it is a great century. I often hear talk of the decadence of the present time; I confess to you, gentlemen, I am tired of these lamentations, and, moreover, I have noticed for a long time that this complaint comes from those people who resist, without explaining why, the current of modern civilization, and who cannot make up their minds to take their part in the democratic era we are now entering. No! we are not a society in decay, because we are a democratic society, we have done

these two great things: we have freed the right to vote and the right to work. . . .

But we are a great century only under certain conditions: we are a great century if we know well what the work, the mission, and the duty of our century are. The last century and the beginning of this one have abolished the privileges of property, the privileges and distinction of class; assuredly the work of our time is not more difficult. Surely, it will necessitate fewer storms, it will exact less grievous sacrifices; it is a peaceful work, it is a generous work, and I define it thus: to get rid of the last, the most formidable of the inequalities founded on birth, the inequality of education. It is the problem of the century and we ought to apply ourselves to it. And as for me, when the supreme honor of representing a portion of the Paris population in the Chamber of Deputies fell to me, I took an oath: among all the necessities of the present time, among all the problems, I would choose one to which I would consecrate all that I have of intelligence, all that I have of soul, of heart, of physical and moral power—the problem of the education of the people.

From the social point of view, inequality of education is, in effect, one of the most glaring and most grievous consequences of the accident of birth. With the inequality of education, I defy you ever to have the equality of rights, not theoretical equality but real equality, and the equality of rights is the very basis and essence of democracy.

Let us construct an hypothesis and take the situation in its extreme terms: let us suppose that he who is born poor is by the same token necessarily and fatally ignorant; I know well that this is an hypothesis, and that the humanitarian instinct and social institutions, even those of the past, have always prevented such an extremity from developing; there have always been in all times—it must be said to the honor of humanity—there have always been means of instruction, more or less organized, accessible to those who were born poor, without resources, without capital. But, since we are concerned with the philosophy of the question, we can suppose a state of things where predestined ignorance is added necessarily to predestined poverty, and such would be, in effect, the logical consequence inevitable to a situation in which knowledge would be the exclusive privilege of wealth. Well, gentlemen, what is the name of that extreme situation in the history of humanity? It is the caste system. The caste system makes knowledge the exclusive prerogative of certain classes. And if modern society does not see to the separation of education and science from wealth, that is to say from the accident of birth, it simply returns to the caste system.

From another point of view, the inequality of education is the greatest

obstacle in the way of the creation of truly democratic customs. This creation goes on under our eyes; it is already the work of today, it will be above all the work of tomorrow; it consists essentially in replacing the relations of inferior to superior by which the world has lived for so many centuries, by relations of equality. Here I ask for the attention of all in this kind of audience while I give an explanation. I do not come to preach any absolute equalizing of social conditions which would suppress the social relations of command and obedience. No, I do not suppress them, I modify them. Ancient societies admitted that humanity was divided into two classes: those who command and those who obey. The notion of command and obedience in a democratic society like ours, is this: there are always, without doubt, men who command, and others who obey, but commanding and obeying are alternatives, and it is for everyone in his turn to command and to obey.

That is the great distinction between democratic societies and those which are not democratic. What I call democratic command does not consist then in the distinction between inferior and superior; there is no longer either inferior or superior; there are two equal men who contract together; in the master and in the servant you do not see anything more than two contracting parties each with his own precise rights, limited and known in advance; each with his duties and, as a consequence, each with his dignity.

That is what modern society one day must be; but—and it is thus that I come back to my subject—what is the primary condition for the establishment of these equal customs (whose birth we are witnessing), for the spreading of democratic reform throughout the world? This condition is that a certain education must be given to him who at another time one called an *inferior*, to him who one still calls a *worker*, in such a way as to inspire him or to give him a sense of his dignity; and, since a contract regulates the two positions, it is necessary at least that it comprise two parties.

Finally, in a society which has as its task to establish liberty, it is very necessary to suppress the distinctions of classes. I ask you, in good faith, all of you who are here and who have received varying degrees of education, whether there are not still distinctions of classes? I say that they still exist; there is one that is fundamental and, moreover, difficult to erase, and that is between those who have received an education and those who have received none at all. Then, gentlemen, I defy you ever to make a nation of equals out of these two classes, a nation animated by that spirit of harmony and by that fraternity of ideas which are the strength of true democracies, if between the two classes there has not been that first drawing together, that first fusion which results from the mixing of the rich and the poor on the benches of some school.

Antiquity understood it, and the ancient republics stated it as a principle that,

for both the children of the poor and the children of the rich, there must be only one kind of education. Ancient society, excessive in all things and easily oppressive because it was confined in general within the walls of one narrow city, was not afraid to separate the child from his family and deliver him wholly, body and soul, to the republic.

When Christianity came to replace ancient civilization, a similar conception was found among the superior men who were during many centuries the leaders of Christian society. I am, gentlemen, one of those who have a very great and sincere historical admiration for Christianity: I find that a work has been achieved during the past eighteen centuries, a work of men and of men's brains which is beyond praise when it is studied from the vantage point of today and analyzed in its entirety. Ah! there we had men with powerful minds; they were not simply priests, they were statesmen, these organizers of Christian and Catholic societies who founded so many of the things which we are having so much trouble in transforming. Well then, we find among them the very principle of which we speak; in Catholic society, in the society of the Middle Ages, one recognizes easily, one can put one's finger upon, the principle of the equality of education.

In the same way as the ancient republics separated children from their families and said the child belongs to the republic; so Christianity, coming in a different time to establish a sort of Christian republic over political divisions and differences of nationality, said: the child belongs to the Church, and then it established for the child, not only for the rich child—I say this to its honor—but just as much for the poor child, a kind of education of which the principle characteristic was rigorous equality. In the first grade, they studied the catechism; in the second grade they studied the sacred language, Latin, and having learned these two things, everything that it is important to know in Christian society was known; one is an accomplished Christian, a savant, a scholar, one has all Christian science. . . .

In effect, there is in America, in all cities which have five hundred families, a school in which one learns, in the first place, all the positive sciences which are the object of our three grades of French education; where one learns, in the second place, all of Latin and Greek that it is important to know; one does not learn to make Latin verses, but one learns to read Latin authors who are not too difficult. That is what is taught free to *seven million children* while in France we have only 500,000 children who go to primary school. America has 2,000 free and public schools. The budget for public instruction in America is not the budget of the American republic, but is the budget of the various states, and, above all, the budget of the townships. Do you know what its total is? It is tremendous: free America spends annually 450 millions for public

schools; and by means of these 450 millions they generously open the great sources of learning to seven million children, and they give to these children of all classes instruction which is received only by a small number of children of the bourgeoisie of France.

And that is not all, gentlemen: there is not only free instruction, common and public; there are enough great colleges, academies, universities, special foundations, to make us hide in humiliation. . . .

In America the rich pay for the instruction of the poor. And I am prepared to find this just.

Gentlemen, in this world there are two ways of understanding the right of wealth; there is the wealthy man, content with himself, who shows off his comforts and casts aspersions on the poor, in saying, as the Pharisee of the Gospel said: "Thank God that I did not have to be born among these miserable people!" He is a satisfied man; he considers that he is within his right and that he owes nothing to anyone; let him bloom in his tranquility; but, without raising any question of social principle, let us say that finer souls have another idea of the duty of wealth. He who has never been struck by the unheard of and shocking aspects of the division of wealth in this world is very much a stranger to the finer qualities of the human soul. . . .

So I declare explicitly that it is just and necessary that the rich should pay for the education of the poor; for in this way their property is justified, and that the degree of moral advancement and civilization is marked by the gradual substitution for the right of the stronger or the richer *the duty of the stronger!* . . .

The equality of educations restores unity within the family. There is today a barrier between woman and man, between wife and husband, which makes many marriages, harmonious in appearance, hide the most profound differences of opinion, of tastes, of sentiments; this is not true marriage, for true marriage, gentlemen, is the marriage of souls. Well, then, tell me, is this marriage of souls frequent? Tell me if there are very many couples united by ideas, sentiments, and opinions? There are many households where the two mates are in accord on all external things, where there is absolute agreement concerning common interests; but as for the intimate thoughts and sentiments which are the whole of the human being, they are as strange to each other as if they were mere acquaintances.

So much for the well-to-do households. But in poor households, what resources are found when the wife brings to the marriage intelligence and wisdom! In place of a deserted house, there is a bright home, animated by conversation, embellished by reading, lit by a sun which puts sad and painful reality into a different light. Condorcet understood this well, and he said that

the equality of education makes the wife of the worker both the guardian of the home and the guardian of the common wisdom.

In any case, it is necessary to realize and to understand that this problem of the education of the woman is connected with the problem of the very existence of actual society.

Today there is going on a hidden but persistent battle between the society of former times, the old régime with its structure of regrets, of beliefs and institutions which do not accept modern democracy, and the society which descends from the French Revolution; there is an old régime among us that is always persistent, active, and when this fight, which is at the bottom of modern anarchy, when this internal fight is over, the political battle will end at the same time. In this struggle woman cannot be neutral; optimists, who do not wish to see to the bottom of things, can imagine that the role of woman is nothing, that she does not take part in the battle, but they do not perceive the secret and persistent help which she brings to that society which is on the way out and which we wish to get rid of forever. . . .

THE FREEDOM OF HIGHER EDUCATION

. . . WHEN WE speak of an act of the State in education, operating to maintain unity, we attribute to the state the only role that it can have in regard to instruction and education.

The State is certainly not at all an instructor in mathematics, an instructor in physiology or in chemistry. If it suits it in the public interest to pay the chemists and the physiologists, if it suits it to pay the professors, it is not in order to create scientific truths; this is not its concern in fostering education; its concern is to maintain a certain state morale, certain state doctrines which are important for its conservation.

What will the most ardent among our adversaries say, and will they not consider this single question as an offense if I say to them: "Is it in the name of the right of the father and family that you tolerate instruction which tends to the negation and discredit of our country?" You have replied, No; haven't you? Well then, I ask this Chamber, I ask this republican majority which listens to me, I ask whether the fatherland is only a piece of land which events can extend or reduce, and whether, along with this native land there is not a moral native land, a set of ideas and aspirations which the government ought to defend as the inheritance of the souls of which it has charge?

I ask them whether there is not in this French society a certain number of ideas nourished on the most pure and generous blood; for twenty-five years, soldiers, writers, philosophers, orators, political men, have continuously striven for these ideas, have poured out their blood for them; I ask whether there is

not a heritage of which you are the guardians, a heritage which you ought to transmit to your children just as your fathers left it to you. . . .

We have, then, to ask ourselves whether the restoration to the State of the right to bestow academic degrees and to reestablish the laws governing unauthorized religious congregations, whether these two enactments (both of which restore to the public domain some of the prerogatives it had yielded to the private domain and which together comprehend in its entirety the law that is submitted to you), exceed the rights of the State—especially in the light of the definition of these rights that has just been given, and in view of the responsibility of the state for conserving unity. . . .

Where is the danger, gentlemen? I answer without hesitating: It is in the Jesuits . . . , it is in their growth, it is in their progress, it is in their incontestable and uncontested power. . . .

In 1861 they had 46 residences, distributed in 33 departments and in Algeria. In 1877, there were 1,509 members, distributed in 74 residences spread over 51 departments, in Algeria and in Reunion island.

How many of these establishments were devoted to secondary education? In 1865, the Jesuits possessed 14 establishments for secondary education, with 5,074 pupils. In 1876 they possessed, according to the statistics of the ministry, 27—I believe that the true figure is 31—27 with 9,131 pupils. Do you know how many pupils there are besides these, belonging to authorized and instructed congregations . . . ? There are . . . 7,854. . . .

In the face of this instruction, the sad picture of which I unfolded yesterday, . . . [it is said in some quarters] that there is only one thing for the government and the Chamber to do: give freedom to individuals and draw up a law of associations.

In making such an eloquent appeal (which surely finds sensitive chords in a French assembly) to the courage of the conviction of those who are in the majority here, to the generous sentiments which are those of the republican party, he says to you: "You are afraid of the Society of Jesus; but these terrors, justifiable a hundred years ago, are part of the government of the ancient régime; but you, have you forgotten? you are a free government! You have these two great forces: liberty and universal suffrage. Liberty you possess completely; power you have without reserve; universal suffrage backs you up; and it is in this situation of predominant and expanding control that you come to ask us for repressive measures against the Society of Jesus!" . . .

Do you not perceive that lay and civil society before 1789, represented by the parlements, had, in the face of the ultramontane and clerical danger, some powers which you do not have? It had absolute power, the power of an ancient historic dynasty; it had the courts, that is to say all the bourgeoisie; it had more

than half, perhaps two-thirds of the French clergy; it was supported at the same time by royal authority, sometimes called episcopacy outside the Church, and by the power of the parlements; . . . it had a great theological and religious current behind it; thus endowed with all material and moral forces, it still felt that it ought to rely for its defense on measures identical with those we have just advised you to adopt.

What remains to us of all this arsenal? Not the absolute power, certainly, but in place of absolute power, governments by opinion, that is fleeting, essentially weak governments; a sovereign and uncontested power, which nothing resists, but which we do not know how to raise to the level of permanent, invariable, and indisputable forces. . . .

Well, I ask you as statesmen who feel the weight of your responsibility, at this hour when it depends on you to abolish the existing laws by your vote or to maintain them solemnly for the future and in the interest of the future, I ask you whether the situation and the moment are well chosen for the republican government to disinterest itself in the education of the younger generation; if the moment appears to have come to give young minds up to the anarchy of opinions, and to make a Republic which abandons to chance the intellectual development of the nation, which lets everything alone, and which is content to remain the scrupulous manager of the material interests of the country, to be a great builder of railroads and an honest collector of taxes.

If you think that this moment has come, it behooves you to recognize all the consequences of the course which you are going to take. . . .

I say that we wish to attack them [Jesuits], and we feel capable of attacking them, because they are the promoters of that attempt at religious revolution which is not yet ended . . . of that attempt so dangerous to civil power and modern society; because it dominates the Church; because it has a large part of the clergy in slavery; because the clergy of France is its captive . . . because these serve as models for all ecclesiastical establishments; because it is from them that these establishments ask for books, and modern histories, and travesties on the history of France! . . .

Finally, we attack the Jesuits because the Jesuits and their adherents are the soul of that new kind of lay army which we have fought for seven years; which has been the master in the national Assembly; which, by means of the Catholic committees extends over the whole of France and covers it like a net; which has a political personnel; which is a party—I am mistaken—which is a faction.

As for warring against Catholicism, truly I am surprised, grievously surprised, at finding this accusation on the lips of M. Lamy, who knows us, who knows very well that there is in the thought of no one of us, in the

thought of no member of the government from which this project emanates, any desire, not the smallest desire, as remote as can be, of attempting, I will not say a persecution, but even an attack against Catholicism.

To attack Catholicism, to go to war with the belief held by the great number of our fellow citizens, why that would be the last and the most criminal of follies! . . .

You have duties, gentlemen, to the generation which have preceded you, and it is not, I think, so that young France might be left to the instruction of the Jesuits that they effected in this country two great revolutions, that of 1789 and that of 1830, both directed against the old régime!

As for your mandate, do you have any doubts as to its character? Did the people of the republic of France send you here simply to fold your arms? Was not a mandate given to you, not only to affirm the Republic and to carry it on here, but also to put it on a solid foundation? Is it in keeping with your mandate, after having chased your eternal adversaries from the political fortresses which they occupied, to permit them to fortify themselves in education?

MAURICE BARRÈS

BORN of the disastrous war of 1870, the Third French Republic led a troubled existence in its early years, and it was not till the last decade of the nineteenth century that it seemed beyond the danger of destruction from within. Lingering royalism, anticlericalism and traditional Catholicism, radicalism, and conservatism rose in conflict each time some untoward incident occurred. And there were many such incidents: the *Seize mai*—the attempt of President MacMahon to dissolve the Chamber in 1876; the Wilson affair—when President Grévy's son-in-law was implicated in the selling of awards of the Legion of Honor; the Boulanger episode—the very abortive attempt at dictatorship by General Boulanger in 1889; the Panama scandal—which involved many republican deputies and officials; and, most serious of all, the Dreyfus case—which tore France asunder. And in the background there were the eternal shame of the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the burning desire for revenge. These crises and this shame often prevented the French bourgeoisie from deriving full satisfaction from the otherwise bright picture of a nation rapidly growing in economic prosperity and in democratic stability. Though the Third Republic was much nearer to the ideal of an orderly government for the people and by the people than had been the "bourgeois" monarchy of Louis Philippe, it also drew considerable criticism both from the extreme Left and the extreme Right.

It was in this political atmosphere that Maurice Barrès (1862–1923) entered public life, and rose to be one of the great literary figures of modern France. His writings were shot through with the sadism, exoticism, and sensualized religiosity characteristic of post-Romantic "Decadence." The early work—three novels forming the trilogy of *Le Culte du moi*—was born of dissatisfaction with the skepticism which was the main fruit of his formal education and was devoted to the development of the individual. But Barrès was a native of Lorraine, the lost territory, and he soon began to ground his individualism, and cultivation of the self, in collective entities: the nation, the soil, the ancestors. Between 1892 and 1902 appeared his second trilogy, *L'Énergie nationale*. Barrès turned to traditional elements for strength—the army, Catholic faith, monarchy. Thus he took part in the debates over the Dreyfus case and, with Paul Déroulède, whom he later succeeded as head of the League of Patriots, he was one of those who cried loudest in defense of what the army and the anti-Dreyfusards called "the honor of the army," while it was only a deliberate attempt at convicting Captain Alfred Dreyfus of "treason" which had been committed by another man. Another great figure in French literature, Emile Zola, put his reputation and his life itself at stake to defend the Jewish officer and to denounce those who had not hesitated to forge documents to strengthen the case against Dreyfus. But Zola was a realistic novelist and a radical republican. Barrès like his Italian contemporary, Gabriele D'Annunzio, and like Thomas Carlyle, belonged to that group of "aesthetes" whose deference to truth was sometimes beclouded by a mystical worship of beautiful "heroism."

Barrès arrived at a definition of nationalism, "integral nationalism," as the

identification of the individual spirit with the national past and of individual life with that of the nation. This doctrine easily could and, with many did, unite with social Catholic concepts of corporatism within the state. It represented the extreme development of French nationalism, beyond which passed only the lunatic fringe and far short of which the vast majority of the French people stopped. It is worth noting that Barrès rejected for France the racist doctrines in his fellow countryman, Count de Gobineau, while the German Richard Wagner took them to heart and joined the newly founded *Gobineau Vereinigung*. But Barrès went far enough in the direction of exclusiveness. His French nationalism could appeal to Frenchmen only and therefore contradicted the more liberal nationalism of republican France—the nationalism of 1789, 1848, and even that of such men as Clemenceau, which appealed to ideals of significance to the world at large as well as to France.

The following selection was translated from Barrès' *Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme* (1902).



FRENCH NATIONALISM

I WAS ASKED to deliver the third lecture of the League of the French Nation. I undertook to define nationalism, that is to say, to seek its basic principles and implications.

We must begin, I said, by understanding the causes of our weakness.

The Dreyfus Affair is only the tragic symptom of a general malady. When a wound fails to heal the physician thinks of diabetes. Beneath the accident let us seek out the underlying condition.

Our deeply ingrained disease is that we are divided, disturbed by a thousand individual wills, by a thousand individual imaginations. We have fallen apart, we have no common awareness of our aim, of our resources, of our core.

Happy are those nations where movements are linked together, where efforts harmonize as if a plan had been developed by a superior mind!

There are many ways in which a country can have this moral unity. Loyalism may rally a nation about its sovereign. In the absence of a dynasty, traditional institutions can provide a center. But a century ago, our France suddenly cursed and destroyed its dynasty and its institutions. Lastly, some races succeed in becoming aware of themselves organically. Such is the case with the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic groups which are developing more and more into races. Alas! there is no French race, but a French people, a French nation, that is to say, an entity consisting of a political grouping. Yes, unfortunately, as compared with rival, and, in the struggle for existence, necessarily enemy groups, ours has not achieved a conscious awareness of itself. We implicitly admit this

in the way in which our publicists, writers, and artists call us sometimes Latins, sometimes Gauls, sometimes "the soldier of the Church" and then again the great nation, "the emancipator of peoples," depending on the needs of the moment.

In the absence of a moral unity, of a common understanding of what France is, we have contradictory words, varied banners beneath which men eager to exercise leadership can gather their following. Each of these groups understands in its own way the internal law of the development of this country.

Nationalism means the resolution of all questions by reference to France. But how are we to do this when we have no common understanding and idea of France?

Should an incident occur, it is interpreted by each party according to the particular meaning the party gives to the concept of France. Hence we can understand the real importance of this Dreyfus Affair: instead of being handled, in a common spirit, by Frenchmen who had the same idea of their country and of what is good for it, it has been considered by doctrinaires who are guided by the precepts of their own taste.

Given this lack of moral unity in a country which has neither dynasty nor traditional institutions, and which is not a race, it is quite natural that dangerous metaphysicians should gain authority over our imaginations, provided that they are eloquent, persuasive, *kindly*. By offering us an ideal, they undertake to give us moral unity. But far from delivering us from confusion, they only increase it by their contradictory assertions.

This is what must be remedied. Only a lazy heart and a mind thoroughly corrupted by anarchy could be content in this France torn and leaderless in thought.

But how can this lacking national consciousness be developed?

First let us repudiate philosophic systems and the political parties to which they give rise. Let us all join our efforts, not behind a vision of our own mind, but behind realities.

We are men of good will: whatever be the opinions which our family, education, environment and many little personal events have given us, we are decided to take as our starting point that which is, and not our own intellectual ideal. One among us may find that the Revolution has turned us from the most prosperous and happy paths, another may regret that the First Consul, by the Concordat, returned France to the influence of Rome; a third is convinced that the destinies of our country are closely linked to those of Catholicism. Each rewrites the history of France. Let us cast aside these fictions. Why mire ourselves in these hypothetical roads which France might have followed? We shall derive a more certain profit from delving into all the moments of

French history, living in our thoughts with all her dead, with every one of her experiences. What moral problems we shall face if our own preference must choose among all these seemingly contradictory revolutions which have occurred in France over a century! After all, the France of the Consulate, the France of the Restoration, the France of 1830, the France of 1848, the France of the authoritarian Empire, all these Frances which go to contradictory extremes with such astonishing agility, all come from the same root, and tend toward the same end; they are the fruits of different seasons from the same seed on the same tree. . . .

If the League of the French Nation could succeed in giving its followers this sense of the real and the relative, if it could convince those honest and devoted professors (who at times have done us so much harm) to judge things as historians rather than as metaphysicians, it would transform the abominable political spirit of our nation, it would restore our moral unity, it would indeed create what we have lacked: a national consciousness.

To have this national, realistic view of the Fatherland accepted, we must develop sentiments which already exist naturally in the country. Union cannot be built on ideas, so long as they are only processes of reason; they must be bulwarked with emotional strength. At the root of all things is feeling. One would try in vain to establish truth by reason alone, for intelligence can always find a new motive for reopening the question.

To create a national consciousness we must combine with this dominant intellectualism whose methods the historians teach, a less conscious, less deliberate element.

Misled by a university training that spoke only of Man and Humanity, I feel that like so many others I should have embroiled myself in anarchical agitation had not certain feelings of veneration warned me and strengthened my heart. . . . [*There follows a description of his emotions on a visit to the military cemetery at Metz.*]

Nothing is more valuable in forming a people's soul than this voice of our ancestors, than this lesson of the soil which Metz teaches so well. Our soil gives us a discipline, for we are the continuation of our dead. That is the reality on which we should build. . . .

The dead! What would a man mean to himself if he stood only by himself? When each of us looks backward he sees an endless train of mysteries, whose recent embodiment is called France. We are the product of a collective being which speaks in us. Let the influence of the ancestors be enduring and the sons will be vigorous and upright, and the nation one. . . . In vain does the foreigner, on naturalization, swear that he will think and live as a Frenchman; in vain has he bound his interests with ours, blood persists in following the order

of nature against all vows, against all laws. He is our guest, this son from beyond the Rhine, or English Channel, and we offer him safety and our generous friendship, but we do not owe him a share in the government of the country. Let him first feel our pulse, and, from roots that will grow, nourish himself from our soil and our dead. His grandchildren, indeed, will be French, genuinely, and not merely through a legal fiction.

VII

POLITICAL LIBERALISM IN A CLIMATE OF NATIONALISM: II

THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS of the German People were proclaimed in December, 1848, by the National Assembly at Frankfurt on the Main, and in March of the following year these rights were included in the constitution proposed for a united liberal Germany. The members of this assembly had been elected in the states formerly included in the dissolved German Confederation, by universal manhood suffrage; many conservatives had abstained from voting. The majority of the delegates were partisans of a federation of liberal monarchies. The large number of professors and other intellectuals accounts in part for the theoretical elaborateness of the document and for the special emphasis placed on educational problems. In the latter field the solutions advocated by the delegates were far in advance of the times.

Unlike the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), this German Bill of Rights was more frankly nationalistic. The loose Confederation had been dissolved only in order to clear the ground for a more effective federal union. But sharp differences developed over the issue of just what areas should be included in the new federation. Those whose goal was the incorporation of all German-speaking provinces of the old Holy Roman Empire advocated the creation of a Greater Germany (*Grossdeutschland*), while the proponents of a Little Germany (*Kleindeutschland*) wished to exclude Austria on the ground that its Slavic and Hungarian provinces could not be successfully assimilated. The majority of the Frankfurt Assembly favored a Greater Germany, along the lines advertised by what was to become the German national anthem (*Deutschland über alles*), that is, "from Memel to the Maas and from the Adige to the Belt." This would have claimed for the new federation the German part of Austria, all of Prussia (including the Polish-speaking provinces), Schleswig-Holstein (then under Danish domination), Holland, and Alsace-Lorraine. It would certainly be difficult to obtain the support of all princes, most of whom were conservative and some of whom were hostile to a German federal union, for the plans of the liberal Frankfurt Assembly. But the delegates began their work with much idealistic optimism. "We are here," said the president, Heinrich von Gagern, "to create a Constitution for Germany, for the whole Reich. Our call to the work and the authority to proceed have their origin in the sovereignty of the People . . . Germany longs to be united and, with the co-operation of all her members, to be governed by the will of the People. It lies also in the province of this assembly to bring about this co-operation on the part of the State Governments."

A liberal Hapsburg prince, Archduke John of Austria, was selected as temporary administrative head, and the new constitution provided for a hereditary Kaiser to be chosen from a ruling German family. The new *Reich* was to be a federation of states, similar to the United States, with delegation of some powers to the central government and reservation of other powers to the several existing states. The parliament was to be bicameral, one chamber representing the states and the other

chamber the people. The ministry was to be responsible to the parliament. The difficult problem of the suffrage was postponed to be decided by an "election law." Section VI, the translation of which follows, was a clear statement of individual liberties, corresponding somewhat to the first ten amendments of our own Constitution, though more detailed. Its purpose, firstly, was to guard against possible encroachments of government, state and federal; secondly, to do away specifically with all remaining feudal obligations, reminiscent of the famous night session of August 4-5, 1789, of the French Revolution.

However, the Frankfurt Assembly had spent nearly a year in its deliberations, and by that time the liberals had lost influence with the governments of Austria and Prussia and had lost much of their popular support. The decision of the assembly to offer the crown to the King of Prussia, who seemed less hostile to the Frankfurt liberals than was the Austrian Emperor, meant the abandonment of the "Greater Germany" plan, for Austria would never consent to play second fiddle. Furthermore, the King of Prussia declined the offer of an imperial crown which came "from the gutter," as he said. He even denied the right of the Frankfurt Assembly to bestow a title upon him. This represented accurately his personal aversion to the democratic parliament, but he had also a more practical reason for refusing, since he knew full well that to do so would not have pleased his peers, their majesties of the kingdoms of Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, Hanover, and especially Austria. The Frankfurt Assembly then collapsed. In the following month, May, 1849, groups of liberal extremists tried to dethrone princes and set up republican governments in various parts of Germany—the Rhenish Palatinate, Saxony, Baden, and Breslau. These "republics" were promptly suppressed. The Prussian king then invited the German states, except Austria, to form a new union under his presidency. Seventeen of the lesser states accepted, and in March, 1850, at Erfurt, the German Union was founded.

In the meantime Austria had put down its own rebellions, and although Count Schwarzenberg, her leading statesman, shared the Prussian king's distaste for liberalism, he did not view with equanimity the fact that Prussia was assuming the hegemony of the German states. So strong was Austrian pressure that Frederick William had to yield in order to avoid war with Austria, the German Union was dissolved, and the German Confederation under the presidency of Austria was revived. Nor was that all, for the restored Diet at Frankfurt formally repealed the Fundamental Rights of the German People and directed a special commission to purge any state constitution of "revolutionary novelties."

However, the Frankfurt Bill of Rights has remained a standard statement of the political philosophy of the bourgeois liberal of the middle of the nineteenth century. "It was, after all, no disgrace, but an honor [wrote the noted German historian Heinrich von Sybel] for those men to have been so far ahead of their contemporaries; and although for that very reason the efforts of the National Assembly were bound to be futile for the time, it was truly the sowing of seed which was to ripen in the glorious future. . . . The impulse and direction which they gave to patriotism and to love for the Fatherland have been ineradicable. Even a more propitious future could not have seen the success of the idea, had not our first Parliament, in spite of all its mistakes and confused notions about the means to be employed, pointed out to the people with such force and emphasis the

true goal of the nation,—the maintenance of Freedom among its members, and of Union in its attitude to foreigners.”

The following selection embodies the whole of the *Fundamental Rights* in the form appearing as *Abschnitt VI* in *Die deutsche Verfassung vom 28. März 1849*.¹



THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

THE FOLLOWING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS shall be guaranteed to the German people. They shall serve as a standard for the constitutions of the separate German states and no constitution or legislation of any German state may ever set aside or limit them.

Article I

1. The German people consists of the citizens of the states which make up the German Reich.

2. Every German has the rights of German citizenship. He may exercise these rights in every German state. The election laws of the Reich determine the right to vote in elections for the Reich's assembly.

3. Every German has the right to sojourn or establish his residence in any part of the territory of the Reich, to acquire real estate of any description and to control the same, to engage in any trade, to enjoy the rights of local citizenship.

The government of the Reich shall establish for the whole of Germany the conditions governing sojourn and residence by a law of residence, and those respecting trades by trade regulations.

4. No German state may make a distinction in matters of civil and criminal law and procedural rights between its citizens and other Germans which would place the latter in the category of aliens.

5. Punishment by deprivation of citizenship shall not take place, and where it has already been decreed it shall cease in its effects, in so far as this does not do injury to private rights acquired thereby.

6. The freedom to emigrate is not limited for reasons of state. Emigration fees may not be levied.

Matters pertaining to emigration come under the protection and care of the Reich.

¹ *Section VI, the German Constitution of 28th March 1849.*

Article II

7. No privilege of rank is valid before the law. Nobility is abolished as a rank.

All privileges of rank are abolished.

All Germans are equal before the law.

All titles, in so far as they do not pertain to an office, are abolished and may never again be introduced.

No member of the state may accept a decoration from a foreign state.

Every public office is open equally to all who are qualified.

Military duties are the same for all; the employment of substitutes is not permissible.

Article III

8. The freedom of the individual is inviolable.

The arrest of a person shall take place, except in case of his being apprehended in the deed, only on the authority of a court order stating the cause. This order must be presented to the arrested person at the time of his arrest or within the following twenty-four hours.

Everyone taken into custody by the police must either be set free in the course of the following day or be turned over to the judicial authorities.

Everyone accused shall be released on presentation of bail to be determined by the court, in so far as compelling evidence of serious criminal activity is not submitted against him. In case of an unlawfully imposed or prolonged imprisonment, the one who is responsible, even if it be the state, is obligated to give satisfaction and compensation to the person injured.

Modifications of this rule necessary for the army and the navy are reserved for special legislation.

9. The death penalty as well as the penalties of the pillory, branding, and corporal punishment are abolished, with the exception of cases in which they are prescribed by martial law or in which they are permissible according to maritime law in the event of mutiny.

10. The home is inviolable.

The searching of a domicile is permissible only:

(i) on authority of a judicial order stating reasons, which order must be presented to the parties concerned immediately or within the following twenty-four hours;

(ii) in case of pursuit of an offender caught in the act on the part of legally authorized officials;

(iii) in those cases and circumstances in which the law exceptionally permits designated officials to do so even without judicial order.

The searching of a domicile must take place, when feasible, with the assistance of the household.

The inviolability of a domicile is not to prevent the arrest of one who is legally pursued.

11. The confiscation of letters and papers may be undertaken only on authority of a judicial order stating reasons, except in case of arrest or of searching of a domicile. This order must be presented to the parties concerned immediately or within the following twenty-four hours.

12. The privacy of letters is guaranteed.

The restrictions necessitated by examinations of a criminal court or at time of war are to be determined by legislation.

Article IV

13. Every German has the right to express his opinion freely in speaking, writing, printing, or pictorial representation.

The freedom of the press may under no circumstances and in no way be limited, suspended, or annulled by means of preventive rules, namely censorship, concessions, safety provisions, state taxes, limitations on printing or the book trade, postal restrictions or other restrictions upon free intercourse.

Offenses of the press, which are officially prosecuted, will be tried before a jury.

Laws governing the press will be proclaimed by the Reich.

Article V

14. Every German has full freedom of belief and of conscience.

No one is obligated to reveal his religious convictions.

15. Every German is unrestricted in the common practice of his religion at home or in public.

The commission of a crime and infringement of law which are committed in the exercise of this freedom are to be punished according to law.

16. The enjoyment of civil and political rights is neither conditioned nor limited by religious belief. Religious belief is not an excuse for failure to perform one's obligations as a citizen of the state.

17. Every religious association directs and controls its own affairs independently, but remains subject to the common laws of the state.

No religious association shall enjoy special privileges from the state above any other association; furthermore there is no state church.

New religious associations may be formed; no recognition of their principles on the part of the state is required.

18. None may be coerced to participate in an ecclesiastical activity or ceremony.

19. In the future the form of the oath shall read: "So help me God."

20. The civil validity of marriage depends only upon the fulfilment of the civil ceremony; the religious ceremony may take place only after the completion of the civil ceremony.

Religious differences are not a civil obstacle to marriage.

21. Record books are kept by the civil authorities.

Article VI

22. Knowledge and the teaching of knowledge are free.

23. Instruction and the system of education are under the supervision of the state and are, with the exception of religious instruction, freed from supervision of the clergy as such.

24. Every German is free to establish, to lead, and to give instruction in institutions for instruction and education, if he has given evidence of his qualifications to do so to the proper authorities of the state.

Instruction at home is not restricted in any way.

25. Sufficient provision shall everywhere be made for the education of German youth through public schools.

Parents or their representatives may not permit their children or wards to be without the instruction which is prescribed for the lower public schools.

26. Public teachers have the rights of public officials.

The state appoints teachers of the public schools from the number of those who have been examined according to the legally established rules of the communities.

27. No tuition will be paid for instruction in the public schools and lower trade schools.

Those without means shall be granted free instruction in all public educational institutions.

28. Everyone is free to choose his occupation and to prepare himself for it, how and where he wishes.

Article VII

29. Every German has the right to apply in writing to the authorities, to the representatives, and to the Reichstag with requests and complaints.

This right may be exercised by individuals as well as by corporations and

by a number jointly; but in the army and navy only in the manner prescribed by the regulations governing discipline.

30. Previous consent of the authorities is not necessary in order to prosecute public officials on account of their official activities.

Article VIII

31. Germans have the right to assemble peacefully and without arms; no special permission to do so is required.

Public assemblies in the open may be forbidden in times of urgent danger in the interest of public order and safety.

32. Germans have the right to form associations. This right shall not be limited by any preventive measure.

33. The provisions included in the last two paragraphs are applicable to army and navy in so far as they are not contrary to regulations for military discipline.

Article IX

34. Private property is inviolable.

Expropriation may take place only in the interest of the public welfare, only according to law and on the basis of just compensation.

Ecclesiastical property shall be protected by legislation.

35. Every owner of real estate may dispose of his property in whole or in part among the living or on account of death. The execution of the principle governing the divisibility of real estate by means of inheritance legislation is left to the separate states.

In the interest of the public welfare, it is permissible for the legislature to impose restrictions on the rights of deceased individuals to acquire and control real estate.

36. Every relationship of bondage or serfdom is ended forever.

37. The following are abolished without compensation:

i. the patrimonial jurisdiction and the police power of the lord of a manor, together with the authority, exemptions, and imposts emanating therefrom.

ii. the personal imposts and services which have their source in the manorial and feudal relationship.

With these rights the counter services and obligations also cease, which formerly had obligated those who had been entitled to the privileges revoked.

38. All imposts and services which have their basis in the soil, the tithe in particular, are revokable. The manner in which this is to be done, whether only on application of those on whom the burden falls or of those who are privileged, is left to the legislatures of the separate states.

Henceforth no piece of real estate may be burdened with an unredeemable impost or service.

39. The right to hunt on one's own property rests in the ownership of that property.

The right to hunt on the property of others, hunting services and fees, or other services for purposes of hunting are abolished without compensation.

Only revokable, however, is the right to hunt which demonstrably has been acquired by contract with the owner of the property thus encumbered. The manner and means of this revocation is to be determined by acts of the legislature.

The regulation of the exercise of the right to hunt for reasons of public safety and the general welfare is reserved to the legislature.

The right to hunt on the property of others may not in the future be determined again as a prerogative attaching to land.

40. The laws governing non-salable family real estate are to be annulled. The manner and conditions of this revocation are to be determined by the legislatures of the separate states.

Decisions regarding family entail of the ruling princely houses are reserved to the legislatures.

41. All feudal relations are to be annulled. Particulars regarding the manner and means of execution are to be ordered by the legislative acts of the separate states.

42. The punishment of confiscation of property shall not take place.

43. Taxation shall be so regulated that the privileged position of some occupations and property shall cease in the community and state.

Article X

44. All legal jurisdiction proceeds from the state. There shall be no patrimonial courts.

45. Judicial power will be exercised independently by the courts. Cabinet and ministerial jurisdiction is inadmissible.

None may be withdrawn from his legal court. Extraordinary courts shall never take place.

46. There shall be no privileged juridical position of persons or of property.

The military tribunal is limited to pass sentence on military crimes and offences as well as on military and disciplinary misdemeanors, with the exception of decrees for the state of war.

47. No judge may be removed from office, or reduced in rank or salary, except through sentence and law.

Suspension may not take place without a court decision.

No judge may against his will be removed to a different location or be retired, except through court decision in specified cases and ways determined by law.

48. Court proceedings shall be public and oral.

Exceptions from publicity are determined by law in the interest of morality.

49. Prosecution applies in criminal cases. Gross criminal cases and all political offences shall always be judged by trial by jury.

50. In matters pertaining to special practical or professional experience, the civil administration of justice shall be administered or assisted by specially qualified judges freely chosen by their colleagues.

51. The execution and administration of justice shall be separated and be independent of each other.

Cases of conflict of jurisdiction between administrative and judicial authorities in the individual states are decided by a court determined by law.

52. Judicial power on the part of administrative authorities ceases. All violations of law are determined by the courts.

The police authorities have no power to punish.

53. Legal decisions of German courts are equally valid and effective in all German states.

A law of the nation will determine details.

Article XI

54. The fundamental principles of the constitution of every community are: (i) the election of its head officer and representative; (ii) the independent administration of its community affairs including the local police, under the legally appointed supervision of the state; (iii) that all matters pertaining to public administration be open to the public; (iv) the rule that all negotiations will be public.

55. Every piece of property shall be under the jurisdiction of a community organization.

Limitations on account of forests or deserts remain reserved to the state legislature.

Article XII

56. Every German state shall have a constitution with representation of the people.

Ministers are responsible to the representatives of the people.

57. The representatives of the people have a decisive voice in legislation, in taxation, in the regulation of affairs of state. Also, in case there is a bicameral

legislature, each chamber has for itself the right of initiating legislation, presenting grievances, of petitioning, as well as of impeaching ministers.

The sessions of the representatives are as a rule public.

Article XIII

58. The non-German speaking races of Germany are guaranteed their racial development, namely the equal right of their languages in the regions which they occupy, their rights in church affairs, in instruction, in local government, and in administration of justice.

Article XIV

59. Every German citizen abroad is under the protection of the Reich.

CHURCH AND STATE IN GERMANY

BARON WILHELM EMMANUEL VON KETTELER (1811-77) was admitted to the priesthood in 1844. He was primarily interested in political, economic, and social problems and was a leading organizer of the Catholic Centrist party in Germany. In 1848 he was a member of the Frankfurt Assembly and in 1850 was ordained Bishop of Mainz. He was considered one of the foremost Catholic authorities on social problems and influenced Pope Leo XIII in the formulation of Catholic social doctrine. He was a friend of Adolf Kolping, who founded in 1847 the Catholic journeyman's guild; this spread from the Rhineland through all the German states. Other contemporaries who held views similar to those of the Bishop were Karl Marlo, Johann Karl Rodbertus, and Ferdinand Lassalle. His most prominent successor was Franz Hitze. Von Ketteler's zeal for his Church never flagged, and after the formation of the German Empire he served in the Reichstag until he thought it best to resign because of the violent controversies of the day. However, he remained a leading figure in opposition to Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*.¹

The first of the following selections has been translated from his book *Die Katholiken im Deutschen Reiche*,² which he wrote toward the end of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and which influenced the Center party in Germany for many years. It states his conception of the proper relation between church and state and presents an analysis of the culture pattern of the German states. Von Ketteler was an enthusiastic admirer of the culture of the Middle Ages because he believed that in it was found the proper relation between the various classes that make up the social order. In keeping with his concern for spiritual values, a model society was for him one in which the church, state, and family together formed a culture pattern which would enable each individual to live a Christian life.

Von Ketteler represented the German Catholic or Austrian philosophy of the state, formulated previously by Adam Heinrich Müller. The "modern" state was anathema to him. In Von Ketteler's eyes the bourgeoisie was un-Christian, anti-clerical, selfish, materialistic; and the "freedom" which they professed was the freedom to exploit the lower economic classes, a freedom founded upon the absence of restraints imposed by church or state. In opposition to the ruling bourgeoisie and the "liberalism" which simply represented its interests, Von Ketteler ardently supported cooperatives, labor unions, and social legislation. He believed that through such means the economic and political power of the bourgeoisie could be restrained and the spiritual and human values of Christianity promoted.

The second selection is a translation of an address by Prince Otto von Bismarck (1815-98) before the Prussian House of Lords on March 10, 1873. In a straightforward manner and with little oratorical flourish, the Imperial Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs makes his point of view clear regarding the conflict of church and state.

¹ *Fight for civilization.*

² *The Catholics in the German Empire.*

The specific problem before the House was the government's proposal to modify Articles 15 and 18 of the Constitution of 1850 of the Prussian State. These articles read:

Art. 15: The Evangelical Church and the Roman Catholic Church, as well as every other religious society, shall order and administer its affairs independently and remain in possession and enjoyment of its institutions, foundations, and landed property established for purposes of religious instruction and welfare activities.

Art. 18: The right to nominate, propose, elect and ratify candidates for ecclesiastical positions is annulled so far as it belongs to the state and does not rest on patronage or particular legal titles.

This statement does not apply to the appointment of clergymen in the army and public institutions.

Bismarck's point of view was supported on April 4, 1873, by a vote of 87 ayes and 53 nays and the constitutional changes he desired were adopted. In the case of Article 15, religious institutions would continue in the enjoyment of their property and management of their affairs, with the proviso that they "remain subject to the laws of the state and the legally provided supervision of the state." Article 18 was not changed but the following provision was added: "However, the law authorizes the state to regulate the education, appointment, and dismissal of clergymen and ecclesiastical officials and determines the limits of ecclesiastical disciplinary authority."

The effect of these amendments, which became law on April 5, 1873, was clearly to place all religious institutions under the supervision and control of the state. Indeed, this was their purpose, for the anti-Catholic laws which had previously been proposed by Dr. Adalbert Falk, Prussian Minister of Education, could not be constitutional until these amendments had been passed. In the following month came the May laws which were the center of the *Kulturkampf*. Two years later, on June 18, 1875, the above mentioned articles, together with Article 16, of the Prussian Constitution were completely annulled. However, by the end of the decade, problems associated with socialism and the Industrial Revolution became so insistent in Germany that the Chancellor abandoned the *Kulturkampf* and established a new *modus vivendi*³ with Rome.



WILHELM VON KETTELER: THE CATHOLICS IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE

PROGRAM

I. Unreserved acceptance of the German government's authority within the limits of its present jurisdiction.

³ Literally, *way of living*; here, *understanding*.

II. Firm national union with Austria, the German *Ostmark*.⁴

III. Just recognition of the independence of the separate lands belonging to the German Empire, as far as the necessary unity of the Empire permits and according to the laws of the Empire.

IV. The Christian religion is the foundation in the Empire as well as in the separate states on all matters pertaining to the practice of religion insofar as such practice is not detrimental to religious freedom.

V. The recognized Christian denominations order and control their affairs independently and remain in possession and enjoyment of their institutions and capital (endowments) founded for purposes of denominational, educational, and welfare activities.

VI. The German Empire demands, above all, German law and German freedom in the sense of an assured jurisdiction of justice for individual and social freedom and in contrast to the lying freedom of absolutism and liberalism which destroy the freedom of the individual and of association.

VII. Connected therewith is freedom of higher, secondary, and primary education, under legally controlled state supervision, and organization of the state school not at the option of state authorities, but in accordance with the genuine, religious, spiritual, and moral circumstances of the people.

VIII. The German Empire demands German constitutional forms in all spheres, not only a constitution for the Empire and country, but also a complete social constitution of the people for all their needs; corporate organization in contrast to the mechanistic constitutional forms of liberalism; self-administration in contrast to mere bureaucracy.

IX. In particular, a constitution expressing integrally these principles for the nation, the community, and the district.

X. The development of the constitution of the Empire:

- (1) through an upper chamber;
- (2) through a supreme court of the Empire as an inviolable bulwark of the entire German legal system, as bulwark of public law, and as juridical control for the administration of the Empire and country.

XI. Regulation of the national debt, reduction of obligations imposed by the state, equalization of taxes. As means thereto:

- (1) introduction of a stock exchange tax;
- (2) introduction of an income tax for commercial enterprises and corporations;
- (3) operation of railroads at state expense;
- (4) reduction of military burdens;
- (5) abolition of taxes on the most essential necessities of life.

XII. Corporate reorganization of laboring and artisan classes.

⁴ [*Eastern border-country.*]

Legal protection of children and women of the working classes against the exploitation of capitalists.

Protection of workers through laws governing hours of labor and Sabbath rest.

Legal protection of health and morals of workers with reference to working places.

Establishment of inspectors to supervise the laws enacted for the protection of the working class.

XIII. Legal prohibition of all secret societies, in particular the order of Freemasons as a secret society.

IV. RELATION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE TO THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

The constitution of the North German Confederation has hitherto been regarded as the model for the constitution of the German Empire and has been transferred with few modifications to the new Empire. It may have suited previous circumstances. However, this point of view cannot be maintained for the future. Such an Empire would not have the right to bear the name of the old German Empire. The German Empire, in contrast to the German Confederation, must serve not only material but also spiritual interests and must respond to the spirit of the German people. The institutions and laws of the Empire must therefore be permeated with respect for religion and morality. They must respect the honorable for its own sake, and protect the moral fibre through which the states are inwardly strengthened; they must renounce the materialistic conception of the state which has made many European countries sick unto death.

This ideal and moral content, however, is thoroughly lacking in the provisional constitution of the Empire. Convincing evidence for this is found in Article IV of the constitution of the North German Confederation, which enumerates the concerns underlying the Confederation and its legislation. Tariffs and taxes, trade, banking, and railroad matters constitute, in addition to military affairs, almost its only content. Important though these are, they give an insufficient content for the lofty concept of the German Empire. A North German paper recently made a significant comment on the July monarchy: "The political trading company which in 1830 took possession of the government in the name of the bourgeoisie, needed a name for the firm and found the same in Louis Philippe of Orleans." This king, it continued, "with his woollen umbrella and high finance" remained an "unintelligible interlude" to the people. The more this is confirmed to be true, the more must the German Empire guard itself against the appearance that it, too, was set up by a trading company which was only seeking an establishment for itself. The German title

of Emperor demands something higher than the management of business interests, and even the lustre of the German armed forces is not able here to take the place of the higher spiritual blessings.

From this point of view, first of all, two propositions follow for our program.

The foundation of the whole historical development of the German people, its culture and its moral being, is the Christian religion. To it the German people owe their higher spiritual blessings. It would be a disgraceful disavowal of the entire past if the constitution of the German Empire should not mention in a single word the Christian religion, that spring from which Germany has derived its spiritual and moral life. In recognition of the fact that the Christian religion is the historical foundation of the religious life in Germany and is the religion of the entire German people with the exception of the Jewish subjects of the state, no attempt was made after the storms of the year 1848 to remove from the Prussian constitution of January 31, 1850, the statement that "the Christian religion will be made the foundation of those arrangements of the state which are related to the practice of religion, safeguarded by the guaranteed freedom of religion." This same statement, in recognition of the same fact, was also included in the German fundamental principles of the Union parliament in its decision of April 27, 1850, and a series of German constitutional charters followed this example.

We demand, therefore, in the first place, the inclusion of the same statement in the constitution of the Empire also. This demand satisfies the most sacred right of the great majority of the Christian population in Germany. Indeed it would be intolerable to belie the fact that the great mass of the German people is Christian. It would be intolerable to withhold from the Christian consciousness of the German people the very thing that was conscientiously guaranteed them even in the year 1848. A refusal to include this or a similar statement in the constitution of the Empire would come pretty close to an open declaration that the German Empire dissociates itself from the Christian religion. Such a declaration, however, would not injure the Christian religion so much as it would the very foundations of the Empire.

OTTO VON BISMARCK: THE ANCIENT STRUGGLE FOR POWER BETWEEN MONARCHY AND PRIESTHOOD

THE QUESTION before us, is in my opinion, misrepresented and is viewed in a false light, if it is considered as a denominational, ecclesiastical question. It is really a political issue. Our Catholic fellow citizens are being told that it is concerned with a struggle between a Protestant dynasty and the Catholic Church.

It is not a conflict between belief and unbelief. It is the ancient struggle for power, which is as old as the human race; the conflict between monarchy and priesthood, which is much older than the advent of our Saviour in this world. It is the conflict in which Agamemnon found himself with his seers, in which he lost his daughter, and which prevented the Greeks from putting to sea. It is the conflict which under the name of the struggles between the popes and the German emperors filled the history of the Middle Ages. . . . It is the conflict which found its end in the death of the last representative of the illustrious Swabian imperial family who died on the scaffold under the ax of a French conqueror. And this French conqueror was at that time in alliance with the Pope. We have been very near to an analogous solution of the situation, translated of course into the customs of our time. If the French war of conquest, whose outbreak coincided with the publication of the Vatican decrees, had been successful, I do not know what would have been said in German ecclesiastical circles of the *gesta Dei per Francos*.⁵ Similar designs were proposed before the last war with Austria, similar designs were proposed at Olmütz,⁶ where a similar alliance stood opposed to the monarchy as it exists in our land on a basis which is not recognized by Rome. It is, in my opinion, a falsification of politics and of history in general to regard His Holiness the Pope exclusively as the high priest of a denomination or the Catholic Church as the representative of ecclesiasticism. The papacy has always been a political power which has intervened in the affairs of the world with the greatest determination and the greatest results. It strives after these encroachments on the state and makes them its program. The programs are known. The goal which continually hovers before the papal power, as the Rhine boundary does before the French, the program, which at the time of the medieval emperors was near realization, is the subjection of the temporal to the spiritual power, an eminently political project. But it is a striving which is as old as humanity, for ever since there have been clever men, real priests, they have maintained that the will of God is more clearly known to them than to their fellow men and that on that basis they had the right to rule their fellow creatures. It is known that this tenet is the basis of papal pretensions to sovereign authority. I need not remind you here of the official papal documents which have been mentioned and criticized a hundred times. . . . The struggle between priesthood and monarchy, the struggle in this case between the Pope and the German Emperor, as we have already seen it in the Middle Ages, is to be judged

⁵ [*Works of God through the French.*]

⁶ [To avert war, the Prussian King, Frederick William IV, signed a treaty with Austria at Olmütz in November 1850, providing for the dissolution of the German Union under the leadership of Prussia and for the restoration of the German Confederation under the presidency of Austria.]

as every other contest. It has its alliances, its treaties of peace, its temporary lulls, its truces. . . .

This contest for power, then, is subject to the same conditions as every other political struggle, and it is a perversion of the problem, calculated to impress people of no judgment, to present it as if it were a matter of persecuting the Church. It is a question of protecting the state; it is a question of fixing the boundary between rule by priesthood and rule by monarchy, and the boundary line must be so established that the state on its part can maintain its existence. For in the realm of this world, it has the power and precedence.

We in Prussia have not always been parties to this struggle through any choice of ours. On the part of the Roman curia we were for a long time not regarded as the main adversary. Frederick the Great lived completely at peace with the Roman Church, while his contemporary, the emperor of the predominantly Catholic Austrian state was engaged in a violent contest with the Catholic Church. I wish only to point out that the problem is thus quite independent of denominationalism. In this same way I can cite the fact that it was really the thoroughly Protestant King, Frederick William III, whose faith was, one may almost say, anti-Catholic, who at the Congress of Vienna urged and accomplished the restoration of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope. Nevertheless he departed from this world while in conflict with the Catholic Church. We have found then, in the constitutional provisions which concern us here a *modus vivendi*, an armistice, which was concluded at a time when the state felt itself to be helpless and believed that it could find support at the hands of the Catholic Church, at least a partial support. This was probably due to the recollection that in the National Assembly of 1848 all the districts with overwhelming Catholic populations elected, I will not say, royalists, but at least friends of order, which was not the case in Protestant districts. In consideration of this, the compromise in the struggle for power between the secular and spiritual forces was concluded but, as was shortly revealed, quite mistakenly so far as the practical consequences were concerned. For it was not the support of the electors for whom those who wanted order had voted, but rather it was the Ministry of Brandenburg and the army of the King who restored order. The state indeed finally had to help itself; the protection which could be granted to it on the part of the various churches had not extricated it. At that time, however, arose the *modus vivendi* under which we lived for a number of years in a peaceful relationship. To be sure, this peace was purchased only by means of continual yielding on the part of the state. The state entrusted its rights with reference to the Catholic Church quite unreservedly to the hands of authorities whose function supposedly was to look after the interests of the Prussian King and state over against the Catholic Church. Actually, however,

these authorities came into the service of the Pope to look after the rights of the Church as opposed to the Prussian state. . . . Meanwhile, because of my aversion to any internal conflict and quarrel of this kind, I preferred this peace with all its disadvantages and on my part have refused to engage in the conflict, although I have often been urged by others to do so. Perhaps there has never been a time, without regard to other issues when the government was more inclined to come to an understanding with the papacy, if it had not been attacked, than at the conclusion of the French War. . . . It is known to everyone who was with us in France that our otherwise naturally good relations with Italy succumbed to a discord, I will not say a gloom, during the entire war and lasted to the conclusion of peace. In our opinion, Italy's entire attitude was that her love for the French was greater than her own interests; otherwise Italy would have had to defend her independence along with us against France. It was a very striking phenomenon for us, and doubts arose as to which of the various interests would be decisive for the Italian government. It was a fact that Italian military forces were hostile to us under Garibaldi, whose departure from Italy, could as we believed, have been prevented if more energy had been used. Fortunately this discord between Italian and German politics has now been overcome. It is thus far from true that a partiality for Italy influenced our political affairs at that time.

While we were still at Versailles, it surprised me somewhat to learn that an appeal was issued to Catholic members of legislative bodies asking them to declare whether they were in favor of joining a denominational fraction, such as we know today as the Center Party; and whether in the politics of the Empire they would agree to work for and vote for the propositions which we are considering today in order that they might be incorporated in the constitution of the Empire. At that time this program did not alarm me so very much—I was peace-loving to that degree—I knew from whom it originated; in part from a highly ranking prince of the Church, Bishop von Ketteler of Mainz, who has the assignment to do whatever he can for papal politics; and partly from an outstanding member of the Center Party, von Savigny, the former Prussian representative of the federal diet. This movement had an advantage in being begun by them. I had not believed of the latter that he would use his influence in a direction hostile to the government. Therein I was completely mistaken. I only add the reasons for not attaching true significance to these matters at that time, for I would not have returned to Germany if I had not been convinced that we could get along with this party and its endeavors. However, when I returned here, I saw for the first time how strong the organization of the party had become, the party of the Church which is in conflict

with the state. I saw the progress which the activities of the Catholic group in the ministry of ecclesiastical affairs and public instruction had made in its attack on the German language in the Polish territories. In Silesia, where this had never happened before, there emerged a Polish party under substantial priestly encouragement and actual protection of ecclesiastical policy. But even that would not in itself have been decisive. What first called my attention to the danger was the power which this newly formed faction had acquired. Representatives who had resided and been respected in their districts and for long had always been elected were set aside by orders from Berlin, and the election ordered of new representatives who were not even known by name in their election districts. That happened not in one but in several election districts. They had such a rigid organization and had won such power over the people to bring about the program of the previously mentioned prince of the Church, the Bishop of Mainz, as revealed in his published writings. To what does this program lead? Read them. These writings are ingeniously written and pleasant to read, and in everyone's hands. Their purpose is to create a political dualism in Prussia, a state within the state; that all Catholics be brought to the point where they receive the direction of their attitude in politics as in private life exclusively from this Center Party. We would thereby come to a dualism of the worst kind. The Austro-Hungarian Empire shows us that a state in propitious circumstances can govern with a dualistic constitution. But there is no denominational dualism there. Here we are concerned with the creation of two denominational states which would have to stand in a dualistic conflict with one another. The highest sovereign of the one is a foreign ecclesiastical prince who has his seat in Rome, a prince of the Church who through the newest changes in the constitution of the Catholic Church has become stronger than he was before. We would thus have, were this program realized, in place of the hitherto united Prussian state, in place of the realizable German Empire, two parallel bodies politic, running side by side. The one would have its general staff in the Center faction; the other would have its general staff in the principle of temporal power and in the government and person of His Majesty the Emperor. This situation was completely unacceptable to the government; it was a duty to protect the state against this danger. The government would have failed to recognize and would have neglected its duty if it had waited quietly while this amazing progress was being revealed by closer examination of the matter. Formerly there had been no occasion to make this examination. This progress was made by infringing upon the state's proper domain, and if the government on its side had quietly folded its hands in its lap, that same infringement would have continued. But

the government found it necessary to terminate the armistice which had been provided for by terms of the constitution of 1848 and to establish a new *modus vivendi* between the secular and the priestly powers. The state cannot permit the situation to endure without being driven to internal conflicts which would deeply affect its stability. The entire question lies in this: are these provisions in the sense in which His Majesty's government bears witness, dangerous to the state or are they not? If they are, you fulfill a conservative duty if you vote against their maintenance. If you regard them to be completely harmless, that would be a conviction which His Majesty's government does not share and it cannot with these constitutional provisions continue to carry on its affairs and meet its responsibilities. The government must then leave it to those who regard these provisions as not dangerous. In its struggle to protect the state, the government turns to the House of Lords with the appeal for support and aid in fortifying the state and for defense against attacks that undermine it and endanger its peace and future. We have confidence that the majority of the House of Lords will not fail us in this support.

(The Count von Landsberg-Velen protested against the expression: "The Center faction with its sovereign in Rome." This resulted in the following remarks by the minister.)

As a matter of fact, I wished to remark that as far as pertains to constitutional circumstances, there is of course no doubt that legally the Center faction also recognizes its sovereign in His Majesty the Emperor, but I wished to say by means of the expression (to which exception is taken) that actually the party follows another power and other influences. I can also recollect in this connection literature and data which issued from the different leaders of the party. Also I would like to remind you that in the suggestions of the program of the party which first came to Versailles—and I could name witnesses who partly accepted and partly declined this program—, there was mention of representing the Pope and of the interests of the Pope as sovereign in his church and in his country. However, I believe that this question will not lead us any further. We all know what the Center Party is. I believe that it would never place itself in a strong opposition to Rome, not even the new Protestant members who have joined it, although they never shrink from strong opposition to their legal and public sovereign. This indicates the conflicts which lie before us. The purpose of my address was really not to go so far into the past as I had to, in order to document my conviction that this problem concerns itself not with ecclesiastical but with political struggles, which under ecclesiastical cloaking have been made to appear in a false light. If one attributes an ecclesiastical character to these conflicts, it is done for the impression this creates in the na-

tion. The same was said, too, in the case of the school supervision law but experience has proved otherwise, and in the future you will continue to fail to produce evidence that the church was endangered by means of a higher degree of education for its officials.⁷

⁷ [This refers to the Falk laws which put under state control the education of the Catholic clergy.]

HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE

PROBABLY the most eloquent apologist of Prussian militarism was a non-Prussian civilian who as a boy had been disappointed by the liberal failure of 1848-49: Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-96), university professor and writer of history and political science. His development is an early example of the conversion of German intellectuals from the nebulous idealism of the Frankfurt Assembly to hard-boiled Bismarckian realism. The delegates to that assembly expressed the feelings of most political-minded Germans only in so far as they advocated national unification and moral leadership. Their liberalism, however, had little popular appeal and failed to shake the ingrained convictions of the real leading class in Prussia and elsewhere—the aristocracy of great landowners, officers, and bureaucrats. These men clung to the feudal tradition of associating the virtues of courage, honor, and nobility with the practice of war, and had little sympathy for the abstract ideologies of the unarmed “professors.” Events seemed to prove that they were right. The 1848-49 liberal revolution collapsed and Frederick William IV, Prussia’s conservative king, had to bow in 1850 to the apparently overwhelming might of Austria, supported by Russia, and was forced to restore the loose Confederation of 1815.

It was at this time that Treitschke, the son of a Saxon army officer whose forebears were Slavic, concluded that Austria’s opposition and the local interests of the petty German states precluded unification except by methods which Bismarck adopted later—blood and iron. First as a student, then as a teacher at the Universities of Freiburg and Heidelberg he advocated unity under Prussian military leadership. It is worth noting that Treitschke himself, like Goebbels—Hitler’s “intellectual” apologist—was physically disqualified from military service. Somewhat later most of Germany rallied around Bismarck when he defeated Denmark, Austria, and France with an army he had built up by unconstitutional means and against the opposition of Prussian liberals. The renunciation was made easier for the liberals by the fact that Bismarck then adopted for the whole of Germany an ostensibly liberal constitution with a Lower House elected by universal suffrage. But the chancellor of the unified Reich was responsible only to the Emperor—not to the House—and the Prussian Parliament, elected in a much less democratic way, continued to play an important part owing to the fact that Prussia was by far the largest state in Germany. Most of the “liberals” became “national liberals,” supporting the successful Iron Chancellor, and most of the German professors turned from philosophical idealism to the investigation of facts “as they actually are,” to quote the expression of another prominent historian, Von Ranke. Nevertheless, they continued to regard themselves, like Treitschke, as liberals and idealists in matters where national interests were not threatened.

Treitschke also drew inspiration from Savigny’s idea of the nation as a continuing entity—an element in time as well as space—and an institution in which

traditions and sentiment and honor were more vital than material things and money-bags. This idea received added support from Fichte and other romantic nationalists, from whom Treitschke also inherited his reverence for the greatness and uniqueness of German culture and his belief in a German historical mission.

With this characteristic blend of professed liberalism, of mystic State worship, and of frank, brutal acceptance of reality Treitschke struck many responsive chords in the common man. His prejudices made him no less popular in Germany than his insight into social behavior, and it was said of him that he expressed what other men felt but feared to say or were ashamed to admit. In later years his anti-Socialist views brought him still closer to the Conservatives, and his anti-Semitism placed him in the large group of intellectuals and clergymen who were rebuked for this attitude by Germany's greatest historian, Theodor Mommsen, and by Bismarck himself.

The succeeding generation, while deeply impressed by Treitschke's outlook, was not unaffected by the pacifist trends which seemed to prevail in Europe in the prosperous years of the early twentieth century. No nation had made such tremendous economic gains as Germany, in spite of the pessimistic prophecies of List and other romantic asserters of the right of an overcrowded people to expand. Emigration from Germany had come to a stand-still. The "softening" of the national temper, however, was denounced by the German ultranationalists, who were often roused to glaring enthusiasm by the intermittent warlike outbursts of Kaiser William II. A prominent spokesman of the reaction against "materialistic" pacifism was General Friedrich von Bernhardi. In a widely read book, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), he piled up quotations from earlier German writers, from Frederick the Great to Goethe, William von Humboldt and Treitschke himself, to show that war always had been regarded as noble and necessary. Schiller, for instance, had said that "Man is stunted by peaceful days—in idle repose his courage decays;—Law is the weakling's game." Moreover, Bernhardi employed, to prove his point, the Darwinian concepts of struggle for existence and survival of the fittest. "Desire for peace," Bernhardi said, "has rendered most civilized nations anaemic, and marks a decay of spirit and political courage. . . . Strong, healthy and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers . . . for the accommodation of their surplus population. . . . New territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors—that is to say, by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity. . . . Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision."

Treitschke never published his lectures on *Politics*, which were delivered at the University of Berlin, where he lectured from 1874-96. After his death they were compiled from his rough notes and the careful stenographic records of some of his students. They were printed in 1897. The following selections have been taken from a translation from the German by Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille, published by Constable and Company, London, 1916.



POLITICS

THE STATE IDEA

THE STATE is the people, legally united as an independent entity. By the word "people" we understand briefly a number of families permanently living side by side. This definition implies that the State is primordial and necessary, that it is as enduring as history, and no less essential to mankind than speech. . . .

The human race was once for all created with certain innate qualities amongst which speech and political genius must undoubtedly be counted. . . .

If, then, political capacity is innate in man, and is to be further developed, it is quite inaccurate to call the State a necessary evil. We have to deal with it as a lofty necessity of Nature. Even as the possibility of building up a civilization is dependent upon the limitation of our powers combined with the gift of reason, so also the State depends upon our inability to live alone. This Aristotle has already demonstrated. The State, says he, arose in order to make life possible; it endured to make good life possible.

This natural necessity of a constituted order is further displayed by the fact that the political institutions of a people, broadly speaking, appear to be the external forms which are the inevitable outcome of its inner life. Just as its language is not the product of caprice but the immediate expression of its most deep-rooted attitude towards the world, so also its political institutions regarded as a whole, and the whole spirit of its jurisprudence, are the symbols of its political genius and of the outside destinies which have helped to shape the gifts which Nature bestowed. . . .

We may say with certainty that the evolution of the State is, broadly speaking, nothing but the necessary outward form which the inner life of a people bestows upon itself, and that peoples attain to that form of government which their moral capacity enables them to reach. Nothing can be more inverted than the opinion that constitutional laws were artificially evolved in opposition to the conception of a Natural Law. Ultramontanes and Jacobins both start with the assumption that the legislation of a modern State is the work of sinful man. They thus display their total lack of reverence for the objectively revealed Will of God, as unfolded in the life of the State.

When we assert the evolution of the State to be something inherently necessary, we do not thereby deny the power of genius or of creative Will in history. For it is of the essence of political genius to be national. There has never

been an example of the contrary. The summit of historical fame was never attained by Wallenstein because he was never a national hero, but a Czech who played the German for the sake of expediency. He was, like Napoleon, a splendid Adventurer of history. The truly great maker of history always stands upon a national basis. This applies equally to men of letters. He only is a great writer who so writes that all his countrymen respond, "Thus it must be. Thus we all feel,"—who is in fact a microcosm of his nation.

If we have grasped that the State is the people legally constituted we thereby imply that it aims at establishing a permanent tradition throughout the Ages. A people does not only comprise the individuals living side by side, but also the successive generations of the same stock. This is one of the truths which Materialists dismiss as a mystical doctrine, and yet it is an obvious truth. Only the continuity of human history makes man a ζῶον πολιτικόν.¹ He alone stands upon the achievements of his forebears, and deliberately continues their work in order to transmit it more perfect to his children and children's children. Only a creature like man, needing aid and endowed with reason, can have a history; and it is one of the ineptitudes of the Materialists to speak of animal States. It is just a play upon words to talk of a bee State. Beasts merely reproduce unconsciously what has been from all time, and none but human beings can possess a form of government which is calculated to endure. There never was a form of Constitution without a law of inheritance. The rational basis for this is obvious, for by far the largest part of a nation's wealth was not created by the contemporary generation. The continuous legalized intention of the past, exemplified in the law of inheritance, must remain a factor in the distribution of property amongst posterity. In a nation's continuity with bygone generations lies the specific dignity of the State. It is consequently a contradiction to say that a distribution of property should be regulated by the deserts of the existing generation. Who would respect the banners of a State if the power of memory had fled? There are cases when the shadows of the past are invoked against the perverted will of the present, and prove more potent. Today in Alsace we appeal from the distorted opinions of the Francophobes to Geiler von Kaisersberg and expect to see his spirit revive again. No one who does not recognize the continued action of the past upon the present can ever understand the nature and necessity of War. Gibbon calls Patriotism "the living sense of my own interest in society"; but if we simply look upon the State as intended to secure life and property to the individual, how comes it that the individual will also sacrifice life and property to the State? It is a false conclusion that wars are waged for the sake of material advantage. Modern wars are not fought for the sake of booty. Here the high moral ideal of national honour is a factor

¹ [*Political animal.*]

handed down from one generation to another, enshrining something positively sacred, and compelling the individual to sacrifice himself to it. This ideal is above all price and cannot be reduced to pounds, shillings, and pence. Kant says, "Where a price can be paid, an equivalent can be substituted. It is he which is above price and which consequently admits of no equivalent, that possesses real value." Genuine patriotism is the consciousness of cooperating with the body-politic, of being rooted in ancestral achievements and of transmitting them to descendants. Fichte has finely said, "Individual man sees in his country the realisation of his earthly immortality."

This involves that the State has a personality, primarily in the juridical, and secondly in the politico-moral sense. Every man who is able to exercise his will in law has a legal personality. Now it is quite clear that the State possesses this deliberate will; nay more, that it has the juridical personality in the most complete sense. In State treaties it is the will of the State which is expressed, not the personal desires of the individuals who conclude them, and the treaty is binding as long as the contracting State exists. When a State is incapable of enforcing its will, or of maintaining law and order at home and prestige abroad, it becomes an anomaly and falls a prey either to anarchy or a foreign enemy. The State therefore must have the most emphatic will that can be imagined. . . .

Treat the State as a person, and the necessary and rational multiplicity of States follows. Just as in individual life the ego implies the existence of the non-ego, so it does in the State. The state is power, precisely in order to assert itself as against other equally independent powers. War and the administration of justice are the chief tasks of even the most barbaric States. But these tasks are only conceivable where a plurality of States are found existing side by side. Thus the idea of one universal empire is odious—the ideal of a State co-extensive with humanity is no ideal at all. In a single State the whole range of culture could never be fully spanned; no single people could unite the virtues of aristocracy and democracy. All nations, like all individuals, have their limitations, but it is exactly in the abundance of these limited qualities that the genius of humanity is exhibited. The rays of the Divine light are manifested, broken by countless facets among the separate peoples, each one exhibiting another picture and another idea of the whole. Every people has a right to believe that certain attributes of the Divine reason are exhibited in it to their fullest perfection. No people ever attains to national consciousness without overrating itself. The Germans are always in danger of enervating their nationality through possessing too little of this rugged pride. The average German has very little political pride; but even our Philistines generally revel in

the intellectual boast of the freedom and universality of the German spirit, and this is well, for such a sentiment is necessary if a people is to maintain and assert itself.

Since in so many nations the race becomes exhausted, and since various types of national culture exist side by side, single peoples can refresh themselves from the sources of other countries' intellectual vigour after a barren period of their own, as the Germans did from the French and English after the Thirty Years' War. The daily life of nations is founded upon mutual give and take, and since Christianity has brought this fact to universal recognition we may lay down that modern civilizations will not perish in the same sense as those of the ancient world, which lacked this knowledge. But it is no mere kindly interchange which takes place; the supreme need is to preserve what has been won. Historical greatness depends less on the first discovery or invention than on forming and keeping. The terrible saying, *Sic vos non vobis*,² is once more vindicated. How tragic is the fate of Spain, which discovered the New World and to-day can show no trophy of that mighty civilizing achievement. Her one remaining advantage is that Spanish is still the language of millions beyond the seas. Other nations advanced and snatched from the Iberian races the fruits of their labour, first the Dutch and then the English. The features of history are virile, unsuited to sentimental or feminine natures. Brave peoples alone have an existence, an evolution or a future; the weak and cowardly perish, and perish justly. The grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations, and it is simply foolish to desire the suppression of their rivalry. Mankind has ever found it to be so. . . .

Further, if we examine our definition of the State as "the people legally united as an independent entity," we find that it can be more briefly put thus: "The State is the public force for Offence and Defence." It is, above all, Power which makes its will to prevail, it is not the totality of the people as Hegel assumes in his deification of it. The nation is not entirely comprised in the State, but the State protects and embraces the people's life, regulating its external aspects on every side. It does not ask primarily for opinion, but demands obedience, and its laws must be obeyed, whether willingly or no.

A step forward has been taken when the mute obedience of the citizens is transformed into a rational inward assent, but it cannot be said that this is absolutely necessary. Powerful, highly-developed Empires have stood for centuries without its aid. Submission is what the State primarily requires; it insists upon acquiescence; its very essence is the accomplishment of its will. . . . A State which can no longer carry out its purpose collapses in anarchy. . . .

The State is not an Academy of Arts. If it neglects its strength in order to promote the idealistic aspirations of man, it repudiates its own nature and

² [Roughly, *What you do is not done for yourself*.]

perishes. This is in truth for the State equivalent to the sin against the Holy Ghost, for it is indeed a mortal error in the State to subordinate itself for sentimental reasons to a foreign Power, as we Germans have often done to England. . . .

We have described the State as an independent force. This pregnant theory of independence implies firstly so absolute a moral supremacy that the State cannot legitimately tolerate any power above its own, and secondly a temporal freedom entailing a variety of material resources adequate to its protection against hostile influences. Legal sovereignty, the State's complete independence of any other earthly power, is so rooted in its nature that it may be said to be its very standard and criterion. . . .

Human communities do exist which in their own fashion pursue aims no less lofty than those of the State, but which must be legally subject to it in their outward relations with the world. It is obvious that contradictions must arise, and that two such authorities, morally but not legally equal, must sometimes collide with each other. Nor is it to be wished that the conflicts between Church and State should wholly cease, for if they did one party or the other would be soulless and dead, like the Russian Church for example. Sovereignty, however, which is the peculiar attribute of the State, is of necessity supreme, and it is a ridiculous inconsistency to speak of a superior and inferior authority within it. The truth remains that the essence of the State consists in its incompatibility with any power over it. How proudly and truly statesmanlike is Gustavus Adolphus' exclamation, "I recognize no power over me but God and the conqueror's sword." This is so unconditionally true that we see at once that it cannot be the destiny of mankind to form a single State, but that the ideal towards which we strive is a harmonious comity of nations, who, concluding treaties of their own free will, admit restrictions upon their sovereignty without abrogating it.

For the notion of sovereignty must not be rigid, but flexible and relative, like all political conceptions. Every State, in treaty making, will limit its power in certain directions for its own sake. States which conclude treaties with each other thereby curtail their absolute authority to some extent. But the rule still stands, for every treaty is a voluntary curb upon the power of each, and all international agreements are prefaced by the clause "*Rebus sic stantibus*." No State can pledge its future to another. It knows no arbiter, and draws up all its treaties with this implied reservation. This is supported by the axiom that so long as international law exists all treaties lose their force at the very moment when war is declared between the contracting parties; moreover, every sovereign State has the undoubted right to declare war at its pleasure, and is consequently entitled to repudiate its treaties. Upon this constantly recurring

alteration of treaties the progress of history depends; every State must take care that its treaties do not survive their effective value, lest another Power should denounce them by a declaration of war; for antiquated treaties must necessarily be denounced and replaced by others more consonant with circumstances.

It is clear that the international agreements which limit the power of a State are not absolute, but voluntary self-restrictions. Hence, it follows that the establishment of a permanent international Arbitration Court is incompatible with the nature of the State, which could at all events only accept the decision of such a tribunal in cases of second- or third-rate importance. When a nation's existence is at stake there is no outside Power whose impartiality can be trusted. Were we to commit the folly of treating the Alsace-Lorraine problem as an open question, by submitting it to arbitration, who would seriously believe that the award could be impartial? It is, moreover, a point of honour for a State to solve such difficulties for itself. International treaties may indeed become more frequent, but a finally decisive tribunal of the nations is an impossibility. The appeal to arms will be valid until the end of history, and therein lies the sacredness of war.

However flexible the conception of Sovereignty may be we are not to infer from that any self-contradiction, but rather a necessity to establish in what its pith and kernel consists. Legally it lies in the competence to define the limits of its own authority, and politically in the appeal to arms. An unarmed State, incapable of drawing the sword when it sees fit, is subject to one which wields the power of declaring war. To speak of a military suzerainty in time of peace obviously implies a *contradictio in adjecto*.³ A defenceless State may still be termed a Kingdom for conventional or courtly reasons, but science, whose first duty is accuracy, must boldly declare that in point of fact such a country no longer takes rank as a State.

This, then, is the only real criterion. The right of arms distinguishes the State from all other forms of corporate life, and those who cannot take up arms for themselves may not be regarded as States, but only as members of a federated constellation of States. The difference between the Prussian Monarchy and the other German States is here apparent, namely, that the King of Prussia himself wields the supreme command, and therefore Prussia, unlike the others, has not lost its sovereignty.

The other test of sovereignty is the right to determine independently the limits of its power, and herein lies the difference between a federation of States and a Federal State. In the latter the central power is sovereign and can extend its competence according to its judgment, whereas in the former, every individual State is sovereign. The various subordinate countries of Germany

³ [*Contradiction in terms.*]

are not genuine States; they must at any moment be prepared to see a right, which they possess at present, withdrawn by virtue of Imperial authority. Since Prussia alone has enough votes on the Federal Council to be in a position to prevent an alteration of the Constitution by its veto, it becomes evident that she cannot be outvoted on such decisive questions. She is therefore, in this second respect also, the only truly sovereign State which remains.

In such matters one must not be guided by historians, but by statesmen. When Bismarck once pointed out to the Emperor William I. that the consent of the Empire would not be forthcoming for a certain political step, the latter exclaimed irritably, "Rubbish! The Empire is after all only an extension of Prussia." This was certainly a crudely military point of view, but it was correct. As history knows of no case in which the conqueror has not strengthened his own organization, so it has come to pass by means of treaties that the might of Prussia has been indirectly extended over the whole Empire; and under these conditions we have prospered, for even the Kings of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Saxony have not lost but rather increased their effective influence through the creation of the German Empire. They have had to abandon a military power which only existed upon paper, and which 1866 had proved to be illusory, but they have gained a channel, through the formation of the Federal Council, by which they can exercise an influence on the collective will of the Empire at large. This influence is so considerable that the actual power of these rulers is at present greater than formerly, since it depends on realities rather than on titles.

Over and above these two essential factors of the State's sovereignty there belongs to the nature of its independence what Aristotle called "*αὐτάρκεια*," *i.e.* the capacity to be self-sufficing. This involves firstly that it should consist of a large enough number of families to secure the continuance of the race, and secondly, a certain geographical area. A ship an inch long, as Aristotle truly observes, is not a ship at all, because it is impossible to row it. Again, the State must possess such material resources as put it in a position to vindicate its theoretic independence by force of arms. Here everything depends upon the form of the community to which the State in question belongs. One cannot reckon its quality by its mileage, it must be judged by its proportionate strength compared with other States. The City State of Athens was not a petty State, but stood in the first rank in the hierarchy of nations of antiquity; the same is true of Sparta, and of Florence and Milan in the Middle Ages. But any political community not in a position to assert its native strength as against any given group of neighbours will always be on the verge of losing its characteristics as a State. This has always been the case. Great changes in the art of war have destroyed numberless States. It is because an army of 20,000 men can only be reckoned

to-day as a weak army corps that the small States of Central Europe cannot maintain themselves in the long run.

There are, indeed, States which do not assert themselves positively by virtue of their own strength, but negatively through the exigencies of the balance of power in Europe. Switzerland, Holland, and Belgium are cases in point. They are sustained by the international situation, a foundation which is, however, extremely solid, and so long as the present grouping of the Powers continues Switzerland may look forward to prolonged existence.

If we apply the test of *αὐτάρκεια* we perceive that, as Europe is now constituted, the larger States are constantly gaining influence in proportion as our international system assumes a more and more aristocratic complexion. The time is not yet very distant when the adhesion or withdrawal of such States as Piedmont and Savoy could actually decide the fate of a coalition. To-day such a thing would be impossible. Since the Seven Years' War the domination of the five great Powers has been necessarily evolved. The big European questions are decided within this circle. Italy is on the verge of being admitted into it, but neither Belgium, Sweden, nor Switzerland have a voice unless their interests are directly concerned.

The entire development of European polity tends unmistakably to drive the second-rate Powers into the background, and this raises issues of immeasurable gravity for the German nation, in the world outside Europe. Up to the present Germany has always had too small a share of the spoils in the partition of non-European territories among the Powers of Europe, and yet our existence as a State of the first rank is vitally affected by the question whether we can become a power beyond the seas. If not, there remains the appalling prospect of England and Russia dividing the world between them, and in such a case it is hard to say whether the Russian knout or the English money bags would be the worst alternative.

On close examination then, it becomes clear that if the State is power, only that State which has power realizes its own idea, and this accounts for the undeniably ridiculous element which we discern in the existence of a small State. Weakness is not itself ridiculous, except when masquerading as strength. In small States that puling spirit is hatched, which judges the State by the taxes it levies, and does not perceive that if the State may not enclose and repress like an egg-shell, neither can it protect. Such thinkers fail to understand that the moral benefits for which we are indebted to the State are above all price. It is by generating this form of materialism that small States have so deleterious an effect upon their citizens.

Moreover, they are totally lacking in that capacity for justice which characterises their greater neighbours. Any person who has plenty of relations and is

not a perfect fool is soon provided for in a small country, while in a large one, although justice tends to become stereotyped, it is not possible to be so much influenced by personal and local circumstances as in the narrower sphere. French centralization is an alarming example. The incurable nuisance of our examinations is unluckily of Prussian origin, for a country with hundreds of *Gymnasien*⁴ cannot give a free hand to the teachers, and with our uncontrolled freedom of domicile and frequent change of employees it will be hard to find a better method of selection for the mass of Government posts which have to be filled than that afforded by the routine of examinations, which have verily become the curse of Germany. Red tape is an inevitable evil in the administration of big States, but it may be sensibly diminished by the increased autonomy of Provinces and Communes.

Everything considered, therefore, we reach the conclusion that the large State is the nobler type. This is more especially true of its fundamental functions such as wielding the sword in defence of the hearth and of justice. Both are better protected by a large State than a small one. The latter cannot wage war with any prospect of success. There is, however, nothing mechanical in the administration of justice, it must be constantly modified by the daily practice of the Courts, which is nourished by experience of life as well as by the science of law, and it is only when the practical experience of numberless Law Courts is continuously accumulating that the administration of Justice can be really effective. There neither is nor ever can be a Swiss jurisprudence; French, German, Italian law exists in Switzerland, but a national code can never be evolved; Swiss jurists continue to develop our German law.

The economic superiority of big countries is patent. A splendid security springs from the mere largeness of their scale. They can overcome economic crises far more easily. Famine, for instance, can hardly attack every part of them at once, and only in them can that truly national pride arise which is a sign of the moral stamina of a people. Their citizens' outlook upon the world will be freer and greater. The command of the sea more especially promotes it. The poet's saying is true indeed that "wide horizons liberate the mind." The time may come when no State will be counted great unless it can boast of territories beyond the seas.

Another essential for the State is a capital city to form a pivot for its culture. No great nation can endure for long without a centre in which its political, intellectual, and material life is concentrated, and its people can feel themselves united. London, Paris, Rome, Madrid, Stockholm, Copenhagen are the towns where the political life of the respective countries has culminated. Such capitals are necessary, their sins and their crimes notwithstanding, but it was not until the nineteenth century that we Germans possessed such a city.

⁴ [Roughly, *high school*.]

Examining closely, we find that culture in general, and in the widest sense of the word, matures more happily in the broader conditions of powerful countries than within the narrow limits of a little State. . . .

We come now to consider the last point which arises out of our definition of the State as the people legally united as an independent entity. . . .

It is a fundamental rule of human nature that the largest portion of the energy of the human race must be consumed in supplying the primary necessities of existence. The chief aim of a savage's life is to make that life secure, and mankind is by nature so frail and needy that the immense majority of men, even on the higher levels of culture, must always and everywhere devote themselves to bread-winning and the material cares of life. To put it simply: the masses must for ever remain the masses. There would be no culture without kitchenmaids.

Obviously education could never thrive if there was nobody to do the rough work. Millions must plough and forge and dig in order that a few thousands may write and paint and study.

It sounds harsh, but it is true for all time, and whining and complaining can never alter it. . . .

It is precisely in the differentiation of classes that the moral wealth of mankind is exhibited. The virtues of wealth stand side by side with those of poverty, with which we neither could nor should dispense, and which by their vigour and sincerity put to shame the jaded victim of over-culture. There is a hearty joy in living which can only flourish under simple conditions of life. Herein we find a remarkable equalization of the apparently cruel classifications of society. Want is a relative conception. It is the task of government to reduce and mitigate distress, but its abolition is neither possible nor desirable. The economy of Nature has here set definite limits upon human endeavour, and on the other hand man's pleasure in life is so overwhelming that a healthy race will increase and spread wherever there is space for them. . . .

From all this a result emerges which closer examination will verify: that there is in fact no actual entity corresponding to the abstract conception of civil society which exists in the brain of the student. Where do we find its concrete embodiment? Nowhere. Any one can see for himself that society, unlike the State, is intangible. We know the State is a unit, and not as a mythical personality. Society, however, has no single will, and we have no duties to fulfil towards it. In all my life I have never once thought of my moral obligations towards society, but I think constantly of my countrymen, whom I seek to honour as much as I can. Therefore, when a savant like Jhering talks of the ethical aim which society is supposed to have set itself, he falls into a logical error. Society is composed of all manner of warring interests, which

if left to themselves would soon lead to a *bellum omnium contra omnes*,⁵ for its natural tendency is towards conflict, and no suggestion of any aspiration after unity is to be found in it. . . .

When we draw our conclusions from all the foregoing we shall not follow Hegel in pronouncing the State to be absolutely the people's life.

In the State he saw the moral idea realized, which is able to accomplish whatever it may desire. Now the State, as we have seen, is not the whole of a nation's life, for its function is only to surround the whole, regulating and protecting it. When the Hegelian Philosophy was at its zenith, a number of gifted men tried to make out that the State, like the Leviathan, should swallow up everything. The modern man will not find this idea easy to accept. No Christian could live for the State alone, because he must cling fast to his destiny in eternity. Out of this arises a youthful error of Richard Rothe's, when, in his work on the history of the Christian Church, he develops the idea that if the State would in the future take over the Church's civilizing duties, the two might amalgamate. This can never be, nor can any one seriously wish it. The State can only work by an outward compulsion: it is only the people as a force; but in saying this we express an endlessly wide and great ideal, for the State is not only the arena for the great primitive forces of human nature, it is also the framework of all national life. In short, a people which is not in a position to create and maintain under the wing of the State an external organization of its own intellectual existence deserves to perish. The Jewish race affords the most tragic example of a richly gifted nation, who were incapable of defending their State, and are now scattered to the ends of the earth. Their life is crippled, for no man can belong to two nations at once. The State, therefore, is not only a high moral good in itself, but is also the assurance for the people's endurance. Only through it can their moral development be perfected, for the living sense of citizenship inspires the community in the same way as a sense of duty inspires the individual. . . .

THE AIM OF THE STATE

Theoretically, therefore, no limit can be set to the functions of a State. It will attempt to dominate the outer life of its members as far as it is able to do so. A more fruitful subject for speculation will be to fix the theoretic minimum for its activity, and decide what functions it must at the least fulfil before it can be given the name of State. When we have set this minimum we shall come to the further question of how far beyond it the State may reasonably extend its action. We then see at once that since its first duty, as we have already said, is the double one of maintaining power without, and law within, its primary obligations must be the care of its Army and its Jurisprudence, in order to

⁵ [*War of all against all.*]

protect and to restrain the community of its citizens. The fulfilment of these two functions is attained by certain material means; therefore some form of fiscal system must exist, even in the most primitive of States, in order to provide these means.

No State can endure which can no longer fulfil these elementary duties. It is only in abnormal circumstances that we find any exception to this rule, as when an artificial balance of power protects the smaller States which can no longer protect themselves.

The functions of the State in maintaining its own internal administration of justice are manifold. It must firstly, in civil law, place the prescribed limit upon the individual will. It will nevertheless proportionately restrict its own activity in this sphere, since no individual is compelled to exercise his own legal rights. Here the State will issue no direct commands, but merely act as mediator, leaving the carrying out of its decrees to the free will of the contracting parties. . . .

The next essential function of the State is the conduct of war. The long oblivion into which this principle had fallen is a proof of how effeminate the science of government had become in civilian hands. In our century this sentimentality was dissipated by Clausewitz, but a one-sided materialism arose in its place, after the fashion of the Manchester school, seeing in man a biped creature, whose destiny lies in buying cheap and selling dear. It is obvious that this idea is not compatible with war, and it is only since the last war that a sounder theory arose of the State and its military power.

Without war no State could be. All those we know of arose through war, and the protection of their members by armed force remains their primary and essential task. War, therefore, will endure to the end of history, as long as there is multiplicity of States. The laws of human thought and of human nature forbid any alternative, neither is one to be wished for. The blind worshipper of an eternal peace falls into the error of isolating the State, or dreams of one which is universal, which we have already seen to be at variance with reason.

Even as it is impossible to conceive of a tribunal above the State, which we have recognized as sovereign in its very essence, so it is likewise impossible to banish the idea of war from the world. It is a favourite fashion of our time to instance England as particularly ready for peace. But England is perpetually at war; there is hardly an instant in her recent history in which she has not been obliged to be fighting somewhere. The great strides which civilization makes against barbarism and unreason are only made actual by the sword. Between civilized nations also war is the form of litigation by which States make their claims valid. The arguments brought forward in these terrible law suits

of the nations compel as no argument in civil suits can ever do. Often as we have tried by theory to convince the small States that Prussia alone can be the leader in Germany, we had to produce the final proof upon the battlefields of Bohemia and the Main.

Moreover, war is a uniting as well as a dividing element among nations; it does not draw them together in enmity only, for through its means they learn to know and to respect each other's peculiar qualities.

It is important not to look upon war always as a judgment from God. Its consequences are evanescent; but the life of a nation is reckoned by centuries, and the final verdict can only be pronounced after the survey of whole epochs.

Such a State as Prussia might indeed be brought near to destruction by a passing phase of degeneracy; but being by the character of its people more reasonable and more free than the French, it retained the power to call up the moral force within itself, and so to regain its ascendancy. Most undoubtedly war is the one remedy for an ailing nation. Social selfishness and party hatreds must be dumb before the call of the State when its existence is at stake. Forgetting himself, the individual must only remember that he is a part of the whole, and realize the unimportance of his own life compared with the common weal.

The grandeur of war lies in the utter annihilation of puny man in the great conception of the State, and it brings out the full magnificence of the sacrifice of fellow-countrymen for one another. In war the chaff is winnowed from the wheat. Those who have lived through 1870 cannot fail to understand Niebuhr's description of his feelings in 1813, when he speaks of how no one who has entered into the joy of being bound by a common tie to all his compatriots, gentle and simple alike, can ever forget how he was uplifted by the love, the friendliness, and the strength of that mutual sentiment.

It is war which fosters the political idealism which the materialist rejects. What a disaster for civilization it would be if mankind blotted its heroes from memory. The heroes of a nation are the figures which rejoice and inspire the spirit of its youth, and the writers whose words ring like trumpet blasts become the idols of our boyhood and our early manhood. He who feels no answering thrill is unworthy to bear arms for his country. To appeal from this judgment to Christianity would be sheer perversity, for does not the Bible distinctly say that the ruler shall rule by the sword, and again that greater love hath no man than to lay down his life for his friend? To Aryan races, who are before all things courageous, the foolish preaching of everlasting peace has always been vain. They have always been men enough to maintain with the sword what they have attained through the spirit.

Goethe once said that the North Germans were always more civilized than

the South Germans. No doubt they were, and a glance at the history of the Princes of Lower Saxony shows that they were for ever either attacking or defending themselves. One-sided as Goethe's verdict is, it contains a core of truth. Our ancient Empire was great under the Saxons; under the Swabian and the Salic Emperors it declined. Heroism, bodily strength, and chivalrous spirit is essential to the character of a noble people.

Such matters must not be examined only by the light of the student's lamp. The historian who moves in the world of the real Will sees at once that the demand for eternal peace is purely reactionary. He sees that all movement and all growth would disappear with war, and that only the exhausted, spiritless, degenerate periods of history have toyed with the idea.

There are then no two opinions about the duty of the State to maintain its own laws and protect its own people. For this purpose every State must have an Exchequer. The machinery of the law, the upkeep of the army, and some system of finance are their first duties. Up to this point no argument need be entertained, for it is of no importance to science whether a truth be accepted quietly, or with wailing and gnashing of teeth. The dispute concerning the aims and business of the State only begins over the question of its ability and vocation to assume other duties towards the human race. No such question was admitted into the political conceptions of classical antiquity, for where the citizen is nothing but a member of the State the idea of its undue interference with his concerns does not arise. It never occurred to Aristotle to inquire whether the State was exceeding its prerogative when it appointed an official to superintend feminine morality. It acted within its rights, and he did not consider whether in so doing it did damage to family life. In the same way it did not strike the Ancients as possible that the State could legislate too much. The words of Tacitus, *in pessima republica plurimæ leges*,⁶ which are so often and so willingly quoted in this context, simply mean that when the morals of a State are bad it may seek in vain to remedy the evil by a multitude of laws.

The modern theory of individualism, decked with its various titles, stands as the poles asunder from these conceptions of antiquity. From it the doctrine emanates that the State should content itself with protection of life and property, and with wings thus clipped be pompously dubbed a Constitutional State.

This teaching is the legitimate child of the old doctrine of Natural Law. According to it the State can only exist as a means for the individual's ends. The more ideal the view adopted of human life, the more certain does it seem that the State should content itself with the purely exterior protective functions. . . . But when we probe this theory which has cast its spell over so many distinguished men, we find that it has totally overlooked the continuity of history, and the bond which unites the succeeding generations. The State, as

⁶ [*The worst state has the most laws.*]

we have seen, is enduring; humanly speaking, it is eternal. Its work therefore is to prepare the foundations for the future. If it existed only to protect the life and goods of its citizens it would not dare to go to war, for wars are waged for the sake of honour, and not for protection of property. They cannot therefore be explained by the empty theory which makes the State no more than an Insurance Society. Honour is a moral postulate, not a juridical conception.

GIUSEPPE MAZZINI

GIUSEPPE MAZZINI (1805-72) towers above other spokesmen of liberal nationalism on account of his conception of Italy's struggle for independence and freedom as a step towards the organization of an international brotherhood of free and sovereign peoples. As a practical politician he shared to a considerable extent the generous shortcomings of the German intellectuals who drafted the Frankfurt Constitution—chiefly a tendency to overestimate the power of metaphysical ideals and to underestimate the obstacles of the present. His errors were mainly those of a prophet, and the impact of his ideas cannot be measured by his failure. In fact, it is not quite exact to speak of failure. His dreams were probably too lofty to attract the masses on whom he pinned his greatest hopes; Italy was too weak to win freedom exclusively by her own efforts (as he advocated) and could not possibly be burdened with the gigantic task of leading the entire world in the sweeping process of material and spiritual regeneration he forecast. Nevertheless, his impassioned propaganda for the liberty and unity of Italy was the greatest factor that awakened the Italian upper and middle class to the necessity of national insurrection and pointed out to international public opinion the impossibility of maintaining the peninsula under the sway of Austria and of seven local despots. His vision of a world federation of free nations was a century ahead of the times, but it was the fountainhead from which sprang the twin streams represented in Woodrow Wilson's espousal of the causes of national self-determination and of a League of Nations.

Mazzini's republicanism was rooted in the traditions of his native city, Genoa—a republic from the eleventh century to the age of Napoleon. But that republic had been oligarchic and regional. Mazzini's program, as defined by him, stressed the need for popular equality and for unity as a means of achieving independence, much in the same way as Machiavelli's last chapter of the *Prince*. "Young Italy," he said, "is republican and unitarian, republican because all the men of a nation are required by the laws of God and Humanity to be freemen, equals, and brothers, and the institution of the republic is the only one that can assure this result; unitarian because without unity there is no strength, and Italy, surrounded by powerful and jealous unitarian nations, must needs before all things be strong . . . Young Italy is the brotherhood of Italians believing in a law of Progress and Duty." Even as ancient Republican Rome had exercised a moral leadership by stating and spreading throughout the world Roman Law, and as Catholic Rome had been the center of diffusion of the Christian ideals, the Third Rome was to have a universal function as the initiator and propagandist of the idea which Mazzini summed up in four words: "God and the People."

Young Italy was a secret association, founded by Mazzini in 1831 after the Savoy kings forced him into exile on account of his connection with the *Carbonari* (charcoal burners), an underground revolutionary movement composed mainly of officers and noblemen. *Young Italy* largely displaced all the older ones, including the *Carbonari*, who were too aristocratic and lacked a precise program and

national coordination. It was the leading force behind the numerous local insurrections which broke out in the following years but were repressed by the absolute governments. It inspired the more popular and sweeping current in the great 1848-49 upheaval, while King Charles Albert of Savoy, Mazzini's unreconciled enemy, took the lead of the moderate liberals. The king was beaten by the Austrians and abdicated. Mazzini was called to head the newly established Republic of Rome, whence the Pope had fled after a short period of half-hearted collaboration with the moderate liberals. French, Austrian and Spanish troops at once attacked the Republic, which resisted gallantly from April 25 to July 4, 1849. Its fall could not be imputed to Mazzini, who had made the best of a hopeless situation, governing with moderation and wisdom. But the collapse of both Mazzini's and Charles Albert's attempts at liberating Italy "by her own efforts" proved that a foreign ally was needed to oust Austria. The diplomatic skill of Cavour secured for the Savoy monarchy that ally in the person of Napoleon III, who as President of the French Republic had sent the troops which had destroyed Mazzini's Roman Republic in 1849. Cavour's honesty won over not only the moderate liberals, but also many of Mazzini's own followers, including Garibaldi. Thus Italy was unified by Victor Emmanuel II, the son of Charles Albert.

Mazzini was willing to support the Savoy monarchs in any struggle for the unification of Italy, but he insisted that only a Constituent Assembly could ultimately decide in the name of the People whether Italy should be a monarchy or a republic. Therefore he could return to his now unified fatherland only by taking shelter under an assumed name in the house of his friend Rosselli. Some sixty years after his death two descendants of his last host, Carlo and Nello Rosselli, were murdered in France by Fascist emissaries. The Mazzinian Republican party played a distinguished role in the struggle against Mussolini and in the Spanish Civil War, but it never had a popular following comparable to that of the Socialist and Communist parties.

The effectiveness of Mazzini as the prophet of liberal nationalism rested upon his synthesizing of many liberal and romantic notions of his day. He championed radical egalitarianism. Opposed to Marxism because of its inheritance of materialism from classical economics, he nevertheless believed in the establishment of a republic founded upon a distribution of rewards in proportion to work done and without class distinctions. Like Condorcet, he believed in the perfectibility of mankind and regarded the achievement of democracy as part of the divine plan. With many romantics he emphasized the duties and destinies inspired by history, but appealed to the dictates of conscience to justify these duties. Influenced by the Saint-Simonians, he felt that the need of the times for a revival of religious attitudes could be met by a new theology combining spiritual and practical powers, and he believed that mankind stood at the threshold of a new "social epoch." In reaction against the individualism of the Enlightenment he set down the principle that the individual could function only through associations such as the nation: in reaction against the philosophy of natural rights he emphasized the duties of man grounded upon a theistic faith. Mazzini, like Cobden and Bright, subscribed to the view that the nation is not an isolated end in itself, but that each nation has its own peculiar contribution to offer toward the general wealth of nations. However, he took this faith out of the realm of free-trade economics and placed

it in a broader cultural setting. The nation was for Mazzini the exclusive instrument for making the coöperation of individuals possible, and with Herder and Hegel he emphasized the peculiar value in the uniqueness of each national tradition. Mazzini still remains the symbol of this kind of internationalism.

The selection that follows is from Mazzini's best known and representative work, *The Duties of Man*. The first four chapters appeared in 1844 in the *Apostolato Popolare*, a journal published by Mazzini for Italians resident in England. The remainder, containing the chapter on "Duties Towards Your Country," appeared in 1858 in the *Pensiero ed Azione*. The chapter that follows is a typical statement of the theory of liberal nationalism.



DUTIES TOWARDS YOUR COUNTRY

YOUR FIRST DUTIES—first as regards importance—are . . . towards Humanity. You are *men* before you are either citizens or fathers. If you do not embrace the whole human family in your affection, if you do not bear witness to your belief in the Unity of that family—consequent upon the Unity of God;—and in that fraternity among the peoples which is destined to reduce that Unity to action; if, wheresoever a fellow-creature suffers, or the dignity of human nature is violated by falsehood or tyranny—you are not ready, if able, to aid the unhappy, and do not feel called upon to combat, if able, for the redemption of the betrayed or oppressed—you violate your Law of life, you comprehend not that Religion which will be the guide and blessing of the future.

But what can each of you, singly, *do* for the moral improvement and progress of Humanity? You can from time to time give sterile utterance to your belief; you may, on some rare occasions, perform some act of *charity* towards a brother man not belonging to your own land;—no more. But charity is not the watchword of the Faith of the future. The watchword of the Faith of the future is *association* and fraternal co-operation of all towards a common aim, and this is as far superior to all charity, as the edifice which all of you should unite to raise would be superior to the humble hut each one of you might build alone or with the mere assistance of lending and borrowing stone, mortar, and tools.

But, you tell me, you cannot attempt united action, distinct and divided as you are in language, customs, tendencies, and capacity. The individual is too insignificant, and Humanity too vast. The mariner of Brittany prays to God as he puts to sea: *Help me, my God! my boat is so small and Thy ocean so wide!* And this prayer is the true expression of the condition of each one of you, until you find the means of infinitely multiplying your forces and powers of action.

This means was provided for you by God when he gave you a country; when, even as a wise overseer of labour distributes the various branches of employment according to the different capacities of the workmen, he divided Humanity into distinct groups or nuclei upon the face of the earth, thus creating the germ of Nationalities. Evil governments have disfigured the Divine design. Nevertheless you may still trace it, distinctly marked out—at least as far as Europe is concerned—by the course of the great rivers, the direction of the higher mountains, and other geographical conditions. They have disfigured it by their conquests, their greed, and their jealousy even of the righteous power of others; disfigured it so far that, if we except England and France—there is not perhaps a single country whose present boundaries correspond to that Design.

These governments did not, and do not, recognise any country save their own families or dynasty, the egotism of caste. But the Divine design will infallibly be realised. Natural divisions, and the spontaneous innate tendencies of the peoples, will take the place of the arbitrary divisions sanctioned by evil governments. The map of Europe will be re-drawn. The countries of the Peoples, defined by the vote of free men, will arise upon the ruins of the countries of kings and privileged castes, and between these countries harmony and fraternity will exist. And the common work of Humanity, of great amelioration, and the gradual discovery and application of its law of life, being distributed according to local and general capacities, will be wrought out in peaceful and progressive development and advance.

Then may each one of you, fortified by the power and the affection of many millions, all speaking the same language, gifted with the same tendencies, and educated by the same historical tradition, hope even by your own single effort to be able to benefit all Humanity.

O my brothers, love your Country! Our country is our Home, the House that God has given us, placing therein a numerous family that loves us, and whom we love; a family with whom we sympathize more readily, and whom we understand more quickly, than we do others; and which, from its being centred round a given spot, and from the homogeneous nature of its elements, is adapted to a special branch of activity.

Our Country is our common workshop, whence the products of our activity are sent forth for the benefit of the whole world; wherein the tools and implements of labour we can most usefully employ are gathered together; nor may we reject them without disobeying the play of the Almighty, and diminishing our own strength.

In labouring for our own country on the right principle, we labour for Humanity. Our country is the fulcrum of the lever we have to wield for the

common good. In abandoning that fulcrum, we run the risk of rendering ourselves useless not only to humanity but to our country itself.

Before men can *associate* with the nations of which humanity is composed, they must have a National existence. There is no true association except among equals. It is only through our country that we can have a recognized *collective* existence.

Humanity is a vast army advancing to the conquest of lands unknown, against enemies both powerful and astute. The peoples are the different corps, the divisions of that army. Each of them has its post assigned to it, and its special operation to execute; and the common victory depends upon the exactitude with which those distinct operations shall be fulfilled. Disturb not the order of battle. Forsake not the banner given to you by God. Wheresoever you may be, in the centre of whatsoever people circumstances may have placed you, be ever ready to combat for the liberty of that people should it be necessary, but combat in such wise that the blood you shed may reflect glory, not on yourselves alone, but on your country. Say not *I*, but *we*. Let each man among you strive to incarnate his country in himself. Let each man among you regard himself as a guarantee, responsible for his fellow-countrymen, and learn so to govern his actions as to cause his country to be loved and respected through him.

Your country is the sign of the mission God has given you to fulfil towards humanity. The faculties and forces of *all* her sons should be associated in the accomplishment of that mission.

The true country is a community of free men and equals, bound together in fraternal concord to labour towards a common aim. You are bound to make it and to maintain it such.

The country is not an *aggregation*, but an *association*.

There is therefore no true country without an uniform Right. There is no true country where the uniformity of that Right is violated by the existence of castes, privilege, and inequality.

Where the activity of a portion of the powers and faculties of the individual is either cancelled or dormant; where there is not a common Principle, recognised, accepted, and developed by all, there is no true Nation, no People; but only a multitude, a fortuitous agglomeration of men whom circumstances have called together, and whom circumstances may again divide.

In the name of the love you bear your country you must peacefully but untiringly combat the existence of privilege and inequality in the land that gave you life.

There is but one sole legitimate privilege, the privilege of Genius when it reveals itself united with virtue. But this is a privilege given by God, and

when you acknowledge it and follow its inspiration, you do so freely, exercising your own reason and your own choice.

Every privilege which demands submission from you in virtue of power, inheritance, or any other right than the Right common to all, is an usurpation and a tyranny which you are bound to resist and destroy.

Be your country your Temple. God at the summit; a people of equals at the base.

Accept no other formula, no other moral law, if you would not dishonour alike your country and yourselves. Let all secondary laws be but the gradual regulation of your existence by the progressive application of this supreme law.

And in order that they may be such, it is necessary that *all* of you should aid in framing them. Laws framed only by a single fraction of the citizens, can never, in the very nature of things, be other than the mere expression of the thoughts, aspirations, and desires of that fraction; the representation, not of the Country, but of a third or fourth part, of a class or zone of the Country.

The laws should be the expression of the *universal* aspiration, and promote the universal good. They should be a pulsation of the heart of the Nation. The entire Nation should, either directly or indirectly, legislate.

By yielding up this mission into the hands of a few, you substitute the egotism of one class for the Country, which is the Union of all classes.

Country is not a mere zone of territory. The true Country is the Idea to which it gives birth; it is the Thought of love, the sense of communion which unites in one all the sons of that territory.

So long as a single one amongst your brothers has no vote to represent him in the development of the National life, so long as there is one left to vegetate in ignorance where others are educated, so long as a single man, able and willing to work, languishes in poverty through want of work to do, you have no Country in the sense in which Country ought to exist—the Country of all and for all.

Education, labour, and the franchise, are the three main pillars of the Nation. Rest not until you have built them strongly up with your own labour and exertions.

Never deny your sister Nations. Be it yours to evolve the life of your Country in loveliness and strength; free from all servile fears or sceptical doubts; maintaining as its basis the People; as its guide the consequences of the principles of its Religious Faith, logically and energetically applied; its strength, the united strength of all; its aim the fulfilment of the mission given to it by God.

And so long as you are ready to die for Humanity, the Life of your Country will be immortal.

FERDINANDO MARTINI

FERDINANDO MARTINI (1841–1928) was a penetrating and witty Tuscan writer and a bourgeois liberal politician. He is presented here as a reluctant spokesman of what later was called the “imperialism of the have nots.” This particular brand of imperialism was not intended primarily to foster the expansion of industrial and financial elites or to gain strategical bases and essential raw materials. It was presented as one possible solution of the problem of overpopulation. Although it was exploited by Mussolini and others to justify wanton aggression, it bid for the support of persons and groups otherwise hostile to capitalism and militarism. One of Italy’s colonial enterprises, for instance, was praised by Gabriele D’Annunzio as a Nietzschean struggle for national affirmation, and by Giovanni Pascoli, a gentle poet with anarchist tendencies, as a step forward in the struggle for existence of a “proletarian nation.” As for Martini, he was one of the two members of the House of Representatives who demanded in 1887 the evacuation of Eritrea, at that time Italy’s only colony. He not only stressed the economic and military difficulties connected with the occupation, but also refuted the “hypocrisy” of the other European powers claiming a civilizing function as a justification for their expansion. “We can carry our civilization into Ethiopia,” he said, “but not to the Ethiopians.” Yet a few years later he qualifiedly endorsed agricultural colonization in Eritrea, for the reasons outlined in the selection quoted below.

It will be easier to understand Martini’s viewpoint if we consider the general background in Italy. The entrance of Victor Emmanuel II’s troops in Rome (1870) had almost completed the work of unification, but two important Italian-speaking regions remained outside the kingdom: Trentino and Venezia Giulia. This “irredenta” (unredeemed) area was the seat of much agitation and of conspiracies against Austrian rule—hated not only because it was foreign but also because it embodied political and religious reaction. Irridentist aspirations found sympathetic ears in Italy, even though the country was officially allied with Austria from 1881 to 1914. Trento and Trieste were to Italy what Alsace and Lorraine were to France—dormant, but not extinct problems, which were eventually to be factors in the eruption of World War I. Colonial expansion would seem to afford some kind of compensation for what appeared as a territorial mutilation of the homeland; perhaps it would give greater strength for an awaited day of reckoning. When an Italian minister justified the occupation of Eritrea (on the Red Sea) by stating that “the keys of the Mediterranean lay in the Red Sea,” he talked strategic nonsense, but echoed feelings widespread in the country.

There were also much deeper motives to suggest expansion. Before 1870 many Italian patriots had lived under the delusion that all of the evils of their fatherland were the result of foreign domination and exploitation. They believed that it would be enough to oust the Austrians and to unify the country for Italy to recover instantly the position of intellectual and economic leadership she had in

the time of the Romans, of the mediaeval Communes, and of the Renaissance. A typical expression of these views, which were largely shared by Mazzini and could be traced as far back as Dante and Machiavelli, was Vincenzo Gioberti's *Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians* (1843). Only Massimo d'Azeglio, a Piedmontese moderate liberal, warned his contemporaries that "after building Italy we shall have to build the Italians." But even he did not realize the complexity of the problems ahead.

Centuries of neglect had increased the natural shortcomings of the Italian soil. To be sure, in the north and in Tuscany, where rain was more abundant and small property or share-cropping were widespread, an exceptionally dense population could be supported, thanks to the ingenious work of reclamation and irrigation carried on for centuries. Illiteracy was not so widespread there even in 1870, and it was all but wiped out in the following decades. But in the South, the larger part was mountainous, with poor soil, and insufficient rains; natural poverty had favored the spread of wasteful grazing economy and deforestation, and had caused the land to be concentrated under a few absentee landlords, there pulverized in holdings too small for profitable cultivation. The peasants, weakened by want, fell a prey to disease. The majority were illiterate. Add that the key materials for industrialization were wanting both in the North and in the South. Hence Italy, far from immediately conjuring back her former splendor, had to engage in a hard struggle to reduce these inveterate problems. Meanwhile the intellectuals grew impatient at the disproportion between her traditions and her present lack of prestige. A larger and larger number of lower-class Italians sought a better chance through emigration. Northern Italians usually went to European countries as skilled laborers and returned home after a while, but southerners were mostly underprivileged peasants who went overseas, won little recognition for themselves or their fatherland, and seldom came back. As an intellectual aware of the plight of the peasants, Martini accepted colonial expansion.

Nevertheless, the progress of Italy in the 44-year period prior to World War I was amazing. Even while Martini was speaking, railroads were being built, free elementary schools spread to the smallest villages, new fields were reclaimed, and industrialization was in process. New methods of curing malaria and other diseases were found. One of many governmental projects supplied water to some 2,000 communities by diverting a river from the Tyrrhenian to the Adriatic sea. (It is interesting to note that this project, like many others executed by the pre-Fascist administration, was advertised by Mussolini as one of his works.) By 1914 northern Italy had caught up with the most advanced regions in the world. Southern Italy also had made considerable progress in spite of the lack of water power, which in the north had partly made up for the want of coal and oil. More persons lived in Italy in 1914 than when Martini wrote, and they had a higher standard of living. But emigration had reached still higher figures: more than 800,000 in 1913, the last year of peace. Only a trifling minority had gone to the Italian colonies, Eritrea, Somaliland, and (since 1912) Libya. The latest figure on Italian population, released by the director of the Italian Central Institute of Statistics on April 2, 1946, is 46,500,000—about 388 per square mile. If the population of the United States (not including Alaska, Hawaii, or the

internal waters) were as dense, it would amount to more than one billion inhabitants.

The following selection is from *Cose Africane (Concerning Africa)* (Treves, Milan, 1897). It was written after a small Italian column was destroyed at Amba Alagi, the same place where the Duke of Aosta surrendered to the British in World War II. At that period General Baratieri was recklessly stretching his meager forces beyond the borders of Eritrea (of which he was Governor) into Ethiopia, following instructions of the megalomaniac Premier, Francesco Crispi. A few months later a well-armed Ethiopian army of more than 100,000 men inflicted at Adowa a severe defeat on Italian forces ten times inferior, but on account of its own great losses could advance no farther. The Italians concluded peace and retained the existing borders of Eritrea until Mussolini resumed the offensive forty years later. Ferdinando Martini was the first civil governor of Eritrea after the defeat at Adowa.



CONCERNING AFRICA

THE COLONY AND EMIGRATION

WHOM DO YOU, my dear readers, believe to be responsible for the trouble we are having in Africa? Was it the fault of Crispi's restless megalomania, of Blanc's see-saw policy, of Sonnino's stubborn miserliness, of General Baratieri's rash assurance and proud negligence, of Col. Arimondi's unavoidable hesitations? In part it was, of course; but I am referring to older guilts, the source and origin of all the others. What was it then? I shall tell you: for, unless you happened to come across some articles recently published, you would never guess it. The fault is of the Investigating Commission which by Parliament-approved Government's decree visited Eritrea in the spring of 1891.

The unhappy Commission! Like the "soldiers going to war" in the popular song, its members "ate poorly and slept on the ground," while the Italian newspapers described and branded their banquets—who knows, perhaps in the Restaurant of El-Auisc or in the Grand Hotel of Gheleb! The unhappy Commission! Two of its members were in their seventies; the others, more or less, were all approaching the half century; and in about three months, riding six or seven hours a day, or, one day when it was necessary, twenty out of twenty-four hours, they went through the Hamasen, the Saraè, the Oculè-Cusai, the Senhait, the Mensa; they went down, in June, to the torrid banks of the Barca, and climbed the plateaus of Era, where no white man had been after Munzinger (except for Baratieri, only once, and a little before): that is, no white

man since 1855. They investigated, observed, compared; and, after studying with untiring passion all problems submitted to them, ultimately they presented to the Government a report which in colonial matters—I may say so freely because I did not write it—is one of the most thoughtful, clear, and substantial works published in the fair Italian kingdom in the last ten years. At that time in Italy, as usual, very few regarded it worth while to read the report. Now some persons, who did not read it then or ever, point to the report as the main cause of the difficulties we have to overcome in Eritrea, and of the considerable expenditure we have to undertake in order to overcome them . . .

What is the big fault with the Commission? Here it is: all of the parliament members who composed it had expressed more or less unfavorable opinions in regard to the African undertaking. One of their number was Luigi Ferrari who, after Dogali, had advised going back to the coast and limiting the occupation to Massaua. There even was in the Commission the humble writer, who had suggested in 1887 and then, again, in 1888, recalling our soldiers. The adversaries of the colony thought in 1891 that a Commission formed in this way could reasonably be expected to offer this suggestion and advice: "Let us get out!" . . .

The Commission did not say so, because saying "Let us get out" would not have been an adequate answer to the problems submitted to its members, because decisions of this kind were no longer timely, and because both the Parliament and the Government had repeatedly declared, in full agreement, that they did not want to leave Eritrea.

What did the Commission say? I think it is worth while to recall it. It said: Italy has 108 inhabitants per square kilometer; France has only 73. In proportion to the territory, only three states in Europe surpass Italy in density of population: Belgium, Holland, and Great Britain. If we go on like this, soon there will be no state that surpasses Italy: in the ten years 1871-1881 the births surpassed the deaths by seven per cent, and in the ten following years by eleven per cent. Every year 100,000 farmers and agricultural laborers emigrate from Italy. In spite of this immense exodus, the country witnesses the fact that, to the greatest danger of her political and economic future, her place in the family of civilized peoples is growing smaller and smaller. In fact, during the last eighty years the English-speaking peoples have risen from 22 to 90 millions; the Russian-speaking peoples from 50 to 70; and so forth, down to the Spanish-speaking peoples who were 18 millions and are now 39. On the other hand, the Italian-speaking peoples have increased only from 20 to 31, and most of the increase has taken place within Italy's own geographical borders. And this is not surprising. Even though our emigrants at first seem to be spreading in foreign land the name, the language, and the prestige of

Italy, since all or nearly all of them go to areas very advanced in civilization, their sons or their grandsons, being attracted and encircled by the vigorous peoples giving them hospitality, end up by forgetting the language of their fathers and ancestors. They merely increase the number of other nations, like branches grafted on a different plant.

Once all this was said, the Commission asked: since we did go to Africa, and we intend to remain there, is it possible to send our emigrants to our own colony, so that they may remain Italians even outside Italy, and that they may conserve Italy's language and traditions? Is it possible to transform many thousands of proletarians from Basilicata, Venetia, Sardinia into small Eritrean farmers? And the Commission answered, yes. The answer may have been wrong, but it certainly was a thoughtful one, supported by such arguments as one cannot easily discount. The Commission, mind you, also added: first of all, while keeping in mind the future, one must not forget the present, and hence one must endeavor to lighten the burden devolving on the taxpayers from colonial expenditure; then, indispensable conditions to achieve our aims are security and order. Hence it was necessary to stay put and quiet within the limits established for our colonizing activity, since the area enclosed within borders which we ourselves had chosen would be sufficient for very many years. In conclusion: since it is desired that we remain in the colony, let us try to remain usefully, that is, modestly and quietly.

Well, according to some, the Commission ought to have said: "Let us get out." Or, if it knew that such a suggestion would have not been followed . . . it ought to have, at least, cursed the "parched sands," "monster-feeding Africa," and cried out from the Alps to Sicily that in Eritrea nothing could be done or hoped for. But the Commission did not want to say so, because that, in its opinion, would not have corresponded to the truth. . . . The Commission suggested transforming Eritrea into an agricultural colony where our emigrants could be admitted; the Government and the Parliament followed the path pointed out by the Commission. Were we wrong? Let us change; but not unless a new way be shown by actual proofs to be easier, safer, less hard. Let us not poke fun at the old way by metaphors and vaticinations! . . .

Here at home, the adversaries of the agricultural colony keep asking wrathfully every day: why waste money in cultivating Africa? Are there not enough uncultivated areas in Italy?

Of course there are, three million hectares or more: but how many of them can be cultivated? . . . Every day one hears loose talk about the uncultivated land in Sicily. Yet the agrarian investigation promoted and conducted by Agostino Bertani proved that in the entire island, that is in a territory of more than two million and a half hectares, only 152,000 have not been cultivated.

All of these, however, except an insignificant area in the Caltanissetta province, have not been cultivated because they are not cultivable. Come on: how can one reasonably imagine that in a time like ours there may be proprietors of fertile land, who neglect it by slothfulness or whim while they could draw profit from it? If land remains such as it is, that means that one of these three things is lacking: the arable soil, capital, or profit. Where arable soil is lacking, there is nothing we can do. Where capital or profit is wanting, it is suggested that the state should take the place of the proprietors. Now and then, in fact, in the platform of a cabinet or in the electoral speech of a political boss we hear the promise or the suggestion of a bill for "internal colonization." But this plant has been watered for years without any leaf or flower sprouting from it. Is it that here, too, the . . . arable soil is wanting?

"The state should step in!" Even where the enterprise is not profitable? In this case, even if I did not believe that our African possessions are fertile—though I do believe it—I still would say: if we must make a poor bargain, in the dark continent we shall lose less.

No doubt ten years ago, before Col. Saletta sailed first from Naples for Massaua with his battalion of Bersaglieri, it was another matter. Now, however, since our stubbornness and our mistakes have cost all that they cost and are costing, even if one wants to leave aside all other considerations and to take into account only the expenditure and the chances of success, I believe that it is less safe and more expensive to endeavor to bring under culture three million hectares still uncultivated in Italy, than to insure the prosperity of a large agricultural colony in Eritrea. . . . It is easy to make jokes about the Abyssinian huts. But, once one has made jokes and laughed, one has good reason to cry when comparing those huts—where our colonial officers yet are living without discomfort—with the sandstone caves where the ploughmen and the reapers of the Roman Campagna are sleeping; or with the crumbling slums of Basilicata, where men, women and children are heaped together, and where, according to medical descriptions, it is possible to breathe only because air filters through the cracks of the rotten walls.

THE DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT

THE INSTITUTION of serfdom was established comparatively late in Russia. It attained its fullest development there in the eighteenth century, at the very time when in many other parts of Europe it was in process of rapid decline. By 1800, however, there were even in Russia unmistakable signs that serfdom must come to an end. The bloodily repressed mass uprisings led by peasant heroes like Pugachev, the bankruptcy of many landlords, the growth of industry and commerce, these were all signs that Russian serfdom was already in decay.

Then came the era of the French Revolution, with deeds and ideas that shook all Europe. The Revolution's main achievement was to sweep away the last vestiges of feudalism in France, and to establish a society based upon a new conception of man as a being endowed with human dignity and natural rights. Hence it captured the imagination of not a few of the Russian youth, and in particular of certain young army officers, members of the liberal nobility, who had fought through to Paris in 1814 and had had an opportunity to become personally acquainted with the land of the Revolution.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Alexander I came to the throne, the atmosphere in Russia had been favorable to the discussion and dissemination of liberal ideas. The new Tsar himself had enjoyed the benefits of a liberal education, having been taught by the Swiss republican Frédéric Laharpe, and looked with a benevolent eye on the discussions and associations of the progressive nobility and intellectuals. Toward the close of his reign, however, the Tsar came increasingly under the influence of reactionary advisers at home and of conservative ministers like Metternich abroad. The last ten years of his reign were characterized by the imposition of a pedantically strict censorship and the establishment of barracks rule under the direction of the military sadist Arakchéev. Under these circumstances liberal thought was inevitably driven underground and compelled to take the form of secret societies somewhat analogous to masonic lodges.

Among the more prominent of these societies was one named "Association for Public Welfare." It grew up among a circle of young nobles and army officers in St. Petersburg in the period 1816-17 with the aim of establishing a limited monarchy. A southern branch of the society established at Tulchin had the more revolutionary aim of overthrowing the autocracy. This southern group also entered into relations with the United Slavs, a secret society of the Ukraine, and with the Polish Secret Patriotic Society, whose aim was to secure the national independence of Poland. The northern group carried on an active propaganda in the army, where it had many sympathizers.

The revolutionaries' great opportunity to do away with absolutism came in 1825. On November 19 of that year the death of the childless Alexander I inaugurated a period of confusion when it was not clear which of Alexander's two brothers, Constantine or Nicholas, would succeed to the throne. Plans were speedily made for an uprising, and Prince Trubetskoi, chief of the northern group, drafted

a manifesto declaring the old régime to be at an end and a Provisional Government to be established. (This Manifesto is among the selections that follow.) On December 14 a mass of people—soldiers of the Guard, marines, members of the public and revolutionaries—gathered in the square of the Senate in St. Petersburg to protest the proclamation of Nicholas as Tsar.

The indecision, inexperience, and even panic of some of the revolutionary leaders doomed the movement to failure and turned the situation to Nicholas's advantage. Cannon were brought up and the rebellion was crushed with great loss of life. A similar fate befell a revolt organized by the societies of the south. The leaders were hanged, the rest sent to the living death of exile in Siberia. They are immortalized in Russian history as the *Dekabristi*, or men of December.

Tsar Nicholas, in his rage that nobles, army men and intellectuals should have dared revolt against the throne, spared no pains to lay bare all the circumstances of the rebellion, down to the most trifling details. He brought all the prisoners to St. Petersburg and conducted a very thorough examination. The material printed in the following selections is a part of the testimony extorted by him from the conspirators. These documents well reflect the conditions and the atmosphere in which the secret societies flourished, and the political, national and constitutional aims for which they worked.

The selections are from A. G. Mazour, *The First Russian Revolution, 1825* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1937).



LETTER OF A. BESTUZHEV TO NICHOLAS I

Your Imperial Highness:

CONVINCED that You, Sovereign, love the truth, I dare to lay before You the historical development of free thinking in Russia and in general of many ideas which constitute the moral and political basis of the events of December 14. I shall speak in full frankness, without concealing evil, without even softening expressions, for the duty of a loyal subject is to tell his Monarch the truth without any embellishment. I commence.

The beginning of the reign of Emperor Alexander was marked with bright hopes for Russia's prosperity. The gentry had recuperated, the merchant class did not object to giving credit, the army served without making trouble, scholars studied what they wished, all spoke what they thought, and everyone expected better days. Unfortunately, circumstances prevented the realization of these hopes, which aged without their fulfillment. The unsuccessful, expensive war of 1807 and others disorganized our finances, though we had not yet realized it when preparing for the national war of 1812. Finally, Napoleon invaded Russia and then only, for the first time, did the Russian peo-

ple become aware of their power; only then awakened in all our hearts a feeling of independence, at first political and finally national. That is the beginning of free thinking in Russia. The government itself spoke such words as "Liberty, Emancipation!" It had itself sown the idea of abuses resulting from the unlimited power of Napoleon, and the appeal of the Russian Monarch resounded on the banks of the Rhine and the Seine. The war was still on when the soldiers, upon their return home, for the first time disseminated grumbling among the masses. "We shed blood," they would say, "and then we are again forced to sweat under feudal obligations. We freed the Fatherland from the tyrant, and now we ourselves are tyrannized over by the ruling class." The army, from generals to privates, upon its return, did nothing but discuss how good it is in foreign lands. A comparison with their own country naturally brought up the question, "Why should it not be so in our own land?"

At first, as long as they talked without being hindered, it was lost in the air, for thinking is like gunpowder, only dangerous when pressed. Many cherished the hope that the Emperor would grant a constitution, as he himself had stated at the opening of the Legislative Assembly in Warsaw, and the attempt of some generals to free their serfs encouraged that sentiment. But after 1817 everything changed. Those who saw evil or who wished improvement, thanks to the mass of spies were forced to whisper about it, and this was the beginning of the secret societies. Oppression by the government of deserving officers irritated men's minds. Then the military men began to talk: "Did we free Europe in order to be ourselves placed in chains? Did we grant a constitution to France in order that we dare not talk about it, and did we buy at the price of blood priority among nations in order that we might be humiliated at home?" The destructive policy toward schools and the persecution of education forced us in utter despair to begin considering some important measures. And since the grumbling of the people, caused by exhaustion and the abuses of national and civil administrations, threatened bloody revolution, the Societies intended to prevent a greater evil by a lesser one and began their activities at the first opportunity. . . .

You, Sovereign, probably already know how we, inspired by such a situation in Russia and seeing the elements ready for change, decided to bring about a *coup d'état*. . . . Here are the plans we had for the future. We thought of creating a Senate of the oldest and wisest Russian men of the present administration, for we thought that power and ambition would always have their attraction. Then we thought of having a Chamber of Deputies composed of national representatives. . . . For enlightenment of the lower classes we wished everywhere to establish Lancasterian schools. And in order to bring about moral improvement we thought of raising the standard of the clergy

by granting to them a means of livelihood. Elimination of nearly all duties, freedom from distillation and road improvement for the state, encouragement of agriculture and general protection of industry would result in satisfying the peasants. Assurance and stability would attract to Russia many resourceful foreigners. Factories would increase with the demand for commodities, while competition would stimulate improvement, which rises along with the prosperity of the people, for the need of commodities for life and luxury is constant. . . .

Most devoted servant of
Your Imperial Highness,
Alexander Bestuzhev. . . .

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOUTHERN AND POLISH SECRET SOCIETIES

(From the Testimony of M. Bestuzhev-Riumin)

AT THE Kiev fair in 1824 I learned from Chodkiewicz that there existed a Society, which, upon finding that we had a similar organization, wished to enter into negotiations. I reported this to the Directory, which gave me instructions to conclude an agreement. This agreement consisted:

On Our Part:

(1) Russia, preferring to have noble allies instead of secret enemies, upon completing her reforms would grant Poland independence.

(2) There would be a new delimitation, and for the sake of retaining friendly and beneficial relationships the provinces which have not been sufficiently Russified would be restored to Poland.

(3) At the same time the interests of those who would be compelled to remain on Russian soil on account of strategic demarcation would be respected.

(4) The Poles could, however, hope to receive back the Provinces of Grodna, part of Vilna, Minsk, and Volynsk.

(5) With the confirmation of the agreement, the Russian Society would give protection to Poles who happened to carry on their work in Russia, provided that that work was not in conflict with national interests.

(6) The Russian Society would use all means to eradicate the antagonism which exists between the two peoples, realizing that in the age of enlightenment in which we live the interests of all peoples are identical, and imbedded hatred is the attribute only of barbaric ages.

(7) For further relations each party appoints deputies who will be instructed:

(a) That they communicate to their respective directories everything designated for them or present information requested by the other party.

(b) Polish deputies will inform the Russian Society concerning developments in Western Europe.

(c) It is strictly forbidden to deputies to name or request them to name any members of either society.

(d) If a Russian deputy meets members of the Polish Society, or a Polish deputy meets members of the Russian Society, they must not reveal that the two organizations have entered into any relationships.

(e) All intercourse between the two directories is to be carried out through deputies only.

(f) The deputies cannot agree to nor promise anything without the consent of their respective directories.

On the Part of the Poles:

The Poles are obligated to:

(1) use all means, regardless of what kind, to prevent Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich from returning to Russia;

(2) rebel simultaneously with us;

(3) attack the Lithuanian Corps, should it move against us;

(4) give us all possible assistance at their disposal;

(5) arrange relations between us and political societies which function in Western Europe;

(6) inform us about all important matters as soon as they know of them;

(7) act during the revolution according to the instructions of our Society, and recognize themselves as our subordinates;

(8) adopt a republican form of government.

THE OATH FOR MEMBERS WHO ENTER THE UNITED SLAVS

UPON JOINING the United Slavs for the liberation of myself from tyranny and for the restoration of freedom, which is so precious to the human race, I solemnly pledge on these arms brotherly love, which is to me divine and from which I expect the fulfillment of all my desires. I swear to be always virtuous, always loyal to our aim, and to observe the deepest secrecy. Hell itself with all its horrors will not be able to compel me to reveal to the tyrants my friends and their aims. I swear that only when a man proves undoubted desire to become a participant, will my tongue reveal the Society; I swear, to the last drop of my blood, to my last breath, to assist you, my friends, from this sacred moment. Special activity will be my first virtue, and mutual love and aid my

sacred duty. I swear that nothing in the world will be able to move me. With sword in hand I shall attain the aim designated by us. I will pass through a thousand deaths, a thousand obstacles—I will pass through, and dedicate my last breath to freedom and the fraternal union of the noble Slavs. Should I violate this oath, then let remorse be the first vengeance for my hideous offense, let the point of this sword turn against my heart and fill it with hellish torment; let the moment of my life that is injurious to my friends, be the last one; let my existence be transformed into a chain of unheard misery from the fatal moment that I forget my pledge. May I see all that is dear to my heart perish by this weapon and in horrible suffering, and this weapon, reaching me, the criminal, cover my body with wounds and cast infamy upon me; and the accumulated burden of physical and moral evil shall impress on my forehead the sign of a monstrous son of Nature.

*A MANIFESTO, DRAWN BY "DICTATOR"
TRUBETSKOI ON THE EVE OF
DECEMBER 14, 1825*

The Manifesto of the Senate should proclaim:

- (1) abolition of the former government;
- (2) establishment of a Provisional Government until a permanent one is decided upon by representatives;
- (3) freedom of the press, hence abolition of censorship;
- (4) religious tolerance to all faiths;
- (5) abolition of the right to own men;
- (6) equality of all classes before the law and therefore abolition of military courts and all sorts of judicial commissions from which all cases proceed to civil courts;
- (7) announcement of rights for every citizen to occupy himself with whatever he wishes and therefore—nobleman, merchant, middle-class man, peasant—all to have equal right to enter military, civil, or clerical service, trade wholesale or retail, paying established taxes for such trade; to acquire all kinds of property such as land, or houses in villages and cities; make all kinds of contracts among themselves, or summon each other for trial;
- (8) cancellation of poll tax and arrears;
- (9) abolition of monopolies on salt and alcohol; permission for free distillation and for the procuring of salt with payment of tax according to the respective amounts of salt and alcohol produced;
- (10) abolition of recruiting and military colonies;

(11) reduction of the term of military service for privates to be followed by equalization of military service of all classes;

(12) retirement without exception of all privates who have served fifteen years;

(13) the creation of Community, County, Gubernia, and Regional administrations, which are to be substituted for all civil service men appointed formerly by the government;

(14) public trials;

(15) introduction of a jury system in criminal and civil courts. There shall be created an administration of two or three persons to which all the highest officers of the government shall be subordinated, such as the Ministry, the Council, the Ministerial Committee, the Army and Navy: in a word, the entire Supreme Executive government, but not the legislative nor judicial. For the latter there remains the Ministry subordinated to the Provisional Government, but for decision of cases not passed upon by the lower courts there will remain a department of the Senate which shall handle civil and criminal cases; its members shall remain in service until a permanent administration is established.

The Provisional Government is instructed to:

(1) equalize all classes;

(2) form all local, Community, County, Gubernia, and Regional administrations;

(3) form a National Guard;

(4) form a judicial branch with a jury;

(5) equalize recruiting obligations among all classes;

(6) abolish a permanent army;

(7) establish a form of election of representatives to the Lower Chamber which will have to ratify the future form of Government.

DOMESTIC REFORM IN RUSSIA

RUSSIAN HISTORY after the Emancipation of the Serfs is characterized by a rising political ferment that finds its expression in a variety of parties, organizations, and groups. One of the principal organizations coming into conflict with the regime was an institution created by the Tsar himself. In 1859 a commission had been created to provide for administrative reform, and from its recommendations emerged the Zemstvos in 1864, by royal decree. The zemstvo was an assembly elected by landlords and peasant communes; there was to be one for every district in Russia, and one for every province as well. The zemstvo, responsible for the building of local roads, schools, hospitals, and bridges, was designed as a concession to the principle of local self-government; and much was expected of it.

However, the actual achievements of the zemstvos were in fact very limited. They were, it is true, increasingly dominated by the progressive, liberal-minded section of the landlords, but these found that their efforts to develop the zemstvos as organs of government were thwarted at every turn. The Tsar never intended that they should become platforms for the opposition or that they should really share in the general government of the country. Hence the provincial governors did not hesitate to use their powers of veto in regard to zemstvo decrees, and all manner of frictions developed. The zemstvos also wished to combine for common purposes, and this above all was feared and forbidden by the Tsar.

Yet another group expressing anti-Tsarist sentiments was the Narodnaya Volya, or People's Will. Formed in 1879, this organization expressed the revolutionary feelings of a circle of intellectuals and workingmen. The Narodnaya Volya was headed by a Revolutionary Executive Committee, and the principal point on its program was the convocation of a Constituent Assembly to be elected by universal suffrage. This program was to be brought before the public by means of propaganda and terroristic activity, a policy of violence that resulted in a wave of assassinations of prominent tsarist officials, and the dynamiting of trains and bridges. An attempt was made in 1880 on the life of Alexander II himself, which resulted in the blowing up of the Winter Palace at St. Petersburg. The Tsar escaped, only to be assassinated the next year while returning from a state parade. The Revolutionary Executive Committee at once reiterated its demands in a letter to Alexander III, and this document is among the selections that follow.

The fiercest opposition to the tsarist regime originated in Russia's new industrial centers. In 1875 the first workingmen's Union was formed at Odessa, inaugurating an era stormy with strikes and the struggle between capital and labor. This movement placed its faith in organization as opposed to the terrorist tactics of the Narodnaya Volya. In 1900 the severe industrial crisis then affecting other European countries communicated itself to Russia, with the result that factories were closed, workers were thrown upon the streets, and an up-

surge of revolutionary feeling occurred among all classes. Fierce clashes between workers and troops were followed by peasant uprisings in the Ukraine in 1902, a general strike of students in the universities, and formal protests from the zemstvos. In January, 1904, the Russo-Japanese war broke out. Russia sustained terrific losses, and suffered decisive defeat in the great battles of Mukden and Tsushima. The war gave rise to a fresh revolutionary wave as the weakness and corruption of the regime received this latest and most striking testimony. On January 9, 1905, a throng of workers headed by a priest named Gapon marched in procession to the Winter Palace in order to present the Tsar Nicholas with a petition asking for redress of their wrongs (this document is included in the following selections). The unarmed procession—women carrying children and men chanting hymns—was fired upon by the Tsar's troops. "Bloody Sunday," as it came to be called, resulted in the killing and maiming of hundreds of people, and marked the beginning of the Revolution of 1905.

A general strike in October, 1905, compelled the Tsar to issue a conciliatory manifesto on October 17, but in spite of his manifesto, Nicholas II continued to crush the revolution by the most energetic means, including the use of "Black Hundred" gangs. In December, 1905, the first legislative assembly, or Duma, was convened, on the basis of a very limited suffrage. This limitation, together with the punitive expedition sent out by the Tsar to quell the last flames of revolt in the four corners of the Empire, was designed to subject the Assembly to despotic control. Even so the Duma did not prove docile enough and was dispersed in the summer of 1906. The document ordering the dissolution is among the following selections.

The first selection below is from the 1912 edition of Mackenzie Wallace's *Russia* (1st ed. 1877). The others are taken from J. H. Robinson and C. A. Beard, *Readings in Modern European History*, Vol. II (Boston, Ginn and Co., 1909); J. Mavor, *Economic History of Russia*, Vol. II (2d ed., New York, E. P. Dutton and Co., 1925); and *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, translated by Abraham Yarmolinsky (Garden City, Doubleday, Page and Co., 1921).



THE ZEMSTVO AND LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

MY PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE with this interesting institution dates from 1870. Very soon after my arrival at Novgorod in that year, I made the acquaintance of a gentleman who was described to me as "the president of the provincial Zemstvo bureau," and finding him amiable and communicative, I suggested that he might give me some information regarding the institution of which he was the chief local representative. . . .

The *Zemstvo* is a kind of local administration which supplements the action of the rural Communes, and takes cognisance of those higher public wants which individual Communes cannot possibly satisfy. Its principal duties are to keep the roads and bridges in proper repair, to provide means of conveyance for the rural police and other officials, to look after primary education and sanitary affairs, to watch the state of the crops and take measures against approaching famine, and, in short, to undertake, within certain clearly defined limits, whatever seems likely to increase the material and moral well-being of the population. In form the institution is Parliamentary—that is to say, it consists of an assembly of deputies which meets regularly once a year, and of a permanent executive bureau elected by the Assembly from among its members. If the Assembly be regarded as a local Parliament, the bureau corresponds to the Cabinet. . . . Once every three years the deputies are elected in certain fixed proportions by the landed proprietors, the rural Communes, and the municipal corporations. Every province (*gubérniya*) and each of the districts (*uyézdy*) into which the province is sub-divided has such an assembly and such a bureau.

Not long after my arrival in Novgorod I had the opportunity of being present at a District Assembly. In the ballroom of the “Club de la Noblesse” I found thirty or forty men seated round a long table covered with green cloth. Before each member lay sheets of paper for the purpose of taking notes, and before the president—the Marshal of Noblesse for the district—stood a small handbell, which he rang vigorously at the commencement of the proceedings and on all occasions when he wished to obtain silence. To the right and left of the president sat the members of the executive (*upráva*), armed with piles of written and printed documents, from which they read long and tedious extracts, till the majority of the audience took to yawning and one or two of the members positively went to sleep. At the close of each of these reports the president rang his bell—presumably for the purpose of awakening the sleepers—and inquired whether anyone had remarks to make on what had just been read. Generally someone had remarks to make, and not unfrequently a discussion ensued. When any decided difference of opinion appeared, a vote was taken by handing round a sheet of paper, or by the simpler method of requesting the Ayes to stand up and the Noes to sit still.

What surprised me most in this assembly was that it was composed partly of nobles and partly of peasants—the latter being decidedly in the majority—and that no trace of antagonism seemed to exist between the two classes. Landed proprietors and their *ci-devant* serfs, emancipated only ten years before, evidently met for the moment on a footing of equality. The discussions were carried on chiefly by the nobles, but on more than one occasion peasant members rose to speak, and their remarks, always clear, practical, and to the

point, were invariably listened to with respectful attention. Instead of that violent antagonism which might have been expected, considering the constitution of the Assembly, there was too much unanimity—a fact indicating plainly that the majority of the members did not take a very deep interest in the matters presented to them.

This assembly for the district was held in the month of September. At the beginning of December the Assembly for the Province met, and during nearly three weeks I was daily present at its deliberations. In general character and mode of procedure it resembled closely the District Assembly. Its chief peculiarities were that its members were chosen, not by the primary electors, but by the assemblies of the ten districts which compose the province, and that it took cognisance merely of those matters which concerned more than one district. Besides this, the peasant deputies were very few in number—a fact which somewhat surprised me, because I was aware that, according to the law, the peasant members of the District Assemblies were eligible, like those of the other classes. The explanation is that the District Assemblies choose their most active members to represent them in the Provincial Assemblies, and consequently the choice generally falls on landed proprietors. To this arrangement the peasants make no objection, for attendance at the Provincial Assemblies demands a considerable pecuniary outlay, and payment of the deputies is expressly prohibited by law. . . .

Even within its proper sphere, as defined by law, the Zemstvo has not accomplished what was expected of it. The country has not been covered with a network of macadamised roads, and the bridges are by no means as safe as could be desired. Village schools and infirmaries are still far below the requirements of the population. Little or nothing has been done for the development of trade or manufactures; and the villages remain very much what they were under the old Administration. Meanwhile the local rates have been rising with alarming rapidity; and many people draw from all this the conclusion that the Zemstvo is a worthless institution which has increased the taxation without conferring any corresponding benefit on the country. . . .

The Zemstvo has, however, done much more than the majority of its critics admit. It fulfils tolerably well, without scandalous speculation and jobbery, its commonplace, every-day duties, and it has created a new and more equitable system of rating by which landed proprietors and house-owners are made to bear their share of the public burdens. It has done a very great deal to provide medical aid and primary education for the common people, and it has improved wonderfully the condition of the hospitals, lunatic asylums, and other benevolent institutions committed to its charge. In its efforts to aid the peasantry it has helped to improve the native breeds of horses and cattle, and it

has created a system of obligatory fire insurance, together with means for preventing and extinguishing fires in the villages—a most important matter in a country where the peasants live in wooden houses and big fires are fearfully frequent. After neglecting for a good many years the essential question as to how the peasants' means of subsistence can be increased, it has latterly . . . helped them to obtain improved agricultural implements and better seed, encouraged the formation of small credit associations and savings banks, and appointed agricultural inspectors to teach them how they may introduce modest improvements within their limited means. At the same time, in many districts it has endeavoured to assist the home industries which are threatened with annihilation by the big factories, and whenever measures have been proposed for the benefit of the rural population, such as the lowering of the land-redemption payments and the creation of the Peasant Land Bank, it has invariably given them its cordial support.

If you ask a zealous member of the Zemstvo why it has not done more he will probably tell you that it is because its activity has been constantly restricted and counteracted by the Government. The Assemblies were obliged to accept as presidents the Marshals of Noblesse, many of whom were men of antiquated ideas and retrograde principles. At every turn the more enlightened, more active members found themselves opposed, thwarted, and finally checkmated by the Imperial officials. . . .

LETTER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO TSAR ALEXANDER III, 1881

March 10, 1881

YOUR MAJESTY:

Although the Executive Committee understands fully the grief that you must experience at this moment, it believes that it has no right to yield to the feeling of natural delicacy which would perhaps dictate the postponement of the following explanation to another time. There is something higher than the most legitimate human feeling, and that is, duty to one's country,—the duty for which a citizen must sacrifice himself and his own feelings, and even the feelings of others. In obedience to this all-powerful duty we have decided to address you at once, waiting for nothing, as will wait for nothing the historical process that threatens us with rivers of blood and the most terrible convulsions. . . .

You are aware, your Majesty, that the government of the late Tsar could not be reproached with a lack of energy. It hanged the innocent and the guilty, and filled prisons and remote provinces with exiles. Scores of so-called "leaders"

were captured and hanged, and died with the courage and tranquillity of martyrs; but the movement did not cease,—on the contrary it grew and strengthened. The revolutionary movement, your Majesty, is not dependent upon any particular individuals; it is a process of the social organism; and the scaffolds raised for its more energetic exponents are as powerless to save the outgrown order of things as the cross that was erected for the Redeemer was powerless to save the ancient world from the triumph of Christianity. The government, of course, may yet capture and hang an immense number of separate individuals, it may break up a great number of separate revolutionary groups; but all this will not change, in the slightest degree, the condition of affairs. . . .

A dispassionate glance at the grievous decade through which we have just passed will enable us to forecast accurately the future progress of the revolutionary movement, provided the policy of the government does not change. The movement will continue to grow and extend; deeds of a terroristic nature will increase in frequency and intensity. Meanwhile the number of the discontented in the country will grow larger and larger; confidence in the government, on the part of the people, will decline; and the idea of revolution—of its possibility and inevitability—will establish itself in Russia more and more firmly. A terrible explosion, a bloody chaos, a revolutionary earthquake throughout Russia, will complete the destruction of the old order of things. Do not mistake this for a mere phrase. We understand better than any one else can how lamentable is the waste of so much talent and energy—the loss, in bloody skirmishes and in the work of destruction, of so much strength which, under other conditions, might have been expended in creative labor and in the development of the intelligence, the welfare, and the civil life of the Russian people. Whence proceeds this lamentable necessity for bloody conflict?

It arises, your Majesty, from the lack in Russia of a real government in the true sense of that word. A government, in the very nature of things, should only give outward form to the aspirations of the people and effect to the people's will. But with us—excuse the expression—the government has degenerated into a mere coterie, and deserves the name of a usurping “gang” much more than does the Executive Committee.

Whatever may be the intentions of the Tsar, the actions of the government have nothing in common with the popular welfare or popular aspirations. The government has brought Russia to such a pass that, at the present time, the masses of the people are in a state of pauperism and ruin; are subjected to the most humiliating surveillance, even at their own domestic hearths; and are powerless even to regulate their own communal and social affairs. The protection of the law and of the government is enjoyed only by the extortionist

and the exploiter, and the most exasperating robbery goes unpunished. But, on the other hand, what a terrible fate awaits the man who sincerely considers the general good! You know very well, your Majesty, that it is not only socialists who are exiled and prosecuted.

These are the reasons why the Russian government exerts no moral influence and has no support among the people. These are the reasons why Russia brings forth so many revolutionists. These are the reasons why even such a deed as killing a Tsar excites in the minds of a majority of the people only gladness and sympathy. Yes, your Majesty! Do not be deceived by the reports of flatterers and sycophants; Tsaricide is popular in Russia.

From such a state of affairs there can be only two modes of escape: either a revolution,—absolutely inevitable and not to be averted by any punishments; or a voluntary turning of the supreme power to the people. In the interest of our native land, in the hope of preventing the useless waste of energy, in the hope of averting the terrible miseries that always accompany revolution, the Executive Committee approaches your Majesty with the advice to take the second course. Be assured, so soon as the supreme power ceases to rule arbitrarily, so soon as it firmly resolves to accede to the demands of the people's conscience and consciousness, you may, without fear, discharge the spies that disgrace the administration, send your guards back to their barracks, and burn the scaffolds that are demoralizing the people. The Executive Committee will voluntarily terminate its own existence, and the organizations formed about it will disperse, in order that their members may devote themselves to the work of promoting culture among the people of their native land.

We address your Majesty as those who have discarded all prejudices, and who have suppressed the distrust of you created by the actions of the government throughout a century. We forget that you are the representative of the authority that has so often deceived and that has so injured the people. We address you as a citizen and as an honest man. We hope that the feeling of personal exasperation will not extinguish in your mind your consciousness of your duties and your desire to know the truth. We also might feel exasperation. You have lost your father. We have lost not only our fathers, but our brothers, our wives, our children, and our dearest friends. We are nevertheless ready to suppress personal feeling if it be demanded by the welfare of Russia. We expect the same from you.

We set no conditions for you; do not let our proposition irritate you. The conditions that are prerequisite to a change from revolutionary activity to peaceful labor are created, not by us, but by history. These conditions are, in our opinion, two.

1. A general amnesty to cover all past political crimes; for the reason that they were not crimes but fulfillments of civil duty.

2. The summoning of representatives of the whole Russian people to examine the existing framework of social and governmental life, and to remodel it in accordance with the people's wishes.

We regard it as necessary, however, to remind you that the legalization of the supreme power, by the representatives of the people, can be valid only in case the elections are perfectly free. We declare solemnly, before the people of our native land and before the whole world, that our party will submit unconditionally to the decisions of a National Assembly elected in the manner above indicated, and that we will not allow ourselves, in future, to offer violent resistance to any government that the National Assembly may sanction.

And now, your Majesty, decide! Before you are two courses, and you are to make your choice between them. We can only trust that your intelligence and conscience may suggest to you the only decision that is compatible with the welfare of Russia, with your own dignity, and with your duty to your native land.

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

FATHER GAPON'S PETITION TO NICHOLAS II

SIRE,—We, working men and inhabitants of St. Petersburg of various classes, our wives and our children and our helpless old parents, come to Thee, Sire, to seek for truth and defence. We have become beggars; we have been oppressed; we are burdened by toil beyond our powers; we are scoffed at; we are not recognized as human beings; we are treated as slaves who must suffer their bitter fate and who must keep silence. We suffered, but we are pushed farther into the den of beggary, lawlessness, and ignorance. We are choked by despotism and irresponsibility, and we are breathless. We have no more power, Sire, the limit of patience has been reached. There has arrived for us that tremendous moment when death is better than the continuation of intolerable tortures. We have left off working, and we have declared to the masters that we shall not begin to work until they comply with our demands. We beg but little; we desire only that without which life is not life, but hard labour and eternal torture. The first request which we made was that our masters should discuss our needs with us; but this they refused, on the ground that no right to make this request is recognized by law. They also declared to be illegal our requests to diminish the working hours to eight hours daily, to agree with us about the prices for our work, to consider our misunderstandings with the

inferior administration of the mills, to increase the wages for the labour of women and of general labourers, so that the minimum daily wage should be one ruble per day, to abolish overtime work, to give us medical attention without insulting us, to arrange the workshops so that it might be possible to work there, and not find in them death from awful draughts and from rain and snow. All these requests appeared to be, in the opinion of our masters and of the factory and mill administrations, illegal. Every one of our requests was a crime, and the desire to improve our condition was regarded by them as impertinence, and as offensive to them.

Sire, here are many thousands of us, and all are human beings only in appearance. In reality in us, as in all Russian people, there is not recognized any human right, not even the right of speaking, thinking, meeting, discussing our needs, taking measures for the improvement of our condition. We have been enslaved, and enslaved under the auspices of Thy officials, with their assistance, and with their co-operation. Every one of us who dares to raise a voice in defence of working-class and popular interests is thrown into jail or is sent into banishment. For the possession of good hearts and sensitive souls we are punished as for crimes. Even to pity a beaten man—a man tortured and without rights—means to commit a heavy crime. All the people—working men as well as peasants—are handed over to the discretion of the officials of the Government, who are thieves of the property of the State—robbers who not only take no care of the interests of the people, but who trample these interests under their feet. The Government officials have brought the country to complete destruction, have involved it in a detestable war, and have further and further led it to ruin. We working men have no voice in the expenditure of the enormous amounts raised from us in taxes. We do not know even where and for what is spent the money collected from a beggared people. The people are deprived of the possibility of expressing their desires, and they now demand that they be allowed to take part in the introduction of taxes and in the expenditure of them.

The working men are deprived of the possibility of organizing themselves in unions for the defence of their interests. . . .

Russia is too great. Its necessities are too various and numerous for officials alone to rule it. National representation is indispensable. It is indispensable that people should assist and should rule themselves. To them only are known their real necessities. Do not reject their assistance, accept it, order immediately the convocation of representatives of the Russian land from all ranks, including representatives from the working men. Let there be capitalists as well as working men—official and priest, doctor and teacher—let all, whatever they

may be, elect their representatives. Let everyone be equal and free in the right of election, and for this purpose order that the elections for the Constitutional Assembly be carried on under the condition of universal, equal, and secret voting. This is the most capital of our requests. In it and upon it everything is based. This is the principal and only plaster for our painful wounds, without which our wounds will fester and bring us rapidly near to death. Yet one measure alone cannot heal our wounds. Other measures are also indispensable. Directly and openly as to a Father, we speak to Thee, Sire, about them in person, for all the toiling classes of Russia. The following are indispensable:

I. Measures against the ignorance and rightlessness of the Russian people:

1. The immediate release and return of all who have suffered for political and religious convictions, for strikes, and national peasant disorders.
2. The immediate declaration of freedom and of the inviolability of the person—freedom of speech and press, freedom of meetings, and freedom of conscience in religion.
3. Universal and compulsory elementary education of the people at the charge of the State.
4. Responsibility of the Ministers before the people and guarantee that the Government will be law-abiding.
5. Equality before the law of all without exception.
6. Separation of the Church from the State.

II. Measures against the poverty of the people:

1. Abolition of indirect taxes and the substitution of a progressive income tax.
2. Abolition of the Redemption Instalments, cheap credit, and gradual transference of the land to the people.
3. The orders for the military and naval ministries should be fulfilled in Russia, and not abroad.
4. The cessation of the war by the will of the people.

III. Measures against the oppression of labour:

1. Abolition of the factory inspectorships.
2. Institution at factories and mills of permanent committees of elected workers, which, together with the administration (of the factories) would consider the complaints of individual workers. Discharge of working men should not take place otherwise than by resolution of this committee.
3. Freedom of organization of co-operative societies of consumers and of labour trade unions immediately.
4. Eight-hours working day and regulation of overtime working.
5. Freedom of the struggle of labour against capital immediately.

6. Normal wages immediately.

7. Participation of working-class representatives in the working out of projects of law upon workmen's State insurance immediately. . . .

CONSTITUTIONAL MANIFESTO OF OCTOBER, 1905

UNREST AND DISTURBANCES in the capitals and in many regions of our Empire fill our heart with a great and heavy grief. The welfare of the Russian Sovereign is inseparable from the welfare of the people, and their sorrow is his sorrow. The unrest now arisen may cause a profound disorder in the masses and become a menace to the integrity and unity of the Russian State. The great vow of Imperial service enjoins us to strive with all the might of our reason and authority to put an end within the shortest possible time to this unrest so perilous to the State. Having ordered the proper authorities to take measures for the suppression of the direct manifestations of disorder, rioting, and violence, and for the protection of peaceful people who seek to fulfil in peace the duties incumbent upon them, We, in order to carry out more effectively the measures outlined by us for the pacification of the country, have found it necessary to unify the activity of the higher Government agencies.

We impose upon the Government the obligation to execute our inflexible will:

1. To grant the population the unshakable foundations of civic freedom on the basis of real personal inviolability, freedom of conscience, of speech, of assemblage, and of association.

2. Without stopping the appointed elections to the Imperial Duma, to admit to participation in the Duma those classes of the population which have hitherto been deprived of the franchise, in so far as this is feasible in the brief period remaining before the convening of the Duma, leaving the further development of the principle of general suffrage to the new legislative order (i.e., the Duma and Imperial Council established by the law of August 6, 1905).

3. To establish it as an unshakable rule that no law can become effective without the sanction of the Imperial Duma and that the people's elected representatives should be guaranteed a real participation in the control over the lawfulness of the authorities appointed by us.

We call upon all the faithful sons of Russia to remember their duty to their country, to lend assistance in putting an end to the unprecedented disturbances and together with us make every effort to restore quiet and peace in our native land. . . .

THE TSAR'S DISSOLUTION OF THE FIRST DUMA

WE SUMMONED the representatives of the nation by our will to the work of productive legislation. Confiding firmly in divine clemency and believing in the great and brilliant future of our people, we confidently anticipated benefits for the country from their labors. We proposed great reforms in all departments of the national life. We have always devoted our greatest care to the removal of the ignorance of the people by the light of instruction, and to the removal of their burdens by improving the conditions of agricultural work.

A cruel disappointment has befallen our expectations. The representatives of the nation, instead of applying themselves to the work of productive legislation, have strayed into spheres beyond their competence, and have been making inquiries into the acts of local authorities established by ourselves, and have been making comments upon the imperfections of the fundamental laws, which can only be modified by our imperial will. In short, the representatives of the nation have undertaken really illegal acts, such as the appeal by the Duma to the nation.

The peasants, disturbed by such anomalies, and seeing no hope of the amelioration of their lot, have resorted in a number of districts to open pillage and the destruction of other people's property, and to disobedience of the law and of the legal authorities. But our subjects ought to remember that an improvement in the lot of the people is only possible under conditions of perfect order and tranquillity. We shall not permit arbitrary or illegal acts, and we shall impose our imperial will on the disobedient by all the power of the State.

We appeal to all well-disposed Russians to combine for the maintenance of legal authority and the restoration of peace in our dear fatherland. May calm be reestablished once more in Russia, and may God help us to accomplish the chiefest of our tasks, the improvement of the lot of the peasant. Our will on this point is unalterable. The Russian husbandman, in case his land is too small to maintain him, shall be supplied, without prejudice to the property of others, with legitimate and honest means for enlarging his holdings. The representatives of the other classes will, at our request, devote all their efforts to the promotion of this great undertaking which will be given a definitely legal form by a future Duma.

In dissolving the Duma we confirm our immutable intention of maintaining this institution, and in conformity with this intention we fix March 5, 1907, as the date of the convocation of a new Duma by a ukase addressed to the Senate. With unshakable faith in divine clemency and in the good sense of

the Russian people, we shall expect from the new Duma the realization of our efforts and their promotion of legislation in accordance with the requirements of a regenerated Russia.

Faithful sons of Russia, your Tsar calls upon you as a father upon his children to unite with him for the regeneration of our holy fatherland. We believe that giants in thought and action will appear, and that, thanks to their assiduous efforts, the glory of Russia will continue to shine.

THE GROWTH OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIA

THE YEAR 1861 is a landmark in Russian history. Up to that date the prevailing form of economy had been serfdom, an organization of life that had kept the mass of the population engaged in agricultural routine. Serfdom had been gradually introduced into Russia during the sixteenth century, precisely at the time when Western Europe was throwing it off. In subsequent centuries it had been worked into a system, embodied into law, and riveted upon the Russian people. It had thus doomed them to stagnation, backwardness, and ignorance at the very time when the rest of Europe, by ridding itself of feudalism, was learning how to read and write, how to build states and develop commerce.

Peter the Great and Catherine II, Russia's great eighteenth-century monarchs had, it is true, done something to modernize Russia by winning for her access to the Baltic and the Black Sea, and by introducing Western methods of manufacturing and modes of thought. But this was not enough. Russia, to become great and modern, had first of all to rid herself of feudalism, even as France and England and Holland had done.

The principal deciding factor in bringing about the Edict of Emancipation in 1861 was a wave of peasant uprisings in the years 1835-55, in the course of which 144 landlords were killed. These peasant disturbances, combined with Russian defeat in the Crimean War, indicated clearly that the Tsar would have to grant freely that which the peasants might otherwise take by force. However, the provisions of the Edict were decisively influenced by the nobility, who insisted upon a heavy indemnity for the loss of their servile labor. Not merely were the peasants compelled to pay their landlords exorbitant sums of money for the houses, gardens, and allotments that they had farmed from time immemorial; the landlords were, in addition, to retain one half of the village lands, no matter how essential such lands might be to the welfare of the village community. The village commune was made responsible to the landlords for assessing and collecting the enormous debt with which the peasants thus found themselves saddled.

The immediate effect of the Emancipation Edict was an actual decrease in the area of the allotment lands which were for the peasant bread and life. This was owing to the fact that the landlords, claiming as their right the best land in the village, cut off from the allotments such strips as they saw fit to retain in their own possession. Choked with debt, robbed of their land, many serfs emerged from "emancipation" with their economic status substantially unimproved.

Subsequent effects of the emancipation were, however, far-reaching. Peasants ruined by the crushing redemption debt, surplus workers and domestic servants of the manor, were forced to seek a living in factory and town. In the quarter

of a century from 1865 to 1890 the number of workers employed in industry and on railroad construction increased from 706,000 to 1,433,000, or more than doubled. In the village itself the practice of buying or renting the "proprietary" lands—that is, the lands still in the hands of the landlords—caused the appearance of numerous peasant landowners and led to the gradual development of farming on a capitalist basis.

The following selections reflect the events described above. The Edict of Emancipation is a historic document published after long deliberations and consultations between statisticians, committees of enquiry, and nobility; in it, the influence of the nobility is primarily reflected. The growth of manufacturing and trade is illustrated from a report submitted by the Russian Government to the world's Columbian Exposition at Chicago in 1893. Count Witte, a selection from whose *Memoirs* is included, was Communications and Finance Minister in the period from 1892–1902. He strove to develop industry and communications in the face of opposition from the Tsar and the nobility; his writing reflects the extent to which foreign capital was used in the development of Russia's natural resources, and reveals the businessman's objections to a regime that failed to provide conditions of security for both the home and the foreign investor.

The selections are taken from J. H. Robinson and C. A. Beard, *Readings in Modern European History*, Vol. II (Boston, Ginn and Co., 1909); *The Industries of Russia*, Vols. I–II (St. Petersburg, 1893); and *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, translated from the Russian by A. Yarmolinsky (Garden City, Doubleday, Page and Co., 1921).



EMANCIPATION OF THE SERFS, 1861

WE, ALEXANDER II, by the grace of God Tsar and Autocrat of all the Russias, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., make known to all our faithful subjects:

Summoned to the throne of our ancestors by Divine Providence and the sacred law of heredity, we have promised ourselves with heartfelt sincerity to extend our affection and imperial solicitude to all our faithful subjects, whatever their rank or condition, from the soldier who nobly bears arms in the defense of his country to the humble artisan who faithfully carries on his industry; from the functionary who occupies a high office in the State to the laborer whose plow furrows the fields.

As we consider the various classes of which the State is composed, we are convinced that the laws of our empire which have wisely provided for the upper and middle classes, and have fixed with precision their rights and obligations, have not reached the same degree of success in relation to the peasants bound to the soil, who, either through ancient laws or custom, have been hereditarily subjected to the authority of the landlords. Indeed, the rights

of landowners over their serfs have hitherto been very extensive and very imperfectly defined by the laws, which have been supplemented by tradition, custom and the good will of the landlords.

This system has at best established patriarchal relations based upon the fairness and benevolence of the landowners and an affectionate docility on the part of the peasants; but as manners have lost their simplicity, the paternal ties between the landlords and the peasants have been weakened. Furthermore, as the seigniorial authority falls into the hands of those exclusively intent on their own selfish advantage, those relations of mutual good will have tended to give way and open the door to arbitrariness, burdensome to the peasants and hostile to their prosperity. This has served to develop in them an indifference to all progress.

These facts did not fail to impress our predecessors of glorious memory, and they took measures to improve the lot of the peasants; but these measures have had little effect, since they were either dependent for their execution on the individual initiative of such landlords as might be animated by a liberal spirit or were merely local in their scope, or adopted as an experiment.

We became convinced, therefore, that the work of fundamentally ameliorating the condition of the peasant was for us a sacred heritage from our ancestors, a mission which in the course of events Divine Providence had called us to fulfill. We have commenced this work by demonstrating our imperial confidence in the nobility of Russia, who have given us so many proofs of their devotion and their constant disposition to make sacrifices for the well-being of the country. It was to the nobility themselves that, in conformity to their own wishes, we reserved the right of formulating the provision for the new organization of the peasants,—provisions which involve the necessity of limiting their own rights over the peasants, and of accepting the responsibilities of a reform which could only be accomplished with some material losses to them. Our confidence has not been deceived. We have found the nobility, united in committees in the various governments, ready to make, through agents who enjoyed their confidence, the voluntary sacrifices of their rights so far as the personal servitude of the peasants is concerned.

The propositions of the local committees of the nobility—which varied greatly, as might be expected from the nature of the problem—have been collated, compared, and reduced to a regular system, then adjusted and supplemented by a higher committee appointed for the purpose. The new provisions thus formulated relative to the peasants and the domestic serfs of the landholders have been submitted to the Council of the Empire. After having invoked divine assistance we have resolved to carry out the work according to the regulations thus drawn up.

The peasants now bound to the soil shall, within the term fixed by the law,

be vested with the full rights of freemen. The landed proprietors, while they shall retain all the rights of ownership over all the lands now belonging to them, shall transfer to the peasants, in return for a rent fixed by law, the full enjoyment of their cottages, farm buildings, and gardens. Furthermore, in order to assure to the peasants their subsistence and enable them to meet their obligations toward the State, the landlords shall turn over to the peasants a quantity of arable and other land provided for in the regulations above mentioned. In return for these allotments the peasant families shall be required to pay rent to the landlords, as fixed by the provisions of the law. Under these conditions, which are temporary, the peasants shall be designated as "temporarily bound."

At the same time the peasants are granted the right of purchasing their cottages and gardens, and, with the consent of the landlords, they may acquire in complete ownership the arable lands and other lands allotted to them as a permanent holding. By the acquisition of a complete title to the land assigned them, the peasants shall be freed from their obligations toward the landlords for land thus purchased, and thus enter definitively into the class of free peasants and landowners.

Since the new organization, owing to the unavoidable complexity of the changes which it involves, cannot immediately be put into execution, a lapse of time is necessary, which cannot be less than two years or thereabouts; to avoid all misunderstanding and to protect public and private interests during this interval, the system actually existing on the estates of landowners will be maintained up to the moment when the new system shall have been instituted by the completion of the required preparatory measures.

Aware of all the difficulties of the reform we have undertaken, we place our trust in the goodness of Divine Providence, who watches over the destinies of Russia. We also count upon the generous devotion of our faithful nobility, and we are happy to testify to that body the gratitude it has deserved from us, as well as from the country, for the disinterested support it has given to the accomplishment of our designs. Russia will not forget that the nobility, actuated solely by its respect for the dignity of man and its love for its neighbor, has spontaneously renounced the rights it enjoyed in virtue of the system of serfdom now abolished, and has laid the foundation of a new future for the peasants. We also entertain the firm hope that it will also direct its further efforts to carry out the new regulation by maintaining good order, in a spirit of peace and benevolence.

In order to render the transactions between the landlords and the peasants easier, so that the latter may acquire in full proprietorship their houses and the adjacent lands and buildings, the government will grant them assistance,

according to a special regulation, through loans of money or a transfer of mortgages encumbering an estate.

When the first rumors of this great reform contemplated by the government spread among the country people who were scarcely prepared for it, it gave rise in some instances to misunderstandings among individuals more intent upon liberty than mindful of the duties which liberty imposes. But generally the good sense of the country has asserted itself. It has been understood that the landlords would not be deprived of rights legally acquired, except for a fit and sufficient indemnity, or by a voluntary concession on their part; that it would be contrary to all equity for the peasants to accept the enjoyment of the lands conceded by the landlords without at the same time accepting equivalent charges.

And now we confidently hope that the freed serfs, in the presence of the new future which is opened before them, will appreciate and recognize the considerable sacrifices which the nobility has made on their behalf. They will understand that the blessing of an existence based upon full ownership of their property, as well as the greater liberty in the administration of their possessions, entails upon them, with new duties towards society and themselves, the obligation of justifying the new laws by a loyal and judicious use of the rights which are now accorded them. For if men do not themselves endeavor to insure their own well-being under the aegis of the laws, the best of those laws cannot guarantee it to them. Only by assiduous labor, a rational expenditure of their strength and resources, a strict economy, and, above all, by an upright life,—a life constantly inspired by the fear of the Lord,—can they hope for prosperity and progress.

And now, my orthodox and faithful people, make the holy sign of the cross and join thy prayers to ours, invoking the blessing of the Most High upon thy first free labors, for this alone is a sure pledge of private well-being and the public weal.

Given at St. Petersburg, the nineteenth day of February [March 3, new style], of the year of grace 1861 and the seventh of our reign.

ALEXANDER

GOVERNMENT REVIEW OF THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY AND TRADE OF RUSSIA

THE RUSSIAN BRANCH of the Slavonic peoples, occupying from immemorial times as colonists the western half of the immense plain stretching for two and one-half thousand kilometres from the rocks of Finland to the mountains

of the Caucasus, and from the Carpathians to the Urals, from necessity, from the rapidity of its natural increase, from its inclination to peaceful domestic occupations, and finally from its habit of struggling against the difficulties presented by nature, has ever been mainly occupied with agricultural pursuits. Trade relations were assisted by the vast rivers and the winter sledge roads, but were hindered by the lack of seacoast, extensive forests, the raids of the tribes of Finnish and Mongolian descent, and the internal disorder which caused the people in the ninth century to elect princes whose chief care consisted in the establishment of internal organization and external defense from those neighbouring tribes which had partly fallen away from, partly been assimilated by Russia. The division of the country into many separate principalities, the warring of the princes, the imposition for two centuries of the Mongol yoke, the ceaseless defensive wars undertaken against the Swedes and the Teutonic knights pressing on from the north-west, against the Poles who had deprived Russia of her western and south-western territories, and against the Tartars who attacked her from the east and south-east, all this occupied the Russian people even in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to such an extent that there was little possibility of beginning any lasting industrial development. Only in the seventeenth century the Moscovite Tsars, after uniting the people and strengthening their authority with the aid of the most enterprising inhabitants of the Moscow region were in a position to present stout resistance to the west, and having finally broken the force of their eastern enemies, were able to begin to think about the development of Russian trade and industry. Opening with the great reforms of Peter the Great, the eighteenth century already brings Russia into the circle of nations with a trading and industrial organization. But these efforts were opposed by the wars with the Swedes, ending with the occupation of the Baltic provinces, the wars in the south for pushing back the Turks who had already succeeded in seizing the northern shores of the Black Sea and the territories of the related Slavs, and the ceaseless extension to the east, where unorganized Asiatic hordes long prevented the establishment of peace and order to which the Russian people ever strove, and which it attained so lately. The beginning of the nineteenth century bears the same character in consequence of the invasion by Napoleon, the Turkish wars and the forcible introduction of an orderly rule in the Caucasus and the Central Asiatic territories, where it was impossible to permit the constant raids upon the country and rapes of the inhabitants by petty Asiatic rulers. At this time trade relations with the west began to develop principally in agricultural raw materials, the production of which visibly increased in proportion as order was established, and to such an extent that the surplus of grain, hemp, flax, timber and wool,

chiefly from the Chernoziom zone of Russia, began to be sent in abundance to the markets of Western Europe, and furnished grounds for regarding Russia as an exclusively agricultural country, a view justified by the whole structure of Russia's past existence. . . .

The chief cause of the feebleness of the development of the home manufacturing industry consisted for a long time in the whole organization of former Russian life, which was concentrated in the peasantry, which directed all its energies to agricultural productions and employed for the attainment of this object only the means which lay at hand, such as the replacement of lands exhausted by cultivation by fresh lots, home-made implements and the felling of forests. The rural gentry, or large landholders, having serf labourers bound to them, employed them also mainly in the cultivation of the land and, like the peasants, strove to satisfy their wants as far as possible from their domestic resources, only having recourse to the productions of manufacturing industry as a luxury. Thus houses were built chiefly of wood from their own estates by their own carpenters, who had attained extraordinary skill in their trade. Clothing also was in the main wove from home-grown flax and wool or made from home furs and skins. In the matter of food the people confined themselves so strictly to their domestic resources that the preparation for winter of various preserves, beginning with salted and soured vegetables and ending with the making of confectionery and sparkling drinks, formed part of the business of every well-to-do household. This patriarchal state of domestic economy, preserved with due reverence for the old order of things, here and there to this day prevailed over the whole country even in the middle of the present century. There was thus little room for the demand for the products of manufacture, a fact which till now serves as the chief explanation of the feeble development of the latter in the Empire. All that there is in this respect is almost entirely new. Mills and manufactories first appeared in those places where, from the growth of the population and from the exhaustion of the soil or the want of land, the conditions permitting of the indefinite preservation of the beloved patriarchal system were disappearing. Particularly, and earlier than anywhere else, was this the case in localities situated near Moscow, where there is already a very dense population. . . .

. . . With the increase of population in this heart of Russia, for a long time and even to-day, the surplus had colonised the more distant districts of the Empire, but notwithstanding this, here earlier than elsewhere, appeared the conditions necessary for the springing up of mills and manufactories requiring unemployed labour, no longer satisfied with agriculture alone. Accordingly the neighbourhood of Moscow has become the centre for the free and independent growth of many kinds of manufactories and works, where

also have been situated from ancient times the centre of Russia's trade relations, not only with the interior but also with foreign countries and especially with Asia.

The present volume is intended to acquaint our country's friends in the United States, and those visiting the World's Columbian Exposition, with the economic life of Russia. The conditions then which favoured the visible growth, or at times, as in the case of sugar and petroleum, the very origin of manufacturing industry, began to appear and improve principally in that period of the sixties and seventies, when the serfs were emancipated from forced labour, and the active construction of the system of Russian railways was begun. The causes of the close connection between these internal reforms and the demonstrations of the necessity for the development of mills and manufactories are numerous. The most important cause must be accounted, that the land began to be tilled by free labour and consequently this labour became more productive than before, and a number of people accordingly appeared seeking for wares, outside of agriculture, although all the peasants had received land allotments, and although the lands of the landholders, both by way of lease and by hired labourers, were brought under more thorough tillage. This latter circumstance was still further helped by the railways which gave an outlet abroad to the grain surplus of many remote regions of Russia. Almost an equal importance is ascribable to certain other causes, among which was the increased demand of all classes of the population for manufactured articles, especially leather, glass, iron, kerosene. Next came the increase of free capital, called forth by the development of banking operations, founded on the issue of land-redemption certificates, or the mortgaging of land and houses, and the circulation of various shares and bonds, a practice until then very rare in Russia. Lastly, must be noticed the propagation of the manners and customs of the towns over the whole country now intersected by railways, whose appearance gave an impulse to every kind of exchange. . . .

. . . The present industrial policy of Russia is directed precisely to the end that the productive forces of the country should be turned to the manufacture of the abundant supplies of agricultural and mineral raw materials in the Empire, that the people may obtain new sources of wages and income and that the buying capacity and wealth of the country may be increased. The demand for articles not of domestic production is still small, but it is always better for the inhabitants when they are satisfied by such means as yield them new wages and permit them, even if only partially, to become accustomed to the satisfaction of their growing needs at the expense of increasing the development of the natural resources of the country. The growth of their pro-

duction at the same time forms an increase in the world's supply, and this at last leads to a lowering of prices. With the present course of affairs, the home manufacturing industry is annually widening at the expense of foreign imports at the rate of about 40 million roubles, although the total demand for manufactured articles grows more slowly. Remaining in the country this sum goes to enlarge the national wealth. Russia now consumes annually about two milliard roubles' worth of goods of this kind, or reckoning about 120 million inhabitants, not more than 17 roubles a head. This comparatively small demand for products not of domestic or agricultural origin is determined not only by the predominance of the rural population striving to this day to satisfy all its needs through home productions, but also by the two considerations set forth below.

When with the abolition of the obligatory labour of the serfs in the sixties, the unsatisfactory character of the former patriarchal system of economy and the impossibility of its continuance became evident, and at the same time the necessity appeared for the development of industry, the conditions did not then exist for the birth and growth of a home manufacturing and mining activity. A demand for goods of this description began to be made by the country, but the satisfying of this demand was effected by means of foreign producers, the customs policy of that time being directed solely to the protection of existing kinds of industry and paying no attention to the establishment at home of the production of goods, the demand for which only became evident with the construction of railways. . . .

At the same time the conditions always existed in Russia for the satisfaction of this demand by means of developing the home production. The demonstration of this fact is now to be seen in the greatly increasing production of cast iron, iron and steel goods, from the time when the principles of customs protection were applied to this industry. The demand for goods manufactured from cast iron has not diminished but has ever increased during recent years, while the satisfaction of this demand by home production began to grow only from the year 1883 when efficient measures were resorted to in order to enable the home production of cast iron, and iron and steel wares, to grow and compete with the earlier developed foreign production. . . . During the current decade this branch of the industry has been growing still more, reaching in all, inclusive of cast iron, steel and iron, more than 70 million pounds. At the same time the home production is growing much faster than the increase in the demand, so that the import of foreign goods is falling greatly and the time is not far distant when the native production of iron, cast iron and steel will cover the demand and even surpass it. This will inevitably lead to a fall in prices and to a growth in the export which has long existed for

Russian iron. In the same manner as in this branch of industry, a growth likewise began not long ago in many kinds of production, both mining and manufacturing, will correspond to the forces and requirements of Russia. Such a growth is taking place gradually and increasing the development of the home wages and wealth among the masses of the people.

. . . The development of the working of many of the natural resources of Russia will lead not only to the lowering of their prices and the enlargement of their consumption, but also to the increase of wealth and prosperity, or as a consequence to the increase of the demand for goods not of domestic production. The example of the petroleum industry shows that several decades of years are required for the attainment of the proper growth of the Russian home manufacturing industry. The treatment on a large scale of petroleum in Baku was begun in 1862, while the almost complete suppression of foreign imports corresponds to the year 1882. The policy of a carefully thought out protection extended to various productions had scarcely begun in the middle of the eighties; the fruits, however, are already beginning to show themselves, although it is impossible to expect a complete result, especially the manifest enlargement of home consumption earlier than the beginning of the next century. The consequence of the prevalence of the conviction in the brilliant period of the sixties, when many sides of Russian life were being reformed, is that Russia as an exclusively agricultural country should not make any special efforts to develop its mining and manufacturing industries, being in a position to advantageously obtain in exchange for its grain all kinds of manufactured goods from foreigners. A result of such a view is not only the feeble development in Russia of mining and manufacturing industry, but the small buying power of the people. . . . The industry which has been customary and from immemorial time peculiar to the Russian people, the growing of grain, has during the past twenty years suffered a great change throughout the whole world. This has had as a consequence the result of lowering the prices for grain produce during this period instead of advancing them. . . .

The fall in the prices of grain products referred to above is due to two causes. In the first place, the number of countries supplying the western European markets, as England, Germany, France, Italy, Holland, and Belgium with grain, has lately increased, not only by the great rise in the imports from the United States but by supplies also from Austria, Roumania, India, Australia, South America and Africa. Such a result was due to the prevailing peace and to the cheapening of transport by sea. . . . The second cause of the lowering of the prices of corn upon the western European markets was the introduction by many countries, such as Germany, France, Italy and

Greece, of customs duties upon foreign grain, with a view to protect the earnings of the home farmers. The Russian farmers, namely the great bulk of the population, lost heavily from the fall in grain prices referred to. The cheapening of freights and a certain regulation of the conditions of the immense home and foreign grain trade of Russia mitigated the burden proceeding from the reduction in the prices of grain, but at the same time various symptoms began to show themselves of the impossibility of relying upon agriculture alone for the further development of the economical life of the country. . . . For the solution of the problem confronting Russia, namely, how to improve the exchange and at the same time increase the wages and wealth of the whole population, there are two methods and their combinations suggested. These are first, to increase the price of the grain exported from Russia, and second, to enlarge the other earnings of its inhabitants. But the first method is not within the power of the people and does not satisfy all interests, because part of Russia are buyers and not sellers of grain. At the same time the rise of prices of grain over the whole world must come of itself, in the natural course of commerce; it is only necessary to wait. Therefore, there remains the second way, that is, the development in Russia of the industrial treatment of its other natural resources, under the conviction that it will lead not only to the increase of the national earnings, but to the export from Russia of various productions of its mining and manufacturing industry. With its cheap grain, with the existing preparation and the variety of the natural resources of the country this is possible for Russia more than for many other countries. This explains the increased protection during the present reign and the transitory economical condition from purely agricultural to industrial agricultural, in which the country now is.

The felling of many forests, the lack of moisture and the consequent repeated cases of crop failures are forcing the adoption of more thorough and rational methods of agriculture. But the absence of the development of manufacturing industry precisely in those governments of Russia which are the preeminent furnishers of grain, places a limit to efforts of this kind, as the cultivation of artificial grasses, roots and plants having a commercial importance cannot be widely developed unless the neighbourhood of industrial enterprises consumes them. Such kinds of agricultural products form the foundation of intensive systems of cultivation, already become necessary, in the majority of the localities of European Russia. Hence although the production of breadstuffs, mainly grain, in Russia has largely increased since the sixties, this has not led to an increase of the wealth in the agricultural districts of the Empire. Thus is explained the above indicated small demand for goods

not of domestic production, and the feeble growth of the demand for such goods in late years. . . .

The turn taken by Russian economical life in this direction, coincides with the beginning of the eighties, that is, to the time of the beginning of the reign of the present Emperor, Alexander Alexandrovich, but receives the most evident expression in the new tariff of 1891. This began at first in very moderate dimensions to protect the raising of all kinds of minerals, for example, sulphur and pyrites, all sorts of ores, stones and coal. At the same time this tariff proceeded to encourage more highly than had the former the existing forms of industry employed in working up home raw materials, and to call new methods into being. This was particularly the case with the chemical manufacturing and metal industries and such rural occupations, as wine making, the making of all kinds of preserves, the preparation of artificial fertilizers, starch, products obtained from wood, such as turpentine, resin, cellulose, and of every kind of agricultural manufactured product. The fruits of this policy are already clearly apparent, and first of all in the direction taken by agricultural activity. An obvious proof of this statement is the rapid growth of cotton planting in the warm regions of Russia. . . .

. . . All these and many other kinds of manufacturing activity in Russia are, however, now only passing through the initial period of their origin, and therefore still encounter many obstacles of various kinds. Thus, many forms of Russian industry should now be regarded as seeds sown at the right moment in an economical soil favourable for growth, demanding the blessed rain of government measures, now pouring down upon them, necessary for quick fruit. . . .

Secured with an immense extent of fertile lands capable without extraordinary effort of feeding the people, even if increasing at the most rapid rate possible, possessing the climatic conditions necessary for the yielding of the most various productions of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, containing in her bowels, almost untouched, every possible kind of ore and stone beginning with the most abundant coal beds and ending with inexhaustible stores of scarcely touched native gold, finally as a territory, having in many parts already a dense population and situated midway between even more thickly populated regions of Europe and Asia, Russia as a country enjoying peace and order, determined by the absolute unity of the will and desires of the Emperor and of the whole people, aspiring with all the fire of youth to receive the blessings of enlightenment, has now reached the period at which the already existing germs of manufacturing industry must inevitably develop with tremendous pace.

WITTE'S FINANCIAL REFORMS

MY FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES proper included, first of all, the conversion of our loans, transactions consisting in passing from loans at a higher rate of interest to loans at a lower rate. In addition to these very extensive financial operations I negotiated several direct loans, exclusively to cover the expenses of railroad construction and to increase our gold resources on connection with the introduction of the gold standard of currency. In all these enterprises I enjoyed the unqualified support of His Majesty.

Among my purely financial reforms the first place belongs, no doubt, to the introduction of the gold standard of currency. This measure definitely established Russia's credit and put her financially on an equal footing with the European Powers. It was owing to this reform that we weathered the wretched Japanese War and the subsequent domestic upheaval. Without it, an economic and financial collapse would have occurred at the very beginning of the war, and all the economic achievements of the recent decades would have been annihilated. . . .

In the beginning, nearly the whole of thinking Russia was opposed to the reform. Very few of our financial and economic experts had any theoretical or practical knowledge of the matter in its entirety. The subject was not taught in our institutions of higher learning, and there were no good books in Russian on currency problems. As we had lived under the régime of paper currency since the Crimean War, the very notion of metallic currency had become obscured in the press and in the minds of educated people generally. We had grown accustomed to paper currency as one gets used to chronic disease, in spite of the fact that gradually it ruins the organism.

I was strenuously opposed by those elements of the population which were interested in the export of commodities, especially the farmers. They imagined that paper currency was advantageous for them, because with the depreciation of our money they obtained more for their products exported abroad, i.e., in terms of our depreciated money. Of course this opinion was erroneous, for the exporter had to pay higher prices for whatever he purchased. Not being an economist, he failed to grasp the correlation of phenomena. . . .

The economic wealth and consequently the political strength of a country depend upon three factors: natural resources, capital, and labour, physical and intellectual. With regard to natural resources, Russia is extremely rich, although she is unfavourably situated because of the rigorous climate in many of her sections. In capital, that is, accumulated values, she is poor, for the

reason that the history of the country is a continuous chain of wars, not to speak of other reasons. Considering her population, she is rich in physical labour and also in intellectual resources, for the Russians are a gifted, sensible, and God-fearing people. All these factors of production are intimately correlated in the sense that only their concerted and coordinated action can produce wealth. At present, owing to the development of communication, natural resources are easily transported, and owing to the growth of international credit, capital is even more easily shifted. In view of this, labour has acquired an exceptional importance in the creation of wealth. It follows that I had to give especial attention to the development of both capital and labour. In the first place, it was necessary to stabilize the national credit. I hope that financial history will acknowledge the fact that never did Russian credit stand higher in both domestic and international money markets than at the time when I was Minister of Finances. It was not my fault that our military adventures have so thoroughly injured our credit. The other day I read in some Russian papers arguments to the effect that it does not matter to the foreign bankers and holders of our securities what régime prevails in our country, provided an end is put to anarchy. This is rather a naïve idea. It is of the utmost importance to both the foreign and the domestic investor that we should have a governmental régime under which adventures like the Japanese War would be impossible, and that the nation should cease to become the object of experiments in the hands of a self-seeking and irresponsible court camarilla. Our creditors can have no faith in a régime under which they lost twenty per cent. of their investments.

During my administration of the country's finances, I increased the state debt, approximately nineteen hundred million rubles, and I spent even more on railroads and amortization of the debts of the Imperial Bank for the purpose of restoring the gold standard of our currency. Thus the money borrowed was expended for productive purposes exclusively. That money has increased the country's capital.

Owing to the confidence of foreign capital in Russia's credit, which I built up, our country obtained several billion rubles of foreign capital. There are people, and their number is not small, who hold this against me. Oh, folly and ignorance! No country has ever developed without foreign capital. Throughout my administration I have defended the idea of the usefulness of foreign capital. In this respect, I had to contend with such statesmen as I. N. Durnovo, Plehve, and other members of the Committee of Ministers. Nicholas, as usual, favoured now one, now the other viewpoint. He went as far as calling a special session to discuss the advisability of importing foreign capital. At this session I declared that I was not afraid of foreign capital, that

on the contrary I considered it beneficial for Russia. What I feared, I said, was that our régime is so peculiar that but few foreigners would care to have anything to do with us. Of course, foreign capital would have entered the country more abundantly if so many obstacles had not been created against it during my administration.

A great many people, including the Emperor, opposed the importation of foreign capital to Russia for purely nationalistic considerations. They argued that Russian natural resources should be exploited by "true" Russians and with the aid of Russian money. They overlooked the fact that the amount of available capital in Russia was very small. As a result, industrial concessions were usually granted to "true" Russians, who subsequently sold them to foreigners and pocketed a round sum of totally unearned money. Thus, for instance, I recall that a certain retired Colonel, by the name of Vonlyarlyarski, obtained a concession for mining gold on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Several months later he sold it to a foreign corporation.

The development of our national labour was another great problem. The productivity of Russian labour is exceedingly low, this being due to the climate, among other reasons. For the latter reason, tens of millions are idle several months during the year. The scarcity of ways of communication is another factor lowering the productivity of labour. After the Turkish War of the '70's railroad construction was suspended, and it fell to my lot to resume the building of railways. In this respect, I have succeeded in achieving a good deal, for during my administration I doubled the railroad mileage. . . .

. . . I strained every effort to develop a railroad net. Military considerations, with which his Majesty often naturally sided prevented me from building the lines most productive economically. As a result, the system yielded a deficit.

After dealing with the railroads for forty years, I can say that in most cases the strategic considerations of our War Ministry regarding the direction of the road are pure fantasy. The country will be best off if, in building railroads, it is guided by purely economic considerations. On the whole, such railroads would also meet the strategic needs. It is my opinion that this should become a basic principle of railroad construction. For thirty years we were building railroads with a view to a war in the West, and we have wasted no end of energy in that section. In the end the war broke out in the Far East.

To create new sources for the application of labour, it was more than desirable to develop our industry. Alexander the Third, with his characteristic firmness and wisdom, was the first to recognize and carry out this policy. In this respect I was his faithful assistant. It was imperative to develop our in-

dustries not only in the interest of the people, but also of the State. A modern body politic cannot be great without a well-developed national industry. As Minister of Finances, I was also in charge of our commerce and industry. As such, I increased our industry threefold. This again is held against me. Fools! It is said that I took artificial measures to develop our industry. What a silly phrase! How else can one develop an industry? Whatever men do is to a certain extent artificial. The measures taken by me were much less artificial and drastic than those practised by many foreign countries. The only thing I did was to support the protectionist tariff introduced by Vyshnegradski under Alexander III. This I did in the face of a strenuous opposition on the part of the large landowners. All my efforts to facilitate the formation of joint-stock companies were systematically thwarted by the Ministry of the Interior and Plehve particularly. I have also been blamed for having issued industrial loans from the Imperial Bank. In reality, these loans amounted only to some 50,000,000 rubles. Besides, a considerable portion of this sum was lent, without my approval, to members of the court camarilla or their friends. I must say that but few people in Russia grasped the full significance of my work of building up the nation's industries. Among those few, be it mentioned in passing, was Mendeleyev, our great scientist and my life-long friend.

Railroad construction and industrial expansion diverted some four or five million men from agriculture, thus increasing, so to speak, the country's land resources by 20,000,000 to 25,000,000 desiatins. Much more will have to be done in the future to fertilize Russian labour. The very conditions under which the people live and work will have to be changed. At present a Russian works as he drinks. While he drinks less than a member of any other nationality, he gets drunk more frequently. While he works less, he overworks himself more frequently than anyone else.

RUSSIAN IMPERIAL EXPANSION

THE VAST HEART of Asia, stretching from the Arctic to the Himalayas, from the Urals to the Pacific, constitutes Siberia. The conquest and exploration of this endless expanse of forest, steppe, and desert belongs among the great epics of history. First steps were taken by the Cossacks in the sixteenth century. Under the leadership of Yermak Timofeyevich they swarmed across the Urals in search of land and fur. Within a century the whole continent had been traversed and colonists were settling in the basin of the Amur river which flows into the Pacific at Nikolaievsk.

Throughout the eighteenth century the Russian occupation of Siberia remained a series of settlements loosely strung across the headwaters and down the valleys of the great rivers, and protected from the nomads by fortresses or stockaded posts. It was not until the nineteenth century that the Tsars began to consolidate the whole Siberian empire and to strengthen their grip on the enormously wealthy lands of the Amur basin. The first moves were made by Nikolai Muraviev, who organized a Russian advance toward the Pacific in the years from 1840 to 1860, and who was responsible for the founding of settlements at Nikolaievsk and Vladivostok.

These moves had been undertaken through fear of a British advance in China. It was clear, however, that no serious advance toward the control of eastern Siberia could be achieved without the building of a railroad to link European Russia and Vladivostok. In the first place, serious colonization of the Pacific territories was impossible without provision of transportation; and in the second place, exploitation of Manchurian and Chinese markets required the institution of a railroad system.

The first of the following selections is from an article which was part of a series specially prepared for the World's Columbian Exposition held in Chicago in 1893. Its purpose was to present a picture of Russian commerce and industry to other countries. It painted in rosy terms the economic benefits to be derived from the construction of the trans-Siberian railroad, which was presented as a harbinger of peace and friendship among the nations. Reality did not bear out the predictions of the article. Russian expansion precipitated the war between China and Japan in 1895, as a result of which Japan hoped to neutralize Russian advances into Manchuria by acquiring a firm foothold on the mainland, notably in Korea. Russian expansion also resulted in the war of 1904-5 in which the Japanese inflicted a severe defeat on the Russians and decisively checked the aspirations of the latter.

Expansion brought Russia into conflict with Britain, as well as with Japan. Britain was especially sensitive to pressure at spots where a Russian advance might endanger imperial communications or colonial territories. She had already fought the Crimean War in order to prevent a Russian advance into the Mediterranean, and subsequently she became alarmed lest Russian influence in Persia

might threaten Afghanistan and Baluchistan, the mountainous outposts of the Indian Empire. The rise of an aggressive German imperialism, however, compelled Britain to make common cause with Russia. The 1907 Treaty registered the existence of spheres of influence in Persia which both parties pledged themselves not to disturb.

The selections are from *Industries of Russia*, Vols. III-IV (St. Petersburg, 1893); and W. H. Cooke and E. P. Stickney, *Readings in European International Relations since 1879* (New York, Harper and Bros., 1931).



GOVERNMENT REPORT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY

THE ENORMOUS EXPENDITURE of 350 million roubles entailed by the construction of the Siberian railroad, which probably for a long time will not prove remunerative in the strict sense of the word, is explained by those numerous advantages not subject to arithmetical computation which may be attained by the Government with the realization of this grand enterprise. [A] previous historical-statistical article has demonstrated that the principal barrier to the development of culture in Siberia is the absence of regular communication, on the one hand between the most important administrative and industrial centres of Siberia, and on the other hand between Siberia and European Russia. Consequently when this principal obstacle is removed the causes will disappear which have for such a long time retarded the regular peopling of this extensive and richly endowed region and the rise in the culture of the aborigines and settlers. In reality the Great Siberian Railway, intersecting the whole of Siberia for a distance of 7,112 versts, embraces a very wide zone, which cannot be taken at less than 100 versts on either side of the line, or about one million and a half square versts. This enormous area, which exceeds the whole extent of central Europe, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Holland, Belgium and Denmark, lies in the mean geographical latitudes, and as regards climate and soil possesses all the qualities favourable to the development of agriculture, rural economy and the industries connected with them. . . .

. . . Thanks to the immediate connection by rail between the "Granary of Siberia" and those governments of the Russian Empire where a lack of land is apparent, the enterprise about to be realized should become an excellent emigration regulator in the interests of the State in general. Taking into consideration the extent already given of suitable colonizing land in Siberia, it may be

expected that in spite of the tendency of late years for emigration to Siberia, this country will for a long time be able to receive freely those who are desirous of availing themselves of its productive power, so great is its size and so vast the amount of suitable land for agricultural purposes.

When once the newly populated regions show signs of activity, the force of intellect will gravitate thither from European Russia and capital will find more advantageous use in the wider enterprises of industry. This might be encouraged by granting certain privileges in acquiring Crown lands to Russian nobles and other individuals in the Government service, who, as a more educated and cultured element, would be able to bring a civilizing influence with them. Thus the Great Siberian Railway, animating the uninhabited fertile lands ruled by the Governor-General of the steppes and opening up an extensive market for the sale of all products of the earth, would at the same time assist the successful solution of one of the most difficult problems of the State, namely, the definite organization of the economical condition of the peasants badly provided with land in the internal governments of European Russia. . . .

All the above mentioned advantages which trade will derive from the Siberian railways are only the most intimate changes which will result from the opening of the line and the new position of commercial intercourse between European Russia and Siberia on the one hand, and within the borders of Siberia on the other hand. In order, however, to grasp the whole extent of the actual importance of the Great Siberian Railway for Russian trade, the scope of vision must be enlarged and the probable consequences of this enterprise must be examined in connection with the fact that uninterrupted railroad communication will be established between Europe and the Pacific and the Far East. Thus the Siberian railway opens a new route, and new horizons for universal, as well as for Russian trade. This was clearly understood by the Russian merchants, whose representatives at the fair of Nizhni-Novgorod in 1889 expressed their hopes connecting the Russian merchant class with the realization of this enterprise in an address on the Siberian railway in the following terms: "This railroad will be of immense economic importance to Russia, and will give a great impulse to Russian industry; it will connect 400 million Chinese and 35 million Japanese with Europe through Russia. The strenuous endeavours made by Germany to gain possession of the markets of the Pacific, and the efforts which have been made to complete the Panama Canal visibly show that the economic struggle already commenced will end on the Pacific Ocean. The Canadian railroad has now appropriated part of the freights of silk, tea and furs which previously reached Europe through the Suez. Undoubtedly part of these goods will pass through Russia as the journey from Europe through Vladivostok to Shanghai will be made in 18 or 20 days,

instead of 45 through Suez or 35 days at present by the Canadian railway."

It is particularly important for Russia that this change in the direction of the traffic between Europe and the east of Asia should be to its advantage, and taking part in this communication with a continuous railroad more than 10 thousand versts long it can reap all the advantages not only in the conveyance of goods from the east of Asia and west of Europe, but also those of a large producer and consumer more closely connected than all others with the people of the east of Asia. The Siberian line will therefore not only have the effect of increasing the importance of Russia in the universal markets but new sources of national wealth will abundantly open around her.

It may be added that China, Japan and Corea, whose united populations amount to over 460 millions and whose international trade turnover exceeds 500 million roubles in gold, have not reached by far the limit of development of their commercial intercourse with Europe, but are rather undergoing the elementary stage of it. The internal provinces of China, being further removed from the shore are but little accessible to Europeans; but when once China has opened its ports to international trade, the provinces which have as yet been but little frequented by Europeans, will in the natural course of events sooner or later enter the international markets and carry on international commerce. In any case the commercial intercourse between Europe and China has every reason to extend, and it is therefore not surprising that the nations of Europe are making strenuous endeavours to gain possession of the eastern markets of Asia and do not hesitate before any expenditure likely to lead to this object. But in this respect, owing to its contiguity to these above mentioned rich countries, Russia possesses important advantages over all the other nations of Europe. Thus, at a distance of only 4 to 4½ thousand versts from the Volga, the Siberian railway approaches so near to the Chinese frontier, that it would be quite possible, by means of a branch line running into the borders of China, to start direct commercial interchange with the thickly populated internal provinces of China; in that case the Russian trade with China would extend very rapidly and the revenue of the main line of the Siberian railway would materially increase as well as the importance of Russia in the international trade with China. Taking also into consideration the predominating class of goods in the international trade of China it is evident that the rather more expensive railway freights compared with those by sea to some extent equalized by the smaller insurance charges, would not be an obstacle, hindering the transfer of Chinese goods from the sea route to the overland; and 58 per cent of the Chinese export trade is composed of two highly expensive articles, namely tea and silk. Besides quickness of transport and other conveniences, assuring the preference to railway transportation, there are

yet particular circumstances, which in the mutual interests of China and Russia, will conduce to the transfer of the transport of tea to the railway route. In the present export trade of China, England plays the most important part, but at the same time she is striving to compete with China in the production of tea and has met with some success as the tea plantations in the Asiatic colonies of England, in India and Ceylon, supply the greatest amount of tea to the whole of Great Britain. There are many favourable conditions in the English colonies which contribute to the success of this competition; among others the network of railways in India is of great advantage in conveying the tea to the ports which are twice as near to Europe as the Chinese ports. On account of the above mentioned circumstances the export of Chinese teas to London and to other countries is rapidly declining, and this is not only a great loss to a large part of the population of China, but for the Chinese treasury also, as tea is subjected to a high export duty in China. In all probability the continued decline of the tea trade will be a very serious question for China, and in this respect the Siberian railway may serve as a great support to the Chinese tea trade, by delivering Chinese teas much quicker in Europe, not only compared with the sea voyage from China through London, but much quicker than the transport of Indian teas. Therefore not only Russia, but China also, is most anxious that Russia should take an active part in the carriage and sale of tea in Europe, as Russia is one of the largest and continually increasing markets for the consumption of tea.

This tangible analogy of the interests of the two countries in the export of tea can but conduce to the gravitation of other Chinese exports towards the new route to Europe, especially as the other principal article of the Chinese export trade, silk, will not only be capable of bearing the expense of a long railway journey, but can also be woven in Russia.

Russia on the other hand, through the agency of the Siberian railway, will be able to take a much more active part in supplying China with those goods which are now imported thither from other countries, and in this respect Russia may meet with particular success in exporting cotton and woollen goods, and even metals, which together compose about one-half of the whole Chinese import. The former on account of their high value compared with their weight, may be conveyed from Moscow, or even from beyond Moscow by rail, and the metals may be brought to China from the Ural, or better still from the nearer mining districts of the Tomsk and Yeniseisk governments, the region of Transbaikalia and part of the government of Irkutsk, where the mineral wealth is but little inferior to that of the Urals and possesses all favorable qualifications for the extensive development of the mining industry. China will be a very near and valuable market for these districts as well as for other

Siberian wares such as leather goods, furs et cetera. The opening of the Siberian railway will therefore enable Russia to profit by the proximity of China for the sale of its produce.

There is no occasion to dwell upon the political importance of the Great Siberian Railway. Its significance is clear from the fact that when the line is completed Russia will not only nominally but actually occupy that position in the east of Asia which it holds among its friends and enemies in Europe. As the line shortens the distance from European Russia to the east of Asia, in a like measure will the power of Russia increase in the East. In addition to this undisputed position, it may be mentioned that the favourable conditions already mentioned occurring from the opening of the line and extending commercial intercourse between Russia and the nations of the East, will undoubtedly conduce to strengthen friendly political relations with those countries. These friendly relations will be cemented by the mutual interests in the field of universal economic activity. Finally the opening of a railway line to the Pacific Ocean will enable Russia to carry on more direct intercourse with the United States of America, which in spite of being the great competitor of Russia in the grain trade of Europe, in consequence of the solidarity of its political and other interests, cherishes sincere sympathy for Russia.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT CONCERNING PERSIA, 1907

THE GOVERNMENTS of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the abovementioned provinces of Persia;

Have agreed on the following terms:

I. Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point

on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

II. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

III. Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any Concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.

All Concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles I and II are maintained.

VIII

THE DIRECTIONS OF NINETEENTH- CENTURY SCIENCE

CHARLES DARWIN

THE APPEARANCE of *The Origin of Species* in 1859 is associated with the general acceptance of the fact of biological evolution—the fact that living species have not been immutable, but are the lineal descendants of other and usually extinct species. Moreover, Charles Darwin (1809–82) was taken as having given a foundation in natural science for the idea of evolution in general, familiar since the eighteenth century, especially as applied to society and social institutions. Thereafter his name was linked with the many and diverse forms of evolutionary social science which tried to gain prestige by borrowing the language of biology.

One type of evolutionary social theory laid special emphasis on the idea of “natural selection,” which Darwin held to be “the most important, but not the exclusive, means of modification” of biological species. These theories extended “natural selection” to human history, reading in social terms his subtitle, “The Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life.” They viewed the development of social institutions as caused by a fierce struggle either between individuals, or between various kinds of groups—races, nations, or classes. Since Bagehot’s *Physics and Politics* (1869), such views have often been called “social Darwinism.” This usage, however, overlooks the fact that Darwinian biological evolution was invoked to justify the most diverse positions, individualism and socialism, competition and cooperation, aristocracy and democracy, militarism and pacifism, ethical pessimism and ethical optimism. Ironically, Darwin himself did not apply his principles to human history, and doubted whether social processes could be explained by natural selection. He remained the biologist, not the social theorist.

Darwin came of a line of physicians; his grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, had been a pioneer evolutionist. After studying medicine, and preparing at Cambridge for theology, Darwin became naturalist for the surveying expedition of the *Beagle*. During this five-year voyage to remote corners of the globe he collected the basic evidence and obtained the initial inspiration for his theory of evolution. On his return he served as secretary of the Geological Society, in close association with Charles Lyell. Lyell’s revolutionary *Principles of Geology* (1830–33) had accustomed men to the immensity of geological time and to the principle of the “uniformity” of nature—the idea that all past changes must be understood as caused by the operation of natural processes like those occurring today. In accordance with this principle, Darwin looked to “artificial selection” (the way the breeder of new varieties of animals and plants selects those he will preserve) as the observable process that bears the closest analogy to the “natural selection” by which species might have been modified. But what automatic mechanism takes the place of the breeder? In 1838 Darwin found the answer in Malthus’s *Essay on Population*. In the competition for survival in human society, Darwin saw the analogue of the struggle for existence he had long observed among

living things. "Under these circumstances, favourable variations would tend to be preserved and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of new species. Here, then, I had a theory by which to work."

Illness forced Darwin to retire to a country seat at Down, where he patiently experimented with plants, and collected further evidence. He worked carefully and slowly, and had a book about half completed, when Alfred Russel Wallace sent him from the Moluccas a paper which read like an abstract of his own theory of natural selection. On the advice of his friends Lyell and Hooker, he sent Wallace's paper together with an abstract of his own to the Linnaean Society, where both were read on July 1, 1858. The next year he issued his completed treatise, *The Origin of Species*. In 1871 *The Descent of Man* crowned his theory by including man in the evolutionary process.

The Origin of Species did two main things. First, it marshaled a mass of cumulative evidence drawn from geographical distribution, paleontology, embryology, comparative anatomy, and experimental breeding, sufficient to convince biologists that, whatever its explanation, the evolution of species is a fact. The idea of organic evolution had of course long been familiar, and in the century before 1859 had found able exponents, as the "Historical Sketch" Darwin prefixed to the second edition makes clear. The opening passage of the following selections emphasizes Lamarck and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. But most naturalists still rejected "transformism," partly because of the limited time then allowed for the history of the earth, partly because not even Lamarck had been able to suggest a credible and verifiable theory of the way in which the process could have taken place. In destroying all confidence in the Mosaic account of creation, Lyell had provoked a marked revival of evolutionary theory. Two things remained to be established: first, a detailed investigation of the distribution of living and fossil forms of life that would sketch the succession of species in time; secondly, an adequate causal explanation of the process. These Darwin and Wallace accomplished simultaneously.

Hence besides collecting the evidence for the *fact* of evolution, *The Origin of Species*, in its title and throughout, emphasizes, secondly, the novel idea of "natural selection" through the survival and perpetuation of the fittest variations in the struggle for existence. This was Darwin's theory of the *factors* involved in the evolutionary process, of the cause of change. As the first plausible account of the method of evolution, the "natural selection" of chance variations played a large part in winning general acceptance of the fact of evolution. Ironically enough, it is Darwin's causal theory that has had to be most drastically supplemented and reconstructed in the light of closer analysis and of detailed knowledge of the mechanisms of heredity. Note, in the Conclusion to the *Origin*, that Darwin rejects "great and abrupt modifications." Since the work of Hugo De Vries, most biologists have accepted his view that only large and sudden variations can be inherited, complete jumps or "mutations." But strictly speaking, in the words of T. H. Morgan, "The causes of the mutations that give rise to new characters we do not know, although we have no reason for supposing that they are due to other than natural processes."

The repercussions of the central ideas of *The Origin of Species* form a large part of the intellectual history of the later nineteenth century. At first, after an

initial struggle to win popular acceptance, Darwin was taken as supplying solid scientific evidence for the familiar Romantic philosophies of evolution, and for various conflicting social programs of "progress." Evolution was broadened to a single inevitable cosmic process, and became an up-to-date version of God's providence—or a substitute for it—the greatest and most seductive of the Romantic faiths. Only slowly did men come to realize that the idea of organic evolution, taken seriously, transformed the problems to which those earlier philosophies and social programs were answers. By the turn of the century men began to see that the real significance of biological evolution lay elsewhere—in the new attitudes and novel ideas to which it pointed: the abolition of the last fixity in nature, the breakdown of sharp lines of demarcation between species, the emphasis on the detailed causal analysis of specific processes of change, a general pluralism and relativism, a revival of all the functional ideas involved in the notion of temporal "process," the abandonment of the earlier exclusively mechanistic approach to nature.

Perhaps most significant of all was Darwin's inclusion of man within nature in *The Descent of Man*, from which the selections quote the first and last paragraphs of the Conclusion. Man could no longer be regarded, in Spinoza's words, as "a kingdom within a kingdom," as excluded from the operation of the laws of the wider universe. There was now a fundamental *continuity* between the various aspects of human life and the rest of nature, which made possible the application to man and to all phases of human experience of the general scientific methods that had proved so successful in dealing with the non-human parts of nature. The relation between man and the universe ceased to be what it had been in the Newtonian world, purely mechanical, and became once more what it had been for Greek thought, biological, the active relation between an organism and its environment. Man had emerged from less complex and "lower" natural processes. It was his human responsibility, as Darwin puts it, to achieve "a still higher destiny in the distant future." The challenge of the Darwinian "naturalism" that now set human life squarely in the midst of nature was to work out an adequate body of social sciences, and to use this knowledge for the conscious direction of human life.



THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES

HISTORICAL SKETCH

UNTIL RECENTLY the great majority of naturalists believed that species were immutable productions, and had been separately created. This view has been ably maintained by many authors. Some few naturalists, on the other hand, have believed that species undergo modification, and that the existing forms

of life are the descendants by true generation of pre-existing forms. Passing over allusions to the subject in the classical writers,¹ the first author who in modern times has treated it in a scientific spirit was Buffon. But as his opinions fluctuated greatly at different periods, and as he does not enter on the causes or means of the transformation of species, I need not here enter on details.

Lamarck was the first man whose conclusions on the subject excited much attention. This justly-celebrated naturalist first published his views in 1801; he much enlarged them in 1809 in his "*Philosophie Zoologique*," and subsequently, in 1815, in the Introduction to his "*Hist. Nat. des Animaux sans Vertébrés*." In these works he upholds the doctrine that all species, including man, are descended from other species. He first did the eminent service of arousing attention to the probability of all change in the organic, as well as in the inorganic world, being the result of law, and not of miraculous interposition. Lamarck seems to have been chiefly led to his conclusion on the gradual change of species, by the difficulty of distinguishing species and varieties, by the almost perfect gradation of forms in certain groups, and by the analogy of domestic productions. With respect to the means of modification, he attributed something to the direct action of the physical conditions of life, something to the crossing of already existing forms, and much to use and disuse, that is, to the effects of habit. To this latter agency he seems to attribute all the beautiful adaptations in nature;—such as the long neck of the giraffe for browsing on the branches of trees. But he likewise believed in a law of progressive development; and as all the forms of life thus tend to progress, in order to account for the existence at the present day of simple productions, he maintains that such forms are now spontaneously generated.² . . .

¹ Aristotle, in his "*Physicæ Auscultationes*" (lib. 2, cap. 8, s. 2), after remarking that rain does not fall in order to make the corn grow, any more than it falls to spoil the farmer's corn when threshed out of doors, applies the same argument to organisation; and adds (as translated by Mr. Clair Grece, who first pointed out the passage to me), "So what hinders the different parts [of the body] from having this merely accidental relation in nature? as the teeth, for example, grow by necessity, the front ones sharp, adapted for dividing, and the grinders flat, and serviceable for masticating the food; since they were not made for the sake of this, but it was the result of accident. And in like manner as to the other parts in which there appears to exist an adaptation to an end. Wheresoever, therefore, all things together (that is all the parts of one whole) happened like as if they were made for the sake of something, these were preserved, having been appropriately constituted by an internal spontaneity; and whatsoever things were not thus constituted, perished, and still perish." We here see the principle of natural selection shadowed forth, but how little Aristotle fully comprehended the principle, is shown by his remarks on the formation of the teeth.

² I have taken the date of the first publication of Lamarck from Isid. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire's ("*Hist. Natl. Générale*," tom. ii., p. 405, 1859) excellent history of opinion on this subject. In this work a full account is given on Buffon's conclusions on the same subject. It is curious how largely my grandfather, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, anticipated the views and erroneous grounds of opinion

INTRODUCTION

When on Board H.M.S. "Beagle," as naturalist, I was much struck with certain facts in the distribution of the organic beings inhabiting South America, and in the geological relations of the present to the past inhabitants of that continent. These facts, as will be seen in the latter chapters of this volume, seemed to throw some light on the origin of species—that mystery of mysteries, as it has been called by one of our greatest philosophers. . . .

This Abstract, which I now publish, must necessarily be imperfect. I cannot here give references and authorities for my several statements; and I must trust to the reader reposing some confidence in my accuracy. No doubt errors will have crept in, though I hope I have always been cautious in trusting to good authorities alone. I can here give only the general conclusions at which I have arrived, with a few facts in illustration, but which, I hope, in most cases will suffice. No one can feel more sensible than I do of the necessity of hereafter publishing in detail all the facts, with references, on which my conclusions have been grounded; and I hope in a future work to do this. For I am well aware that scarcely a single point is discussed in this volume on which facts cannot be adduced, often apparently leading to conclusions directly opposite to those at which I have arrived. A fair result can be obtained only by fully stating and balancing the facts and arguments on both sides of each question; and this is here impossible. . . .

In considering the origin of species, it is quite conceivable that a naturalist, reflecting on the mutual affinities of organic beings, on their embryological relations, their geographical distribution, geological succession, and other such facts, might come to the conclusion that species had not been independently created, but had descended, like varieties, from other species. Nevertheless, such a conclusion, even if well founded, would be unsatisfactory, until it could be shown how the innumerable species inhabiting this world have been modified, so as to acquire that perfection of structure and coadaptation which justly excites our admiration. Naturalists continually refer to external conditions, such as climate, food, &c., as the only possible cause of variation. In one limited sense, as we shall hereafter see, this may be true; but it is preposterous to at-

of Lamarck in his "Zoonomia" (vol. i., pp. 500-510), published in 1794. According to Isid. Geoffroy there is no doubt that Goethe was an extreme partisan of similar views, as shown in the Introduction to a work written in 1794 and 1795, but not published till long afterwards: he has pointedly remarked ("Goethe als Naturforscher," von Dr. Karl Meding, s. 34) that the future question for naturalists will be how, for instance, cattle got their horns, and not for what they are used. It is rather a singular instance of the manner in which similar views arise at about the same time, that Goethe in Germany, Dr. Darwin in England, and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (as we shall immediately see) in France, came to the same conclusion on the origin of species, in the years 1794-5.

tribute to mere external condition, the structure, for instance, of the woodpecker, with its feet, tail, beak and tongue, so admirably adapted to catch insects under the bark of trees. In the case of the mistletoe, which draws its nourishment from certain trees, which has seeds that must be transported by certain birds, and which has flowers with separate sexes absolutely requiring the agency of certain insects to bring pollen from one flower to the other, it is equally preposterous to account for the structure of this parasite, with its relations to several distinct organic beings, by the effects of external conditions, or of habit, or of the volition of the plant itself.

It is, therefore, of the highest importance to gain a clear insight into the means of modification and co-adaptation. At the commencement of my observations it seemed to me probable that a careful study of domesticated animals and of cultivated plants would offer the best chance of making out this obscure problem. Nor have I been disappointed; in this and in all other perplexing cases I have invariably found that our knowledge, imperfect though it be, of variation under domestication, afforded the best and safest clue. I may venture to express my conviction of the high value of such studies, although they have been very commonly neglected by naturalists.

From these considerations, I shall devote the first chapter of this Abstract to Variation under Domestication. We shall thus see that a large amount of hereditary modification is at least possible; and, what is equally or more important, we shall see how great is the power of man in accumulating by his Selection successive slight variations. I will then pass on to the variability of species in a state of nature; but I shall, unfortunately, be compelled to treat this subject far too briefly, as it can be treated properly only by giving long catalogues of facts. We shall, however, be enabled to discuss what circumstances are most favourable to variation. In the next chapter the Struggle for Existence amongst all organic beings throughout the world, which inevitably follows from the higher geometrical ratio of their increase, will be considered. This is the doctrine of Malthus, applied to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms. As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be *naturally selected*. From the strong principle of inheritance, any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form.

This fundamental subject of Natural Selection will be treated at some length in the fourth chapter; and we shall then see how Natural Selection almost inevitably causes much Extinction of the less improved forms of life,

and leads to what I have called Divergence of Character. In the next chapter I shall discuss the complex and little known laws of variation. In the five succeeding chapters, the most apparent and gravest difficulties in accepting the theory will be given: namely, first, the difficulties of transitions, or how a simple being or a simple organ can be changed and perfected into a highly developed being or into an elaborately constructed organ; secondly, the subject of Instinct, or the mental powers of animals; thirdly, Hybridism, or the infertility of species and the fertility of varieties when intercrossed; and fourthly, the imperfection of the Geological Record. In the next chapter I shall consider the geological succession of organic beings throughout time; in the twelfth and thirteenth, their geographical distribution throughout space; in the fourteenth, their classification or mutual affinities, both when mature and in an embryonic condition. In the last chapter I shall give a brief recapitulation of the whole work, and a few concluding remarks.

No one ought to feel surprise at much remaining as yet unexplained in regard to the origin of species and varieties, if he make due allowance for our profound ignorance in regard to the mutual relations of the many beings which live around us. Who can explain why one species ranges widely and is very numerous, and why another allied species has a narrow range and is rare? Yet these relations are of the highest importance, for they determine the present welfare and, as I believe, the future success and modification of every inhabitant of this world. Still less do we know of the mutual relations of the innumerable inhabitants of the world during the many past geological epochs in its history. Although much remains obscure, and will long remain obscure, I can entertain no doubt, after the most deliberate study and dispassionate judgment of which I am capable, that the view which most naturalists until recently entertained, and which I formerly entertained—namely, that each species has been independently created—is erroneous. I am fully convinced that species are not immutable; but that those belonging to what are called the same genera are lineal descendants of some other and generally extinct species, in the same manner as the acknowledged varieties of any one species are the descendants of that species. Furthermore, I am convinced that Natural Selection has been the most important, but not the exclusive, means of modification.

CHAPTER IV: NATURAL SELECTION; OR THE SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST

. . . If under changing conditions of life organic beings present individual differences in almost every part of their structure, and this cannot be disputed; if there be, owing to their geometrical rate of increase, a severe struggle for life at some age, season, or year, and this certainly cannot be disputed; then,

considering the infinite complexity of the relations of all organic beings to each other and to their conditions of life, causing an infinite diversity in structure, constitution, and habits, to be advantageous to them, it would be a most extraordinary fact if no variations had ever occurred useful to each being's own welfare, in the same manner as so many variations have occurred useful to man. But if variations useful to any organic being ever do occur, assuredly individuals thus characterised will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from the strong principle of inheritance, these will tend to produce offspring similarly characterised. This principle of preservation, or the survival of the fittest, I have called Natural Selection. It leads to the improvement of each creature in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life; and consequently, in most cases, to what must be regarded as an advance in organisation. Nevertheless, low and simple forms will long endure if well fitted for their simple conditions of life.

Natural selection, on the principle of qualities being inherited at corresponding ages, can modify the egg, seed, or young, as easily as the adult. Amongst many animals, sexual selection will have given its aid to ordinary selection, by assuring to the most vigorous and best adapted males the greatest number of offspring. Sexual selection will also give characters useful to the males alone, in their struggles or rivalry with other males; and these characters will be transmitted to one sex or to both sexes, according to the form of inheritance which prevails. . . .

. . . It is the common, the widely-diffused and widely-ranging species, belonging to the larger genera within each class, which vary most; and these tend to transmit to their modified offspring that superiority which now makes them dominant in their own countries. Natural selection, as has just been remarked, leads to divergence of character and to much extinction of the less improved and intermediate forms of life. On these principles, the nature of the affinities, and the generally well-defined distinctions between the innumerable organic beings in each class throughout the world, may be explained. It is a truly wonderful fact—the wonder of which we are apt to overlook from familiarity—that all animals and all plants throughout all time and space should be related to each other in groups, subordinate to groups, in the manner which we everywhere behold—namely, varieties of the same species most closely related, species of the same genus less closely and unequally related, forming sections and sub-genera, species of distinct genera much less closely related, and genera related in different degrees, forming sub-families, families, orders, sub-classes and classes. The several subordinate groups in any class cannot be ranked in a single file, but seem clustered round points, and these round other points, and so on in almost endless cycles. If species had been in-

dependently created, no explanation would have been possible of this kind of classification; but it is explained through inheritance and the complex action of natural selection, entailing extinction and divergence of character. . . .

The affinities of all the beings of the same class have sometimes been represented by a great tree. I believe this simile largely speaks the truth. The green and budding twigs may represent existing species; and those produced during former years may represent the long succession of extinct species. At each period of growth all the growing twigs have tried to branch out on all sides, and to overtop and kill the surrounding twigs and branches, in the same manner as species and groups of species have at all times overmastered other species in the great battle for life. The limbs divided into great branches, and these into lesser and lesser branches, were themselves once, when the tree was young, budding twigs; and this connection of the former and present buds by ramifying branches may well represent the classification of all extinct and living species in groups subordinate to groups. Of the many twigs which flourished when the tree was a mere bush, only two or three, now grown into great branches, yet survive and bear the other branches; so with the species which lived during long-past geological periods, very few have left living and modified descendants. From the first growth of the tree, many a limb and branch has decayed and dropped off; and these fallen branches of various sizes may represent those whole orders, families, and genera which have now no living representatives, and which are known to us only in a fossil state. As we here and there see a thin straggling branch springing from a fork low down in a tree, and which by some chance has been favoured and is still alive on its summit, so we occasionally see an animal like the *Ornithorhynchus* or *Lepidosiren*, which in some small degree connects by its affinities two large branches of life, and which has apparently been saved from fatal competition by having inhabited a protected station. As buds give rise by growth to fresh buds, and these, if vigorous, branch out and overtop on all sides many a feebler branch, so by generation I believe it has been with the great Tree of Life, which fills with its dead and broken branches the crust of the earth, and covers the surface with its ever-branching and beautiful ramifications.

CHAPTER XV: RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION

. . . Under domestication we see much variability, caused, or at least excited, by changed conditions of life; but often in so obscure a manner, that we are tempted to consider the variations as spontaneous. Variability is governed by many complex laws,—by correlated growth, compensation, the increased use and disuse of parts, and the definite action of the surrounding conditions. There is much difficulty in ascertaining how largely our domestic

productions have been modified; but we may safely infer that the amount has been large, and that modifications can be inherited for long periods. . . .

There is no reason why the principles which have acted so efficiently under domestication should not have acted under nature. In the survival of favoured individuals and races, during the constantly-recurrent Struggle for Existence, we see a powerful and ever-acting form of Selection. The struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high geometrical ratio of increase which is common to all organic beings. This high rate of increase is proved by calculation,—by the rapid increase of many animals and plants during a succession of peculiar seasons, and when naturalised in new countries. More individuals are born than can possibly survive. A grain in the balance may determine which individual shall live and which shall die,—which variety or species shall increase in number, and which shall decrease, or finally become extinct. As the individuals of the same species come in all respects into the closest competition with each other, the struggle will generally be most severe between them; it will be almost equally severe between the varieties of the same species, and next in severity between the species of the same genus. On the other hand the struggle will often be severe between beings remote in the scale of nature. The slightest advantage in certain individuals, at any age or during any season, over those with which they come into competition, or better adaptation in however slight a degree to the surrounding physical conditions, will, in the long run, turn the balance.

With animals having separated sexes, there will be in most cases a struggle between the males for the possession of the females. The most vigorous males, or those which have most successfully struggled with their conditions of life, will generally leave most progeny. But success will often depend on the males having special weapons, or means of defence, or charms; and a slight advantage will lead to victory.

As geology plainly proclaims that each land has undergone great physical changes, we might have expected to find that organic beings have varied under nature, in the same way as they have varied under domestication. And if there has been any variability under nature, it would be an unaccountable fact if natural selection had not come into play. It has often been asserted, but the assertion is incapable of proof, that the amount of variation under nature is a strictly limited quantity. Man, though acting on external characters alone and often capriciously, can produce within a short period a great result by adding up mere individual differences in his domestic productions; and every one admits that species present individual differences. But, besides such differences, all naturalists admit that natural varieties exist, which are considered sufficiently distinct to be worthy of record in systematic works. No one has

drawn any clear distinction between individual differences and slight varieties; or between more plainly marked varieties and sub-species, and species. On separate continents, and on different parts of the same continent when divided by barriers of any kind, and on outlying islands, what a multitude of forms exist, which some experienced naturalists rank as varieties, others as geographical races or sub-species, and others as distinct, though closely allied species!

If then, animals and plants do vary, let it be ever so slightly or slowly, why should not variations or individual differences, which are in any way beneficial, be preserved and accumulated through natural selection, or the survival of the fittest? If man can by patience select variations useful to him, why, under changing and complex conditions of life, should not variations useful to nature's living products often arise, and be preserved or selected? What limit can be put to this power, acting during long ages and rigidly scrutinising the whole constitution, structure, and habits of each creature,—favouring the good and rejecting the bad? I can see no limit to this power, in slowly and beautifully adapting each form to the most complex relations of life. The theory of natural selection, even if we look no farther than this, seems to be in the highest degree probable. . . .

On the view that species are only strongly marked and permanent varieties, and that each species first existed as a variety, we can see why it is that no line of demarcation can be drawn between species, commonly supposed to have been produced by special acts of creation, and varieties which are acknowledged to have been produced by secondary laws. On this same view we can understand how it is that in a region where many species of a genus have been produced, and where they now flourish, these same species should present many varieties; for where the manufactory of species has been active, we might expect, as a general rule, to find it still in action; and this is the case if varieties be incipient species. Moreover, the species of the larger genera, which afford the greater number of varieties or incipient species, retain to a certain degree the character of varieties; for they differ from each other by a less amount of difference than do the species of smaller genera. The closely allied species also of the larger genera apparently have restricted ranges, and in their affinities they are clustered in little groups round other species—in both respects resembling varieties. These are strange relations on the view that each species was independently created, but are intelligible if each existed first as a variety.

As each species tends by its geometrical rate of reproduction to increase inordinately in number; and as the modified descendants of each species will be enabled to increase by as much as they become more diversified in habits

and structure, so as to be able to seize on many and widely different places in the economy of nature, there will be a constant tendency in natural selection to preserve the most divergent offspring of any one species. Hence, during a long continued course of modification, the slight differences characteristic of varieties of the same species, tend to be augmented into the greater differences characteristic of the species of the same genus. New and improved varieties will inevitably supplant and exterminate the older, less improved, and intermediate varieties; and thus species are rendered to a large extent defined and distinct objects. Dominant species belonging to the larger groups within each class tend to give birth to new and dominant forms; so that each large group tends to become still larger, and at the same time more divergent in character. But as all groups cannot thus go on increasing in size, for the world would not hold them, the more dominant groups beat the less dominant. This tendency in the large groups to go on increasing in size and diverging in character, together with the inevitable contingency of much extinction, explains the arrangement of all the forms of life in groups subordinate to groups, all within a few great classes, which has prevailed throughout all time. This grand fact of the grouping of all organic beings under what is called the Natural System, is utterly inexplicable on the theory of creation.

As natural selection acts solely by accumulating slight, successive, favourable variations, it can produce no great or sudden modifications; it can act only by short and slow steps. Hence, the canon of "*Natura non facit saltum*," which every fresh addition to our knowledge tends to confirm, is on this theory intelligible. We can see why throughout nature the same general end is gained by an almost infinite diversity of means, for every peculiarity when once acquired is long inherited, and structures already modified in many different ways have to be adapted for the same general purpose. We can, in short, see why nature is prodigal in variety, though niggard in innovation. But why this should be a law of nature if each species has been independently created no man can explain.

Many other facts are, as it seems to me, explicable on this theory. How strange it is that a bird, under the form of a woodpecker, should prey on insects on the ground; that upland geese which rarely or never swim, should possess webbed feet; that a thrush-like bird should dive and feed on sub-aquatic insects; and that a petrel should have the habits and structure fitting it for the life of an auk! and so in endless other cases. But on the view of each species constantly trying to increase in number, with natural selection always ready to adapt the slowly varying descendants of each to any unoccupied or ill-occupied place in nature, these facts cease to be strange, or might even have been anticipated.

We can to a certain extent understand how it is that there is so much beauty throughout nature; for this may be largely attributed to the agency of selection. That beauty, according to our sense of it, is not universal, must be admitted by every one who will look at some venomous snakes, at some fishes, and at certain hideous bats with a distorted resemblance to the human face. Sexual selection has given the most brilliant colours, elegant patterns, and other ornaments to the males, and sometimes to both sexes of many birds, butterflies, and other animals. With birds it has often rendered the voice of the male musical to the female, as well as to our ears. Flowers and fruit have been rendered conspicuous by brilliant colours in contrast with the green foliage, in order that the flowers may be readily seen, visited and fertilized by insects, and the seeds disseminated by birds. How it comes that certain colours, sounds, and forms should give pleasure to man and the lower animals,—that is, how the sense of beauty in its simplest form was first acquired,—we do not know any more than how certain odours and flavours were first rendered agreeable.

As natural selection acts by competition, it adapts and improves the inhabitants of each country only in relation to their co-inhabitants; so that we need feel no surprise at the species of any one country, although on the ordinary view supposed to have been created and specially adapted for that country, being beaten and supplanted by the naturalised productions from another land. Nor ought we to marvel if all the contrivances in nature be not, as far as we can judge, absolutely perfect, as in the case even of the human eye; or if some of them be abhorrent to our ideas of fitness. We need not marvel at the sting of the bee, when used against an enemy, causing the bee's own death; at drones being produced in such great numbers for one single act, and being then slaughtered by their sterile sisters; at the astonishing waste of pollen by our fir-trees; at the instinctive hatred of the queen-bee for her own fertile daughters; and the ichneumonidae feeding within the living bodies of caterpillars; or at other such cases. The wonder indeed is, on the theory of natural selection, that more cases of the want of absolute perfection have not been detected.

The complex and little known laws governing the production of varieties are the same, as far as we can judge, with the laws which have governed the production of distinct species. In both cases physical conditions seem to have produced some direct and definite effect, but how much we cannot say. Thus, when varieties enter any new station, they occasionally assume some of the characters proper to the species of that station. With both varieties and species, use and disuse seem to have produced a considerable effect; for it is impossible to resist this conclusion when we look, for instance, at the logger headed

duck, which has wings incapable of flight, in nearly the same condition as in the domestic duck; or when we look at the burrowing tucu-tucu, which is occasionally blind, and then at certain moles, which are habitually blind and have their eyes covered with skin; or when we look at the blind animals inhabiting the dark caves of America and Europe. With varieties and species, correlated variation seems to have played an important part, so that when one part has been modified other parts have been necessarily modified. With both varieties and species, reversions to long-lost characters occasionally occur. How inexplicable on the theory of creation is the occasional appearance of stripes on the shoulders and legs of the several species of the horse-genus and of their hybrids! How simply is this fact explained if we believe that these species are all descended from a striped progenitor, in the same manner as the several domestic breeds of the pigeon are descended from the blue and barred rock-pigeon.

On the ordinary view of each species having been independently created, why should specific characters, or those by which the species of the same genus differ from each other, be more variable than generic characters in which they all agree? Why, for instance, should the colour of a flower be more likely to vary in any one species of a genus, if the other species possess differently coloured flowers, than if all possessed the same coloured flowers? If species are only well-marked varieties, of which the characters have become in a high degree permanent, we can understand this fact; for they have already varied since they branched off from a common progenitor in certain characters, by which they have come to be specifically distinct from each other; therefore these same characters would be more likely again to vary than the generic characters which have been inherited without change for an immense period. It is inexplicable on the theory of creation why a part developed in a very unusual manner in one species alone of a genus, and therefore, as we may naturally infer, of great importance to that species, should be eminently liable to variation; but, on our view, this part has undergone, since the several species branched off from a common progenitor, an unusual amount of variability and modification, and therefore we might expect the part generally to be still variable. But a part may be developed in the most unusual manner, like the wing of a bat, and yet not be more variable than any other structure, if the part be common to many subordinate forms, that is, if it has been inherited for a very long period; for in this case it will have been rendered constant by long-continued natural selection. . . .

The similar framework of bones in the hand of a man, wing of a bat, fin of the porpoise, and leg of the horse,—the same number of vertebrae forming the neck of the giraffe and of the elephant,—and innumerable other such

facts, at once explain themselves on the theory of descent with slow and slight successive modifications. The similarity of pattern in the wing and in the leg of a bat, though used for such different purpose,—in the jaws and legs of a crab,—in the petals, stamens, and pistils of a flower, is likewise, to a large extent, intelligible on the view of the gradual modification of parts or organs, which were aboriginally alike in an early progenitor in each of these classes. On the principle of successive variations not always supervening at an early age, and being inherited at a corresponding not early period of life, we clearly see why the embryos of mammals, birds, reptiles, and fishes should be so closely similar, and so unlike the adult forms. We may cease marvelling at the embryo of an air breathing mammal or bird having branchial slits and arteries running in loops, like those of a fish which has to breathe the air dissolved in water by the aid of well-developed branchiae.

Disuse, aided sometimes by natural selection, will often have reduced organs when rendered useless under changed habits or conditions of life; and we can understand on this view the meaning of rudimentary organs. But disuse and selection will generally act on each creature, when it has come to maturity and has to play its full part in the struggle for existence, and will thus have little power on an organ during early life; hence the organ will not be reduced or rendered rudimentary at this early age. The calf, for instance, has inherited teeth, which never cut through the gums of the upper jaw, from an early progenitor having well-developed teeth; and we may believe, that the teeth in the mature animal were formerly reduced by disuse, owing to the tongue and palate, or lips, having become excellently fitted through natural selection to browse without their aid; whereas in the calf, the teeth have been left unaffected, and on the principle of inheritance at corresponding ages have been inherited from a remote period to the present day. On the view of each organism with all its separate parts having been specially created, how utterly inexplicable is it that organs bearing the plain stamp of inutility, such as the teeth in the embryonic calf or the shrivelled wings under the soldered wing-covers of many beetles, should so frequently occur. Nature may be said to have taken pains to reveal her scheme of modification, by means of rudimentary organs, of embryological and homologous structures, but we are too blind to understand her meaning.

I have now recapitulated the facts and considerations which have thoroughly convinced me that species have been modified, during a long course of descent. This has been effected chiefly through the natural selection of numerous successive, slight, favourable variations; aided in an important manner by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts; and in an unimportant manner, that is in relation to adaptive structures, whether past or present, by the direct

action of external conditions, and by variations which seem to us in our ignorance to arise spontaneously. It appears that I formerly underrated the frequency and value of these latter forms of variation, as leading to permanent modifications of structure independently of natural selection. But as my conclusions have lately been much misrepresented, and it has been stated that I attribute the modification of species exclusively to natural selection, I may be permitted to remark that in the first edition of this work, and subsequently, I placed in a most conspicuous position—namely, at the close of the Introduction—the following words: “I am convinced that natural selection has been the main but not the exclusive means of modification.” This has been of no avail. Great is the power of steady misrepresentation; but the history of science shows that fortunately this power does not long endure.

It can hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain, in so satisfactory a manner as does the theory of natural selection, the several large classes of facts above specified. It has recently been objected that this is an unsafe method of arguing; but it is a method used in judging of the common events of life, and has often been used by the greatest natural philosophers. The undulatory theory of light has thus been arrived at; and the belief in the revolution of the earth on its own axis was until lately supported by hardly any direct evidence. It is no valid objection that science as yet throws no light on the far higher problem of the essence or origin of life. Who can explain what is the essence of the attraction of gravity? No one now objects to following out the results consequent on this unknown element of attraction; notwithstanding that Leibnitz formerly accused Newton of introducing “occult qualities and miracles into philosophy.”

I see no good reason why the views given in this volume should shock the religious feelings of any one. It is satisfactory, as showing how transient such impressions are, to remember that the greatest discovery ever made by man, namely the law of the attraction of gravity, was also attacked by Leibnitz, “as subversive of natural, and inferentially of revealed, religion.” A celebrated author and divine has written to me that “he has gradually learnt to see that it is just as noble a conception of the Deity to believe that He created a few original forms capable of self-development into other and needful forms, as to believe that He required a fresh act of creation to supply the voids caused by the action of His laws.”

Why, it may be asked, until recently did nearly all the most eminent living naturalists and geologists disbelieve in the mutability of species. It cannot be asserted that organic beings in a state of nature are subject to no variation; it cannot be proved that the amount of variation in the course of long ages is a limited quantity; no clear distinction has been, or can be, drawn between

species and well-marked varieties. It cannot be maintained that species when intercrossed are invariably sterile, and varieties invariably fertile; or that sterility is a special endowment and sign of creation. The belief that species were immutable productions was almost unavoidable as long as the history of the world was thought to be of short duration; and now that we have acquired some idea of the lapse of time, we are too apt to assume, without proof, that the geological record is so perfect that it would have afforded us plain evidence of the mutation of species, if they had undergone mutation.

But the chief cause of our natural unwillingness to admit that one species has given birth to clear and distinct species, is that we are always slow in admitting great changes of which we do not see the steps. The difficulty is the same as that felt by so many geologists, when Lyell first insisted that long lines of inland cliffs had been formed, and great valleys excavated, by the agencies which we see still at work. The mind cannot possibly grasp the full meaning of the term of even a million years; it cannot add up and perceive the full effects of many slight variations, accumulated during an almost infinite number of generations.

Although I am fully convinced of the truth of the views given in this volume under the form of an abstract, I by no means expect to convince experienced naturalists whose minds are stocked with a multitude of facts all viewed, during a long course of years, from a point of view directly opposite to mine. It is so easy to hide our ignorance under such expressions as the "plan of creation," "unity of design," &c., and to think that we give an explanation when we only re-state a fact. Any one whose disposition leads him to attach more weight to unexplained difficulties than to the explanation of a certain number of facts will certainly reject the theory. A few naturalists, endowed with much flexibility of mind, and who have already begun to doubt the immutability of species, may be influenced by this volume; but I look with confidence to the future,—to young and rising naturalists, who will be able to view both sides of the question with impartiality. Whoever is led to believe that species are mutable will do good service by conscientiously expressing his conviction; for thus only can the load of prejudice by which this subject is overwhelmed be removed.

Several eminent naturalists have of late published their belief that a multitude of reputed species in each genus are not real species; but that other species are real, that is, have been independently created. This seems to me a strange conclusion to arrive at. They admit that a multitude of forms, which till lately they themselves thought were special creations, and which are still thus looked at by the majority of naturalists, and which consequently have all the external characteristic features of true species,—they admit that these have been pro-

duced by variation, but they refuse to extend the same view to other and slightly different forms. Nevertheless they do not pretend that they can define, or even conjecture, which are the created forms of life, and which are those produced by secondary laws. They admit variation as a *vera causa*⁸ in one case, they arbitrarily reject it in another, without assigning any distinction in the two cases. The day will come when this will be given as a curious illustration of the blindness of preconceived opinion. These authors seem no more startled at a miraculous act of creation than at an ordinary birth. But do they really believe that at innumerable periods in the earth's history certain elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into living tissues? Do they believe that at each supposed act of creation one individual or many were produced? Were all the infinitely numerous kinds of animals and plants created as eggs or seed, or as full grown? and in the case of mammals, were they created bearing the false marks of nourishment from the mother's womb? Undoubtedly some of these same questions cannot be answered by those who believe in the appearance or creation of only a few forms of life, or of some one form alone. It has been maintained by several authors that it is as easy to believe in the creation of a million beings as of one; but Maupertuis' philosophical axiom "of least action" leads the mind more willingly to admit the smaller number; and certainly we ought not to believe that innumerable beings within each great class have been created with plain, but deceptive, marks of descent from a single parent.

As a record of a former state of things, I have retained in the foregoing paragraphs, and elsewhere, several sentences which imply that naturalists believe in the separate creation of each species; and I have been much censured for having thus expressed myself. But undoubtedly this was the general belief when the first edition of the present work appeared. I formerly spoke to very many naturalists on the subject of evolution, and never once met with any sympathetic agreement. It is probable that some did then believe in evolution, but they were either silent, or expressed themselves so ambiguously that it was not easy to understand their meaning. Now things are wholly changed, and almost every naturalist admits the great principle of evolution. There are, however, some who still think that species have suddenly given birth, through quite unexplained means, to new and totally different forms: but, as I have attempted to show, weighty evidence can be opposed to the admission of great and abrupt modifications. Under a scientific point of view, and as leading to further investigation, but little advantage is gained by believing that new forms are suddenly developed in an inexplicable manner from old and widely different forms, over the old belief in the creation of species from the dust of the earth.

⁸ [True cause.]

It may be asked how far I extend the doctrine of the modification of species. The question is difficult to answer, because the more distinct the forms are which we consider, by so much the arguments in favour of community of descent become fewer in number and less in force. But some arguments of the greatest weight extend very far. All the members of whole classes are connected together by a chain of affinities, and all can be classed on the same principle, in groups subordinate to groups. Fossil remains sometimes tend to fill up very wide intervals between existing orders.

Organs in a rudimentary condition plainly show that an early progenitor had the organ in a fully developed condition; and this in some cases implies an enormous amount of modification in the descendants. Throughout whole classes various structures are formed on the same pattern, and at a very early age the embryos closely resemble each other. Therefore I cannot doubt that the theory of descent with modification embraces all the members of the same great class or kingdom. I believe that animals are descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number.

Analogy would lead me one step farther, namely, to the belief that all animals and plants are descended from some one prototype. But analogy may be a deceitful guide. Nevertheless all living things have much in common, in their chemical composition, their cellular structure, their laws of growth, and their liability to injurious influences. We see this even in so trifling a fact as that the same poison often similarly affects plants and animals; or that the poison secreted by the gall-fly produces monstrous growths on the wild rose or oak-tree. With all organic beings, excepting perhaps some of the very lowest, sexual production seems to be essentially similar. With all, as far as is at present known, the germinal vesicle is the same; so that all organisms start from a common origin. If we look even to the two main divisions—namely, to the animal and vegetable kingdoms—certain low forms are so far intermediate in character that naturalists have disputed to which kingdom they should be referred. As Professor Asa Gray has remarked, “the spores and other reproductive bodies of many of the lower algae may claim to have first a characteristically animal, and then an unequivocally vegetable existence.” Therefore, on the principle of natural selection with divergence of character, it does not seem incredible that, from some such low and intermediate form, both animals and plants may have been developed; and, if we admit this, we must likewise admit that all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth may be descended from some one primordial form. But this inference is chiefly grounded on analogy, and it is immaterial whether or not it be accepted. . . .

Authors of the highest eminence seem to be fully satisfied with the view that

each species has been independently created. To my mind it accords better with what we know of the laws impressed on matter by the Creator, that the production and extinction of the past and present inhabitants of the world should have been due to secondary causes, like those determining the birth and death of the individual. When I view all beings not as special creations, but as the lineal descendants of some few beings which lived long before the first bed of the Cambrian system was deposited, they seem to me to become ennobled. Judging from the past, we may safely infer that not one living species will transmit its unaltered likeness to a distant futurity. And of the species now living very few will transmit progeny of any kind to a far distant futurity; for the manner in which all organic beings are grouped, shows that the greater number of species in each genus, and all the species in many genera, have left no descendants, but have become utterly extinct. We can so far take a prophetic glance into futurity as to foretell that it will be the common and widely-spread species, belonging to the larger and dominant groups within each class, which will ultimately prevail and procreate new and dominant species. As all the living forms of life are the lineal descendants of those which lived long before the Cambrian epoch, we may feel certain that the ordinary succession by generation has never once been broken, and that no cataclysm has desolated the whole world. Hence we may look with some confidence to a secure future of great length. And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection.

It is interesting to contemplate a tangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent upon each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the largest sense, being Growth with Reproduction; Inheritance which is almost implied by reproduction; Variability from the indirect and direct action of the conditions of life, and from use and disuse: a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms. Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity,

from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved.

THE DESCENT OF MAN

CHAPTER XXI: GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The main conclusion here arrived at, and now held by many naturalists, who are well competent to form a sound judgment, is that man is descended from some less highly organized form. The grounds upon which this conclusion rests will never be shaken, for the close similarity between man and the lower animals in embryonic development, as well as in innumerable points of structure and constitution, both of high and of the most trifling importance—the rudiments which he retains, and the abnormal reversions to which he is occasionally liable—are facts which cannot be disputed. They have long been known, but, until recently, they told us nothing with respect to the origin of man. Now, when viewed by the light of our knowledge of the whole organic world, their meaning is unmistakable. The great principle of evolution stands up clear and firm when these groups of facts are considered in connection with others, such as the mutual affinities of the members of the same group, their geographical distribution in past and present times, and their geological succession. It is incredible that all these facts should speak falsely. He who is not content to look, like a savage, at the phenomena of nature as disconnected, cannot any longer believe that man is the work of a separate act of creation. He will be forced to admit that the close resemblance of the embryo of man to that, for instance, of a dog—the construction of his skull, limbs, and whole frame on the same plan with that of other mammals, independently of the uses to which the parts may be put—the occasional reappearance of various structures, for instance of several muscles, which man does not normally possess, but which are common to the *Quadrumana*—and a crowd of analogous facts—all point in the plainest manner to the conclusion that man is the co-descendant with other mammals of a common progenitor. . . .

[This] conclusion . . . will, I regret to think, be highly distasteful to many. But there can hardly be a doubt that we are descended from barbarians. The astonishment which I felt on first seeing a party of Fuegians on a wild and broken shore will never be forgotten by me, for the reflections at once rushed into my mind—such were our ancestors. These men were absolutely naked and bedaubed with paint, their long hair was tangled, their mouths frothed with excitement, and their expression was wild, startled and distrustful. They

possessed hardly any arts, and like wild animals lived on what they could catch; they had no government, and were merciless to every one not of their own small tribe. He who has seen a savage in his native land will not feel much shame, if forced to acknowledge that the blood of some more humble creature flows in his veins. For my own part I would as soon be descended from that heroic little monkey who braved his dreaded enemy in order to save the life of his keeper, or from that old baboon, who, descending from the mountains, carried away in triumph his young comrade from a crowd of astonished dogs—as from a savage who delights to torture his enemies, offers up bloody sacrifices, practices infanticide without remorse, treats his wives like slaves, knows no decency, and is haunted by the grossest superstitions.

Man may be excused for feeling some pride at having risen, though not through his own exertions, to the very summit of the organic scale; and the fact of his having thus risen, instead of having been aboriginally placed there, may give him hope for a still higher destiny in the distant future. But we are not here concerned with hopes or fears, only with the truth as far as our reason permits us to discover it; and I have given the evidence to the best of my ability. We must, however, acknowledge, as it seems to me, that man, with all his noble qualities, with sympathy which feels for the most debased, with benevolence which extends not only to other men but to the humblest living creature, with his godlike intellect which has penetrated into the movements and constitution of the solar system—with all these exalted powers—man still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin.

HERMANN VON HELMHOLTZ

“IN TRUE PHILOSOPHY,” wrote Huygens in his famous *Treatise on Light*, “the causes of all natural phenomena are conceived in mechanical terms. We must do this, in my opinion, or else give up all hope of understanding anything in physics.” This characteristic expression of the aims of natural science in the seventeenth century continued to represent the aspirations of many of the best minds of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as well. The ideal which they sought to realize was to explain the entire range of natural phenomena in terms of the *science of mechanics*—the science whose primary distinctions are commonly taken to be mass, length, and time, and whose basic principles were formulated by Galileo and Newton and were later generalized in certain directions by Joseph Lagrange and William R. Hamilton. Subsequent developments in the study of electromagnetism finally led to the abandonment of this ideal even within physics proper (see pp. 1042 ff. below); but meanwhile, some of the most impressive achievements of nineteenth-century science supplied at least temporary support for the view that mechanics is the universal science of nature.

The remarkably fruitful application of the mechanical ideal, not only to different branches of physical inquiry, but also to anatomy, physiological optics, and physiological acoustics, was a dominant feature of the work of Helmholtz (1821–94), perhaps the most versatile and influential physicist of nineteenth-century Germany. The moderate means of his father and the uncertain financial rewards of a life devoted to pure research prevented the young Helmholtz from preparing himself specifically for a career in pure science, and he therefore decided to study medicine. But except for a few years of nominal service as surgeon in the Prussian army, he did not engage in medical practice—though in later years he congratulated himself upon having had a medical education, since he believed, in his own case at least, “the study of medicine to have been that training which preached more impressively and more convincingly than [any] other could have done, the everlasting principles of scientific work.”

Helmholtz explicitly espoused the use of the inductive-experimental method for achieving knowledge of natural phenomena. At the same time, though he was thoroughly distrustful of the speculative philosophies of nature developed by Schelling and Hegel—still influential on German thought when Helmholtz began his scientific career—he insisted upon the primary place in scientific thought of general concepts and laws whose function it is to exhibit what would otherwise be simply a catalogue of facts as ordered systems. Helmholtz was also convinced, in part by the great physiologist Johannes Müller (one of his teachers at the time he was studying medicine at the University of Berlin) that the assumption of irreducible “vital forces” in order to explain physiological behavior is simply to baptize our ignorance. He therefore maintained that the general methods which had been so successful in yielding a systematic understanding of inorganic phenomena are also competent to unravel the complexities of living

behavior. In any event, Helmholtz's career as a physiologist is distinguished by the consistent use he made of the approach and the techniques of the physicist. His researches on the mechanism of vision were fundamental, and his invention of such instruments as the ophthalmoscope and ophthalmometer opened up new roads for the study of the living eye. His *Handbook of Physiological Optics* (published first in 1867 and in revised form posthumously in 1896), became immediately a classic in the field; and the appearance in 1862 of his *Sensation of Tone* was hailed by his contemporaries as "the *Principia* of physiological acoustics."

However, Helmholtz's concern with the theoretical fundamentals of natural science is most clearly illustrated in his generalization of the principle of conservation of energy to all types of phenomena, whether mechanical, thermal, electrical, magnetic, chemical, or physiological. The constancy of the sum of the kinetic and potential energies of a *mechanical* system is a demonstrable consequence of the Newtonian laws of motion; and accordingly, even before this principle was generalized by Helmholtz, men had recognized the impossibility of constructing perpetual-motion machines which would employ only mechanical forces. Nevertheless, many still hoped that by employing other types of forces, machines might be so devised that they could perform useful work without replenishment of their source of power. This hope was shown to be futile by a series of investigations, of which Helmholtz's famous paper on the conservation of energy was theoretically the most important. Already in the eighteenth century a number of scientists had suspected that there is a constant relation between the energy lost by a mechanical machine when frictional forces interfere with its operations and the attendant rise in temperature in those parts of the machine where friction occurs. By 1843 Joule at Manchester had completed his experiments to determine the mechanical equivalent of thermal, electrical, and chemical energies. Helmholtz was familiar with the work of Joule, and his own studies on muscular contraction convinced him that there is a constant connection between the amount of mechanical work expended in such contractions and the quantity of heat which is thereby generated. It was reserved for Helmholtz to formulate the general principle involved and to supply a theoretical foundation for it. In the epoch-making paper which he presented to the Physical Society of Berlin in 1847, he argued that, on the assumption that all phenomena are explicable in terms of the motions of material particles between which central forces are operative (that is, forces acting along lines connecting the centers of the particles and having magnitudes which depend on the distances between these centers), the principle of conservation of energy must have a universal scope. Accordingly, the facts on the interrelations of various kinds of energy which he and others had observed could be understood as illustrations of a unified physical conception. And in particular, the construction of perpetual-motion machines of any kind was shown to be impossible, since the power obtained from any machine must be viewed as simply a transformation of the energy used to run the machine. The excesses of the Romantic philosophies of Schelling and Hegel had produced such a general distrust of purely theoretical arguments that Helmholtz's paper was refused publication by the leading physical journal in Germany. Nevertheless, the essay was destined to exercise a powerful influence

on the course of physical inquiry throughout the nineteenth century; for the principle it formulated enabled scientists in all branches of natural knowledge to institute quantitative comparisons and correlations between phenomena of diverse kinds, and thereby "to connect like with like, and to elaborate a general conception embracing them all."

The following selections are from an address of 1869, translated from the German by W. Flight and printed in *Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects* (1873).



THE AIM AND PROGRESS OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE

IN DISCUSSING the progress of physical science as a whole, the first question which presents itself is, By what standard are we to estimate this progress?

To the uninitiated, this science of ours is an accumulation of a vast number of facts, some of which are conspicuous for their practical utility, while others are merely curiosities, or objects of wonder. And, if it were possible to classify this unconnected mass of facts, as was done in the Linnean system, or in encyclopaedias, so that each may be readily found when required, such knowledge as this would not deserve the name of science, nor satisfy either the scientific wants of the human mind, or the desire for progressive mastery over the powers of nature. For the former requires an intellectual grasp of the connection of ideas, the latter demands our anticipation of a result in cases yet untried, and under conditions that we propose to introduce in the course of our experiment. Both are obviously arrived at by a knowledge of the *law* of the phenomena.

Isolated facts and experiments have in themselves no value, however great their number may be. They only become valuable in a theoretical or practical point of view when they make us acquainted with the *law* of a series of uniformly recurring phenomena, or, it may be, only give a negative result showing an incompleteness in our knowledge of such a law, till then held to be perfect. From the exact and universal conformity to law of natural phenomena, a single observation of a condition that we may presume to be rigorously conformable to law, suffices, it is true, at times to establish a rule with the highest degree of probability; just as, for example, we assume our knowledge of the skeleton of a prehistoric animal to be complete if we find only one complete

skeleton of a single individual. But we must not lose sight of the fact that the isolated observation is not of value in that it is isolated, but because it is an aid to the knowledge of the comformable regularity in bodily structure of an entire species of organisms. In like manner, the knowledge of the specific heat of one small fragment of a new metal is important because we have no grounds for doubting that any other pieces of the same metal subjected to the same treatment will yield the same result.

To find the *law* by which they are regulated is to *understand* phenomena. For law is nothing more than the general conception in which a series of similarly recurring natural processes may be embraced. Just as we include in the conception "mammal" all that is common to the man, the ape, the dog, the lion, the hare, the horse, the whale, &c., so we comprehend in the law of refraction that which we observe to regularly recur when a ray of light of any colour passes in any direction through the common boundary of any two transparent media.

A law of nature, however, is not a mere logical conception that we have adopted as a kind of *memoria technica*¹ to enable us to more readily remember facts. We of the present day have already sufficient insight to know that the laws of nature are not things which we can evolve by any speculative method. On the contrary, we have to *discover* them in the facts; we have to test them by repeated observation or experiment, in constantly new cases, under ever-varying circumstances; and in proportion only as they hold good under a constantly increasing change of conditions, in a constantly increasing number of cases and with greater delicacy in the means of observation, does our confidence in their trustworthiness rise.

Thus the laws of nature occupy the position of a power with which we are not familiar, not to be arbitrarily selected and determined in our minds, as one might devise various systems of animals and plants one after another, so long as the object is only one of classification. Before we can say that our knowledge of any one law of nature is complete, we must see that *it holds good without exception*, and make this the test of its correctness. If we can be assured that the conditions under which the law operates have presented themselves, the result must ensue without arbitrariness, without choice, without our co-operation, and from the very necessity which regulates the things of the external world as well as our perception. The law then takes the form of an objective power, and for that reason we call it *force*.

For instance, we regard the law of refraction objectively as a refractive force in transparent substances; the law of chemical affinity as the elective force exhibited by different bodies towards one another. In the same way, we speak of electrical force of contact of metals, of a force of adhesion, capillary force,

¹ [*Mnemonic device.*]

and so on. Under these names are stated objectively laws which for the most part comprise small series of natural processes, the conditions of which are somewhat involved. In science our conceptions begin in this way, proceeding to generalization from a number of well-established special laws. We must endeavour to eliminate the incidents of form and distribution in space which masses under investigation may present by trying to find from the phenomena attending large visible masses laws for the operation of infinitely small particles; or, expressed objectively, by resolving the forces of composite masses into the forces of their smallest elementary particles. But precisely in this, the simplest form of expression of force—namely, of mechanical force acting on a point of the mass—is it especially clear that force is only the law of action objectively expressed. The force arising from the presence of such and such bodies is equivalent to the acceleration of the mass on which it operates multiplied by this mass. The actual meaning of such an equation is that it expresses the following law: if such and such masses are present and no other, such and such acceleration of their individual points occurs. Its actual signification may be compared with the facts and tested by them. The abstract conception of force we thus introduce implies moreover, that we did not discover this law at random, that it is an essential law of phenomena.

Our desire to *comprehend* natural phenomena, in other words, to ascertain their *laws*, thus takes another form of expression—that is, we have to seek out the *forces* which are the *causes* of the phenomena. The conformity to law in nature must be conceived as a causal connection the moment we recognise that it is independent of our thought and will.

If then we direct our inquiry to the progress of physical science as a whole, we shall have to judge of it by the measure in which the recognition and knowledge of a causative connection embracing all natural phenomena has advanced.

On looking back over the history of our sciences, the first great example we find of the subjugation of a wide mass of facts to a comprehensive law, occurred in the case of theoretical mechanics, the fundamental conception of which was first clearly propounded by Galileo. The question then was to find the general propositions that to us now appear so self-evident, that all substance is inert, and that the magnitude of force is to be measured not by its velocity, but by changes in it. At first the operation of a continually acting force could only be represented as a series of small impacts. It was not till Leibnitz and Newton, by the discovery of the differential calculus, had dispelled the ancient darkness which enveloped the conception of the infinite, and had clearly established the conception of the Continuous and of continuous change, that a full and productive application of the newly-found me-

chanical conceptions made any progress. The most singular and most splendid instance of such an application was in regard to the motion of the planets, and I need scarcely remind you here how brilliant an example astronomy has been for the development of the other branches of science. In its case, by the theory of gravitation, a vast and complex mass of facts were first embraced in a single principle of great simplicity, and such a reconciliation of theory and fact established as has never been accomplished in any other department of science, either before or since. In supplying the wants of astronomy, have originated almost all the exact methods of measurement as well as the principal advances made in modern mathematics; the science itself was peculiarly fitted to attract the attention of the general public, partly by the grandeur of the objects under investigation, partly by its practical utility in navigation and geodesy, and the many industrial and social interests arising from them.

Galileo began with the study of terrestrial gravity. Newton extended the application, at first cautiously and hesitatingly, to the moon, then boldly to all the planets. And, in more recent times, we learn that these laws of the common inertia and gravitation of all ponderable masses hold good of the movements of the most distant double stars of which the light has yet reached us.

During the latter half of the last and the first half of the present century came the great progress of chemistry which conclusively solved the ancient problem of discovering the elementary substances, a task to which so much metaphysical speculation had been devoted. Reality has always far exceeded even the boldest and wildest speculation, and, in the place of the four primitive metaphysical elements—fire, water, air, and earth—we have now the sixty-five simple bodies of modern chemistry. Science has shown that these elements are really indestructible, unalterable in their mass, unalterable also in their properties; in short, that from every condition into which they may have been converted, they can invariably be isolated, and recover those qualities which they previously possessed in the free state. Through all the varied phases of the phenomena of animated and inanimate nature, so far as we are acquainted with them, in all the astonishing results of chemical decomposition and combination, the number and diversity of which the chemist with unwearied diligence augments from year to year, the one law of the *immutability of matter* prevails as a necessity that knows no exception. And chemistry has already pressed on into the depths of immeasurable space, and detected in the most distant suns or nebulae indications of well-known terrestrial elements, so that doubts respecting the prevailing homogeneity of the matter of the universe no longer exist, though certain elements may perhaps be restricted to certain groups of the heavenly bodies.

From this invariability of the elements follows another and wider conse-

quence. Chemistry shows by actual experiment that all matter is made up of the elements which have been already isolated. These elements may exhibit great differences as regards combination or mixture, the mode of aggregation or molecular structure—that is to say, they may vary the mode of their *distribution in space*. In their *properties*, on the other hand, they are altogether unchangeable; in other words, when referred to the same compound, as regards isolation, and to the same state of aggregation, they invariably exhibit the same properties as before. If, then, all elementary substances are unchangeable in respect to their properties, and only changeable as regards their combination and their states of aggregation—that is, in respect to their distribution in space—it follows that all changes in the world are changes in the local distribution of elementary matter, and are eventually brought about through *Motion*.

If, however, motion be the primordial change which lies at the root of all the other changes occurring in the world, every elementary force is a force of motion, and the ultimate aim of physical science must be to determine the movements which are the real causes of all other phenomena and discover the motive powers on which they depend; in other words, to merge itself into mechanics.

Though this is clearly the final consequence of the qualitative and quantitative immutability of matter, it is after all an ideal proposition, the realization of which is still very remote. The field is a prescribed one, in which we have succeeded in tracing back actually observed changes to motions and forces of motion of a definite kind. Besides astronomy, may be mentioned the purely mechanical part of physics, then acoustics, optics, and electricity; in the science of heat and in chemistry, strenuous endeavours are being made towards perfecting definite views respecting the nature of the motion and position of molecules, while physiology has scarcely made a definite step in this direction.

This renders all the more important, therefore, a noteworthy advancement of the most general importance made during the last quarter of a century in the direction we are considering. If all elementary forces are forces of motion, and all, consequently, of similar nature, they should all be measurable by the same standard, that is, the standard of the mechanical forces. And that this is actually the fact is now regarded as proved. The law expressing this is known under the name of *the law of the Conservation of Force*.

For a small group of natural phenomena it had already been pronounced by Newton, then more definitely and in more general terms by D. Bernouilli, and so continued of recognised application in the greater part of the then known purely mechanical processes. Certain amplifications at times attracted attention, like those of Rumford, Davy, and Montgolfier. The first, how-

ever, to compass the clear and distinct idea of this law, and to venture to pronounce its absolute universality, was one whom we shall have soon the pleasure of hearing from this platform, Dr. Robert Mayer, of Heilbronn. While Dr. Mayer was led by physiological questions to the discovery of the most general form of this law, technical questions in mechanical engineering led Mr. Joule, of Manchester, simultaneously, and independently of him, to the same considerations; and it is to Mr. Joule that we are indebted for those important and laborious experimental researches in that department where the applicability of the law of the conservation of force appeared most doubtful, and where the greatest gaps in actual knowledge occurred, namely, in the production of work from heat, and of heat from work.

To state the law clearly it was necessary, in contradistinction to Galileo's conception of the *intensity of force*, that a new mechanical idea was elaborated, which we may term the conception of the *quantity of force*, and which has also been called *quantity of work* or of *energy*.

A way to this conception of the quantity of force had been prepared partly, in theoretical mechanics, through the conception of the amount of *vis viva* of a moving body, and partly by practical mechanics through the conception of the motive power necessary to keep a machine at work. Practical machinists had already found a standard by which any motive power could be measured, in the determination of the number of pounds that it could lift one foot in a second; and, as is known, a horse-power was defined to be equivalent to the motive power required to lift seventy kilogrammes one metre in each second.

Machines, and the motive powers required for their movement, furnish, in fact, the most familiar illustrations of the uniformity of all natural forces expressed by the law of the conservation of force. Any machine which is to be set in motion requires a mechanical motive power. Whence this power is derived or what its form, is of no consequence, provided only it be sufficiently great and act continuously. At one time we employ a steam-engine, at another a water-wheel or turbine, here horses or oxen at a whim, there a windmill, or if but little power is required, the human arm, a raised weight, or an electro-magnetic engine. The choice of the machine is merely dependent on the amount of power we would use, or the force of circumstance. In the watermill the weight of the water flowing down the hills is the agent; it is lifted to the hills by a meteorological process, and becomes the source of motive power for the mill. In the windmill it is the *vis viva* of the moving air which drives round the sails; this motion also is due to a meteorological operation of the atmosphere. In the steam-engine we have the tension of the heated vapour which drives the piston to and fro; this is engendered by the heat arising from the combustion of the coal in the firebox, in other words;

by a chemical process; and in this case the latter action is the source of the motive power. If it be a horse or the human arm which is at work, we have the muscles stimulated through the nerves, directly producing the mechanical force. In order, however, that the living body may generate muscular power it must be nourished and breathe. The food it takes separates again from it, after having combined with the oxygen inhaled from the air, to form carbonic acid and water. Here again, then, a chemical process is an essential element to maintain muscular power. A similar state of things is observed in the electro-magnetic machines of our telegraphs.

Thus, then, we obtain mechanical motive force from the most varied processes of nature in the most different ways; but it will also be remarked in only a limited quantity. In doing so we always *consume* something that nature supplies to us. In the watermill we use a quantity of water collected at an elevation, coal in the steam-engine, zinc and sulphuric acid in the electro-magnetic machine, food for the horse; in the windmill we use up the motion of the wind, which is arrested by the sails.

Conversely, if we have a motive force at our disposal we can develop with it forms of action of the most varied kind. It will not be necessary in this place to enumerate the countless diversity of industrial machines, and the varieties of work which they perform.

Let us rather consider the physical differences of the possible performance of a motive power. With its help we can raise loads, pump water to an elevation, compress gases, set a railway train in motion, and through friction generate heat. By its aid we can turn magneto-electric machines, and produce electric currents, and with them decompose water and other chemical compounds having the most powerful affinities, render wires incandescent, magnetise iron, &c.

Moreover, had we at our disposal a sufficient mechanical motive force we could restore all those states and conditions from which, as was seen above, we are enabled at the outset to derive mechanical motive power.

As, however, the motive power derived from any given natural process is limited, so likewise is there a limitation to the total amount of modifications which we may produce by the use of any given motive power.

These deductions, arrived at first in isolated instances from machines and physical apparatus, have now been welded into a law of nature of the widest validity. Every change in nature is equivalent to a certain development, or a certain consumption of motive force. If motive power be developed it may either appear as such, or be directly used up again to form other changes equivalent in magnitude. The leading determinations of this equivalency are founded on Joule's measurements of the mechanical equivalent of heat. When,

by the application of heat, we set a steam-engine in motion, heat proportional to the work done disappears within it; in short, the heat which can warm a given weight of water one degree of the Centigrade scale is able, if converted into work, to lift the same weight of water to a height of 425 metres. If we convert work into heat by friction we again use, in heating a given weight of water one degree Centigrade, the motive force which the same quantity of water would have generated in flowing down from a height of 425 metres. Chemical processes generate heat in definite proportion, and in like manner we estimate the motive power equivalent to such chemical forces; and thus the energy of the chemical force of affinity is also measurable by the mechanical standard. The same holds true for all the other forms of natural forces, but it will not be necessary to pursue the subject further here.

It has actually been established, then, as a result of these investigations, that all the forces of nature are measurable by the same mechanical standard, and that all pure motive forces are, as regards performance of work, equivalent. And thus one great step towards the solution of the comprehensive theoretical task of referring all natural phenomena to motion has been accomplished.

Whilst the foregoing considerations chiefly seek to elucidate the logical value of the law of the conservation of force, its actual signification in the general conception of the processes of nature is expressed in the grand connection which it establishes between the entire processes of the universe, through all distances of place or time. The universe appears, according to this law, to be endowed with a store of energy which, through all the varied changes in natural processes, can neither be increased nor diminished, which is maintained therein in ever-varying phases, but, like matter itself, is from eternity to eternity of unchanging magnitude; *acting in space*, but not *divisible*, as matter is, with it. Every change in the world simply consists in a variation in the mode of appearance of this store of energy. Here we find one portion of it as the *vis viva* ² of moving bodies, there as regular oscillation in light and sound; or, again, as heat, that is to say, the irregular motion of invisible particles; at another point the energy appears in the form of the weight of two masses gravitating towards each other, than as internal tension and pressure of elastic bodies, or as chemical attraction, electrical tension, or magnetic distribution. If it disappears in one form, it reappears as surely in another; and whenever it presents itself in a new phase we are certain that it does so at the expense of one of its other forms.

Carnot's law of the mechanical theory of heat, as modified by Clausius, has, in fact, made it clear that this change moves in the main continuously onward

² [*Vital force*.]

in a definite direction, so that a constantly increasing amount of the great store of energy in the universe is being transformed into heat.

We can, therefore, see with the mind's eye the original condition of things in which the matter composing the celestial bodies was still cold, and probably distributed as chaotic vapour or dust through space; we see that it must have developed heat when it collected together under the influence of gravity. Even at the present time spectrum analysis (a method the theoretical principles of which owe their origin to the mechanical theory of heat) enables us to detect remains of this loosely distributed matter in the nebulae; we recognise it in the meteor-showers and comets; the act of agglomeration and the development of heat still continue, though in our portion of the stellar system they have ceased to a great extent. The chief part of the primordial energy of the matter belonging to our system is now in the form of solar heat. This energy, however, will not remain locked up in our system for ever: portions of it are continually radiating from it, in the form of light and heat, into infinite space. Of this radiation our earth receives a share. It is these solar heat-rays which produce on the earth's surface the winds and the currents of the ocean, and lift the watery vapour from the tropical seas, which, distilling over hill and plain, returns as springs and rivers to the sea. The solar rays impart to the plant the power to separate from carbonic acid and water those combustible substances which serve as food for animals, and thus, in even the varied changes of organic life, the moving power is derived from the infinitely vast store of the universe.

This exalted picture of the connection existing between all the processes of nature has been often presented to us in recent times; it will suffice here that I direct attention to its leading features. If the task of physical science be to determine laws, a step of the most comprehensive significance towards that object has here been taken.

The application of the law of the conservation of force to the vital processes of animals and plants, which has just been discussed, leads us in another direction in which our knowledge of nature's conformity to law has made an advance. The law to which we referred is of the most essential importance in leading questions of physiology, and it was for this reason that Dr. Mayer and I were led on physiological grounds to investigations having especial reference to the conservation of force.

As regards the phenomena of inorganic nature all doubts have long since been laid to rest respecting the principles of the method. It was apparent that these phenomena had fixed laws, and examples enough were already known to make the finding of such laws probable.

In consequence, however, of the greater complexity of the vital processes, their connection with mental action, and the unmistakable evidence of adaptability to a purpose which organic structures exhibit, the existence of a settled conformity to law might well appear doubtful, and, in fact, physiology has always had to encounter this fundamental question: are all vital processes absolutely conformable to law? Or is there, perhaps, a range of greater or less magnitude within which an exception prevails? More or less obscured by words, the view of Paracelsus, Helmont, and Stahl, has been, and is at present, held, particularly outside Germany, that there exists a soul of life ("*Lebensseele*") directing the organic processes which is endowed more or less with consciousness like the soul of man. The influence of the inorganic forces of nature on the organism was still recognised on the assumption that the soul of life only exercises power over matter by means of the physical and chemical forces of matter itself; so that without this aid it could accomplish nothing, but that it possessed the faculty of suspending or permitting the operation of the forces at pleasure.

After death, when no longer subject to the control of the soul of life or vital force, it was these very chemical forces of organic matter which brought about decomposition. In short, through all the different modes of expressing it, whether it was termed the Archäus, the *anima inscia*,⁸ or the *vital force* and the *restorative power of nature*, the faculty to build up the body according to system, and to suitably accommodate it to external circumstances, remained the most essential attribute of this hypothetically controlling principle of the vitalistic theory with which, therefore, by reason of its attributes, only the name of soul fully harmonised.

It is apparent, however, that this notion runs directly counter to the law of the conservation of force. If vital force were for a time to annul the gravity of a weight, it could be raised without labour to any desired height, and subsequently, if the action of gravity were again restored, could perform work of any desired magnitude. And thus work could be obtained out of nothing without expense. If vital force could for a time suspend the chemical affinity of carbon for oxygen, carbonic acid could be decomposed without work being employed for that purpose, and the liberated carbon and oxygen could perform new work.

In reality, however, no trace of such an action is to be met with as that of the living organism being able to generate an amount of work without an equivalent expenditure. When we consider the work done by animals, we find the operation comparable in every respect with that of the steam-engine. Animals, like machines, can only move and accomplish work by being continuously supplied with fuel (that is to say, food) and air containing oxygen;

⁸ [*Unconscious spirit.*]

both give off again this material in a burnt state, and at the same time produce heat and work. All investigation, thus far, respecting the amount of heat which an animal produces when at rest is in no way at variance with the assumption that this heat exactly corresponds to the equivalent, expressed as work, of the forces of chemical affinity then in action.

As regards the work done by plants, a source of power in every way sufficient, exists in the solar rays which they require for the increase of the organic matter of their structures. Meanwhile it is true that exact quantitative determinations of the equivalents of force, consumed and produced in the vegetable as well as the animal kingdom, have still to be made in order to fully establish the exact accordance of these two values.

If, then, the law of the conservation of force hold good also for the living body, it follows that the physical and chemical forces of the material employed in building up the body are in continuous action without intermission and without choice, and that *their exact conformity to law never suffers a moment's interruption*. . . .

Before the time of Darwin only two theories respecting organic adaptability were in vogue, both of which pointed to the interference of free intelligence in the course of natural processes. On the one hand it was held, in accordance with the vitalistic theory, that the vital processes were continuously directed by a living soul; or, on the other, recourse was had to an act of supernatural intelligence to account for the origin of every living species. The latter view indeed supposes that the causal connection of natural phenomena had been broken less often, and allows of a strict scientific examination of the processes observable in the species of human beings now existing; but even it is not able to entirely explain away those exceptions to the law of causality, and consequently it enjoyed no considerable favour as opposed to the vitalistic view, which was powerfully supported, by apparent evidence, that is, by the natural desire to find similar causes behind similar phenomena.

Darwin's theory contains an essentially new creative thought. It shows how adaptability of structure in organisms can result from a blind rule of a law of nature without any intervention of intelligence. . . .

. . . We should not forget the clear interpretation Darwin's grand conception has supplied of the till then mysterious notions respecting natural affinity, natural systems, and homology of organs in various animals; how by its aid the remarkable recurrence of the structural peculiarities of lower animals in the embryos of others higher in the scale, the special kind of development appearing in the series of palaeontological forms, and the peculiar conditions of affinity of the faunas and floras of limited areas have, one and all, received elucidation. Formerly natural affinity appeared to be a mere enigmatical, and

altogether groundless similarity of forms; now it has become a matter for actual consanguinity. The natural system certainly forced itself as such upon the mind, although theory strictly disavowed any real significance to it; at present it denotes an actual genealogy of organisms. The facts of palaeontological and embryological evolution and of geographical distribution were enigmatical wonders so long as each species was regarded as the result of an independent act of creation, and cast a scarcely favourable light on the strange tentative method which was ascribed to the Creator. Darwin has raised all these isolated questions from the condition of a heap of enigmatical wonders to a great consistent system of development, and established definite ideas in the place of such a fanciful hypothesis as, among the first, had occurred to Goethe, respecting the facts of the comparative anatomy and the morphology of plants.

This renders possible a definite statement of problems for further inquiry, a great gain in any case, even should it happen that Darwin's theory does not embrace the whole truth, and that, in addition to the influences which he has indicated, there should be found to be others which operate in the modification of organic forms. . . .

Physical science has made active progress, not only in this or that direction, but as a vast whole, and what has been accomplished may warrant the attainment of further progress. Doubts respecting the entire conformity to law of nature are more and more dispelled; laws more general and more comprehensive have revealed themselves. That the direction which scientific study has taken is a healthy one its great practical issues have clearly demonstrated; and I may here be permitted to direct particular attention to the branch of science more especially my own. In physiology particularly scientific work had been crippled by doubts respecting the necessary conformity to law, which means, as we have shown, the intelligibility of vital phenomena, and this naturally extended itself to the practical science directly dependent on physiology, namely, medicine. Both have received an impetus, such as had not been felt for thousands of years, from the time that they seriously adopted the method of physical science, the exact observation of phenomena and experiment. As a practising physician, in my earlier days, I can personally bear testimony to this. I was educated at a period when medicine was in a transitional stage, when the minds of the most thoughtful and exact were filled with despair. It was not difficult to recognise that the old predominant theorising methods of practising medicine were altogether untenable; with these theories, however, the facts on which they had actually been founded had become so inextricably entangled that they also were mostly thrown overboard. How a science should be built up anew had already been seen in the

case of the other sciences; but the new task assumed colossal proportions; few steps had been taken towards accomplishing it, and these first efforts were in some measure but crude and clumsy. We need feel no astonishment that many sincere and earnest men should at that time have abandoned medicine as unsatisfactory, or on principle given themselves over to an exaggerated empiricism.

But well directed efforts produced the right result more quickly even than many had hoped for. The application of the mechanical ideas to the doctrine of circulation and respiration, the better interpretation of thermal phenomena, the more refined physiological study of the nerves, soon led to practical results of the greatest importance; microscopic examination of parasitic structures, the stupendous development of pathological anatomy, irresistibly led from nebulous theories to reality. We found that we now possessed a much clearer means of distinguishing, and a clearer insight into the mechanism of the process of disease than the beats of the pulse, the urinary deposit, or the fever type of older medical science had ever given us. If I might name one department of medicine in which the influence of the scientific method has been, perhaps, most brilliantly displayed, it would be in ophthalmic medicine. The peculiar constitution of the eye enables us to apply physical modes of investigation as well in functional as in anatomical derangements of the living organ. Simple physical expedients, spectacles, sometimes spherical, sometimes cylindrical or prismatic, suffice, in many cases, to cure disorders which in earlier times left the organ in a condition of chronic incapacity; a great number of changes on the other hand, which formerly did not attract notice till they induced incurable blindness, can now be detected and remedied at the outset. From the very reason of its presenting the most favourable ground for the application of the scientific method, ophthalmology has proved attractive to a peculiarly large number of excellent investigators, and rapidly attained its present position, in which it sets an example to the other departments of medicine, of the actual capabilities of the true method, as brilliant as that which astronomy for long had offered to the other branches of physical science.

KARL PEARSON

EVEN VERY GREAT men of science will sometimes employ ideas successfully in their inquiries without a clear sense of their precise meanings. Indeed, important intellectual tools are not infrequently associated by scientists with assumptions not warranted by actual practice. This fact will not seem strange if it is recalled that much of the language employed in the sciences is borrowed from every-day affairs; and such language may thus be coupled with conceptions that represent a much less critical stage of thought than is demanded by a subsequent development of scientific practice. The history of terms like "force," "cause," and "energy," employed in physics, illustrates this point. These terms were associated for a long time with meanings derived from their earlier usage in connection with specifically human affairs, even though their anthropomorphic meanings are strictly irrelevant to their technical use in physics.

Many scientists are not vitally concerned with the systematic coherence and clarity of the ideas they employ—at least as long as those ideas, with whatever excess meanings they may be burdened, serve as effective instruments of research. Nevertheless, at crucial stages in the development of inquiry such excess meanings may become hindrances to further research. Accordingly, periods of great scientific activity often call forth critical reflections directed primarily upon the foundations of the sciences—reflections which eventuate, not in the rejection of the results of the sciences, but in their reinterpretation in the light of a critique of fundamental concepts.

The latter part of the nineteenth century witnessed the rise in many countries of just such a critical literature on the foundations and scope of the natural sciences. Some of this literature exercised far-reaching influence on subsequent technical developments, as well as upon the climate of general opinion concerning the nature and function of science. Among the prominent European scientists who made a contribution of this kind are Hermann Helmholtz and Wilhelm Ostwald in Germany, Ernst Mach and Ludwig Boltzmann in Austria, Claude Bernard and Henri Poincaré in France, Giuseppe Vailati in Italy, and W. K. Clifford and Karl Pearson in England. Many of these critically minded scientists, moreover, became profoundly discontented with the ways of traditional philosophy, for they found only poetic fancy rather than assured knowledge in most of the great philosophic systems of the past, and saw only failure in philosophic attempts to illumine the tasks which the sciences set for themselves. Indeed, traditional metaphysics was frequently viewed as a serious obstacle to the extension of the methods of science to new domains; and a number of scientists who were seriously concerned with the broader implications of the scientific enterprise developed a militant hostility toward metaphysical speculation.

Karl Pearson (1857–1936) was perhaps the foremost English exponent of this latter point of view, though undoubtedly the writings of Ernst Mach exercised greater influence both on the continent of Europe and in English-speaking coun-

tries. In 1884 Pearson succeeded W. K. Clifford as professor of applied mathematics at the University of London, and was thus led to consider how he might present the fundamentals of mechanics to engineering students, "freed from the metaphysics and confused thinking" which, according to him, characterized the current textbooks. Subsequently, he lectured to popular audiences on the basic concepts of the sciences. *The Grammar of Science* (his most widely read book, first published in 1892) grew directly out of this teaching and lecturing experience. Through his biologist associates, Pearson's attention was directed to evolution as a field for the application of mathematical methods. He was for a long time the leading spirit in the creation of new tools of statistical analysis needed for the quantitative study of biological variation, and in placing biometrics (as this study came to be called) on a substantial theoretical basis; indeed, the contributions he made in this connection to theoretical statistics, though not without defects, were of a fundamental character, and constitute his chief claim for a place in the history of science.

Pearson's aim in *The Grammar of Science* was to clarify the language in which the results of modern physics were formulated, and thus to exhibit in clear light the logic of scientific procedure. He hoped thereby to convince his contemporaries that the potential province of scientific method extended far beyond the physical sciences, and that the moral and social problems of men, in particular, could be effectively handled by that method. He made strenuous efforts to show that the pursuit of science demands the highest type of individual and social morality, and maintained, therefore, that "Modern science, as training the mind to an exact and impartial analysis of facts, is an education specially fitted to promote sound citizenship." In general, he interpreted the function of science in somewhat Darwinian fashion to be that of aiding men in the biological struggle for existence and in adapting themselves to their environment.

However, much of Pearson's analysis of specific scientific concepts was controlled by the preconceptions of British empiricistic philosophy. He assumed, for example, that sense impressions are the ultimate materials of knowledge, the loci of sense impressions being at the nerve endings in the brain. He thus declared that "science deals with the contents of the mind, the 'inside' world," and that "beyond the sense-impressions, beyond the brain terminals of the sensory nerves we cannot get." A scientific law therefore "simply resumes, in a few brief words, the relationships observed between a vast range of phenomena. It economizes thought by stating in conceptual shorthand that routine of our perceptions which forms for us the universe of gravitating matter. . . . How idle is it, then, to speak of the law of gravitation, or indeed of any scientific law, as *ruling* nature. Such laws simply *describe*, they never *explain* the routine of our perceptions, the sense-impressions we project into an 'outside world.' " Assumptions and dicta such as these were not, in general, found to be illuminating or free from serious difficulties; they gave rise to an extensive polemical literature. On the other hand, many of Pearson's readers found such views inescapable and even congenial, and similar ideas have continued to dominate the broader outlook of a not inconsiderable number of eminent scientists. But even in those quarters where Pearson's philosophic assumptions did not win acceptance, as well as in those in which it did, *The Grammar of Science* served as an important

stimulus for the development of a critical philosophy of science. It is from this work (London, A. and C. Black) that the following brief selections are taken.



THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE

THE SCOPE OF SCIENCE

. . . THIS is the peculiarity of scientific method, that when once it has become a habit of mind, that mind converts *all* facts whatsoever into science. The field of science is unlimited; its material is endless, every group of natural phenomena, every phase of social life, every stage of past or present development is material for science. *The unity of all science consists alone in its method, not in its material.* The man who classifies facts of any kind whatever, who sees their mutual relation and describes their sequences, is applying the scientific method and is a man of science. The facts may belong to the past history of mankind, to the social statistics of our great cities, to the atmosphere of the most distant stars, to the digestive organs of a worm, or to the life of a scarcely visible bacillus. It is not the facts themselves which form science, but the method in which they are dealt with. The material of science is co-extensive with the whole physical universe, not only that universe as it now exists, but with its past history and the past history of all life therein. When every fact, every present or past phenomenon of that universe, every phase of present or past life therein, has been examined, classified, and co-ordinated with the rest, then the mission of science will be completed. What is this but saying that the task of science can never end till man ceases to be, till history is no longer made, and development itself ceases?

It might be supposed that science has made such strides in the last two centuries, and notably in the last fifty years, that we might look forward to a day when its work would be practically accomplished. At the beginning of this century it was possible for an Alexander von Humboldt to take a survey of the entire domain of then extant science. Such a survey would be impossible for any scientist now, even if gifted with more than Humboldt's powers. Scarcely any specialist of to-day is really master of all the work which has been done in his own comparatively small field. Facts and their classification have been accumulating at such a rate, that nobody seems to have leisure to recognise the relations of sub-groups to the whole. It is as if individual work-

ers in both Europe and America were bringing their stones to one great building and piling them on and cementing them together without regard to any general plan or to their individual neighbour's work; only where some one has placed a great corner-stone, is it regarded, and the building then rises on this firmer foundation more rapidly than at other points, till it reaches a height at which it is stopped for want of side support. Yet this great structure, the proportions of which are beyond the ken of any individual man, possesses a symmetry and unity of its own, notwithstanding its haphazard mode of construction. This symmetry and unity lie in scientific method. The smallest group of facts, if properly classified and logically dealt with, will form a stone which has its proper place in the great building of knowledge, wholly independent of the individual workman who has shaped it. Even when two men work unwittingly at the same stone they will but modify and correct each other's angles. In the face of all this enormous progress of modern science, when in all civilised lands men are applying the scientific method to natural, historical, and mental facts, we have yet to admit that the goal of science is and must be infinitely distant.

For we must note that when from a sufficient if partial classification of facts a simple principle has been discovered which describes the relationship and sequences of any group, then this principle or law itself generally leads to the discovery of a still wider range of hitherto unregarded phenomena in the same or associated fields.¹ Every great advance of science opens our eyes to facts which we had failed before to observe, and makes new demands on our powers of interpretation. This extension of the material of science into regions where our great-grandfathers could see nothing at all, or where they would have declared human knowledge impossible, is one of the most remarkable features of modern progress. Where they interpreted the motion of the planets of our own system, we discuss the chemical constitution of stars, many of which did not exist for them, for their telescopes could not reach them. Where they discovered the circulation of the blood, we see the physical conflict of living poisons within the blood, whose battles would have been absurdities for them. Where they found void and probably demonstrated to their own satisfaction that there was void, we conceive great systems in rapid motion capable of carrying energy through brick walls as light passes through glass. Great as the advance of scientific knowledge has been, it has not been greater than the growth of the material to be dealt with. The goal of science

¹ For example, while in the last two decades our theory of light and magnetism has advanced by leaps and bounds, we have at the same time discovered wide ranges of novel phenomena, of which we had previously no cognisance.

is clear—it is nothing short of the complete interpretation of the universe. But the goal is an ideal one—it marks the *direction* in which we move and strive, but never a stage we shall actually reach. The universe grows ever larger as we learn to understand more of our own corner of it. . . .

THE IGNORANCE OF SCIENCE

It must not be supposed that science for a moment denies the existence of some of the problems which have hitherto been classed as philosophical or metaphysical. On the contrary, it recognises that a great variety of physical and biological phenomena lead directly to these problems. But it asserts that the methods hitherto applied to these problems have been futile, because they have been unscientific. The classifications of facts hitherto made by the system-mongers have been hopelessly inadequate or hopelessly prejudiced. Until the scientific study of psychology, both by observation and experiment, has advanced immensely beyond its present limits—and this may take generations of work—science can only answer to the great majority of “metaphysical” problems “I am ignorant.” Meanwhile it is idle to be impatient or to indulge in system-making. The cautious and laborious classification of facts must have proceeded much further than at present before the time will be ripe for drawing conclusions.

Science stands now with regard to the problems of life and mind in much the same position as it stood with regard to cosmical problems in the seventeenth century. Then the system-mongers were the theologians, who declared that cosmical problems were not the “legitimate problems of science.” It was vain for Galilei to assert that the theologians’ classification of facts was hopelessly inadequate. In solemn congregation assembled they settled that:

“The doctrine that the earth is neither the centre of the universe nor immovable, but moves even with a daily rotation is absurd, and both philosophically and theologically false, and at the least an error of faith.”

It took nearly two hundred years to convince the whole theological world that cosmical problems were the legitimate problems of science and science alone, for in 1819 the books of Galilei, Copernicus, and Kepler were still upon the index of forbidden books, and not till 1822 was a decree issued allowing books teaching the motion of the earth about the sun to be printed and published in Rome!

I have cited this memorable example of the absurdity which arises from trying to pen science into a limited field of thought, because it seems to me exceedingly suggestive of what must follow again, if any attempt, philosophical or theological, be made to define the “legitimate problems of science.” Wherever there is the slightest possibility for the human mind to *know*, there is a

legitimate problem of science. Outside the field of actual knowledge can only lie a region of the vaguest opinion and imagination, to which unfortunately men too often, but still with decreasing prevalence, pay higher respect than to knowledge.

We must here investigate a little more closely what the man of science means when he says, "*Here I am ignorant.*" In the first place, he does not mean that the method of science is necessarily inapplicable, and accordingly that some other method is to be sought for. In the next place, if the ignorance really arises from the inadequacy of the scientific method, then we may be quite sure that no other method whatsoever will reach the truth. The ignorance of science means the enforced ignorance of mankind. I should be sorry myself to assert that there is any field of either mental or physical perceptions which science may not in the long course of centuries enlighten. Who can give us the assurance that the fields already occupied by science are alone those in which knowledge is possible? Who, in the words of Galilei, is willing to set limits to the human intellect? It is true that this view is not held by several leading scientists, both in this country and Germany. They are not content with saying, "We *are* ignorant," but they add, with regard to certain classes of facts, "Mankind must *always* be ignorant." Thus in England Professor Huxley has invented the term *Agnostic*, not so much for those who are ignorant as for those who limit the possibility of knowledge in certain fields. In Germany Professor E. duBois-Reymond has raised the cry, "*Ignorabimus*" ("We shall be ignorant"), and both his brother and he have undertaken the difficult task of demonstrating that with regard to certain problems human knowledge is impossible. We must, however, note that in these cases we are not concerned with the limitation of the scientific method, but with the denial of the possibility that any method whatever can lead to knowledge. Now I venture to think that there is great danger in this cry, "We *shall* be ignorant." To cry "We are ignorant" is safe and healthy, but the attempt to demonstrate an endless futurity of ignorance appears a modesty which approaches despair. Conscious of the past great achievements and the present restless activity of science, may we not do better to accept as our watchword that sentence of Galilei: "Who is willing to set limits to the human intellect?"—interpreting it by what evolution has taught us of the continual growth of man's intellectual powers.

Scientific ignorance may, as I have remarked, either arise from an insufficient classification of facts, or be due to the unreality of the facts with which science has been called upon to deal. Let us take, for example, fields of thought which were very prominent in mediæval times, such as alchemy, astrology, witchcraft. In the fifteenth century nobody doubted the "facts" of astrology

and witchcraft. Men were ignorant as to how the stars exerted their influence for good or ill; they did not know the exact mechanical process by which all the milk in a village was turned blue by a witch. But for them it was nevertheless a fact that the stars did influence human lives, and a fact that the witch had the power of turning the milk blue. Have we solved the problems of astrology and witchcraft to-day?

Do we now know how the stars influence human lives, or how witches turn milk blue? Not in the least. We have learnt to look upon the facts themselves as unreal, as vain imaginings of the untrained human mind; we have learnt that they could not be described scientifically because they involved notions which were in themselves contradictory and absurd. With alchemy the case was somewhat different. Here a false classification of real facts was combined with inconsistent sequences—that is, sequences not deduced by a rational method. So soon as science entered the field of alchemy with a true classification and a true method, alchemy was converted into chemistry and became an important branch of human knowledge. Now it will, I think, be found that the fields of inquiry, where science has not yet penetrated and where the scientist still confesses ignorance, are very like the alchemy, astrology, and witchcraft of the Middle Ages. Either they involve facts which are in themselves unreal—conceptions which are self-contradictory and absurd, and therefore incapable of analysis by the scientific or any other method,—or, on the other hand, our ignorance arises from an inadequate classification and a neglect of scientific method.

This is the actual state of the case with those mental and spiritual phenomena which are said to lie outside the proper scope of science, or which appear to be disregarded by scientific men. No better example can be taken than the range of phenomena which are entitled Spiritualism. Here science is asked to analyse a series of facts which are to a great extent unreal, which arise from the vain imaginings of untrained minds and from atavistic tendencies to superstition. So far as the facts are of this character, no account can be given of them, because, like the witch's supernatural capacity, their unreality will be found at bottom to make them self-contradictory. Combined, however, with the unreal series of facts are probably others, connected with hypnotic and other conditions, which are real and only incomprehensible because there is as yet scarcely any intelligent classification or true application of scientific method. The former class of facts will, like astrology, never be reduced to law, but will one day be recognised as absurd; the other, like alchemy, may grow step by step into an important branch of science. Whenever, therefore, we are tempted to desert the scientific method of seeking truth, whenever the silence of science suggests that some other gateway must be

sought to knowledge, let us inquire first whether the elements of the problem, of whose solution we are ignorant, may not after all, like the facts of witchcraft, arise from a superstition, and be self-contradictory and incomprehensible because they are unreal.

If on inquiry we ascertain that the facts cannot possibly be of this class, we must then remember that it may require long ages of increasing toil and investigation before the classification of the facts can be so complete that science can express a definite judgment on their relationship. Let us suppose that the Emperor Karl V. had said to the learned of his day: "I want a method by which I can send a message in a few seconds to that new world, which my mariners take weeks in reaching. Put your heads together and solve the problem." Would they not undoubtedly have replied that the problem was impossible? To propose it would have seemed as ridiculous to them as the suggestion that science should straightway solve many problems of life and mind seems to the learned of to-day. It required centuries spent in the discovery and classification of new facts before the Atlantic cable became a possibility. It may require the like or even a longer time to unriddle those psychical and biological enigmas to which I have referred; but he who declares that they can never be solved by the scientific method is to my mind as rash as the man of the early sixteenth century would have been had he declared it utterly impossible that the problem of talking across the Atlantic Ocean should ever be solved.

THE WIDE DOMAIN OF SCIENCE

If I have put the case of science at all correctly, the reader will have recognised that modern science does much more than demand that it shall be left in undisturbed possession of what the theologian and metaphysician please to term its "legitimate field." It claims that the whole range of phenomena, mental as well as physical—the entire universe—is its field. It asserts that the scientific method is the sole gateway to the whole region of knowledge. The word science is here used in no narrow sense, but applies to all reasoning about facts which proceeds, from their accurate classification, to the appreciation of their relationship and sequence. The touchstone of science is the universal validity of its results for all normally constituted and duly instructed minds. Because the glitter of the great metaphysical systems becomes dross when tried by this touchstone, we are compelled to classify them as interesting works of the imagination, and not as solid contributions to human knowledge.

Although science claims the whole universe as its field, it must not be supposed that it has reached, or ever can reach, complete knowledge in every department. Far from this, it confesses that its ignorance is more widely ex-

tended than its knowledge. In this very confession of ignorance, however, it finds a safeguard for future progress. Science cannot give its consent to man's development being some day again checked by the barriers which dogma and myth are ever erecting round territory that science has not yet effectually occupied. It cannot allow theologian or metaphysician, those Portuguese of the intellect, to establish a right to the foreshore of our present ignorance, and so hinder the settlement in due time of vast and yet unknown continents of thought. In the like barriers erected in the past science finds some of the greatest difficulties in the way of intellectual progress and social advance at the present. It is the want of impersonal judgment, of scientific method, and of accurate insight into facts, a want largely due to a non-scientific training, which renders clear thinking so rare, and random and irresponsible judgments so common, in the mass of our citizens to-day. Yet these citizens, owing to the growth of democracy, have graver problems to settle than probably any which have confronted their forefathers since the days of the Revolution.

EDWARD BURNETT TYLOR

EDWARD BURNETT TYLOR (1832-1917) is the father of anthropology in the modern sense and, together with Herbert Spencer, the classical pioneer in applying the idea of evolution to the history of human societies. Tylor's Quaker parentage excluded him from the universities; ill health led him to abandon work in his father's brass foundry and to travel in the United States in 1855-56. In Havana in 1856 he met by chance Henry Christy, an enthusiast for archaeology; together they visited Mexico. The record of this investigation, *Anahuac: or, Mexico and the Mexican, Ancient and Modern*, appeared in 1861. Tylor's reputation was made with his *Researches into the Early History of Mankind* (1865). His *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art and Custom*, came out in 1871, the same year as Darwin's *Descent of Man*; it became at once the standard treatise on anthropology. A smaller popular handbook, *Anthropology*, was published in 1881. From 1883 on Tylor lectured and organized at Oxford, first as Keeper of the University museum, then as reader in anthropology (1884). In 1896 he was named the first professor of anthropology at Oxford, where he founded the School of Anthropology.

One of the major intellectual enterprises of the second half of the nineteenth century was to establish the general study of human life as a branch of natural science. Other students, notably the Germans Adolph Bastian (1826-1905) and Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), were already giving careful descriptive accounts of many primitive peoples, based on wide travels. But Spencer and Tylor were the first to attempt to construct a science of the development of human society on the rather simple model of the mechanistic physical science of the midcentury. In Tylor's words, "The history of mankind is part and parcel of the history of nature; our thoughts, wills, and actions accord with laws as definite as those which govern the motion of waves, the combination of acids and bases, and the growth of plants and animals." Note how he relies on Quetelet's (1796-1874) statistical formulation of such laws.

To this principle of "the uniform action of uniform causes," faith in evolutionary theory added the second principle, that the phenomena of culture may be classified and arranged, stage by stage, in a probable order of evolution. Culture, it was assumed, everywhere evolves in a continuous process to an increasing complexity of forms. Since this uniform process takes place because of widely acting similar causes, it follows everywhere the same course, which may be discovered by the study of examples collected at random from every part of the world. Extreme evolutionists even assumed a unilinear development according to which every existing primitive and advanced culture might be given its proper place in a single ascending line. This collecting of specimens of primitive institutions and cultures, which were then fitted into a simple and rigid scheme of "stages" of development based on speculative generalization from a few instances, was known as the "comparative method."

Herbert Spencer followed this method in his *Principles of Sociology*, which came out in successive volumes from 1876 to 1896. He had assistants go through

Herbert Spencer followed this method in his *Principles of Sociology*, which came out in successive volumes from 1877 to 1896. He had assistants go through the reports of travelers and missionaries to gather instances of customs and beliefs to illustrate the stages of cultural evolution he had already worked out by a largely deductive method. Facts were cavalierly fitted into the formula; little attention was paid to the means by which the changes were effected—they came “by evolution.” Spencer did not himself attempt to arrange whole societies in a single evolutionary scale. He analyzed cultures into several different “institutions”—political, industrial, ceremonial, and so on—and traced evolutionary “stages” in each of these fields. Tylor had the advantage over Spencer, who had never left England, of firsthand familiarity with a variety of primitive cultures. He is much more critical, much less deductive in temper, much more concerned with the weight of evidence, and much more balanced and moderate in judgment. The impressive and timeless quality of his *Primitive Culture* owes much to this careful and judicious reasoning, in which he greatly resembles Darwin himself.

One of Tylor’s major contributions to evolutionary method is the idea of “survivals” left over from an earlier stage of development, which have lost their original functions or acquired new ones. He regarded them as proofs of the existence of an earlier cultural condition, and as evidence from which that stage can be reconstructed. He emphasized how much of our own culture consists of such “survivals.” “To ingenious attempts at explaining by the light of reason things which want the light of history to show their meaning, much of the learned nonsense of the world has indeed been due.”

These central ideas of Tylor come out in the following selection from the opening section of his *Primitive Culture* (4th ed., 1903). This selection also emphasizes his revolutionary concern to undertake a scientific study of the development of religion, “from its rudest forms up to the status of an enlightened Christianity,” without recourse to dogmatic theology and without raising any questions of authority or value. Over half the work is occupied with illustrations of “animism,” the belief in souls and spirits, which he took as “a bare and meagre definition of a minimum of religion.” Tylor’s views stimulated Andrew Lang’s suggestive studies of myth and ritual, and Sir James G. Frazer’s delightful *Golden Bough*, which did more than any other work in popularizing the anthropological approach to religion.

The selection does not illustrate the impressive wealth of detailed evidence amassed by Tylor; but it does bring out his power to construct consistent leading principles modeled on the necessarily limited physical and biological concepts of his day, and above all his vision of the application of genuinely scientific methods to the study of man and man’s changing social life. This mass of evidence and this constructive power were what held the minds of men enthralled for over a generation to an evolutionary anthropology and to the comparative method, until the detailed facts Tylor’s own principles brought to light led to the downfall of his oversimplified evolutionary scheme. But though Tylor’s own organizing hypotheses have been superseded, his vision of a natural science of human societies and of cultural change has won new triumphs in our own day, and in the school of Franz Boas anthropology may fairly claim to have become the most critical and “scientific” in its method of all the social sciences.

PRIMITIVE CULTURE

CHAPTER I: THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE

CULTURE OR CIVILIZATION, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. The condition of culture among the various societies of mankind, in so far as it is capable of being investigated on general principles, is a subject apt for the study of laws of human thought and action. On the one hand, the uniformity which so largely pervades civilization may be ascribed, in great measure, to the uniform action of uniform causes; while on the other hand its various grades may be regarded as stages of development or evolution, each the outcome of previous history, and about to do its proper part in shaping the history of the future. To the investigation of these two great principles in several departments of ethnography, with especial consideration of the civilization of the lower tribes as related to the civilization of the higher nations, the present volumes are devoted.

Our modern investigators in the sciences of inorganic nature are foremost to recognize, both within and without their special fields of work, the unity of nature, the fixity of its laws, the definite sequence of cause and effect through which every fact depends on what has gone before it, and acts upon what is to come after it. They grasp firmly the Pythagorean doctrine of pervading order in the universal Kosmos. They affirm, with Aristotle, that nature is not full of incoherent episodes, like a bad tragedy. They agree with Leibnitz in what he calls "my axiom, that nature never acts by leaps (*la nature n'agit jamais par saut*)," as well as in his "great principle, commonly little employed, that nothing happens without sufficient reason." Nor again, in studying the structure and habits of plants and animals, or in investigating the lower functions even of man, are these leading ideas unacknowledged. But when we come to talk of the higher processes of human feeling and action, of thought and language, knowledge and art, a change appears in the prevalent tone of opinion. The world at large is scarcely prepared to accept the general study of human life as a branch of natural science, and to carry out, in a large sense, the poet's injunction to "Account for moral as for natural things." To many educated minds there seems something presumptuous and repulsive in the view that the history of mankind is part and parcel of the history of nature,

that our thoughts, wills, and actions accord with laws as definite as those which govern the motion of waves, the combination of acids and bases, and the growth of plants and animals.

The main reasons of this state of the popular judgment are not far to seek. There are many who would willingly accept a science of history if placed before them with substantial definiteness of principle and evidence, but who not unreasonably reject the systems offered to them, as falling too far short of a scientific standard. Through resistance such as this, real knowledge always sooner or later makes its way, while the habit of opposition to novelty does such excellent service against the invasions of speculative dogmatism, that we may sometimes even wish it were stronger than it is. But other obstacles to the investigation of laws of human nature arise from considerations of metaphysics and theology. The popular notion of free human will involves not only freedom to act in accordance with motive, but also a power of breaking loose from continuity and acting without cause,—a combination which may be roughly illustrated by the simile of a balance sometimes acting in the usual way, but also possessed of the faculty of turning by itself without or against its weights. This view of an anomalous action of the will, which it need hardly be said is incompatible with scientific argument, subsists as an opinion patent or latent in men's minds, and strongly affecting their theoretic views of history, though it is not, as a rule, brought prominently forward in systematic reasoning. Indeed the definition of human will, as strictly according with motive, is the only possible scientific basis in such enquiries. Happily, it is not needful to add here yet another to the list of dissertations on supernatural intervention and natural causation, on liberty, predestination, and accountability. We may hasten to escape from the regions of transcendental philosophy and theology, to start on a more hopeful journey over more practicable ground. None will deny that, as each man knows by the evidence of his own consciousness, definite and natural cause does, to a great extent, determine human action. Then, keeping aside from considerations of extra-natural interference and causeless spontaneity, let us take this admitted existence of natural cause and effect as our standing-ground, and travel on it so far as it will bear us. It is on this same basis that physical science pursues, with ever-increasing success, its quest of laws of nature. Nor need this restriction hamper the scientific study of human life, in which the real difficulties are the practical ones of enormous complexity of evidence, and imperfection of methods of observation.

Now it appears that this view of human will and conduct as subject to definite law, is indeed recognised and acted upon by the very people who

oppose it when stated in the abstract as a general principle, and who then complain that it annihilates man's free will, destroys his sense of personal responsibility, and degrades him to a soulless machine. He who will say these things will nevertheless pass much of his own life in studying the motives which lead to human action, seeking to attain his wishes through them, framing in his mind theories of personal character, reckoning what are likely to be the effects of new combinations, and giving to his reasoning the crowning character of true scientific enquiry, by taking it for granted that in so far as his calculation turns out wrong, either his evidence must have been false or incomplete, or his judgment upon it unsound. Such a one will sum up the experience of years spent in complex relations with society, by declaring his persuasion that *there is a reason for everything in life*, and that where events look unaccountable, the rule is to wait and watch in hope that the key to the problem may some day be found. This man's observation may have been as narrow as his inferences are crude and prejudiced, but nevertheless he has been an inductive philosopher "more than forty years without knowing it." He has practically acknowledged definite laws of human thought and action, and has simply thrown out of account in his own studies of life the whole fabric of motiveless will and uncaused spontaneity. It is assumed here that they should be just so thrown out of account in wider studies, and that the true philosophy of history lies in extending and improving the methods of the plain people who form their judgments upon facts, and check them upon new facts. Whether the doctrine be wholly or but partly true, it accepts the very condition under which we search for new knowledge in the lessons of experience, and in a word the whole course of our rational life is based upon it.

"One event is always the son of another, and we must never forget the parentage," was a remark made by a Bechuana chief to Casalis the African missionary. Thus at all times historians, so far as they have aimed at being more than mere chroniclers, have done their best to show not merely succession, but connexion, among the events upon their record. Moreover, they have striven to elicit general principles of human action, and by these to explain particular events, stating expressly or taking tacitly for granted the existence of a philosophy of history. Should any one deny the possibility of thus establishing historical laws, the answer is ready with which Boswell in such a case turned on Johnson: "Then, sir, you would reduce all history to no better than an almanack." That nevertheless the labours of so many eminent thinkers should have as yet brought history only to the threshold of science, need cause no wonder to those who consider the bewildering complexity of the problems which come before the general historian. The evidence from which he is to draw his conclusions is at once so multifarious and so doubtful, that a

full and distinct view of its bearing on a particular question is hardly to be attained, and thus the temptation becomes all but irresistible to garble it in support of some rough and ready theory of the course of events. The philosophy of history at large, explaining the past and predicting the future phenomena of man's life in the world by reference to general laws, is in fact a subject with which, in the present state of knowledge, even genius aided by wide research seems but hardly able to cope. Yet there are departments of it which, though difficult enough, seem comparatively accessible. If the field of enquiry be narrowed from History as a whole to that branch of it which is here called Culture, the history, not of tribes or nations, but of the condition of knowledge, religion, art, custom, and the like among them, the task of investigation proves to lie within far more moderate compass. We suffer still from the same kind of difficulties which beset the wider argument, but they are much diminished. The evidence is no longer so wildly heterogeneous, but may be more simply classified and compared, while the power of getting rid of extraneous matter, and treating each issue on its own proper set of facts, makes close reasoning on the whole more available than in general history. This may appear from a brief preliminary examination of the problem, how the phenomena of Culture may be classified and arranged, stage by stage, in a probable order of evolution.

Surveyed in a broad view, the character and habit of mankind at once display that similarity and consistency of phenomena which led the Italian proverb-maker to declare that "all the world is one country," "tutto il monde è paese." To general likeness in human nature on the one hand, and to general likeness in the circumstances of life on the other, this similarity and consistency may no doubt be traced, and they may be studied with especial fitness in comparing races near the same grade of civilization. Little respect need be had in such comparisons for date in history or for place on the map; the ancient Swiss lake-dweller may be set beside the mediaeval Aztec, and the Ojibwa of North America beside the Zulu of South Africa. As Dr. Johnson contemptuously said when he had read about Patagonians and South Sea Islanders in Hawkesworth's *Voyages*, "one set of savages is like another." How true a generalization this really is, any Ethnological Museum may show. Examine for instance the edged and pointed instruments in such a collection; the inventory includes hatchet, adze, chisel, knife, saw, scraper, awl, needle, spear and arrowhead, and of these most or all belong with only differences of detail to races the most various. So it is with savage occupations; the wood-chopping, fishing with net and line, shooting and spearing game, fire-making, cooking, twisting cord and plaiting baskets, repeat themselves with wonderful uniformity in the museum shelves which illustrate the life of the lower races

from Kamchatka to Tierra del Fuego, and from Dahome to Hawaii. Even when it comes to comparing barbarous hordes with civilized nations, the consideration thrusts itself upon our minds, how far item after item of the life of the lower races passes into analogous proceedings of the higher, in forms not too far changed to be recognized, and sometimes hardly changed at all. Look at the modern European peasant using his hatchet and his hoe, see his food boiling or roasting over the log-fire, observe the exact place which beer holds in his calculation of happiness, hear his tale of the ghost in the nearest haunted house, and of the farmer's niece who was bewitched with knots in her inside till she fell into fits and died. If we choose out in this way things which have altered little in a long course of centuries, we may draw a picture where there shall be scarce a hand's breadth difference between an English ploughman and a negro of Central Africa. . . .

A first step in the study of civilization is to dissect it into details, and to classify these in their proper groups. Thus, in examining weapons, they are to be classed under spear, club, sling, bow and arrow, and so forth; among textile arts are to be ranged matting, netting, and several grades of making and weaving threads; myths are divided under such headings as myths of sunrise and sunset, eclipse-myths, earthquake-myths, local myths which account for the names of places by some fanciful tale, eponymic myths which account for the parentage of a tribe by turning its name into the name of an imaginary ancestor; under rites and ceremonies occur such practices as the various kinds of sacrifice to the ghosts of the dead and to other spiritual beings, the turning to the east in worship, the purification of ceremonial or moral uncleanness by means of water or fire. Such are a few miscellaneous examples from a list of hundreds, and the ethnographer's business is to classify such details with a view to making out their distribution in geography and history, and the relations which exist among them. What this task is like, may be almost perfectly illustrated by comparing these details of culture with the species of plants and animals as studied by the naturalist. To the ethnographer the bow and arrow is a species, the habit of flattening children's skulls is a species, the practice of reckoning numbers by tens is a species. The geographical distribution of these things, and their transmission from region to region, have to be studied as the naturalist studies the geography of his botanical and zoological species. Just as certain plants and animals are peculiar to certain districts, so it is with such instruments as the Australian boomerang, the Polynesian stick-and-groove for fire-making, the tiny bow and arrow used as a lancet or phlebotomy by tribes about the Isthmus of Panama, and in like manner with many in art, myth, or custom, found isolated in a particular field. Just as the catalogue of all the species of plants and animals

of a district represents its Flora and Fauna, so the list of all the items of the general life of a people represents that whole which we call its culture. And just as distant regions so often produce vegetables and animals which are analogous, though by no means identical, so it is with the details of the civilization of their inhabitants. How good a working analogy there really is between the diffusion of plants and animals and the diffusion of civilization, comes well into view when we notice how far the same causes have produced both at once. In district after district, the same causes which have introduced the cultivated plants and domesticated animals of civilization, have brought in with them a corresponding art and knowledge. The course of events which carried horses and wheat to America carried with them the use of the gun and the iron hatchet, while in return the whole world received not only maize, potatoes, and turkeys, but the habit of tobacco-smoking and the sailor's hammock. . . .

It being shown that the details of Culture are capable of being classified in a great number of ethnographic groups of arts, beliefs, customs, and the rest, the consideration comes next how far the facts arranged in these groups are produced by evolution from one another. It need hardly be pointed out that the groups in question, though held together each by a common character, are by no means accurately defined. To take up again the natural history illustration, it may be said that they are species which tend to run widely into varieties. And when it comes to the question what relations some of these groups bear to others, it is plain that the student of the habits of mankind has a great advantage over the student of the species of plants and animals. Among naturalists it is an open question whether a theory of development from species to species is a record of transitions which actually took place, or a mere ideal scheme serviceable in the classification of species whose origin was really independent. But among ethnographers there is no such question as to the possibility of species of implements or habits or beliefs being developed one out of another, for development in Culture is recognized by our most familiar knowledge. Mechanical invention supplies apt examples of the kind of development which affects civilization at large. In the history of fire-arms, the clumsy wheel-lock, in which a notched steel wheel revolved by means of a spring against a piece of pyrites till a spark caught the priming, led to the invention of the more serviceable flint-lock, of which a few still hang in the kitchens of our farm-houses for the boys to shoot small birds with at Christmas; the flint-lock in time passed by modification into the percussion-lock, which is just now changing its old-fashioned arrangement to be adapted from muzzle-loading to breech-loading. The mediaeval astrolabe passed into the quadrant, now discarded in its turn by the seaman, who uses the more

delicate sextant, and so it is through the history of one art and instrument after another. Such examples of progression are known to us as direct history, but so thoroughly is this notion of development at home in our minds, that by means of it we reconstruct lost history without scruple, trusting to general knowledge of the principles of human thought and action as a guide in putting the facts in their proper order. Whether chronicle speaks or is silent on the point, no one comparing a long-bow and a cross-bow would doubt that the cross-bow was a development arising from the simpler instrument. So among the fire-drills for igniting by friction, it seems clear on the face of the matter that the drill worked by a cord or bow is a later improvement on the clumsier primitive instrument twirled between the hands. That instructive class of specimens which antiquaries sometimes discover, bronze celts modelled on the heavy type of the stone hatchet, are scarcely explicable except as first steps in the transition from the Stone Age to the Bronze Age, to be followed soon by the next stage of progress, in which it is discovered that the new material is suited to a handier and less wasteful pattern. And thus, in the other branches of our history, there will come again and again into view series of facts which may be consistently arranged as having followed one another in a particular order of development, but which will hardly bear being turned round and made to follow in reversed order. Such for instance are the facts I have here brought forward in a chapter on the Art of Counting, which tend to prove that as to this point of culture at least, savage tribes reached their position by learning and not by unlearning, by elevation from a lower rather than by degradation from a higher state.

Among evidence aiding us to trace the course which the civilization of the world has actually followed, is that great class of facts to denote which I have found it convenient to introduce the term "survivals." These are processes, customs, opinions, and so forth, which have been carried on by force of habit into a new state of society different from that in which they had their original home, and they thus remain as proofs and examples of an older condition of culture out of which a newer has been evolved. Thus, I know an old Somersetshire woman whose hand-loom dates from the time before the introduction of the "flying shuttle," which new-fangled appliance she has never even learnt to use, and I have seen her throw her shuttle from hand to hand in true classic fashion; this old woman is not a century behind her times, but she is a case of survival. Such examples often lead us back to the habits of hundreds and even thousands of years ago. The ordeal of the Key and Bible, still in use, is a survival; the Midsummer bonfire is a survival; the Breton peasants' All Souls' supper for the spirits of the dead is a survival. The simple keeping up of ancient habits is only one part of the transition from old into new and

changing times. The serious business of ancient society may be seen to sink into the sport of later generations, and its serious belief to linger on in nursery folk-lore, while superseded habits of old-world life may be modified into new-world forms still powerful for good and evil. Sometimes old thoughts and practices will burst out afresh, to the amazement of a world that thought them long since dead or dying; here survival passes into revival, as has lately happened in so remarkable a way in the history of modern spiritualism, a subject full of instruction from the ethnographer's point of view. The study of the principles of survival has, indeed, no small practical importance, for most of what we call superstition is included within survival, and in this way lies open to the attack of its deadliest enemy, a reasonable explanation. Insignificant, moreover, as multitudes of the facts of survival are in themselves, their study is so effective for tracing the course of the historical development through which alone it is possible to understand their meaning, that it becomes a vital point of ethnographic research to gain the clearest possible insight into their nature. This importance must justify the detail here devoted to an examination of survival, on the evidence of such games, popular sayings, customs, superstitions, and the like, as may serve well to bring into view the manner of its operation.

Progress, degradation, survival, revival, modification, are all modes of the connexion that binds together the complex network of civilization. It needs but a glance into the trivial details of our own daily life to set us thinking how far we are really its originators, and how far but the transmitters and modifiers of the results of long past ages. Looking round the rooms we live in, we may try here how far he who only knows his own time can be capable of rightly comprehending even that. Here is the "honeysuckle" of Assyria, there the fleur-de-lis of Anjou, a cornice with a Greek border runs round the ceiling, the style of Louis XIV and its parent the Renaissance share the looking-glass between them. Transformed, shifted, or mutilated, such elements of art still carry their history plainly stamped upon them; and if the history yet farther behind is less easy to read, we are not to say that because we cannot clearly discern it there is therefore no history there. It is thus even with the fashion of the clothes men wear. The ridiculous little tails of the German postilion's coat show of themselves how they came to dwindle to such absurd rudiments; but the English clergyman's bands no longer so convey their history to the eye, and look unaccountable enough till one has seen the intermediate stages through which they came down from the more serviceable wide collars, such as Milton wears in his portrait, and which gave their name to the "band-box" they used to be kept in. In fact, the books of costume, showing how one garment grew or shrank by gradual stages and passed into

another, illustrate with much force and clearness the nature of the change and growth, revival and decay, which go on from year to year in more important matters of life. In books, again, we see each writer not for and by himself, but occupying his proper place in history; we look through each philosopher, mathematician, chemist, poet, into the background of his education,—through Leibnitz into Descartes, through Dalton into Priestley, through Milton into Homer. The study of language has, perhaps, done more than any other in removing from our view of human thought and action the ideas of chance and arbitrary invention, and in substituting for them a theory of development by the co-operation of individual men, through processes ever reasonable and intelligible where the facts are fully known. Rudimentary as the science of culture still is, the symptoms are becoming very strong that even what seem its most spontaneous and motiveless phenomena will, nevertheless, be shown to come within the range of distinct cause and effect as certainly as the facts of mechanics. What would be popularly thought more indefinite and uncontrolled than the products of the imagination in myths and fables? Yet any systematic investigation of mythology, on the basis of a wide collection of evidence, will show plainly enough in such efforts or fancy at once a development from stage to stage, and a production of uniformity of result from uniformity of cause. Here, as elsewhere, causeless spontaneity is seen to recede farther and farther into shelter within the dark precincts of ignorance; like chance, that still holds its place among the vulgar as a real cause of events otherwise unaccountable, while to educated men it has long consciously meant nothing but this ignorance itself. It is only when men fail to see the line of connexion in events, that they are prone to fall upon the notions of arbitrary impulses, causeless freaks, chance and nonsense and indefinite unaccountability. If childish games, purposeless customs, absurd superstitions, are set down as spontaneous because no one can say exactly how they came to be, the assertion may remind us of the like effect that the eccentric habits of the wild rice-plant had on the philosophy of a Red Indian tribe, otherwise disposed to see in the harmony of nature the effects of one controlling personal will. The Great Spirit, said these Sioux theologians, made all things except the wild rice; but the wild rice came by chance.

“Man,” said Wilhelm von Humboldt, “ever connects on from what lies at hand (*der Mensch knüpft immer an Vorhandenes an*).” The notion of the continuity of civilization contained in this maxim is no barren philosophic principle, but is at once made practical by the consideration that they who wish to understand their own lives ought to know the stages through which their opinions and habits have become what they are. Auguste Comte scarcely overstated the necessity of this study of development when he declared at the

beginning of his "Positive Philosophy" that "no conception can be understood except through its history," and his phrase will bear extension to culture at large. To expect to look modern life in the face and comprehend it by mere inspection, is a philosophy whose weakness can easily be tested. Imagine any one explaining the trivial saying, "a little bird told me," without knowing of the old belief in the language of birds and beasts, to which Dr. Dasent, in the introduction to the *Norse Tales*, so reasonably traces its origin. Attempts to explain by the light of reason things which want the light of history to show their meaning, may be instanced from Blackstone's *Commentaries*. To Blackstone's mind, the very right of the commoner to turn his beast out to graze on the common, finds its origin and explanation in the feudal system. "For, when lords of manors granted out parcels of land to tenants, for services either done or to be done, these tenants could not plough or manure the land without beasts; these beasts could not be sustained without pasture; and pasture could not be had but in the lord's wastes, and on the uninclosed fallow grounds of themselves and the other tenants. The law therefore annexed this right of common, as inseparably incident, to the grant of the lands; and this was the original of common appendant," &c. Now though there is nothing irrational in this explanation, it does not agree at all with the Teutonic land-law which prevailed in England long before the Norman Conquest, and of which the remains have never wholly disappeared. In the old village-community even the arable land, lying in the great common fields which may still be traced in our country, had not yet passed into separate property, while the pasturage in the fallows and stubbles and on the waste belonged to the householders in common. Since those days, the change from communal to individual ownership has mostly transformed this old-world system, but the right which the peasant enjoys of pasturing his cattle on the common still remains, not as a concession to feudal tenants, but as possessed by the commoners before the lord ever claimed the ownership of the waste. It is always unsafe to detach a custom from its hold on past events, treating it as an isolated fact to be simply disposed of by some plausible explanation.

In carrying on the great task of rational ethnography, the investigation of the causes which have produced the phenomena of culture, and of the laws to which they are subordinate, it is desirable to work out as systematically as possible a scheme of evolution of this culture along its many lines. In the following chapter, on the *Development of Culture*, an attempt is made to sketch a theoretical course of civilization among mankind, such as appears on the whole most accordant with the evidence. By comparing the various stages of civilization among races known to history, with the aid of archaeological inference from the remains of prehistoric tribes, it seems possible to judge in

a rough way of an early general condition of man, which from our point of view is to be regarded as a primitive condition, whatever yet earlier state may in reality have lain behind it. This hypothetical primitive condition corresponds in a considerable degree to that of modern savage tribes, who, in spite of their difference and distance, have in common certain elements of civilization, which seem remains of an early state of the human race at large. If this hypothesis be true, then, notwithstanding the continual interference of degeneration, the main tendency of culture from *primaeval* up to modern times has been from savagery towards civilization. On the problem of this relation of savage to civilized life, almost every one of the thousands of facts discussed in the succeeding chapters has its direct bearing. *Survival in Culture*, placing all along the course of advancing civilization way-marks full of meaning to those who can decipher their signs, even now sets up in our midst *primaeval* monuments of barbaric thought and life. Its investigation tells strongly in favour of the view that the European may find among the Greenlanders or Maoris many a trait for reconstructing the picture of his own primitive ancestors. Next comes the problem of the Origin of Language. Obscure as many parts of this problem still remain, its clearer positions lie open to the investigation whether speech took its origin among mankind in the savage state, and the result of the enquiry is that consistently with all known evidence, this may have been the case. From the examination of the Art of Counting a far more definite consequence is shown. It may be confidently asserted, that not only is this important art found in a rudimentary state among savage tribes, but that satisfactory evidence proves numeration to have been developed by rational invention from this low stage up to that in which we ourselves possess it. The examination of Mythology contained in the first volume, is for the most part made from a special point of view, on evidence collected for a special purpose, that of tracing the relation between the myths of savage tribes and their analogues among more civilized nations. The issue of such enquiry goes far to prove that the earliest myth-maker arose and flourished among savage hordes, setting on foot an art which his more cultured successors would carry on, till its results came to be fossilized in superstition, mistaken for history, shaped and draped in poetry, or cast aside as lying folly.

Nowhere, perhaps, are broad views of historical development more needed than in the study of religion. Notwithstanding all that has been written to make the world acquainted with the lower theologies, the popular ideas of their place in history and their relation to the faiths of higher nations are still of the *mediaeval* type. It is wonderful to contrast some missionary journals with Max Müller's *Essays*, and to set the unappreciating hatred and

ridicule that is lavished by narrow hostile zeal on Brahmanism, Buddhism, Zoroastrism, besides the catholic sympathy with which deep and wide knowledge can survey those ancient and noble phases of man's religious consciousness; nor, because the religions of savage tribes may be rude and primitive compared with the great Asiatic systems, do they lie too low for interest and even for respect. The question really lies between understanding and misunderstanding them. Few who will give their minds to master the general principles of savage religion will ever again think it ridiculous, or the knowledge of it superfluous to the rest of mankind. Far from its beliefs and practices being a rubbish-heap of miscellaneous folly, they are consistent and logical in so high a degree as to begin, as soon as even roughly classified, to display the principles of their formation and development; and these principles prove to be essentially rational, though working in a mental condition of intense and inveterate ignorance. It is with a sense of attempting an investigation which bears very closely on the current theology of our own day, that I have set myself to examine systematically, among the lower races, the development of Animism; that is to say, the doctrine of souls and other spiritual beings in general. More than half of the present work is occupied with a mass of evidence from all regions of the world, displaying the nature and meaning of this great element of the Philosophy of Religion, and tracing its transmission, expansion, restriction, modification, along the course of history into the midst of our own modern thought. Nor are the questions of small practical moment which have to be raised in a similar attempt to trace the development of certain prominent Rites and Ceremonies—customs so full of instruction as to the inmost powers of religion, whose outward expression and practical result they are.

In these investigations, however, made rather from an ethnographic than a theological point of view, there has seemed little need of entering into direct controversial argument, which indeed I have taken pains to avoid as far as possible. The connexion which runs through religion, from its rudest forms up to the status of an enlightened Christianity, may be conveniently treated of with little recourse to dogmatic theology. The rites of sacrifice and purification may be studied in their stages of development without entering into questions of their authority and value, nor does an examination of the successive phases of the world's belief in a future life demand a discussion of the arguments adduced for or against the doctrine itself. The ethnographic results may then be left as materials for professed theologians, and it will not perhaps be long before evidence so fraught with meaning shall take its legitimate place. To fall back once again on the analogy of natural history, the time may soon come when it will be thought as unreasonable for a scientific student

of theology not to have a competent acquaintance with the principles of the religions of the lower races, as for a physiologist to look with the contempt of past centuries on evidence derived from the lower forms of life, deeming the structure of mere invertebrate creatures matter unworthy of his philosophic study.

Not merely as a matter of curious research, but as an important practical guide to the understanding of the present and the shaping of the future, the investigation into the origin and early development of civilization must be pushed on zealously. Every possible avenue of knowledge must be explored, every door tried to see if it is open. No kind of evidence need be left untouched on the score of remoteness or complexity, of minuteness or triviality. The tendency of modern enquiry is more and more towards the conclusion that if law is anywhere, it is everywhere. To despair of what a conscientious collection and study of facts may lead to, and to declare any problem insoluble because difficult and far off, is distinctly to be on the wrong side in science; and he who will choose a hopeless task may set himself to discover the limits of discovery. One remembers Comte starting in his account of astronomy with a remark on the necessary limitation of our knowledge of the stars: we conceive, he tells us, the possibility of determining their form, distance, size, and movement, whilst we should never by any method be able to study their chemical composition, their mineralogical structure, &c. Had the philosopher lived to see the application of spectrum analysis to this very problem, his proclamation of the dispiriting doctrine of necessary ignorance would perhaps have been recanted in favour of a more hopeful view. And it seems to be with the philosophy of remote human life somewhat as with the study of the nature of the celestial bodies. The processes to be made out in the early stages of our mental evolution lie distant from us in time as the stars lie distant from us in space, but the laws of the universe are not limited with the direct observation of our senses. There is vast material to be used in our enquiry; many workers are now busied in bringing this material into shape, though little may have yet been done in proportion to what remains to do; and already it seems not too much to say that the vague outlines of a philosophy of primæval history are beginning to come within our view.

GUSTAV VON SCHMOLLER

GUSTAV VON SCHMOLLER (1838–1917) was one of the leading German representatives of historicism in economics—a movement which dominated so much of nineteenth century thought. In reaction to what it called the static analysis of classical economics, the historical school insisted upon the importance of a dynamic and organismic approach to economic questions. Because of its concern with change and development, it absorbed itself in what Comte called social dynamics, the study of laws of development, as opposed to social statics, the study of laws connecting coexisting facts. The organicism of the historical school led it to hold that economics could not be studied in abstraction from the whole social context. As a result of this double interest in the past and the social context of economic behavior, the historical school stressed the importance of studying history and sociology, and its interest in these studies led it to regard classical political economy as a purely deductive study of unreal economic men torn from their places in the social organism and their indissoluble links with the past.

Schmoller is usually associated with a distinctively German brand of historicism and is usually placed fourth in a line of German economists which begins with Roscher, Knies, and Hildebrand. It should not be forgotten, however, that Schmoller has much in common, methodologically at any rate, with a tradition that stems from Condorcet, St. Simon, Sismondi, James Stewart, and Richard Jones—the line of economic evolutionists from which Karl Marx emerges. On the other hand, the two schools are not to be indiscriminately fused, for there was at least one important point on which they differed. Schmoller and the German historicists, in their effort to break with classical political economy, frequently give the impression that there is a radical opposition between the inductive and deductive methods. Now Marx also attacks the classical political economists for failing to recognize the transitory character of stages in social development and for failing to see the value of studying history, but he is himself an ardent exponent of the deductive method.

A struggle over the relative importance of induction and deduction in economics broke out in 1883 when Carl Menger, the Austrian economist, published an attack on historicism. In general the effect of this was to discredit the extreme empiricism of Schmoller and his school. It is important to remember, however, that Schmoller did not deny the importance of seeking causal laws in economics. He was chiefly concerned with discovering the stage of inquiry at which generalization was feasible. This, he thought, was at the end, after an enormous amount of historical and statistical data had been collected. The collecting of data, however, was what he stimulated and his followers became more and more interested in history, rather than in building a theoretical structure upon their statistical facts. His influence, therefore, has been felt mainly in economic history and many of his disciples became concerned with the

history of business enterprise rather than with an analytical formulation of the laws governing its operation.

The following selection has been translated from Schmoller's "Volkswirtschaft, Volkswirtschaftslehre und ihre Methode," in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, Vol. VI (Gustav Fischer, 1894).



POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ITS METHOD

THE SYSTEMS OR GENERAL THEORIES OF STATE, LAW AND NATIONAL ECONOMY

THE ECONOMIC THEORIES of the Middle Ages had their common roots in Christianity, in Christian ethics and in the doctrines of just price and usury. The theories of state economy characteristic of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries which are usually referred to as mercantilist had their origin primarily in a world view based upon the ideologies of the later periods of the Roman Empire and of Roman law. These mercantilist doctrines reflect the then prevailing conceptions of the absolute state of such thinkers as Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, Pufendorf and Christian Wolf. Their primary objective seems to have been the formation of the modern state. Just as the political units such as manors, cities, counties, and regions had to be centralized under one administration, so regional economies had to be integrated into one unified market system interconnected by trade, division of labor, and a uniform medium of exchange: The most important means of attaining this end are a good system of coinage and a rapid circulation of money. Export industries, colonies, foreign trade and mining create a monetary surplus and promote an abundant circulation of money. That is to say, money within the country ought not to find its way abroad. The entire national economy is to be unified by means of import restrictions which indirectly influence and guide commerce and industry. Animosity toward foreign countries is general; one fights for outlets, colonies and commercial predominance. The common people are regarded as a lazy crowd which it is the task of statesmen to prompt and to lead toward progress. In these mercantilist conceptions there are many correct and a few incorrect observations and judgments. Primarily, however, these theories have to be regarded as the expression of ideas which were justified both practically and historically. Based upon a one-sided world view

and state theory these mercantilist doctrines provided temporarily adequate ends and ideals for the formulation of policy.

The theories of political economy which owe their origin to the Physiocrats and Adam Smith were based upon conceptions of natural science and natural law. They regard political economy as a natural, harmonious and orderly system of individual and egoistically motivated forces whose interaction, according to the deistic optimism of their authors, can have only favorable results. These theories preached the ideals of individualism and liberalism; they regarded the state as almost superfluous, considered every statesman a scoundrel, and made the elimination of all medieval institutions part of their program. These theories served the needs of great practical reforms in the way that the doctrines of mercantilism did at one time and those of socialism do today.

The latter are based upon a materialistic overestimation of the importance of external goods and material happiness; they imply a negation of life after death and are the result of a complete misunderstanding of the very essence of human nature. Nevertheless these socialist doctrines lend support to urgent practical needs as well as to the trend and aspiration toward a democratic way of life, equality, technical progress and state centralization. The socialist world view has many elements in common with that of the enlightenment—for instance political radicalism, the glorification of the republican form of government, and the intention to organize society in accordance with logical categories. Other elements of socialism based upon Hegel and Feuerbach, such as the socialist philosophy of history, reflect 19th century philosophy. Virtually all economic theories of socialism are borrowed from Ricardo's one-sided abstractions. The supreme ideal of socialism is the elimination of inequalities of income and wealth, the abolition of class rule and, if possible, the abolition of all conflicts of classes. Its justified aim consists in the betterment and improvement of the life of the working classes, and great advances have already been made in this direction. The socialist doctrines represent an understandable reaction to the one-sidedness of the natural law theory of free competition. They serve the interest of the third estate just as the doctrines of free competition served that of the middle classes. On the whole, however, the doctrines of socialism are not less one-sided. While they have led to numerous [valuable] investigations their results are just as far from any profound insight and understanding as those of their predecessor, the Manchester School. Indeed, one might almost say that in their methods they exaggerated the rationalistic errors of the latter.

Even the less extreme contemporary theories and systems of political economy and social policy are based upon a definite philosophy, and reflect a par-

ticular idea of the development of the universe and human history, at least to the extent that they achieve a certain unity and derive from it ideals for the future. Only he who has an over-all and concrete idea of the development of such important institutions as the state, civil law and the economic system is able to say where we will and ought to go in the future. This picture must remain to a certain extent a subjective one; at any rate it is often supplemented by conceptions derived from constructive imagination and is based in most instances upon considerations of a teleological character. No matter how eminent an individual theorist may be, no matter how much he may consider himself free of all class and party interests, which likewise have their specific economic theories, the fact remains that in so far as he pursues practical policies and sets up practical ends of human conduct, his point of departure is a belief and a particular world-view; and no matter how scientific his approach, he is not capable of convincing all men equally of the truth and validity of his doctrines. This applies to the state socialist ideals of Adolf Wagner just as much as to Brentano's proposals for trade unions, and to the moderate plans of reform of the Association for Social Legislation (*Verein für Sozialpolitik*) as well as to the radical plans of English Fabianism.

These observations apply not only to the formulation of ideals for the future and to theoretical systems; indeed, all pronouncements about great historical phenomena such as the formation of states, their decline, social revolutions, and economic and cultural progress or retrogression, no matter how much they may be based upon the most accurate knowledge of details, are deduced from premises of a teleological kind and are derived from conceptions of the universe and world history which differ according to the philosopher's world view and the personality of the individual scholar. They are never more than tentative approximations and do not live up to that criterion of truth which is the prerequisite of perfect science, namely, that each investigator must arrive at the same conclusion.

The more exact sciences strive toward this goal. They endeavor to arrive at immutable truths; and they have attained their goal in fields where the interrelation of phenomena is less complex. This goal can be attained if science confines itself at first to the investigation of particular details. The more a particular science does this the more it has to give up the attempt to set up ultimate ends and to teach what ought to be. For this can only be done by viewing the totality of all interrelationships. If therefore exact science in the field of political economy requires that attitude of resignation which at first raises only the question of how things have developed, it does not abandon the hope of contributing to a better organization of human life in the future. In the interest of a legitimate division of labor economic science aims at pure

knowledge, especially because in the social and political sciences the objectivity of scientific procedures has suffered more than in other sciences by the desire to use concrete investigations for the purpose of lending support to subjective notions of what ought to be. It cannot be denied that the ultimate aim of all knowledge is a practical one and that the will always precedes the intellect and remains its master; in fact, every case of progress in understanding is itself an act of the will. One may even admit that for certain pedagogical purposes, especially in applied economics and public finance, the explanation of what is may be supplemented quite properly by references to probable future development and to the advantages of one or the other of the several alternative possibilities. However, in the interest of scientific progress, it is more correct to believe that scientific investigation based upon exact methods ought to be confined as far as possible to (1) correct observations of phenomena, (2) their definition and classification, and (3) their causal explanation.

In dealing with these three intellectual operations in the following pages we are not implying that it is always possible to carry them out separately and in the order just indicated. They always tend to overlap; the first step of observation already presupposes correct definitions and classifications; and each genuine observation yields causal explanations. Nevertheless some kind of crude observation is always the beginning, and the completed causal explanation is the final step of scientific procedures. . . .

THE STATISTICAL METHOD AND STATISTICAL ENQUIRIES

It was possible to emancipate empirical studies from subjective delusions and to obtain truths of general validity, first in those fields where specific phenomena could be measured in terms of quantity and number. For centuries people have measured for practical purposes of administration the hides of land, the population of countries, heads of cattle and numbers of buildings. These quantitative measurements were needed increasingly often by the tyrants of the Renaissance and even more by the enlightened despots of the 17th and 18th centuries for financial, military and other purposes. The awakening science of political economy appropriated these statistical materials for its own purposes. Petty and Davenant spoke of political arithmetic when they collected and compared economic data. G. Aschenwald and his successors began to supplement the descriptive accounts [of the history] of nations by numbers, and called this procedure "statistics." Peter Süssmilch made the data found in church records the basis of the systematic study of population.

We are concerned here only with statistics as a method of systematic observation of mass data. . . . The significance of the statistical method for the

progress of all social sciences concerned with government, society and national economy is tremendous. The development of this method was one of the most important steps in the advance made during the last 50 years. Statistics has provided in many respects an experimental method which has been lacking in the social sciences; statistical methods and procedures have created a sense of exactness and precision; they have replaced vague notions by definite conceptions of magnitude. They have permitted for the first time [in the history of the social sciences] the subjection of mass data, which so far could only be expressed in terms of vague estimates, to definite observations; and have permitted the use of quantitative phenomena for purposes of an absolutely sure classification and description. By their tables, graphs and other means they have directed attention to causes and have enabled us to measure the influence of essential and contributing causes. By classifying statistical results according to space and time and by thus making mass phenomena, so to speak, functions of space and time, it became possible to achieve an understanding of the different degrees of effectiveness of contributing causes. Statistics has created the theory of population and has laid the firm foundation for ethnological studies and public finance. Statistical methods and procedures have eliminated great errors from the theories of money and price and have revealed the distortion inherent in so many premature generalizations in different fields; they have become the main tool of descriptive political economy. The progress now being made in statistics dealing with labor, wages, occupations and consumption indicate how much these methods and procedures are capable of improving and even completely reorienting important branches of the social sciences.

And yet, there can be no doubt about the limitations of the fruitfulness of the statistical method. Almost all statistical data are derived from a short period of the most recent history [of mankind] and apply to a few civilized nations only. Statistics furnishes truth only in connection with other special sciences; it cannot do so alone. Only the economist, the anthropologist, the criminologist and the physician who is completely at home in his field is able to treat the subject matter of his investigations with the measuring instrument of statistics. The latter can yield only relationships of quantities; qualities which go beyond quantities, especially the highly important ethical and spiritual phenomena, lie outside the scope of statistics, at least in so far as they cannot be reduced to measurable events like suicides and penalties. Very frequently we are unable to penetrate to the truly interesting aspects of measurable objects because the questions asked become too complicated and the answers too false and too difficult to summarize. We measure the number of **milk cows**, but not their weight and how much milk they produce; we estab-

lish the number of factories as well as the number of their workers, but we have not adequately succeeded in measuring the number of their machines, the amount of their capital and their annual output. Lexis points out that statistical investigations are superfluous, or at best only useful as a check, in all those instances where we know already the causes of events recurring in a simple and typical fashion. In all those cases where we have to deal with mass phenomena which are historically of a more specific and unique character, the value of statistics as a tool declines in proportion to the extent to which the phenomena under observation are specific and non-typical. Even though there remains between these two groups of phenomena a large and important field open for statistical methods and procedures, it must be realized that, where statistical methods are applicable, they never reveal the complicated causes and combination of causes. Statistical methods enable only the expert to presume interrelationships by means of a comparison of quantities. . . .

HISTORY AND HISTORICAL METHOD

If statistics is a young science, history is an old one. Statistics is a specialized auxiliary science. History is, aside from philosophy, the most universal of all sciences. And yet, both these sciences are related to political economy in a similar manner: as far as political economy is concerned, both history and statistics are primarily auxiliary sciences which provide it with selected, examined and properly organized empirical data. Of course, this does not indicate the whole contribution of history to political economy.

What does history aim at? . . . I should like to describe its objectives as follows: Historical science collects, examines and relates, within an intelligible and interrelated over-all picture, the entire past of the political and cultural development of nations and of humanity. History pursues two aims: the first, the critique and systematic arrangement of the past, utilizing this as a means to the second, a narration and exposition of the facts. The most appropriate and typical domain of historical science is that of critique and orderly arrangement. It is in this field that history, together with philology, has, especially during the last hundred years, developed exact methods and yielded definite results which live up to the highest standards of knowledge and equal the results of all other sciences. It is for this reason that one has come to look upon history as an exact science similar to the natural sciences. It is here that history has developed her most typical techniques and has achieved her greatest triumphs. However, the greatest importance, the greatest effectiveness of history lies in the domain of the narration and exposition of facts as well as in the value judgments, conclusions and general truths

derived therefrom. By turning from a mere enumeration of facts to a more intelligible presentation and finally to methods of genetic exposition which endeavor to explain the inner and causal interrelationship of events, the significance of nature and race and the role of traditional ideas and new knowledge, as well as the importance of great men and institutions, history was bound to make use directly or indirectly of all human knowledge including philosophy and specialized disciplines. In the nature of things this ultimate and highest aim of history can never be fully attained. Historical science must frequently be content with an explanation which renders intelligible and conceivable the basic enigmas of world history and content to interpret them in terms of aims inherent in history instead of explaining their causes with complete scientific disinterestedness. Thus, it is clear that the results of historical science, because they are arrived at with the aid of different methods, are of very different significance as far as their usefulness to other sciences is concerned. . . .

Both the development of general historical science and that of the independent subsidiary sciences have received their strongest impulses during the last 100 years from Germany. Niebuhr and Ranke are celebrated today throughout the world as the founders of modern historical science. Savigny, Eichhorn and Waitz occupy the same position in the history of law: Böckh, Arnold, Maurer and Nitsch are the founders of economic history and Friedrich List, Roscher, Hildebrand and Knies are the first political economists who realized the increasing importance of history for their science. In other civilized nations the influence of historical science was felt much later, partly because its development had been delayed and partly because the sciences of man had reached a state of relative stagnation. This is true especially for England, which experienced the peak of its scientific development at the time of Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Adam Smith, but which after 1780 produced only several generations of sterile epigones. If the world outside England paid attention to and studied the largely platitudinous treatises on political economy of the epigones, this was not due to any high level scientific achievement but reflected merely the fact that the economic life of England was ahead of that of other countries. In France it was August Comte who demanded emphatically that social studies be based upon the historical method; but he remained an isolated outsider for a considerable time.

If now the question is raised as what the general science of history and its more specialized, subsidiary disciplines such as economic history, history of law and others have to contribute to the political and economic sciences, it is not difficult to find the answer, which has already been indicated above. The historical sciences provide empirical material and data which transform the

scholar from a mere beggar into a rich man as far as knowledge of reality is concerned. And it is this historical-empirical material which, like all good observation and description, serves to illustrate and verify theoretical conclusions, to demonstrate the limitations of the validity of certain truths, and, more than anything else, to obtain inductively new truths. This applies particularly to the more complicated fields of political economy, in which it is possible to advance only on the basis of historical investigations. For example, purely abstract deductions are without value as regards the effects of machinery on wages and the influence of the production of precious metals on the value of money. This is even truer with respect to the evolution of economic institutions and theories, and the problem of economic progress in general. It is for this reason that Knies is correct in pointing out that to consult history belongs to the most appropriate methods of political economy. The most prominent opponent of the historical school, Karl Menger, admits that the most important economic institutions such as property, money, and credit have both an individual nature and a historical side to their existence; consequently "he who knows the essence of these phenomena only in one phase of their existence does not know them at all." If this is true with respect to money and credit it is even truer with respect to the family economy, the division of labor, the formation of social classes, different forms of business organization, the phenomena of the market and other institutions of trade, guilds, freedom of domestic trade, patterns of rural life and indeed, of all typical patterns and specific arrangements which are known as economic institutions and which, after having crystallized into law, tend to dominate either permanently or for centuries the economic process.

If it were true that history describes only what is concrete and specific and that generalization is beyond its scope, its influence would, indeed, be limited. However, history is concerned not only with the explanation of the rise of particular persons and their destiny as well as that of nations; it also deals with the psychological and institutional and, indeed, the general causes of social events, which have to be integrated theoretically by the political sciences. And although much of historical science does not deal with problems of state and political economy, and while many of the preliminary results and especially value judgments and endeavors of explanation are more of the nature of philosophical speculation than of exact knowledge and can, therefore, be used by other sciences only with extreme caution, the fact remains that a substantial part of the material covered by history is of an economic and social nature. Whereas history presents this material in a chronological order and in a descriptive manner, the political sciences have to present it in a theoretical and generalizing fashion. If the past is not fully recorded and if

the available records reflect only a very small part of what has actually happened it is, nevertheless, true that the most important events have been recorded for thousands of years; moreover, our knowledge of past events grows in proportion as it approaches the present. In any event, what history records is a million times more than what the contemporary investigator is able to see and observe today, and what he observes indirectly of the present is recorded history, which likewise may be incomplete and may need to be checked with respect to its authenticity. Certainly, as far as the present is concerned there exist many means of observation which are lacking for the past . . . In any event, the most important economic processes have grown and developed for many decades and centuries; they have their origin in a distant past which can only be discovered historically.

No reasonable person has ever denied that the empirico-historical material constitutes only one part of what can be utilized for the purposes of political economy and that in addition it is important to pay attention to geographical, ethnological, statistical, psychological and technological data. If Karl Menger has recently asserted that there are some authors who point out that economic history is the only justifiable empirical basis of theoretical investigation into the functioning of the economic system, he has been in no way able to offer even the slightest indication of proof for his assertion. It is precisely historical economists who have always emphasized the need for psychological and statistico-empirical investigations.

. . . Statistics possesses greater usefulness for the comprehension of quantities; and yet, as compared with statistics, historical science is, nevertheless, more effective when it comes to the description of mass phenomena, the comprehension of typical pattern of social life, and the penetration into the more refined and especially the psychological, moral and various other types of causal relationships. [A.] Wagner praises the advantages of statistical methods, which the latter possess only if they are applied in conjunction with conclusions of a different nature and with other sciences. The same may be said of the conclusions of historical science. It is, nevertheless, important to note that the intellectual content and universal character of history enables the latter to bear fruits of a broader kind as well as to discover causes. Moreover, if general history examines critically the records of the past and combines them for purposes of systematic presentation, the special branches of history such as economic history and the history of law and languages necessarily go further and undertake the classification and organization of material as well as the demonstration of regularities and causes.

The historical method in the narrower sense of the word includes the study both of original sources and those critical procedures which have the purpose

of examining, determining and organizing the recorded material; this method cannot be dispensed with in economic history, and it can become directly useful and necessary for certain particular fields of political economy. But in general the historical method serves only as a preparatory science for the organization of historical facts. The descriptive account of economic history and of general history, in so far as the latter records matters pertaining to the economic life of the past, are not economic theory; but they constitute the material essential for the formulation of such theory. As a matter of fact, the more concrete the particular account is and the more it explains the development of events the more is it possible that the specific results of economic history become elements of theory and thus lead to general truths. The earlier so-called historical school has often attempted to use the results of general history too quickly for theoretical purposes; today we realize that laborious monographs in economic history constitute only the foundation upon which it becomes possible to comprehend history from the point of view of political economy and social policy and to put economic theory upon an adequate empirical basis. It is precisely for this reason that it was not the general efforts of Roscher and Hildebrand in the direction of a historical treatment of economic problems, but the historical monographs of a later period which opened a new epoch in the evolution of economic science. This has been achieved just as much by the contributions of the Englishmen Tooke, Newmarch, Rogers, Ashley, the Frenchmen Depping, Bourquelot, Levasseur, Pigeonneau, and the Belgian Laveleye, as by the work of the Germans Brentano, Bücher, Gothein, Held, Inama, Knapp, Lamprecht, Lexis, Meitzen, Miaskowski, Schanz, Schönberg, Schmoller, Schnapper-Arndt, Thun, etc.

Simultaneously with these repercussions of studies in economic history we notice the much more general effect which the spread of historical knowledge has had the more it has penetrated into all of the sciences of man. It was the spread of historical knowledge which, more than any other single factor, destroyed the natural law theories of an egoistic exchange economy which originated in the period of the Enlightenment. This historical education showed that human beings are not always the same and that they do not always live under the same typical economic arrangements and social institutions. It also created the idea of a historical evolution of nations and of humanity as well as of economic institutions. It re-established the link of economic research with ethics, law, government, and the general causes of the growth of civilization. It showed the necessity for combining the investigation of phenomena pertaining to society as a whole with those studies and conclusions which deal with the individual and his egoistic interests. It taught how to supplement theoretical analysis by a correct synthesis. It complemented the method of selective

abstraction by showing how the results of the latter have to be treated as integral parts of a whole. Thus, what had been empty abstraction and dead mechanism again took on blood and life. These effects of historical studies have thus transformed the general foundations of economic theory and have led to more useful conclusions in the field of economic policy. Above all they have promoted that practical sense of reality without which all theorizing on social and political matters is led astray, and a realistic sense for the possible. This realism is unwilling to consider bold progress impossible on the ground that men do not change, just as it is unwilling to accept foolish plans for the future in the hope that some kind of socialist institution will bring forth suddenly nothing but virtuous and altruistic human beings.

IX
SOCIETY AND SCIENCE

AUGUSTE COMTE

AUGUSTE COMTE (1798–1857), born at Montpellier of Catholic royalist parents, developed into intellectual maturity during the period of reaction to the predominantly individualistic social philosophy of the Enlightenment. The writings of de Bonald and de Maistre had made him sensitive to the historical and “organic” nature of society; and he soon became impatient with attempts, such as that of the French Revolution, to create new systems of society without taking into account the laws of historical development. “Society does not and cannot progress in this way,” he wrote in 1822; “the pretension of constructing offhand in a few months or even years a social system, in its complete and definite shape, is an extravagant chimera absolutely incompatible with the weakness of the human intellect.” His *System of Positive Philosophy* had for its twofold objective the generalization of scientific conceptions, so that they could be applied to the study of society, and the systematization of the art of social life, so that intellect might be subordinated to social feeling. Consonant with his conviction that a new moral faith must be developed to replace the spiritual loyalties destroyed by the French Revolution, the culmination of his *System* was a new “religion of humanity,” whose aim was the fostering of universal altruism and whose motto was “Order and progress—live for others.”

Comte's importance as a thinker consists in his systematic use of the method of comparative historical analysis in social studies and in his ambitious attempt to trace the main course of social development. Nevertheless, his encyclopaedic system was but an elaboration and unification of ideas and methods which were already familiar; he borrowed heavily not only from de Maistre and St. Simon but from Plato, Hume, Montesquieu, Turgot, Kant, and Condorcet as well. In the first of his two major works, the *System of Positive Philosophy* (published in six volumes at intervals from 1830 to 1842), he tried to show by a detailed analysis of science and history that sociology (a word he coined) could and inevitably must become a full-fledged science. He first noted that the sciences can be arranged in order of increasing complexity, beginning with mathematics, followed by astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology, and ending with the study of society; he claimed that this order corresponds to the historical order in which these sciences mature. Finally he argued that every science must necessarily pass through three stages of development and that while all but the last have gone through the full cycle of evolution sociology was also on the point of becoming a genuine science.

These three stages of scientific development were regarded by Comte as illustrating a general law of progress whose scope included every phase of the history of mankind. Part of his evidence for this law was the supposed threefold division of man's cerebral system into emotional, active, and intellectual powers; but the main burden of his argument consists in the presentation of the alleged facts of the moral, intellectual, and political development of society. Thus, in the first or “theological” stage explanations of events are in terms of the capricious acts of gods or spirits; in this stage the political organization of society is along military lines, while men's emotional needs find satisfaction in the family.

In the second or "metaphysical" stage events are understood in terms of the operations of abstract essences or occult causes; the political organization of society is now "juristic," military offense being replaced by a system of defensive measures, while emotional satisfaction is found in the national state. The final stage is the "scientific" or "positivistic." The sole aim of inquiry now is the discovery of the laws connecting phenomena, and observation, experiment, and the comparison of facts are the basis for certitude; science is no longer an idle pastime and a socially useless speculation, for its motto has become *voir pour prévoir*.¹ In this stage society is organized on industrial lines, and the spiritual loyalty of men is given to the "race" or "mankind."

Comte believed he had produced enough evidence to show that the science of society, which he regarded as being still in the metaphysical stage, was about to enter the positivistic period of its development. According to him, sociology has two main subdivisions—social statics and social dynamics. Social statics studies the permanent conditions of social "order": it examines the way in which the essential functions of society are performed by its various parts and the manner in which these functions require integration through various coordinating agencies such as the government. Social dynamics, on the other hand, is concerned with the laws and conditions of "progress": the law of three stages is its most important conclusion. But in Comte's view the static and dynamic phases of society are intimately related to one another; and his chief criticism of philosophies of conservatism and revolution was that they failed to note the limitations which the conditions of order and progress imposed on social policy.

The coping stone to Comte's conception of society was provided in the second of his major works, the *System of Positive Polity* (published in four volumes at intervals between 1851 and 1854). Because of the specialization of functions which occurs in a society, Comte argued, there is a natural need for a central coordinating agency; and in addition the final integrating function in a positivistic society will have to be performed by the "Religion of Humanity" and its priests—specialists in sociology rather than theology. He therefore worked out in great detail the character and organization of the new religious cult: an international hierarchy of priests would administer the sacred rituals and sacraments; there would be a calendar of saints, or benefactors of humanity, as well as a roster of devils, or evil spirits who have been hindrances to progress; and there would be a continually revised index of sacred writings, or outstanding contributions to the positivistic spirit. It is accurate to say that Comte proposed "catholicism without Christianity." Comte's priests would enjoy no temporal power and would exert their influence through their teaching and preaching. On the contrary, temporal power would be vested in the captains of industry (bankers, landlords, and manufacturers), and Comte relied on the altered moral tone of society consequent to the establishment of his religion to prevent abuse of power.

The first of the following selections is taken from *The Positive Philosophy* originally written in French (as "freely translated and condensed" by Harriet Martineau, 3d ed., 1856). The second selection is from the second edition of the *General View of Positivism* (1851), which first appeared in 1848. It was translated from the French by J. H. Bridges.

¹ [See in order to foresee.]

THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY

IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND the true value and character of the Positive Philosophy, we must take a brief general view of the progressive course of the human mind, regarded as a whole; for no conception can be understood otherwise than through its history.

From the study of the development of human intelligence, in all directions, and through all times, the discovery arises of a great fundamental law, to which it is necessarily subject, and which has a solid foundation of proof, both in the facts of our organization and in our historical experience. The law is this:—that each of our leading conceptions—each branch of our knowledge—passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious; the Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or positive. In other words, the human mind, by its nature, employs in its progress three methods of philosophizing, the character of which is essentially different, and even radically opposed: viz., the theological method, the metaphysical, and the positive. Hence arise three philosophies, or general systems of conceptions on the aggregate of phenomena, each of which excludes the others. The first is the necessary point of departure of the human understanding; and the third is its fixed and definite state. The second is merely a state of transition.

In the theological state, the human mind, seeking the essential nature of beings, the first and final causes (the origin and purpose) of all effects—in short, Absolute knowledge—supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings.

In the metaphysical state, which is only a modification of the first, the mind supposes, instead of supernatural beings, abstract forces, veritable entities (that is, personified abstractions) inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena. What is called the explanation of phenomena is, in this stage, a mere reference of each to its proper entity.

In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after Absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws—that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance. Reasoning and observation, duly combined, are the means of this knowledge. What is now understood when we speak of an explanation of facts is simply the establishment of a connection between single phenomena and some general facts, the number of which continually diminishes with the progress of science.

The Theological system arrived at the highest perfection of which it is capable when it substituted the providential action of a single Being for the varied operations of the numerous divinities which had been before imagined. In the same way, in the last stage of the Metaphysical system, men substitute one great entity (Nature) as the cause of all phenomena, instead of the multitude of entities at first supposed. In the same way, again, the ultimate perfection of the Positive system would be (if such perfection could be hoped for) to represent all phenomena as particular aspects of a single general fact—such as Gravitation, for instance.

The importance of the working of this general law will be established hereafter. At present, it must suffice to point out some of the grounds of it.

There is no science which, having attained the positive stage, does not bear the marks of having passed through the others. Some time since it was (whatever it might be) composed, as we can now perceive, of metaphysical abstractions; and, further back in the course of time, it took its form from theological conceptions. We shall have only too much occasion to see, as we proceed, that our most advanced sciences still bear very evident marks of the two earlier periods through which they have passed.

The progress of the individual mind is not only an illustration, but an indirect evidence of that of the general mind. The point of departure of the individual and of the race being the same, the phases of the mind of a man correspond to the epochs of the mind of the race. Now, each of us is aware, if he looks back upon his own history, that he was a theologian in his childhood, a metaphysician in his youth, and a natural philosopher in his manhood. All men who are up to their age can verify this for themselves.

Besides the observation of facts, we have theoretical reasons in support of this law.

The most important of these reasons arises from the necessity that always exists for some theory to which to refer our facts, combined with the clear impossibility that, at the outset of human knowledge, men could have formed theories out of the observation of facts. All good intellects have repeated, since Bacon's time, that there can be no real knowledge but that which is based on observed facts. This is incontestable, in our present advanced stage; but, if we look back to the primitive stage of human knowledge, we shall see that it must have been otherwise then. If it is true that every theory must be based upon observed facts, it is equally true that facts can not be observed without the guidance of some theory. Without such guidance, our facts would be desultory and fruitless; we could not retain them: for the most part we could not even perceive them.

Thus, between the necessity of observing facts in order to form a theory, and having a theory in order to observe facts, the human mind would have been entangled in a vicious circle, but for the natural opening afforded by Theological conceptions. This is the fundamental reason for the theological character of the primitive philosophy. This necessity is confirmed by the perfect suitability of the theological philosophy to the earliest researches of the human mind. It is remarkable that the most inaccessible questions—those of the nature of beings, and the origin and purpose of phenomena—should be the first to occur in a primitive state, while those which are really within our reach are regarded as almost unworthy of serious study. The reason is evident enough:—that experience alone can teach us the measure of our powers; and if men had not begun by an exaggerated estimate of what they can do, they would never have done all that they are capable of. Our organization requires this. At such a period there could have been no reception of a positive philosophy, whose function is to discover the laws of phenomena, and whose leading characteristic it is to regard as interdicted to human reason those sublime mysteries which theology explains, even to their minutest details, with the most attractive facility. It is just so under a practical view of the nature of the researches with which men first occupied themselves. Such inquiries offered the powerful charm of unlimited empire over the external world—a world destined wholly for our use, and involved in every way with our existence. The theological philosophy, presenting this view, administered exactly the stimulus necessary to incite the human mind to the irksome labor without which it could make no progress. We can now scarcely conceive of such a state of things, our reason having become sufficiently mature to enter upon laborious scientific researches, without needing any such stimulus as wrought upon the imaginations of astrologers and alchemists. We have motive enough in the hope of discovering the laws of phenomena, with a view to the confirmation or rejection of a theory. But it could not be so in the earliest days; and it is to the chimeras of astrology and alchemy that we owe the long series of observations and experiments on which our positive science is based. Kepler felt this on behalf of astronomy, and Berthollet on behalf of chemistry. Thus was a spontaneous philosophy, the theological, the only possible beginning, method, and provisional system, out of which the Positive philosophy could grow. It is easy, after this, to perceive how Metaphysical methods and doctrines must have afforded the means of transition from the one to the other.

The human understanding, slow in its advance, could not step at once from the theological into the positive philosophy. The two are so radically

opposed, that an intermediate system of conceptions has been necessary to render the transition possible. It is only in doing this, that metaphysical conceptions have any utility whatever. In contemplating phenomena, men substitute for supernatural direction a corresponding entity. This entity may have been supposed to be derived from the supernatural action: but it is more easily lost sight of, leaving attention free from the facts themselves, till, at length, metaphysical agents have ceased to be anything more than the abstract names of phenomena. It is not easy to say by what other process than this our minds could have passed from supernatural considerations to natural; from the theological system to the positive. . . .

Though involved with the physiological, Social phenomena demand a distinct classification, both on account of their importance and of their difficulty. They are the most individual, the most complicated, the most dependent on all others; and therefore they must be the latest,—even if they had no special obstacle to encounter. This branch of science has not hitherto entered into the domain of Positive philosophy. Theological and metaphysical methods, exploded in other departments, are as yet exclusively applied, both in the way of inquiry and discussion, in all treatment of Social subjects, though the best minds are heartily weary of eternal disputes about divine right and the sovereignty of the people. This is the great, while it is evidently the only gap which has to be filled, to constitute, solid and entire, the Positive Philosophy. Now that the human mind has grasped celestial and terrestrial physics,—mechanical and chemical; organic physics, both vegetable and animal,—there remains one science, to fill up the series of sciences of observation,—Social physics. . . .

The philosophical principle of the science being that social phenomena are subject to natural laws, admitting of rational prevision, we have to ascertain what is the precise subject, and what the peculiar character of those laws. The distinction between the Statical and Dynamical conditions of the subject must be extended to social science. . . .

The statical study of sociology consists in the investigation of the laws of action and reaction of the different parts of the social system—apart, for the occasion, from the fundamental movement which is always gradually modifying them. In this view, sociological prevision, founded upon the exact general knowledge of those relations, acts by judging by each other the various statical indications of each mode of social existence, in conformity with direct observation—just as is done daily in the case of anatomy. This view condemns the existing philosophical practice of contemplating social elements separately, as if they had an independent existence; and it leads us to regard them

as in mutual relation, and forming a whole which compels us to treat them in combination. By this method, not only are we furnished with the only possible basis for the study of social movement, but we are put in possession of an important aid to direct observation; since many social elements which can not be investigated by immediate observation, may be estimated by their scientific relation to others already known. . . .

It follows from this attribute that there can be no scientific study of society, either in its conditions or its movements, if it is separated into portions, and its divisions are studied apart. . . . Materials may be furnished by the observation of different departments; and such observation may be necessary for that object; but it can not be called science. The methodical division of studies which takes place in the simple inorganic sciences is thoroughly irrational in the recent and complex science of society, and can produce no results. The day may come when some sort of subdivision may be practicable and desirable; but it is impossible for us now to anticipate what the principle of distribution may be; for the principle itself must arise from the development of the science; and that development can take place not otherwise than by our formation of the science as a whole. The complete body will indicate for itself, at the right season, the particular points which need investigation; and then will be the time for such special study as may be required. By any other method of proceeding, we shall only find ourselves encumbered with special discussions, badly instituted, worse pursued, and accomplishing no other purpose than that of impeding the formation of real science. It is no easy matter to study social phenomena in the only right way,—viewing each element in the light of the whole system. It is no easy matter to exercise such vigilance as that no one of the number of contemporary aspects shall be lost sight of. But it is the right and the only way; and we may perceive in it a clear suggestion that this lofty study should be reserved for the highest order of scientific minds, better prepared than others, by wise educational discipline, for sustained speculative efforts, aided by an habitual subordination of the passions to the reason. . . .

Though the statical view of society is the basis of sociology, the dynamical view is not only the more interesting of the two, but the more marked in its philosophical character from its being more distinguished from biology by the master-thought of continuous progress, or rather, of the gradual development of humanity. If I were writing a methodical treatise on political philosophy, it would be necessary to offer a preliminary analysis of the individual impulsions which make up the progressive force of the human race, by referring them to that instinct which results from the concurrence of all

our natural tendencies, and which urges man to develop the whole of his life, physical, moral, and intellectual, as far as his circumstances allow. But this view is admitted by all enlightened philosophers; so that I may proceed at once to consider the continuous succession of human development, regarded in the whole race, as if humanity were one. For clearness, we may take advantage of Condorcet's device of supposing a single nation to which we may refer all the consecutive social modifications actually witnessed among distinct peoples. This rational fiction is nearer the reality than we are accustomed to suppose; for, in a political view, the true successors of such or such a people are certainly those who, taking up and carrying out their primitive endeavors, have prolonged their social progress, whatever may be the soil which they inhabit, or even the race from which they spring. In brief, it is political continuity which regulates sociological succession, though the having a common country must usually affect this continuity in a high degree. As a scientific artifice merely, however, I shall employ this hypothesis, and on the ground of its manifest utility.

The true general spirit of social dynamics then consists in conceiving of each of these consecutive social states as the necessary result of the preceding, and the indispensable move of the following, according to the axiom of Leibnitz—*the present is big with the future*. In this view, the object of science is to discover the laws which govern this continuity, and the aggregate of which determines the course of human development. In short, social dynamics studies the laws of succession, while social statics inquires into those of co-existence; so that the use of the first is to furnish the true theory of progress to political practice, while the second performs the same service in regard to order; and this suitability to the needs of modern society is a strong confirmation of the philosophical character of such a combination.

If the existence of sociological laws has been established in the more difficult and uncertain case of the statical condition, we may assume that they will not be questioned in the dynamical province. In all times and places, the ordinary course of even our brief individual life has disclosed certain remarkable modifications which have occurred, in various ways, in the social state; and all the most ancient representations of human life bear unconscious and most interesting testimony to this, apart from all systematic estimate of the fact. Now it is the slow, continuous accumulation of these successive changes which gradually constitutes the social movement, whose steps are ordinarily marked by generations, as the most appreciable elementary variations are wrought by the constant renewal of adults. At a time when the average rapidity of this progression seems to all eyes to be remarkably accelerated, the reality of the movement can not be disputed, even by those who most

abhor it. The only question is about the constant subjection of these great dynamical phenomena to invariable natural laws, a proposition about which there is no question to any one who takes his stand on positive philosophy. It is easy however to establish, from any point of view, that the successive modifications of society have always taken place in a determinate order, the rational explanation of which is already possible in so many cases that we may confidently hope to recognise it ultimately in all the rest. So remarkable is the steadiness of this order, moreover, that it exhibits an exact parallelism of development among distinct and independent populations, as we shall see when we come to the historical portion of this volume. Since, then, the existence of the social movement is unquestionable, on the one hand, and, on the other, the succession of social states is never arbitrary, we can not but regard this continuous phenomenon as subject to natural laws as positive as those which govern all other phenomena, though more complex. There is in fact no intellectual alternative; and thus it is evident that it is on the ground of social science that the great conflict must soon terminate which has gone on for three centuries between the positive and the theologico-metaphysical spirit. Banished for ever from all other classes of speculation, in principle at least, the old philosophies now prevail in social science alone; and it is from this domain that they have to be excluded, by the conception of the social movement being subject to invariable natural laws, instead of to any will whatever. . . .

. . . Whatever may be the importance of the ideas communicated by the inorganic sciences to sociology, the scientific office must especially belong to biology, which, from the nature of the subjects concerned, must always furnish the fundamental ideas that must guide sociological research; and often even rectify or improve the results. Moreover, it is biology which presents to us the domestic state, intermediate between individual and social existence, which is more or less common to all the superior animals, and which is, in our species, the true primitive basis of the more vast collective organism. However, the first elaboration of this new science could not but be essentially dynamical; so that the laws of harmony have nearly throughout been implicitly considered among the laws of succession, in which alone social physics can at present consist. The scientific link between biology and sociology is the connection of their two series, by which the second may be regarded as the prolongation of the first, though the terms of the one may be successive, and of the other, coexisting. With this difference, we find that the essential character of the human evolution results from the growing power of the superior attributes which place Man at the head of the animal hierarchy, where they also enable us to assign the chief degrees of animality. Thus we see

the vast organic system really connecting the humblest vegetative existence with the noblest social life through a long succession, which, if necessarily discontinuous, is not the less essentially homogeneous. And, in as far as the principle of such a connection consists in the decreasing generality of the chief phenomena, this double organic series is connected with the rudimentary inorganic, the interior succession of which is determined by the same principle. The necessary direction of the human movement being thus ascertained, the only remaining task, in constituting sociology, was to mark out its general course. This was done by my ascertaining the law of evolution, which in connection with the hierarchical law, establishes a true philosophical system, the two chief elements of which are absolutely interconnected. In this dynamical conception, sociology is radically connected with biology, since the original state of humanity essentially coincides with that in which the superior animals are detained by their organic imperfection,—their speculative ability never transcending the primitive fetichism from which man could not have issued but for the strong impulsion of the collective development. The resemblance is yet stronger in the practical aspect. The sociological theory being thus constituted, nothing remained but to put it to the proof by an historical application of it to the intellectual and social progression of the most advanced portion of the human race through forty centuries. This test has discredited all the historical conceptions proposed before, and has shown the reality of the theory by explaining and estimating each phase as it passed in review, so as to enable us to do honor to the services of the most opposite influences,—as in the case of the polytheistic and monotheistic states. A political and philosophical preparation like this was necessary to emancipate the mind of the inquirer from the old philosophy and critical prejudices, and to substitute for them the scientific condition of mind which is indispensable for the humblest speculations, but far more necessary, and at the same time more difficult, in the case of the most transcendent and the most impassioned researches that the human mind can undertake.

A GENERAL VIEW OF POSITIVISM

POSITIVISM consists essentially of a Philosophy and a Polity. These can never be dissevered; the former being the basis, and the latter the end of one comprehensive system, in which our intellectual faculties and our social sympathies are brought into close correlation with each other. For, in the first place, the science of Society, besides being more important than any other, supplies the only logical and scientific link by which all our varied observations of

phenomena can be brought into one consistent whole. Of this science it is even more true than of any of the preceding sciences, that its real character cannot be understood without explaining its exact relation in all general features with the art corresponding to it. Now here we find a coincidence which is assuredly not fortuitous. At the very time when the theory of society is being laid down, an immense sphere is opened for the application of that theory; the direction, namely, of the social regeneration of Western Europe. For, if we take another point of view, and look at the great crisis of modern history, as its character is displayed in the natural course of events, it becomes every day more evident how hopeless is the task of reconstructing political institutions without the previous remodelling of opinion and of life. To form then a satisfactory synthesis of all human conceptions is the most urgent of our social wants: and it is needed equally for the sake of Order and of Progress. During the gradual accomplishment of this great philosophical work, a new moral power will arise spontaneously throughout the West, which, as its influence increases, will lay down a definite basis for the reorganization of society. It will offer a general system of education for the adoption of all civilized nations, and by this means will supply in every department of public and private life fixed principles of judgment and of conduct. Thus the intellectual movement and the social crisis will be brought continually into close connection with each other. Both will combine to prepare the advanced portion of humanity for the acceptance of a true spiritual power, a power more coherent, as well as more progressive, than the noble but premature attempt of mediaeval Catholicism.

The primary object, then, of Positivism is twofold: to generalize our scientific conceptions, and to systematize the art of social life. These are but two aspects of one and the same problem. They will form the subjects of the two first chapters of this work. I shall first explain the general spirit of the new philosophy. I shall then show its necessary connection with the whole course of that vast revolution which is now about to terminate under its guidance in social reconstruction.

This will lead us naturally to another question. The regenerating doctrine cannot do its work without adherents; in what quarter should we hope to find them? Now, with individual exceptions of great value, we cannot expect the adhesion of any of the upper classes in society. They are all more or less under the influence of baseless metaphysical theories, and of aristocratic self-seeking. They are absorbed in blind political agitation, and in disputes for the possession of the useless remnants of the old theological and military system. Their action only tends to prolong the revolutionary state indefinitely, and can never result in true social renovation.

Whether we regard its intellectual character or its social objects, it is certain

that Positivism must look elsewhere for support. It will find a welcome in those classes only whose good sense has been left unimpaired by our vicious system of education, and whose generous sympathies are allowed to develop themselves freely. It is among Women, therefore, and among the Working classes that the heartiest supporters of the new doctrines will be found. It is intended, indeed, ultimately for all classes of society. But it will never gain much real influence over the higher ranks till it is forced upon their notice by these powerful patrons. When the work of spiritual reorganization is completed, it is on them that its maintenance will principally depend; and so too, their combined aid is necessary for its commencement. Having but little influence in political government, they are the more likely to appreciate the need of a moral government the special object of which it will be to protect them against the oppressive action of the temporal power. . . .

Thus it is that a philosophy originating in speculations of the most abstract character, is found applicable not merely to every department of practical life, but also to the sphere of our moral nature. But to complete the proof of its universality I have still to speak of another very essential feature. I shall show, in spite of prejudices which exist very naturally on this point, that Positivism is eminently calculated to call the Imaginative faculties into exercise. It is by these faculties that the unity of human nature is most distinctly represented: they are themselves intellectual, but their field lies principally in our moral nature, and the result of their operation is to influence the active powers. The subject of women treated in the fourth chapter, will lead me by a natural transition to speak in the fifth of the Esthetic aspects of Positivism. I shall attempt to show that the new doctrine by the very fact of embracing the whole range of human relations in the spirit of reality, discloses the true theory of Art, which has hitherto been so great a deficiency in our speculative conceptions. The principle of the theory is that, in co-ordinating the primary functions of Humanity, Positivism places the Idealities of the poet midway between the Ideas of the philosopher and the Realities of the statesman. We see from this theory how it is that the poetical power of Positivism cannot be manifested at present. We must wait until moral and mental regeneration has advanced far enough to awaken the sympathies which naturally belong to it, and on which Art in its renewed state must depend for the future. The first mental and social shock once passed, Poetry will at last take her proper rank. She will lead Humanity onward towards a future which is now no longer vague and visionary while at the same time she enables us to pay due honour to all phases of the past. The great object which Positivism sets before us individually and socially, is the endeavour to become more perfect. The highest importance is attached therefore to the

imaginative faculties, because in every sphere with which they deal they stimulate the sense of perfection. Limited as my explanations in this work must be, I shall be able to show that Positivism, while opening out a new and wide field for art, supplies in the same spontaneous way new means of expression. . . .

As summed up in the Positivist motto, *Love, Order, Progress* they lead us to the conception of Humanity, which implicitly involves and gives new force of each of them. Rightly interpreting this conception, we view Positivism at last as a complete and consistent whole. The subject will naturally lead us to speak in general terms of the future progress of social regeneration, as far as the history of the past enables us to foresee it. The movement originates in France, and is limited at first to the great family of Western nations. I shall show that it will afterwards extend, in accordance with definite laws, to the rest of the white race, and finally to the other two great races of man. . . .

It will now not be difficult to show that all the characteristics of Positivism are summed up in its motto, *Order and Progress*, a motto which has a philosophical as well as political bearing, and which I shall always feel glad to have put forward.

Positivism is the only school which has given a definite significance to these two conceptions, whether regarded from their scientific or their social aspect. With regard to Progress, the assertion will hardly be disputed, no definition of it but the Positive ever having yet been given. In the case of Order, it is less apparent; but as I have shown in the first chapter, it is no less profoundly true. All previous philosophies had regarded Order as stationary, a conception which rendered it wholly inapplicable to modern politics. But Positivism, by rejecting the absolute, and yet not introducing the arbitrary, represents Order in a totally new light, and adapts it to our progressive civilization. It places it on the firmest possible foundation, that is, on the doctrine of the invariability of the laws of nature, which defends it against all danger from subjective chimeras. The Positivist regards artificial Order in Social phenomena, as in all others, as resting necessarily upon the Order of nature, in other words, upon the whole series of natural laws.

But Order has to be reconciled with Progress: and here Positivism is still more obviously without a rival. Necessary as the reconciliation is, no other system has even attempted it. But the facility with which we are now enabled, by the encyclopaedic scale, to pass from the simplest mathematical phenomena to the most complicated phenomena of political life, leads at once to a solution of the problem. Viewed scientifically, it is an instance of that necessary correlation of existence and movement, which we find indicated in the inorganic world, and which becomes still more distinct in Biology. Finding it in all the

lower sciences, we are prepared for its appearance in a still more definite shape in Sociology. Here its practical importance becomes more obvious, though it had been implicitly involved before. In Sociology the correlation assumes this form: Order is the condition of all Progress; Progress is always the object of Order. Or, to penetrate the question still more deeply, Progress may be regarded simply as the development of Order; for the order of nature necessarily contains within itself the germ of all possible progress. The rational view of human affairs is to look on all their changes, not as new Creations, but as new Evolutions. And we find this principle fully borne out in history. Every social innovation has its roots in the past; and the rudest phases of savage life show the primitive trace of all subsequent improvement. Progress then is in its essence identical with Order, and may be looked upon as Order made manifest.

Therefore, in explaining this double conception on which the Science and Art of society depend, we may at present limit ourselves to the analysis of Progress. Thus simplified it is more easy to grasp, especially now that the novelty and importance of the question of Progress are attracting so much attention. For the public is becoming instinctively alive to its real significance, as the basis on which all sound moral and political teaching must henceforth rest.

Taking, then, this point of view, we may say that the one great object of life, personal and social, is to become more perfect in every way; in our external condition first, but also, and more especially, in our own nature. The first kind of Progress we share in common with the higher animals; all of which make some efforts to improve their material position. It is of course the least elevated stage of progress; but being the easiest, it is the point from which we start towards the higher stages. A nation that has made no efforts to improve itself materially, will take but little interest in moral or mental improvement. This is the only ground on which enlightened men can feel much pleasure in the material progress of our own times. It stirs up influences that tend to the nobler kinds of Progress; influences which would meet with even greater opposition than they do, were not the temptations presented to the coarser natures by material prosperity so irresistible. Owing to the mental and moral anarchy in which we live, systematic efforts to gain the higher degrees of Progress are as yet impossible; and this explains, though it does not justify, the exaggerated importance attributed nowadays to material improvements. But the only kinds of improvement really characteristic of Humanity are those which concern our own nature; and even here we are not quite alone; for several of the higher animals show some slight tendencies to improve themselves physically.

Progress in the higher sense includes improvements of three sorts; that is to say, it may be Physical, Intellectual, or Moral progress; the difficulty of each class being in proportion to its value and the extent of its sphere. Physical progress, which again might be divided on the same principle, seems under some of its aspects almost the same thing as material. But regarded as a whole it is far more important and far more difficult: its influence on the well-being of Man is also much greater. We gain more, for instance, by the smallest addition to length of life, or by any increased security for health, than by the most elaborate improvements in our modes of travelling by land or water, in which birds will probably always have a great advantage over us. However, as I said before, physical progress is not exclusively confined to Man. Some of the animals, for instance, advance as far as cleanliness, which is the first step in the progressive scale.

Intellectual and Moral progress, then, is the only kind really distinctive of our race. Individual animals sometimes show it, but never a whole species, except as a consequence of prolonged intervention on the part of Man. Between these two highest grades, as between the two lower, we shall find a difference of value, extent, and difficulty; always supposing the standard to be the manner in which they affect Man's well-being collectively or individually. To strengthen the intellectual powers, whether for art or for science, whether it be the powers of observation or those of induction and deduction, is, when circumstances allow of their being made available for social purposes, of greater and more extensive importance, than all physical and *a fortiori* than all material improvements. But we know from the fundamental principle laid down in the first chapter of this work that moral progress has even more to do with our well-being than intellectual progress. The moral faculties are more modifiable, although the effort required to modify them is greater. If the benevolence or courage of the human race were increased, it would bring more real happiness than any addition to our intellectual powers. Therefore, to the question, What is the true object of human life, whether looked at collectively or individually? the simplest and most precise answer would be, the perfection of our moral nature; since it has a more immediate and certain influence on our well-being than perfection of any other kind. All the other kinds are necessary, if for no other reason than to prepare the way for this; but from the very fact of this connection, it may be regarded as their representative; since it involves them all implicitly and stimulates them to increased activity. Keeping then to the question of moral perfection, we find two qualities standing above the rest in practical importance, namely, Sympathy and Energy. Both these qualities are included in the word *Heart*, which in all European languages has a different meaning for the two sexes. Both will be

developed by Positivism, more directly, more continuously, and with greater result, than under any former system. The whole tendency of Positivism is to encourage sympathy; since it subordinates every thought, desire, and action to social feeling. Energy is also presupposed, and at the same time fostered by the system. For it removes a heavy weight of superstition, it reveals the true dignity of man, and it supplies an unceasing motive for individual and collective action. The very acceptance of Positivism demands some vigour of character, it implies the braving of spiritual terrors, which were once enough to intimidate the firmest minds.

Progress, then, may be regarded under four successive aspects: Material, Physical, Intellectual, and Moral. Each of these might again be divided on the same principle, and we should then discover several intermediate phases. These cannot be investigated here; and I have only to note that the philosophical principle of this analysis is precisely the same as that on which I have based the Classification of the Sciences. In both cases the order followed is that of increasing generality and complexity in the phenomena. The only difference is in the mode in which the two arrangements are developed. For scientific purposes the lower portion of the scale has to be expanded into greater detail; while from the social point of view attention is concentrated on the higher parts. But whether it be the scale of the True or that of the Good, the conclusion is the same in both. Both alike indicate the supremacy of social considerations; both point to universal Love as the highest ideal.

I have now explained the principal purpose of Positive Philosophy, namely spiritual reorganization; and I have shown how that purpose is involved in the Positivist motto, Order and Progress. Positivism, then, realizes the highest aspirations of mediaeval Catholicism, and at the same time fulfils the conditions, the absence of which caused the failure of the Convention. It combines the opposite merits of the Catholic and the Revolutionary spirit, and by so doing supersedes them both. Theology and Metaphysics may now disappear without danger, because the service which each of them rendered is now harmonised with that of the other, and will be performed more perfectly. The principle on which this result depends is the separation of spiritual from temporal power. This, it will be remembered, had always been the chief subject of contention between the two antagonistic parties. . . .

The peculiar reality of Positivism, and its invariable tendency to concentrate our intellectual powers upon social questions, are attributes, both of which involve its adoption of the essential principle of Communism; that principle being, that Property is in its nature social, and that it needs control.

Property has been erroneously represented by most modern jurists as conferring an absolute right upon the possessor, irrespectively of the good or bad

use made of it. This view is instinctively felt by the working classes to be unsound, and all true philosophers will agree with them. It is an anti-social theory, due historically to exaggerated reaction against previous legislation of a peculiarly oppressive kind, but it has no real foundation either in justice or in fact. Property can neither be created, nor even transmitted by the sole agency of its possessor. The co-operation of the public is always necessary, whether in the assertion of the general principle or in the application of it to each special case. Therefore the tenure of property is not to be regarded as a purely individual right. In every age and in every country the state has intervened, to a greater or less degree, making property subservient to social requirements. Taxation evidently gives the public an interest in the private fortune of each individual; an interest which, instead of diminishing with the progress of civilization, has been always on the increase, especially in modern times, now that the connection of each member of society with the whole is becoming more apparent. The practice of confiscation which also is in universal use, shows that in certain extreme cases the community considers itself authorised to assume entire possession of private property. Confiscation has, it is true, been abolished for a time in France. But this isolated exception is due only to the abuses which recently accompanied the exercise of what was in itself an undoubted right; and it will hardly survive when the causes which led to it are forgotten, and the power which introduced it has passed away. In their abstract views of property, then, Communists are perfectly able to maintain their ground against the jurists.

They are right, again, in dissenting as deeply as they do from the Economists, who lay it down as an absolute principle that the application of wealth should be entirely unrestricted by society. This error, like the one just spoken of, is attributable to instances of unjustifiable interference. But it is utterly opposed to all sound philosophical teaching, although it has a certain appearance of truth, in so far as it recognizes the subordination of social phenomena to natural laws. But the Economists seem to have adopted this important principle only to show how incapable they are of comprehending it. Before they applied the conception of Law to the higher phenomena of nature, they ought to have made themselves well acquainted with its meaning, as applied to the lower and more simple phenomena. Not having done so, they have been utterly blind to the fact that the Order of nature becomes more and more modifiable as it grows more complicated. This conception lies at the very root of our whole practical life; therefore nothing can excuse the metaphysical school of Economists for systematically resisting the intervention of human wisdom in the various departments of social action. That the movement of society is subject to natural laws is certain; but this truth, instead of inducing

us to abandon all efforts to modify society, should rather lead to a wiser application of such efforts, since they are at once more efficacious, and more necessary in social phenomena than in any other.

So far, therefore, the fundamental principle of Communism is one which the Positivist school must obviously adopt. Positivism not only confirms this principle, but widens its scope, by showing its application to other departments of human life; by insisting that, not wealth only, but that all our powers shall be devoted in the true republican spirit to the continuous service of the community. The long period of revolution which has elapsed since the Middle Ages has encouraged individualism in the moral world, as in the intellectual it has fostered the specialising tendency. But both are equally inconsistent with the final order of modern society. In all healthy conditions of Humanity, the citizen, whatever his position, has been regarded as a public functionary, whose duties and claims were determined more or less distinctly by his faculties. The case of property is certainly no exception to this general principle. Proprietorship is regarded by the Positivist as an important social function; the function, namely, of creating and administering that capital by means of which each generation lays the foundation for the operation of its successor. This is the only tenable view of property; and wisely interpreted, it is one which, while ennobling to its possessor, does not exclude a due measure of freedom. It will in fact place his position on a firmer basis than ever.

But the agreement here pointed out between sociological science and the spontaneous inspirations of popular judgment goes no farther. Positivists accept, and indeed enlarge, the programme of Communism; but we reject its practical solution on the ground that it is at once inadequate and subversive. The chief difference between our own solution and theirs is that we substitute moral agencies for political. Thus we come again to our leading principle of separating spiritual from temporal power; a principle which, disregarded, as it has hitherto been in the system of modern renovators, will be found in every one of the important problems of our time to be the sole possible issue. In the present case, while throwing such light on the fallacy of Communism, it should lead us to excuse the fallacy, by reminding us that politicians of every accredited school are equally guilty of it. At a time when there are so very few, even of cultivated minds, who have a clear conception of this the primary principle of modern politics, it would be harsh to blame the people for still accepting a result of revolutionary empiricism, which is so universally adopted by other classes. . . .

The ignorance of the true laws of social life under which Communists labour is evident in their dangerous tendency to suppress individuality. Not only do they ignore the inherent preponderance in our nature of the personal

instincts; but they forget that, in the collective Organism, the separation of functions is a feature no less essential than the co-operation of functions. Suppose for a moment that the connection between men could be made such that they were physically inseparable, as has been actually the case with twins in certain cases of monstrosity; society would obviously be impossible. Extravagant as this supposition is, it may illustrate the fact that in social life individuality cannot be dispensed with. It is necessary in order to admit of that variety of simultaneous efforts which constitutes the immense superiority of the Social Organism over every individual life. The great problem for man is to harmonize, as far as possible, the freedom resulting from isolation, with the equally urgent necessity for convergence. To dwell exclusively upon the necessity of convergence would tend to undermine not merely our practical energy, but our true dignity; since it would do away with the sense of personal responsibility. In exceptional cases where life is spent in forced subjection to domestic authority, the comforts of home are often not enough to prevent existence from becoming an intolerable burden, simply from the want of sufficient independence. What would it be, then, if everybody stood in a similar position of dependence towards a community that was indifferent to his happiness? Yet no less a danger than this would be the result of adopting any of these utopian schemes which sacrifice true liberty to uncontrolled equality, or even to an exaggerated sense of fraternity. Wide as the divergence between Positivism and the Economic schools is, Positivists adopt substantially the strictures which they have passed upon Communism; especially those of Dunoyer, their most advanced writer.

There is another point in which Communism is equally inconsistent with the laws of Sociology. Acting under false views of the constitution of our modern industrial system, it proposes to remove its directors, who form so essential a part of it. An army can no more exist without officers than without soldiers; and this elementary truth holds good of Industry as well as of War. The organization of modern industry has not been found practicable as yet; but the germ of such organization lies unquestionably in the division which has arisen spontaneously between Capitalist and Workman. No great works could be undertaken if each worker were also to be a director, or if the management, instead of being fixed, were entrusted to a passive and irresponsible body. It is evident that under the present system of industry there is a tendency to a constant enlargement of undertakings: each fresh step leads at once to still further extension. Now this tendency, so far from being opposed to the interests of the working classes, is a condition which will most seriously facilitate the real organization of our material existence, as soon as we have a moral authority competent to control it. For it is only the larger

employers that the spiritual power can hope to penetrate with a strong and habitual sense of duty to their subordinates. Without a sufficient concentration of material power, the means of satisfying the claims of morality would be found wanting, except at such exorbitant sacrifices as would be incompatible with all industrial progress. This is the weak point of every plan of reform which limits itself to the mode of acquiring power, whether public power or private, instead of aiming at controlling its use in whose ever hands it may be placed. It leads to a waste of those forces which, when rightly used, form our principal resource in dealing with grave social difficulties.

The motives, therefore, from which modern Communism has arisen, however estimable, lead at present, in the want of proper scientific teaching, to a very wrong view both of the nature of the disease and of its remedy. A heavier reproach against it is, that in one point it shows a manifest insufficiency of social instinct. Communists boast of their spirit of social union; but they limit it to the union of the present generation, stopping short of historical continuity, which yet is the principal characteristic of Humanity. When they have matured their moral growth, and have followed out in Time that connection which at present they only recognise in Space, they will at once see the necessity of these general conditions which at present they would reject. They will understand the importance of inheritance, as the natural means by which each generation transmits to its successor the result of its own labours and the means of improving them. The necessity of inheritance, as far as the community is concerned, is evident, and its extension to the individual is an obvious consequence. But whatever reproaches Communists may deserve in this respect are equally applicable to all the other progressive sects. They are all pervaded by an anti-historic spirit, which leads them to conceive of Society as though it had no ancestors; and this, although their own ideas for the most part can have no bearing except upon posterity. . . .

Love, then, is our principle; Order our basis; and Progress our end. Such is the essential character of the system of life which Positivism offers for the definite acceptance of society; a system which regulates the whole course of our private and public existence, by bringing Feeling, Reason, and Activity into permanent harmony. In this final synthesis, all essential conditions are far more perfectly fulfilled than in any other. Each special element of our nature is more fully developed, and at the same time the general working of the whole is more coherent. Greater distinctness is given to the truth that the affective element predominates in our nature. Life in all its actions and thoughts is brought under the control and inspiring charm of Social Sympathy.

By the supremacy of the Heart, the Intellect, so far from being crushed, is elevated; for all its powers are consecrated to the service of the social in-

instincts, with the purpose of strengthening their influence and directing their employment. By accepting its subordination to Feeling, Reason adds to its own authority. To it we look for the revelation of the laws of nature, of the established Order which dictates the inevitable conditions of human life. The objective basis thus discovered for human effort reacts most beneficially on our moral nature. Forced as we are to accept it; it controls the fickleness to which our affections are liable, and acts as a direct stimulus to social sympathy. Concentrated on so high an office, the intellect will be preserved from useless digression; and will yet find a boundless field for its operations in the study of all the natural laws by which human destinies are affected, and especially those which relate to the constitution of man or of society. The fact that every subject is to be regarded from the sociological point of view, so far from discouraging even the most abstract order of speculations, adds to their logical coherence as well as to their moral value by introducing the central principle round which alone they can be co-ordinated into a whole.

And whilst Reason is admitted to its due share of influence on human life, Imagination is also strengthened and called into constant exercise. Henceforth it will assume its proper function, the idealization of truth. For the objective basis of our conceptions scientific investigation is necessary. But this basis once obtained, the constitution of our mind is far better adapted to esthetic than to scientific study, provided always that imagination never disregard the truths of science, and degenerate into extravagance. Subject to this condition, Positivism gives every encouragement to esthetic studies, being as they are so closely related to its guiding principle and to its practical aim, to Love namely, and to Progress. Art will enter largely into the social life of the Future, and will be regarded as the most pleasurable and most salutary exercise of our intellectual powers, because it leads them in the most direct manner to the culture and improvement of our moral nature.

Originating in the first instance from practical life, Positivism will return thither with increased force, now that its long period of scientific preparation is accomplished, and that it has occupied the field of moral truth, which henceforth will be its principal domain. Its principle of sympathy, so far from relaxing our efforts, will stimulate all our faculties to universal activity by urging them onwards towards perfection of every kind. Scientific study of the natural Order is inculcated solely with the view of directing all the forces of Man and of Society to its improvement by artificial effort. Hitherto this aim has hardly been recognized, even with regard to the material world, and but a very small proportion of our energies has been spent upon it. Yet the aim is high, provided always that the view taken of human progress extend beyond its lower and more material stages. Our theoretical powers once con-

centrated on the moral problems which form their principal field, our practical energies will not fail to take the same direction, devoting themselves to that portion of the natural Order which is most imperfect, and at the same time most modifiable. With these larger and more systematic views of human life, its best efforts will be given to the improvement of the mind, and still more to the improvement of the character, and to the increase of affection and courage. Public and private life are now brought into close relation by the identity of their principal aim, which, being kept constantly in sight, ennobles every action in both. Practical questions must ever continue to preponderate, as before, over questions of theory; but this condition, so far from being adverse to speculative power, concentrates it upon the most difficult of all problems, the discovery of moral and social laws, our knowledge of which will never be fully adequate to our practical requirements. Mental and practical activity of this kind can never result in hardness of feeling. On the contrary, it impresses us more strongly with the conviction that Sympathy is not merely our highest happiness, but the most effectual of all our means of improvement; and that without it, all other means can be of little avail.

Thus it is that in the Positive system, the Heart, the Intellect, and the Character mutually strengthen and develop one another, because each is systematically directed to the mode of action for which it is by nature adapted. Public and private life are brought into a far more harmonious relation than in any former time, because the purpose to which both are consecrated is identical; the difference being merely in the range of their activities. The aim in both is to secure to the utmost possible extent, the victory of Social feeling over Self-love; and to this aim all our powers, whether of affection, thought, or action, are in both unceasingly directed.

This, then, is the shape in which the great human problem comes definitely before us. Its solution demands all the appliances of Social Art. The primary principle on which the solution rests, is the separation of the two elementary powers of society; the moral power of counsel, and the political power of command. The necessary preponderance of the latter, which rests upon material force, corresponds to the fact that in our imperfect nature, where the coarser wants are the most pressing and the most continuously felt; the selfish instincts are naturally stronger than the unselfish. In the absence of all compulsory authority, our action even as individuals would be feeble and purposeless, and social life still more certainly would lose its character and its energy. Moral force, therefore, by which is meant the force of conviction and persuasion, is to be regarded simply as a modifying influence, not as a means of authoritative direction.

Moral force originates in Feeling and in Reason. It represents the social

side of our nature, and to this its direct influence is limited. Indeed by the very fact that it is the expression of our highest attributes, it is precluded from that practical ascendancy which is possessed by faculties of a lower but more energetic kind. Inferior to material force in power, though superior to it in dignity, it contrasts and opposes its own classification of men according to the standard of moral and intellectual worth, to the classification by wealth and worldly position which actually prevails. True, the higher standard will never be adopted practically, but the effort to uphold it will react beneficially on the natural order of society. It will inspire those larger views, and reanimate that sense of duty, which are so apt to become obliterated in the ordinary current of life. . . .

The highest progress of man and of society consists in gradual increase of our mastery over all our defects, especially the defects of our moral nature. Among the nations of antiquity the progress in this direction was but small; all that they could do was to prepare the way for it by certain necessary phases of intellectual and social development. The whole tendency of Greek and Roman society was such as made it impossible to form a distinct conception of the great problem of our moral nature. In fact, Morals were with them invariably subordinate to Politics. Nevertheless, it is moral progress which alone can satisfy our nature; and in the Middle Ages it was recognised as the highest aim of human effort, notwithstanding that its intellectual and social conditions were as yet very imperfectly realised. The creeds of the Middle Ages were too unreal and imperfect, the character of society was too military and aristocratic, to allow Morals and Politics to assume permanently their right relation. The attempt was made, however; and, inadequate as it was, it was enough to allow the people of the West to appreciate the fundamental principle involved in it, a principle destined to survive the opinions and the habits of life from which it arose. Its full weight could never be felt until the Positive spirit had extended beyond the elementary subjects to which it had been so long subjected, to the sphere of social truth; and had thus reached the position at which a complete synthesis became possible. Equally essential was it that in those countries which had been incorporated into the Western Empire, and had passed from it into Catholic Feudalism, war should be definitely superseded by industrial activity. In the long period of transition which has elapsed since the Middle Ages, both these conditions have been fulfilled, while at the same time the old system had been gradually decomposed. Finally the great crisis of the Revolution has stimulated all advanced minds to reconsider, with better intellectual and social principles, the same problem that Christianity and Chivalry had attempted. The radical solution of it was then begun, and it is now completed and enunciated in a systematic form by Positivism.

All essential phases in the evolution of society answer to corresponding phases in the growth of the individual, whether it has proceeded spontaneously or under systematic guidance, supposing always that this development be complete. But it is not enough to prove the close connection which exists between all modes and degrees of human regeneration. We have yet to find a central point round which all will naturally meet. In this point consists the unity of Positivism as a system of life. Unless it can be thus condensed, round one single principle, it will never wholly supersede the synthesis of Theology, notwithstanding its superiority in the reality and stability of its component parts, and in their homogeneity and coherence as a whole. There should be a central point in the system, towards which Feeling, Reason, and Activity alike converge. The proof that Positivism possesses such a central point will remove the last obstacle to its complete acceptance as the guide of private or of public life.

Such a centre we find in the great conception of Humanity, towards which every aspect of Positivism naturally converges. By it the conception of God will be entirely superseded, and a synthesis be formed, more complete and permanent than that provisionally established by the old religions. Through it the new doctrine becomes at once accessible to men's hearts in its full extent and application. From their hearts it will penetrate their minds, and thus the immediate necessity of beginning with a long and difficult course of study is avoided, though this must of course be always indispensable to its systematic teachers.

This central point of Positivism is even more moral than intellectual in character; it represents the principle of Love upon which the whole system rests. It is the peculiar characteristic of the Great Being who is here set forth, to be compounded of separable elements. Its existence depends therefore entirely upon mutual Love knitting together its various parts. The calculations of self-interest can never be substituted as a combining influence for the sympathetic instincts.

Yet the belief in Humanity, while stimulating Sympathy, at the same time enlarges the scope and vigour of the Intellect. For it requires high powers of generalization to conceive clearly of this vast organism, as the result of spontaneous co-operation, abstraction made of all partial antagonisms. Reason, then, has its part in this central dogma as well as Love. It enlarges and completes our conception of the Supreme Being, by revealing to us the external and internal conditions of its existence.

Lastly, our active powers are stimulated by it no less than our feelings and our reason. For since Humanity is so far more complex than any other organism, it will react more strongly and more continuously on its environment,

submitting to its influence and so modifying it. Hence results Progress which is simply the development of Order, under the influence of Love.

Thus, in the conception of Humanity, the three essential aspects of Positivism, its subjective principle, its objective dogma, and its practical object are united. Towards Humanity, who is for us the only true Great Being, we, the conscious elements of whom she is composed, shall henceforth direct every aspect of our life, individual or collective. Our thoughts will be devoted to the knowledge of Humanity, our affections to her love, our actions to her service.

Positivists then may, more truly than theological believers of whatever creed, regard life as a continuous and earnest act of worship; worship which will elevate and purify our feelings, enlarge and enlighten our thoughts, enoble and invigorate our actions. It supplies a direct solution, so far as a solution is possible, of the great problem of the Middle Ages, the subordination of Politics to Morals. For this follows at once from the consecration now given to the principle that social sympathy should preponderate over self-love.

Thus Positivism becomes, in the true sense of the word, a Religion; the only religion which is real and complete; destined therefore to replace all imperfect and provisional systems resting on the primitive basis of theology. . . .

By entirely renouncing wealth and worldly position, and that not as individuals merely, but as a body, the priests of Humanity will occupy a position of unparalleled dignity. For with their moral influence they will combine what since the downfall of the old theocracies has always been separated from it, the influence of superiority in art and science. Reason, Imagination, and Feeling will be brought into unison: and so united, will react strongly on the imperious conditions of practical life; bringing it into closer accordance with the laws of universal morality, from which it is so prone to deviate. And the influence of this new modifying power will be the greater that the synthesis on which it rests will have preceded and prepared the way for the social system of the future; whereas theology could not arrive at its central principle, until the time of its decline was approaching. All functions, then, that co-operate in the elevation of man will be regenerated by the Positive priesthood. Science, Poetry, Morality, will be devoted to the study, the praise, and the love of Humanity, in order that under their combined influence, our political action may be more unremittingly given to her service.

With such a mission, Science acquires a position of unparalleled importance, as the sole means through which we come to know the nature and conditions of this great Being, the worship of whom should be the distinctive feature of our whole life. For this all-important knowledge, the study of Sociology would

seem to suffice: but Sociology itself depends upon preliminary study, first of the outer world, in which the actions of Humanity take place; and secondly, of Man, the individual agent.

The object of Positivist worship is not like that of theological believers, an absolute, isolated, incomprehensible Being, whose existence admits of no demonstration, or comparison with anything real. The evidence of the Being here set forward is spontaneous, and is shrouded in no mystery. Before we can praise love, and serve Humanity as we ought, we must know something of the laws which govern her existence, an existence more complicated than any other of which we are cognizant.

HERBERT SPENCER

HERBERT SPENCER (1820–1903) was born in Derby, England, of parents who were religious nonconformists; an uncle took a prominent part in the agitation for universal suffrage and for the abolition of the Corn Laws; and Philosophical Radicalism was the dominant intellectual temper of his early environment. His career as a social philosopher began in 1850 with the publication of his first book, the important and highly influential *Social Statics*; it did not terminate until his death in 1903. Spencer lived on the income from the sale of his books and on the stipend provided by American admirers.

Spencer's philosophy is an impressive expression of some dominant beliefs shared by his contemporaries. It adopted the scientific positivism of Comte and Mill, reinterpreting their essential conclusions in terms of the facts of social and psychological development; it envisaged a universal pattern of evolution, and thereby supplied a cosmic foundation for optimism concerning human progress; it domesticated the findings of the natural sciences by applying the categories of physical and biological evolution to the study of human psychology and history; and it provided what seemed like a definitive justification for English industrial society—its policy of free trade and its doctrine of *laissez faire*. Spencer's *Synthetic Philosophy* (published in ten volumes between 1860 and 1896) and his numerous other books and essays surveyed the entire scope of man's knowledge from physics to ethics in terms of one comprehensive law of evolution; and his writings influenced not only the method and direction of inquiry in the social sciences but also the formulation of issues in practical matters of politics, law, and reform.

When Spencer began his career, evolutionary theories were already in the air, for writers like Erasmus Darwin, Lamarck, St. Hilaire, Goethe, as well as the romantic philosophy of Schelling, had popularized the notion of the transformation of species. Partly under the indirect influence of Schelling, he was converted to the truth of organic evolution by reading the geologist Lyell's early criticism of Lamarck. However, Spencer took evolution to be, not an isolated phenomenon, but a general characteristic of nature. With great energy, and on the basis of only a limited factual study, he promptly applied the evolutionary concept both in psychology and in sociology. In his *Social Statics*, viewing human society as an organism, he outlined the steps of its development as following the general pattern of organic evolution.

Spencer understood evolution to be the process by which all things pass from an initially simple form, with their parts only loosely organized and undifferentiated, into a more complex organic structure having highly differentiated parts. The systematic application of this general formula and the exhibition of the facts of inorganic nature and society as illustrating it were the aims of the *Synthetic Philosophy*. In accordance with that formula Spencer was led to as-

sume that every society must necessarily pass through a linear series of stages. Moreover, since on his view societies are organisms, the conditions of their existence and alteration were required to be understood in terms of biological categories. Accordingly societies were said to carry on a struggle for existence with their social and physical environments—a struggle which entailed gradual changes in a society if it was to maintain an equilibrium of energy between itself and its environment. Primitive societies are primarily military organizations, which become slowly transformed as an increasing proportion of the population acquires habits of industry. In this process the need for coercion disappears and is replaced by an automatic coördination of individual activity. Accordingly universal peace and democratic institutions are the natural and inevitable outcome of the industrialization of society. Social progress does not, therefore, depend on moral conversion, governmental regulation, or revolutionary activity; it is the natural accompaniment of the slow development of industrial society. Thus, the evils of American public life were attributed by Spencer to the fact that the Constitution of the United States was an artificial construction, not a natural growth.

The bearing of Spencer's conception of social evolution upon concrete practical issues was made evident in his *Social Statics and Man versus the State* (published with this title in 1884), and other writings. Scientific morality, according to his view, must be based on biology; hence conduct is good or bad according to its contribution to the maintenance of life—to the integrated adjustment of the individual with his environment and ultimately to his pleasure. The ideal society is one which provides the maximum opportunity for the elimination of the unfit and the realization of integrated individuals; in such a society each individual will enjoy as perfect a degree of freedom as is compatible with similar privileges of other individuals. The state is consequently nothing but a joint-stock company, formed for the mutual protection of its members; and it must refrain from any acts which do not contribute to this aim. The state will therefore neither regulate industry or commerce nor institute sanitary measures or charities (for it must not interfere with the operation of natural selection), nor coin money or regulate its use, nor improve harbors and waterways; in short, it must do nothing other than enforce contracts and provide safety against physical assault and foreign aggression. Spencer undoubtedly convinced many of his contemporaries that individualistic liberalism was part of the warp and woof of the universe. In a famous dissenting opinion Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court made evident the great influence of Spencer's views by his remark that "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics*."

Spencer attacked the socialistic tendencies of his day with great vigor, declaring that those supporting "paternalistic" legislation were short-sighted sentimentalists who were preparing the ground for a new slavery. Even when admitting that his conception of the true limits of state activity would not be adopted for generations to come, he was supremely confident that the future was on his side. However that may be, there is no doubt that Spencer's writings did much to fortify and to popularize the notion of individual liberty; and he

was not without influence even within the ranks of philosophical anarchists and evolutionary socialists.

The following selections, taken from an essay of 1857 reprinted in *Illustrations of Universal Progress*, and from *Social Statics and Man versus the State*, are intended to convey the essential elements in Spencer's notion of progress and the main burden of his application of the evolutionary theory to social problems in support of Liberalism.



ILLUSTRATIONS OF UNIVERSAL PROGRESS

PROGRESS: ITS LAW AND CAUSE

THE CURRENT CONCEPTION of Progress is somewhat shifting and indefinite. Sometimes it comprehends little more than simple growth—as of a nation in the number of its members and the extent of territory over which it has spread. Sometimes it has reference to quantity of material products—as when the advance of agriculture and manufactures is the topic. Sometimes the superior quality of these products is contemplated: and sometimes the new or improved appliances by which they are produced. When, again, we speak of moral or intellectual progress, we refer to the state of the individual or people exhibiting it; while, when the progress of Knowledge, of Science, of Art, is commented upon, we have in view certain abstract results of human thought and action. Not only, however, is the current conception of Progress more or less vague, but it is in great measure erroneous. It takes in not so much the reality of Progress as its accompaniments—not so much the substance as the shadow. That progress in intelligence seen during the growth of the child into the man, or the savage into the philosopher, is commonly regarded as consisting in the greater number of facts known and laws understood: whereas the actual progress consists in those internal modifications of which this increased knowledge is the expression. Social progress is supposed to consist in the produce of a greater quantity and variety of the articles required for satisfying men's wants; in the increasing security of person and property; in widening freedom of action: whereas, rightly understood, social progress consists in those changes of structure in the social organism which have entailed these consequences. The current conception is a teleological one. The phenomena are contemplated solely as bearing on human happiness. Only those changes are held to constitute progress which directly or indirectly tend to heighten

human happiness. And they are thought to constitute progress simply *because* they tend to heighten human happiness. But rightly to understand progress, we must inquire what is the nature of these changes, considered apart from our interests. Ceasing, for example, to regard the successive geological modifications that have taken place in the Earth, as modifications that have gradually fitted it for the habitation of Man, and as *therefore* a geological progress, we must seek to determine the character common to these modifications—the law to which they all conform. And similarly in every other case. Leaving out of sight concomitants and beneficial consequences, let us ask what Progress is in itself.

In respect to that progress which individual organisms display in the course of their evolution, this question has been answered by the Germans. The investigations of Wolff, Goethe, and Von Baer, have established the truth that the series of changes gone through during the development of a seed into a tree, or an ovum into an animal, constitute an advance from homogeneity of structure to heterogeneity of structure. In its primary stage, every germ consists of a substance that is uniform throughout, both in texture and chemical composition. The first step is the appearance of a difference between two parts of this substance; or, as the phenomenon is called in physiological language, a differentiation. Each of these differentiated divisions presently begins itself to exhibit some contrast of parts; and by and by these secondary differentiations become as definite as the original one. This process is continuously repeated—is simultaneously going on in all parts of the growing embryo; and by endless such differentiations there is finally produced that complex combination of tissues and organs constituting the adult animal or plant. This is the history of all organisms whatever. It is settled beyond dispute that organic progress consists in a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.

Now, we propose in the first place to show, that this law of organic progress is the law of all progress. Whether it be in the development of the Earth, in the development of Life upon its surface, in the development of Society, of Government, of Manufactures, of Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, Art, this same evolution of the simple into the complex, through successive differentiations, holds throughout. From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of civilization, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, is that in which Progress essentially consists. . . .

It is clearly enough displayed in the progress of the latest and most heterogeneous creature—Man. It is alike true that, during the period in which the Earth has been peopled, the human organism has grown more heterogeneous

among the civilized divisions of the species; and that the species, as a whole, has been growing more heterogeneous in virtue of the multiplication of races and the differentiation of these races from each other.

In proof of the first of these positions, we may cite the fact that, in the relative development of the limbs, the civilized man departs more widely from the general type of the placental mammalia than do the lower human races. While often possessing well-developed body and arms, the Papuan has extremely small legs: thus reminding us of the quadrumana, in which there is no great contrast in size between the hind and fore limbs. But in the European, the greater length and massiveness of the legs has become very marked—the fore and hind limbs are relatively more heterogeneous. Again, the greater ratio which the cranial bones bear to the facial bones illustrates the same truth. Among the vertebrata in general, progress is marked by an increasing heterogeneity in the vertebral column, and more especially in the vertebræ constituting the skull: the higher forms being distinguished by the relatively larger size of the bones which cover the brain, and the relatively smaller size of those which form the jaw, &c. Now, this characteristic, which is stronger in Man than in any other creature, is stronger in the European than in the savage. Moreover, judging from the greater extent and variety of faculty he exhibits, we may infer that the civilized man has also a more complex or heterogeneous nervous system than the uncivilized man: and indeed the fact is in part visible in the increased ratio which his cerebrum bears to the subjacent ganglia.

If further elucidation be needed, we may find it in every nursery. The infant European has sundry marked points of resemblance to the lower human races; as in the flatness of the alæ of the nose, the depression of its bridge, the divergence and forward opening of the nostrils, the form of the lips, the absence of a frontal sinus, the width between the eyes, the smallness of the legs. Now, as the developmental process by which these traits are turned into those of the adult European, is a continuation of that change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous displayed during the previous evolution of the embryo, which every physiologist will admit; it follows that the parallel developmental process by which the like traits of the barbarous races have been turned into those of the civilized races, has also been a continuation of the change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. The truth of the second position—that Mankind, as a whole, have become more heterogeneous—is so obvious as scarcely to need illustration. Every work on Ethnology, by its divisions and subdivisions of races, bears testimony to it. Even were we to admit the hypothesis that Mankind originated from several separate stocks, it would still remain true, that as, from each of these stocks, there have

sprung many now widely different tribes, which are proved by philological evidence to have had a common origin, the race as a whole is far less homogeneous than it once was. Add to which, that we have, in the Anglo-Americans, an example of a new variety arising within these few generations; and that, if we may trust to the description of observers, we are likely soon to have another such example in Australia.

On passing from Humanity under its individual form, to Humanity as socially embodied, we find the general law still more variously exemplified. The change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous is displayed equally in the progress of civilization as a whole, and in the progress of every tribe or nation; and is still going on with increasing rapidity. As we see in existing barbarous tribes, society in its first and lowest form is a homogeneous aggregation of individuals having like powers and like functions: the only marked difference of function being that which accompanies difference of sex. Every man is warrior, hunter, fisherman, tool-maker, builder; every woman performs the same drudgeries; every family is self-sufficing, and save for purposes of aggression and defence, might as well live apart from the rest. Very early, however, in the process of social evolution, we find an incipient differentiation between the governing and the governed. Some kind of chieftainship seems coeval with the first advance from the state of separate wandering families to that of a nomadic tribe. The authority of the strongest makes itself felt among a body of savages as in a herd of animals, or a posse of schoolboys. At first, however, it is indefinite, uncertain; is shared by others of scarcely inferior power; and is unaccompanied by any difference in occupation or style of living: the first ruler kills his own game, makes his own weapons, builds his own hut, and economically considered, does not differ from others of his tribe. Gradually, as the tribe progresses, the contrast between the governing and the governed grows more decided. Supreme power becomes hereditary in one family; the head of that family, ceasing to provide for his own wants, is served by others; and he begins to assume the sole office of ruling.

At the same time there has been arising a co-ordinate species of government—that of Religion. As all ancient records and traditions prove, the earliest rulers are regarded as divine personages. The maxims and commands they uttered during their lives are held sacred after their deaths, and are enforced by their divinely-descended successors; who in their turns are promoted to the pantheon of the race, there to be worshipped and propitiated along with their predecessors: the most ancient of whom is the supreme god, and the rest subordinate gods. For a long time these connate forms of government—civil and religious—continue closely associated. For many generations the king

continues to be the chief priest, and the priesthood to be members of the royal race. For many ages religious law continues to contain more or less of civil regulation, and civil law to possess more or less of religious sanction; and even among the most advanced nations these two controlling agencies are by no means completely differentiated from each other.

Having a common root with these, and gradually diverging from them, we find yet another controlling agency—that of Manners or ceremonial usages. All titles of honour are originally the names of the god-king; afterwards of God and the king; still later of persons of high rank; and finally come, some of them, to be used between man and man. All forms of complimentary address were at first the expressions of submission from prisoners to their conqueror, or from subjects to their ruler, either human or divine—expressions that were afterwards used to propitiate subordinate authorities, and slowly descended into ordinary intercourse. All modes of salutation were once obeisances made before the monarch and used in worship of him after his death. Presently others of the god-descended race were similarly saluted; and by degrees some of the salutations have become the due of all. Thus, no sooner does the originally homogeneous social mass differentiate into the governed and the governing parts, than this last exhibits an incipient differentiation into religious and secular—Church and State; while at the same time there begins to be differentiated from both, that less definite species of government which rules our daily intercourse—a species of government which, as we may see in heralds' colleges, in books of the peerage, in masters of ceremonies, is not without a certain embodiment of its own. Each of these is itself subject to successive differentiations. In the course of ages, there arises, as among ourselves, a highly complex political organization of monarch, ministers, lords and commons, with their subordinate administrative departments, courts of justice, revenue offices, &c., supplemented in the provinces by municipal governments, county governments, parish or union governments—all of them more or less elaborated. By its side there grows up a highly complex religious organization, with its various grades of officials, from archbishops down to sextons, its colleges, convocations, ecclesiastical courts, &c.; to all which must be added the ever multiplying independent sects, each with its general and local authorities. And at the same time there is developed a highly complex aggregation of customs, manners, and temporary fashions, enforced by society at large, and serving to control those minor transactions between man and man which are not regulated by civil and religious law. Moreover it is to be observed that this ever increasing heterogeneity in the governmental appliances of each nation, has been accompanied by an increasing heterogeneity in the governmental appliances of

different nations; all of which are more or less unlike in their political systems and legislation, in their creeds and religious institutions, in their customs and ceremonial usages.

Simultaneously there has been going on a second differentiation of a more familiar kind; that, namely, by which the mass of the community has been segregated into distinct classes and orders of workers. . . .

Long after considerable progress has been made in the division of labour among different classes of workers, there is still little or no division of labour among the widely separated parts of the community; the nation continues comparatively homogeneous in the respect that in each district the same occupations are pursued. But when roads and other means of transit become numerous and good, the different districts begin to assume different functions, and to become mutually dependent. The calico manufacture locates itself in this county, the woollen-cloth manufacture in that; silks are produced here, lace there; stockings in one place, shoes in another; pottery, hardware, cutlery, come to have their special towns; and ultimately every locality becomes more or less distinguished from the rest by the leading occupation carried on in it. Nay, more, this subdivision of functions shows itself not only among the different parts of the same nation, but among different nations. That exchange of commodities which free-trade promises so greatly to increase, will ultimately have the effect of specializing, in a greater or less degree, the industry of each people. . . .

Not only is the law thus clearly exemplified in the evolution of the social organism, but it is exemplified with equal clearness in the evolution of all products of human thought and action, whether concrete or abstract, real or ideal. . . .

And now, from this uniformity of procedure, may we not infer some fundamental necessity whence it results? May we not rationally seek for some all-pervading principle which determines this all-pervading process of things? Does not the universality of the *law* imply a universal *cause*? . . .

Just as it was possible to interpret Kepler's laws as necessary consequences of the law of gravitation; so it may be possible to interpret this law of Progress, in its multiform manifestations, as the necessary consequence of some similarly universal principle. As gravitation was assignable as the *cause* of each of the groups of phenomena which Kepler formulated; so may some equally simple attribute of things be assignable as the cause of each of the groups of phenomena formulated in the foregoing pages. We may be able to affiliate all these varied and complex evolutions of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, upon certain simple facts of immediate experience, which, in virtue of endless repetition, we regard as necessary.

The probability of a common cause, and the possibility of formulating it, being granted, it will be well, before going further, to consider what must be the general characteristics of such cause, and in what direction we ought to look for it. We can with certainty predict that it has a high degree of generality; seeing that it is common to such infinitely varied phenomena: just in proportion to the universality of its application must be the abstractness of its character. We need not expect to see in it an obvious solution of this or that form of Progress; because it equally refers to forms of Progress bearing little apparent resemblance to them: its association with multiform orders of facts, involves its dissociation from any particular order of facts. Being that which determines Progress of every kind—astronomic, geologic, organic, ethnologic, social, economic, artistic, &c.—it must be concerned with some fundamental attribute possessed in common by these; and must be expressible in terms of this fundamental attribute. The only obvious respect in which all kinds of Progress are alike, is, that they are modes of *change*; and hence, in some characteristic of changes in general, the desired solution will probably be found. We may suspect *à priori* that in some law of change lies the explanation of this universal transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous.

Thus much premised, we pass at once to the statement of the law, which is this:—*Every active force produces more than one change—every cause produces more than one effect.*

Before this law can be duly comprehended, a few examples must be looked at. When one body is struck against another, that which we usually regard as the effect, is a change of position or motion in one or both bodies. But a moment's thought shows us that this is a careless and very incomplete view of the matter. Besides the visible mechanical result, sound is produced; or, to speak accurately, a vibration in one or both bodies, and in the surrounding air: and under some circumstances we call this the effect. Moreover, the air has not only been made to vibrate, but has had sundry currents caused in it by the transit of the bodies, further, there is a disarrangement of the particles of the two bodies in the neighbourhood of their point of collision; amounting in some cases to a visible condensation. Yet more, this condensation is accompanied by the disengagement of heat. In some cases a spark—that is, light—results, from the incandescence of a portion struck off; and sometimes this incandescence is associated with chemical combination.

Thus, by the original mechanical force expended in the collision, at least five, and often more, different kinds of changes have been produced. Take, again, the lighting of a candle. Primarily this is a chemical change consequent on a rise of temperature. The process of combination having once been set going by extraneous heat, there is a continued formation of carbonic acid,

water, &c.—in itself a result more complex than the extraneous heat that first caused it. But accompanying this process of combination there is a production of heat; there is a production of light; there is an ascending column of hot gases generated; there are currents established in the surrounding air. Moreover, the decomposition of one force into many forces does not end here: each of the several changes produced becomes the parent of further changes. The carbonic acid given off will by and by combine with some base; or under the influence of sunshine give up its carbon to the leaf of a plant. The water will modify the hygrometric state of the air around; or, if the current of hot gases containing it come against a cold body, will be condensed: altering the temperature, and perhaps the chemical state, of the surface it covers. The heat given out melts the subjacent tallow, and expands whatever it warms. The light, falling on various substances, calls forth from them reactions by which it is modified; and so divers colours are produced. Similarly even with these secondary actions, which may be traced out into ever-multiplying ramifications, until they become too minute to be appreciated. And thus it is with all changes whatever. No case can be named in which an active force does not evolve forces of several kinds, and each of these, other groups of forces. Universally the effect is more complex than the cause. . . .

However, to avoid committing ourselves to more than is yet proved, we must be content with saying that such are the law and the cause of all progress that is known to us. Should the Nebular Hypothesis ever be established, then it will become manifest that the Universe at large, like every organism, was once homogeneous; that as a whole, and in every detail, it has unceasingly advanced towards greater heterogeneity; and that its heterogeneity is still increasing. It will be seen that as in each event of to-day, so from the beginning, the decomposition of every expended force into several forces has been perpetually producing a higher complication; that the increase of heterogeneity so brought about is still going on, and must continue to go on; and that thus Progress is not an accident, not a thing within human control, but a beneficent necessity.

SOCIAL STATICS AND MAN VERSUS THE STATE

THE EVANESCENCE OF EVIL

ALL EVIL results from the non-adaptation of constitution to conditions. Does a shrub dwindle in poor soil, or become sickly when deprived of light, or die outright if removed to a cold climate? it is because the harmony between its organization and its circumstances has been destroyed. Those experiences of

the farm-yard and the menagerie which show that pain, disease, and death, are entailed upon animals by certain kinds of treatment, may be similarly generalized. Every suffering incident to the human body, from a headache up to a fatal illness, from a burn or a sprain up to accidental loss of life, is similarly traceable to the having placed that body in a situation for which its powers did not fit it. Nor is the expression confined in its application to physical evil. Is the bachelor unhappy because his means will not permit him to marry? does the mother mourn over her lost child? does the emigrant lament leaving his father-land? The explanation is still the same. No matter what the special nature of the evil, it is invariably referable to the one generic cause—want of congruity between the faculties and their spheres of action.

Equally true is it that evil perpetually tends to disappear. In virtue of an essential principle of life, this non-adaptation of an organism to its conditions is ever being rectified; and modification of one or both, continues until the adaptation is complete. Whatever possesses vitality, from the elementary cell up to man himself, inclusive, obeys this law. . . .

We must adopt one of three propositions. We must either affirm that the human being is unaltered by the influences brought to bear on him—his circumstances; or that he tends to become *unfitted* to those circumstances; or that he tends to become fitted to them. If the first be true, then all schemes of education, of government, of social reform are useless. If the second be true, then the way to make a man virtuous is to accustom him to vicious practices, and *vice versa*. Both of which propositions being absurd, we are impelled to admit the remaining one. . . .

But why is not man adapted to the social state?

Simply because he yet partially retains the characteristics appropriate to an antecedent state. The respects in which he is not fitted to society, are the respects in which he is fitted for his original predatory life. His primitive circumstances required that he should sacrifice the welfare of other beings to his own; his present circumstances require that he shall not do so; and in so far as his old attribute still clings to him, he is unfit for the social state. All sins of men against one another, from the cannibalism of the Fijian to the crimes and venalities we see around us, the felonies which fill our prisons, the trickeries of trade, the quarrellings of class with class and of nation with nation, have their causes comprehended under this generalization.

Man needed one moral constitution to fit him for his original state; he needs another to fit him for his present state; and he has been, is, and will long continue to be, in process of adaptation. And the belief in human perfectibility merely amounts to the belief that, in virtue of this process, man will eventually become completely suited to his mode of life.

Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity. Instead of civilization being artificial it is a part of nature; all of a piece with the development of an embryo or the unfolding of a flower. The modifications mankind have undergone, and are still undergoing, result from a law underlying the whole organic creation; and provided the human race continues, and the constitution of things remains the same, those modifications must end in completeness. As surely as the tree becomes bulky when it stands alone, and slender if one of a group; as surely as a blacksmith's arm grows large, and the skin of a laborer's hand thick; as surely as the eye tends to become long-sighted in the sailor, and short-sighted in the student; as surely as a clerk acquires rapidity in writing and calculation; as surely as the musician learns to detect an error of a semitone amidst what seems to others a very babel of sound; as surely as a passion grows by indulgence and diminishes when restrained; as surely as a disregarded conscience becomes inert, and one that is obeyed active; as surely as there is any meaning in such terms as habit, custom, practice;—so surely must the human faculties be moulded into complete fitness for the social state; so surely must evil and immorality disappear; so surely must man become perfect.¹

POOR LAWS

. . . Pervading all Nature we may see at work a stern discipline which is a little cruel that it may be very kind. That state of universal warfare maintained throughout the lower creation, to the great perplexity of many worthy people, is at bottom the most merciful provision which the circumstances admit of. It is much better that the ruminant animal, when deprived by age of the vigour which made its existence a pleasure, should be killed by some beast of prey, than that it should linger out a life made painful by infirmities, and eventually die of starvation. By the destruction of all such, not only is existence ended before it becomes burdensome, but room is made for a younger generation capable of the fullest enjoyment; and, moreover, out of the very act of substitution happiness is derived for a tribe of predatory creatures. Note, further, that their carnivorous enemies not only remove from herbivorous herds individuals past their prime, but also weed out the sickly, the malformed, and the least

¹ [This note appears in the 1892 edition of *Social Statics*: "With the exception of small verbal improvements, I have let this chapter stand unaltered, though it is now clear to me that the conclusions drawn in it should be largely qualified. 1. Various races of mankind, inhabiting bad habitats, and obliged to lead miserable lives, cannot by any amount of adaptation be moulded into satisfactory types. 2. Astronomical and geological changes must continue hereafter to cause such changes of surface and climate as must entail migrations from habitats rendered unfit to fitter habitats; and such migrations must entail modified modes of life, with consequent re-adaptations. 3. The rate of progress towards any adapted form must diminish with the approach to complete adaptation, since the force producing it must diminish; so that, other causes apart, perfect adaptation can be reached only in infinite time."]

fleet or powerful. By the aid of which purifying process, as well as by the fighting so universal in the pairing season, all vitiation of the race through the multiplication of its inferior samples is prevented; and the maintenance of a constitution completely adapted to surrounding conditions, and therefore most productive of happiness, is ensured.

The development of the higher creation is a progress towards a form of being, capable of a happiness undiminished by these drawbacks. It is in the human race that the consummation is to be accomplished. Civilization is the last stage of its accomplishment. And the ideal man is the man in whom all the conditions to that accomplishment are fulfilled. Meanwhile, the well-being of existing humanity and the unfolding of it into this ultimate perfection, are both secured by that same beneficial though severe discipline, to which the animate creation at large is subject. It seems hard that an unskilfulness which with all his efforts he cannot overcome, should entail hunger upon the artizan. It seems hard that a labourer incapacitated by sickness from competing with his stronger fellows, should have to bear the resulting privations. It seems hard that widows and orphans should be left to struggle for life or death. Nevertheless, when regarded not separately but in connexion with the interests of universal humanity, these harsh fatalities are seen to be full of beneficence—the same beneficence which brings to early graves the children of diseased parents, and singles out the intemperate and the debilitated as the victims of an epidemic.

There are many very amiable people who have not the nerve to look this matter fairly in the face. Disabled as they are by their sympathies with present suffering, from duly regarding ultimate consequences, they pursue a course which is injudicious, and in the end even cruel. We do not consider it true kindness in a mother to gratify her child with sweetmeats that are likely to make it ill. We should think it a very foolish sort of benevolence which led a surgeon to let his patient's disease progress to a fatal issue, rather than inflict pain by an operation. Similarly, we must call those spurious philanthropists who, to prevent present misery, would entail greater misery on future generations. That rigorous necessity which, when allowed to operate, becomes so sharp a spur to the lazy and so strong a bridle to the random, these paupers' friends would repeal, because of the wailings it here and there produces. Blind to the fact that under the natural order of things society is constantly excreting its unhealthy, imbecile, slow, vacillating, faithless members, these unthinking, though well-meaning, men advocate an interference which not only stops the purifying process, but even increases the vitiation—absolutely encourages the multiplication of the reckless and incompetent by offering them an unfailing provision, and discourages the multiplication of the

competent and provident by heightening the difficulty of maintaining a family. And thus, in their eagerness to prevent the salutary sufferings that surround us, these sigh-wise and groan-foolish people bequeath to posterity a continually increasing curse.

Returning again to the highest point of view, we find that there is a second and still more injurious mode in which law-enforced charity checks the process of adaptation. To become fit for the social state, man has not only to lose his savageness but he has to acquire the capacities needful for civilized life. Power of application must be developed; such modification of the intellect as shall qualify it for its new tasks must take place; and, above all, there must be gained the ability to sacrifice a small immediate gratification for a future great one. The state of transition will of course be an unhappy state. Misery inevitably results from incongruity between constitution and conditions. Humanity is being pressed against the inexorable necessities of its new position—is being moulded into harmony with them, and has to bear the resulting happiness as best it can. The process *must* be undergone and the sufferings *must* be endured. No power on Earth, no cunningly-devised laws of statesmen, no world-rectifying schemes of the humane, no communist panaceas, no reforms that men ever did broach or ever will broach, can diminish them one jot. Intensified they may be, and are; and in preventing their intensification the philanthropic will find ample scope for exertion. But there is bound up with the change a *normal* amount of suffering, which cannot be lessened without altering the very laws of life. Every attempt at mitigation of this eventuates in exacerbation of it. All that a poor-law or any kindred institution can do, is to partially suspend the transition—to take off for a time, from certain members of society, the painful pressure which is effecting their transformation. At best this is merely to postpone what must ultimately be borne. But it is more than this: it is to undo what has already been done. For the circumstances to which adaptation is taking place cannot be superseded without causing a retrogression; and as the whole process must some time or other be passed through, the lost ground must be gone over again, and the attendant pain borne afresh.

At first sight these considerations seem conclusive against *all* relief to the poor—voluntary as well as compulsory; and it is no doubt true that they imply a condemnation of whatever private charity enables the recipients to elude the necessities of our social existence. With this condemnation, however, no rational man will quarrel. That careless squandering of pence which has fostered into perfection a system of organized begging—which has made skilful mendicancy more profitable than ordinary manual labour—which induces the simulation of diseases and deformities—which has called into

existence warehouses for the sale and hire of impostor's dresses—which has given to pity-inspiring babes a market value of 9*d.* per day—the unthinking benevolence which has generated all this, cannot but be disapproved by every one. Now it is only against this injudicious charity that the foregoing argument tells. To that charity which may be described as helping men to help themselves, it makes no objection—countenances it rather. And in helping men to help themselves, there remains abundant scope for the exercise of a people's sympathies. Accidents will still supply victims on whom generosity may be legitimately expended. Men thrown off the track by unforeseen events, men who have failed for want of knowledge inaccessible to them, men ruined by the dishonesty of others, and men in whom hope long delayed has made the heart sick, may, with advantage to all parties, be assisted. Even the prodigal, after severe hardships has branded his memory with the unbending conditions of social life to which he must submit, may properly have another trial afforded him. And, although by these ameliorations the process of adaptation must be remotely interfered with, yet, in the majority of cases, it will not be so much retarded in one direction as it will be advanced in another.

Objectionable as we find a poor-law to be, even under the supposition that it does what it is intended to do—diminish present suffering—how shall we regard it on finding that in reality it does no such thing—cannot do any such thing? Yet, paradoxical as the assertion looks, this is absolutely the fact. Let but the observer cease to contemplate so fixedly one side of the phenomenon—pauperism and its relief, and begin to examine the other side—rates and the *ultimate* contributors of them, and he will discover that to suppose the sum-total of distress diminishable by act-of-parliament bounty is a delusion.

Here, at any specified period, is a given quantity of food and things exchangeable for food, in the hands or at the command of the middle and upper classes. A certain portion of this food is needed by these classes themselves, and is consumed by them at the same rate, or very near it, be there scarcity or abundance. Whatever variation occurs in the sum-total of food and its equivalents, must therefore affect the remaining portion, not used by these classes for personal sustenance. This remaining portion is paid by them to the people in return for their labour, which is partly expended in the production of a further supply of necessities, and partly in the production of luxuries. Hence, by how much this portion is deficient, by so much must the people come short. A re-distribution by legislative or other agency cannot make that sufficient for them which was previously insufficient. It can do nothing but change the parties by whom the insufficiency is felt. If it gives enough to some who else would not have enough, it must inevitably reduce certain others to the condition of not having enough. . . .

THE COMING SLAVERY

The kinship of pity to love is shown among other ways in this, that it idealizes its object. Sympathy with one in suffering suppresses, for the time being, remembrance of his transgressions. The feeling which vents itself in "poor fellow!" on seeing one in agony, excludes the thought of "bad fellow," which might at another time arise. Naturally, then, if the wretched are unknown or but vaguely known, all the demerits they may have are ignored; and thus it happens that when the miseries of the poor are dilated upon, they are thought of as the miseries of the deserving poor, instead of being thought of as the miseries of the undeserving poor, which in large measure they should be. Those whose hardships are set forth in pamphlets and proclaimed in sermons and speeches which echo throughout society, are assumed to be all worthy souls, grievously wronged; and none of them are thought of as bearing the penalties of their misdeeds.

On hailing a cab in a London street, it is surprising how frequently the door is officiously opened by one who expects to get something for his trouble. The surprise lessens after counting the many loungers about tavern-doors, or after observing the quickness with which a street-performance, or procession, draws from neighbouring slums and stable-yards a group of idlers. Seeing how numerous they are in every small area, it becomes manifest that tens of thousands of such swarm through London. "They have no work," you say. Say rather that they either refuse work or quickly turn themselves out of it. They are simply good-for-nothings, who in one way or other live on the good-for-somethings—vagrants and sots, criminals and those on the way to crime, youths who are burdens on hard-worked parents, men who appropriate the wages of their wives, fellows who share the gains of prostitutes; and then, less visible and less numerous, there is a corresponding class of women.

Is it natural that happiness should be the lot of such? or is it natural that they should bring unhappiness on themselves and those connected with them? Is it not manifest that there must exist in our midst an immense amount of misery which is a normal result of misconduct, and ought not to be dissociated from it? There is a notion, always more or less prevalent and just now vociferously expressed, that all social suffering is removable, and that it is the duty of somebody or other to remove it. Both these beliefs are false. To separate pain from ill-doing is to fight against the constitution of things, and will be followed by far more pain. Saving men from the natural penalties of dissolute living, eventually necessitates the infliction of artificial penalties in solitary cells, on tread-wheels, and by the lash. I suppose

a dictum on which the current creed and the creed of science are at one, may be considered to have as high an authority as can be found. Well, the command "if any would not work neither should he eat," is simply a Christian enunciation of that universal law of Nature under which life has reached its present height—the law that a creature not energetic enough to maintain itself must die: the sole difference being that the law which in the one case is to be artificially enforced, is, in the other case, a natural necessity. And yet this particular tenet of their religion which science so manifestly justifies, is the one which Christians seem least inclined to accept. The current assumption is that there should be no suffering, and that society is to blame for that which exists. . . .

. . . Influences of various kinds conspire to increase corporate action and decrease individual action. And the change is being on all sides aided by schemers, each of whom thinks only of his pet plan and not at all of the general reorganization which his plan, joined with others such, are working out. It is said that the French Revolution devoured its own children. Here, an analogous catastrophe seems not unlikely. The numerous socialistic changes made by Act of Parliament, joined with the numerous others presently to be made, will by-and-by be all merged in State-socialism—swallowed in the vast wave which they have little by little raised.

"But why is this change described as 'the coming slavery'?" is a question which many will still ask. The reply is simple. All socialism involves slavery.

What is essential to the idea of a slave? We primarily think of him as one who is owned by another. To be more than nominal, however, the ownership must be shown by control of the slave's actions—a control which is habitually for the benefit of the controller. That which fundamentally distinguishes the slave is that he labours under coercion to satisfy another's desires. The relation admits of sundry gradations. Remembering that originally the slave is a prisoner whose life is at the mercy of his captor, it suffices here to note that there is a harsh form of slavery in which, treated as an animal, he has to expend his entire effort for his owner's advantage. Under a system less harsh, though occupied chiefly in working for his owner, he is allowed a short time in which to work for himself, and some ground on which to grow extra food. A further amelioration gives him power to sell the produce of his plot and keep the proceeds. Then we come to the still more moderated form which commonly arises where, having been a free man working on his own land, conquest turns him into what we distinguish as a serf; and he has to give to his owner each year a fixed amount of labour or produce, or both: retaining the rest himself. Finally, in some cases, as in Russia before serfdom was abolished, he is allowed to leave his owner's estate and work or trade for himself

elsewhere, under the condition that he shall pay an annual sum. What is it which, in these cases, leads us to qualify our conception of the slavery as more or less severe? Evidently the greater or smaller extent to which effort is compulsorily expended for the benefit of another instead of for self-benefit. If all the slave's labour is for his owner the slavery is heavy, and if but little it is light. Take now a further step. Suppose an owner dies, and his estate with its slaves comes into the hands of trustees; or suppose the estate and everything on it to be bought by a company; is the condition of the slave any the better if the amount of his compulsory labour remains the same? Suppose that for a company we substitute the community; does it make any difference to the slave if the time he has to work for others is as great, and the time left for himself is as small, as before? The essential question is—How much is he compelled to labour for other benefit than his own, and how much can he labour for his own benefit? The degree of his slavery varies according to the ratio between that which he is forced to yield up and that which he is allowed to retain; and it matters not whether his master is a single person or a society. If, without option, he has to labour for the society, and receives from the general stock such portion as the society awards him, he becomes a slave to the society. Socialistic arrangements necessitate an enslavement of this kind; and towards such an enslavement many recent measures, and still more the measures advocated, are carrying us. . . .

Evidently then, the changes made, the changes in progress, and the changes urged, will carry us not only towards State-ownership of land and dwellings and means of communication, all to be administered and worked by State-agents, but towards State-usurpation of all industries: the private forms of which, disadvantaged more and more in competition with the State, which can arrange everything for its own convenience, will more and more die away; just as many voluntary schools have, in presence of Board-schools. And so will be brought about the desired ideal of the socialists.

And now when there has been compassed this desired ideal, which "practical" politicians are helping socialists to reach, and which is so tempting on that bright side which socialists contemplate, what must be the accompanying shady side which they do not contemplate? It is a matter of common remark, often made when a marriage is impending, that those possessed by strong hopes habitually dwell on the promised pleasures and think nothing of the accompanying pains. A further exemplification of this truth is supplied by these political enthusiasts and fanatical revolutionists. Impressed with the miseries existing under our present social arrangements, and not regarding these miseries as caused by the ill-working of a human nature but partially adapted to the social state, they imagine them to be forthwith curable by

this or that rearrangement. Yet, even did their plans succeed it could only be by substituting one kind of evil for another. A little deliberate thought would show that under their proposed arrangements, their liberties must be surrendered in proportion as their material welfares were cared for.

For no form of co-operation, small or great, can be carried on without regulation, and an implied submission to the regulating agencies. Even one of their own organizations for effecting social changes yields them proof. It is compelled to have its councils, its local and general officers, its authoritative leaders, who must be obeyed under penalty of confusion and failure. And the experience of those who are loudest in their advocacy of a new social order under the paternal control of a Government, shows that even in private voluntarily-formed societies, the power of the regulative organization becomes great, if not irresistible: often, indeed, causing grumbling and restiveness among those controlled. Trades-unions which carry on a kind of industrial war in defence of workers' interests *versus* employers' interests, find that subordination almost military in its strictness is needful to secure efficient action; for divided councils prove fatal to success. And even in bodies of co-operators, formed for carrying on manufacturing or distributing businesses, and not needing that obedience to leaders which is required where the aims are offensive or defensive, it is still found that the administrative agency gains such supremacy that there arise complaints about "the tyranny of organization." Judge then what must happen when, instead of relatively small combinations, to which men may belong or not as they please, we have a national combination in which each citizen finds himself incorporated, and from which he cannot separate himself without leaving the country. Judge what must under such conditions become the despotism of a graduated and centralized officialism, holding in its hands the resources of the community, and having behind it whatever amount of force it finds requisite to carry out its decrees and maintain what it calls order. Well may Prince Bismarck display leanings towards State-socialism.

And then after recognizing, as they must if they think out their scheme, the power possessed by the regulative agency in the new social system so temptingly pictured, let its advocates ask themselves to what end this power must be used. Not dwelling exclusively, as they habitually do, on the material well-being and the mental gratifications to be provided for them by a beneficent administration, let them dwell a little on the price to be paid. The officials cannot create the needful supplies: they can but distribute among individuals that which the individuals have joined to produce. If the public agency is required to provide for them, it must reciprocally require them to furnish the means. There cannot be, as under our existing system, agreement between

employer and employed—this the scheme excludes. There must in place of it be command by local authorities over workers, and acceptance by the workers of that which the authorities assign to them. And this, indeed, is the arrangement distinctly, but as it would seem inadvertently, pointed to by the members of the Democratic Federation. For they propose that production should be carried on by "agricultural and industrial *armies* under State-control": apparently not remembering that armies pre-suppose grades of officers, by whom obedience would have to be insisted upon; since otherwise neither order nor efficient work could be ensured. So that each would stand toward the governing agency in the relation of slave to master.

"But the governing agency would be a master which he and others made and kept constantly in check; and one which therefore would not control him or others more than was needful for the benefit of each and all."

To which reply the first rejoinder is that, even if so, each member of the community as an individual would be a slave to the community as a whole. Such a relation has habitually existed in militant communities, even under quasi-popular forms of government. In ancient Greece the accepted principle was that the citizen belonged neither to himself nor to his family, but belonged to his city—the city being with the Greek equivalent to the community. And this doctrine, proper to a state of constant warfare, is a doctrine which socialism unawares re-introduces into a state intended to be purely industrial. The services of each will belong to the aggregate of all; and for these services, such returns will be given as the authorities think proper. So that even if the administration is of the beneficent kind intended to be secured, slavery, however mild, must be the outcome of the arrangement.

A second rejoinder is that the administration will presently become not of the intended kind, and that the slavery will not be mild. The socialist speculation is vitiated by an assumption like that which vitiates the speculations of the "practical" politician. It is assumed that officialism will work as it is intended to work, which it never does. The machinery of Communism, like existing social machinery, has to be framed out of existing human nature; and the defects of existing human nature will generate in the one the same evils as in the other. The love of power, the selfishness, the injustice, the untruthfulness, which often in comparatively short times bring private organizations to disaster, will inevitably, where their effects accumulate from generation to generation, work evils far greater and less remediable; since, vast and complex and possessed of all the resources, the administrative organization once developed and consolidated, must become irresistible. And if there needs proof that the periodic exercise of electoral power would fail to prevent this, it suffices to instance the French Government, which, purely popular in origin,

and subject at short intervals to popular judgment, nevertheless tramples on the freedom of citizens to an extent which the English delegates to the late Trades Unions Congress say "is a disgrace to, and an anomaly in, a Republican nation."

The final result would be a revival of despotism. A disciplined army of civil officials, like an army of military officials, gives supreme power to its head—a power which has often led to usurpation, as in mediæval Europe and still more in Japan—nay, has thus so led among our neighbours, within our own times. The recent confessions of M. de Maupas have shown how readily a constitutional head, elected and trusted by the whole people, may, with the aid of a few unscrupulous confederates, paralyze the representative body and make himself autocrat. That those who rose to power in a socialistic organization would not scruple to carry out their aims at all costs, we have good reason for concluding. When we find that shareholders who, sometimes gaining but often losing, have made that railway-system by which national prosperity has been so greatly increased, are spoken of by the council of the Democratic Federation as having "laid hands" on the means of communication, we may infer that those who directed a socialistic administration might interpret with extreme perversity the claims of individuals and classes under their control. And when, further, we find members of this same council urging that the State should take possession of the railways, "with or without compensation," we may suspect that the heads of the ideal society desired, would be but little deterred by considerations of equity from pursuing whatever policy they thought needful: a policy which would always be one identified with their own supremacy. It would need but a war with an adjacent society, or some internal discontent demanding forcible suppression, to at once transform a socialistic administration into a grinding tyranny like that of ancient Peru; under which the mass of the people, controlled by grades of officials, and leading lives that were inspected out-of-doors and in-doors, laboured for the support of the organization which regulated them, and were left with but a bare subsistence for themselves. And then would be completely revived, under a different form, that *régime* of status—that system of compulsory co-operation, the decaying tradition of which is represented by the old Toryism, and towards which the new Toryism is carrying us back.

"But we shall be on our guard against all that—we shall take precautions to ward off such disasters," will doubtless say the enthusiasts. Be they "practical" politicians with their new regulative measures, or communists with their schemes for re-organizing labour their reply is ever the same;—"It is true that plans of kindred nature have, from unforeseen causes or adverse accidents, or the misdeeds of those concerned, been brought to failure; but this

time we shall profit by past experiences and succeed." There seems no getting people to accept the truth, which nevertheless is conspicuous enough, that the welfare of a society and the justice of its arrangements are at bottom dependent on the characters of its members; and that improvement in neither can take place without that improvement in character which results from carrying on peaceful industry under the restraints imposed by an orderly social life. The belief, not only of the socialists but also of those so-called Liberals who are diligently preparing the way for them, is that by due skill an ill-working humanity may be framed into well-working institutions. It is a delusion. The defective natures of citizens will show themselves in the bad acting of whatever social structure they are arranged into. There is no political alchemy by which you can get golden conduct out of leaden instincts.

THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY

THE MAN who more than anyone else made "Darwinism" a household word for his contemporaries, synonymous with a "new reformation" in thought, was Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-95). While still in his teens he chanced upon the writings of Sir William Hamilton, the philosopher, and Thomas Carlyle. Both men left a permanent mark upon his outlook: the former's insistence on the "relativity of all knowledge" bore fruit in Huxley's subsequent agnosticism, while from the latter he acquired a passionate resolve "to make things clear and get rid of cant and shams of all sorts." In 1839, under the guidance of two brothers-in-law who were physicians, he began to study medicine privately, and in 1846 he entered into practice.

The publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859 converted Huxley to evolution and embarked him on his career as "Darwin's Bulldog." After a first reading of the book he wrote to Darwin expressing his adherence to the central evolutionary doctrine contained in it, though making some reservations as to details; and he added: "I trust you will not allow yourself to be in any way disgusted or annoyed by the considerable abuse and misrepresentation which, unless I greatly mistake, is in store for you. . . . I am sharpening up my claws and beak in readiness." Huxley's first opportunity to test his claws came in 1860, during a famous session of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. In the course of an attack on the theory of evolution as both factually invalid and inimical to religion, Samuel Wilberforce, the Bishop of Oxford, addressed himself at one point to Huxley to ask with apparent solicitude whether the latter was descended from the apes on the side of his grandfather or grandmother. Huxley rose to the occasion, and after controverting the Bishop's facts (on which the latter had been coached by Richard Owen), he declared: "A man has no reason to be ashamed of having an ape for his grandfather. If there were an ancestor whom I should feel shame in recalling it would rather be a *man*—a man of restless and versatile intellect—who, not content with an equivocal success in his own sphere of activity, plunges into scientific questions with which he has no real acquaintance, only to obscure by an aimless rhetoric, and distract the attention of his hearers from the real point at issue by eloquent digressions and skilled appeals to religious prejudice." This retort made Huxley immediately notorious; and perhaps inevitably evolution was turned into a public question—to be fought over as much for its anti-religious implications as for its validity. For almost two-score years thereafter, at meetings of scientific societies, on the public platform, as well as in books and articles, Huxley went about fulfilling an early vow "to smite all humbugs, however big"—expounding and defending Darwin's ideas, though without accepting them slavishly.

It was Huxley rather than Darwin who established by experimental analyses the anatomical kinship of man to the apes. In 1875 he was invited to attend the opening of the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore; and on a visit to

Nashville, Tennessee (years later the scene of a renewed struggle over the teaching of evolution) he was hailed publicly for his scientific achievements. Because of failing health he retired from regular teaching in 1885; but he continued to enjoy using his claws upon the sanctimonious and complacent figures in British intellectual society who placed loyalty to what they conceived was important public policy above the devotion to disinterested scientific inquiry. In his brief *Autobiography* he expressed clearly and fairly the ideals controlling that phase of his life which made him a dominant figure in English society: "To promote the increase of natural knowledge and to forward the application of scientific methods of investigation to all problems of life to the best of my ability, in the conviction which has grown with my growth and strengthened with my strength, that there is no alleviation for the sufferings of mankind except veracity of thought and action, and the resolute facing of the world as it is when the garment of make-believe by which pious hands have hidden its uglier features is stripped off. It is with this intent that I have subordinated any reasonable, or unreasonable, ambition for scientific fame which I may have permitted myself to entertain to other ends; to the popularisation of science; to the development and organisation of scientific education; to the endless series of battles and skirmishes over evolution; and to untiring opposition to that ecclesiastical spirit, that clericalism, which in England, as everywhere else, and to whatever domination it may belong, is the deadly enemy of science."

Huxley's intellectual interests were not exhausted by these activities, and the concern for large philosophical problems which he developed in his youth remained with him throughout his life. He argued that protoplasm is the physical basis of life and that mental phenomena are simply the manifestations of an underlying protoplasmic activity. He thereby arrived at the conception of mind as an epi-phenomenon: "consciousness" is merely a by-product of protoplasm and is as completely without power of modifying the working of the physical organism "as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery." Huxley dismissed as so much ungrounded speculation the philosophic systems which tried to peer into the reality lying behind the opaque curtain of "consciousness." He therefore called himself an "agnostic" because, as he once wrote Kingsley, "I don't know whether Matter is anything distinct from Force. I don't know that the atoms are anything but pure myths . . . I am quite as ready to admit your doctrine that souls secrete bodies as I am the opposite that bodies secrete souls—simply because I deny the possibility of obtaining any evidence as to the truth and falsehood of either hypothesis. My fundamental axiom of speculative philosophy is that *materialism and spiritualism are opposite poles of the same absurdity*—the absurdity of imagining that we know anything about either spirit or matter."

Huxley's acceptance of Darwin's theories was always qualified by doubts concerning the adequacy of the doctrine of natural selection to explain all the facts as to the transmutation of species. Nevertheless, he subscribed to evolution as a reasonable hypothesis on the available data, and he admitted that natural selection is a factor—even if not the exclusive one—in the evolutionary process. On the other hand, he was dismayed by current attempts to use Darwinism as the basis for a theory of morals; and he was impatient with those who tried to derive

political theory from a priori assumptions concerning natural rights. Huxley contrasted the cosmic order, characterized by cruel and ceaseless struggle, with the social order, whose end is the good of mankind; and he minced no words in pointing out that natural selection does not usually bring about the survival of either the physically or the morally fittest. The essays in which he develops these views (most vigorously in "Evolution and Ethics," the Romanes Lecture for 1893, selections from which follow), form the prose counterparts to Matthew Arnold's poetical protests (as expressed, for example, in his "To an Independent Preacher") against taking the "harmony of nature" as the model for human conduct.

Huxley was also quite decided in his criticisms of social theories based on a priori and unfounded assumptions concerning the "natural" state of mankind. He was particularly effective in destroying the foundations upon which the theory of the state as a mere policeman was built—although, because Spencer was a close friend, Huxley's explicit criticisms of him were somewhat sparing. Nevertheless, in the two essays "Administrative Nihilism" (1870) and "Government: Anarchy or Regimentation" (1890) he made short work of Spencer's "anarchic individualism" and showed that the latter's advocacy of governmental abstention from all regulative activity was without rational foundation. Thus, in defending the newly enacted compulsory-education provision of 1870, Huxley declared: "The higher the state of civilisation, the more completely do the actions of one member of the social body influence all the rest, and the less possible is it for any man to do a wrong thing without interfering, more or less, with the freedom of all his fellow-citizens. So that, even upon the narrowest view of the functions of the State, it must be admitted to have wider powers than the advocates of the police theory are disposed to admit." Although Huxley warned against the tyranny of socialistic regimentation (the militarism which would attempt to set artificial equality in place of the natural inequality of mankind), and although he dismissed a priori arguments for socialism as no better than those for extreme individualism, he could nevertheless say: "I do not see how any limit whatever can be laid down as to the extent to which, under some circumstances, the action of Government may be rightfully carried . . . At present the State protects men in the possession and enjoyment of their property, and defines what property is. The justification for its doing so is that its action promotes the good of the people. If it can be clearly proved that the abolition of property would tend still more to promote the good of the people, the State will have the same justification for abolishing property that it now has for maintaining it."



EVOLUTION AND ETHICS

FROM VERY LOW FORMS up to the highest—in the animal no less than in the vegetable kingdom—the process of life presents the same appearance of cyclical evolution. Nay, we have but to cast our eyes over the rest of the world and cyclical change presents itself on all sides. It meets us in the water that flows to the sea and returns to the springs; in the heavenly bodies that wax and wane, go and return to their places; in the inexorable sequence of the ages of man's life; in that successive rise, apogee, and fall of dynasties and of states which is the most prominent topic of civil history.

As no man fording a swift stream can dip his foot twice into the same water, so no man can, with exactness, affirm of anything in the sensible world that it is. As he utters the words, nay, as he thinks them, the predicate ceases to be applicable; the present has become the past; the "is" should be "was." And the more we learn of the nature of things, the more evident is it that what we call rest is only unperceived activity; that seeming peace is silent but strenuous battle. In every part, at every moment, the state of the cosmos is the expression of a transitory adjustment of contending forces; a scene of strife, in which all the combatants fall in turn. What is true of each part, is true of the whole. Natural knowledge tends more and more to the conclusion that "all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth" are the transitory forms of parcels of cosmic substance wending along the road of evolution, from nebulous potentiality, through endless growths of sun and planet and satellite; through all varieties of matter; through infinite diversities of life and thought; possibly, through modes of being of which we neither have a conception, nor are competent to form any, back to the indefinable latency from which they arose. Thus the most obvious attribute of the cosmos is its impermanence. It assumes the aspect not so much of a permanent entity as of a changeful process in which naught endures save the flow of energy and the rational order which pervades it. . . .

But there is another aspect of the cosmic process, so perfect as a mechanism, so beautiful as a work of art. Where the cosmopoietic energy works through sentient beings, there arises, among its other manifestations, that which we call pain or suffering. This baleful product of evolution increases in quantity and in intensity, with advancing grades of animal organization, until it attains its highest level in man. Further, the consummation is not reached in

man, the mere animal; nor in man, the whole or half savage; but only in man, the member of an organized polity. And it is a necessary consequence of his attempt to live in this way; that is, under those conditions which are essential to the full development of his noblest powers.

Man, the animal, in fact, has worked his way to the headship of the sentient world, and has become the superb animal which he is, in virtue of his success in the struggle for existence. The conditions having been of a certain order, man's organization has adjusted itself to them better than that of his competitors in the cosmic strife. In the case of mankind, the self-assertion, the unscrupulous seizing upon all that can be grasped, the tenacious holding of all that can be kept, which constitute the essence of the struggle for existence, have answered. For his successful progress, throughout the savage state, man has been largely indebted to those qualities which he shares with the ape and the tiger; his exceptional physical organization; his cunning, his sociability, his curiosity, and his imitativeness; his ruthless and ferocious destructiveness when his anger is roused by opposition.

But, in proportion as men have passed from anarchy to social organization, and in proportion as civilization has grown in worth, these deeply ingrained serviceable qualities have become defects. After the manner of successful persons, civilized man would gladly kick down the ladder by which he has climbed. He would be only too pleased to see "the ape and tiger die." But they decline to suit his convenience; and the unwelcome intrusion of these boon companions of his hot youth into the ranged existence of civil life adds pains and griefs, innumerable and immeasurably great, to those which the cosmic process necessarily brings on the mere animal. In fact, civilized man brands all these ape and tiger promptings with the name of sins; he punishes many of the acts which flow from them as crimes; and, in extreme cases, he does his best to put an end to the survival of the fittest of former days by axe and rope.

I have said that civilized man has reached this point; the assertion is perhaps too broad and general; I had better put it that ethical man has attained thereto. The science of ethics professes to furnish us with a reasoned rule of life; to tell us what is right action and why it is so. Whatever differences of opinion may exist among experts there is a general consensus that the ape and tiger methods of the struggle for existence are not reconcilable with sound ethical principles. . . .

Theories of the universe, in which the conception of evolution plays a leading part, were extant at least six centuries before our era. Certain knowledge of them, in the fifth century, reaches us from localities as distant as the valley

of the Ganges and the Asiatic coasts of the Ægean. To the early philosophers of Hindostan, no less than to those of Ionia, the salient and characteristic feature of the phenomenal world was its changefulness; the unresting flow of all things, through birth to visible being and thence to not being, in which they could discern no sign of a beginning and for which they saw no prospect of an ending. It was no less plain to some of these antique forerunners of modern philosophy that suffering is the badge of all the tribe of sentient things; that it is no accidental accompaniment, but an essential constituent of the cosmic process. The energetic Greek might find fierce joys in a world in which "strife is father and king"; but the old Aryan spirit was subdued to quietism in the Indian sage; the mist of suffering which spread over humanity hid everything else from his view; to him life was one with suffering and suffering with life.

In Hindostan, as in Ionia, a period of relatively high and tolerably stable civilization had succeeded long ages of semi-barbarism and struggle. Out of wealth and security had come leisure and refinement, and, close at their heels, had followed the malady of thought. To the struggle for bare existence, which never ends, though it may be alleviated and partially disguised for a fortunate few, succeeded the struggle to make existence intelligible and to bring the order of things into harmony with the moral sense of man, which also never ends, but, for the thinking few, becomes keener with every increase of knowledge and with every step towards the realization of a worthy ideal of life.

Two thousand five hundred years ago, the value of civilization was as apparent as it is now; then, as now, it was obvious that only in the garden of an orderly polity can the finest fruits humanity is capable of bearing be produced. But it had also become evident that the blessings of culture were not unmingled. The garden was apt to turn into a hothouse. The stimulation of the senses, the pampering of the emotions, endlessly multiplied the sources of pleasure. The constant widening of the intellectual field indefinitely extended the range of that especially human faculty of looking before and after, which adds to the fleeting present those old and new worlds of the past and the future, wherein men dwell the more the higher their culture. But that very sharpening of the sense and that subtle refinement of emotion, which brought such a wealth of pleasures, were fatally attended by a proportional enlargement of the capacity for suffering; and the divine faculty of imagination, while it created new heavens and new earths, provided them with the corresponding hells of futile regret for the past and morbid anxiety for the future. Finally, the inevitable penalty of over-stimulation, exhaustion, opened the gates of civilization to its great enemy, ennui; the stale and flat weariness

when man delights not, nor woman neither; when all things are vanity and vexation; and life seems not worth living except to escape the bore of dying.

Even purely intellectual progress brings about its revenges. Problems settled in a rough and ready way by rude men, absorbed in action, demand renewed attention and show themselves to be still unread riddles when men have time to think. The beneficent demon, doubt, whose name is Legion and who dwells amongst the tombs of old faiths, enters into mankind and thenceforth refuses to be cast out. Sacred customs, venerable dooms of ancestral wisdom, hallowed by tradition and professing to hold good for all time, are put to the question. Cultured reflection asks for their credentials; judges them by its own standards; finally, gathers those of which it approves into ethical systems, in which the reasoning is rarely much more than a decent pretext for the adoption of foregone conclusions.

One of the oldest and most important elements in such systems is the conception of justice. Society is impossible unless those who are associated agree to observe certain rules of conduct towards one another; its stability depends on the steadiness with which they abide by that agreement; and, so far as they waver, that mutual trust which is the bond of society is weakened or destroyed. Wolves could not hunt in packs except for the real, though unexpressed, understanding that they should not attack one another during the chase. The most rudimentary polity is a pack of men living under the like tacit, or expressed, understanding; and having made the very important advance upon wolf society, that they agree to use the force of the whole body against individuals who violate it and in favour of those who observe it. This observance of a common understanding, with the consequent distribution of punishments and rewards according to accepted rules, received the name of justice, while the contrary was called injustice. Early ethics did not take much note of the animus of the violator of the rules. But civilization could not advance far, without the establishment of a capital distinction between the case of involuntary and that of wilful misdeed; between a merely wrong action and a guilty one. And, with increasing refinement of moral appreciation, the problem of desert, which arises out of this distinction, acquired more and more theoretical and practical importance. If life must be given for life, yet it was recognized that the unintentional slayer did not altogether deserve death; and, by a sort of compromise between the public and the private conception of justice, a sanctuary was provided in which he might take refuge from the avenger of blood.

The idea of justice thus underwent a gradual sublimation from punishment and reward according to acts, to punishment and reward according to desert; or, in other words, according to motive. Righteousness, that is, action from

right motive, not only became synonymous with justice, but the positive constituent of innocence and the very heart of goodness.

Now when the ancient sage, whether Indian or Greek, who had attained to this conception of goodness, looked the world, and especially human life, in the face, he found it as hard as we do to bring the course of evolution into harmony with even the elementary requirements of the ethical ideal of the just and the good.

If there is one thing plainer than another, it is that neither the pleasures nor the pains of life, in the merely animal world, are distributed according to desert; for it is admittedly impossible for the lower orders of sentient beings to deserve either the one or the other. If there is a generalization from the facts of human life which has the assent of thoughtful men in every age and country, it is that the violator of ethical rules constantly escapes the punishment which he deserves; that the wicked flourishes like a green bay tree, while the righteous begs his bread; that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children; that, in the realm of nature, ignorance is punished just as severely as wilful wrong; and that thousands upon thousands of innocent beings suffer for the crime, or the unintentional trespass of one.

Greek and Semite and Indian are agreed upon this subject. The book of Job is at one with the "Works and Days" and the Buddhist Sutras; the Psalmist and the Preacher of Israel, with the Tragic Poets of Greece. What is a more common motive of the ancient tragedy in fact, than the unfathomable injustice of the nature of things; what is more deeply felt to be true than its presentation of the destruction of the blameless by the work of his own hands, or by the fatal operation of the sins of others? Surely *Œdipus* was pure of heart; it was the natural sequence of events—the cosmic process—which drove him, in all innocence, to slay his father and become the husband of his mother, to the desolation of his people and his own headlong ruin. Or to step, for a moment, beyond the chronological limits I have set myself, what constitutes the sempiternal attraction of *Hamlet* but the appeal to deepest experience of that history of a no less blameless dreamer, dragged, in spite of himself, into a world out of joint; involved in a tangle of crime and misery, created by one of the prime agents of the cosmic process as it works in and through man?

Thus, brought before the tribunal of ethics, the cosmos might well seem to stand condemned. The conscience of man revolted against the moral indifference of nature, and the microcosmic atom should have found the illimitable macrocosm guilty. But few, or none, ventured to record that verdict. . . .

We are more than sufficiently familiar with modern pessimism, at least as a speculation; for I cannot call to mind that any of its present votaries have sealed their faith by assuming the rags and the bowl of the mendicant

Bhikku, or the cloak and the wallet of the Cynic. The obstacles placed in the way of sturdy vagrancy by an unphilosophical police have, perhaps, proved too formidable for philosophical consistency. We also know modern speculative optimism, with its perfectibility of the species, reign of peace, and lion and lamb transformation scenes; but one does not hear so much of it as one did forty years ago; indeed, I imagine it is to be met with more commonly at the tables of the healthy and wealthy, than in the congregations of the wise. The majority of us, I apprehend, profess neither pessimism nor optimism. We hold that the world is neither so good, nor so bad, as it conceivably might be; and, as most of us have reason, now and again, to discover that it can be. Those who have failed to experience the joys that make life worth living are, probably, in as small a minority as those who have never known the griefs that rob existence of its savour and turn its richest fruits into mere dust and ashes.

Further, I think I do not err in assuming that, however diverse their views on philosophical and religious matters, most men are agreed that the proportion of good and evil in life may be very sensibly affected by human action. I never heard anybody doubt that the evil may be thus increased, or diminished; and it would seem to follow that good must be similarly susceptible of addition or subtraction. Finally, to my knowledge, nobody professes to doubt that, so far forth as we possess a power of bettering things, it is our paramount duty to use it and to train all our intellect and energy to this supreme service of our kind.

Hence the pressing interest of the question, to what extent modern progress in natural knowledge, and, more especially, the general outcome of that progress in the doctrine of evolution, is competent to help us in the great work of helping one another?

The propounders of what are called the "ethics of evolution," when the "evolution of ethics" would usually better express the object of their speculations, adduce a number of more or less interesting facts and more or less sound arguments in favour of the origin of the moral sentiments, in the same way as other natural phenomena, by a process of evolution. I have little doubt, for my own part, that they are on the right track; but as the immoral sentiments have no less been evolved, there is, so far, as much natural sanction for the one as the other. The thief and the murderer follow nature just as much as the philanthropist. Cosmic evolution may teach us how the good and the evil tendencies of man may have come about; but, in itself, it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil than we had before. Some day, I doubt not, we shall arrive at an understanding of the evolution of the æsthetic faculty; but all the under-

standing in the world will neither increase nor diminish the force of the intuition that this is beautiful and that is ugly.

There is another fallacy which appears to me to pervade the so-called "ethics of evolution." It is the notion that because, on the whole, animals and plants have advanced in perfection of organization by means of the struggle for existence and the consequent "survival of the fittest"; therefore men in society, men as ethical beings, must look to the same process to help them towards perfection. I suspect that this fallacy has arisen out of the unfortunate ambiguity of the phrase "survival of the fittest." "Fittest" has a connotation of "best"; and about "best" there hangs a moral flavour. In cosmic nature, however, what is "fittest" depends upon the conditions. Long since, I ventured to point out that if our hemisphere were to cool again, the survival of the fittest might bring about, in the vegetable kingdom, a population of more and more stunted and humbler and humbler organisms, until the "fittest" that survived might be nothing but lichens, diatoms, and such microscopic organisms as those which give red snow its colour; while, if it became hotter, the pleasant valleys of the Thames and Isis might be uninhabitable by any animated beings save those that flourish in a tropical jungle. They, as the fittest, the best adapted to the changed conditions, would survive.

Men in society are undoubtedly subject to the cosmic process. As among other animals, multiplication goes on without cessation, and involves severe competition for the means of support. The struggle for existence tends to eliminate those less fitted to adapt themselves to the circumstances of their existence. The strongest, the most self-assertive, tend to tread down the weaker. But the influence of the cosmic process on the evolution of society is the greater the more rudimentary its civilization. Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest, in respect of the whole of the conditions which obtain, but of those who are ethically the best.

As I have already urged, the practice of that which is ethically best—what we call goodness or virtue—involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence. It demands that each man who enters into the enjoyment of the advantages of a polity shall be mindful of his debt to those who have laboriously constructed it; and shall

take heed that no act of his weakens the fabric in which he has been permitted to live. Laws and moral precepts are directed to the end of curbing the cosmic process and reminding the individual of his duty to the community, to the protection and influence of which he owes, if not existence itself, at least the life of something better than a brutal savage.

It is from neglect of these plain considerations that the fanatical individualism of our time attempts to apply the analogy of cosmic nature to society. Once more we have a misapplication of the stoical injunction to follow nature; the duties of the individual to the state are forgotten, and his tendencies to self-assertion are dignified by the name of rights. It is seriously debated whether the members of a community are justified in using their combined strength to constrain one of their number to contribute his share to the maintenance of it; or even to prevent him from doing his best to destroy it. The struggle for existence which has done such admirable work in cosmic nature, must, it appears, be equally beneficent in the ethical sphere. Yet if that which I have insisted upon is true; if the cosmic process has no sort of relation to moral ends; if the imitation of it by man is inconsistent with the first principles of ethics; what becomes of this surprising theory?

Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it. It may seem an audacious proposal thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm and to set man to subdue nature to his higher ends; but I venture to think that the great intellectual difference between the ancient times with which we have been occupied and our day, lies in the solid foundation we have acquired for the hope that such an enterprise may meet with a certain measure of success.

The history of civilization details the steps by which men have succeeded in building up an artificial world within the cosmos. Fragile reed as he may be, man, as Pascal says, is a thinking reed: there lies within him a fund of energy operating intelligently and so far akin to that which pervades the universe, that it is competent to influence and modify the cosmic process. In virtue of his intelligence, the dwarf bends the Titan to his will. In every family, in every polity that has been established, the cosmic process in man has been restrained and otherwise modified by law and custom; in surrounding nature, it has been similarly influenced by the art of the shepherd, the agriculturist, the artisan. As civilization has advanced, so has the extent of this interference increased; until the organized and highly developed sciences and arts of the present day have endowed man with a command over the course of non-human nature greater than that once attributed to the magicians. The most impressive, I might say startling, of these changes have

been brought about in the course of the last two centuries; while a right comprehension of the process of life and of the means of influencing its manifestations is only just dawning upon us. We do not yet see our way beyond generalities; and we are befogged by the obtrusion of false analogies and crude anticipations. But Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, have all had to pass through similar phases, before they reached the stage at which their influence became an important factor in human affairs. Physiology, Psychology, Ethics, Political Science, must submit to the same ordeal. Yet it seems to me irrational to doubt that, at no distant period, they will work as great a revolution in the sphere of practice.

The theory of evolution encourages no millennial anticipations. If, for millions of years, our globe has taken the upward road, yet, some time, the summit will be reached and the downward route will be commenced. The most daring imagination will hardly venture upon the suggestion that the power and the intelligence of man can ever arrest the procession of the great year.

Moreover, the cosmic nature born with us and, to a large extent, necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely ethical ends. Ethical nature may count upon having to reckon with a tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts. But, on the other hand, I see no limit to the extent to which intelligence and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence, for a period longer than that now covered by history. And much may be done to change the nature of man himself. The intelligence which has converted the brother of the wolf into the faithful guardian of the flock ought to be able to do something towards curbing the instincts of savagery in civilized men.

But if we may permit ourselves a larger hope of abatement of the essential evil of the world than was possible to those who, in the infancy of exact knowledge, faced the problem of existence more than a score of centuries ago, I deem it an essential condition of the realization of that hope that we should cast aside the notion that the escape from pain and sorrow is the proper object of life.

We have long since emerged from the heroic childhood of our race, when good and evil could be met with the same "frolic welcome"; the attempts to escape from evil, whether Indian or Greek, have ended in flight from the battle-field; it remains to us to throw aside the youthful over-confidence and the no less youthful discouragement of nonage. We are grown men, and must play the man

strong in will

To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield,

cherishing the good that falls in our way, and bearing the evil, in and around us, with stout hearts set on diminishing it. So far, we all may strive in one faith towards one hope:

It may be that the gulfs will wash us down,

It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles,

. . . . but something ere the end,

Some work of noble note may yet be done.¹

¹ [These lines are from Tennyson's *Ulysses*.]

HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE

THE EDITION of the great work by Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-62) that was published four years after his death was entitled *A History of Civilization in England, France, Spain, and Scotland*. This makes clearer than the original title (*Introduction to the History of Civilization in England*) what Buckle wanted to do. He wanted to study in systematic fashion the rise of civilization in modern times, and he believed that civilization was largely a European affair dating from the few centuries since 1500. His views required that he collect large masses of facts, compare them, and derive from them "laws"—just like a man of science using induction to formulate a generality.

Yet Buckle's two large volumes, as his original title stated, were but an "Introduction" to a stupendous history that would occupy fifteen volumes, a life's work which was to make an end of simple narrative history and make it seem in relation to historical science what alchemy had been to the science of chemistry. This is to say that Buckle's passion for facts went with a real scorn for their meaningless accumulation. His philosophy, derived from Comte's positivism, started with a number of hypotheses which he hoped to turn into verified conclusions:

First: that climate, soil, food and the aspects of nature are the underlying causes of progress—the first three by determining the quantity and distribution of wealth, the last by determining the quantity and distribution of thought.

Second: that statistics prove the regularity of human actions, and thus that the laws of these actions can be finally formulated.

Third: that in modern civilization the influence of natural laws is growing less and the influence of mental laws increasing. The supremacy of European civilization is due precisely to the fact that in Europe man is stronger than nature.

Fourth: that progress is due not to moral agencies but to intellectual activity, and this in turn is proportional to the spread and freedom of the mental effort exerted. Individual talent is insignificant, great men are creatures of their time, and in fact the "mental laws" that rule modern civilization are to be found only by the method of averages, which disregards exceptions. This brings us back to the need for gathering many facts.

Buckle therefore proceeds to his demonstration by marshaling the particulars that relate to a single age and country chosen for its clearly marked characteristics. Thus the age of Louis XIV in France serves him to show that interference with the free activity of mind—what he calls the "protective spirit"—inevitably leads to material loss and social decay. This according to Buckle happened to France for over a century, until the death of Louis XIV and the rise of the Enlightenment. In contrast with this, English civilization flourished during the comparable period for the opposite reason: the free play of mind. Civilization, Buckle concludes, is directly proportional to skepticism and inversely proportional to the protective spirit. More than that, religion, literature, and government in any age are not the causes of civilization; they are products of the underlying intellect at work.

It is easy to see that being a Positivist does not mean for Buckle replacing the effect of mind by that of material circumstance. Only, the kind of mind that in-

terests him is the mind that applies itself to developing the means of human betterment. All of modern history seemed to him, as to many of his contemporaries, to reveal a steady course of material improvement. This progress was connected with science, which is mind working on matter, and it was thus logical for the historian to study the past with the same method as the scientist and to present his results as equally objective and tested—as science.

The degree to which these convictions were already a part of nineteenth-century culture is shown by the fact that on the appearance of his first volume in 1857, Buckle immediately became famous. For a season he was the lion of British society. His book was quickly translated abroad and used by secularist and radical groups in their propaganda against religion and "obscurantism." He himself had been impelled to his chosen work by the spirit of the age. Bred to wealth and leisure as the son of a rich London merchant, he had cast about for an aim in life and had at first decided on a history of the Middle Ages. But by 1851 he knew what he wanted to do, and the next six years went into reading, reflecting, and endless rewriting.

His success as a historian also brought to light the fact that he was one of the leading chess players of his time. He was in demand everywhere—to lecture and write reviews. He spoke in public but once, on the "Influence of Women on the Progress of Knowledge." In 1859 he reviewed J. S. Mill's essay *On Liberty* and surprised many readers by ending his article with a passionate argument for believing in immortality. The fact was that he had just lost his mother to whom he was deeply attached. To recover his health and spirits he traveled to the Near East, but he caught fever at Damascus, and died there, his great work unfinished.

Scholars then and more recently have not accepted Buckle's conclusions, but they could not fail to recognize his power of marshaling facts in the composition of what we now call cultural history. Buckle did for his time what has to be done every quarter century—give a new impulse to historiography by lifting it out of the ruts of bald narrative and specialism. Buckle prepared the European mind for Marx, for the historians of "forces" and "trends," for the anthropologists and other students of the environment, and for the twentieth-century layman who explains everything by his "culture." All this he managed to do in ten years of intense thought, and—it may be noted—without the aid of jargon for communicating his insights.



INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN ENGLAND

STATEMENT OF THE RESOURCES FOR INVESTIGATING HISTORY, AND PROOFS
OF THE REGULARITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. THESE ACTIONS ARE GOVERNED
BY MENTAL AND PHYSICAL LAWS: THEREFORE BOTH SETS OF LAWS MUST
BE STUDIED, AND THERE CAN BE NO HISTORY WITHOUT THE NATURAL
SCIENCES

. . . THE UNFORTUNATE PECULIARITY of the history of man is, that although its separate parts have been examined with considerable ability, hardly any one has attempted to combine them into a whole, and ascertain the way in which they are connected with each other. In all the other great fields of inquiry the necessity of generalization is universally admitted, and noble efforts are being made to rise from particular facts in order to discover the laws by which those facts are governed. So far, however, is this from being the usual course of historians, that among them a strange idea prevails that their business is merely to relate events, which they may occasionally enliven by such moral and political reflections as seem likely to be useful. According to this scheme, any author who, from indolence of thought, or from natural incapacity, is unfit to deal with the highest branches of knowledge, has only to pass some years in reading a certain number of books, and then he is qualified to be an historian: he is able to write the history of a great people, and his work becomes an authority on the subject which it professes to treat.

The establishment of this narrow standard has led to results very prejudicial to the progress of our knowledge. Owing to it, historians, taken as a body, have never recognized the necessity of such a wide and preliminary study as would enable them to grasp their subject in the whole of its natural relations. Hence the singular spectacle of one historian being ignorant of political economy; another knowing nothing of law; another nothing of ecclesiastical affairs and changes of opinion; another neglecting the philosophy of statistics, and another physical science; although these topics are the most essential of all, inasmuch as they comprise the principal circumstances by which the temper and character of mankind have been affected, and in which they are displayed. These important pursuits being, however, cultivated, some by one man, and some by another, have been isolated rather than united: the aid which might be derived from analogy and from mutual illustration has been lost; and no disposition has been shown to concentrate them upon history, of which they are, properly speaking, the necessary components.

Our acquaintance with history being so imperfect, while our materials are so numerous, it seems desirable that something should be done on a scale far larger than has hitherto been attempted, and that a strenuous effort should be made to bring up this great department of inquiry to a level with other departments, in order that we may maintain the balance and harmony of our knowledge. It is in this spirit that the present work has been conceived. To make the execution of it fully equal to the conception is impossible: still I hope to accomplish for the history of man something equivalent, or at all events analogous, to what has been effected by other inquirers for the different branches of natural science. In regard to nature, events apparently the most

irregular and capricious have been explained, and have been shown to be in accordance with certain fixed and universal laws. This has been done because men of ability, and, above all, men of patient, untiring thought, have studied natural events with the view of discovering their regularity: and if human events were subjected to a similar treatment, we have every right to expect similar results. For it is clear that they who affirm that the facts of history are incapable of being generalized, take for granted the very question at issue. Indeed they do more than this. They not only assume what they cannot prove, but they assume what in the present state of knowledge is highly improbable. Whoever is at all acquainted with what has been done during the last two centuries must be aware that every generation demonstrates some events to be regular and predictable, which the preceding generation had declared to be irregular and unpredictable; so that the marked tendency of advancing civilization is to strengthen our belief in the universality of order, of method and of law. This being the case, it follows that if any facts, or class of facts, have not yet been reduced to order, we, so far from pronouncing them to be irreducible, should rather be guided by our experience of the past, and should admit the probability that what we now call inexplicable will at some future time be explained. This expectation of discovering regularity in the midst of confusion is so familiar to scientific men, that among the most eminent of them it becomes an article of faith: and if the same expectation is not generally found among historians, it must be ascribed partly to their being of inferior ability to the investigators of nature, and partly to the greater complexity of those social phenomena with which their studies are concerned.

Both these causes have retarded the creation of the science of history. The most celebrated historians are manifestly inferior to the most successful cultivators of physical science: no one having devoted himself to history who in point of intellect is at all to be compared with Kepler, Newton, or many others that might be named. And as to the greater complexity of the phenomena, the philosophic historian is opposed by difficulties far more formidable than those which meet the student of nature; since, while on the one hand, his observations are more liable to those causes of error which arise from prejudice and passion, he, on the other hand, is unable to employ the great physical resource of experiment, by which we can often simplify even the most intricate problems in the external world.

It is not, therefore, surprising that the study of the movements of Man should be still in its infancy, as compared with the advanced state of the study of the movements of Nature. Indeed the difference between the progress of the two pursuits is so great, that while in physics the regularity of events, and the power of predicting them, are often taken for granted, even in cases still

unproved, a similar regularity is in history not only not taken for granted, but is actually denied. Hence it is that whoever wishes to raise history to a level with other branches of knowledge is met by a preliminary obstacle; since he is told that in the affairs of men there is something mysterious and providential, which makes them impervious to our investigations, and which will always hide from us their future course. To this it might be sufficient to reply, that such an assertion is gratuitous; that it is by its nature incapable of proof; and that it is moreover opposed by the notorious fact that everywhere else increasing knowledge is accompanied by an increasing confidence in the uniformity with which, under the same circumstances, the same events must succeed each other. It will, however, be more satisfactory to probe the difficulty deeper, and inquire at once into the foundation of the common opinion that history must always remain in its present empirical state, and can never be raised to the rank of a science. We shall thus be led to one vast question, which indeed lies at the root of the whole subject, and is simply this: Are the actions of men, and therefore of societies, governed by fixed laws, or are they the result either of chance or of supernatural interference? The discussion of these alternatives will suggest some speculations of considerable interest.

For, in reference to this matter, there are two doctrines, which appear to represent different stages of civilization. According to the first doctrine, every event is single and isolated, and is merely considered as the result of a blind chance. This opinion, which is most natural to a perfectly ignorant people, would soon be weakened by that extension of experience which supplies a knowledge of those uniformities of succession and of co-existence that nature constantly presents. If, for example, wandering tribes, without the least tincture of civilization, lived entirely by hunting and fishing, they might well suppose that the appearance of their necessary food was the result of some accident which admitted of no explanation. The irregularity of the supply, and the apparent caprice with which it was sometimes abundant and sometimes scanty, would prevent them from suspecting anything like method in the arrangements of nature; nor could their minds even conceive the existence of those general principles which govern the order of events, and by a knowledge of which we are often able to predict their future course. But when such tribes advance into the agricultural state, they for the first time use a food of which not only the appearance, but the very existence, seems to be the result of their own act. What they sow, that likewise do they reap. The provision necessary for their wants is brought more immediately under their own control, and is more palpably the consequence of their own labour. They perceive a distinct plan, and a regular uniformity of sequence, in the relation which the seed they put into the ground bears to the corn when arrived at maturity. They are

now able to look to the future, not indeed with certainty, but with a confidence infinitely greater than they could have felt in their former and more precarious pursuits. Hence there arises a dim idea of the stability of events, and for the first time there begins to dawn upon the mind a faint conception of what at a later period are called the Laws of Nature. Every step in the great progress will make their view of this more clear. As their observations accumulate, and as their experience extends over a wider surface, they meet with uniformities that they had never suspected to exist, and the discovery of which weakens that doctrine of chance with which they had originally set out. Yet a little further, and a taste for abstract reasoning springs up; and then some among them generalize the observations that have been made, and, despising the old popular opinion, believe that every event is linked to its antecedent by an inevitable connexion, that such antecedent is connected with a preceding fact; and that thus the whole world forms a necessary chain, in which indeed each man may play his part, but can by no means determine what that part shall be.

Thus it is that, in the ordinary march of society, an increasing perception of the regularity of nature destroys the doctrine of Chance, and replaces it by that of Necessary Connexion. And it is, I think, highly probable that out of these two doctrines of Chance and Necessity there have respectively arisen the subsequent dogmas of Free Will and Predestination. Nor is it difficult to understand the manner in which, in a more advanced state of society, this metamorphosis would occur. In every country, as soon as the accumulation of wealth has reached a certain point, the produce of each man's labour becomes more than sufficient for his own support: it is therefore no longer necessary that all should work; and there is formed a separate class, the members of which pass their lives for the most part in the pursuit of pleasure; a very few, however, in the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge. Among these last there are always found some who, neglecting external events, turn their attention to the study of their own minds; and such men, when possessed of great abilities, become the founders of new philosophies and new religions, which often exercise immense influence over the people who receive them. But the authors of these systems are themselves affected by the character of the age in which they live. It is impossible for any man to escape the pressure of surrounding opinions; and what is called a new philosophy or a new religion is generally not so much a creation of fresh ideas as a new direction given to ideas already current among contemporary thinkers. Thus, in the case now before us, the doctrine of Chance in the external world corresponds to that of Free Will in the internal; while the other doctrine of Necessary Connexion is equally analogous to that of Predestination; the only difference

being that the first is a development by the metaphysician, the second by the theologian. In the first instance, the metaphysician, setting out with the doctrine of Chance, carries into the study of the mind this arbitrary and irresponsible principle, which in its new field becomes Free Will; an expression by which all difficulties seem to be removed, since perfect freedom, itself the cause of all actions, is caused by none, but, like the doctrine of Chance, is an ultimate fact admitting of no further explanation. In the second instance, the theologian, taking up the doctrine of Necessary Connexion, recasts it into a religious shape; and his mind being already full of conceptions of order and of uniformity, he naturally ascribes such undeviating regularity to the prescience of Supreme Power; and thus to the magnificent notion of One God there is added the dogma that by Him all things have from the beginning been absolutely predetermined and pre-ordained.

These opposite doctrines of free will and predestination do, no doubt, supply a safe and simple solution of the obscurities of our being; and as they are easily understood, they are so suited to the average capacity of the human mind, that even at the present day an immense majority of men are divided between them; and they have not only corrupted the sources of our knowledge, but have given rise to religious sects, whose mutual animosities have disturbed society, and too often embittered the relations of private life. Among the more advanced European thinkers there is, however, a growing opinion that both doctrines are wrong, or, at all events, that we have no sufficient evidence of their truth. And as this is a matter of great moment, it is important, before we proceed further, to clear up as much of it as the difficulties inherent in these subjects will enable us to do.

Whatever doubts may be thrown on the account which I have given of the probable origin of the ideas of free will and predestination, there can, at all events, be no dispute as to the foundation on which those ideas are now actually based. The theory of predestination is founded on a theological hypothesis; that of free will on a metaphysical hypothesis. The advocates of the first proceed on a supposition for which, to say the least of it, they have as yet brought forward no good evidence. They require us to believe that the Author of Creation, whose beneficence they at the same time willingly allow, has, notwithstanding His supreme goodness, made an arbitrary distinction between the elect and the non-elect; that He has from all eternity doomed to perdition millions of creatures yet unborn, and whom His act alone can call into existence: and that He has done this, not in virtue of any principle of justice, but by a mere stretch of despotic power. This doctrine owes its authority among Protestants to the dark though powerful mind of Calvin: but in the early Church it was first systematically methodized by Augustin, who appears to

have borrowed it from the Manichæans. At all events, and putting aside its incompatibility with other notions which are supposed to be fundamental, it must, in a scientific investigation, be regarded as a barren hypothesis, because, being beyond one province of our knowledge, we have no means of ascertaining either its truth or its falsehood.

The other doctrine, which has long been celebrated under the name of Free Will, is connected with Arminianism; but it in reality rests on the metaphysical dogma of the supremacy of human consciousness. Every man, it is alleged, feels and knows that he is a free agent: nor can any subtleties of argument do away with our consciousness of possessing a free will. Now the existence of this supreme jurisdiction, which is thus to set at defiance all the ordinary methods of reasoning, involves two assumptions: of which the first, though possibly true, has never been proved; and the other is unquestionably false. These assumptions are, that there is an independent faculty called consciousness, and that the dictates of that faculty are infallible. But, in the first place, it is by no means certain that consciousness is a faculty; and some of the ablest thinkers have been of opinion that it is merely a state or condition of the mind. Should this turn out to be the case, the argument falls to the ground; since, even if we admit that all the faculties of the mind, when completely exercised, are equally accurate, no one will make the same claim for every condition into which the mind itself may be casually thrown. However, waiving this objection, we may, in the second place, reply, that even if consciousness is a faculty, we have the testimony of all history to prove its extreme fallibility. All the great stages through which, in the progress of civilization, the human race has successively passed, have been characterized by certain mental peculiarities or convictions, which have left their impress upon the religion, the philosophy, and the morals of the age. Each of these convictions has been to one period a matter of faith, to another a matter for derision; and each of them has, in its own epoch, been as intimately bound up with the minds of men, and become as much a part of their consciousness, as is that opinion which we now term freedom of the will. Yet it is impossible that all these products of consciousness can be true, because many of them contradict each other. Unless, therefore, in different ages there are different standards of truth, it is clear that the testimony of a man's consciousness is no proof of an opinion being true; for if it were so, then two propositions diametrically opposed to each other might both be equally accurate. Besides this, another view may be drawn from the common operations of ordinary life. Are we not in certain circumstances conscious of the existence of spectres and phantoms; and yet is it not generally admitted that such things have no existence at all? Should it be attempted to refute this argument by saying that such consciousness is

apparent and not real, then I ask, What is it that judges between the consciousness which is genuine and that which is spurious? If this boasted faculty deceives us in some things, what security have we that it will not deceive us in others? If there is no security, the faculty is not trustworthy. If there is a security, then whatever it may be, its existence shows the necessity for some authority to which consciousness is subordinate, and thus does away with that doctrine of the supremacy of consciousness, on which the advocates of free will are compelled to construct the whole of their theory. Indeed, the uncertainty as to the existence of consciousness as an independent faculty, and the manner in which that faculty, if it exists, has contradicted its own suggestions, are two of the many reasons which have long since convinced me that metaphysics will never be raised to a science by the ordinary method of observing individual minds; but that its study can only be successfully prosecuted by the deductive application of laws which must be discovered historically, that is to say, which must be evolved by an examination of the whole of those vast phenomena which the long course of human affairs presents to our view.

Fortunately, however, for the object of this work, the believer in the possibility of a science of history is not called upon to hold either the doctrine of predestined events, or that of freedom of the will¹; and the only positions which, in this stage of the inquiry, I shall expect him to concede are the following: That when we perform an action, we perform it in consequence of some motive or motives; that those motives are the results of some antecedents; and that, therefore, if we are acquainted with the whole of the antecedents, and with all the laws of their movements, we could with unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results. This, unless I am greatly mistaken, is the view which must be held by every man whose mind is unbiassed by system, and who forms his opinions according to the evidence actually before him.² If, for example, I am intimately acquainted with the character of any person, I can frequently tell how he will act under some given circumstances. Should

¹ Meaning by free will, a cause of action residing in the mind, and exerting itself independently of motives. If any one says that we have this power of acting without motives, but that in the practical exercise of the power we are always guided by motives either conscious or unconscious,—if any one says this, he asserts a barren proposition, which does not interfere with my views, and which may or may not be true, but which most assuredly no one has ever yet succeeded in proving.

² That is, according to the phenomenal evidence presented to the understanding, and estimated by the ordinary logic with which the understanding is conversant. But Kant has made a most remarkable attempt to avoid the practical consequences of this, by asserting that freedom, being an idea produced by the reason, must be referred to transcendental laws of the reason; that is, to laws which are removed from the domain of experience, and cannot be verified by observation. In regard, however, to the scientific conceptions of the understanding (as distinguished from the Reason) he fully admits the existence of a Necessity destructive of Liberty. . . .

I fail in this prediction, I must ascribe my error not to the arbitrary and capricious freedom of his will, nor to any supernatural pre-arrangement, for of neither of these things have we the slightest proof; but I must be content to suppose either that I had been misinformed as to some of the circumstances in which he was placed, or else that I had not sufficiently studied the ordinary operations of his mind. If, however, I were capable of correct reasoning, and if, at the same time, I had a complete knowledge both of his disposition and of all the events by which he was surrounded, I should be able to foresee the line of conduct which, in consequence of those events, he would adopt.³

Rejecting, then, the metaphysical dogma of free will and the theological dogma of predestined events,⁴ we are driven to the conclusion that the actions of men, being determined solely by their antecedents, must have a character of uniformity, that is to say, must, under precisely the same circumstances, always issue in precisely the same results. And as all antecedents are either in the mind or out of it, we clearly see that all the variations in the results, in other words, all the changes of which history is full, all the vicissitudes of the human race, their progress or their decay, their happiness or their misery, must be the fruit of a double action; an action of external phenomena upon the mind, and another action of the mind upon the phenomena.

These are the materials out of which a philosophic history can alone be constructed. On the one hand, we have the human mind obeying the laws of its own existence, and, when uncontrolled by external agents, developing itself according to the conditions of its organization. On the other hand, we have what is called Nature, obeying likewise its laws; but incessantly coming into contact with the minds of men, exciting their passions, stimulating their intellect, and therefore giving to their actions a direction which they would not have taken without such disturbance.⁵ Thus we have man modifying nature, and nature modifying man; while out of this reciprocal modification all events must necessarily spring. . . .

³ This is, of course, an hypothetical case, merely given as an illustration. We never can know the whole of any man's antecedents, or even the whole of our own; but it is certain that the nearer we approach to a complete knowledge of the antecedent, the more likely we shall be to predict the consequent.

⁴ The doctrine of providential interference is bound up with that of predestination, because the Deity, foreseeing all things, must have foreseen His own intention to interfere. To deny this foresight, is to limit the omniscience of God. Those, therefore, who hold that, in particular cases, a special providence interrupts the ordinary course of events, must also hold that in each case the interruption had been predestined; otherwise they impeach one of the Divine attributes. For, as Thomas Aquinas puts it (*Neander's History of the Church*, vol. viii. p. 176), "knowledge, as knowledge, does not imply, indeed, causality; but in so far as it is a knowledge belonging to the artist who forms, it stands in the relation of causality to that which is produced by his art." . . .

⁵ [As "disturbance" here means the whole of the correlations, the last clause creates a confusion. "Without such disturbance" men would not exist.—ED.]

MENTAL LAWS ARE EITHER MORAL OR INTELLECTUAL. COMPARISON OF MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL LAWS, AND INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECT PRODUCED BY EACH ON THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY

Whatever . . . the moral and intellectual progress of men may be, it resolves itself not into a progress of natural capacity, but into a progress, if I may so say, of opportunity; that is, an improvement in the circumstances under which that capacity after birth comes into play. Here, then, lies the gist of the whole matter. The progress is one, not of internal power, but of external advantage. The child born in a civilized land is not likely, as such, to be superior to one born among barbarians; and the difference which ensues between the acts of the two children will be caused, so far as we know, solely by the pressure of external circumstances; by which I mean the surrounding opinions, knowledge, associations, in a word, the entire mental atmosphere in which the two children are respectively nurtured.

On this account it is evident that if we look at mankind in the aggregate, their moral and intellectual conduct is regulated by the moral and intellectual notions prevalent in their own time. There are, of course, many persons who will rise above those notions, and many others who will sink below them. But such cases are exceptional, and form a very small proportion of the total amount of those who are nowise remarkable either for good or for evil. An immense majority of men must always remain in a middle state, neither very foolish nor very able, neither very virtuous nor very vicious, but slumbering on in a peaceful and decent mediocrity, adopting without much difficulty the current opinions of the day, making no inquiry, exciting no scandal, causing no wonder, just holding themselves on a level with their generation, and noiselessly conforming to the standard of morals and of knowledge common to the age and country in which they live.

Now, it requires but a superficial acquaintance with history to be aware that this standard is constantly changing, and that it is never precisely the same even in the most similar countries, or in two successive generations in the same country. The opinions which are popular in any nation, vary in many respects almost from year to year; and what in one period is attacked as a paradox or a heresy, is in another period welcomed as a sober truth; which, however, in its turn is replaced by some subsequent novelty. This extreme mutability in the ordinary standard of human actions, shows that the conditions on which the standard depends must themselves be very mutable; and those conditions, whatever they may be, are evidently the originators of the moral and intellectual conduct of the great average of mankind.

Here, then, we have a basis on which we can safely proceed. We know that the main cause of human actions is extremely variable; we have only, therefore, to apply this test to any set of circumstances which are supposed to be the cause, and if we find that such circumstances are not very variable, we must infer that they are not the cause we are attempting to discover.

Applying this test to moral motives, or to the dictates of what is called moral instinct, we shall at once see how extremely small is the influence those motives have exercised over the progress of civilization. For there is, unquestionably, nothing to be found in the world which has undergone so little change as those great dogmas of which moral systems are composed. To do good to others; to sacrifice for their benefit your own wishes; to love your neighbour as yourself; to forgive your enemies; to restrain your passions; to honour your parents; to respect those who are set over you; these, and a few others, are the sole essentials of morals; but they have been known for thousands of years, and not one jot or tittle has been added to them by all the sermons, homilies, and text-books which moralists and theologians have been able to produce.

But if we contrast this stationary aspect of moral truths with the progressive aspect of intellectual truths, the difference is indeed startling. All the great moral systems which have exercised much influence, have been fundamentally the same; all the great intellectual systems have been fundamentally different. In reference to our moral conduct, there is not a single principle now known to the most cultivated Europeans, which was not likewise known to the ancients. In reference to the conduct of our intellect, the moderns have not only made the most important additions to every department of knowledge that the ancients ever attempted to study, but besides this, they have upset and revolutionized the old methods of inquiry; they have consolidated into one great scheme all those resources of induction which Aristotle alone dimly perceived; and they have created sciences, the faintest idea of which never entered the mind of the boldest thinker antiquity produced.

These are, to every educated man, recognized and notorious facts; and the inference to be drawn from them is immediately obvious. Since civilization is the product of moral and intellectual agencies, and since that product is constantly changing, it evidently cannot be regulated by the stationary agent; because, when surrounding circumstances are unchanged, a stationary agent can only produce a stationary effect. The only other agent is the intellectual one; and that this is the real mover may be proved in two distinct ways: first, because being, as we have already seen, either moral or intellectual, and being, as we have also seen, not moral, it must be intellectual; and secondly, because

the intellectual principle has an activity and a capacity for adaptation, which, as I undertake to show, is quite sufficient to account for the extraordinary progress that, during several centuries, Europe has continued to make.

Such are the main arguments by which my view is supported; but there are also other and collateral circumstances which are well worthy of consideration. The first is, that the intellectual principle is not only far more progressive than the moral principle, but is also far more permanent in its results. The acquisitions made by the intellect are, in every civilized country, carefully preserved, registered in certain well-understood formulas, and protected by the use of technical and scientific language; they are easily handed down from one generation to another, and thus assuming an accessible, or, as it were, a tangible form, they often influence the most distant posterity, they become the heirlooms of mankind, the immortal bequest of the genius to which they owe their birth. But the good deeds effected by our moral faculties are less capable of transmission; they are of a more private and retiring character; while, as the motives to which they owe their origin are generally the result of self-discipline and of self-sacrifice, they have to be worked out by every man for himself; and thus, begun by each anew, they derive little benefit from the maxims of preceding experience, nor can they well be stored up for the use of future moralists. The consequence is, that although moral excellence is more amiable, and to most persons more attractive, than intellectual excellence, still it must be confessed that, looking at ulterior results, it is far less active, less permanent, and, as I shall presently prove, less productive of real good. Indeed, if we examine the effects of the most active philanthropy, and of the largest and most disinterested kindness, we shall find that those effects are, comparatively speaking, short-lived; that there is only a small number of individuals they come in contact with and benefit; that they rarely survive the generation which witnessed their commencement; and that, when they take the more durable form of founding great public charities, such institutions invariably fall, first into abuse, then into decay, and after a time are either destroyed, or perverted from their original intention, mocking the effort by which it is vainly attempted to perpetuate the memory even of the purest and most energetic benevolence. . . .

. . . The French and English people have, by the mere force of increased contact, learned to think more favourably of each other, and to discard that foolish contempt in which both nations formerly indulged. In this, as in all cases, the better one civilized country is acquainted with another, the more it will find to respect and to imitate. For of all the causes of national hatred, ignorance is the most powerful. When you increase the contact, you remove

the ignorance, and thus you diminish the hatred. This is the true bond of charity; and it is worth all the lessons which moralists and divines are able to teach. They have pursued their vocation for centuries, without producing the least effect in lessening the frequency of war. But it may be said without the slightest exaggeration, that every new railroad which is laid down, and every fresh steamer which crosses the Channel, are additional guarantees for the preservation of that long and unbroken peace which, during forty years, has knit together the fortunes and the interests of the two most civilized nations of the earth.

I have thus, so far as my knowledge will permit, endeavoured to indicate the causes which have diminished religious persecution and war; the two greatest evils with which men have yet contrived to afflict their fellow-creatures. The question of the decline of religious persecution I have only briefly noticed, because it will be more fully handled in a subsequent part of this volume. Enough however, has been advanced to prove how essentially it is an intellectual process, and how little good can be effected on this subject by the operation of moral feelings. The causes of the decline of the warlike spirit I have examined at considerable, and perhaps, to some readers, at tedious length; and the result of that examination has been, that the decline is owing to the increase of the intellectual classes, to whom the military classes are necessarily antagonistic. In pushing the inquiry a little deeper, we have, by still further analysis, ascertained the existence of three vast though subsidiary causes, by which the general movement has been accelerated. These are—the invention of Gunpowder, the discoveries of Political Economy, and the discovery of improved means of Locomotion. Such are the three great modes or channels by which the progress of knowledge has weakened the old warlike spirit; and the way in which they have effected this has, I trust, been clearly pointed out. The facts and arguments which I have brought forward have, I can conscientiously say, been subjected to careful and repeated scrutiny. . . . From them we are bound to infer that the two oldest, greatest, most inveterate, and most widely-spread evils which have ever been known, are constantly, though on the whole slowly, diminishing; and that their diminution has been effected, not at all by moral feelings, nor by moral teachings, but solely by the activity of the human intellect, and by the inventions and discoveries which, in a long course of successive ages, man has been able to make.

Since, then, in the two most important phenomena which the progress of society presents, the moral laws have been steadily and invariably subordinate to the intellectual laws, there arises a strong presumption that in inferior matters the same process has been followed. To prove this in its full extent, and thus raise the presumption to an absolute certainty, would be to write, not an

Introduction to history, but the History itself. The reader must therefore be satisfied for the present with what, I am conscious, is merely an approach towards demonstration; and the complete demonstration must necessarily be reserved for the future volumes of this work: in which I pledge myself to show that the progress Europe has made from barbarism to civilization is entirely due to its intellectual activity; that the leading countries have now, for some centuries, advanced sufficiently far to shake off the influence of those physical agencies by which in an earlier state their career might have been troubled; and that although the moral agencies are still powerful, and still cause occasional disturbances, these are but aberrations, which, if we compare long periods of time, balance each other and thus in the total amount entirely disappear. So that, in a great and comprehensive view, the changes in every civilized people are, in their aggregate, dependent solely on three things: first, on the amount of knowledge possessed by their ablest men; secondly, on the direction which that knowledge takes, that is to say, the sort of subjects to which it refers; thirdly, and above all, on the extent to which the knowledge is diffused, and the freedom with which it pervades all classes of society.

These are the three great movers of every civilized country; and although their operation is frequently disturbed by the vices or the virtues of powerful individuals, such moral feelings correct each other, and the average of long periods remains unaffected. Owing to causes of which we are ignorant, the moral qualities do, no doubt, constantly vary; so that in one man, or perhaps even in one generation, there will be an excess of good intentions, in another an excess of bad ones. But we have no reason to think that any permanent change has been effected in the proportion which those who naturally possess good intentions bear to those in whom bad ones seem to be inherent. In what may be called the innate and original morals of mankind, there is, so far as we are aware, no progress. Of the different passions with which we are born, some are more prevalent at one time, some at another; but experience teaches us that, as they are always antagonistic, they are held in balance by the force of their own opposition. The activity of one motive is corrected by the activity of another. For to every vice there is a corresponding virtue. Cruelty is counteracted by benevolence; sympathy is excited by suffering; the injustice of some provokes the charity of others; new evils are met by new remedies, and even the most enormous offences that have ever been known have left behind them no permanent impression. The desolation of countries and the slaughter of men are losses which never fail to be repaired, and at the distance of a few centuries every vestige of them is effaced. The gigantic crimes of Alexander or Napoleon become after a time void of effect, and the affairs of the world return to their former level. This is the ebb and flow of history, the perpetual

flux to which by the laws of our nature we are subject. Above all this, there is a far higher movement; and as the tide rolls on, now advancing, now receding, there is, amid its endless fluctuations, one thing, and one alone, which endures for ever. The actions of bad men produce only temporary evil, the actions of good men only temporary good; and eventually the good and the evil altogether subside, are neutralized by subsequent generations, absorbed by the incessant movement of future ages. But the discoveries of great men never leave us; they are immortal, they contain those eternal truths which survive the shock of empires, outlive the struggles of rival creeds, and witness the decay of successive religions. All these have their different measures and their different standards; one set of opinions for one age, another set for another. They pass away like a dream; they are as the fabric of a vision, which leaves not a rack behind. The discoveries of genius alone remain: it is to them we owe all that we now have; they are for all ages and all times; never young, and never old, they bear the seeds of their own life; they flow on in a perennial and undying stream; they are essentially cumulative, and, giving birth to the additions which they subsequently receive, they thus influence the most distant posterity, and after the lapse of centuries produce more effect than they were able to do even at the moment of their promulgation.

INQUIRY INTO THE INFLUENCE EXERCISED BY RELIGION, LITERATURE, AND GOVERNMENT

. . . The importance of the history of a country depends, not upon the splendour of its exploits, but upon the degree to which its actions are due to causes springing out of itself. If, therefore, we could find some civilized people who had worked out their civilization entirely by themselves; who had escaped all foreign influence, and who had been neither benefited nor retarded by the personal peculiarities of their rulers,—the history of such a people would be of paramount importance; because it would present a condition of normal and inherent development; it would show the laws of progress acting in a state of isolation; it would be, in fact, an experiment ready-made, and would possess all the value of that artificial contrivance to which natural science is so much indebted.

To find such a people as this is obviously impossible; but the duty of the philosophic historian is to select for his special study the country in which the conditions have been most closely followed. Now, it will be readily admitted, not only by ourselves, but by intelligent foreigners, that in England, during, at all events, the last three centuries, this has been done more constantly and more successfully than in any other country. I say nothing of the number of our discoveries, the brilliancy of our literature, or the success of our arms.

These are invidious topics; and other nations may perhaps deny to us those superior merits which we are apt to exaggerate. But I take up this single position, that of all European countries England is the one where, during the longest period, the government has been most quiescent, and the people most active; where popular freedom has been settled on the widest basis; where each man is most able to say what he thinks, and do what he likes; where every one can follow his own bent, and propagate his own opinions; where, religious persecution being little known, the play and flow of the human mind may be clearly seen, unchecked by those restraints to which it is elsewhere subjected; where the profession of heresy is least dangerous, and the practice of dissent most common; where hostile creeds flourish side by side, and rise and decay without disturbance, according to the wants of the people, unaffected by the wishes of the church, and uncontrolled by the authority of the state; where all interests, and all classes, both spiritual and temporal, are most left to take care of themselves; where that meddlesome doctrine called Protection was first attacked, and where alone it has been destroyed; and where, in a word, those dangerous extremes to which interference gives rise having been avoided, despotism and rebellion are equally rare, and concession being recognized as the groundwork of policy, the national progress has been least disturbed by the power of privileged classes, by the influence of particular sects, or by the violence of arbitrary rulers. . . .

. . . [Although] it is often said that, after the restoration of Charles II., our national character began to be greatly influenced by French example, this, as I shall fully prove, was confined to that small and insignificant part of society which hung about the court; nor did it produce any marked effect upon the two most important classes,—the intellectual class and the industrious class. The movement may, indeed, be traced in the most worthless parts of our literature,—in the shameless productions of Buckingham, Dorset, Etherege, Killigrew, Mulgrave, Rochester, and Sedley. But neither then, nor at a much later period, were any of our great thinkers influenced by the intellect of France; on the contrary, we find in their ideas, and even in their style, a certain rough and native vigour, which, though offensive to our more polished neighbours, has at least the merit of being the indigenous product of our own country. The origin and extent of that connexion between the French and English intellects which subsequently arose, is a subject of immense importance; but, like most others of real value, it has been entirely neglected by historians. In the present work, I shall attempt to supply this deficiency: in the meantime I may say, that although we have been, and still are, greatly indebted to the French for our improvement in taste, in refinement, in manners, and indeed in all the amenities of life, we have borrowed from them

nothing absolutely essential, nothing by which the destinies of nations are permanently altered. On the other hand, the French have not only borrowed from us some very valuable political institutions, but even the most important event in French history is due, in no small degree, to our influence. Their Revolution of 1789 was, as is well known, brought about, or, to speak more properly, was mainly instigated, by a few great men, whose works, and afterwards whose speeches, roused the people to resistance; but what is less known, and nevertheless is certainly true, is, that these eminent leaders learnt in England that philosophy and those principles by which, when transplanted into their own country, such fearful and yet such salutary results were effected.

It will not, I hope, be supposed that by these remarks I mean to cast any reflection on the French: a great and admirable people; a people in many respects superior to ourselves; a people from whom we have still much to learn, and whose deficiencies, such as they are, arise from the perpetual interference of a long line of arbitrary rulers. But, looking at this matter historically, it is unquestionably true that we have worked out our civilizations with little aid from them, while they have worked out theirs with great aid from us. At the same time, it must also be admitted that our governments have interfered less with us than their governments have interfered with them. And without in the least prejudging the question as to which is the greater country, it is solely on these grounds that I consider our history more important than theirs: and I select for especial study the progress of English civilization simply because, being less affected by agencies not arising from itself, we can the more clearly discern in it the normal march of society, and the undisturbed operation of those great laws by which the fortunes of mankind are ultimately regulated.

After this comparison between the relative value of French and English history, it seems scarcely necessary to examine the claims which may be put forward for the history of other countries. Indeed, there are only two in whose favour anything can be said: I mean Germany, considered as a whole, and the United States of North America. As to the Germans, it is undoubtedly true that since the middle of the eighteenth century they have produced a greater number of profound thinkers than any other country, I might perhaps say, than all other countries put together. But the objections which apply to the French are still more applicable to the Germans. For the protective principle has been, and still is, stronger in Germany than in France. Even the best of the German governments are constantly interfering with the people; never leaving them to themselves, always looking after their interests, and meddling in the commonest affairs of daily life. Besides this, the German literature, though now the first in Europe, owes its origin, as we shall here-

after see, to that great sceptical movement, by which, in France, the Revolution was preceded. Before the middle of the eighteenth century, the Germans, notwithstanding a few eminent names, such as Kepler and Leibnitz, had no literature of real value; and the first impetus which they received, was caused by their contact with the French intellect, and by the influence of those eminent Frenchmen who, in the reign of Frederick the Great, flocked to Berlin, a city which has ever since been the head-quarters of philosophy and science. From this there have resulted some very important circumstances, which I can here only briefly indicate. The German intellect, stimulated by the French into a sudden growth, has been irregularly developed; and thus hurried into an activity greater than the average civilization of the country requires. The consequence is, that there is no nation in Europe in which we find so wide an interval between the highest minds and the lowest minds. The German philosophers possess a learning, and a reach of thought, which places them at the head of the civilized world. The German people are more superstitious, more prejudiced, and, notwithstanding the care which the government takes of their education, more really ignorant, and more unfit to guide themselves, than are the inhabitants either of France or of England. This separation and divergence of the two classes is the natural result of that artificial stimulus, which a century ago was administered to one of the classes, and which thus disturbed the normal proportions of society. Owing to this, the highest intellects have, in Germany, so outstripped the general progress of the nation, that there is no sympathy between the two parties; nor are there at present any means by which they may be brought into contact. Their great authors address themselves, not to their country, but to each other. They are sure of a select and learned audience, and they use what, in reality, is a learned language: they turn their mother-tongue into a dialect, eloquent indeed, and very powerful, but so difficult, so subtle, and so full of complicated inversions, that to their own lower classes it is utterly incomprehensible. From this, there have arisen some of the most marked peculiarities of German literature. For, being deprived of ordinary readers, it is cut off from the influence of ordinary prejudice; and hence, it has displayed a boldness of inquiry, a recklessness in the pursuit of truth, and a disregard of traditional opinions, which entitle it to the highest praise. But, on the other hand, this same circumstance has produced that absence of practical knowledge, and that indifference to material and physical interests, for which the German literature is justly censured. As a matter of course, all this has widened the original breach, and increased the distance which separates the great German thinkers from that dull and plodding class, which, though it lies immediately beneath them, still remains

uninfluenced by their knowledge, and uncheered by the glow and fire of their genius.

In America, on the other hand, we see a civilization precisely the reverse of this. We see a country of which it has been truly said, that in no other are there so few men of great learning, and so few men of great ignorance. In Germany, the speculative classes and the practical classes are altogether dis-united; in America, they are altogether fused. In Germany, nearly every year brings forward new discoveries, new philosophies, new means by which the boundaries of knowledge are to be enlarged. In America, such inquiries are almost entirely neglected: since the time of Jonathan Edwards no great metaphysician has appeared; little attention has been paid to physical science; and, with the single exception of jurisprudence, scarcely anything has been done for those vast subjects on which the Germans are incessantly labouring. The stock of American knowledge is small, but it is spread through all classes; the stock of German knowledge is immense, but it is confined to one class. Which of these two forms of civilization is the more advantageous, is a question we are not now called upon to decide. It is enough for our present purpose that in Germany there is a serious failure in the diffusion of knowledge; and, in America, a no less serious one in its accumulation. And as civilization is regulated by the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge, it is evident that no country can even approach to a complete and perfect pattern, if, cultivating one of these conditions to an excess, it neglects the cultivation of the other. Indeed, from this want of balance and equilibrium between the two elements of civilization, there have arisen in America and in Germany those great but opposite evils, which, it is to be feared, will not be easily remedied; and which, until remedied, will certainly retard the progress of both countries, notwithstanding the temporary advantages which such one-sided energy does for the moment always procure.

I have very briefly, but I hope fairly, and certainly with no conscious partiality, endeavoured to estimate the relative value of the history of the four leading countries of the world. As to the real greatness of the countries themselves, I offer no opinion; because each considers itself to be the first. But, unless the facts I have stated can be controverted, it certainly follows that the history of England is, to the philosopher, more valuable than any other; because he can more clearly see in it the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge going hand-in-hand; because that knowledge has been less influenced by foreign and external agencies; and because it has been less interfered with, either for good or for evil, by those powerful, but frequently incompetent men, to whom the administration of public affairs is intrusted.

It is on account of these considerations, and not at all from those motives which are dignified with the name of patriotism, that I have determined to write the history of my own country, in preference to that of any other; and to write it in a manner as complete, and as exhaustive, as the materials which are now extant will enable me to do. But inasmuch as the circumstances already stated render it impossible to discover the laws of society solely by studying the history of a single nation, I have drawn up the present Introduction, in order to obviate some of the difficulties with which this great subject is surrounded. In the earlier chapters, I have attempted to mark out the limits of the subject considered as a whole, and fix the largest possible basis upon which it can rest. With this view, I have looked at civilization as broken into two vast divisions: the European division, in which Man is more powerful than Nature; and the non-European division, in which Nature is more powerful than Man. This has led us to the conclusion that national progress, in connexion with popular liberty, could have originated in no part of the world except in Europe; where, therefore, the rise of real civilization, and the encroachments of the human mind upon the forces of nature, are alone to be studied. The superiority of the mental laws over the physical being thus recognized as the groundwork of European history, the next step has been, to resolve the mental laws into moral and intellectual, and prove the superior influence of the intellectual ones in accelerating the progress of Man. . . .

THOMAS HILL GREEN

AMONG the philosophers inspired by German thought, Thomas Hill Green (1836–82) was by far the most influential and representative Englishman to combine philosophical idealism with social and political liberalism. In his relatively short life he made a marked impression upon philosophical thinking in Britain, and he also participated actively in the reform of popular education and in the shaping of Liberal politics. Both by his teaching and his personal example in the Oxford Town Council, Green inspired efforts to bring the English universities more into touch with the people, including the industrial workers. A literary portrait of him, as Mr. Gray, exists in Mrs. Humphrey Ward's widely read novel *Robert Elsmere*. From his twentieth year until his death he was a member of Balliol College, first as undergraduate, then as college tutor, and finally as Professor of Moral Philosophy. His two principal works, based on his lectures, first appeared after his death, the *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1883) and the *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (delivered in 1879–80 and published a few years after his death).

Green himself had published an extensive critical introduction to Hume's works. In this he sought to make the critique of Humean empiricism his own philosophical point of departure. He elaborated the thesis of post-Kantian idealism that self-consciousness enters as an active, creative factor in constituting both knowledge and rational ideals. Human experience finds within itself an inherent desire for perfect self-realization. Moreover, Green sought to show that the nature of particular things is constituted by their relationships, and he carried this to the conclusion that the totality of meaningful relations, which transcends human consciousness, is realized in the divine or absolute mind.

Pursuing his emphasis on relations, Green said that the self-realization of a person involves that of others. From this fact arises the moral obligation to work for a common good, including the interest of others along with one's own. The state, so far as it represents this kind of general moral will, should act to further conditions of a good life for all its members. With this doctrine Green abandoned *laissez-faire* liberalism, and entered the path leading to a welfare state with its provisions for general education, health, factory regulation, and various forms of social insurance. But by the same moral ideal he criticized exploitative and coercive measures of states, including international aggressions.

The "Introduction" to the *Prolegomena*, reprinted here, presents the intellectual situation for moral philosophy in England as defined by the prevailing currents of Utilitarianism (J. S. Mill), Positivism (G. H. Lewes), and Evolutionism (Herbert Spencer). Green finds no obligation, on a basis of hedonism, to take an interest in other people's pleasure. Those who would develop ethics as a "physical science" will thereby undermine moral prescriptions and the idea of a free will, he argues. The pages of this "Introduction" continue fresh and alive, in raising the question whether moral philosophy, if it is not a natural science, can have a rational validity other than that of poetry or special religious revelation. In America T. H. Green

influenced the further development, not only of idealistic philosophy, but also of social behaviorism and experimental naturalism by such men as G. H. Mead and John Dewey. These subsequent philosophic movements aim to achieve a less abstract intellectual treatment than Green provided of social goods and of the constructive relations between individual persons and society.



PROLEGOMENA TO ETHICS

A WRITER who seeks to gain general confidence scarcely goes the right way to work when he begins with asking whether there really is such a subject as that of which he proposes to treat; whether it is one to which enquiry can be directed with any prospect of a valuable result. Yet to a writer on Moral Philosophy such a mode of procedure is prescribed, not only by the logical impulse to begin at the beginning, but by observation of the prevalent opinions around him. He can scarcely but be aware that Moral Philosophy is a name of somewhat equivocal repute; that it commands less respect among us than was probably the case a century ago; and that any one who professes to teach or write upon a subject to which this name is in any proper or distinctive sense applicable, is looked upon with some suspicion.

There is, indeed, no lack of utterance in regard to the great problems of life or the rights and wrongs of human conduct. Nor does it by any means confine itself to what are commonly counted secular or "positive" considerations. Guesses as to some

sweet strange mystery,
Of what beyond these things may lie,
And yet remain unseen,

are announced with little reserve and meet with ready acceptance. These, we may say, are for the multitude of the educated, who have wearied of the formulas of a stereotyped theology, but still demand free indulgence for the appetite which that theology supplied with a regulation-diet. But the highest poetry of our time—that in which the most serious and select spirits find their food—depends chiefly for its interest on what has been well called "the application of ideas to life"; and the ideas so applied are by no means sensibly verifiable. They belong as little to the domain of natural science, strictly so called, as to that of dogmatic theology. A moral philosopher may be excused for finding much excellent philosophy, in his special sense of the word, in such poems as the "In Memoriam" of Lord Tennyson and Mr. Browning's "Rabbi Ben Ezra," to say nothing of the more explicitly ethical poetry of Wordsworth.

Presented in the rapt unreasoned form of poetic utterance, not professing to do more than represent a mood of the individual poet, it is welcomed by reflecting men as expressing deep convictions of their own. Such men seem little disturbed by the admission to a joint lodgement in their minds of inferences from popularised science, which do not admit of being reconciled with these deeper convictions in any logical system of beliefs.

But if any one, alarmed at this dangerous juxtaposition, and unwilling that what seem to him the deepest and truest views of life should be retained merely on scientific sufferance, seeks to find for them some independent justification, in the shape of a philosophy which does not profess to be a branch either of dogmatic theology or of natural science, he must look for little thanks for his trouble. The most intelligent critics had rather, it would seem, that the ideas which poetry applies to life, together with those which form the basis of practical religion, should be left to take their chance alongside of seemingly incompatible scientific beliefs, than that anything calling itself philosophy should seek to systematise them and to ascertain the regions to which they on the one side, and the truths of science on the other, are respectively applicable. "Poetry we feel, science we understand";—such will be the reflection, spoken or unspoken, of most cultivated men;—"theology professes to found itself on divine revelation, and has at all events a sphere of its own in the interpretation of sacred writings which entitles it at least to respectful recognition; but this philosophy, which is neither poetry nor science nor theology, what is it but a confusion of all of these in which each of them is spoilt? Poetry has a truth of its own, and so has religion—a truth which we feel, though from the scientific point of view we may admit it to be an illusion. Philosophy is from the scientific point of view equally an illusion, and has no truth that we can feel. Better trust poetry and religion to the hold which, however illusive, they will always have on the human heart, than seek to explain and vindicate them, as against science, by help of a philosophy which is itself not only an illusion but a dull and pretentious one, with no interest for the imagination and no power over the heart."

With such opinion in the air all around him, it must be with much misgiving that one who has no prophetic utterance to offer in regard to conduct, but who still believes in the necessity of a philosophy of morals which no adaptation of natural science can supply, undertakes to make good his position. He will gain nothing, however, by trying to sail under false colours, or by disguising his recognition of an antithesis between the natural and the moral, which can alone justify his claim to have something to say that lies beyond the limits of the man of science. It is better that he should make it clear at the outset why and in what sense he holds that there is a subject-matter of

enquiry which does not consist of matters of fact, ascertainable by experiment and observation, and what place he assigns to morals in this subject-matter. In other words, at the risk of repelling readers by presenting them first with the most difficult and least plausible part of his doctrine, he should begin with explaining why he holds a "metaphysic of morals" to be possible and necessary; the proper foundation, though not the whole, of every system of Ethics.

This has not been the method commonly pursued by English writers on the subject, and, in the face of present tendencies, is likely to seem something of an anachronism. To any one who by idiosyncrasy, or by the accident of his position, is led to occupy himself with Moral Philosophy, the temptation to treat his subject as a part of natural science is certainly a strong one. In so doing he can plead the authority of eminent names and is sure of intelligent acceptance; nor can he fail by patient enquiry to arrive at a theory of some phenomena of human life, which, though it may leave certain primary problems untouched, shall be not only plausible but true so far as it goes. He can reckon securely on having more to show for his life's work, when it comes to an end, than if he spent himself on questions which he may recognise as of real interest, but to which he will also be aware that experiment and observation, strictly so called, cannot afford an answer. It thus would not be wonderful that, with most enquirers and teachers, the interest once taken in Moral Philosophy should be mainly transferred to the physical science conveniently called Anthropology, even if the insufficiency of the latter to deal with the most important questions of Moral Philosophy were admitted.

This admission, however, has of late been fast coming to be thought unnecessary. That a physical science of Ethics is not intrinsically impossible, however difficult it may be rendered by the complexity, and inaccessibility to direct experiment, of its subject-matter; that there are no intelligible questions—no questions worth asking—as to human life which would be beyond the reach of such a science; this would seem to be the general opinion of modern English "culture," so far as it is independent of theological prepossessions. And it is natural that it should be so. The questions raised for us by the Moral Philosophy which in England we have inherited, are just such as to invite a physical treatment. If it is the chief business of the moralist to distinguish the nature and origin of the pleasures and pains which are supposed to be the sole objects of human desire and aversion, to trace the effect upon conduct of the impulses so constituted, and to ascertain the several degrees in which different courses of action, determined by anticipation of pleasure and pain are actually productive of the desired result; then the sooner the methods of scientific experiment and observation are substituted for vague guessing and

an arbitrary interpretation by each man of his own consciousness, the better it will be. Ethics, so understood, becomes to all intents and purposes, a science of health and the true moralist will be the physiologist who, making the human physique his specialty, takes a sufficiently wide view of his subject; who traces the influence of historical and political factors, or of what it is now the fashion to call the "social medium," in giving a specific character to those susceptibilities of pleasure and pain on which, according to the theory supposed, the phenomena of human action depend.

There were two elements, indeed, in the system of popular ethics inherited from the last century, which were long thought incompatible with its complete reduction to the form of a physical science. These were the doctrines of free-will and of a moral sense. Each, however, was understood in a way which suggested to the naturalist a ready explanation of its supposed claim to lie beyond his sphere. The moral sense, according to the accepted view, was a specific susceptibility to pleasure or pain in the contemplation of certain acts. What was the quality in the acts which excited this pleasure or pain in the contemplation of them? If it were something in the conception of which any originaive function of the reason was implied, then the existence of the moral sense would have meant that there was a determining agent in the inner life of man, of which no natural history could be given. But those writers who had made most of the moral sense had been very indefinite in their account of the quality in action to which it was relative. The most consistent theory on the subject was Hume's. According to him the pleasure of moral sense is pleasure felt in the "mere survey" of an act, independently of any consequences of the act to the person contemplating it; and that which occasions this pleasure is the tendency of the act to bring pleasure to the agent himself or to others. Moral sense, in short, is a social sentiment either of satisfaction in the view of such conduct as has been generally found to increase the pleasure or diminish the pain of others, or of uneasiness in the reverse, quite apart from any expectation of personal advantage or loss. It is thus properly not by the action of the person feeling it, but by that of others, that it is excited. An act of a man's own, necessarily proceeding, according to Hume, from some desire for pleasure which it satisfies or fails to satisfy, must have personal consequences for him, incompatible with that disinterested survey which alone yields the pleasure or pain of moral sense, properly so called. Sympathy, however, with the effect which he knows that his act produces on the moral sense of others, may modify the feeling which it causes to the doer of it. An act, in gratification of some passion, which he would otherwise look forward to as pleasant, may become so painful in anticipation from sympathy with the general uneasiness which he knows would arise upon the

contemplation of it that, without any fear of punishment, he abstains from doing it.

Thus moral sense and sympathy jointly, as understood by Hume, serve plausibly to explain the office ordinarily ascribed to conscience, as the judge and possible controller in each man of his own acts. At the same time the lines are indicated along which a physical theory of "conscience" might be logically attempted. The problem which Hume bequeathed to a successor who adopted his principles was mainly to account for the twofold fact, that the mere survey of actions as tending to produce pleasures in which the contemplator will have no share, is yet a source of pleasure to him; and that, among the pleasures taken into account in that estimate of the tendency of an action which determines the moral sentiment, are such as have no direct connexion with the satisfaction of animal wants. A theory which will account for this will also account for the affection of the agent by sympathy with the sentiment which the contemplation of his action excites in others. Can we find any scientific warrant for believing in a process by which, out of susceptibility to pleasures incidental to the merely animal life, there have grown those capacities for enjoyment which we consider essential to general well-being, and those social interests which not only make the contemplation of general well-being an independent source of pleasure, but also make the pleasure of exciting this pleasure—the pleasure of satisfying the moral sentiment of others—an object of desire so strong as in many cases to determine action? If we can, it would seem that we have given to our national system of ethics—the ethics of moral sentiment—the solid foundation of a natural science.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the evolutionists of our day, should claim to have given a wholly new character to ethical inquiries. In Hume's time a philosopher who denied the innateness of the moral sentiments, and held that they must have a natural history, had only the limits of the individual life within which to trace this history. These limits did not give room enough for even a plausible derivation of moral interests from animal wants. It is otherwise when the history may be supposed to range over an indefinite number of generations. The doctrine of hereditary transmission, it is held, explains to us how susceptibilities of pleasure and pain, of desire and aversion, of hope and fear, may be handed down with gradually accumulated modifications which in time attain the full measure of the difference between the moral man and the greater ape. Through long ages of interaction between the human organism and the social medium in which it lives, there has been developed that "sensibility of principle which feels a stain like a wound"; that faculty of moral intuition which not only pronounces unerringly on the social tend-

encies of the commoner forms of human action, but enables us in some measure to see ourselves as others see us; that civil spirit through which the promptings of personal passion are controlled even in the individual by the larger vision and calmer interest of society.

Thus it would seem that for the barren speculation of the old metaphysical ethics we should seek a substitute in a scientific "Kulturgeschichte"; in a natural history of man conducted on the same method as an enquiry into any other form of life which cannot be reduced to the operation of strictly mechanical laws. For the later stages of this history we have, of course, abundant materials in the actual monuments of human culture—linguistic, literary, and legal—and these, the physiologist may say, have yet to be considered in connexion with the data which his own science furnishes. It is true that, however far they carry us back, however great the variations of moral sentiment to which they testify, they do not bring us to a state of things in which the essential conditions of that sentiment were absent. The most primitive man they exhibit to us is already conscious of his own good as conditioned by that of others, already capable of recognising an obligation. But the theory of descent and evolution opens up a vista of possibilities beyond the facts, so far ascertained, of human history, and suggests an enquiry into the antecedents of the moralised man based on other data than the records which he has left of himself. Such enquiry, it is thought, will in time give us the means of reducing the moral susceptibilities of man to the rank of ordinary physical facts, parts of one system, and intelligible by the same methods, with all the natural phenomena which we are learning to know. Man will then have his ascertained place in nature, as perhaps the noblest of the animals, but an animal still.

When the moral sentiment has been explained on the principles of natural science, free-will is not likely to be regarded as presenting any serious obstacle to the same mode of treatment. By those of our national philosophers who have asserted its existence, it has generally been understood as a faculty of determining action apart from determination by motives; as a power, distinct alike from reason and from desire, which chooses between motives without being itself dependent on any motive. So crude a notion must long ago have given way before the questions of science, if there had not been a practical conviction behind it which it failed fairly to interpret. What after all, it is asked, is any faculty but an hypostatised abstraction? A faculty is no more than a possibility. Whatever happens implies no doubt a possibility of its happening. Voluntary action implies a possibility of voluntary action, just as the motion of a billiard-ball implies a possibility of that motion; but the possibility in each is determined by definite conditions. In the case of the billiard-ball these conditions,

or some of them, are so obvious that we do not think of treating the possibility of the ball's moving as a faculty inherent in the ball, and of ascribing the ball's motion to this faculty as its cause; although, as we know, when the causes of a motion are less apparent, the uninstructed are quite ready to ascribe it to a faculty or power in the moving body. In ascribing any voluntary action to a faculty in man, we are doing, it is said, just the same as in ascribing any particular motion to a faculty in the moving body. The fact is the particular voluntary action, which must be possible, no doubt, or it would not be done, but of which the real possibility consists in the assemblage of conditions which make up its cause. To include any faculty of action among these is merely to express our ignorance of what they are or our unwillingness to examine them. Among them, it is true, is the wish which happens to be predominant in the agent at the moment of action; but this, too, has its definite conditions in the circumstances of the case and the motives operating on the agent. It may be owing to the character of the agent that one of these motives gets the upper hand; but his character again is only a name for an assemblage of conditions, of which it may be scarcely possible for us completely to trace the antecedents, but which we are not on that account justified in assigning to a cause that is no cause, but merely a verbal substantiation of the abstraction of our ignorance. Human freedom must be understood in some different sense from that with which our anthropologists are familiar, if it is to stand in the way of the scientific impulse to naturalise the moral man.

We will suppose then that a theory has been formed which professes to explain, on the method of a natural history conducted according to the principle of evolution, the process by which the human animal has come, according to the terminology in vogue, to exhibit the phenomena of a moral life—to have a conscience, to feel remorse, to pursue ideals, to be capable of education through appeals to the sense of honour and of shame, to be conscious of antagonism between the common and private good, and even sometimes to prefer the former. It has generally been expected of a moralist, however, that he should explain not only how men do act, but how they should act: and as a matter of fact we find that those who regard the process of man's natural development most strictly as a merely natural one are as forward as any to propound rules of living, to which they conceive that, according to their view of the influences which make him what he is, man *ought* to conform. The natural science of man is to them the basis of a practical art. They seek to discover what are the laws—the modes of operation of natural forces—under which we have come to be what we are, in order that they may counsel us how to seek our happiness by living according to those laws.

Now it is obvious that to a being who is simply a result of natural forces an

injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning. It implies that there is something in him independent of those forces, which may determine the relation in which he shall stand to them. A philosopher, then, who would reconstruct our ethical systems in conformity with the doctrines of evolution and descent, if he would be consistent, must deal less scrupulously with them than perhaps any one has yet been found to do. If he has the courage of his principles, having reduced the speculative part of them to a natural science, he must abolish the practical or preceptive part altogether. Instead, for instance, of telling men of a greatest sum of pleasures which they ought to seek, and which by acting in the light of a true insight into natural laws they may attain, he will content himself with ascertaining, so far as he can, whether such and such a temperament under such and such circumstances yields more frequent, durable, and intense pleasures than such another temperament under such other circumstances. He will not mock the misery of him who fails, nor flatter the self-complacency of him who prospers, by speaking of a happiness that is to be obtained by conformity to the laws of nature, when he knows that, according to his own principles, it is a struggle for existence determined by those laws which has brought the one to his wretchedness and the other to his contentment. He will rather set himself to show how the phraseology of "ought" and "ought not," the belief in a good attainable by all, the consciousness of something that should be though it is not, may according to his philosophy be accounted for. Nor, if he has persuaded himself that the human consciousness, as it is, can be physically accounted for, will he find any further difficulty in thus explaining that language of moral injunction which forms so large an element in its expression. He will probably trace this language to the joint action of two factors—to the habit of submission to the commands of a physical or political superior, surviving the commands themselves and the memory of them, combined with that constant though ineffectual wish for a condition of life other than his own, which is natural to a being who looks before and after over perpetual alternations of pleasure and pain.

The elimination of ethics, then, as a system of precepts, involves no intrinsic difficulties other than those involved in the admission of a natural science that can account for the moralisation of man. The discovery, however, that our assertions of moral obligation are merely the expression of an ineffectual wish to be better off than we are, or are due to the survival of habits originally enforced by physical fear, but of which the origin is forgotten, is of a kind to give us pause. It logically carries with it the conclusion, however the conclusion may be disguised, that, in inciting ourselves or others to do anything because it ought to be done, we are at best making use of a serviceable illusion.

And when this consequence is found to follow logically from the conception of man as in his moral attributes a subject of natural science, it may lead to a reconsideration of a doctrine which would otherwise have been taken for granted as the most important outcome of modern enlightenment. As the first charm of accounting for what has previously seemed the mystery of our moral nature passes away, and the spirit of criticism returns, we cannot but enquire whether a being that was merely a result of natural forces could form a theory of those forces as explaining himself. We have to return once more to that analysis of the conditions of knowledge, which forms the basis of all Critical Philosophy whether called by the name of Kant or no, and to ask whether the experience of connected matters of fact, which in its methodical expression we call science, does not presuppose a principle which is not itself any one or number of such matters of fact, or their result.

Can the knowledge of nature be itself a part or product of nature, in that sense of nature in which it is said to be an object of knowledge? This is our first question. If it is answered in the negative, we shall at least have satisfied ourselves that man, in respect of the function called knowledge, is not merely a child of nature. We shall have ascertained the presence in him of a principle not natural, and a specific function of this principle in rendering knowledge possible. . . .

X

CAPITALISM AFTER 1850

BIG BUSINESS

THE CLASSICAL ECONOMISTS trusted to competition to prevent the plundering of the consumer and to secure some relationship between prices and costs. For competition to be effective in keeping prices down there must be many enterprises each seeking to sell its goods in a free market. Such conditions were realized in most phases of agriculture, at least, down to the 1930s.

But in other types of business the story was different. Even in Adam Smith's day, as he remarked, it was normal for people in the same kind of trade to get together in a more or less covert conspiracy to raise prices. None the less, until the latter part of the nineteenth century trusts and combines were not yet a serious problem, though there were always some elements of monopoly in public utilities, like railways, and in patented or copyrighted articles. About 1880 a new trend became apparent. The size of business enterprises was growing. The larger ones were tending to swallow up the smaller ones. As the number in a given line of activity was reduced to a few hundred, or a few score, it became possible for the various firms to get together to fix prices, or even for most of them to coalesce into one giant combine. In some cases, the objectives were the economies of large-scale production, the avoidance of duplication of sales forces or advertising, and the allocation of markets to avoid cross-hauls in transportation. But frequently the main purpose was to increase profits by restricting the supply and raising prices.

In each country the movement in business to eliminate competition took a somewhat different form. In America gigantic trusts, like the Standard Oil Company, or the American Tobacco Company, perfected horizontal combinations, and once they had achieved a monopoly or a near monopoly exploited the consumer by charging high prices. At a later date, the trusts were replaced by informal or gentlemen's agreements, like Judge Gary's famous dinners which influenced steel prices. Still later, holding companies and trade associations were used to obviate "the evils of cut-throat competition."

In Germany the cartel or Kartell was the usual device for getting rid of competition. A cartel is an association of semi-independent concerns for a specified purpose or purposes—selling, buying, dividing the market, "stabilizing prices," and so on. Sometimes the cartel amounted to little more than an annual meeting to discuss and decide common problems. More often the members carried on important joint activities. They might, for example, sell through a single sales organization. Before World War I the cartel had penetrated into almost every line of business in Germany. There were mighty cartels in coal and potash, chemicals and electrical goods, and minor ones, like that of the hotelkeepers of the Black Forest. The cartel grew important in the international sphere as well. In aluminum, electrical goods, chemicals, oils, and other lines, the combines

formed on a national basis got together more or less formally to divide the world's markets and agree on price policies. This trend was evident from about 1900 on and continued in the two decades after World War I.

In England, the union of competing firms usually took one of two forms—the amalgamation in which one company absorbed others, and the combine in which two or more companies got together to form a new concern. Such deals were much facilitated by the intricacies of the corporate form of organization. They could often be effected merely by the purchase or exchange of stock. Great combines and amalgamations in England after 1880 came to dominate such diverse fields as salt, sewing thread, chemicals, tires, and tobacco.

In the following selection Lord Furness is urging the stockholders of an engine-building company to accept a scheme for an amalgamation. His speech was delivered on December 29, 1908, before the Eighth Ordinary General Meeting of the Shareholders of Richardsons, Westgarth and Company, Ltd.



LORD FURNESS'S SPEECH ON AMALGAMATION

THE USUAL ROUTINE with regard to our annual meeting has this year been interfered with on account of a proposal which has been made to your directors for the amalgamation of our business with those of several other engine building firms on this coast. I may at once say that I was in no way responsible for the proposal, and am neither directly nor indirectly interested in the scheme except as your chairman and as a shareholder in your company, but the commercial possibilities of such an amalgamation are in the opinion of your directors so important, that we feel it our duty, even at the sacrifice of very considerable time, to investigate the position thoroughly and to take part in what are proving to be very prolonged negotiations.

You will, I know, agree with me that the past year has been one of the most disastrous in the annals of the North-East Coast, involving as it did the practical stoppage of the engineering industry for no less than seven months by the engineers' strike, this in our own case being preceded by partial stoppage and complete disorganisation owing to sectional strikes in the shipyards. We have lost, in fact, an entire year, and the immense efforts we have made in laboriously building up additional branches to our business by the creation of new departments for the manufacture of steam turbines, pumping machinery, steel works' equipment and electric installations, have been ruthlessly

upset by one of the most ill-advised and calamitous strikes on record. The general public have grown so accustomed to the continuous succession of strikes that nothing short of the stoppage of the nation's railway system or coal supply creates more than ordinary interest, but the alarming fact remains that British industries are being jeopardised and British capital destroyed to an extent unparalleled in British industrial history. Take our own case as an example. We have three works, in Hartlepool, Middlesbrough, and Sunderland, with staffs of highly trained technical experts for the conduct and development of our various manufactures, each department having an organisation of designers and draughtsmen complete in itself. To supervise the actual manufacture there is a further organisation of works managers, departmental foremen and assistants, and in addition the usual commercial and clerical staffs, numbering in all some 250 men, whose services cannot, of course, be dispensed with the moment the general body of employes decide to go out on strike. At the commencement of the strike it also happened that we had an unusual number of important contracts in process of erection in various parts of the kingdom, and at a stroke everything was brought to a complete stoppage, this being followed by the virtual paralysis of our entire business for seven weary months, each successive month bringing possibilities of settlement by various proposals, including the intervention of the Board of Trade, whose good offices were so flouted by the men as to result in the resignation of Mr. Barnes, the General Secretary of the Amalgamated Engineers' Society. For ourselves, we were compelled to see our profits turned into losses, grass actually growing in our yards, our customers disappointed and disgusted, and our prospective business brought to a dead standstill by reason of our inability to accept orders. In the town, as you know, men were brought to beggary, women and children to the verge of starvation, and tradesmen's savings reduced almost to vanishing point. This, then, is the sorry picture of a strike for which there was no justification whatever and which was blindly persisted in notwithstanding many friendly efforts, including those of a Cabinet Minister and the men's leaders.

We are still among the wreckage, but let us hope that this epidemic of strikes is over, for otherwise it will be quite impossible to maintain the prosperity which has hitherto been associated with the engineering industry on this coast. Indeed, even with a mutual desire to recover lost ground, it is problematical whether we can do so unless we adopt methods by which the cost of production can be reduced by the elimination of wastage. The position we have to face is one of intense competition, and what that competition means is well illustrated by the fact that our once highly-remunerative forge department, together with many others in the district, is now practically

closed, as we can obtain forgings at considerably lower prices than we can either produce them ourselves or buy them in this country. This competition will surely spread to other departments unless we adopt wise measures, and the points we must always keep prominently in view are—that there must be no strikes, that greater individual interest must be taken in the day's work, that contract dates must be kept and the confidence of buyers restored, and that the cost of production must be reduced.

If commercial success is to be achieved by any scheme of amalgamation, however, it is obvious that it can only result from increasing the excellence of our manufactures and decreasing the cost of their production. Any attempt at artificially creating a range of selling prices higher than the market standard prevailing at any given time is foredoomed to failure, as we should deservedly lose our trade by sacrificing the goodwill of our friends and customers. The one objective must, therefore, be to beneficially influence the shipbuilding industry by supplying machinery at prices which will compare favourably with those of other competing centres, and at the same time secure, if possible, a fair manufacturing profit. It is unquestionable that marine engine building presents an ideal proposition for the application of such a scheme, and if it becomes an accomplished fact and is carried out with an enthusiastic determination to make it a great success, then, in my opinion, it cannot fail to have a favourable and permanent influence on the shipbuilding industry on this coast.

Experience has shown that the highest success in any manufacture can only be obtained by specialised production in large quantities under expert management. The production of marine machinery, and the mass of detail in particular connection therewith, involves so many trades each requiring a separate department, that specialised production in bulk under highly concentrated management becomes practically impossible for the average engine builder; but under an adequate scheme of amalgamation the entire proposition is simplified and is feasibly desirable. For example, the firms considering this scheme have, during the past seven years, supplied complete engine equipment to 1206 steam-ships, having an aggregate horse-power of 2,150,000. The detail alone in connection with the yearly output of 172 sets of machinery is enormous, and were it standardised and manufactured under modern conditions, profits would be obtained which, under the present conditions, are quite impossible.

In view of the highly progressive nature, not only of the manufacture of marine and other machinery but also of its design, every single builder is now constantly face to face with heavy expenditures for plant in order to keep pace with the times. Take another example: since this Company was formed,

seven years ago, we have spent £133,000 in new machinery and buildings, besides another £140,000 or thereabouts in maintaining our three works in a high state of efficiency, this expenditure being entirely apart from the cost of our turbine works, which are practically independent and constitute what is to us an entirely new business, and which have involved an outlay of fully £50,000. We are, of course, not alone in this expenditure, as all firms recognise that it is necessary for their very existence, and, heavy as it is now, it will undoubtedly become more so in the future by reason of the ever-increasing severity of competition throughout the industrial world. By amalgamating several of these big businesses, however, and localising, as far as practically possible, the manufacture of standard details, this enormous aggregate expenditure could either be very greatly reduced or, if spent as freely as at present, would inevitably result in far greater profit-earning capacity. This is to my mind the most important requirement of the present-day engineering manufacture. Experience has proved beyond question that in order to exist at all every engine manufacturer must, no matter how well his works may be equipped at present, continue to spend money very freely, and the essence of the contemplated scheme of amalgamation is to spend that money in such a manner as will enable a united body of manufacturers to meet competition with far greater success than is possible as independent units, each repeating the others' work in a fashion which, in years to come, will be regarded as tantamount to commercial suicide. The suggested amalgamation is therefore a commercial proposition of the first order, its anticipated effect being to conserve and ultimately to considerably enhance the value of the capital embarked in the industry, an effect which will apply equally to all the capital invested in engineering works on this coast. This is possible because an amalgamation offers facilities for the high development of an organisation on commercial, technical, and practical lines quite beyond those afforded by independent competitive units. Of course, any scheme of amalgamation decreases internal competition and automatic benefit would accrue under that head, but it would be a mere bye-product in comparison with the central aim and object, viz.: decreased cost of production. It would, of course, require time and immense energy on the part of everyone concerned to organise the new departure, but there would be compensation in the fact that the energy would be centred in the useful channel of progressive construction rather than in competitive destruction, and, therefore, it would beget that enthusiasm which is invariably associated with success.

It is a pertinent fact that all the firms on the coast buy many details in this country cheaper than they themselves can produce them, and yet the manufacturers of these details make very substantial profits. They do so, of course,

by specialised production and concentrated management. Again, we all make details which cost us just as much as we could buy them for, and we content ourselves with the thought that they contribute their quota to our working expenses. To obtain the profits we now lose, however, is only possible if the scheme of amalgamation is sufficiently large, so that unless all the firms at present interested in the matter are in agreement it cannot be carried through.

Under the present system engines and boilers are built by each of the firms to the requirements of the several classifications, and whilst the average result of each firm's productions closely approximates that obtained by the others, yet each builder has some points of excellence, either in design, method of manufacture, arrangement of parts, quality of material or of workmanship, which in combination would yield greater excellence, and being reflected in the higher general efficiency of the entire machinery, would tend to place British construction on a higher plane in the markets of the world. Again, each firm has an expensive staff, producing designs practically identical with those of its competitors, as well as pattern-shops producing equally identical patterns. The useless expenditure under these two heads alone may be estimated from the fact that the designs and patterns for a cargo boat's engines cost about £500 to produce, and for passenger steamers a correspondingly higher figure.

It is impossible for me to enumerate within the limits of a speech all the sources of economy that are open to such an amalgamation, but its possibilities are sufficiently indicated if you consider the matter on its broad lines. The adoption of a single scheme of buying under the control of the commercial directors would alone tend to a considerable diminution in first cost.

With regard to the works, one system of organisation would be established, all antiquated tools would be replaced, and the latest methods of manufacture adopted. Overtime, which is at all times highly expensive, would be abolished as far as manufacturing conditions permitted, and night shift at high rates of pay only resorted to when it was warranted by the conditions of trade and obtainable prices—the productive capacity of the whole of the works acting in union would in all ordinary circumstances dispel the conditions which lead the individual to resort to overtime. Broadly, the leading principle would be to limit the working hours to the standard length of the working week and to divide the work amongst the various shops to that end—an arrangement, one would suppose, that would be as satisfactory to the workmen as it would undoubtedly be to the employers.

An important advantage to the shipbuilders would result from contract deliveries being strictly maintained, as in the event of local pressure relief

could always be given by one or other of the amalgamated works. There would also be no reason why ships should not always be engined in the port in which they are built, as the same standard of workmanship would prevail in each of the amalgamated works. Last year the expenses incurred in this connection alone amounted approximately to £18,000 for insurance, towage, etc., all of which represents unnecessary cost, apart altogether from the loss involved by the delay in completion consequent on the ship's absence in a distant port for approximately a fortnight.

It is intended to retain the identity of the several firms as at present, and each firm would therefore trade under the name upon which its business has been built up, and by which its productions are known and celebrated the world over. Moreover, the local boards of management would continue and the executive staffs would be retained, as only by their united efforts could the new scheme of organisation be developed with dispatch and success.

I would again emphasise the fact that I am simply putting before you the proposition which has been put before your Directors, and before all the firms interested in this matter, and it is only by force of circumstances and not by intention that it falls to my lot to give public expression to the views which prompted any of us to give the scheme our consideration. I am convinced, however, that if we are to advance our industries and protect the capital invested in them we must recognise facts and modernise our methods, and in dealing with this scheme we must also endeavour to sink personal considerations of every kind. We cannot but realise that the industrial world is advancing at a pace unparalleled in its history. To have been told ten years ago, or even five years ago, that Japan would be building, and building with the greatest success, her "Dreadnoughts," her fast torpedo boat destroyers, and her 23-knot passenger liners, would have been regarded as a dream, yet they are accomplished facts. Continental competition is also, as you know, increasing by leaps and bounds, but in spite of all I am convinced that we can hold our own, nay more than hold our own, if we will but shake off the incubus of our stereotyped industrial methods. In Germany, which is in the forefront of industrial progress, there are some hundreds of amalgamations of one kind and another, so there it has been amply demonstrated that the secret of commercial success lies in a policy of combined effort. At this stage I cannot say whether the scheme will mature or not; if it does it will involve an adjustment of our capital to a basis which, it has been decided, shall be the standard basis for every firm, although on that point I am unable, and it is altogether unnecessary that I should say more on the present occasion. Your Board propose to you that this meeting shall stand adjourned until a con-

venient date, and that in the meantime you will patiently await the maturing of the negotiations that are now afoot, relying upon the ability and zeal of your directors to safeguard and protect your interests in every possible way, and as soon as the negotiations are sufficiently advanced we will lose no time in putting the matter fully before you for your final decision.

ANDREW CARNEGIE

BORN IN SCOTLAND, the son of a hand-loom weaver forced to flee to America, when hand work was displaced by the advance of machine industry, Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919) found in the New World the realized dream of equality of opportunity. He began work at the age of thirteen and at eighteen found his opportunity when he took a position with the Pennsylvania Railroad as a telegraph clerk. Carnegie exploited his personal contacts, and in six years he was superintendent of the western division of the Pennsylvania. By dint of scrupulous saving and sagacious investments Carnegie built up his fortune, and by 1863, in the midst of the Civil War, the young capitalist reckoned his income at \$47,860.67. In 1865 he left his job with the railroad (which was anything but the essential source of his income, since he had never earned more than \$2,400 a year through his work as superintendent) and entered the iron business. In 1873 he turned his energies to the organization of steel companies—the industry in connection with which he is best remembered. Carnegie's opening ventures in steel were capitalized at a total sum of \$700,000: it was characteristic of his career that by 1892 he and his associates had acquired \$40,000,000 on this original investment.

In his own way Carnegie personified the spirit of the industrial capitalism in which he flourished. His business methods were always individualistic, his companies were organized around him, and his successes were usually the fruits of his personal connections. Thus, he remained scrupulously away from the banks and the investment market; he kept his partners within the firm, and always kept a controlling interest; he was his own sales manager and his own public-relations man; he was sometimes on favorable terms with labor unions, sometimes at odds with them—but whatever his relations with labor, and whatever his relations with his competitors, they were always on his own terms. It was he more than any other who was responsible for the tremendous expansion of the steel industry in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Even his retirement in 1901 was symbolic of the passing of an era: for he sold out (at his own price) to the newly formed United States Steel Corporation, controlled by Morgan, who was primarily a financier.

Carnegie, the rugged individualist, was not unaware of his debt to the New World, nor did his conception of the gospel of wealth omit the sense of social obligation. In a series of essays he set forth his belief that wealth was a public trust. Always the individualist, however, he refused to accept the government as the seat of that trust, but insisted that the philanthropic individual must be the source of social services. His beliefs did not end in theory. Carnegie gave away a total of \$288,000,000 within the United States and \$62,000,000 in Great Britain. The primary interest of this social program arose out of Carnegie's antagonism to the imperialism associated with finance capital. Perhaps closest to his heart was the movement for world peace; to advance it, he established the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace.

The following selections are from three of Carnegie's essays, "The Gospel of Wealth," "Popular Illusions about Trusts," and "An Employer's View of the Labor Question," which appeared together in book form under the title *The Gospel of Wealth* (New York, The Century Company, 1900).



THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH

The Gospel of Wealth

THE PROBLEM OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF WEALTH

THE PROBLEM of our age is the proper administration of wealth, that the ties of brotherhood may still bind together the rich and poor in harmonious relationship. The conditions of human life have not only been changed, but revolutionized, within the past few hundred years. In former days there was little difference between the dwelling, dress, food, and environment of the chief and those of his retainers. The Indians are to-day where civilized man then was. When visiting the Sioux, I was led to the wigwam of the chief. It was like the others in external appearance, and even within the difference was trifling between it and those of the poorest of his braves. The contrast between the palace of the millionaire and the cottage of the laborer with us to-day measures the change which has come with civilization. This change, however, is not to be deplored, but welcomed as highly beneficial. It is well, nay, essential, for the progress of the race that the houses of some should be homes for all that is highest and best in literature and the arts, and for all the refinements of civilization, rather than that none should be so. Much better this great irregularity than universal squalor. Without wealth there can be no Mæcenæ. The "good old times" were not good old times. Neither master nor servant was as well situated then as to-day. A relapse to old conditions would be disastrous to both—not the least so to him who serves—and would sweep away civilization with it. But whether the change be for good or ill, it is upon us, beyond our power to alter, and, therefore, to be accepted and made the best of. It is a waste of time to criticize the inevitable.

It is easy to see how the change has come. One illustration will serve for almost every phase of the cause. In the manufacture of products we have the whole story. It applies to all combinations of human industry, as stimulated and enlarged by the inventions of this scientific age. Formerly, articles were manufactured at the domestic hearth, or in small shops which formed part

of the household. The master and his apprentices worked side by side, the latter living with the master, and therefore subject to the same conditions. When these apprentices rose to be masters, there was little or no change in their mode of life, and they, in turn, educated succeeding apprentices in the same routine. There was, substantially, social equality, and even political equality, for those engaged in industrial pursuits had then little or no voice in the State.

The inevitable result of such a mode of manufacture was crude articles at high prices. To-day the world obtains commodities of excellent quality at prices which even the preceding generation would have deemed incredible. In the commercial world similar causes have produced similar results, and the race is benefited thereby. The poor enjoy what the rich could not before afford. What were the luxuries have become the necessities of life. The laborer has now more comforts than the farmer had a few generations ago. The farmer has more luxuries than the landlord had, and is more richly clad and better housed. The landlord has books and pictures rarer and appointments more artistic than the king could then obtain.

The price we pay for this salutary change is, no doubt, great. We assemble thousands of operatives in the factory, and in the mine, of whom the employer can know little or nothing, and to whom he is little better than a myth. All intercourse between them is at an end. Rigid castes are formed, and, as usual, mutual ignorance breeds mutual distrust. Each caste is without sympathy with the other, and ready to credit anything disparaging in regard to it. Under the law of competition, the employer of thousands is forced into the strictest economies, among which the rates paid to labor figure prominently, and often there is friction between the employer and employed, between capital and labor, between rich and poor. Human society loses homogeneity.

The price which society pays for the law of competition, like the price it pays for cheap comforts and luxuries, is also great; but the advantages of this law are also greater still than its cost—for it is to this law that we owe our wonderful material development, which brings improved conditions in its train. But, whether the law be benign or not, we must say of it, as we say of the change in the conditions of men to which we have referred: It is here; we cannot evade it; no substitutes for it have been found; and while the law may be sometimes hard for the individual, it is best for the race, because it insures the survival of the fittest in every department. We accept and welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great inequality of environment; the concentration of business, industrial and commercial, in the hands of a few; and the law of competition between these, as being not only beneficial, but essential to the future progress of the race. Hav-

ing accepted these, it follows that there must be great scope for the exercise of special ability in the merchant and in the manufacturer who has to conduct affairs upon a great scale. That this talent for organization and management is rare among men is proved by the fact that it invariably secures enormous rewards for its possessor, no matter where or under what laws or conditions. The experienced in affairs always rate the MAN whose services can be obtained as a partner as not only the first consideration, but such as renders the question of his capital scarcely worth considering: for able men soon create capital; in the hands of those without the special talent required, capital soon takes wings. Such men become interested in firms or corporations using millions; and, estimating only simple interest to be made upon the capital invested, it is inevitable that their income must exceed their expenditure and that they must, therefore, accumulate wealth. Nor is there any middle ground which such men can occupy, because the great manufacturing or commercial concern which does not earn at least interest upon its capital soon becomes bankrupt. It must either go forward or fall behind; to stand still is impossible. It is a condition essential to its successful operation that it should be thus far profitable, and even that, in addition to interest on capital, it should make profit. It is a law, as certain as any of the others named, that men possessed of this peculiar talent for affairs, under the free play of economic forces must, of necessity, soon be in receipt of more revenue than can be judiciously expended upon themselves; and this law is as beneficial for the race as the others.

Objections to the foundations upon which society is based are not in order, because the condition of the race is better with these than it has been with any other which has been tried. Of the effect of any new substitutes proposed we cannot be sure. The Socialist or Anarchist who seeks to overturn present conditions is to be regarded as attacking the foundation upon which civilization itself rests, for civilization took its start from the day when the capable, industrious workman said to his incompetent and lazy fellow, "If thou dost not sow, thou shalt not reap," and thus ended primitive Communism by separating the drones from the bees. One who studies this subject will soon be brought face to face with the conclusion that upon the sacredness of property civilization itself depends—the right of the laborer to his hundred dollars in the savings-bank, and equally the legal right of the millionaire to his millions. Every man must be allowed "to sit under his own vine and fig-tree, with none to make afraid," if human society is to advance, or even to remain so far advanced as it is. To those who propose to substitute Communism for this intense Individualism, the answer therefore is: The race has tried that. All progress from that barbarous day to the present time has resulted from its displacement. Not evil, but good, has come to the race from the accumulation

of wealth by those who have had the ability and energy to produce it. But even if we admit for a moment that it might be better for the race to discard its present foundation, Individualism,—that it is a nobler ideal that man should labor, not for himself alone, but in and for a brotherhood of his fellows, and share with them all in common, realizing Swedenborg's idea of heaven, where, as he says, the angels derive their happiness, not from laboring for self, but for each other,—even admit all this, and a sufficient answer is, This is not evolution, but revolution. It necessitates the changing of human nature itself—a work of eons, even if it were good to change it, which we cannot know.

It is not practicable in our day or in our age. Even if desirable theoretically, it belongs to another and long-succeeding sociological stratum. Our duty is with what is practicable now—with the next step possible in our day and generation. It is criminal to waste our energies in endeavoring to uproot, when all we can profitably accomplish is to bend the universal tree of humanity a little in the direction most favorable to the production of good fruit under existing circumstances. We might as well urge the destruction of the highest existing type of man because he failed to reach our ideal as to favor the destruction of Individualism, Private Property, the Law of Accumulation of Wealth, and the Law of Competition; for these are the highest result of human experience, the soil in which society, so far, has produced the best fruit. Unequally or unjustly, perhaps, as these laws sometimes operate, and imperfect as they appear to the Idealist, they are, nevertheless, like the highest type of man, the best and most valuable of all that humanity has yet accomplished.

We start, then, with a condition of affairs under which the best interests of the race are promoted, but which inevitably gives wealth to the few. Thus far, accepting conditions as they exist, the situation can be surveyed and pronounced good. The question then arises,—and if the foregoing be correct, it is the only question with which we have to deal,—What is the proper mode of administering wealth after the laws upon which civilization is founded have thrown it into the hands of the few? And it is of this great question that I believe I offer the true solution. It will be understood that fortunes are here spoken of, not moderate sums saved by many years of effort, the returns from which are required for the comfortable maintenance and education of families. This is not wealth, but only competence, which it should be the aim of all to acquire, and which it is for the best interests of society should be acquired.

There are but three modes in which surplus wealth can be disposed of. It can be left to the families of the decedents; or it can be bequeathed for public purposes; or, finally, it can be administered by its possessors during their lives.

Under the first and second modes most of the wealth of the world that has reached the few has hitherto been applied. Let us in turn consider each of these modes. The first is the most injudicious. In monarchical countries, the estates and the greatest portion of the wealth are left to the first son, that the vanity of the parent may be gratified by the thought that his name and title are to descend unimpaired to succeeding generations. The condition of this class in Europe to-day teaches the failure of such hopes or ambitions. The successors have become impoverished through their follies, or from the fall in the value of land. Even in Great Britain the strict law of entail has been found inadequate to maintain an hereditary class. Its soil is rapidly passing into the hands of the stranger. Under republican institutions the division of property among the children is much fairer; but the question which forces itself upon thoughtful men in all lands is, Why should men leave great fortunes to their children? If this is done from affection, is it not misguided affection? Observation teaches that, generally speaking, it is not well for the children that they should be so burdened. Neither is it well for the State. Beyond providing for the wife and daughters moderate sources of income, and very moderate allowances indeed, if any, for the sons, men may well hesitate; for it is no longer questionable that great sums bequeathed often work more for the injury than for the good of the recipients. Wise men will soon conclude that, for the best interests of the members of their families, and of the State, such bequests are an improper use of their means.

It is not suggested that men who have failed to educate their sons to earn a livelihood shall cast them adrift in poverty. If any man has seen fit to rear his sons with a view to their living idle lives, or, what is highly commendable, has instilled in them the sentiment that they are in a position to labor for public ends without reference to pecuniary considerations, then, of course, the duty of the parent is to see that such are provided for in moderation. There are instances of millionaires' sons unspoiled by wealth, who, being rich, still perform great services to the community. Such are the very salt of the earth, as valuable as, unfortunately, they are rare. It is not the exception, however, but the rule, that men must regard; and, looking at the usual result of enormous sums conferred upon legatees, the thoughtful man must shortly say, "I would as soon leave to my son a curse as the almighty dollar," and admit to himself that it is not the welfare of the children, but family pride, which inspires these legacies.

As to the second mode, that of leaving wealth at death for public uses . . . the cases are not few in which the real object sought by the testator is not attained, nor are they few in which his real wishes are thwarted. In many cases the bequests are so used as to become only monuments of his folly.

It is well to remember that it requires the exercise of not less ability than that which acquires it, to use wealth so as to be really beneficial to the community. Besides this, it may fairly be said that no man is to be extolled for doing what he cannot help doing, nor is he to be thanked by the community to which he only leaves wealth at death. Men who leave a vast sum in this way may fairly be thought men who would not have left it at all had they been able to take it with them. The memories of such cannot be held in grateful remembrance, for there is no grace in their gifts. It is not to be wondered at that such bequests seem so generally to lack the blessing. . . .

There remains, then, only one mode of using great fortunes; but in this we have the true antidote for the temporary unequal distribution of wealth, the reconciliation of the rich and the poor—a reign of harmony, another ideal, differing, indeed, from that of the Communist in requiring only the further evolution of existing conditions, not the total overthrow of our civilization. It is founded upon the present most intense Individualism, and the race is prepared to put it in practice by degrees whenever it pleases. Under its sway we shall have an ideal State, in which the surplus wealth of the few will become, in the best sense, the property of the many, because administered for the common good: and this wealth, passing through the hands of the few, can be made a much more potent force for the elevation of our race than if distributed in small sums to the people themselves. Even the poorest can be made to see this, and to agree that great sums gathered by some of their fellow-citizens and spent for public purposes, from which the masses reap the principal benefit, are more valuable to them than if scattered among themselves in trifling amounts through the course of many years. . . .

The best uses to which surplus wealth can be put have already been indicated. Those who would administer wisely must, indeed, be wise; for one of the serious obstacles to the improvement of our race is indiscriminate charity. It were better for mankind that the millions of the rich were thrown into the sea than so spent as to encourage the slothful, the drunken, the unworthy. Of every thousand dollars spent in so-called charity to-day, it is probable that nine hundred and fifty dollars is unwisely spent—so spent, indeed, as to produce the very evils which it hopes to mitigate or cure. A well-known writer of philosophic books admitted the other day that he had given a quarter of a dollar to a man who approached him as he was coming to visit the house of his friend. He knew nothing of the habits of this beggar, knew not the use that would be made of this money, although he had every reason to suspect that it would be spent improperly. This man professed to be a disciple of Herbert Spencer; yet the quarter-dollar given that night will probably work more injury than all the money will do good which its thoughtless donor will

ever be able to give in true charity. He only gratified his own feelings, saved himself from annoyance—and this was probably one of the most selfish and very worst actions of his life, for in all respects he is most worthy.

In bestowing charity, the main consideration should be to help those who will help themselves; to provide part of the means by which those who desire to improve may do so; to give those who desire to rise the aids by which they may rise; to assist, but rarely or never to do all. Neither the individual nor the race is improved by almsgiving. Those worthy of assistance, except in rare cases, seldom require assistance. The really valuable men of the race never do, except in case of accident or sudden change. Every one has, of course, cases of individuals brought to his own knowledge where temporary assistance can do genuine good, and these he will not overlook. But the amount which can be wisely given by the individual for individuals is necessarily limited by his lack of knowledge of the circumstances connected with each. He is the only true reformer who is as careful and as anxious not to aid the unworthy as he is to aid the worthy, and, perhaps, even more so, for in almsgiving more injury is probably done by rewarding vice than by relieving virtue.

The rich man is thus almost restricted to following the examples of Peter Cooper, Enoch Pratt of Baltimore, Mr. Pratt of Brooklyn, Senator Stanford, and others, who know that the best means of benefiting the community is to place within its reach the ladders upon which the aspiring can rise—free libraries, parks, and means of recreation, by which men are helped in body and mind; works of art, certain to give pleasure and improve the public taste; and public institutions of various kinds, which will improve the general condition of the people; in this manner returning their surplus wealth to the mass of their fellows in the forms best calculated to do them lasting good.

Thus is the problem of rich and poor to be solved. The laws of accumulation will be left free, the laws of distribution free. Individualism will continue, but the millionaire will be but a trustee for the poor, intrusted for a season with a great part of the increased wealth of the community, but administering it for the community far better than it could or would have done for itself. The best minds will thus have reached a stage in the development of the race in which it is clearly seen that there is no mode of disposing of surplus wealth creditable to thoughtful and earnest men into whose hands it flows, save by using it year by year for the general good. This day already dawns. Men may die without incurring the pity of their fellows, still sharers in great business enterprises from which their capital cannot be or has not been withdrawn, and which is left chiefly at death for public uses; yet the day is not far distant when the man who dies leaving behind him millions of available wealth,

which was free for him to administer during life, will pass away "unwept, unhonored, and unsung," no matter to what uses he leaves the dross which he cannot take with him. Of such as these the public verdict will then be: "The man who dies thus rich dies disgraced."

Such, in my opinion, is the true gospel concerning wealth, obedience to which is destined some day to solve the problem of the rich and the poor, and to bring "Peace on earth, among men good will."

Popular Illusions About Trusts

. . . The day of small concerns within the means of many able men seems to be over, never to return. The rise to partnership in vast concerns must come chiefly through such means as these permitted by the laws of limited partnership.

To-day we hear little of the joint-stock corporation, which has settled into its proper sphere and escapes notice. It was succeeded by the "syndicate," a combination of corporations which pulled together for a time, and expected to destroy destructive competition. The word has already almost passed out of use, and now the syndicate has given place to the trust.

We see in all these efforts of men the desire to furnish opportunities to mass capital, to concentrate the small savings of the many and to direct them to one end. The conditions of human society create for this an imperious demand; the concentration of capital is a necessity for meeting the demands of our day, and as such should not be looked at askance, but be encouraged. There is nothing detrimental to human society in it, but much that is, or is bound soon to become, beneficial. It is an evolution from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous [*sic*], and is clearly another step in the upward path of development.

Abreast of this necessity for massing the wealth of the many in even larger and larger sums for huge enterprises, another law is seen in operation in the invariable tendency from the beginning till now to lower the cost of all articles produced by man. Through the operation of this law the home of the laboring man of our day boasts luxuries which even in the palaces of monarchs as recent as Queen Elizabeth were unknown. It is a trite saying that the comforts of to-day were the luxuries of yesterday, and conveys only a faint impression of the contrast, until one walks through the castles and palaces of older countries, and learns that two or three centuries ago these had for carpets only rushes, small open spaces for windows, glass being little known, and were without gas or water-supply, or any of what we consider to-day the conveniences of life. As for those chief treasures of life, books, there is scarcely

a workingman's family which has not at its command, without money and without price, access to libraries to which the palace was recently a stranger.

If there be in human history one truth clearer and more indisputable than another, it is that the cheapening of articles, whether of luxury or of necessity or of those classed as artistic, insures their more general distribution, and is one of the most potent factors in refining and lifting a people, and in adding to its happiness. In no period of human activity has this great agency been so potent or so wide-spread as in our own. Now, the cheapening of all these good things, whether it be in the metals, in textiles, or in food, or especially in books and prints, is rendered possible only through the operation of the law, which may be stated thus: cheapness is in proportion to the scale of production. To make ten tons of steel a day would cost many times as much per ton as to make one hundred tons; to make one hundred tons would cost double as much per ton as a thousand; and to make one thousand tons per day would cost greatly more than to make ten thousand tons. Thus, the larger the scale of operation the cheaper the product. The huge steamship of twenty thousand tons burden carries its ton of freight at less cost, it is stated, than the first steamships carried a pound. It is, fortunately, impossible for man to impede, much less to change, this great and beneficent law, from which flow most of his comforts and luxuries, and also most of the best and most improving forces in his life.

In an age noted for its inventions, we see the same law running through these. Inventions facilitate big operations, and in most instances require to be worked upon a great scale. Indeed, as a rule, the great invention which is beneficent in its operation would be useless unless operated to supply a thousand people where ten were supplied before. Every agency in our day labors to scatter the good things of life, both for mind and body, among the toiling millions. Everywhere we look we see the inexorable law ever producing bigger and bigger things. One of the most notable illustrations of this is seen in the railway freight-car. When the writer entered the service of the Pennsylvania Railroad from seven to eight tons were carried upon eight wheels; to-day they carry fifty tons. The locomotive has quadrupled in power. The steamship to-day is ten times bigger, the blast-furnace has seven times more capacity, and the tendency everywhere is still to increase. The contrast between the hand printing-press of old and the elaborate newspaper printing-machine of to-day is even more marked.

We conclude that this overpowering, irresistible tendency toward aggregation of capital and increase of size in every branch of product cannot be arrested or even greatly impeded, and that, instead of attempting to restrict either, we should hail every increase as something gained, not for the few

rich, but for the millions of poor, seeing that the law is salutary, working for good and not for evil. Every enlargement is an improvement, step by step, upon what has preceded. It makes for higher civilization, for the enrichment of human life, not for one, but for all classes of men. It tends to bring to the laborer's cottage the luxuries hitherto enjoyed only by the rich, to remove from the most squalid homes much of their squalor, and to foster the growth of human happiness relatively more in the workman's home than in the millionaire's palace. It does not tend to make the rich poorer, but it does tend to make the poor richer in the possession of better things, and greatly lessens the wide and deplorable gulf between the rich and the poor. Superficial politicians may, for a time, deceive the uninformed, but more and more will all this be clearly seen by those who are now led to regard aggregations as injurious.

In all great movements, even of the highest value, there is cause for criticism, and new dangers arising from new conditions, which must be guarded against. There is no nugget free from more or less impurity, and no good cause without its fringe of scoria. The sun itself has spots, but, as has been wisely said, these are rendered visible only by the light it itself sends forth. . . .

An Employer's View of the Labor Question

. . . A strike or lockout is, in itself, a ridiculous affair. Whether a failure or a success, it gives no direct proof of its justice or injustice. In this it resembles war between two nations. It is simply a question of strength and endurance between the contestants. The gage of battle, or the duel, is not more senseless, as a means of establishing what is just and fair, than an industrial strike or lockout. It would be folly to conclude that we have reached any permanent adjustment between capital and labor until strikes and lockouts are as much things of the past as the gage of battle or the duel have become in the most advanced communities.

Taking for granted, then, that some further modifications must be made between capital and labor, I propose to consider the various plans that have been suggested by which labor can advance another stage in its development in relation to capital. And, as a preliminary, let it be noted that it is only labor and capital in their greatest masses which it is necessary to consider. It is only in large establishments that the industrial unrest of which I have spoken ominously manifests itself. The farmer who hires a man to assist him, or the gentleman who engages a groom or a butler, is not affected by strikes. The innumerable cases in which a few men only are directly concerned, which comprise in the aggregate the most of labor, present upon the whole a tolerably

satisfactory condition of affairs. This clears the ground of much, and leaves us to deal only with the immense mining and manufacturing concerns of recent growth, in which capital and labor often array themselves in alarming antagonism.

Among the expedients suggested for their better reconciliation, the first place must be assigned to the idea of coöperation, or the plan by which the workers are to become part-owners in enterprises, and share their fortunes. There is no doubt that if this could be effected it would have the same beneficial effect upon the workman which the ownership of land has upon the man who has hitherto tilled the land for another. The sense of ownership would make of him more of a man as regards himself, and hence more of a citizen as regards the commonwealth. But we are here met by a difficulty which I confess I have not yet been able to overcome, and which renders me less sanguine than I should like to be in regard to coöperation. The difficulty is this, and it seems to me to be inherent in all gigantic manufacturing, mining, and commercial operations. Two men or two combinations of men will erect blast-furnaces, iron-mills, cotton-mills, or piano manufactories adjoining each other, or engage in shipping or commercial business. They will start with equal capital and credit; and to those only superficially acquainted with the personnel of these concerns, success will seem as likely to attend the one as the other. Nevertheless, one will fail after dragging along a lifeless existence, and pass into the hands of its creditors; while the neighboring mill or business will make a fortune for its owners. Now, the successful manufacturer, dividing every month or every year a proportion of his profits among his workmen, either as a bonus or as dividends upon shares owned by them, will not only have a happy and contented body of operatives, but he will inevitably attract from his rival the very best workmen in every department. His rival, having no profits to divide among his workmen, and paying them only a small assured minimum to enable them to live, finds himself despoiled of foremen and of workmen necessary to carry on his business successfully. His workmen are discontented and, in their own opinion, defrauded of the proper fruits of their skill, through incapacity or inattention of their employers. Thus, unequal business capacity in the management produces unequal results.

It will be precisely the same if one of these manufactories belongs to the workmen themselves; but in this case, in the present stage of development of the workmen, the chances of failure will be enormously increased. It is, indeed, greatly to be doubted whether any body of working-men in the world could to-day organize and successfully carry on a mining or manufacturing or commercial business in competition with concerns owned by men trained

to affairs. If any such coöperative organization succeeds, it may be taken for granted that it is principally owing to the exceptional business ability of one of the managers, and only in a very small degree to the efforts of the mass of workmen-owners. This business ability is excessively rare, as is proved by the incredibly large proportion of those who enter upon the stormy sea of business only to fail. I should say that twenty coöperative concerns would fail to every one that would succeed. There are, of course, a few successful establishments, notably two in France and one in England, which are organized upon the coöperative plan, in which the workmen participate directly in the profits. But these were all created by the present owners, who now generously share the profits with their workmen, and are making the success of their manufactories upon the coöperative plan the proud work of their lives. What these concerns will become when the genius for affairs is no longer with them to guide, is a matter of grave doubt and, to me, of foreboding. I can, of course, picture in my mind a state of civilization in which the most talented business men shall find their most cherished work in carrying on immense concerns, not primarily for their own personal aggrandizement, but for the good of the masses of workers engaged therein, and their families; but this is only a foreshadowing of a dim and distant future. When a class of such men has evolved, the problem of capital and labor will be permanently solved to the entire satisfaction of both. But as this manifestly belongs to a future generation, I cannot consider coöperation, or common ownership, as the next immediate step in advance which it is possible for labor to make in its upward path.

The next suggestion is that peaceful settlement of differences should be reached through arbitration. Here we are upon firmer ground. I would lay it down as a maxim that there is no excuse for a strike or a lockout until arbitration of differences has been offered by one party and refused by the other. No doubt serious trouble attends even arbitration at present, from the difficulty of procuring suitable men to judge intelligently between the disputants. There is a natural disinclination among business men to expose their business to men in whom they have not entire confidence. We lack, so far, in America a retired class of men of affairs. Our vile practice is to keep on accumulating more dollars until we die. If it were the custom here, as it is in England, for men to withdraw from active business after acquiring a fortune, this class would furnish the proper arbitrators. . . .

The influence of trades-unions upon the relations between the employer and employed has been much discussed. Some establishments in America have refused to recognize the right of the men to form themselves into these unions, although I am not aware that any concern in England would dare to take this position. This policy, however, may be regarded as only a tem-

porary phase of the situation. The right of the working-men to combine and to form trades-unions is no less sacred than the right of the manufacturer to enter into associations and conferences with his fellows, and it must sooner or later be conceded. Indeed, it gives one but a poor opinion of the American workman if he permits himself to be deprived of a right which his fellow in England long since conquered for himself. My experience has been that trades-unions, upon the whole, are beneficial both to labor and capital. They certainly educate the working-men, and give them a truer conception of the relations of capital and labor than they could otherwise form. The ablest and best workmen eventually come to the front in these organizations; and it may be laid down as a rule that the more intelligent the workman the fewer the contests with employers. It is not the intelligent workman, who knows that labor without his brother capital is helpless, but the blatant ignorant man, who regards capital as the natural enemy of labor, who does so much to embitter the relations between employer and employed; and the power of this ignorant demagogue arises chiefly from the lack of proper organization among the men through which their real voice can be expressed. This voice will always be found in favor of the judicious and intelligent representative. Of course, as men become intelligent more deference must be paid to them personally and to their rights, and even to their opinions and prejudices; and, upon the whole, a greater share of profits must be paid in the day of prosperity to the intelligent than to the ignorant workman. He cannot be imposed upon so readily. On the other hand, he will be found much readier to accept reduced compensation when business is depressed; and it is better in the long run for capital to be served by the highest intelligence, and to be made well aware of the fact that it is dealing with men who know what is due to them, both as to treatment and compensation.

One great source of the trouble between employers and employed arises from the fact that the immense establishments of to-day, in which alone we find serious conflicts between capital and labor, are not managed by their owners, but by salaried officers, who cannot possibly have any permanent interest in the welfare of the working-men. These officials are chiefly anxious to present a satisfactory balance-sheet at the end of the year, that their hundreds of shareholders may receive the usual dividends, and that they may therefore be secure in their positions, and be allowed to manage the business without unpleasant interference either by directors or shareholders. It is notable that bitter strikes seldom occur in small establishments where the owner comes into direct contact with his men, and knows their qualities, their struggles, and their aspirations. It is the chairman, situated hundreds of miles away from his men, who only pays a flying visit to the works and perhaps

finds time to walk through the mill or mine once or twice a year, that is chiefly responsible for the disputes which break out at intervals. I have noticed that the manager who confers oftenest with a committee of his leading men has the least trouble with his workmen. Although it may be impracticable for the presidents of these large corporations to know the working-men personally, the manager at the mills, having a committee of his best men to present their suggestions and wishes from time to time, can do much to maintain and strengthen amicable relations, if not interfered with from headquarters. I, therefore, recognize in trades-unions, or, better still, in organizations of the men of each establishment, who select representatives to speak for them, a means, not of further embittering the relations between employer and employed, but of improving them. . . .

Whatever the future may have in store for labor, the evolutionist, who sees nothing but certain and steady progress for the race, will never attempt to set bounds to its triumphs, even to its final form of complete and universal industrial coöperation, which I hope is some day to be reached. But I am persuaded that the next step forward is to be in the direction I have here ventured to point out; and as one who is now most anxious to contribute his part toward helping forward the day of amicable relations between the two forces of capital and labor, which are not enemies, but are really auxiliaries who stand or fall together, I ask at the hands of both capital and labor a careful consideration of these views.

WALTER RATHENAU

IN THE OPENING years of the twentieth century, Walter Rathenau (1867–1922) made, among his other creative achievements, a notable contribution, both practical and theoretical, to the development of cartel organization in German industry. His father had founded Germany's greatest electrical combine, the *Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft* (AEG), and after taking his doctorate in theoretical physics, Rathenau became a "captain of industry," first as his father's chief assistant and then his successor at the head of the AEG. His mind was an unusually complex one, and it ranged over a vast panorama of topics, of which economics was only one. Although he was engaged in a multitude of far-flung business enterprises, he found time to employ his versatile gifts and his incredibly prolific pen in the service of science, philosophy, aesthetics, religion and mysticism, metaphysics, ethics, literature, history, politics, psychology, and autobiography—altogether his collected works in these fields comprise five brilliantly written volumes.

When the German war effort threatened to collapse in the fall and winter of 1914 for lack of imported raw materials, Rathenau volunteered his services to the War Ministry and organized a thoroughgoing system of planned economy whose primary purpose was to ensure the allocation of scarce supplies to factories producing munitions. A "war cartel," in which the government had the deciding vote, was established for each main branch of German industry, and every firm was obliged to be a member for the duration of the war. Thus, the first comprehensive attempt to plan a modern nation's entire economic activity came into existence. The first achievement of Rathenau's organization was to avert a critical shortage of nitrates (without which explosives could not be made) by moving quickly to collect manure before it could be spread on the fields by farmers, extracting from it the needed saltpeter, and thus enabling the German guns to go on firing until synthetic nitrates became available thanks to the development of the Haber fixation process.

Despite his vital contribution to the war effort—or rather because the anti-Semitic military bureaucracy found it humiliating to have been rescued from their own short-sighted blunders by a Jewish civilian—Rathenau was forced out of the War Office in 1915. He occupied his leisure during the next few years in writing a series of widely read books that attempted to chart a path for Germany in the postwar world. The war cartels, he argued, had represented "a decisive step in the direction of state socialism," but they had simultaneously aimed at "self-government in industry to the highest possible degree." He looked forward to a "New Economy" based on universal cartelization of industry, with the public interest safeguarded by the participation of workers and consumers in the making of all important decisions. *Laissez-faire* and competition for markets would thus be entirely superseded by a totally planned, but decentralized and nonbureaucratic, economy operating to secure maximum efficiency. In politics a parliament chosen to represent economic interests would supplement or take the place of the Reichstag based on geographic constituencies. Thus a "German Collective Economy" (*Gemeinwirt-*

schaft) would arise as a logical development out of large-scale industry, and Germany's closely knit structure of cartels would evolve into a nonauthoritarian corporate state.

Though his ideas found many followers, and were widely regarded as Germany's most acceptable alternative to Bolshevism on the one hand and to the "anarchy of private economy" on the other, the only institutional change directly inspired by the "New Economy" was the National Economic Council provided for in Article 165 of the Weimar Constitution, which had little practical significance during the republican period. Rathenau's ideas did have a powerful effect in shaping the "rationalization movement"—the drive for greater technical efficiency and for a higher integration of plants—in German industry, which was carried out on a large scale with the aid of large American loans in the latter nineteen-twenties. Some of his phrases also were taken over by Nazi economic planners, though his basically democratic ideals were, of course, thoroughly perverted.

Rathenau became a martyr to his liberal and internationalist convictions when he was assassinated in 1922, while serving as Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic, by nationalist fanatics who were enraged at his policy of reconciliation and of loyal fulfillment of the Treaty of Versailles. After 1933 his name was *verbotten* in Germany.

The following selection is taken from *In Days to Come*, which first appeared in 1918, was translated from the German by Eden and Cedar Paul (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1921), and is here reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company, New York.



IN DAYS TO COME

IF WE CONTEMPLATE the extant functioning of large-scale private property, looking at the matter in a purely mechanical way, and leaving the ethico-social implications of the problem unconsidered, we see that such property performs a duty which, however uncongenial it appears in its essential nature, is nevertheless of great importance from the economic outlook. Private property shoulders the risk of the world economy.

All the enterprises of the capitalist system share common characteristics; they all require large means, and they are all risky. The revenue department of any properly organised community can supply the requisite means. Much more difficult, however, is it for a municipality or a state to engage in bold virtues. These corporations lack the passionate stimulus of private enterprise; the sense of responsibility renders them timid; they are devoid of that autocratic and instinctive judgment which makes the prospects of success outweigh the possibilities of danger. Onlookers are apt to imagine that specialised skill can provide a substitute for the aforesaid incisive powers of judgment, but

the desiderated substitute will not prove effective when the risks of great enterprises are under consideration; the experts will differ among themselves, and by the time they have settled their differences, the favourable opportunity will have been lost.

Private capital secures ample funds by the joint-stock method; it encounters the risks of enterprise by indefatigable endeavours towards success and profit; it overcomes the uncertainties of the future by exercising the greatest possible care in the choice of its agents, and by the number and variety of its enterprises.

Hitherto this demand could be met only by means of the surplus capital which, accumulating in the hands of the well-to-do after these had consumed all they considered requisite for daily life, clamoured for reinvestment and increase. The smaller savings were satisfied with increased security and less risk. . . .

Almost without exception these enterprises assume the impersonal form of the joint-stock company. No one is a permanent owner. The composition of the thousandfold complex which functions as lord of the undertaking, is in a state of perpetual flux. The original arrangement, in accordance with which a number of well-to-do merchants combined for the joint conduct of some business which was too extensive for any one of them to undertake single-handed, has become a matter of purely historical interest. Almost fortuitously, one person or another acquires one or several shares in an enterprise; he may hold on for a dividend or for a rise in values; in many cases he has bought merely to sell again as soon as possible. The fact that he has become a shareholder in a limited company hardly enters into his consciousness. In a great many instances, all that he has done is to bet upon the prosperity of some branch of business enterprise, and the scrip which he holds is merely the symbol of this bet.

The investor, however, is likewise the possessor of other stock and scrip, perhaps in a great many different enterprises; he is the point of intersection of various rights of ownership, and in each case the ownership is a fluctuating complex. In many cases he knows nothing more of these enterprises than the name; he may have been personally advised to invest in them; he may have been attracted by a newspaper article; he may have followed a popular craze in favour of some particular investment.

The relationship we have been describing signifies that ownership has been de-individualised. The primitive personal relationship between a man and a tangible, accurately known affair, has given place to an impersonal claim upon a theoretical yield.

The de-individualisation of ownership simultaneously implies the objecti-

fication of the thing owned. The claims to ownership are subdivided in such a fashion, and are so mobile, that the enterprise assumes an independent life, as if it belonged to no one; it takes on an objective existence, such as in earlier days was embodied only in state and church, in a municipal corporation, in the life of a guild or a religious order.

In the vital activity of the undertaking, this relationship manifests itself as a shifting of the centre of gravity. The executive instruments of an official hierarchy become the new centre. The community of owners still retains the sovereign right of decision, but this right grows increasingly theoretical, inasmuch as a multiplicity of other collective organisms (especially banks) are entrusted by the shareholders with the maintenance of their rights, and inasmuch as these fiduciaries in their turn work hand in hand with the directors of the enterprise.

To-day, already, the paradox is conceivable that the enterprise might come to own itself inasmuch as with the profits it could buy out the individual shareholders. German law imposes restrictions upon such a process, insisting that the original shareholders must retain their voting rights. Nevertheless, there is no organic contradiction to the complete detachment of ownership from the owner.

The de-individualisation of ownership, the objectification of enterprise, the detachment of property from the possessor, leads to a point where the enterprise becomes transformed as it were into a trusteeship, or perhaps it would be better to say into an institution resembling the state. This condition, which I shall denote by the term "autonomy," can be reached by many routes. One of these, the repayment of capital, has previously been mentioned. A second method, the distribution of ownership among the employees and officials of the undertaking, has been followed somewhat closely by one of our German manufacturers. The right of ownership can be vested in official positions, universities, town councils, governments; this has happened in the case of one of the oldest mining corporations in Germany. Nothing more is requisite than that there should be adequate and practical stipulations, which provide that the enterprise shall be permanently conducted by the best discoverable instruments.

If its constitution be wisely drafted, the enterprise will be able to provide for all future requirements of capital, however extensive these may become. Its first resource will be to lay hands upon the revenues which hitherto from year to year it has distributed to the shareholders. Next, transiently or permanently, it can issue debentures. In case of need, it can retreat a step, and can issue new shares. Above all, if under the protection of a state whose wealth is inexhaustible, and if subjected to the control of this state, it has a right to

expect that in case of need the state will provide it with funds in return for sufficient guarantees. Nay more, the state itself will wish and demand that autonomous enterprises shall be willing at any time, under proper supervision, to take over and to invest surpluses from the state treasury.

The counterpart of the objective tendency towards autonomy is the subjective psychological evolution of the enterprise and its organs.

In so far as wealthy private entrepreneurs still exist, they have long been accustomed to regard their businesses as independent entities, incorporated objectively as companies. Such an entity has its own personal responsibility; it works, grows, makes contracts and alliances on its own account; it is nourished by its own profits; it lives for its own purposes. The fact that it nourishes the proprietor may be purely accessory, and in most cases is not the main point. A good man of business will incline to restrict unduly his own and his family's consumption, in order to provide more abundant means for the strengthening and extension of the firm. The growth and the power of this organism is a delight to the owner, a far greater delight than lucre. The desire for gain is overshadowed by ambition and by the joys of creation.

Such an outlook is accentuated among the chiefs of great corporate undertakings. Here we already encounter an official idealism identical with that which prevails in the state service. The executive instruments labour for the benefit of times when, in all human probability, they will long have ceased to be associated with the enterprise. Almost without exception, they do their utmost to reserve for the undertaking the larger moiety of its profits, and to distribute no more than the lesser moiety in the form of dividends, although to the detriment of their individual incomes. They try to preserve for their successors the yield of the period during which they have been the administrators. A leading official in such an enterprise, if offered the choice between having his salary doubled and becoming one of the directors, will prefer responsibility to wealth. The power, the archetypal reality, of the institution has become an end in itself. Covetousness, as the motive force, has been completely superseded by the sense of responsibility.

Thus the psyche of the enterprise works towards the same end as the evolution of the possessional relationships. Both culminate in the production of autonomy.

In ultimate analysis, the economic meaning of the whole movement grows clear. It is no longer the wealthy capitalist's desire for gain which shapes the enterprise. The undertaking itself, now grown into an objective personality, maintains itself, creates its own means just as much as it creates its own tasks. It is ready to provide these means out of its own profits, by the temporary

issue of debentures, out of state loans, out of foundations, out of the savings of its staff and its workmen—or in any way that may be possible.

Thus, between the domain of state organisations and the domain of private businesses, there arises a domain of intermediate structures. In this we find autonomous enterprises, arising out of and conducted by private initiative, subjected to state supervision, and leading an independent life. Essentially, they are transitional varieties between private economy and state economy. Presumably, in future centuries, this objective and de-individualised ownership will become the leading mode of existence for all permanent property. In contrast therewith, property in articles of consumption will remain private, whilst property in goods of communal utility will continue to be vested in the state. Industrial monopolies will be conducted under the form of mixed-economic enterprises.

The laws of property must take into account the characteristics of autonomous undertakings, no less than the characteristics of foundations, which will likewise prove of increasing importance in days to come. Both kinds of institution should be authorised to accept legacies, in so far at least as their aims meet with public approval. Thus the creator of an economic organism will be empowered to give expression to his ideal will, to the will permanently incorporated in his work, without transmitting property rights and revenues to idle generations. The economic will thus secures enduring existence in so far as it works productively, whereas it is mortal in so far as it strives for the accumulation of material goods. The foundation, grown objective, and detached from the individual life, becomes the true monument of an outwardly-working existence. It acquires an analogy with the ideal creation of a work of art, an analogy which is manifest in respect of absolute existence if not in respect of spiritual content. . . .

If we now survey the economic life of a country which we assume to have realised the principles of the new order, we shall discern the following series of effects.

The aspect of production has changed. All the energies of the land have become active; none but invalids and the elderly are idle. The import and manufacture of needless, ugly, and noxious products has been reduced to a minimum. Thereby a third of the national labour power has been saved, so that the production of necessary goods has been notably cheapened and increased.

The concentration of manufacturing energy upon necessary and useful products increases the effectiveness of human labour in relation to the goods produced. The factor of attainability grows. The average share of products

available for consumption rises, so that for an equal amount of labour a higher standard of life becomes possible.

Whilst the general wellbeing of the country is doubled or trebled by the setting of idle hands to work and by the rationalisation of production, the accumulation of private wealth is checked. Consequently the growth of property must advantage the community. These benefits accrue in two different ways.

First of all, the state grows rich beyond imagination.

All the tasks it has hitherto performed, can now be performed much better. The state can abolish poverty and unemployment; it can fulfil to an unprecedented degree all obligations of a generally useful character, without having recourse to increased taxation. Sources of revenue which to-day are utilised by methods that exploit economic life and thus work immense harm, can in the new order be dealt with apart from fiscal considerations. Considering in this connection one problem alone, that of traffic and transport, it is obvious that the abandonment of profit-making considerations by the state would result in a great multiplication of productive capacity and in an almost incredible cheapening of manufacture. For, practically speaking, the whole transport system in the hands of the state would be made free. The effect would be the same as if all the sources of raw material and all the means of production throughout the country had been concentrated into a single area. The same considerations apply to the generation and distribution of mechanical energy.

The state becomes the guardian and administrator of enormous means for investment. On the most moderate terms, it places these means at the disposal of all productive occupations, while making it a condition that those to whom such means are ceded shall pay the normal rate of wages. A new middle class comes into existence through the national financing of such medium-scale enterprises as it is expedient to maintain side by side with the large-scale industries. The influx of nationalised capital lowers the rate of interest in industrial undertakings throughout the country and facilitates the establishment of enterprises of moderate proportions.

At the same time, the state is enabled to liberate intellectual labour from the mechanism of material industry, and to ensure to brainworkers that adequate return which to-day depends upon the chances of an unspiritual success. The artist, the thinker, and the man of learning, grow independent of the decrees of a market which will not reward the genuine unless it is lucky enough to be confounded with the spurious.

As the state becomes more prosperous, so concomitantly does the wellbeing of the people increase, not indeed through an increase in great private fortunes, but through the general diffusion of civic comfort. Class contrasts have

disappeared; the path towards independence and responsibility has been thrown open to all; the means of culture are accessible to every person of talent. No longer has the man of ability to struggle against the closed phalanx of the privileged; we see a continuous intermingling, an enduring ascent and descent, in the ranks of the active and in the ranks of the leaders. In proportion as, on the one hand, the accumulation of savings facilitates the securing of economic credits, and, on the other hand, the recommencement of existences becomes a daily occurrence through withdrawal into the battalions of the less highly skilled workers—wage struggles grow less bitter, all the more so since moral and intellectual qualities are increasingly influential in deciding choice of occupation. Above all we shall find that the conditions of the supply of labour have changed. Whereas to-day hands are at times idle, while machines and the means of production are in excessive demand, in the new order, machines and capital will wait for the hands to set them at work, and consequently willing workers will secure an enhanced share of the values produced by labour.

The stratum of new structures, the stratum of autonomous enterprises which has been intercalated between the private economy and the state economy, contributes to promote these results. The autonomous economic instrument has its activities predominantly determined by other considerations than those of high profit. It aims at the accumulation of surpluses only in so far as is requisite for renovation and extension. The conflict with the interests of the wage-earners is mitigated. Nay more, some of these new organisms will as a matter of principle admit the workers to a share in the profits; others will seek to secure the advantages of an economic form which is no longer subordinated to the monetary interests of shareholders and capitalists, by improving the status of their workers through high wages, and thus securing work of better quality and a greater degree of intensity. The existence and the competition of these autonomous enterprises will have a stimulating reaction upon the labour market.

When economic life assumes such characters, it becomes possible to ensure equality in education and the careful selection of all available talent, these measures decisively contributing to strengthen the whole life of the nation; whereas to-day the best attempts towards an unprejudiced popular education are shipwrecked through the diversities in the domestic circumstances of the pupils, and through the variations in their bodily and mental qualities. A nation can only come to full maturity, can only develop its spiritual and moral powers to the maximum, when no grain of corn falls on barren ground, and when every shoot secures the care which comports with the worth and the divine calling of the human spirit. Lest any fallacy should creep in to invaii-

date the understanding of what might seem to be a utopian picture, the contrast between the existing system and that which is destined to replace it may be briefly summarised:

1. Production and wellbeing must be increased throughout the country, for:
extravagance will be put a stop to;
superfluous production will be replaced by useful production;
idleness will be abolished, and all available forces will be harnessed to the work of spiritual and material production;
free competition and the spirit of private enterprise will be preserved;
responsibility will be placed in the hands of those who are most capable both morally and intellectually.
2. The accumulation of immoderate and dead wealth will be checked.
3. Caste barriers will be broken down; in place of permanently burdened and permanently burdening members, there will be a system characterised by organic movement and by organic ascent and descent.
4. Therewith will increase:
the power of the state, its material strength, and its equalising energy;
and simultaneously there will arise an equable condition of average wellbeing, which will permeate all classes, will do away with class contrasts, and will promote throughout the land the highest conceivable development of intellectual and economic energies.

THE DOCKERS' STRIKE

THE GREAT DOCK STRIKE of 1889 marked a turning point in the British labor movement. Up to that time the English unions had been in the main composed of skilled workers. They did not include unskilled low-paid workers such as dockers (stevedores and longshoremen who loaded and unloaded ships).

The dockers of London were overworked, underpaid, and exploited mercilessly through unfavorable conditions of hiring and employment. In 1889, a small strike broke out at the West India Dock and quickly spread to other piers. Led by Ben Tillett and his lieutenants, Tom Mann and John Burns (who were trade unionists and engineers), the dockers were quickly organized into a union. Despite lack of funds and trade-union experience, the dockers held firm during the strike, which lasted for more than a month. Meanwhile their cause had awakened much sympathy not only among labor, both organized and unorganized, but also among the middle class. Young liberals, radicals, Fabian socialists, and humanitarians rallied to their cause, took up collections, passed out soup to the strikers, wrote articles, and made speeches. The employers could not find scabs (called blacklegs in England) to replace the strikers because of the general sympathy for the strikers. Nearly £50,000 was raised to help the dockers, by public subscription.

Finally, through the mediation of Cardinal Manning, the leading Catholic churchman of England, and Sydney Buxton, the strike was ended. The dockers won all their main demands: sixpence an hour as a minimum wage, extra pay for overtime, four hours as the minimum period of employment, abolition of piecework, and improved conditions of hiring.

In the ensuing years the organization of unskilled workers progressed rapidly in England and there was an increased solidarity among the ranks of labor. Many regard the dock strike as the beginning of this trend.

The passage below is Tom Mann's own story of the strike, one of many which he helped to organize and lead in his long career in the forefront of the English labor movement. It is taken from *Tom Mann's Memoirs* (London, Labour Publishing Company, 1923).



TOM MANN'S MEMOIRS

THE LONDON DOCK STRIKE of 1889 involved a much wider issue than that of a large number of port workers fighting for better conditions. There had long been no more than a dogged acquiescence in the conditions insisted upon by the employers, more particularly on the part of those classed as unskilled labourers. Skilled and unskilled alike were dominated over by their employers; and at the same time the unskilled, not being yet organised, were in many instances subject to further dictation and domination by the organised skilled men. The industrial system was (as it still is, with some modification) creating an army of surplus workers, who, never having been decently paid for their work, had never been decently fed; every occupation had its proportion of this surplus. Irregularity of work, coupled with liability to arduous and dangerous toil when employed, characterised the dock workers in an exceptional degree; and although dock labour was classed as unskilled, in grim reality it often required a considerable amount of skill; moreover, accidents were frequent. Nevertheless, in the struggle against death by starvation, a larger percentage of worn-out men (cast-offs from other occupations) made their way to compete for casual labour at the docks and wharves of London, than to any other place or to any similar occupation.

This does not mean that all the dock workers were weaklings! Far from it. Some of the finest built men in the country would always be found amongst the dockers; but the above generalisation was true. Again, whilst dockers were in a very large number of cases badly paid per hour, and could only get a few hours' work per week, in the work of a large port there is always a number who get regular work, and some, of course, who get relatively good wages.

Many circumstances seem to have conspired to make the upheaval of 1889 the assertion of the rights of a large class in the community—the rights of those who had never before been recognised as possessing the rights and the title to respect of civilised humans. It was nothing less than a challenge to all hostile forces, and an assertion of the claim for proper treatment. The challenge was successful; the claim was enforced.

I was at the office of the "Labour Elector" in Paternoster Row, on August 14th in that year, when, about midday, I received a wire from Ben Tillett asking me to make my way to the South West India Dock. I went at once. There was no difficulty in finding the men, for Ben was with them, and they were about to hold a meeting. I was soon put in possession of the main facts.

The men had been discharging a sailing ship named "The Lady Armstrong." They were working for fivepence an hour and "plus," this meaning that, in a vague fashion, very ill defined, there was a recognised time for discharging certain goods, and if the men did the work in less time they received a surplus of a halfpenny or penny per hour. The men argued they had kept correct tally, but the dock superintendent refused to admit the claim. The dockers were told that their demand for more pay would have to be dealt with by the chief authority, The London and India Docks Joint Committee. The men refused to return to work.

Serious discussion must have taken place prior to the "Lady Armstrong" difficulty, because almost immediately it was proposed that now they were out, they should insist in the future upon an established minimum of sixpence per hour for ordinary time and eightpence per hour for overtime. When I arrived, they had already decided to claim at least as much as this, and to call upon their fellow dockers to help them. No need here to go into detail beyond that of giving a correct idea of the definiteness of aim, and the effect of the achievement. For myself, I kept at that strike until it was over; and for long after I remained in touch with the dockers, and with the movement of which they were a part.

Burns, as all know, was, like Tillett, in the thick of the struggle, being active in every phase of it, except when absolutely compelled to take rest. The Strike Committee at the start made its headquarters at Wroots' Coffee House, Poplar, and the first day that relief tickets were given out I had a very difficult duty. There was a crowd of several thousand men to deal with, and each had to be given one ticket, and only one. As yet there had been no time to organise the distribution systematically. The men were in urgent need; they had been told a few hours before that tickets would be issued that day. Now they had assembled, and the committee had just received the tickets from the printer. Wroots' Coffee House door opened out on to a main thoroughfare. If only we could admit the men at a quiet walking pace they could go out at a side door; but naturally they were eager; they were fearful there might not be enough tickets to go round; they would hardly listen to instructions that order must be preserved. I, therefore, stood on the doorstep and briefly addressed the crowd, telling them that every one would get a ticket, but that we must keep control of the position, and I asked them to pass me quietly. To their great credit, they entirely agreed. Almost immediately a thousand men were right close to me, but endeavouring to be perfectly orderly. I put my back against one of the doorposts, and stretched out my leg with my foot on the opposite post, jamming myself in. I talked pleasantly to the men, and passed each man in under my leg, by this means steadying the

rush. The fact that they did not make it impossible for me to remain at the task was exceedingly creditable, for, to prevent a stampede, many had to keep their mates back, and it was all done in good humour. At the close I was so stiff and bruised, I could scarcely walk for a while. I pulled my shirt off and wrung it out. It was soaked with perspiration, and my back had a good deal of skin off; but the job was completed satisfactorily.

The stevedores, the men who load the long-distance boats, and therefore stow the cargo, had organised in 1872, and had established a rate of eightpence an hour ordinary time and one shilling an hour overtime, thus giving evidence of the disciplinary effects of organisation. Their meeting place was at the Wades' Arms, Jeremiah Street, Poplar; and as the accommodation was more suitable there than at Wroots', the Strike Committee moved to the stevedores' headquarters. Tom McCarthy (dead now this twenty-two years) was a prominent and active member. Another stevedore, James Twomey, was chairman of the Strike Committee—for these and all other waterside workers were out in sympathy, if not directly affected.

The Strike Committee sat every day and evening, usually till midnight. The questions to be dealt with were multitudinous; occasionally there would be warmth of temper shown, but generally speaking the proceedings were conducted in a most orderly fashion. I was told off to give special attention to picketing, and to the organisation of forces on the south side of the river. This left others available for public speaking, attempts at negotiations, etc. I usually turned up at committee about 11 P.M., unless special questions demanded consideration.

What stress and strain and responsibility! What opportunities for demonstrating capacity, a knowledge of what was necessary, a readiness to do it! And, speaking generally, wonderfully good work was done. Apart from public speaking, picketing, and negotiating, a thousand things every day required attention, and as a rule they were well attended to. Besides the thirty thousand dock and wharf workers, there were sailors and firemen, carmen, lightermen, and dry-dock workers, making another thirty thousand. These, with their dependents, all had to be provided for. Four hundred and forty thousand food tickets were distributed during the five weeks the dispute lasted, and many thousands of meals were organised and provided by friendly agencies. Public sympathy was entirely with the men, and practically the whole press was kindly disposed. Large sums were collected, but in spite of this help the time came when finances were at a very low ebb and the prospects of a settlement seemed remote. Next day, however, came a cable from Australia sending two thousand pounds, with promise of more; a few days later, the Australians cabled fifteen hundred pounds more. All told they sent

no less than thirty thousand pounds. What a godsend! How it delighted the men; how it encouraged the leaders; and how it must have told the other way on the dock directors!

The dockers' fight in London fired the imagination of all classes in Australia; and employers, as readily and as heartily as workers, contributed to the London Dockers' Fund. I have had opportunities of thanking the people of Australia by addressing them in person at public meetings in nearly every city and township. What of it, that many Australians who subscribed to the London Dockers' Fund in 1889, fought determinedly against the transport workers in Australasia in 1890? These are the vagaries of human nature. As Yorkshire people say: "Ther's nowt so queer as folk."

John Burns and Ben Tillett were two very different men in temperament and style, but each of them possessed exactly the right qualities to fire audiences and keep up the struggle to a successful finish. John Burns—with his assertiveness, his businesslike readiness to deal with emergencies, his power and disposition to keep at arm's length those who would have foisted themselves on the movement to its disadvantage, his cheery jocularly and homely remarks to the men on the march or on Tower Hill, his scathing criticism of hostile comments in the press or on the part of the dock directors—vitality contributed to the continuous encouragement of the mass of the strikers.

Ben Tillett, who had a close relationship to the men as general secretary of the Tea Operatives' and General Labourers' Union, would pour forth invectives upon all opponents, would reach the heart's core of the dockers by his description of the way in which they had to beg for work and the paltry pittance they received, and by his homely illustrations of their life as it was and as it ought to be. He was short in stature, but tough; pallid, but dauntless; affected with a stammer at this time, but the real orator of the group. Ben was a force to be reckoned with all through the fight.

H. H. Champion, cooler than a cucumber, would make statements of a revolutionary character, would deal with the weak points in the men's position, and would encourage them to rectify the same. Occasionally R. B. Cunninghame Graham would appear, as neat as a West End dude, with an eye keener than a hawk's and a voice and manner that riveted attention as he drove home his satirical points, but always leaving a nice impression.

Tom McCarthy was a keen-witted, eloquent, versatile Irishman, full of personal knowledge of the actual life and work of a waterside man. Harry Orbell was a simple-spoken, frank, honest fellow, familiar with all the difficulties of the unskilled labourer, but was himself a highly-skilled man in the furnishing business. He had been squeezed out of this employment by the

exigencies of trade depression. On the south side, Harry Quelch took a keen interest in the organisation of the men, and built up the Labour Protection League.

When at length the dock directors agreed to the demands, with certain reservations as to the date when they should become operative, the position became critical. At the Mansion House many conferences had been held. The Lord Mayor, the dock directors, the men's representatives, and with general acquiescence a few prominent persons not identified directly with the business side of life, including the Bishop of London and Cardinal Manning, participated.

I had never seen the Cardinal before, and it was a matter of no small interest to me to find myself closely identified with such a man for a colleague.

A large percentage of the men at the docks were (and are) Roman Catholics. Now that a stage had been reached when the men's representatives were of opinion that the offers of the company merited serious consideration, the Cardinal, on the suggestion of the Strike Committee chairman, agreed to go to Poplar and put the case to the men, who held him in the greatest respect and reverence.

The meeting was held in the Kirby Street Catholic School at Poplar. The Cardinal was a very slender man; his face was most arresting, so thin, so refined, so kindly. In the whole of my life I have never seen another like unto it. He spoke to the dockers in such a quiet, firm, and advising fatherly manner, that minute by minute as he was speaking one could feel the mental atmosphere changing. The result was an agreement that the conditions should be accepted, to become operative in November.

The chief gains were: a minimum of sixpence an hour instead of fivepence (only fourpence formerly at Tilbury); eightpence an hour for overtime; none to be paid off with less than two shillings, or four hours' work. This seems a trifling gain now, but it was an important matter then, to have regular taking-on times instead of taking-on at any hour of the day, and to have gangs properly made up. The last point was not included in the original settlement, but it became a current practice at the docks and wharves, to the great advantage of the men. The change for the better was very real; and although subsequently difficulties arose, when many of the men became careless, and when petty bosses sought to score over the dockers, still, all who knew and know the facts will admit that the struggle of 1889 was a real landmark.

Ben Tillet, who had been general secretary all the time, writing of what happened in 1889 and its effects, when reviewing the position twenty-one years later, in *A Brief History of the Dockers' Union*, wrote:

We had established a new spirit; the bully and the thief, for a time at least, were squelched; no more would the old man be driven and cursed to death by the younger man, threatened and egged on to murder by an overmastering bully. The whole tone and conduct of work, of management of the men, was altered, and for the best.

The goad of the sack was not so fearful; the filthiness and foulness of language was altered for an attempt at courtesy, which, if not refined, was at least a recognition of the manhood of our brothers.

From a condition of the foulest blackguardism in directing the work, the men found a greater respect shown them; they, too, grew in self-respect, and the men we saw after the strike were comparable to the most self-respecting of the other grades of labour.

The "calls" worked out satisfactorily; organisation took the place of the haphazard; the bosses who lazed and loafed on their subordinates were perforce obliged to earn instead of thieving their money; the work was better done; the men's lives were more regular as the work was—the docker had, in fact, become a man!

The man became greater in the happiness of a better supplied larder and home; and the women folk, with the children, shared the sense of security and peace the victory at the docks had wrought.

I must give myself the satisfaction here of putting on record the great kindness and forbearance shown to the Strike Committee, and to the stream of deputations they had to deal with, by Mrs. Hickey of the Wades' Arms. The hostess, her son, and her daughters had, indeed, a heavy task. We practically took possession of the house, not for an hour or two, but for all day and every day during the five weeks the strike lasted. But Mrs. Hickey treated these fellows—ourselves of the Committee included—as though she had been mother to the lot. She literally kept a shillelah handy, with which she frequently, in a half-serious way, would threaten any young fellow who was too noisy; but it was fine that these rough chaps respected her so thoroughly, and that she had the splendid tact to make it easy for them to keep good order all through the trying time.

I was generally one of the last members of the committee to get away. Often enough I left the premises nearer one o'clock than midnight—not to go home, for there was little chance of doing that, but to get to the house of Brother Jem Twomey, the chairman of the Strike Committee, with whom I used to stay.

I can honestly say, for my own part, that I cared nothing at all for the public meetings, whether on Tower Hill or elsewhere, or for what was thought of the fight by the public. I concentrated on the work of organisation, and was indifferent to outside opinion. I had been at it about three weeks, and was now dealing specially with the south side of the Thames.

One day I realised that my boots had become so worn out, and that I must get others, or go barefoot (we always had long marches, and I invariably marched with the crowd). I slipped away from the marching column as soon as I noticed a boot shop. Hastily buying a pair of boots, I put them on and hurried to catch up with the crowd. When we reached Sayes Court, Deptford, I spoke as usual upon the general situation. A few days later, we were marching again along the thoroughfare where I had bought the boots. My eye lighted on the shop window, and to my amazement I noticed my name on a card. I approached the window, and to my still greater astonishment I saw that the card bearing my name was on the pair of old boots I had shed a few days before. The writing on the card ran: "The boots worn by Tom Mann during the long marches in the Dock Strike." I was positively flabbergasted, to think that importance of any kind could attach to such articles, or to me.

I had become so inextricably involved in the dispute, and felt so completely a part of everything that was taking place, that I had left work, home, and all else, and paid no regard to anything other than the fight I was in. I scarcely noticed the papers, and had it not been for the subscriptions from Australia, I doubt if I should have known that the activities in which I was swallowed up had arrested attention outside this country. But, as events proved, the dock strike started a wave which spread over a great part of the world, and the working conditions of many millions were affected by it.

SOCIAL INSURANCE IN GERMANY

ONE OF THE MOST vexing problems bound up with the growth of industrial society is that of social insecurity. Under conditions of *laissez faire* nothing seems to protect the worker against the loss of income due to sickness, accidents, old age, or unemployment. Under feudal conditions this problem did not arise, at least not in any considerable magnitude. Prolonged unemployment did not occur; old people could still be employed on odd jobs on the land or in the house; work accidents were hardly typical, and sick people could be taken care of by their relatives without seriously impairing the latter's standard of living. Moreover, feudal customs and laws imposed upon the lord various duties of protecting his serfs in case of emergencies. The increasing replacement of feudal relationships by free wage contracts between employer and wage earner in modern industrial society changed the status of the worker from an unfree to a free person and by the same token threw upon him the responsibility of providing for a livelihood. The problem of insecurity became particularly acute under the factory system after the Industrial Revolution multiplied work hazards and made it advantageous to employ only the more efficient and cheaper younger workers. Further, the growing division of labor, with the resulting production for an anonymous market instead of to order for known customers, had a peculiar tendency of increasing economic instability and giving rise to periodic crises and recurrent unemployment. Faced with the problem of social insecurity, advocates of *laissez faire* were inclined to ask the rather rhetorical question "Why don't they save in good times in order to provide for rainy days?" What these advocates of thrift as a solution for the problem of insecurity overlooked was the fact that even the good times were hardly good enough to permit any accumulation of private savings by the workers. The problem clearly called for a solution on a national scale and in a more systematic fashion than that offered by individual thrift.

It is interesting to note that the modern system of mutual insurance which has become the typical approach to the solution of the problem of insecurity in all advanced countries was by no means a new one when it originally took shape in Germany in 1880. Sick benefit societies and private relief societies based upon the insurance principle have had a long history. Some of these insurance societies, especially those among German miners (*Knappschaftskassen*), can trace their origin back to the early sixteenth century. At first these societies were workmen's associations with no contributions from masters or employers. They usually provided sickness and invalidity benefits. Gradually these societies were reorganized and put on a contributory basis. Frederick II even made membership in them compulsory for all workers of a particular mine. Centralization of mining property led to a high degree of centralization of insurance societies for miners. It is these earlier forms of private insurance which served as a model for the system of compulsory social insurance in Germany which the Reichstag adopted,

largely through the initiative of Bismarck, from 1883 to 1889. The German measures inaugurated the era of social insurance legislation which cannot yet be regarded as closed, in view of the fact that even after the far-reaching provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 in the United States the struggle continues, for an extension of the principle to sickness insurance and for more adequate coverage and benefits.

The German legislation during the eighties provided for sickness insurance (1883), accident insurance (1884), and old age and invalidity insurance (1889). It made adherence to the insurance scheme compulsory, organized it upon a contributory basis and, in the case of old age and invalidity insurance, placed part of the financial burden upon the state.

Liberal opponents of social insurance have accused Bismarck of promoting state socialism. While it is doubtless correct that Bismarck was greatly influenced by the views held by individual members of the German Historical School who stood for social reform and were known as professorial socialists (*Kathedersozialisten*), he can hardly be called a state socialist. On the contrary he was "a thoroughgoing individualist in economic matters who keenly resented any interference of the state in his private business. The state should not concern itself either with the amount of his income, or with the management of his estates or factory" (Gustav Schmoller, Preface to Annie Ashley, *The Social Policy of Bismarck*, 1912). The real motives behind Bismarck's social policy were political. In addition to his general conservative views about the responsibility of the monarchy towards the "lower" classes, Bismarck was motivated by the desire to counteract the highly effective underground activities of the Social Democratic Party which had been outlawed by the *Act against the Aims of Social Democracy Dangerous to the Commonwealth* in 1878. Here again, then, one cannot help noticing the difference between social reforms in Germany and Western democracy. Whereas in England workers had the right to organize in trade unions as early as 1825, and ever since have been able to fight their own battles, social reforms in Bismarck's Germany were directed *against* the labor movement. "To governments still steeped in the traditions of absolutism it seemed safer to admit a tacit obligation to do for labour what it was not able or allowed to do for itself" (W. H. Dawson, *The German Empire, 1867-1914*, 1919). Needless to say, the socialists attacked the social insurance legislation as falling far short of their aims.

It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of social insurance. Its general effects upon industrial efficiency and national health in Germany have been the subject of the following significant comments, respectively, by Count Posadowsky in the German Reichstag of 1906, and Louis Loucheur in the French Chamber of Deputies in 1930:

"If Germany has just experienced a vast industrial expansion equalled by no other country in the world during the same time, it is chiefly due to the efficiency of the workers. But this efficiency must inevitably have suffered had we not secured to our working-classes, by the social legislation of recent years, a tolerable standard of life, and had we not, so far as was possible, guaranteed their physical health."

"In the year 1880 France had the lowest death rate of any country in Europe;

it was 20% less than Germany. In the year 1913 the death rate in France stood 25% higher than the German rate. Why? Because Germany has social insurance."

The following selections have been partly translated from Bismarck's *Gesammelte Werke* (Vol. XII, Berlin, 1929); and partly taken from W. H. Dawson, *Bismarck and State Socialism* (London, Swan Sonnenschein, 1891).



*SPEECH OPENING THE REICHSTAG,
FEBRUARY 15, 1881*

AT THE OPENING of the Reichstag in February, 1879, the Emperor, in reference to the [Anti-Socialist] law of October 21st, 1878, gave expression to the hope that this House would not refuse its cooperation in the remedying of social ills by means of legislation. A remedy cannot alone be sought in the repression of Socialistic excesses; there must be simultaneously the positive advancement of the welfare of the working classes. And here the care of those workpeople who are incapable of earning their livelihood is of the first importance. In the interest of these the Emperor has caused a bill for the insurance of workpeople against the consequences of accident to be sent to the Bundesrath—a bill which, it is hoped, will meet a need felt both by workpeople and employers. His Majesty hopes that the measure will in principle receive the assent of the Federal Governments, and that it will be welcomed by the Reichstag as a complement of the legislation affording protection against Social-Democratic movements. Past institutions intended to insure working people against the danger of falling into a condition of helplessness owing to the incapacity resulting from accident or age have proved inadequate, and their insufficiency has to no small extent contributed to cause the working classes to seek help by participating in Social-Democratic movements.

*OFFICIAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE FIRST
ACCIDENT INSURANCE BILL OF
MARCH 8, 1881*

THAT THE STATE should interest itself to a greater degree than hitherto in those of its members who need assistance, is not only a duty of humanity and Christianity—by which State institutions should be permeated—but a duty of State-preserving policy, whose aim should be to cultivate the conception—and that, too, amongst the non-propertied classes, which form at once the

most numerous and the least instructed part of the population—that the State is not merely a necessary but a beneficent institution. These classes must, by the evident and direct advantages which are secured to them by legislative measures, be led to regard the State not as an institution contrived for the protection of the better classes of society, but as one serving their own needs and interests. The apprehension that a Socialistic element might be introduced into legislation if this end were followed should not check us. So far as that may be the case it will not be an innovation but the further development of the modern State idea, the result of Christian ethics, according to which the State should discharge, besides the defensive duty of protecting existing rights, the positive duty of promoting the welfare of all its members, and especially those who are weak and in need of help, by means of judicious institutions and the employment of those resources of the community which are at its disposal. In this sense the legal regulation of poor relief which the modern State, in opposition to that of antiquity and of the Middle Ages, recognises as a duty incumbent upon it, contains a Socialistic element, and in truth the measures which may be adopted for improving the condition of the non-propertied classes are only a development of the idea which lies at the basis of poor relief. Nor should the fear that legislation of this kind will not attain important results unless the resources of the Empire and of the individual States be largely employed be a reason for holding back, for the value of measures affecting the future existence of society and the State should not be estimated according to the sacrifice of money which may be entailed. With a single measure, such as is at present proposed, it is of course impossible to remove entirely, or even to a considerable extent, the difficulties which are contained in the social question. This is, in fact, but the first step in a direction in which a difficult work, that will last for years, will have to be overcome gradually and cautiously, and the discharge of one task will only produce new ones.

*MESSAGE OF WILLIAM I TO THE REICHSTAG,
NOVEMBER 17, 1881*

WE HOLD IT as our imperial duty to urge upon the Reichstag anew the promotion of the welfare of the worker, and we should have so much the greater satisfaction in the achievement, with which God has certainly blessed our reign, to look back, if it should be attained in the future, with the consciousness that we had left the Fatherland new and growing assurance of its inner peace and greater certainty and productiveness of assistance to those needing help, to which they are entitled. In our carefully considered plan we are cer-

tain of the assent of all cooperating governments and rely upon the aid of the Reichstag without distinction of party alignment. Pursuant thereto the draft of a law concerning the insurance of the worker against industrial accidents has been prepared first. Supplementary to it a proposal accompanies it which puts forward the task of uniform organization of the industrial sickness fund affairs. But also those of the working population who become incapable of work because of age or invalidity, on the other hand, have an established claim upon a higher measure of state care, when it can be had for them. To find the right means and method for this care is a difficult, but also one of the highest, tasks of every community, which stands upon the common basis of Christian public life.

*SPEECH OF BISMARCK IN SUPPORT OF THE NEW
ACCIDENT INSURANCE BILL, MARCH 15, 1884*

I SHOULD LIKE us and the German Reichstag to have the merit of having made at least a beginning in this domain of legislation, and thus of having preceded the other European States. The limitation of the measure is dictated by the consideration that the wider and more comprehensive it is the more numerous are the interests touched, and therefore the greater the opposition on the part of the representatives of these interests, which will be aroused and will find expression here, so that the passing of the measure would be all the more difficult. The extent of the limitation should in my opinion be determined by the extent of the Employers' Liability Act of 1871, for I regarded it as our first duty to remove the deficiencies of the first attempt made in this domain by that law.

According to Frederick the Great, it is the duty of government to serve the people . . . The opposite would be to rule the people. We desire to serve the people . . . Only if you have decided not to improve the conditions of the workers do I understand why you reject the Anti-Socialist Law. For it is unjust to prevent a numerous class of compatriots from taking the necessary steps for their self defence and not to offer them a hand in removing the cause of their discontent. I can well understand that the leaders of the Social Democratic Party are not in favor of this law. What they need are precisely dissatisfied workers. They want to lead and to rule and in order to achieve this goal they need numerous dissatisfied classes. They must oppose each attempt of the government . . . to remove the causes of dissatisfaction since they do not want to lose their hold over the masses which they have led astray.

.. As soon as the State takes this matter [of insurance] in hand—and I be-

lieve it is its duty to take it in hand—it must seek the cheapest form of insurance, and, not aiming at profit for itself, must keep primarily in view the benefit of the poor and needy. Otherwise we might leave the fulfilment of certain State duties—such as poor relief, in the widest sense of the words, is amongst others—like education and national defence with more right to share-companies, only asking ourselves, Who will do it most cheaply? who will do it most effectively? If provision for the necessitous in a greater degree than is possible with the present poor relief legislation is a State duty, the State must take the matter in hand; it cannot rest content with the thought that a share-company will undertake it.

The whole matter centres in the question, Is it the duty of the State, or is it not, to provide for its helpless citizens? I maintain that it is its duty, that it is the duty not only of the "*Christian State*," as I ventured once to call it when speaking of "practical Christianity," but of every State. It would be foolish for a corporation to undertake matters which the individual can attend to alone; and similarly the purposes which the parish can fulfil with justice and with advantage are left to the parish. But there are purposes which only the State as a whole can fulfil. To these belong national defence, the general system of communications, and, indeed, everything spoken of in Article 4 of the constitution. To these, too, belong the help of the necessitous and the removal of those just complaints which provide Social Democracy with really effective material for agitation. This is a duty of the State, a duty which the State cannot permanently disregard.

I am not impressed if some people consider this law as socialistic. The question is rather how far one is to go in applying the principles of state socialism. Without the latter our economic life would become impossible. Every poor law is socialism. Indeed there are nations which do not want to have anything to do with socialism and which consequently have no poor laws at all. I need only mention the case of France. These conditions in France are reflected in the ideas of the eminent political economist Leon Say . . . whose views are based upon the conception that every French citizen has the right to starve and that the government is not obliged to prevent him from exercising this right. . . .

JOHN CECIL RHODES

FACTORS IN European imperialism of the late nineteenth century are sometimes catalogued under such headings as: the search for markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities; population pressure; humanitarian and missionary enterprise; national patriotism and the search for prestige and naval bases. The British seizure of Rhodesia is an example of enterprise in which the economic motive, combined with patriotism, played a major role.

By the year 1888, the "dark continent" of Africa had been opened to the light of Western civilization by traders, explorers, patriots, and missionaries, and much of the interior was already claimed by European powers. There remained, however, a broad corridor from south to north through the heart of Africa over which native chieftains still exercised control. One of these areas lay between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers, directly west of Portuguese Mozambique. Far to the northeast were lands claimed by the German East Africa Association. To the south and southwest were the Boer Republic of Transvaal and the newly acquired British Protectorate of Bechuanaland.

The recognized ruler of this territory, comprising more than 100,000 square miles, was a wily native chieftain named Lo Bengula, King of Matabeleland and Mashonaland of the Amandebele and related tribes. This chieftain had been able to cope with the few white traders, exporters, and missionaries who entered his domain, and he refused to sign away his independence to any company or country, as others had done.

In 1886, however, the discovery of gold in Transvaal brought to Lo Bengula's territory a parade of quarrelsome prospectors and concessions seekers whose demands became so insistent and whose rivalry so intense that Lo Bengula was hard put to it to maintain order, peace, and his own independence. His people were herders and farmers, with no interest in the subsoil, and they wished only to be let alone—vain hope! The importunate white men infested the Royal Kraal with the persistence of rats.

The rivalry was not international, except as the Boers were involved. The Germans remained far to the north and west, although they might not always remain so. The Portuguese, who talked of expansion, were so embarrassed financially and so weak militarily that no serious competition was expected from them. The concessions hunters were mostly English and a few Boers. In the end, the successful men were the agents of John Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902), trust builder, financier, mine operator, railway builder, and Cape Colony politician. Rhodes was also a British patriot, imperialist, and dreamer, and his most persistent vision was of a broad band of British pink stretching from the Cape to Cairo through the heart of Africa.

In the hope of finding new sources of income, new mines, new paths for his railways, and new land for the British Empire, Rhodes sent agents to join the others seeking concessions in Matabeleland. They represented interests which were vast and financially reliable, and they apparently persuaded Lo Bengula that, since

he could not keep white men from his lands, he might as well put everything into the hands of men who could pay well, meet their financial obligations, and who could help him maintain order. Lo Bengula signed.

Shortly thereafter the disappointed concessions seekers banded together and persuaded Lo Bengula that he had given too much for too little, and the chieftain tried to undo what he had done. But it was too late. Rhodes had already enlisted some distinguished British lords and financiers in a new company to exploit the territory and persuaded the British government to give the enterprise its blessing. Lo Bengula had to submit.

The sequel is interesting too. Rhodes sent pioneers into the country, not to mine but to farm. Lo Bengula and the natives were not cooperative and, in order to protect the English settlers, Rhodes followed up with troops who conquered the king and his army and took his cattle. Lo Bengula's sons became Rhodes scholars, but Matabeleland became Rhodesia.

The following selections from the official British documents, it is hoped, will tell the story. A note about names in the text may be helpful. Charles Rudd was one of Rhodes' earliest partners. George Cawston was his attorney in London. Umsheti and Babaan were natives, members of Lo Bengula's council of *Indunas*, or nobles.



THE TRAGEDY OF LO BENGULA

The Treaty of Peace and Amity

THE CHIEF Lo Bengula, Ruler of the tribe known as the Amandebele, together with the Mashuma and Makakalaka, tributaries of the same, hereby agrees to the following articles and conditions:

That peace and amity shall continue for ever between Her Britannic Majesty, Her subjects, and the Amandebele people; and the contracting chief Lo Bengula engages to use his utmost endeavours to prevent any rupture of the same, to cause the strict observance of this treaty, and so to carry out the spirit of the treaty of friendship which was entered into between his late father, the Chief Umsiligaas, with the then Governor of the Cape of Good Hope in the year of our Lord 1836.

It is hereby further agreed by Lo Bengula, Chief in and over the Amandebele country with its dependencies as aforesaid, on behalf of himself and people, that he will refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any Foreign State or Power to sell, alienate, or cede, or permit or countenance any

sale, alienation, or cession of the whole or any part of the said Amandebele country under his chieftainship, or upon any other subject, without the previous knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa.

In faith of which I, Lo Bengula, on my part have hereunto set my hand at Gubulawayo, Amandebeleland, this eleventh day of February, and of Her Majesty's reign the fifty-first.

(Signed)

Witnesses (Signed)

LO BENGULA, his X mark.

W. GRAHAM.

G. B. VAN WYK

Before me,

(Signed)

J. S. MOFFAT,

Assistant Commissioner.

February 11, 1888.

G. Cawston, Esq., to Colonial Office

Hatton Court, Threadneedle Street, London, E.C.

My Lord,

I have the honour to request you to permit me to draw your attention to the Treaty of Peace and Amity which has been signed between the High Commissioner of the British Government in South Africa and Lo Bengula, Chief of the Matebeles.

It is the intention of myself, in conjunction with others, to send a representative to Matebeleland to negotiate with Lo Bengula a treaty for trading, mining, and general purposes.

Before doing so we are desirous of ascertaining whether we shall have the support of the British Government. For, of course, capital will not be expended in the development of the country unless encouraged, as we trust it will be.

In the event of such encouragement being obtained would the High Commissioner at the Cape be requested to render such assistance as will be compatible with the wishes of Lo Bengula, and with the best interests of his country.

I have, etc.

(Signed) GEO. CAWSTON

To the Right Hon. Lord Knutsford, G.C.M.G.,

Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies

May 4, 1888

The Mining Concession

Know all men by these presents that whereas Charles Dunell Rudd of Kimberley, Rochfort Maguire of London, and Francis Robert Thompson of Kemberley, herein-after called the grantees, have covenanted and agreed and do hereby covenant and agree to pay to me my heirs and successors the sum of one hundred pounds sterling British currency on the first day of every lunar month, and further to deliver at my Royal Kraal one thousand Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles, together with one hundred thousand rounds of suitable ball cartridge, five hundred of the said rifles and fifty thousand of the said cartridges to be ordered from England forthwith and delivered with reasonable despatch, and the remainder of the said rifles and cartridges to be delivered as soon as the said grantees shall have commenced to work mining machinery within my territory, and further to deliver on the Zambesi River a steamboat with guns suitable for defensive purposes on the said river, or in lieu of the said steamboat, should I so elect, to pay me the sum of five hundred pounds sterling British currency on the execution of these presents, I, Lo Bengula, King of Matabeleland, Mashonaland, and other adjoining territories, in the exercise of my sovereign powers, and in the presence and with the consent of my Council of Indunas, do hereby grant and assign unto the said grantees, their heirs, representatives, and assigns, jointly and severally, the complete and exclusive charge over all metals and minerals situated and contained in my kingdoms, principalities, and dominions, together with full power to do all things that they may deem necessary to win and procure the same, and to hold, collect, and enjoy the profits and revenues, if any, derivable from the said metals and minerals subject to the aforesaid payment, and whereas I have been much molested of late by divers persons seeking and desiring to obtain grants and concessions of land and mining rights in my territories, I do hereby authorise the said grantees, their heirs, representatives, and assigns, to take all necessary and lawful steps to exclude from my kingdoms, principalities, and dominions all persons seeking land, metals, minerals, or mining rights therein, and I do hereby undertake to render them such needful assistance as they may from time to time require for the exclusion of such persons and to grant no concessions of land or mining rights from and after this date without their consent and concurrence, provided that if at any time the said monthly payment of one hundred pounds shall be in arrear for a period of three months then this grant shall cease and determine from the date of the last made payment, and further provided that nothing contained in these presents shall extend to or affect a grant made by me of certain

mining rights in a portion of my territory south of the Ramakoban River, which grant is commonly known as the Tati Concession.

This given under my hand this thirtieth day of October in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and eighty-eight at my Royal Kraal.

(Signed) LO BENGULA

his X mark

C. D. RUDD

ROCHFORD MAGUIRE

F. R. THOMPSON

Witnesses

(Signed) CHAS. D. HELM

J. G. DREYER

I hereby certify that the accompanying document has been fully interpreted and explained by me to the Chief Lo Bengula and his full Council of Indunas, and that all the constitutional usages of the Matabele nation had been complied with prior to his executing the same.

Dated at Umgusa River this thirtieth day of October 1888.

(Signed) CHAS. D. HELM

Message of Lo Bengula to Queen Victoria

Lo Bengula desires to know that there is a Queen. Some of the people who come into his land tell him there is a Queen, some of them tell him there is not.

Lo Bengula can only find out the truth by sending eyes to see whether there is a Queen.

The Indunas are his eyes.

Lo Bengula desires, if there is a Queen, to ask her to advise and help him, as he is much troubled by white men who come into his country and ask to dig gold.

There is no one with him upon whom he can trust, and he asks that the Queen will send someone from herself.

March 2, 1889

Message of the Queen to Lo Bengula

The Queen has heard the words of Lo Bengula. She is glad to receive the messengers from Lo Bengula, and to learn the message which he has sent.

The Queen will send words in reply through her Secretary of State, for the messengers to take to Lo Bengula.

A reply to the letter of Lo Bengula will be sent through the High Com-

missioner. Lo Bengula may trust in the advice and words of that officer, as he is specially appointed by the Queen to receive the words of all friendly Chiefs in South Africa, and to send to them any reply which the Queen may be pleased to give.

March 2, 1889

Lord Knutsford to Lo Bengula

(ENTRUSTED TO UMSHETI AND BABAAN)

I, Lord Knutsford, one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, am commanded by the Queen to give the following reply to the message delivered by Umsheti and Babaan.

The Queen has heard the words of Lo Bengula. She was g'lad to receive these messengers and to learn the message which they have brought.

They say that Lo Bengula is much troubled by white men, who come into his country and ask to dig gold, and that he begs for advice and help.

Lo Bengula is the ruler of his country, and the Queen does not interfere in the government of that country, but as Lo Bengula desires her advice, Her Majesty is ready to give it, and having therefore consulted Her Principal Secretary of State holding the Seals of the Colonial Department, now replies as follows:

In the first place, the Queen wishes Lo Bengula to understand distinctly that Englishmen who have gone out to Matabeleland to ask leave to dig for stones, have not gone with the Queen's authority, and that he should not believe any statements made by them or any of them to that effect.

The Queen advises Lo Bengula not to grant hastily concessions of land, or leave to dig, but to consider all applications very carefully.

It is not wise to put too much power into the hands of the men who come first, and to exclude other deserving men. A King gives a stranger an ox, not his whole herd of cattle, otherwise what would other strangers arriving have to eat?

Umsheti and Babaan say that Lo Bengula asks that the Queen will send him some one from herself. To this request the Queen is advised that Her Majesty may be pleased to accede. But they cannot say whether Lo Bengula wishes to have an Imperial officer to reside with him permanently, or only to have an officer sent out on a temporary mission, nor do Umsheti and Babaan state what provision Lo Bengula would be prepared to make for the expenses and maintenance of such an officer.

Upon this and any other matters Lo Bengula should write, and should send his letters to the High Commissioner at the Cape, who will send them direct to the Queen. The High Commissioner is the Queen's officer, and she

places full trust in him, and Lo Bengula should also trust him. Those who advise Lo Bengula otherwise deceive him.

The Queen sends Lo Bengula a picture of herself to remind him of this message, and that he may be assured that the Queen wishes him peace and order in his country.

The Queen thanks Lo Bengula for the kindness which, following the example of his father, he has shown to many Englishmen visiting and living in Matabeleland.

This message has been interpreted to Umsheti and Babaan in my presence, and I have signed it in their presence, and affixed the seal of the Colonial Office.

(Signed) KNUTSFORD

Colonial Office,
March 26, 1889

[Seal]

*To Her Majesty Queen Victoria from Lo Bengula,
King of the Amandebele*

King's Kraal, Ungusa River

Greeting:

Some time ago a party of men came into my country, the principal one appearing to be a man named Rudd. They asked me for a place to dig for gold, and said they would give me certain things for the right to do so. I told them to bring what they would give and I would then show them what I would give.

A document was written and presented to me for signature. I asked what it contained and was told that in it were my words and the words of those men.

I put my hand to it.

About three months afterwards I heard from other sources that I had given by that document the right to all the minerals in my country.

I called a meeting of my Indunas and also of the white men, and demanded a copy of the document. It was proved to me that I *had* signed away the mineral rights of my whole country to Rudd and his friends.

I have since had a meeting of my Indunas, and they will not recognise the paper as it contains neither my words nor the words of those who got it.

After the meeting I demanded that the original document be returned to me. It has not come yet, although it is two months since, and they promised to bring it back soon.

The men of the party who were in my country at the time were told to

remain until the document was brought back. One of them, Maguire, has now left without my knowledge and against my orders.

I write to you that you may know the truth about this thing and may not be deceived.

With renewed and cordial greetings.

I am your friend,

As Witnesses:

G. A. PHILLIPS

MOSS COHEN

JAMES FAIRBAIRN

(Signed) LO BENGULA

his X mark

[Elephant seal of Lo Bengula]

W. F. USHER, Interpreter

April 23, 1889

Creation of the British South Africa Company

VICTORIA BY THE GRACE OF GOD, OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND IRELAND QUEEN, DEFENDER OF THE FAITH

To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

Whereas a Humble Petition has been presented to Us in Our Council by the Most Noble James Duke of Abercorn, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; the Most Noble Alexander William George Duke of Fife, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, Privy Councillor; the Right Honourable Edric Frederick Lord Gifford, V.C.; Cecil John Rhodes, of Kimberley, in the Cape Colony, Member of the Executive Council and of the House of Assembly of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope; Alfred Beit, of 29, Holborn Viaduct, London, Merchant; Albert Henry George Grey, of Howick, Northumberland, Esquire; and George Cawston, of 18, Lennox Gardens, London, Esquire, Barrister-at-law.

And whereas the said Petition states amongst other things:

That the Petitioners and others are associated, for the purpose of forming a Company or Association, to be incorporated, if to Us should seem fit, for the objects in the said Petition set forth under the corporate name of The British South Africa Company.

That the existence of a powerful British Company, controlled by those of Our subjects in whom We have confidence, and having its principal field of operations in that region of South Africa lying to the north of Bechuanaland and to the west of Portuguese East Africa, would be advantageous to the commercial and other interests of Our subjects in the United Kingdom and in Our Colonies.

That the Petitioners desire to carry into effect divers concessions and agreements which have been made by certain of the chiefs and tribes inhabiting the said region, and such other concessions agreements grants and treaties as the Petitioners may hereafter obtain within the said region or elsewhere in Africa with the view of promoting trade commerce civilisation and good government (including the regulation of liquor traffic with the Natives) in the territories which are or may be comprised or referred to in such concessions agreements grants and treaties as aforesaid.

That the Petitioners believe that if the said concessions agreements grants and treaties can be carried into effect, the condition of the Natives inhabiting the said territories will be materially improved and their civilisation advanced and an organisation established which will tend to the suppression of the slave trade in the said territories, and to the opening up of the said territories, to the immigration of Europeans, and to the lawful trade and commerce of Our subjects and of other nations.

That the success of the enterprise in which the Petitioners are engaged would be greatly advanced if it should seem fit to Us to grant them Our Royal Charter of incorporation as a British Company under the said name or title, or such other name or title, with such powers, as to Us may seem fit for the purpose of more effectually carrying into effect the objects aforesaid.

That large sums of money have been subscribed for the purposes of the intended Company by the Petitioners and others, who are prepared also to subscribe or to procure such further sums as may hereafter be found requisite for the development of the said enterprise, in the event of Our being pleased to grant to them Our Royal Charter of incorporation as aforesaid.

Now, therefore, We having taken the said Petition into Our Royal consideration in Our Council, and being satisfied that the intentions of the petitioners are praiseworthy and deserve encouragement, and that the enterprise in the petition described may be productive of the benefits set forth therein, by Our Prerogative Royal and of Our especial grace, certain knowledge and mere motion, have constituted, erected, and incorporated, and by this Our Charter for Us and Our heirs and Royal successors do constitute, erect, and incorporate into one body politic and corporate by the name of the British South Africa Company the said James Duke of Abercorn, Alexander William George Duke of Fife, Edric Frederick Lord Gifford, Cecil John Rhodes, Alfred Beit, Albert Henry George Grey and George Cawston, and such other persons and such bodies as from time to time become and are members of the body politic and corporate by these presents constituted, erected and incorporated, with perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to break, alter, or renew the same at discretion, and with the further authorities,

powers, and privileges conferred, and subject to the conditions imposed by this Our Charter: And We do hereby accordingly will ordain give grant constitute appoint and declare as follows (that is to say)—

1. The principal field of the operations of The British South Africa Company (in this our Charter referred to as “the Company”) shall be the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese Dominions.

2. The Company is hereby authorised and empowered to hold, use, and retain for the purposes of the Company and on the terms of this Our Charter the full benefit of the concessions and agreements made as aforesaid, so far as they are valid, or any of them, and all interests, authorities and powers comprised or referred to in the said concessions and agreements. Provided always that nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect any other valid and subsisting concessions or agreements which may have been made by any of the chiefs or tribes aforesaid, and in particular nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect certain concessions granted in and subsequent to the year 1880 relating to the territory usually known as the district of the Tati; nor shall anything herein contained be construed as giving any jurisdiction, administrative or otherwise within the said district of the Tati. . . .

3. The Company is hereby further authorized and empowered, subject to the approval of one of Our Principal Secretaries of State . . . , from time to time, to acquire by any concession agreement grant or treaty, all or any rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions, and powers of any kind of nature whatever, including powers necessary for the purposes of government, and the preservation of public order in or for the protection of territories, lands, or property, comprised or referred to in the concessions and agreements made as aforesaid, or affecting other territories, lands, or property in Africa, or the inhabitants thereof, and to hold, use, and exercise such territories, lands, property, rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions, and powers respectively for the purposes of the Company, and on the terms of this Our Charter. . . .

Witness Ourself at Westminster, the (29th) day of (October) in the fifty (third) year of Our reign.

By warrant under the Queen's Sign Manual.

Message to Lo Bengula

I, Lord Knutsford, one of the Queen's Principal Secretaries of State, am commanded by Her Majesty to send this further message to Lo Bengula. The Queen has kept in her mind the letter sent by Lo Bengula, and the message brought by Umsheti and Babaan in the beginning of this year, and she has

now desired Mr. Moffat, whom she trusts, and whom Lo Bengula knows to be his true friend, to tell him what she has done for him and what she advises him to do.

2. Since the visit of Lo Bengula's Envoys, the Queen has made the fullest inquiries into the particular circumstances of Matabeleland, and understands the trouble caused to Lo Bengula by different parties of white men coming to his country to look for gold; but wherever gold is, or wherever it is reported to be, there it is impossible for him to exclude white men, and, therefore, the wisest and safest course for him to adopt, and that which will give least trouble to himself and his tribe, is to agree, not with one or two white men separately, but with one approved body of white men, who will consult Lo Bengula's wishes and arrange where white people are to dig, and who will be responsible to the Chief for any annoyance or trouble caused to himself or his people. If he does not agree with one set of people there will be endless disputes among the white men, and he will have all this time taken up in deciding their quarrels.

3. The Queen, therefore, approves of the concession made by Lo Bengula to some white men, who were represented in his country by Messrs. Rudd, Maguire, and Thompson. The Queen has caused inquiry to be made respecting these persons, and is satisfied that they are men who will fulfil their undertakings, and who may be trusted to carry out the working for gold in the Chief's country without molesting his people, or in any way interfering with their kraals, gardens, or cattle. And, as some of the Queen's highest and most trusted subjects have joined themselves with those to whom Lo Bengula gave his concessions, the Queen now thinks Lo Bengula is acting wisely in carrying out his agreement with these persons, and hopes that he will allow them to conduct their mining operations without interference or molestation from his subjects.

4. The Queen understands that Lo Bengula does not like deciding disputes among white men or assuming jurisdiction over them. This is very wise, as these disputes would take up much time, and Lo Bengula cannot understand the laws and customs of white people; but it is not well to have people in his country who are subject to no law, therefore the Queen thinks Lo Bengula would be wise to entrust to that body of white men, of whom Mr. Jamieson is now the principal representative in Matabeleland, the duty of deciding disputes and keeping the peace among white persons in his country.

5. In order to enable them to act lawfully and with full authority, the Queen has, by her Royal Charter, given to that body of men leave to undertake this duty, and will hold them responsible for their proper performance of such duty. Of course this must be as Lo Bengula likes, as he is King of the country,

and no one can exercise jurisdiction in it without his permission; but it is believed that this will be very convenient for the Chief, and the Queen is informed that he has already made such an arrangement in the Tati district, by which he is there saved all trouble.

6. The Queen understands that Lo Bengula wishes to have some one from her residing with him. The Queen, therefore, has directed her trusted servant, Mr. Moffat, to stay with the Chief as long as he wishes. Mr. Moffat is, as Lo Bengula knows, a true friend to himself and the Matabele tribe, while he is also in the confidence of the Queen and will from time to time convey the Queen's words to the Chief, and the Chief should always listen to and believe Mr. Moffat's words.

(Signed) KNUTSFORD

Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies

Downing Street

November 15 1889

ANDRÉ GIDE

THE RIGHTS and wrongs of modern colonialism have been discussed at great length and with much moral fervor by writers on both sides of the question, but perhaps no critic has brought greater psychological discernment or more searching objectivity to his task than did André Gide (1869-1951). In his two books (*Voyage au Congo*, 1927, and *Le Retour du Tchad*, 1928) he used no second-hand evidence but presented only a calm description of what he had seen on a vacation trip through French Equatorial Africa in 1925. His indictment of the colonial administration was all the more telling in that his account was presented dispassionately and without exaggeration. His personal influence—as one of France's leading men of letters—and the pressure of public opinion which his books aroused, compelled the Chamber of Deputies to launch an official investigation of the abuses he had exposed. Some corrective measures were eventually taken, but most of these were subsequently nullified by the influence of the great rubber companies operating in the Congo.

Gide's criticism did not stem from any doctrinaire political or economic philosophy—indeed at the time his *Travels in the Congo* appeared he was known primarily as a convinced protagonist of “pure literature” and of “art for art's sake.” He was equally famous as the apostle of an individualism so extreme that it demanded liberation not only from the shackles of family, church, and social convention, but even from the individual's own moral scruples. He had previously concerned himself but little with social questions, and—far from having any preconceived opinions about capitalism or colonialism—he had believed that the human condition could be improved only by changing men's own natures. He had been content to leave such matters as colonial policy to the constituted authorities and their expert advisers. In the Congo, however, “. . . it was not the same thing. There I could not doubt that, as far as the wronged were concerned, nobody would be there to hear them.”

The following passages are reprinted from *Travels in the Congo*, which includes both *To the Congo* and *Back from Chad*. The book was translated from the French by Dorothy Bussy and published in 1929 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.; this selection is used by permission of the publisher.



TRAVELS IN THE CONGO

Bangui, 27 October

WE WENT to bed early and were both fast asleep under our mosquito-nets in the post hut when, at about two o'clock in the morning, a noise of steps and voices woke us up. Someone wanted to come in. We called out in Sango: “*Zo niè?* (Who is there?)” It was a native chief of

some importance, who had called before that same evening while we were at dinner, but, being afraid of disturbing us, he had put off the interview he wished to have until the next morning; in the mean time, a messenger, sent after him by Pacha, the administrator of Boda, had just arrived with orders that he should return at once to his village. He was obliged to obey. But in despair at seeing his last chance of speaking to us vanish, he had made so bold as to wake us up at this impossible hour. He talked with extreme volubility in a language of which we understood not a single word. We begged him to let us sleep. He could come back later when we should have an interpreter. We promised to take the responsibility of the delay on ourselves and to shield him from the terrible Pacha. Why should this latter be so anxious to prevent the chief Samba N'Goto from giving us his message? We easily understood the reason when next morning, with Mobaye acting as interpreter, we learnt the following circumstances from Samba N'Goto.

On October 21 last (six days ago, that is) Sergeant Yemba was sent by the administrator of Boda to Bodembéré in order to execute reprisals on the inhabitants of this village (between Boda and N'Goto), who had refused to obey the order to move their settlement on to the Carnot road. They pleaded that they were anxious not to abandon their plantations and urged besides that the people established on the Carnot road are Bayas, while they are Bofis.

Sergeant Yemba therefore left Boda with three guards (whose names we carefully noted). This small detachment was accompanied by the capita Baoué, and two men under his command. On the road, Sergeant Yemba requisitioned two or three men from each of the villages they passed through, and after having put them in chains, took them along with the party. When they arrived at Bodempéré, the reprisals began; twelve men were seized and tied up to trees, while the chief of the village, a man called Cobelé, took flight. Sergeant Yemba and the guard Bonjo then shot and killed the twelve men who had been tied up. Then followed a great massacre of women, whom Yemba struck down with a matchet; after which he seized five young children, shut them up in a hut, and set fire to it. In all, said Samba N'Goto, there were thirty-two victims.

We must add to this number the capita of M'Biri, who had fled from his village (Boubakara, near N'Goto) and whom Yemba came upon at Bossué, the first village north of N'Goto.

We also learnt that Samba N'Goto was returning to Boda, where he lives and had nearly reached it when on the road he met Governor Lamblin's car, which was taking us to N'Goto. At this he turned back, thinking that it contained the Governor himself and anxious to appeal to him in person. He must have walked very quickly, as he arrived at N'Goto a very short time after us.

He was determined not to let this unhopèd-for chance of appealing to the white chief escape him.¹

28 October

Samba N'Goto's deposition lasted more than two hours. It was raining. This was no passing tornado shower. The sky was thickly covered; the rain had set in for long. We started nevertheless at ten o'clock. I sat beside Mobaye; Marc and Zézé settled themselves inside the lorry as comfortably as they could on the sleeping-bags, though they found it very stifling under the tarpaulin. The road was sodden and the car's progress was despairingly slow. At the slightest hill and also in the parts where the road was too sandy, we had to get out in the rain and push, to prevent the lorry from sticking in the mud.

We were so much upset by Samba N'Goto's deposition and by Garron's tales that when, in the forest, we came across a group of women who were mending the road, we had no heart even to smile at them. These poor creatures, more like cattle than human beings, were in the streaming rain, a number of them with babies at the breast. Every twenty yards or so there were huge pits by the side of the road, generally about ten feet deep; it was out of these that the poor wretches had dug the sandy earth with which to bank the road, and this *without proper tools*. It has happened more than once that the loose earth has given way and buried the women and children who were working at the bottom of the pit. We were told this by several persons.² As they usually work too far from the village to return at night, the poor women have built themselves temporary huts in the forest, wretched shelters of branches and reeds, useless against the rain. We heard that the native soldier who is their overseer had made them work all night in order to repair the damage done by a recent storm and to enable us to pass. . . .

29 October

This morning I went to see one of the native chiefs who came to meet us yesterday. This evening he returned my visit. We had a long conversation. Adoum, sitting on the ground between the chief and me, acted as interpreter.

¹ Needless to say, Samba N'Goto was flung into prison as soon as he returned to Boda. A letter to Pacha which I had given him in order to excuse his delay and protect him if possible was of no avail. He was flung into prison with several members of his family whom Pacha was easily able to lay his hands on. In the mean time, Pacha absented himself on tour, accompanied by that very Yemba, whose exploits had by no means brought him into disgrace. I hasten to add that this impunity did not last long, nor the incarceration of Samba N'Goto either. On the receipt of my letter the Governor ordered an official inquiry. It was entrusted to M. Marchessou, inspector of Ubangui-Shari, who confirmed everything stated above. This led to the prosecution of Pacha.

² It is to be noted that this murderous road, which was particularly difficult to lay, owing to the nature of the soil, serves exclusively for the car which once a month takes the Forestière's representative, Mr. M., accompanied by the administrator Pacha to the market at Bambio.

The information of the Bambio chief confirms everything that I heard from Samba N'Goto. In particular, he gave me an account of "the ball" last market day at Boda. I here transcribe the story as I copied it from Garron's private diary.

At Bambio, on September 8, ten rubber-gatherers (twenty, according to later information³) belonging to the Goundi gang, who work for the *Compagnie Forestière*—because they had not brought in any rubber the month before (but this month they brought in double, from 40 to 50 kilogrammes)—were condemned to go round and round the factory under a fierce sun, carrying very heavy wooden beams. If they fell down, they were forced up by guards flogging them with whips.

The "ball" began at eight o'clock and lasted the whole day, with Messrs. Pacha and Maudurier, the company's agent, looking on. At about eleven o'clock a man from Bagouma, called Malongué, fell to get up no more. When M. Pacha was informed of this, he merely replied: "*Je m'en f—*" and ordered the "ball" to go on. All this took place in the presence of the assembled inhabitants of Bambio and of all the chiefs who had come from the neighbouring villages to attend the market.

The chief spoke to us also of the conditions reigning in the Boda prison; of the wretched plight of the natives and of how they are fleeing to some less accursed country. My indignation against Pacha is naturally great, but the *Compagnie Forestière* plays a part in all this, which seems to be very much graver, though more secret. For, after all, it—its representatives, I mean—knew everything that was going on. It (or its agents) profited by this state of things. Its agents approved Pacha, encouraged him, were his partners. It was at their request that Pacha arbitrarily threw into prison the natives who did not furnish enough stuff; etc. . . .

As I am anxious to make a good job of my letter to the Governor, I have decided to put off leaving here till the day after tomorrow. The short time I have passed in French Equatorial Africa has already put me on my guard against "authentic accounts," exaggerations and deformations of the smallest facts. I am terribly afraid, however, that this scene of the "ball" was nothing exceptional, if the stories of several eyewitnesses, whom I questioned one after the other, are to be believed. The terror Pacha inspires makes them implore me not to name them. No doubt they will withdraw everything later on and deny that they ever saw anything. When a Governor goes on tour, his subordinates usually present reports containing the facts they think most likely to please him. Those that I have to place before him are of a kind, I fear, that may never come to his notice, and the voices that might inform him of them will be carefully stifled. A simple tourist like myself may, I feel sure,

³ They were all fined a sum equal to the price of their work. Consequently they worked for two months for nothing. One of them, who tried "to argue," was besides condemned to a month's imprisonment.

often hear and see things which never reach a person in his high position.

When I accepted this mission, I failed to grasp at first what it was I was undertaking, what part I could play, how I could be useful. I understand it now and I am beginning to think that my coming will not have been in vain.

During my stay in the colony I have come to realize how terribly the problems which I have to solve are interwoven one with the other. Far be it from me to raise my voice on points which are not within my competence and which necessitate a prolonged study. But this is a matter of certain definite facts, completely independent of questions of a general order. Perhaps the *chef de circonscription* has been already informed of them. From what the natives tell me, he seems to be ignorant of them. The circumscription is too vast; a single man who is without the means of rapid transport is unable to keep his eye on the whole of it. One is here, as everywhere else in French Equatorial Africa, brought up against those two terrible impediments: want of sufficient staff; want of sufficient money.

We held a grand view of our porters this evening by moonlight on the vast open space behind the shelter house. Marc told them off, arranged them in groups of ten, showed them how to count themselves. The ones who could understand shouted with laughter at those who could not. We distributed a spoonful of salt to each man, which caused an outburst of lyrical gratitude and enthusiastic protestations of devotion.

30 October

Impossible to sleep. The Bambio "ball" haunted my night. I cannot content myself with saying, as so many do, that the natives were still more wretched before the French occupation. We have shouldered responsibilities regarding them which we have no right to evade. The immense pity of what I have seen has taken possession of me; I know things to which I cannot reconcile myself. What demon drove me to Africa, What did I come out to find in this country, I was at peace. I know now. I must speak.

But how can I get people to listen, Hitherto I have always spoken without the least care whether I was heard or not; always written for tomorrow, with the single desire of lasting. Now I envy the journalist, whose voice carries at once, even if it perishes immediately after. Have I been walking hitherto between high walls of falsehood? I must get behind them, out on to the other side, and learn what it is they are put to hide, even if the truth is horrible. The horrible truth that I suspect is what I must see.

Spent the whole day composing my letter. . . .

31 October

. . . Long conversation with the two chiefs of the Bakongo village. But the one who was at first talking to us alone, stopped as soon as the other came up. He would not say another word; and nothing could be more harrowing than his silence and his fear of compromising himself when we questioned him about the Boda prison, where he has himself been confined. When he was again alone with us later on, he told us that he had seen ten men die in it in a single day, as a result of ill treatment. He himself bears the marks of flogging and showed us his scars. He confirmed what we had already heard,⁴ that the prisoners receive as sole food, once a day, a ball of manioc as big as—he showed us his fist.

He spoke of the fines that the Compagnie Forestière are in the habit of inflicting on the natives who fail to bring in sufficient quantities of rubber—fines of forty francs—that is to say, the whole of one month's pay. He added that when the wretched man has not enough to pay the fine, he can only escape being thrown into prison by borrowing from someone better off than himself; if he can find such a person—and then he is sometimes thrown into prison "into the bargain." Terror reigns and the surrounding villages are deserted. We talked to other chiefs. When they are asked: "How many men in your village," they count them by putting down a finger for each one. There are rarely more than ten. Adoum acts as interpreter.

Adoum is intelligent, but he does not know French very well. When we halt in the forest, he says it is because we have found a "palace" (for a "place"). He says "*un nomme*" (instead of "*un homme*"), and when we tell him to ask a chief: "How many men have run away from your village, or have been put in prison?" Adoum answers: "Here ten *nommes*; there six *nommes*; and eight *nommes* farther on."

A great many natives come to see us. So-and-so asks for a paper to certify that he is sorcerer-in-chief to a great many villages; so-and-so wants a paper to authorize him to go away and "make a little village all by himself." When I inquire how many prisoners there are in the Boda jail, the only answer I get, whoever it may be who gives it, is: "Many; many; me can't count." There seem to be numbers of women and children as well among the prisoners. . . .

9 November

. . . I should like to preserve here some record of yesterday evening's fantastic party. We were dining at Dr. B.'s with A., the young agent of the Société Wial (only twenty-two years old), and L., the river steamship captain, who has just arrived from Brazzaville. We very soon noticed that the doctor

⁴ Confirmed in turn by the official inquiry.

was not in a perfectly normal state; it was not only his excited remarks, but I saw that when he offered me wine, I had the greatest difficulty in keeping my glass under the bottle—he kept trying to pour it out *on the other side*. And on several occasions he put the piece of meat on his fork down on the tablecloth, instead of putting it into his mouth. He got more and more excited, without, however, drinking too much; but perhaps he had already drunk a good deal, in honour of the steamer's arrival. But it was not so much drink that I suspected as . . . The day before, I had shown him my letter to Governor Alfassa, containing the serious charges against Pacha; he had seemed indignant; then, that evening, when I imprudently spoke of sending my letter to the minister, seized with fear, no doubt, or from a sort of feeling of solidarity, he burst out into protests that there were numbers of officials and administrators who were honest, devoted, conscientious, excellent workers. I, in my turn, protested that I had never doubted it, and that I knew a great many such; but that it was all the more important that a few unfortunate exceptions (and I added that of the quantities of officials of all ranks I had seen, I had never met but one) should not bring discredit upon the others.

"But," he cried, "you won't be able to prevent attention's being called especially to that exception, and public opinion will be formed on it. It is deplorable."

There was a good deal of truth in what he said, and I was aware of it. He seemed to be afraid that he had gone too far in approving my letter the day before, and to be making a protest against that very approbation. For immediately afterwards he started approving a policy of brutality towards the blacks, affirming that one could get nothing out of them except by blows, and by making examples, even bloody ones. He went so far as to say that he himself had one day killed a Negro; then he added hastily that it was in defence, not of himself, but of a friend, who would otherwise have certainly been done in. Then he said that the only way to be respected by the Negroes was to make oneself feared, and he spoke of a confrere, Dr. X., the doctor who had preceded him at Nola, who, as he was peacefully going through the village of Katakouo (or Katapo), which we had gone through the day before, was seized, bound, stripped, daubed with paint from head to foot, and forced to dance to the sound of the tamtam for two days on end. He was only delivered by a squadron that was sent from Nola. . . . All this was said more and more queerly, more and more incoherently and excitedly. We were all silent; no one else spoke a word. And if we had not finally broken up the party, because we had our packing to attend to for the next morning's start, he would certainly have said more. He almost went so far as to approve Pacha; at any rate, everything he said was with the unavowed object of excusing him

and of repudiating me. He said besides (and, if true, this is very important) that the recognized chiefs of the villages are more often than not men who are held in no consideration among the natives they are supposed to rule; that they are former slaves, mere figure-heads, chosen to shoulder responsibilities and suffer any punishments that may be inflicted; and that all the inhabitants of the villages were delighted when they were flung into jail. The real chief is a secret chief, whom the French government hardly ever get to know of.

I can only repeat his remarks more or less roughly; I cannot give any idea of the fantastic, uncanny atmosphere of the scene. One could only manage this with a great deal of art and I am writing as it comes. It should be noted that the doctor began the subject abruptly, by a direct attack, evidently premeditated; the soup had not been cleared away before he suddenly asked me whether I had been to see the Nola cemetery. And when I said no, "Well! there are sixteen white men's graves there," etc. . . .

10 November

. . . The obligingness and attentiveness and zeal of our boys is beyond words; as for our cook, his cooking is the best we have tasted in this country. I continue to think, and think more and more, that most of the faults people complain of in the servants here come more than anything from the way in which they are treated and spoken to. We can only be congratulated on ours—to whom we have never spoken an unkind word, to whom we trust all our possessions, and who, so far, have shown themselves scrupulously honest. More than that: we leave all our small objects lying about in view of our porters, and in view of the inhabitants of the villages we pass through—objects that are exceedingly tempting to them and the theft of which it would be exceedingly difficult to discover—a thing we should never dare do in France—and so far nothing has disappeared. A mutual confidence and cordiality have sprung up between our servants and us, and all, without a single exception, are as nice to us as we make a point of being to them.⁵

⁵ This judgment, which might seem premature, was only more and more confirmed as time went on. And I confess I cannot understand why all Europeans, almost without exception, officials as well as traders, women as well as men, think it necessary to treat their servants roughly—in speech, at any rate—even when they show them real kindness. I know a lady, who is otherwise charming and gentle, who never calls her boy anything but "*tête de brute*" ("blockhead" is a mild translation of this), though she never raises her hand against him. Such is the custom. "You will end by it too. Wait and see." We waited ten months without changing our servants and we did not end by it. Were we particularly lucky? Perhaps. . . . But I am inclined to think that every master has the servants he deserves, and what I say does not apply only to the Congo. What servant in our country would care to remain honest if he heard his master deny him the possession of a single virtue? If I had been Mr. X.'s boy, I should have robbed him the very same night I heard him declare that all Negroes were cheats, liars, and thieves.

I am going on with Adoum's reading-lessons. His application is touching; he is getting on steadily, and every day I am becoming more attached to him. When the white man gets angry with the blacks' stupidity, he is usually showing up his own foolishness! Not that I think them capable of any but the slightest mental development; their brains as a rule are dull and stagnant—but how often the white man seems to make it his business to thrust them back into their darkness.

"Doesn't your boy understand French?" I asked with some uneasiness.

"He speaks it admirably. . . . Why?"

"Aren't you afraid that what you have just said . . . ?"

"It'll teach him that I'm not taken in by him."

At the same dinner I heard a guest declare that all women (and he wasn't talking of Negresses this time) care for nothing but pleasure as long as they are worthy of our attentions, and that no woman is ever really pious before the age of forty.

These gentlemen have the same knowledge of Negroes that they have of women. Experience rarely teaches us anything. A man uses everything he comes across to strengthen him in his own opinion and sweeps everything into his net to prove his convictions. . . . No prejudice so absurd but finds its confirmation in experience.

Negroes, who are prodigiously malleable, oftener than not become what people think, or want, or fear them to be. I would not swear that our boys too might not have been turned into rascals. One has only to set about it in the right way; and colonials are extraordinarily ingenious in this matter. One teaches his parrot to say: "Get out, dirty nigger!" Another is angry because his boy brings vermouth and bitters after dinner instead of liqueurs. "Double-dyed idiot! Don't you know yet what an *apéritif* is? . . ." Another time a poor boy who, thinking he was doing right, had warmed a porcelain tea-pot with boiling water is railed at before the whole company and again called a fool. Hadn't he been taught that hot water broke glasses?

XI

SOCIAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE RECENT PAST

JOHN STUART MILL

THE SOCIAL THOUGHT of Mill stands midway between that of Herbert Spencer, the other leading spokesman for the liberalism of the period (with its emphasis upon liberty as the absence of government restraints), and that of such philosophers as T. H. Green, who emphasized that the right of liberty was, not a natural endowment of the individual, but a social ideal, aiming to release individual potentialities. The divergence of these two contrasting types of liberalism has continued to the present. John Stuart Mill's works constantly oscillate between these two poles—his habitual reluctance to admit government to too wide a power over individual activities and his readiness, to which the flexible character of the principle of utility contributed, to espouse positive governmental reforms in order to bring about conditions more conducive to the general happiness. Thus, in his *Principles of Political Economy* Mill's insistence upon the test of utility brings about his most notable departure from orthodox economic theory—his espousal of what he was later to call "socialistic" institutions of distribution. While he differs from classical economics in his insistence that the laws of distribution are of human contrivance, Mill continues to support the belief that the laws of production are "natural laws" and therefore unchangeable.

Mill's essay *On Liberty* takes its place with Milton's *Areopagitica* as a classic English defense of civil liberties and cultural freedom. He wrote it with the cooperation of his wife and published it in 1859. Its argument departs from traditional liberal and utilitarian statements in a number of respects. Most important is its emphasis upon the principle of diversity and its consequent consideration of safeguards against the tyranny of the majority, in contrast with the more characteristic preoccupation of the Philosophic Radicals with majority rule. Mill's argument in *On Liberty* transcends an appeal to the utilitarian "greatest happiness" standard, making of freedom of inquiry and of discussion a necessary ingredient of human happiness.



ON LIBERTY

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTORY

. . . THE OBJECT of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form

of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.

It is proper to state that I forgo any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the larger sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of each, which concern the interest of other people. If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a *prima facie* case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow creature's life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception. In all things which regard the external relations of the individual, he is *de jure* amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to society as their protector. There are often good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility; but these reasons must arise from the special expedencies of the case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act better, when left to his own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which society have it in their power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce other evils, greater than those which it would prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgement-seat, and protect those interests of others which have no external protection; judging himself all the more rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made accountable to the judgement of his fellow creatures.

But there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participa-

tion. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself; and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.

Though this doctrine is anything but new, and to some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and practice. Society has expended fully as much effort in the attempt (according to its lights) to compel people to conform to its notions of personal, as of social excellence. The ancient commonwealths thought themselves entitled to practise, and the ancient philosophers countenanced, the regulation of every part of private conduct by public authority, on the ground that the State had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its citizens; a mode of thinking which may have been admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of being subverted by foreign attack or internal com-

motion, and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects of freedom. In the modern world, the greater size of political communities, and, above all, the separation between spiritual and temporal authority (which placed the direction of men's consciences in other hands than those which controlled their worldly affairs), prevented so great an interference by law in the details of private life; but the engines of moral repression have been wielded more strenuously against divergence from the reigning opinion in self-regarding, than even in social matters; religion, the most powerful of the elements which have entered into the formation of moral feeling, having almost always been governed either by the ambition of a hierarchy, seeking control over every department of human conduct, or by the spirit of Puritanism. And some of those modern reformers who have placed themselves in strongest opposition to the religions of the past, have been no way behind either churches or sects in their assertion of the right of spiritual domination: M. Comte, in particular, whose social system, as unfolded in his *Système de Politique Positive*, aims at establishing (though by moral more than by legal appliances) a despotism of society over the individual, surpassing anything contemplated in the political ideal of the most rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers. . . .

CHAPTER II: OF THE LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION

The time, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be necessary of the "liberty of the press" as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear. This aspect of the question, besides, has been so often and so triumphantly enforced by preceding writers, that it needs not be specially insisted on in this place. Though the law of England, on the subject of the press, is as servile to this day as it was in the time of the Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force against political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when fear of insurrection drives ministers and judges from their propriety; and, speaking generally, it is not, in constitutional countries, to be apprehended, that the government, whether completely responsible to the people or not, will often attempt to control the expression of opinion, except when in doing so it makes itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public. Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I

deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.

It is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still . . .

We have . . . recognized the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds; which we will now briefly recapitulate.

First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.

Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.

Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cum-

bering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.

Before quitting the subject of freedom of opinion, it is fit to take some notice of those who say, that the free expression of all opinions should be permitted, on condition that the manner be temperate, and do not pass the bounds of fair discussion. Much might be said on the impossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are to be placed; for if the test be offence to those whose opinion is attacked, I think experience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is telling and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent. But this, though an important consideration in a practical point of view, merges in a more fundamental objection. Undoubtedly the manner of asserting an opinion, even though it be a true one, may be very objectionable, and may justly incur severe censure. But the principal offences of the kind are such as it is mostly impossible, unless by accidental self-betrayal, to bring home to conviction. The gravest of them is, to argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion. But all this, even to the most aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect good faith, by persons who are not considered, and in many other respects may not deserve to be considered, ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely possible on adequate grounds conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable; and still less could law presume to interfere with this kind of controversial misconduct. With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like, the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not only be used without general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation. Yet whatever mischief arises from their use, is greatest when they are employed against the comparatively defenceless; and whatever unfair advantage can be derived by any opinion from this mode of asserting it, accrues almost exclusively to received opinions. The worst offence of this kind which can be committed by a polemic, is to stigmatize those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral men. To calumny of this sort, those who hold any unpopular opinion are peculiarly exposed, because they are in general few and uninfluential, and nobody but themselves feels much interested in seeing justice done them; but this weapon is, from the nature of the

case, denied to those who attack a prevailing opinion: they can neither use it with safety to themselves, nor, if they could, would it do anything but recoil on their own cause. In general, opinions contrary to those commonly received can only obtain a hearing by studied moderation of language, and the most cautious avoidance of unnecessary offence, from which they hardly ever deviate even in a slight degree without losing ground: while unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of the prevailing opinion, really does deter people from professing contrary opinions, and from listening to those who profess them. For the interest, therefore, of truth and justice, it is far more important to restrain this employment of vituperative language than the other; and, for example, if it were necessary to choose, there would be much more need to discourage offensive attacks on infidelity, than on religion. It is, however, obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining either, while opinion ought, in every instance, to determine its verdict by the circumstances of the individual case; condemning every one, on whichever side of the argument he places himself, in whose mode of advocacy either want of candour, or malignity, bigotry, or intolerance of feeling manifest themselves; but not inferring these vices from the side which a person takes, though it be the contrary side of the question to our own: and giving merited honour to every one, whatever opinion he may hold, who has calmness to see and honesty to state what his opponents and their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their discredit, keeping nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their favour. This is the real morality of public discussion: and if often violated, I am happy to think that there are many controversialists who to a great extent observe it, and a still greater number who conscientiously strive towards it.

CHAPTER III: OF INDIVIDUALITY, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEING

Such being the reasons which make it imperative that human beings should be free to form opinions, and to express their opinions without reserve; and such the baneful consequences to the intellectual, and through that to the moral nature of man, unless this liberty is either conceded, or asserted in spite of prohibition; let us next examine whether the same reasons do not require that men should be free to act upon their opinions—to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either physical or moral, from their fellow men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril. This last proviso is of course indispensable. No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor,

or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard. Acts, of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavorable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgement in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost. That mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most part, are only half-truths; that unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable than at present of recognizing all sides of the truth, are principles applicable to men's modes of action, not less than to their opinions. As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person's own character, but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.

In maintaining this principle, the greatest difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the appreciation of means towards an acknowledged end, but in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself. If it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being; that it is not only a co-ordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things; there would be no danger that liberty should be undervalued, and the adjustment of the boundaries between it and social control would present no extraordinary difficulty. But the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by the common modes of thinking, as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account. The majority, being satisfied with the ways of mankind as they now are (for it is they who make them what they are), cannot comprehend why those ways should not be

good enough for everybody; and what is more, spontaneity forms no part of the ideal of the majority of moral and social reformers, but is rather looked on with jealousy, as a troublesome and perhaps rebellious obstruction to the general acceptance of what these reformers, in their own judgement, think would be best for mankind. Few persons, out of Germany, even comprehend the meaning of the doctrine which Wilhelm von Humboldt, so eminent both as a savant and as a politician, made the text of a treatise—that “the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole”; that, therefore, the object “towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially those who design to influence their fellow men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development”; that for this there are two requisites, “freedom, and variety of situations”; and that from the union of these arise “individual vigour and manifold diversity,” which combine themselves in “originality.”

Little, however, as people are accustomed to a doctrine like that of Von Humboldt, and surprising as it may be to them to find so high a value attached to individuality, the question, one must nevertheless think, can only be one of degree. No one's idea of excellence in conduct is that people should do absolutely nothing but copy one another. No one would assert that people ought not to put into their mode of life, and into the conduct of their concerns, any impress whatever of their own judgement, or of their own individual character. On the other hand, it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it; as if experience had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct, is preferable to another. Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth, as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of human experience. But it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances and character. The traditions and customs of other people are, to a certain extent, evidence of what their experience has taught *them*; presumptive evidence, and as such, have a claim to his deference: but, in the first place, their experience may be too narrow; or they may not have interpreted it rightly. Secondly, their interpretation of experience may be correct, but unsuitable to him. Customs are made for customary circumstances, and customary characters; and his circumstances or his character may be uncustomary. Thirdly, though the customs be both good as customs, and suitable to him, yet to conform to custom,

merely *as* custom, does not educate or develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being. The human faculties of perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice. He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used. The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing only because others believe it. If the grounds of an opinion are not conclusive to the person's own reason, his reason cannot be strengthened, but is likely to be weakened, by his adopting it: and if the inducements to an act are not such as are consentaneous to his own feelings and character (where affection, or the rights of others, are not concerned) it is so much done towards rendering his feelings and character inert and torpid, instead of active and energetic. . . .

It will probably be conceded that it is desirable people should exercise their understandings, and that an intelligent following of custom, or even occasionally an intelligent deviation from custom, is better than a blind and simply mechanical adhesion to it. To a certain extent it is admitted, that our understanding should be our own: but there is not the same willingness to admit that our desires and impulses should be our own likewise; or that to possess impulses of our own, and of any strength, is anything but a peril and a snare. Yet desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being, as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced; when one set of aims and inclinations is developed into strength, while others, which ought to co-exist with them, remain weak and inactive. It is not because men's desires are strong that they act ill; it is because their consciences are weak. There is no natural connexion between strong impulses and a weak conscience. The natural connexion is the other way. To say that one person's desires and feelings are stronger and more various than those of another, is merely to say that he has more of the raw material of human nature, and is therefore capable, perhaps of more evil, but certainly of more good. Strong impulses are but another name for energy. Energy may be turned to bad uses; but more good may always be made of an energetic nature, than of an indolent and impassive one. Those who have most natural feeling, are always those whose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest. The same strong susceptibilities which make the personal impulses vivid and powerful, are also the source from whence are generated the most passionate love of virtue, and the sternest self-control. It is through the cultivation of these, that society both does its duty and protects its interests: not by rejecting the stuff of which heroes

are made, because it knows not how to make them. A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character. If, in addition to being his own, his impulses are strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he has an energetic character. Whoever thinks that individuality of desires and impulses should not be encouraged to unfold itself, must maintain that society has no need of strong natures—is not the better for containing many persons who have much character—and that a high general average of energy is not desirable.

In some early states of society, these forces might be, and were, too much ahead of the power which society then possessed of disciplining and controlling them. There has been a time when the element of spontaneity and individuality was in excess, and the social principle had a hard struggle with it. The difficulty then was, to induce men of strong bodies or minds to pay obedience to any rules which required them to control their impulses. To overcome this difficulty, law and discipline, like the Popes struggling against the Emperors, asserted a power over the whole man, claiming to control all his life in order to control his character—which society had not found any other sufficient means of binding. But society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences. Things are vastly changed, since the passions of those who were strong by station or by personal endowment were in a state of habitual rebellion against laws and ordinances, and required to be rigorously chained up to enable the persons within their reach to enjoy any particle of security. In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, every one lives as under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. Not only in what concerns others, but in what concerns only themselves, the individual or the family do not ask themselves—what do I prefer? or, what would suit my character and disposition? or, what would allow the best and highest in me to have fair play, and enable it to grow and thrive? They ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? what is usually done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances? or (worse still) what is usually done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine? I do not mean that they choose what is customary, in preference to what suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they like in crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done: pe-

culiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with crimes: until by dint of not following their own nature, they have no nature to follow: their human capacities are withered and starved: they become incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth, or properly their own. Now is this, or is it not, the desirable condition of human nature?

It is so, on the Calvinistic theory. According to that, the one great offence of man is self-will. All the good of which humanity is capable, is comprised in obedience. You have no choice; thus you must do, and no otherwise: "whatever is not a duty, is a sin." Human nature being radically corrupt, there is no redemption for any one until human nature is killed within him. To one holding this theory of life, crushing out any of the human faculties, capacities, and susceptibilities, is no evil: man needs no capacity, but that of surrendering himself to the will of God: and if he uses any of his faculties for any other purpose but to do that supposed will more effectually, he is better without them. This is the theory of Calvinism; and it is held, in a mitigated form, by many who do not consider themselves Calvinists; the mitigation consisting in giving a less ascetic interpretation to the alleged will of God; asserting it to be his will that mankind should gratify some of their inclinations; of course not in the manner they themselves prefer, but in the way of obedience, that is, in a way prescribed to them by authority; and, therefore, by the necessary conditions of the case, the same for all.

In some such insidious form there is at present a strong tendency to this narrow theory of life, and to the pinched and hidebound type of human character which it patronizes. Many persons, no doubt, sincerely think that human beings thus cramped and dwarfed, are as their Maker designed them to be; just as many have thought that trees are a much finer thing when clipped into pollards, or cut out into figures of animals, than as nature made them. But if it be any part of religion to believe that man was made by a good Being, it is more consistent with that faith to believe, that this Being gave all human faculties that they might be cultivated and unfolded, not rooted out and consumed, and that he takes delight in every nearer approach made by his creatures to the ideal conception embodied in them, every increase in any of their capabilities of comprehension, of action, or of enjoyment. There is a different type of human excellence from the Calvinistic; a conception of humanity as having its nature bestowed on it for other purposes than merely to be abnegated. "Pagan self-assertion" is one of the elements of human worth, as well as "Christian self-denial." There is a Greek ideal of self-development, which the Platonic and Christian ideal of self-government blends with, but does not supersede. It

may be better to be a John Knox than an Alcibiades, but it is better to be a Pericles than either; nor would a Pericles, if we had one in these days, be without anything good which belonged to John Knox.

It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them. As much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with; but for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human development. The means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of the development of other people. And even to himself there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere displeasure, develops nothing valuable, except such force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint. If acquiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole nature. To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives. In proportion as this latitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to posterity. Even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as individuality exists under it; and whatever crushes individuality is despotism, by whatever name it may be called, and whether it professes to be enforcing the will of God or the injunctions of men. . . .

CHAPTER V: APPLICATIONS

The principles asserted in these pages must be more generally admitted as the basis for discussion of details, before a consistent application of them to all the various departments of government and morals can be attempted with any prospect of advantage. The few observations I propose to make on ques-

tions of detail, are designed to illustrate the principles, rather than to follow them out to their consequences. I offer, not so much applications, as specimens of application; which may serve to bring into greater clearness the meaning and limits of the two maxims which together form the entire doctrine of this Essay, and to assist the judgement in holding the balance between them, in the cases where it appears doubtful which of them is applicable to the case.

The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.

In the first place, it must by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference. In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others, or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining. Such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would be unavoidable under any institutions. Whoever succeeds in an over-crowded profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by common admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. In other words, society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering; and feels called on to interfere, only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit—namely, fraud or treachery, and force.

Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society: accordingly, it was once held to be the duty of governments, in all cases which were considered of importance, to fix prices, and regulate the processes of manufacture. But it is now recognized, though not till after a long struggle, that both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly

free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, *quâ* restraint, is an evil: but the restraints in question affect only that part of conduct which society is competent to restrain, and are wrong solely because they do not really produce the results which it is desired to produce by them. As the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of Free Trade, so neither is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the limits of that doctrine; as for example, what amount of public control is admissible for the prevention of fraud by adulteration; how far sanitary precautions, or arrangements to protect workpeople employed in dangerous occupations, should be enforced on employers. Such questions involve considerations of liberty, only in so far as leaving people to themselves is always better, *caeteris paribus*,¹ than controlling them: but that they may be legitimately controlled for these ends, is in principle undeniable. On the other hand, there are questions relating to interference with trade, which are essentially questions of liberty; such as the Maine Law, already touched upon; the prohibition of the importation of opium into China; the restriction of the sale of poisons; all cases, in short, where the object of the interference is to make it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity. These interferences are objectionable, not as infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller, but on that of the buyer.

One of these examples, that of the sale of poisons, opens a new question; the proper limits of what may be called the functions of police; how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident. It is one of the undisputed functions of government to take precautions against crime before it has been committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards. The preventive function of government, however, is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than the punitive function; for there is hardly any part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented, and fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency. Nevertheless, if a public authority, or even a private person, sees any one evidently preparing to commit a crime, they are not bound to look on inactive until the crime is committed, but may interfere to prevent it. If poisons were never bought or used for any purpose except the commission of murder, it would be right to prohibit their manufacture and sale. They may, however, be wanted not only for innocent but for useful purposes, and restrictions cannot be imposed in the one case without operating in the other. Again, it is a proper office of public authority to guard

¹ [*Other things equal.*]

against accidents. If either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. Nevertheless, when there is not a certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk: in this case, therefore (unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting faculty), he ought, I conceive, to be only warned of the danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it. Similar considerations, applied to such a question as the sale of poisons, may enable us to decide which among the possible modes of regulation are or are not contrary to principle. Such a precaution, for example, as that of labelling the drug with some word expressive of its dangerous character, may be enforced without violation of liberty: the buyer cannot wish not to know that the thing he possesses has poisonous qualities. But to require in all cases the certificate of a medical practitioner, would make it sometimes impossible, always expensive, to obtain the article for legitimate uses. The only mode apparent to me, in which difficulties may be thrown in the way of crime committed through this means, without any infringement, worth taking into account, upon the liberty of those who desire the poisonous substance for other purposes, consists in providing what, in the apt language of Bentham, is called "preappointed evidence." This provision is familiar to every one in the case of contracts. It is usual and right that the law, when a contract is entered into, should require as the condition of its enforcing performance, that certain formalities should be observed, such as signatures, attestation of witnesses, and the like, in order that in case of subsequent dispute, there may be evidence to prove that the contract was really entered into, and that there was nothing in the circumstances to render it legally invalid: the effect being, to throw great obstacles in the way of fictitious contracts, or contracts made in circumstances which, if known, would destroy their validity. Precautions of a similar nature might be enforced in the sale of articles adapted to be instruments of crime. The seller, for example, might be required to enter in a register the exact time of the transaction, the name and address of the buyer, the precise quality and quantity sold; to ask the purpose for which it was wanted, and record the answer he received. When there was no medical prescription, the presence of some third person might be required, to bring home the fact to the purchaser, in case there should afterwards be reason to believe that the article had been applied to criminal purposes. Such regulations would in general be no material impediment to obtaining the article, but a

very considerable one to making an improper use of it without detection.

The right inherent in society, to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim, that purely self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled with in the way of prevention or punishment. Drunkenness, for example, in ordinary cases, is not a fit subject for legislative interference; but I should deem it perfectly legitimate that a person, who had once been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink, should be placed under a special legal restriction, personal to himself; that if he were afterwards found drunk, he should be liable to a penalty, and that if when in that state he committed another offence, the punishment to which he would be liable for that other offence should be increased in severity. The making himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others. So, again, idleness, except in a person receiving support from the public, or except when it constitutes a breach of contract, cannot without tyranny be made a subject of legal punishment; but if, either from idleness or from any other avoidable cause, a man fails to perform his legal duties to others, as for instance to support his children, it is no tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation, by compulsory labour, if no other means are available.

Again, there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners, and coming thus within the category of offences against others, may rightfully be prohibited. Of this kind are offences against decency; on which it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they are only connected indirectly with our subject, the objection to publicity being equally strong in the case of many actions not in themselves condemnable, nor supposed to be so.

There is another question to which an answer must be found, consistent with the principles which have been laid down. In cases of personal conduct supposed to be blameable, but which respect for liberty precludes society from preventing or punishing, because the evil directly resulting falls wholly on the agent; what the agent is free to do, ought other persons to be equally free to counsel or instigate? This question is not free from difficulty. The case of a person who solicits another to do an act, is not strictly a case of self-regarding conduct. To give advice or offer inducements to any one, is a social act, and may, therefore, like actions in general which affect others, be supposed amenable to social control. But a little reflection corrects the first impression, by showing that if the case is not strictly within the definition of individual liberty, yet the reasons on which the principle of individual liberty is grounded, are applicable to it. If people must be allowed, in whatever concerns only them-

selves, to act as seems best to themselves at their own peril, they must equally be free to consult with one another about what is fit to be so done; to exchange opinions, and give and receive suggestions. Whatever it is permitted to do, it must be permitted to advise to do. The question is doubtful, only when the instigator derives a personal benefit from his advice; when he makes it his occupation, for subsistence or pecuniary gain, to promote what society and the State consider to be an evil. Then, indeed, a new element of complication is introduced; namely, the existence of classes of persons with an interest opposed to what is considered as the public weal, and whose mode of living is grounded on the counteraction of it. Ought this to be interfered with, or not? Fornication, for example, must be tolerated, and so must gambling; but should a person be free to be a pimp, or to keep a gambling-house? The case is one of those which lie on the exact boundary line between two principles, and it is not at once apparent to which of the two it properly belongs. There are arguments on both sides. On the side of toleration it may be said, that the fact of following anything as an occupation, and living or profiting by the practice of it, cannot make that criminal which would otherwise be admissible; that the act should either be consistently permitted or consistently prohibited; that if the principles which we have hitherto defended are true, society has no business, *as society*, to decide anything to be wrong which concerns only the individual; that it cannot go beyond dissuasion, and that one person should be as free to persuade, as another to dissuade. In opposition to this it may be contended, that although the public, or the State, are not warranted in authoritatively deciding, for purposes of repression or punishment, that such or such conduct affecting only the interests of the individual is good or bad, they are fully justified in assuming, if they regard it as bad, that its being so or not is at least a disputable question: That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavouring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial—who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only. There can surely, it may be urged, be nothing lost, no sacrifice of good, by so ordering matters that persons shall make their election, either wisely or foolishly, on their own prompting, as free as possible from the arts of persons who stimulate their inclinations for interested purposes of their own. Thus (it may be said) though the statutes respecting unlawful games are utterly indefensible—though all persons should be free to gamble in their own or each other's houses, or in any place of meeting established by their own subscriptions, and open only to the members and their visitors—yet public gambling-houses should not be permitted. It is true that the prohibition is never effectual, and

that, whatever amount of tyrannical power may be given to the police, gambling-houses can always be maintained under other pretences; but they may be compelled to conduct their operations with a certain degree of secrecy and mystery, so that nobody knows anything about them but those who seek them; and more than this, society ought not to aim at. There is considerable force in these arguments. I will not venture to decide whether they are sufficient to justify the moral anomaly of punishing the accessary, when the principal is (and must be) allowed to go free; of fining or imprisoning the procurer, but not the fornicator, the gambling-house keeper, but not the gambler. Still less ought the common operations of buying and selling to be interfered with on analogous grounds. Almost every article which is bought and sold may be used in excess, and the sellers have a pecuniary interest in encouraging that excess; but no argument can be founded on this, in favour, for instance, of the Maine Law; because the class of dealers in strong drinks, though interested in their abuse, are indispensably required for the sake of their legitimate use. The interest, however, of these dealers in promoting intemperance is a real evil, and justifies the State in imposing restrictions and requiring guarantees which, but for that justification, would be infringements of legitimate liberty. . . .

It was pointed out in an early part of this Essay, that the liberty of the individual, in things wherein the individual is alone concerned, implies a corresponding liberty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard no persons but themselves. This question presents no difficulty, so long as the will of all the persons implicated remains unaltered; but since that will may change, it is often necessary, even in things in which they alone are concerned, that they should enter into engagements with one another; and when they do, it is fit, as a general rule, that those engagements should be kept. Yet, in the laws, probably, of every country, this general rule has some exceptions. Not only persons are not held to engagements which violate the rights of third parties, but it is sometimes considered a sufficient reason for releasing them from an engagement, that it is injurious to themselves. In this and most other civilized countries, for example, an engagement by which a person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and void; neither enforced by law nor by opinion. The ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case. The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at the least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he

forgoes any future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the presumption in its favour, that would be afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom. These reasons, the force of which is so conspicuous in this peculiar case, are evidently of far wider application; yet a limit is everywhere set to them by the necessities of life, which continually require, not indeed that we should resign our freedom, but that we should consent to this and the other limitation of it. The principle, however, which demands uncontrolled freedom of action in all that concerns only the agents themselves, requires that those who have become bound to one another, in things which concern no third party, should be able to release one another from the engagement: and even without such voluntary release, there are perhaps no contracts or engagements, except those that relate to money or money's worth, of which one can venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever of retractation. . . .

I have already observed that, owing to the absence of any recognized general principles, liberty is often granted where it should be withheld, as well as withheld where it should be granted; and one of the cases in which, in the modern European world, the sentiment of liberty is the strongest, is a case where, in my view, it is altogether misplaced. A person should be free to do as he likes in his own concerns; but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in acting for another, under the pretext that the affairs of the other are his own affairs. The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others. This obligation is almost entirely disregarded in the case of the family relations, a case, in its direct influence on human happiness, more important than all others taken together. The almost despotic power of husbands over wives needs not be enlarged upon here, because nothing more is needed for the complete removal of the evil, than that wives should have the same rights, and should receive the protection of law in the same manner, as all other persons; and because, on this subject, the defenders of established injustice do not avail themselves of the plea of liberty, but stand forth openly as the champions of power. It is in the case of children, that misapplied notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the fulfilment by the State of its duties. One would almost think that a man's children were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically, a part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with his absolute and exclusive control over them; more jealous than of almost any interference with his own freedom of action:

so much less do the generality of mankind value liberty than power. Consider, for example, the case of education. Is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the State should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen? Yet who is there that is not afraid to recognize and assert this truth? Hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the most sacred duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the father), after summoning a human being into the world, to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others and towards himself. But while this is unanimously declared to be the father's duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it. Instead of his being required to make any exertion or sacrifice for securing education to the child, it is left to his choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis! It still remains unrecognized, that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the parent does not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the parent.

Were the duty of enforcing universal education once admitted, there would be an end to the difficulties about what the State should teach, and how it should teach, which now convert the subject into a mere battle-field of sects and parties, causing the time and labour which should have been spent in educating, to be wasted in quarrelling about education. If the government would make up its mind to *require* for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of *providing* one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer classes of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them. The objections which are urged with reason against State education, do not apply to the enforcement of education by the State, but to the State's taking upon itself to direct that education: which is a totally different thing. That the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as any one in deprecating. All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural

tendency to one over the body. An education established and controlled by the State should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence. Unless, indeed, when society in general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide for itself any proper institutions of education, unless the government undertook the task: then, indeed, the government may, as the less of two great evils, take upon itself the business of schools and universities, as it may that of joint-stock companies, when private enterprise, in a shape fitted for undertaking great works of industry, does not exist in the country. But in general, if the country contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to provide education under government auspices, the same persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary principle, under the assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering education compulsory, combined with State aid to those unable to defray the expense.

The instrument for enforcing the law could be no other than public examinations, extending to all children, and beginning at an early age. An age might be fixed at which every child must be examined, to ascertain if he (or she) is able to read. If a child proves unable, the father, unless he has some sufficient ground of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be worked out, if necessary, by his labour, and the child might be put to school at his expense. Once in every year the examination should be renewed, with a gradually extending range of subjects, so as to make the universal acquisition, and what is more, retention, of a certain minimum of general knowledge, virtually compulsory. Beyond that minimum, there should be voluntary examinations on all subjects, at which all who come up to a certain standard of proficiency might claim a certificate. To prevent the State from exercising, through these arrangements, an improper influence over opinion, the knowledge required for passing an examination (beyond the merely instrumental parts of knowledge, such as languages and their use) should, even in the higher classes of examinations, be confined to facts and positive science exclusively. The examinations on religion, politics, or other disputed topics, should not turn on the truth or falsehood of opinions, but on the matter of fact that such and such an opinion is held, on such grounds, by such authors, or schools, or churches. Under this system, the rising generation would be no worse off in regard to all disputed truths, than they are at present; they would be brought up either churchmen or dissenters as they now are, the State merely taking care that they should be instructed churchmen, or instructed dissenters. There would be nothing to hinder them from being taught religion, if their parents chose, at the same schools where they were taught other things. All attempts by the State to bias

the conclusions of its citizens on disputed subjects, are evil; but it may very properly offer to ascertain and certify that a person possesses the knowledge, requisite to make his conclusions, on any given subject, worth attending to. . . .

It is not in the matter of education only, that misplaced notions of liberty prevent moral obligations on the part of parents from being recognized, and legal obligations from being imposed, where there are the strongest grounds for the former always, and in many cases for the latter also. The fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life. To undertake this responsibility—to bestow a life which may be either a curse or a blessing—unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being. And in a country either over-peopled, or threatened with being so, to produce children, beyond a very small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of labour by their competition, is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their labour. The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the State: and whether such laws be expedient or not (a question mainly dependent on local circumstances and feelings), they are not objectionable as violations of liberty. Such laws are interferences of the State to prohibit a mischievous act—an act injurious to others, which ought to be a subject of reprobation, and social stigma, even when it is not deemed expedient to superadd legal punishment. Yet the current ideas of liberty, which bend so easily to real infringements of the freedom of the individual in things which concern only himself, would repel the attempt to put any restraint upon his inclinations when the consequence of their indulgence is a life or lives of wretchedness and depravity to the offspring, with manifold evils to those sufficiently within reach to be in any way affected by their actions. When we compare the strange respect of mankind for liberty, with their strange want of respect for it, we might imagine that a man had an indispensable right to do harm to others, and no right at all to please himself without giving pain to any one.

I have reserved for the last place a large class of questions respecting the limits of government interference, which, though closely connected with the subject of this Essay, do not, in strictness, belong to it. These are cases in which the reasons against interference do not turn upon the principle of liberty: the question is not about restraining the actions of individuals, but about helping them: it is asked whether the government should do, or cause to be done, something for their benefit, instead of leaving it to be done by themselves, individually, or in voluntary combination.

The objections to government interference, when it is not such as to involve infringement of liberty, may be of three kinds.

The first is, when the thing to be done is likely to be better done by individuals than by the government. Speaking generally, there is no one so fit to conduct any business, or to determine how or by whom it shall be conducted, as those who are personally interested in it. This principle condemns the interferences, once so common, of the legislature, or the officers of government, with the ordinary processes of industry. But this part of the subject has been sufficiently enlarged upon by political economists, and is not particularly related to the principles of this Essay.

The second objection is more nearly allied to our subject. In many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education—a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal. This is a principal, though not the sole, recommendation of jury trial (in cases not political); of free and popular local and municipal institutions; of the conduct of industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary associations. These are not questions of liberty, and are connected with that subject only by remote tendencies; but they are questions of development. It belongs to a different occasion from the present to dwell on these things as parts of national education; as being, in truth, the peculiar training of a citizen, the practical part of the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests, the management of joint concerns—habituating them to act from public or semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another. Without these habits and powers, a free constitution can neither be worked nor preserved; as is exemplified by the too-often transitory nature of political freedom in countries where it does not rest upon a sufficient basis of local liberties. The management of purely local business by the localities, and of the great enterprises of industry by the union of those who voluntarily supply the pecuniary means, is further recommended by all the advantages which have been set forth in this Essay as belonging to individuality of development, and diversity of modes of action. Government operations tend to be everywhere alike. With individuals and voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experience. What the State can usefully do, is to make itself a central depository, and active circulator

and diffuser, of the experience resulting from many trials. Its business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit by the experiments of others; instead of tolerating no experiments but its own.

The third, and most cogent reason for restricting the interference of government, is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power. Every function superadded to those already exercised by the government, causes its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, and converts, more and more, the active and ambitious part of the public into hangers-on of the government, or of some party which aims at becoming the government. If the roads, the railways, the banks, the insurance offices, the great joint-stock companies, the universities, and the public charities, were all of them branches of the government; if, in addition, the municipal corporations and local boards, with all that now devolves on them, became departments of the central administration; if the employes of all these different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government, and looked to the government for every rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise than in name. And the evil would be greater, the more efficiently and scientifically the administrative machinery was constructed—the more skilful the arrangements for obtaining the best qualified hands and heads with which to work it. In England it has of late been proposed that all the members of the civil service of government should be selected by competitive examination, to obtain for those employments the most intelligent and instructed persons procurable; and much has been said and written for and against this proposal. One of the arguments most insisted on by its opponents, is that the occupation of a permanent official servant of the State does not hold out sufficient prospects of emolument and importance to attract the highest talents, which will always be able to find a more inviting career in the professions, or in the service of companies and other public bodies. One would not have been surprised if this argument had been used by the friends of the proposition, as an answer to its principal difficulty. Coming from the opponents it is strange enough. What is urged as an objection is the safety-valve of the proposed system. If indeed all the high talent of the country *could* be drawn into the service of the government, a proposal tending to bring about that result might well inspire uneasiness. If every part of the business of society which required organized concert, or large and comprehensive views, were in the hands of the government, and if government offices were universally filled by the ablest men, all the enlarged culture and practised intelligence in the country, except the purely speculative, would be concentrated in a numerous bureaucracy, to whom alone the rest of the community would look for all things: the multitude for direction and dictation in all they had to do; the

able and aspiring for personal advancement. To be admitted into the ranks of this bureaucracy, and when admitted, to rise therein, would be the sole objects of ambition. Under this régime, not only is the outside public ill-qualified, for want of practical experience, to criticize or check the mode of operation of the bureaucracy, but even if the accidents of despotic or the natural working of popular institutions occasionally raise to the summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations, no reform can be effected which is contrary to the interest of the bureaucracy. Such is the melancholy condition of the Russian empire, as shown in the accounts of those who have had sufficient opportunity of observation. The Czar himself is powerless against the bureaucratic body; he can send any one of them to Siberia, but he cannot govern without them, or against their will. On every decree of his they have a tacit veto, by merely refraining from carrying it into effect. In countries of more advanced civilization and of a more insurrectionary spirit, the public, accustomed to expect everything to be done for them by the State, or at least to do nothing for themselves without asking from the State not only leave to do it, but even how it is to be done, naturally hold the State responsible for all evil which befalls them, and when the evil exceeds their amount of patience, they rise against the government and make what is called a revolution; whereupon somebody else, with or without legitimate authority from the nation, vaults into the seat, issues his orders to the bureaucracy, and everything goes on much as it did before; the bureaucracy being unchanged, and nobody else being capable of taking their place.

A very different spectacle is exhibited among a people accustomed to transact their own business. In France, a large part of the people having been engaged in military service, many of whom have held at least the rank of non-commissioned officers, there are in every popular insurrection several persons competent to take the lead, and improvise some tolerable plan of action. What the French are in military affairs, the Americans are in every kind of civil business; let them be left without a government, every body of Americans is able to improvise one, and to carry on that or any other public business with a sufficient amount of intelligence, order, and decision. This is what every free people ought to be: and a people capable of this is certain to be free; it will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins of the central administration. No bureaucracy can hope to make such a people as this do or undergo anything that they do not like. But where everything is done through the bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all. The constitution of such countries is an organization of the experience and practical ability of the nation, into a disciplined body for the purpose of governing the rest; and the more perfect that organization is in itself, the more successful in drawing to

itself and educating for itself the persons of greatest capacity from all ranks of the community, the more complete is the bondage of all, the members of the bureaucracy included. For the governors are as much the slaves of their organization and discipline, as the governed are of the governors. A Chinese mandarin is as much the tool and creature of a despotism as the humblest cultivator. An individual Jesuit is to the utmost degree of abasement the slave of his order, though the order itself exists for the collective power and importance of its members. . . .

To determine the point at which evils, so formidable to human freedom and advancement, begin, or rather at which they begin to predominate over the benefits attending the collective application of the force of society, under its recognized chiefs, for the removal of the obstacles which stand in the way of its well-being; to secure as much of the advantages of centralized power and intelligence, as can be had without turning into governmental channels too great a proportion of the general activity—is one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the art of government. It is, in a great measure, a question of detail, in which many and various considerations must be kept in view, and no absolute rule can be laid down. But I believe that the practical principle in which safety resides, the ideal to be kept in view, the standard by which to test all arrangements intended for overcoming the difficulty, may be conveyed in these words: the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible centralization of information, and diffusion of it from the centre. Thus, in municipal administration, there would be, as in the New England States, a very minute division among separate officers, chosen by the localities, of all business which is not better left to the persons directly interested; but besides this, there would be, in each department of local affairs, a central superintendence, forming a branch of the general government. The organ of this superintendence would concentrate, as in a focus, the variety of information and experience derived from the conduct of that branch of public business in all the localities, from everything analogous which is done in foreign countries, and from the general principles of political science. This central organ should have a right to know all that is done, and its special duty should be that of making the knowledge acquired in one place available for others. Emancipated from the petty prejudices and narrow views of a locality by its elevated position and comprehensive sphere of observation, its advice would naturally carry much authority, but its actual power, as a permanent institution, should, I conceive, be limited to compelling the local officers to obey the laws laid down for their guidance. In all things not provided for by general rules, those officers should be left to their own judgement, under responsibility to their constituents. For the violation of rules, they should be

responsible to law, and the rules themselves should be laid down by the legislature; the central administrative authority only watching over their execution, and if they were not properly carried into effect, appealing, according to the nature of the case, to the tribunals to enforce the law, or to the constituencies to dismiss the functionaries who had not executed it according to its spirit. Such, in its general conception, is the central superintendence which the Poor Law Board is intended to exercise over the administrators of the Poor Rate throughout the country. Whatever powers the Board exercises beyond this limit, were right and necessary in that peculiar case, for the cure of rooted habits of maladministration in matters deeply affecting not the localities merely, but the whole community; since no locality has a moral right to make itself by mismanagement a nest of pauperism, necessity overflowing into other localities, and impairing the moral and physical condition of the whole labouring community. The powers of administrative coercion and subordinate legislation possessed by the Poor Law Board (but which, owing to the state of opinion on the subject, are very scantily exercised by them), though perfectly justifiable in a case of first-rate national interest, would be wholly out of place in the superintendence of interests purely local. But a central organ of information and instruction for all the localities, would be equally valuable in all departments of administration. A government cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimulates, individual exertion and development. The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs; when, instead of informing, advising, and, upon occasion, denouncing, it makes them work in fetters, or bids them stand aside and does their work instead of them. The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which postpones the interest of *their* mental expansion and elevation, to a little more of administrative skill, or of that semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes—will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

MARX'S CRITIQUE of capitalist economy was intended to be an integral part of a more general philosophy of "scientific socialism." This philosophy brought together three of the chief streams of thought of the nineteenth century—the philosophy of Hegel and the Hegelians, the classical economics of the British school, and the socialist doctrines growing out of the French rationalism inherited from the Enlightenment. The philosophy of Marxian socialism—"dialectical materialism"—was a compound of the thought of Hegel and the materialist Ludwig Feuerbach. The materialistic philosophy of Feuerbach offered to Marx and Engels an effective weapon in the struggle against existing social institutions and their religious and metaphysical apologetics. They felt, however, that Feuerbach's "mechanical" materialism was insufficient and needed correction in a number of respects: it was not sufficiently comprehensive; it made no place for the historical and evolutionary approach and took no account of the most recent advances in chemistry and biology; and as a consequence it regarded "human nature" too abstractly, without considering its specific social and cultural context. As a corrective the Hegelian dialectic was appropriated. The result, as Marx and Engels put it, was to take the philosophy of Hegel, which "stands on its head," and "turn it right way up." The Hegelian dialectic became for Marx "the science of the general laws of motion both of the external world and of human thinking."

The application of this philosophy to the science of society resulted in the two great notions which distinguished the "scientific" phase of socialism from the "utopian": the materialist or economic interpretation of history and the theory of the class struggle. The economic interpretation of history is the doctrine, in Marx's words, that "the mode of production of the material means of life determines, in general, the social, political, and intellectual processes of life." This interpretation of history works itself out in terms of belief in the ubiquity of the class struggle in human affairs. Marx did not regard himself as the author of this notion. He recognized Augustin Thierry (1795-1856), the historian of the bourgeois revolution in France, as "the father of the class struggle in French historical writing," and he relied upon the Ricardian analysis of the laws of distribution, with its adumbration of the theory of the inherent antagonism between the employer and the worker. Seen as an application of the dialectic, however, the theory of the class struggle takes on new value in the hands of Marx as a philosophy of history in terms of which all events may be understood and the mechanism by which a "class-conscious" proletariat, free because of its recognition of the necessity of the historic laws, might transform capitalist society into socialism. Marx held that his revision of the notion of the class struggle was a contribution in a number of respects: it tied the existence of classes to particular phases in the history of production, it indicated that the class struggle led neces-

sarily to the "dictatorship of the proletariat," a transitional stage in the ultimate development of a classless society.

Marx's economics are distinctively conditioned by this historical approach. "It is the ultimate aim of this work to reveal the economic law of motion of modern society," he writes in the Preface to *Capital*. The doctrine of "surplus value," central to his analysis, illustrates the pervasive class struggle as it works out within capitalism. Maintaining the classic doctrine of Smith and Ricardo that labor is the source of value, he insisted that capitalism, the system of production for profit, was maintained by virtue of the fact that the laborer creates more value than he gets back in the form of wages. The surplus value goes to the capitalist in the form of profit. It is out of this accretion of surplus value that what Marx calls "the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation" arises. On the one hand industry becomes progressively more centralized as profits go into fixed capital (as contrasted with variable capital, the price of labor power); wealth becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of the few. On the other hand the centralization of labor tends to educate the worker with respect to his shared lot with other workers throughout the world; and the functioning of the Iron Law keeps him at the bare subsistence level and reduces an increasing number of persons to that level. Periodic crises of over-production result from the fact that the great masses cannot buy back the fruits of their labor. It is at this point that the socialist society emerges. "Marx," says Lenin, "deduces the inevitability of the transformation of capitalist society into Socialist society wholly and exclusively from the economic law of the movement of contemporary society." "The expropriation [of the capitalist] is brought about by the operation of the immanent laws of capitalist production, by the centralization of capital. . . . The centralization of the means of production and the socialization of labor reach a point where they prove incompatible with their capitalist husk. This husk bursts asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated."

After 1870 wherever the working class functioned as an independent political force Marxian socialism was the single most important philosophy. And even where Marxism did not culminate in revolution, as it did in Russia in 1917, its influence was tremendous. It was partly in the attempt to counteract the influence of Marxism that Bismarck's program of social legislation was undertaken. The entrance of many workers into Marxist trade unions called forth the reformulation of the social policies of the churches—as seen, notably, in the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI. And it was by claiming to be bulwarks against the threat of Marxism that both the Fascist Party and the Nazi Party first came to power.

The following selection is from a translation of Nikolai Lenin's *The Teachings of Karl Marx*, originally written in 1914 (London, Martin Lawrence, 1931). (On Lenin, see pp. 908-9, below.)



NIKOLAI LENIN: THE TEACHINGS OF KARL MARX

DIALECTICS

MARX AND ENGELS regarded Hegelian dialectics, the theory of evolution most comprehensive, rich in content and profound, as the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy. All other formulations of the principle of development, of evolution, they considered to be one-sided, poor in content, distorting and mutilating the actual course of development of nature and society (a course often consummated in leaps and bounds, catastrophes, revolutions). . . .

. . . Engels writes:

The great basic idea that the world is not to be viewed as a complex of fully fashioned objects, but as a complex of processes, in which apparently stable objects, no less than the images of them inside our heads (our concepts), are undergoing incessant changes, arising here and disappearing there, and which with all apparent accident and in spite of all momentary retrogression, ultimately constitutes a progressive development—this great basic idea has, particularly since the time of Hegel, so deeply penetrated the general consciousness that hardly any one will now venture to dispute it in its general form. But it is one thing to accept it in words, quite another thing to put it in practice on every occasion and in every field of investigation.

In the eyes of dialectic philosophy, nothing is established for all time, nothing is absolute or sacred. On everything and in everything it sees the stamp of inevitable decline; nothing can resist it save the unceasing process of formation and destruction, the unending ascent from the lower to the higher—a process of which that philosophy itself is only a simple reflection within the thinking brain.

Thus dialectics, according to Marx, is “the science of the general laws of motion both of the external world and of human thinking.” . . .

In our times, the idea of development, of evolution, has almost fully penetrated social consciousness, but it has done so in other ways, not through Hegel’s philosophy. Still, the same idea, as formulated by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel’s philosophy, is much more comprehensive, much more abundant in content than the current theory of evolution. A development that repeats, as it were, the stages already passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher plane (“negation of negation”); a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line; a development in leaps and bounds, catastrophes, revolutions; “intervals of gradualness”; transformation of quantity

into quality; inner impulses for development, imparted by the contradiction, the conflict of different forces and tendencies reacting on a given body or inside a given phenomenon or within a given society; interdependence, and the closest, indissoluble connection between *all* sides of every phenomenon (history disclosing ever new sides), a connection that provides the one world-process of motion proceeding according to law—such are some of the features of dialectics as a doctrine of evolution more full of meaning than the current one.

MATERIALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

Realising the inconsistency, the incompleteness, and the one-sidedness of the old materialism, Marx became convinced that it was necessary “to harmonise the science of society with the materialist basis, and to reconstruct it in accordance with this basis.” If, speaking generally, materialism explains consciousness as the outcome of existence, and not conversely, then, applied to the social life of mankind, materialism must explain *social* consciousness as the outcome of *social* existence. “Technology,” writes Marx in the first volume of *Capital*, “reveals man’s dealings with nature, discloses the direct productive activities of his life, thus throwing light upon social relations and the resultant mental conceptions.” In the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx gives an integral formulation of the fundamental principles of materialism as applied to human society and its history, in the following words:

In the social production of the means of life, human beings enter into definite and necessary relations which are independent of their will—productive relations which correspond to a definite stage of the development of their productive forces. The totality of these production relations constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis upon which a legal and political superstructure arises and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of the material means of life, determines, in general, the social, political, and intellectual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of human beings that determines their existence, but, conversely, it is their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing production relationships, or, what is but a legal expression for the same thing, with the property relationships within which they have hitherto moved. From forms of development of the productive forces, these relationships turn into their fetters. A period of social revolution then begins. With the change in the economic foundation, the whole gigantic superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations we must always distinguish between the material changes in the economic conditions of production, changes which can be determined with the precision of natural

science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic, in short, ideological forms, in which human beings become conscious of this conflict and fight it out to an issue.

Just as little as we judge an individual by what he thinks of himself, just so little can we appraise such a revolutionary epoch in accordance with its own consciousness of itself. On the contrary, we have to explain this consciousness as the outcome of the contradictions of material life, of the conflict existing between social productive forces and production relationships. . . . In broad outline we can designate the Asiatic, the classical, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois forms of production as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society.

The discovery of the materialist conception of history, or, more correctly, the consistent extension of materialism to the domain of social phenomena, obviated the two chief defects in earlier historical theories. For, in the first place, those theories, at best, examined only the ideological motives of the historical activity of human beings without investigating the origin of these ideological motives, or grasping the objective conformity to law in the development of the system of social relationships, or discerning the roots of these social relationships in the degree of development of material production. In the second place, the earlier historical theories ignored the activities of the *masses*, whereas historical materialism first made it possible to study with scientific accuracy the social conditions of the life of the masses and the changes in these conditions. At best, pre-Marxist "sociology" and historiography gave an accumulation of raw facts collected at random, and a description of separate sides of the historic process. Examining the *totality* of all the opposing tendencies, reducing them to precisely definable conditions in the mode of life and the method of production of the various *classes* of society, discarding subjectivism and free will in the choice of various "leading" ideas or in their interpretation, showing how all the ideas and all the various tendencies, without exception, have their roots in the condition of the material forces of production, Marxism pointed the way to a comprehensive, an all-embracing study of the rise, development, and decay of socio-economic structures. People make their own history; but what determines their motives, that is, the motives of people in the mass; what gives rise to the clash of conflicting ideas and endeavours; what is the sum total of all these clashes among the whole mass of human societies; what are the objective conditions for the production of the material means of life that form the basis of all the historical activity of man; what is the law of the development of these conditions?—to all these matters Marx directed attention, pointing out the way to a scientific study of history as a unified and true-to-law process despite its being extremely variegated and contradictory.

CLASS STRUGGLE

That in any given society the strivings of some of the members conflict with the strivings of others; that social life is full of contradictions; that history discloses to us a struggle among peoples and societies, and also within each nation and each society, manifesting in addition an alternation between periods of revolution and reaction, peace and war, stagnation and rapid progress or decline—those facts are generally known. Marxism provides a clue which enables us to discover the reign of law in this seeming labyrinth and chaos: the theory of the class struggle. Nothing but the study of the totality of the strivings of all the members of a given society, or group of societies, can lead to the scientific definition of the result of these strivings. Now, the conflict of strivings arises from differences in the situation and modes of life of the *classes* into which society is divided. . . .

Since the time of the great French Revolution, the class struggle as the actual motive force of events has been most clearly manifest in all European history. During the Restoration period in France, there were already a number of historians (Thierry, Guizot, Mignet, Thiers) who, generalising events, could not but recognise in the class struggle the key to the understanding of all the history of France. In the modern age—the epoch of the complete victory of the bourgeoisie, of representative institutions, of extended (if not universal) suffrage, of cheap daily newspapers widely circulated among the masses, etc., of powerful and ever-expanding organisations of workers and employers, etc.—the class struggle (though sometimes in a highly one-sided, “peaceful,” “constitutional” form) has shown itself still more obviously to be the mainspring of events. . . .

In a number of historical works Marx gave brilliant and profound examples of materialist historiography, an analysis of the position of *each* separate class, and sometimes of that of various groups or strata within a class, showing plainly why and how “every class struggle is a political struggle.” The above quoted passage is an illustration of what a complex network of social relations and *transitional stages* between one class and another, between the past and the future, Marx analyses in order to arrive at the resultant of the whole historical development.

Marx’s economic doctrine is the most profound, the most many-sided, and the most detailed confirmation and application of his teaching.

MARX’S ECONOMIC DOCTRINE

“It is the ultimate aim of this work to reveal the economic law of motion of modern society” (that is to say, capitalist, bourgeois society), writes Marx

in the preface to the first volume of *Capital*. The study of the production relationships in a given, historically determinate society, in their genesis, their development, and their decay—such is the content of Marx's economic teaching. In capitalist society the dominant feature is the production of *commodities*, and Marx's analysis therefore begins with an analysis of commodity.

Value. A commodity is, firstly, something that satisfies a human need; and, secondly, it is something that is exchanged for something else. The utility of a thing gives it *use-value*. Exchange-value (or simply, value) presents itself first of all as the proportion, the ratio, in which a certain number of use-values of one kind are exchanged for a certain number of use-values of another kind. Daily experience shows us that by millions upon millions of such exchanges, all and sundry use-values, in themselves very different and not comparable one with another, are equated to one another. Now, what is common in these various things which are constantly weighed one against another in a definite system of social relationships? That which is common to them is that they are *products of labour*. In exchanging products, people equate to one another most diverse kinds of labour. The production of commodities is a system of social relationships in which different producers produce various products (the social division of labour), and in which all these products are equated to one another in exchange. Consequently, the element common to all commodities is not concrete labour in a definite branch of production, not labour of one particular kind, but *abstract* human labour—human labour in general. All the labour power of a given society, represented in the sum total of values of all commodities, is one and the same human labour power. Millions upon millions of acts of exchange prove this. Consequently, each particular commodity represents only a certain part of *socially necessary* labour time. The magnitude of the value is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour, or by the labour time that is socially requisite for the production of the given commodity, of the given use-value. "... Exchanging labour products of different kinds one for another, they equate the values of the exchanged products; and in doing so they equate the different kinds of labour expended in production, treating them as homogeneous human labour. They do not know that they are doing this, but they do it." As one of the earlier economists said, value is a relationship between two persons, only he should have added that it is a relationship hidden beneath a material wrapping. We can only understand what value is when we consider it from the point of view of a system of social production relationships in one particular historical type of society; and, moreover, of relationships which present themselves in a mass form, the phenomenon of exchange repeating itself millions upon millions of times. "As values, all commodities are only definite quantities of congealed

labour time." Having made a detailed analysis of the twofold character of the labour incorporated in commodities, Marx goes on to analyse the *form of value and of money*. His main task, then, is to study the *origin* of the money form of value, to study the *historical process* of the development of exchange, beginning with isolated and casual acts of exchange ("simple, isolated, or casual value form," in which a given quantity of one commodity is exchanged for a given quantity of another), passing on to the universal form of value, in which a number of different commodities are exchanged for one and the same particular commodity, and ending with the money form of value, when gold becomes this particular commodity, the universal equivalent. Being the highest product of the development of exchange and of commodity production, money masks the social character of individual labour, and hides the social tie between the various producers who come together in the market. Marx analyses in great detail the various functions of money; and it is essential to note that here (as generally in the opening chapters of *Capital*) what appears to be an abstract and at times purely deductive mode of exposition in reality reproduces a gigantic collection of facts concerning the history of the development of exchange and commodity production.

Money . . . presupposes a definite level of commodity exchange. The various forms of money (simple commodity equivalent or means of circulation, or means of payment, treasure, or international money) indicate, according to the different extent to which this or that function is put into application, and according to the comparative predominance of one or other of them, very different grades of the social process of production. [*Capital*, Vol. I.]

Surplus Value. At a particular stage in the development of commodity production, money becomes transformed into capital. The formula of commodity circulation was C-M-C (commodity-money-commodity); the sale of one commodity for the purpose of buying another. But the general formula of capital, on the contrary, is M-C-M (money-commodity-money); purchase for the purpose of selling—at a profit. The designation "surplus value" is given by Marx to the increase over the original value of money that is put into circulation. The fact of this "growth" of money in capitalist society is well known. Indeed, it is this "growth" which transforms money into *capital*, as a special, historically defined, social relationship of production. Surplus value cannot arise out of the circulation of commodities, for this represents nothing more than the exchange of equivalents; it cannot arise out of an advance in prices, for the mutual losses and gains of buyers and sellers would equalise one another; and we are concerned here, not with what happens to individuals, but with a mass or average or social phenomenon. In order that he may be able to receive surplus value, "Moneybags must . . . find in the market a com-

modity whose use-value has the peculiar quality of being a source of value"—a commodity, the actual process of whose use is at the same time the process of the creation of value. Such a commodity exists. It is human labour power. Its use is labour, and labour creates value. The owner of money buys labour power at its value, which is determined, like the value of every other commodity, by the socially necessary labour time requisite for its production (that is to say, the cost of maintaining the worker and his family). Having bought labour power, the owner of money is entitled to use it, that is, to set it to work for the whole day—twelve hours, let us suppose. Meanwhile, in the course of six hours ("necessary" labour time) the labourer produces sufficient to pay back the cost of his own maintenance, and in the course of the next six hours ("surplus" labour time), he produces a "surplus" product for which the capitalist does not pay him—surplus product or surplus value. In capital, therefore, from the viewpoint of the process of production, we have to distinguish between two parts: first, constant capital, expended for the means of production (machinery, tools, raw materials, etc.), the value of this being (all at once or part by part) transferred, unchanged, to the finished product; and, secondly, variable capital, expended for labour power. The value of this latter capital is not constant, but grows in the labour process, creating surplus value. To express the degree of exploitation of labour power by capital, we must therefore compare the surplus value, not with the whole capital but only with the variable capital. Thus, in the example just given, the rate of surplus value, as Marx calls this relationship, will be 6:6, i.e., 100 per cent.

There are two historical prerequisites to the genesis of capital: first, accumulation of a considerable sum of money in the hands of individuals living under conditions in which there is a comparatively high development of commodity production. Second, the existence of workers who are "free" in a double sense of the term: free from any constraint or restriction as regards the sale of their labour power; free from any bondage to the soil or to the means of production in general—i.e., of propertyless workers, of "proletarians" who cannot maintain their existence except by the sale of their labour power.

There are two fundamental ways in which surplus value can be increased: by an increase in the working day ("absolute surplus value"); and by a reduction in the necessary working day ("relative surplus value"). Analysing the former method, Marx gives an impressive picture of the struggle of the working class for shorter hours and of governmental interference, first (from the fourteenth century to the seventeenth) in order to lengthen the working day, and subsequently (factory legislation of the nineteenth century) to shorten it. Since the appearance of *Capital*, the history of the working-class movement in all lands provides a wealth of new facts to amplify this picture.

Analysing the production of relative surplus value, Marx investigates the three fundamental historical stages of the process whereby capitalism has increased the productivity of labour; (1) simple co-operation; (2) division of labour, and manufacture; (3) machinery and large-scale industry. How profoundly Marx has here revealed the basic and typical features of capitalist development is shown by the fact that investigations of the so-called "kustar" industry of Russia furnish abundant material for the illustration of the first two of these stages. The revolutionising effect of large-scale machine industry, described by Marx in 1867, has become evident in a number of "new" countries, such as Russia, Japan, etc., in the course of the last fifty years.

But to continue. Of extreme importance and originality is Marx's analysis of the *accumulation of capital*, that is to say, the transformation of a portion of surplus value into capital and the applying of this portion to additional production, instead of using it to supply the personal needs or to gratify the whims of the capitalist. Marx pointed out the mistake made by earlier classical political economy (from Adam Smith on), which assumed that all the surplus value which was transformed into capital became variable capital. In actual fact, it is divided into *means of production* plus variable capital. The more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable capital in the sum total of capital is of immense importance in the process of development of capitalism and in that of the transformation of capitalism into Socialism.

The accumulation of capital, accelerating the replacement of workers by machinery, creating wealth at the one pole and poverty at the other, gives birth to the so-called "reserve army of labour," to a "relative overabundance" of workers or to "capitalist over-population." This assumes the most diversified forms, and gives capital the possibility of expanding production at an exceptionally rapid rate. This possibility, in conjunction with enhanced facilities for credit and with the accumulation of capital in the means of production, furnishes, among other things, the key to the understanding of the *crises* of over-production that occur periodically in capitalist countries—first about every ten years, on an average, but subsequently in a more continuous form and with a less definite periodicity. From accumulation of capital upon a capitalist foundation we must distinguish the so-called "primitive accumulation": the forcible severance of the worker from the means of production, the driving of the peasants off the land, the stealing of the communal lands, the system of colonies and national debts, of protective tariffs, and the like. "Primitive accumulation" creates, at one pole, the "free" proletariat: at the other, the owner of money, the capitalist.

The "*historical tendency of capitalist accumulation*" is described by Marx in the following well-known terms:

The expropriation of the immediate producers is effected with ruthless vandalism, and under the stimulus of the most infamous, the basest, the meanest, and the most odious of passions. Self-earned private property [of the peasant and the handicraftsman], the private property that may be looked upon as grounded on a coalescence of the isolated, individual, and independent worker with his working conditions, is supplemented by capitalist private property, which is maintained by the exploitation of others' labour, but of labour which in a formal sense is free. . . . What has now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working on his own account, but the capitalist who exploits many labourers. This expropriation is brought about by the operation of the immanent laws of capitalist production, by the centralisation of capital. One capitalist lays a number of his fellow capitalists low. Hand in hand with this centralisation, concomitantly with the expropriation of many capitalists by a few, the co-operative form of the labour process develops to an ever-increasing degree; therewith we find a growing tendency towards the purposive application of science to the improvement of technique; the land is more methodically cultivated; the instruments of labour tend to assume forms which are only utilisable by combined effort; the means of production are economised through being turned to account only by joint, by social labour; all the peoples of the world are enmeshed in the net of the world market, and therefore the capitalist régime tends more and more to assume an international character. While there is thus a progressive diminution in the number of the capitalist magnates (who usurp and monopolise all the advantages of this transformative process), there occurs a corresponding increase in the mass of poverty, oppression, enslavement, degeneration, and exploitation; but at the same time there is a steady intensification of the wrath of the working class—a class which grows ever more numerous, and is disciplined, unified, and organised by the very mechanism of the capitalist method of production. Capitalist monopoly becomes a fetter upon the method of production which has flourished with it and under it. The centralisation of the means of production and the socialisation of labour reach a point where they prove incompatible with their capitalist hulk. This bursts asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated. [*Capital*, Vol. I.]

Of great importance and quite new is Marx's analysis, in the second volume of *Capital*, of the reproduction of social capital, taken as a whole. Here, too, Marx is dealing, not with an individual phenomenon, but with a mass phenomenon; not with a fractional part of the economy of society, but with economy as a whole. Having corrected the above-mentioned mistake of the classical economists, Marx divides the whole of social production into two great sections: production of the means of production, and production of articles for consumption. Using figures for an example, he makes a detailed examination of the circulation of all social capital taken as a whole—both when it is reproduced in its previous proportions and when accumulation takes place. The third volume of *Capital* solves the problem of how the average rate of profit is formed on the basis of the law of value. An immense

advance in economic science is this, that Marx conducts his analysis from the point of view of mass economic phenomena, of the aggregate of social economy, and not from the point of view of individual cases or upon the purely superficial aspects of competition—a limitation of view so often met with in vulgar political economy and in the contemporary “theory of marginal utility.” First, Marx analyses the origin of surplus value, and then he goes on to consider its division into profit, interest, and ground-rent. Profit is the ratio between the surplus value and all the capital invested in an undertaking. Capital with a “high organic composition” (i.e., with a preponderance of constant capital over variable capital to an extent above the social average) yields a below-average rate of profit; capital with a “low organic composition” yields an above-average rate of profit. Competition among the capitalists, who are free to transfer their capital from one branch of production to another, reduces the rate of profit in both cases to the average. The sum total of the values of all the commodities in a given society coincides with the sum total of the prices of all the commodities; but in separate undertakings, and in separate branches of production, as a result of competition, commodities are sold, not in accordance with their values, but in accordance with the *prices of production*, which are equal to the expended capital plus the average profit.

In this way the well-known and indisputable fact of the divergence between prices and values and of the equalisation of profits is fully explained by Marx in conformity with the law of value; for the sum total of the values of all the commodities coincides with the sum total of all the prices. But the adjustment of value (a social matter) to price (an individual matter) does not proceed by a simple and direct way. It is an exceedingly complex affair. Naturally, therefore, in a society made up of separate producers of commodities, linked solely through the market, conformity to law can only be an average, a general manifestation, a mass phenomenon, with individual and mutually compensating deviations to one side and the other. . . .

In connection with the analysis of the “genesis of capitalist ground-rent” must be noted Marx’s profound ideas concerning the *evolution of capitalism in agriculture* (this is of especial importance in its bearing on backward countries, such as Russia).

The transformation of rent in kind into money rent is not only necessarily accompanied, but even anticipated by the formation of a class of propertyless day labourers, who hire themselves out for wages. During the period of their rise, when this new class appears but sporadically, the custom necessarily develops among the better situated tributary farmers of exploiting agricultural labourers for their own account, just as the wealthier serfs in feudal times used to employ serfs for their own benefit. In this way they gradually acquire the ability to accumulate a

certain amount of wealth and to transform themselves even into future capitalists. The old self-employing possessors of the land thus gave rise among themselves to a nursery for capitalist tenants, whose development is conditioned upon the general development of capitalist production outside of the rural districts. [*Capital*, Vol. III.]

The expropriation of part of the country folk, and the hunting of them off the land, does not merely "set free" the workers for the uses of industrial capital, together with their means of subsistence and the materials of their labour; in addition it creates the home market, [*Capital*, Vol. I.]

The impoverishment and the ruin of the agricultural population lead, in their turn, to the formation of a reserve army of labour for capital. In every capitalist country, "part of the rural population is continually on the move, in course of transference to join the urban proletariat, the manufacturing proletariat. . . . (In this connection, the term "manufacture" is used to include all non-agricultural industry.) This source of a relative surplus population is, therefore, continually flowing. . . . The agricultural labourer, therefore, has his wages kept down to the minimum, and always has one foot in the swamp of pauperism" (*Capital*, Vol. I). The peasant's private ownership of the land he tills constitutes the basis of small-scale production and causes the latter to flourish and attain its classical form. But such petty production is only compatible with a narrow and primitive type of production, with a narrow and primitive framework of society. Under capitalism, the exploitation of the peasants "differs from the exploitation of the industrial proletariat only in point of form. The exploiter is the same: capital. The individual capitalists exploit the individual peasants through mortgages and usury, and the capitalist class exploits the peasant class through state taxation" (*Class Struggles in France*). "Peasant agriculture, the smallholding system, is merely an expedient whereby the capitalist is enabled to extract profit, interest, and rent from the land, while leaving the peasant proprietor to pay himself his own wages as best he may." As a rule, the peasant hands over to the capitalist society, i.e. to the capitalist class, part of the wages of his own labour, sinking "down to the level of the Irish tenant—all this on the pretext of being the owner of private property." Why is it that "the price of cereals is lower in countries with a predominance of small farmers than in countries with a capitalist method of production"? (*Capital*, Vol. III.) The answer is that the peasant presents part of his surplus product as a free gift to society (i.e., to the capitalist class). "This lower price [of bread and other agricultural products] is also a result of the poverty of the producers and by no means of the productivity of their labour" (*Capital*, Vol. III). Peasant proprietorship, the smallholding system, which is the normal form of petty production, degenerates, withers, perishes under capitalism.

Small peasants' property excludes by its very nature the development of the social powers of production, of labour, the social forms of labour, the social concentration of capital, cattle raising on a large scale, and a progressive application of science. Usury and a system of taxation must impoverish it everywhere. The expenditure of capital in the price of the land withdraws this capital from cultivation. An infinite dissipation of means of production and an isolation of the producers themselves go with it. [Co-operatives, i.e., associations of small peasants, while playing an unusually progressive bourgeois rôle, only weaken this tendency without eliminating it; one must not forget besides, that these co-operatives do much for the well-to-do peasants and very little, almost nothing, for the mass of the poor peasants, also that the associations themselves become exploiters of wage labour.] Also an enormous waste of human energy. A progressive deterioration of the conditions of production and a raising of the price of means of production is a necessary law of small peasants' property. [*Capital*, Vol. III.]

In agriculture as in industry, capitalism improves the production process only at the price of the "martyrdom of the producers."

The dispersion of the rural workers over large areas breaks down their powers of resistance at the very time when concentration is increasing the powers of the urban operatives in this respect. In modern agriculture, as in urban industry, the increased productivity and the greater mobility of labour are purchased at the cost of devastating labour power and making it a prey to disease. Moreover, every advance in capitalist agriculture is an advance in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but also of robbing the soil . . . capitalist production, therefore, is only able to develop the technique and the combination of the social process of production by simultaneously undermining the foundations of all wealth—the land and the workers. [*Capital*, Vol. I.]

NIKOLAI LENIN

THE NAME OF LENIN (Vladimir Ilyitch Ulyanov, 1870–1924) stands second only to that of Marx in the history of socialist theory and is without a recognized equal in the story of socialist practice. Since the Revolution of 1917 the “teachings of history” to which Marxists have appealed have been largely those lessons taught by Lenin under the impact of the epoch-making events in which he was the chief participator. To be sure, Leninism has become the subject of various and often divergent interpretations, but wherever the need for authority is strong among Communists it is his name which is invoked.

Born in Russia, and a lawyer by profession, Lenin, after 1893, devoted himself to a career of agitation on behalf of socialism. In 1896 he was imprisoned, and from 1897 to 1900 he was a political exile in Siberia. In the period from 1900 until 1917 he was in Russia for only two years, at the time of the Revolution of 1905; nevertheless, he was through all this period one of the leaders in the anti-Tsarist movement, and the acknowledged leader of the majority (Bolshevik) faction within the Russian Socialist Party.

Throughout these years Lenin was incessantly involved in political activity. Convinced as he was, however, of the necessary connection between theory and practice, he made extremely significant contributions to Marxian doctrine. On the whole, Lenin's was the attempt to apply the teachings of Marx and Engels to the imperialistic phase of capitalism. Between 1871 (with the fall of the Paris commune) and 1914 (with the opening of an imperialist war) capitalism had entered a period which Lenin characterized as “the substitution of capitalist monopolies for capitalist free competition.” Connected with this decisive feature were the increasing control of a banking oligarchy, the formation of international capitalist monopolies, the territorial division of the earth among the great powers, and the rising importance of the export of capital as contrasted with the export of commodities. Imperialism, according to Lenin, marked the end of capitalism as a genuinely progressive force moving toward the constant expansion of production; it marked also a period of relative stagnation in which the bourgeoisie took on the distinguishing features of a static *rentier* class and in which imperialism itself was pressed towards ever more reactionary measures for maintaining its monopoly of economic resources. Historically speaking, imperialism is thus “capitalism in transition, or, more precisely, . . . dying capitalism.” All the inherent “contradictions” of capitalism were sharpened during this period.

In the light of this analysis of the development of capitalism, Lenin is forced to amplify the Marxian critique of capitalism in order to explain and to contend with the unrevolutionary behavior of the working class and the “betrayal of socialism” on the part of Social-Democratic leaders, with their adoption of a policy of collaboration with their bourgeois governments. Lenin argued that the benefits of imperialism reached sections of the workers in those countries which were successful with this policy, and so operated to give some workmen the

stake (even though tenuous) of a *petit bourgeois* in the maintenance of the existing system. "The receipt of high monopoly profits by the capitalists of one of the numerous branches of industry, of one of the numerous countries, etc., gives them the economic possibility of corrupting individual sections of the working-class and sometimes a fairly considerable minority, attracting them on to the side of the capitalists of a given industry or nation, against all others."

In terms of this analysis, we find emerging Lenin's characteristic emphasis upon the decisive role of a centralized party with a tightly knit ideology. In the pamphlet *What Is to Be Done?* (1902) Lenin distinguished between ordinary trade-union psychology, produced in the everyday struggle of workers for immediate reforms, and socialist ideology. "The history of all countries shows that the working-class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness. . . ." ". . . The workers can acquire class political consciousness *only from without*, that is, only . . . from the sphere of relationships between *all* classes and the state and government. . . . Only a party that will *organize* real all-national exposures can become the vanguard of the revolutionary forces in our time." Without the Communist Party, then, the proletarian revolution against imperialist monopoly capitalism is unthinkable—a view which constitutes a significant addition to Marxism, for Marx had never regarded the spread of socialist ideology as uniquely dependent on a political party, but had regarded it as a natural articulation of the experience of workers in the class struggle. The role of a Communist Party, "the vanguard of the proletariat," is thus to take advantage of the inherent breakdown of capitalism by the creation and direction into its own channels of a revolutionary sentiment, through the propagation to all classes of the ideology of revolt. It is this task which forces the consideration of the relations of revolution to the state and government as a whole—a question to which Lenin turns in *The State and Revolution*.

In this work (1917) Lenin draws together the results of his analysis of capitalism and his program for Communist organization in terms of the concept of "the dictatorship of the proletariat, the organization of the vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of crushing the oppressor." *The State and Revolution* is an attempt to set forth the relationship of proletarian revolution to the state, and is one of the fundamental works in the body of Marxist ideology, explaining as it does the development of the Russian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the building up of the productive forces and the stages of progress towards an ultimately classless society. Begun in the summer of 1917, it was never finished. The November Revolution called Lenin away from writing the seventh chapter, an interruption which was only too welcome. In a note appended to the work Lenin wrote: "Such a hindrance can only be welcomed. . . . It is more pleasant and more useful to live through the experience of a revolution than to write about it."

The following selections are from *What Is to Be Done?* (New York, International Publishers, 1929) and *The State and Revolution* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1919).



WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

. . . The case of the Russian Social-Democrats strikingly illustrates the fact observed in the whole of Europe (and long ago observed in German Marxism) that the notorious freedom of criticism implies, not the substitution of one theory by another, but freedom from every complete and thought-out theory; it implies eclecticism and absence of principle. Those who are in the least acquainted with the actual state of our movement cannot but see that the spread of Marxism was accompanied by a certain deterioration of theoretical standards. Quite a number of people, with very little, and even totally lacking in, theoretical training, joined the movement for the sake of its practical significance and its practical successes. We can judge, therefore, how tactless *Rabocheye Dyelo* is when, with an air of invincibility, it quotes the statement of Marx that: "A single step of the real movement is worth a dozen programmes." To repeat these words in the epoch of theoretical chaos is sheer mockery. Moreover, these words of Marx are taken from his letter on the Gotha Programme, in which he *sharply condemns* eclecticism in the formulation of principles: "If you must combine," Marx wrote to the party leaders, "then enter into agreements to satisfy the practical aims of the movement, but do not haggle over principles, do not make 'concessions' in theory." This was Marx's idea, and yet there are people among us who strive—in his name!—to belittle the significance of theory.

Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement. This cannot be insisted upon too strongly at a time when the fashionable preaching of opportunism is combined with absorption in the narrowest forms of practical activity. . . .

We shall quote what Engels said in 1874 concerning the significance of theory in the Social-Democratic movement. Engels recognizes *not two* forms of the great struggle Social-Democracy is conducting (political and economic), as is the fashion among us, *but three, adding to the first two also the theoretical struggle*. His recommendations to the German labour movement, which has now become practically and politically strong, are so instructive from the point of view of present-day controversies, that we hope the reader will forgive us for quoting a long passage from his Introduction to the *Peasant War in Germany*, which long ago became a literary rarity.

The German workers have two important advantages compared with the rest of Europe. First, they belong to the most theoretical people of Europe; second, they have retained that sense of theory which the so-called "educated" people of

Germany have totally lost. Without German philosophy, particularly that of Hegel, German scientific Socialism (the only scientific Socialism extant) would never have come into existence. Without a sense for theory, scientific Socialism would have never become blood and tissue of the workers. What an enormous advantage this is, may be seen on the one hand, from the indifference of the English labour movement towards all theory, which is one of the reasons why it moves so slowly, in spite of the splendid organisation of the individual unions; on the other hand, from the mischief and confusion created by Proudhonism in its original form among the Frenchmen and Belgians, and in its caricature form as presented by Bakunin, among the Spaniards and Italians.

The second advantage is that, chronologically speaking, the Germans were the last to appear in the labour movement. In the same manner as German theoretical Socialism will never forget that it rests on the shoulders of Saint Simon, Fourier and Owen, the three who, in spite of their fantastic notions and Utopianism, belonged to the most significant heads of all time, and whose genius anticipated the correctness of what can now be proved in a scientific way, so the practical German labour movement must never forget that it has developed on the shoulders of the English and French movements, that it had utilised their experience, acquired at a heavy price, and that for this reason it was in a position to avoid their mistakes which in their time were unavoidable. Without the English trade unions and the French political workers' struggles preceding the German labour movement, without the mighty impulse given by the Paris Commune, where would we now be?

It must be said to the credit of the German workers that they utilised the advantages of their situation with rare understanding. For the first time in the history of the labour movement, the struggle is being so conducted that its three sides, the theoretical, the political, and the practical economic (resistance to the capitalists), form one harmonious and well-planned entity. In this concentric attack, as it were, lies the strength and invincibility of the German movement.

It is due to this advantageous situation on the one hand, to the insular peculiarities of the British, and to the cruel oppression of the French movements on the other, that for the present moment the German workers form the vanguard of the proletarian struggle. How long events will allow them to occupy this post of honour cannot be foreseen. But as long as they are placed in it, let us hope that they will discharge their duties in the proper manner. To this end it will be necessary to double our energies in all the spheres of struggle and agitation. It is the specified duty of the leaders to gain an ever-clearer understanding of the theoretical problems, to free themselves more and more from the influence of traditional phrases inherited from the old conception of the world, and constantly to keep in mind that Socialism, having become a science, demands the same treatment as every other science—it must be studied. The task of the leaders will be to bring understanding, thus acquired and clarified, to the working masses, to spread it with increased enthusiasm, to close the ranks of the party organisations and of the labour unions with ever-greater energy. . . .

If the German workers proceed in this way they may not march exactly at the head of the movement—it is not in the interest of the movement that the workers of one country should march at the head of all—but they will occupy an honourable

place on the battle line, and they will stand armed for battle when other unexpected grave trials or momentous events will demand heightened courage, heightened determination, and the will to act.

Engels' words proved prophetic. Within a few years, the German workers were subjected to severe trials in the form of the anti-Socialist laws; but they were fully armed to meet the situation, and succeeded in emerging from it victoriously.

The Russian workers will have to undergo trials immeasurably more severe; they will have to take up the fight against a monster, compared with which anti-Socialist laws in a constitutional country are but pigmies. History has now confronted us with an immediate task which is *more revolutionary than all the immediate tasks* that confront the proletariat of any other country. The fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but also (it may now be said) of Asiatic reaction, places the Russian proletariat in the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat. We shall have the right to count upon acquiring the honourable title already earned by our predecessors, the revolutionists of the seventies, if we succeed in inspiring our movement—which is a thousand times wider and deeper—with the same devoted determination and vigor. . . .

We said that *there could not yet be* Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. This consciousness could only be brought to them from without. The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness, *i.e.*, it may itself realise the necessity for combining in unions, to fight against the employers and to strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc.

The theory of Socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories that were elaborated by the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals. The founders of modern scientific Socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. Similarly in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose quite independently of the spontaneous growth of the labour movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of ideas among the revolutionary Socialist intelligentsia. At the time of which we are speaking, *i.e.*, the middle of the nineties, this doctrine not only represented the completely formulated programme of the Emancipation of Labour group but had already won the adhesion of the majority of the revolutionary youth in Russia. . . .

. . . Subservience to the spontaneity of the labour movement, the belittling

of the rôle of "the conscious element," of the rôle of Social-Democracy, *means, whether one likes it or not, growth of influence of bourgeois ideology among the workers.* All those who talk about "exaggerating the importance of ideology," about exaggerating the rôle of the conscious elements, etc., imagine that the pure and simple labour movement can work out an independent ideology for itself, if only the workers "take their fate out of the hands of the leaders." But in this they are profoundly mistaken. To supplement what has been said above, we shall quote the following profoundly true and important utterances by Karl Kautsky on the new programme of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party:

Many of our revisionist critics believe that Marx asserted that economic development and the class struggle create, not only the conditions for Socialist production, but also, and directly, the *consciousness* (K.K.'s italics) of its necessity. And these critics advance the argument that the most highly capitalistically developed country, England, is more remote than any other from this consciousness. Judging from the draft, one must come to the conclusion that the committee which drafted the Austrian Programme shared this alleged orthodox-Marxian view which is thus refuted. In the draft programme it is stated: "The more capitalist development increases the numbers of the proletariat, the more the proletariat is compelled, and obtains the opportunity to fight against capitalism." The proletariat becomes "conscious" of the possibility and necessity for Socialism. In this connection Socialist consciousness is represented as a necessary and direct result of the proletarian class struggle. But this is absolutely untrue. Of course, Socialism, as a theory, has its roots in a modern economic relationship in the same way as the class struggle of the proletariat has, and in the same way as the latter emerges from the struggle against the capitalist-created poverty and misery of the masses. But Socialism and the class struggle arise side by side and not one out of the other; each arises out of different premises. Modern Socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge. Indeed, modern economic science is as much a condition for Socialist production, as say, modern technology, and the proletariat can create neither the one nor the other, no matter how much it may desire to do so; both arise out of the modern social process. The vehicles of science are not the proletariat, but the *bourgeois intelligentsia* (K.K.'s italics): It was out of the heads of members of this stratum that modern Socialism originated, and it was they who communicated it to the more intellectually developed proletarians who, in their turn, introduced it into the proletarian class struggle where conditions allow that to be done. Thus, Socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without (*von Aussen Hineingetragen*), and not something that arose within it spontaneously (*urwüchsig*). Accordingly, the old Hainfeld programme quite rightly stated that the task of Social-Democracy is to imbue the proletariat with the *consciousness* of its position and the consciousness of its tasks. There would be no need for this if consciousness emerged from the class struggle. The new draft copied this postulate from the old programme, and attached it to the postulate mentioned above. But this completely broke the line of thought. . . .

Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology being developed by the masses of the workers in the process of their movement then *the only choice is*: Either bourgeois, or Socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for humanity has not created a "third" ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or above-class ideology). Hence, to belittle Socialist ideology *in any way*, to *deviate from it in the slightest degree* means strengthening bourgeois ideology. There is a lot of talk about spontaneity, but the *spontaneous* development of the labour movement leads to its becoming subordinated to bourgeois ideology . . . for the spontaneous labour movement is pure and simple trade unionism, is *Nur-Gewerkschaftlerei*, and trade unionism means the ideological subordination of the workers to the bourgeoisie. Hence, our task, the task of Social-Democracy, is to *combat spontaneity*, to *divert* the labour movement, with its spontaneous trade-unionist striving, from under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and bring it under the wing of revolutionary Social-Democracy. . . .

It is only natural that a Social-Democrat who conceives the political struggle as being identical with the "economic struggle against the employers and the government," should conceive "organisation of revolutionists" as being more or less identical with "organisation of workers." And this, in fact, is what actually happens; so that when we talk about organisation, we literally talk in different tongues. I recall a conversation I once had with a fairly consistent Economist, with whom I had not been previously acquainted. We were discussing the brochure *Who Will Make the Political Revolution?* and we were very soon agreed that the principal defect in that brochure was that it ignored the question of organisation. We were beginning to think that we were in complete agreement with each other—but as the conversation proceeded, it became clear that we were talking of different things. My interlocutor accused the author of the brochure just mentioned of ignoring strike funds, mutual-aid societies, etc.; whereas I had in mind an organisation of revolutionists, as an essential factor in "making" the political revolution. After that became clear, I hardly remember a single question of importance upon which I was in agreement with that Economist!

What was the source of our disagreement? It is the fact that on questions of organisation and politics the Economists are forever lapsing from Social-Democracy into trade unionism. The political struggle carried on by the Social-Democrats is far more extensive and complex than the economic struggle the workers carry on against the employers and the government. Similarly (and indeed for that reason), the organisation of revolutionary Social-Democrats must inevitably *differ* from the organisations of the workers designed for the

latter struggle. The workers' organisations must in the first place be trade organisations; secondly, they must be as wide as possible; and thirdly, they must be as public as conditions will allow (here, of course, I have only autocratic Russia in mind). On the other hand, the organisations of revolutionists must be comprised first and foremost of people whose profession is that of revolutionists (that is why I speak of organisations of *revolutionists*, meaning revolutionary Social-Democrats). As this is the common feature of the members of such an organisation, *all distinctions as between workers and intellectuals*, and certainly distinctions of trade and profession, must be dropped. Such an organisation must of necessity be not too extensive and as secret as possible. Let us examine this three-fold distinction.

In countries where political liberty exists the distinction between a labour union and a political organisation is clear, as is the distinction between trade unions and Social-Democracy. . . . In Russia, however, the yoke of autocracy appears at first glance to obliterate all distinctions between a Social-Democratic organisation and trade unions, because *all* trade unions and *all* circles are prohibited, and because the principal manifestation and weapon of the workers' economic struggle—the strike—is regarded as a crime (and sometimes even as a political crime!). Conditions in our country, therefore, strongly “impel” the workers who are conducting the economic struggle to concern themselves with political questions. . . .

“A committee of students is no good, it is not stable.” Quite true. But the conclusion that should be drawn from this is that we must have a committee of professional *revolutionists* and it does not matter whether a student or a worker is capable of qualifying himself as a professional revolutionist. The conclusion you draw, however, is that the working-class movement must not be pushed on from outside! In your political innocence you fail to observe that you are playing into the hands of our Economists and furthering our primitiveness. I would like to ask, what is meant by the students “pushing on” the workers? *All* it means is that the students bring to the worker the fragments of political knowledge they possess, the crumbs of Socialist ideas they have managed to acquire (for the principal intellectual diet of the present-day student, legal Marxism, can furnish only the A.B.C., only the crumbs of knowledge). *Such* “pushing on from outside” can never be too excessive; on the contrary, so far there has been too little, all too little of it in our movement; we have been stewing in our own juice far too long; we have bowed far too slavishly before the spontaneous “economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government.” We professional revolutionists must continue, and will continue, *this kind* of “pushing,” and a hundred times more forcibly than we have done hitherto. . . .

As I have already said, by "wise men," in connection with organisation, I mean *professional revolutionists*, irrespective of whether they are students or working men. I assert: 1. That no movement can be durable without a stable organisation of leaders to maintain continuity; 2. that the more widely the masses are drawn into the struggle and form the basis of the movement, the more necessary is it to have such an organisation and the more stable must it be (for it is much easier then for demagogues to side-track the more backward sections of the masses); 3. that the organisation must consist chiefly of persons engaged in revolution as a profession; 4. that in a country with a despotic government, the more we *restrict* the membership of this organisation to persons who are engaged in revolution as a profession and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to catch the organisation; and 5. the *wider* will be the circle of men and women of the working class or of other classes of society able to join the movement and perform active work in it. . . .

But to concentrate all secret functions in the hands of as small a number of professional revolutionists as possible, does not mean that the latter will "do the thinking for all" and that the crowd will not take an active part in the movement. On the contrary, the crowd will advance from its ranks increasing numbers of professional revolutionists, for it will know that it is not enough for a few students and workingmen waging economic war to gather together and form a "committee," but that professional revolutionists must be trained for years. . . .

. . . A "dozen" experienced revolutionists, no less professionally trained than the police, will concentrate all the secret side of the work in their hands—prepare leaflets, work out approximate plans and appoint bodies of leaders for each town district, for each factory district, and for each educational institution (I know that exception will be taken to my "undemocratic" views, but I shall reply to this altogether unintelligent objection later on). The centralisation of the more secret functions in an organisation of revolutionists will not diminish, but rather increase the extent and the quality of the activity of a large number of other organisations intended for wide membership and which, therefore, can be as loose and as public as possible, for example, trade unions, workers' circles for self-education, and the reading of illegal literature, and Socialist, and also democratic, circles for *all other sections of the population*, etc., etc. . . .

The most grievous sin we have committed in regard to organisation is that *by our primitiveness we have lowered the prestige of revolutionists in Russia*. A man who is weak and vacillating on theoretical questions, who has a narrow outlook, who makes excuses for his own slackness on the ground that the

masses are awakening spontaneously, who resembles a trade-union secretary more than a people's tribune, who is unable to conceive a broad and bold plan, who is incapable of inspiring even his enemies with respect for himself, and who is inexperienced and clumsy in his own professional art—the art of combating the political police—such a man is not a revolutionist but a hopeless amateur!

Let no active worker take offense at these frank remarks, for as far as insufficient training is concerned, I apply them first and foremost to myself. I used to work in a circle that set itself a great and all-embracing task: and every member of that circle suffered to the point of torture from the realisation that we were proving ourselves to be amateurs at a moment in history when we might have been able to say—paraphrasing a well-known epigram: "Give us an organisation of revolutionists, and we shall over-turn the whole of Russia!" And the more I recall the burning sense of shame I then experienced, the more bitter are my feelings towards those pseudo-Social-Democrats whose teachings bring disgrace on the calling of a revolutionist, who fail to understand that our task is not to degrade the revolutionist to the level of an amateur, but to exalt the amateur to the level of a revolutionist. . . .

. . . The *form* a strong revolutionary organisation . . . may take in an autocratic country may be described as a "conspirative" organisation, because the French word "*conspiration*" means in Russian "*conspiracy*," and we must have the utmost conspiracy for an organisation like that. Secrecy is such a necessary condition for such an organisation that all the other conditions (number and selection of members, functions, etc.) must all be subordinated to it: . . .

It is further argued against us that the views on organisation here expounded contradict the "principles of democracy." Now while the first mentioned accusation was of purely Russian origin, this one is of *purely foreign* origin. And only an organisation abroad (the League of Russian Social-Democrats) would be capable of giving its editorial board instructions like the following:

Principles of Organisation. In order to secure the successful development and unification of Social-Democracy, broad democratic principles of party organisation must be emphasised, developed and fought for; and this is particularly necessary in view of the anti-democratic tendencies that have become revealed in the ranks of our party. (*Two Congresses*, p. 18.)

We shall see how *Rabocheye Dyelo* fights against *Iskra's* "anti-democratic tendencies" in the next chapter. Here we shall examine more closely the "principle" that the Economists advance. Every one will probably agree that "broad principles of democracy" presupposes the two following conditions:

first, full publicity and second, election to all functions. It would be absurd to speak about democracy without publicity, that is a publicity that extends beyond the circle of the membership of the organisation. We call the German Socialist Party a democratic organisation because all it does is done publicly; even its party congresses are held in public. But no one would call an organisation that is hidden from every one but its members by a veil of secrecy, a democratic organisation. What is the use of advancing "*broad* principles of democracy" when the fundamental condition for this principle *cannot be fulfilled* by a secret organisation. "Broad principles" turns out to be a resonant, but hollow phrase. More than that, this phrase proves that the urgent tasks in regard to organisation are totally misunderstood. Every one knows how great is the lack of secrecy among the "broad" masses of revolutionists. We have heard the bitter complaints of B—v on this score, and his absolutely just demand for a "strict selection of members." And yet people who boast about their "sensitiveness to life" come forward in a situation like this and *urge* that strict secrecy and a strict (and therefore more restricted) selection of members is unnecessary, and that what is necessary are—"broad principles of democracy"! This is what we call being absolutely wide of the mark.

Nor is the situation with regard to the second attribute of democracy, namely, the principle of election, any better. In politically free countries, this condition is taken for granted. "Membership of the party is open to those who accept the principles of the party programme, and render all the support they can to the party"—says paragraph 1 of the rules of the German Social-Democratic Party. And as the political arena is as open to the public view as is the stage in a theatre, this acceptance or non-acceptance, support or opposition is announced to all in the press and at public meetings. Every one knows that a certain political worker commenced in a certain way, passed through a certain evolution, behaved in difficult periods in a certain way; every one knows all his qualities, and consequently, knowing all the facts of the case, *every party member can decide for himself whether or not to elect this person for a certain party office*. The general control (in the literal sense of the term) that the party exercises over every act this person commits on the political field brings into being an automatically operating mechanism which brings about what in biology is called "survival of the fittest." "Natural selection," full publicity, the principle of election and general control provide the guarantee that, in the last analysis, every political worker will be "in his proper place," will do the work for which he is best fitted, will feel the effects of his mistakes on himself, and prove before all the world his ability to recognise mistakes and to avoid them.

Try to put this picture in the frame of our autocracy! Is it possible in Russia

for all those "who accept the principles of the party programme and render it all the support they can," to control every action of the revolutionist working in secret? Is it possible for all the revolutionists to elect one of their number to any particular office when, in the very interests of the work, he *must conceal his identity* from nine out of ten of these "all"? Ponder a little over the real meaning of the high-sounding phrases that *Rabocheye Dyelo* gives utterance to, and you will realise that "broad democracy" in party organisation, amidst the gloom of autocracy and the domination of the gendarmes, is nothing more than a *useless and harmful toy*. It is a useless toy, because as a matter of fact, no revolutionary organisation has ever practiced *broad* democracy, nor could it, however much it desired to do so. It is a harmful toy, because any attempt to practice the "broad principles of democracy" will simply facilitate the work of the police in making big raids, it will perpetuate the prevailing primitiveness, divert the thoughts of the practical workers from the serious and imperative task of training themselves to become professional revolutionists to that of drawing up detailed "paper" rules for election systems. Only abroad, where very often people who have no opportunity of doing real live work gather together, can the "game of democracy" be played here and there, especially in small groups.

THE STATE AND REVOLUTION

Class Society and the State

THE "WITHERING AWAY" OF THE STATE AND VIOLENT REVOLUTION

ENGELS' WORDS regarding the "withering away" of the state enjoy such popularity, they are so often quoted, and they show so clearly the essence of the usual adulteration by means of which Marxism is made to look like opportunism, that we must dwell on them in detail. Let us quote the whole passage from which they are taken.

The proletariat seizes state power, and then transforms the means of production into state property. But in doing this, it puts an end to itself as the proletariat, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms, it puts an end also to the state as the state. Former society, moving in class antagonisms, had need of the state, that is, an organisation of the exploiting class at each period for the maintenance of its external conditions of production; therefore, in particular, for the forcible holding down of the exploited class in the conditions of oppression (slavery, bondage or serfdom, wage-labour) determined by the existing mode of production. The state was the official representative of society as a whole, its embodiment in a visible corporate body; but it was this only in so far as it was the state of that class which itself, in its epoch, represented society as a whole: in ancient times, the

state of the slave-owning citizens; in the Middle Ages, of the feudal nobility; in our epoch, of the bourgeoisie. When ultimately it becomes really representative of society as a whole, it makes itself superfluous. As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in subjection; as soon as, along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the former anarchy of production, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a state, is no longer necessary. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the seizure of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of a state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then becomes dormant of itself. Government over persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not “abolished,” *it withers away*. It is from this standpoint that we must appraise the phrase “people’s free state”—both its justification at times for agitational purposes, and its ultimate scientific inadequacy—and also the demand of the so-called Anarchists that the state should be abolished overnight.

Without fear of committing an error, it may be said that of this argument by Engels so singularly rich in ideas, only one point has become an integral part of Socialist thought among modern Socialist parties, namely, that, unlike the Anarchist doctrine of the “abolition” of the state, according to Marx the state “withers away.” To emasculate Marxism in such a manner is to reduce it to opportunism, for such an “interpretation” only leaves the hazy conception of a slow, even, gradual change, free from leaps and storms, free from revolution. The current popular conception, if one may say so, of the “withering away” of the state undoubtedly means a slurring over, if not a negation, of revolution.

Yet, such an “interpretation” is the crudest distortion of Marxism, which is advantageous only to the bourgeoisie; in point of theory, it is based on a disregard for the most important circumstances and considerations pointed out in the very passage summarising Engels’ ideas, which we have just quoted in full.

In the first place, Engels at the very outset of his argument says that, in assuming state power, the proletariat by that very act “puts an end to the state as the state.” One is “not accustomed” to reflect on what this really means. Generally, it is either ignored altogether, or it is considered as a piece of “Hegelian weakness” on Engels’ part. As a matter of fact, however, these words express succinctly the experience of one of the greatest proletarian revolutions—the Paris Commune of 1871, of which we shall speak in greater detail in its proper place. As a matter of fact, Engels speaks here of the destruction of the bourgeois state by the proletarian revolution, while the words about its withering away refer to the remains of *proletarian* statehood *after*

the Socialist revolution. The bourgeois state does not "wither away," according to Engels, but is "put an end to" by the proletariat in the course of the revolution. What withers away after the revolution is the proletarian state or semi-state.

Secondly, the state is a "special repressive force." This splendid and extremely profound definition of Engels' is given by him here with complete lucidity. It follows from this that the "special repressive force" of the bourgeoisie for the suppression of the proletariat, of the millions of workers by a handful of the rich, must be replaced by a "special repressive force" of the proletariat for the suppression of the bourgeoisie (the dictatorship of the proletariat). It is just this that constitutes the destruction of "the state as the state." It is just this that constitutes the "act" of "the seizure of the means of production in the name of society." And it is obvious that such a substitution of one (proletarian) "special repressive force" for another (bourgeois) "special repressive force" can in no way take place in the form of a "withering away."

Thirdly, as to the "withering away" or, more expressively and colourfully, as to the state "becoming dormant," Engels refers quite clearly and definitely to the period *after* "the seizure of the means of production [by the state] in the name of society," that is, *after* the Socialist revolution. We all know that the political form of the "state" at that time is complete democracy. But it never enters the head of any of the opportunists who shamelessly distort Marx that when Engels speaks here of the state "withering away," or "becoming dormant," he speaks of *democracy*. At first sight this seems very strange. But it is "unintelligible" only to one who has not reflected on the fact that democracy is *also* a state and that, consequently, democracy will *also* disappear when the state disappears. The bourgeois state can only be "put an end to" by a revolution. The state in general, *i.e.*, most complete democracy, can only "wither away."

Fourthly, having formulated his famous proposition that "the state withers away," Engels at once explains concretely that this proposition is directed equally against the opportunists and the Anarchists. In doing this, however, Engels puts in the first place that conclusion from his proposition about the "withering away" of the state which is directed against the opportunists. . . .

The "people's free state" was a demand in the programme of the German Social-Democrats and their current slogan in the 'seventies. There is no political substance in this slogan other than a pompous middle-class circumlocution of the idea of democracy. In so far as it referred in a lawful manner to a democratic republic, Engels was prepared to "justify" its use "at times" from a propaganda point of view. But this slogan was opportunist, for it not only expressed an exaggerated view of the attractiveness of bourgeois democ-

racy, but also a lack of understanding of the Socialist criticism of every state in general. We are in favour of a democratic republic as the best form of the state for the proletariat under capitalism, but we have no right to forget that wage slavery is the lot of the people even in the most democratic bourgeois republic. Furthermore, every state is a "special repressive force" for the suppression of the oppressed class. Consequently, *no* state is either "free" or a "people's state." Marx and Engels explained this repeatedly to their party comrades in the 'seventies.

Fifthly, in the same work of Engels, from which every one remembers his argument on the "withering away" of the state, there is also a disquisition on the significance of a violent revolution. The historical analysis of its rôle becomes, with Engels, a veritable panegyric on violent revolution. This, of course, "no one remembers"; to talk or even to think of the importance of this idea is not considered good form by contemporary Socialist parties, and in the daily propaganda and agitation among the masses it plays no part whatever. Yet it is indissolubly bound up with the "withering away" of the state in one harmonious whole.

Here is Engels' argument:

. . . That force, however, plays another rôle (other than that of a diabolical power) in history, a revolutionary rôle; that, in the words of Marx, it is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with the new; that it is the instrument with whose aid social movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilised political forms—of this there is not a word in Herr Dühring. It is only with sighs and groans that he admits the possibility that force will perhaps be necessary for the overthrow of the economic system of exploitation—unfortunately! because all use of force, forsooth, demoralises the person who uses it. And this in spite of the immense moral and spiritual impetus which has resulted from every victorious revolution! And this in Germany, where a violent collision—which indeed may be forced on the people—would at least have the advantage of wiping out the servility which has permeated the national consciousness as a result of the humiliation of the Thirty Years' War. And this parson's mode of thought—lifeless, insipid and impotent—claims to impose itself on the most revolutionary party which history has known?

How can this panegyric on violent revolution, which Engels insistently brought to the attention of the German Social-Democrats between 1878 and 1894, *i.e.*, right to the time of his death, be combined with the theory of the "withering away" of the state to form one doctrine? . . .

We have already said above and shall show more fully later that the teaching of Marx and Engels regarding the inevitability of a violent revolution refers to the bourgeois state. It *cannot* be replaced by the proletarian state (the dic-

tatorship of the proletariat) through "withering away," but, as a general rule, only through a violent revolution. The panegyric sung in its honour by Engels and fully corresponding to the repeated declarations of Marx (remember the concluding passages of the *Poverty of Philosophy* and the *Communist Manifesto*, with its proud and open declaration of the inevitability of a violent revolution; remember Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* of 1875 in which, almost thirty years later, he mercilessly castigates the opportunist character of that programme)—this praise is by no means a mere "impulse," a mere declamation, or a polemical sally. The necessity of systematically fostering among the masses *this* and just this point of view about violent revolution lies at the root of the *whole* of Marx's and Engels' teaching. The neglect of such propaganda and agitation by both the present predominant social-chauvinist and the Kautskyist currents brings their betrayal of Marx's and Engels' teaching into prominent relief.

The replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian state, *i.e.*, of all states, is only possible through "withering away." . . .

The Economic Base of the Withering Away of the State

A MOST DETAILED elucidation of this question is given by Marx in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. The polemical part of this remarkable work, consisting of a criticism of Lassalleanism, has, so to speak, overshadowed its positive part, namely, the analysis of the connection between the development of Communism and the withering away of the state.

FORMULATION OF THE QUESTION BY MARX

. . . The whole theory of Marx is an application of the theory of evolution—in its most consistent, complete, well considered and fruitful form—to modern capitalism. It was natural for Marx to raise the question of applying this theory both to the *coming* collapse of capitalism and to the *future* evolution of *future* Communism.

On the basis of what *data* can the future evolution of future Communism be considered?

On the basis of the fact that *it has its origin* in capitalism, that it develops historically from capitalism, that it is the result of the action of a social force to which capitalism *has given birth*. There is no shadow of an attempt on Marx's part to conjure up a Utopia, to make idle guesses about that which cannot be known. Marx treats the question of Communism in the same way

as a naturalist would treat the question of the evolution of, say, a new biological species, if he knew that such and such was its origin, and such and such the direction in which it changed. . . .

The first fact that has been established with complete exactness by the whole theory of evolution, by science as a whole—a fact which the Utopians forgot, and which is forgotten by the present-day opportunists who are afraid of the Socialist revolution—is that, historically, there must undoubtedly be a special stage or epoch of *transition* from capitalism to Communism.

TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO COMMUNISM

Between capitalist and Communist society [Marx continues] lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the former into the latter. To this also corresponds a political transition period, in which the state can be no other than *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*.

This conclusion Marx bases on an analysis of the rôle played by the proletariat in modern capitalist society, on the data concerning the evolution of this society, and on the irreconcilability of the opposing interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Earlier the question was put thus: to attain its emancipation, the proletariat must overthrow the bourgeoisie, conquer political power and establish its own revolutionary dictatorship.

Now the question is put somewhat differently: the transition from capitalist society, developing towards Communism, towards a Communist society, is impossible without a "political transition period," and the state in this period can only be the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

What, then, is the relation of this dictatorship to democracy?

We have seen that the *Communist Manifesto* simply places side by side the two ideas: the "transformation of the proletariat into the ruling class" and the "establishment of democracy." On the basis of all that has been said above, one can define more exactly how democracy changes in the transition from capitalism to Communism.

In capitalist society, under the conditions most favourable to its development, we have more or less complete democracy in the democratic republic. But this democracy is always bound by the narrow framework of capitalist exploitation, and consequently always remains, in reality, a democracy for the minority, only for the possessing classes, only for the rich. Freedom in capitalist society always remains just about the same as it was in the ancient Greek republics: freedom for the slave-owners. The modern wage-slaves, owing to the conditions of capitalist exploitation, are so much crushed by want and poverty that "democracy is nothing to them," "politics is nothing to them";

that, in the ordinary peaceful course of events, the majority of the population is debarred from participating in social and political life.

The correctness of this statement is perhaps most clearly proved by Germany, just because in this state constitutional legality lasted and remained stable for a remarkably long time—for nearly half a century (1871-1914)—and because Social-Democracy in Germany during that time was able to achieve far more than in other countries in “utilising legality,” and was able to organise into a political party a larger proportion of the working class than anywhere else in the world.

What, then, is this largest proportion of politically conscious and active wage-slaves that has so far been observed in capitalist society? One million members of the Social-Democratic Party—out of fifteen million wage-workers! Three million organised in trade unions—out of fifteen million!

Democracy for an insignificant minority, democracy for the rich—that is the democracy of capitalist society. If we look more closely into the mechanism of capitalist democracy, everywhere, both in the “petty”—so-called petty—details of the suffrage (residential qualification, exclusion of women, etc.), and in the technique of the representative institutions, in the actual obstacles to the right of assembly (public buildings are not for “beggars”!), in the purely capitalist organisation of the daily press, etc., etc.—on all sides we see restriction after restriction upon democracy. These restrictions, exceptions, exclusions, obstacles for the poor, seem slight, especially in the eyes of one who has himself never known want and has never been in close contact with the oppressed classes in their mass life (and nine-tenths, if not ninety-nine hundredths, of the bourgeois publicists and politicians are of this class), but in their sum total these restrictions exclude and squeeze out the poor from politics and from an active share in democracy.

Marx splendidly grasped this *essence* of capitalist democracy, when, in analysing the experience of the Commune, he said that the oppressed were allowed, once every few years, to decide which particular representatives of the oppressing class should be in parliament to represent and repress them!

But from this capitalist democracy—inevitably narrow, subtly rejecting the poor, and therefore hypocritical and false to the core—progress does not march onward, simply, smoothly and directly, to “greater and greater democracy,” as the liberal professors and petty-bourgeois opportunists would have us believe. No, progress marches onward, *i.e.*, towards Communism, through the dictatorship of the proletariat; it cannot do otherwise, for there is no one else and no other way to *break the resistance* of the capitalist exploiters.

But the dictatorship of the proletariat—*i.e.*, the organisation of the vanguard

of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of crushing the oppressors—cannot produce merely an expansion of democracy. *Together* with an immense expansion of democracy which *for the first time* becomes democracy for the poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the rich folk, the dictatorship of the proletariat produces a series of restrictions of liberty in the case of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists. We must crush them in order to free humanity from wage-slavery; their resistance must be broken by force; it is clear that where there is suppression there is also violence, there is no liberty, no democracy.

Engels expressed this splendidly in his letter to Bebel when he said, as the reader will remember, that “as long as the proletariat still *needs* the state, it needs it not in the interests of freedom, but for the purpose of crushing its antagonists; and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom, then the state, as such, ceases to exist.”

Democracy for the vast majority of the people, and suppression by force, *i.e.*, exclusion from democracy, of the exploiters and oppressors of the people—this is the modification of democracy during the *transition* from capitalism to Communism. . . .

Thus, in capitalist society, we have a democracy that is curtailed, poor, false; a democracy only for the rich, for the minority. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the period of transition to Communism, will, for the first time, produce democracy for the people, for the majority, side by side with the necessary suppression of the minority—the exploiters. Communism alone is capable of giving a really complete democracy, and the more complete it is the more quickly will it become unnecessary and wither away of itself.

In other words: under capitalism we have a state in the proper sense of the word, that is, special machinery for the suppression of one class by another, and of the majority by the minority at that. Naturally, for the successful discharge of such a task as the systematic suppression by the exploiting minority of the exploited majority, the greatest ferocity and savagery of suppression are required, seas of blood are required, through which mankind is marching in slavery, serfdom, and wage-labour.

Again, during the *transition* from capitalism to Communism, suppression is *still* necessary; but it is the suppression of the minority of exploiters by the majority of exploited. A special apparatus, special machinery for suppression, the “state,” is *still* necessary, but this is now a transitional state, no longer a state in the usual sense, for the suppression of the minority of exploiters, by the majority of the wage slaves of *yesterday*, is a matter comparatively so easy, simple and natural that it will cost far less bloodshed than the suppression of the risings of slaves, serfs or wage labourers, and will cost mankind far

less. This is compatible with the diffusion of democracy among such an overwhelming majority of the population, that the need for *special machinery* of suppression will begin to disappear. The exploiters are, naturally, unable to suppress the people without a most complex machinery for performing this task; but *the people* can suppress the exploiters even with very simple "machinery," almost without any "machinery," without any special apparatus, by the simple *organisation of the armed masses* (such as the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, we may remark, anticipating a little).

Finally, only Communism renders the state absolutely unnecessary, for there is *no one* to be suppressed—"no one" in the sense of a *class*, in the sense of a systematic struggle with a definite section of the population. We are not Utopians, and we do not in the least deny the possibility and inevitability of excesses on the part of *individual persons*, nor the need to suppress *such* excesses. But, in the first place, no special machinery, no special apparatus of repression is needed for this; this will be done by the armed people itself, as simply and as readily as any crowd of civilised people, even in modern society, parts a pair of combatants or does not allow a woman to be outraged. And, secondly, we know that the fundamental social cause of excesses which consist in violating the rules of social life is the exploitation of the masses, their want and their poverty. With the removal of this chief cause, excesses will inevitably begin to "*wither away*." We do not know how quickly and in what succession, but we know that they will wither away. With their withering away, the state will also *wither away*.

Without going into Utopias, Marx defined more fully what can *now* be defined regarding this future, namely, the difference between the lower and higher phases (degrees, stages) of Communist society.

FIRST PHASE OF COMMUNIST SOCIETY

... The first phase of Communism ... still cannot produce justice and equality; differences, and unjust differences, in wealth will still exist, but the *exploitation* of man by man will have become impossible, because it will be impossible to seize as private property the *means of production*, the factories, machines, land, and so on. In tearing down Lassalle's petty-bourgeois, confused phrase about "equality" and "justice" *in general*, Marx shows the *course of development* of Communist society, which is forced at first to destroy *only* the "injustice" that consists in the means of production having been seized by private individuals, and which *is not capable* of destroying at once the further injustice consisting in the distribution of the articles of consumption "according to work performed" (and not according to need).

The vulgar economists, including the bourgeois professors and also "our"

Tugan-Baranovsky, constantly reproach the Socialists with forgetting the inequality of people and with "dreaming" of destroying this inequality. Such a reproach, as we see, only proves the extreme ignorance of the gentlemen propounding bourgeois ideology.

Marx not only takes into account with the greatest accuracy the inevitable inequality of men; he also takes into account the fact that the mere conversion of the means of production into the common property of the whole of society ("Socialism" in the generally accepted sense of the word) *does not remove* the defects of distribution and the inequality of "bourgeois right" which *continue to rule* as long as the products are divided "according to work performed."

But these defects—Marx continues—are unavoidable in the first phase of Communist society, when, after long travail, it first emerges from capitalist society. Justice can never rise superior to the economic conditions of society and the cultural development conditioned by them.

And so, in the first phase of Communist society (generally called Socialism) "bourgeois right" is *not* abolished in its entirety, but only in part, only in proportion to the economic transformation so far attained, *i.e.*, only in respect of the means of production. "Bourgeois right" recognises them as the private property of separate individuals. Socialism converts them into common property. *To that extent*, and to that extent alone, does "bourgeois right" disappear.

However, it continues to exist as far as its other part is concerned; it remains in the capacity of regulator (determining factor) distributing the products and allotting labour among the members of society. "He who does not work, shall not eat"—this Socialist principle is *already* realised; "for an equal quantity of labour, an equal quantity of products"—this Socialist principle is also *already* realised. However, this is not yet Communism, and this does not abolish "bourgeois right," which gives to unequal individuals, in return for an unequal (in reality unequal) amount of work, an equal quantity of products.

This is a "defect," says Marx, but it is unavoidable during the first phase of Communism; for, if we are not to fall into Utopianism, we cannot imagine that, having overthrown capitalism, people will at once learn to work for society *without any standards of right*; indeed, the abolition of capitalism *does not immediately lay* the economic foundations for *such* a change.

And there is no other standard yet than that of "bourgeois right." To this extent, therefore, a form of state is still necessary, which, while maintaining public ownership of the means of production, would preserve the equality of labour and equality in the distribution of products.

The state is withering away in so far as there are no longer any capitalists, any classes, and, consequently, no *class* can be suppressed.

But the state has not yet altogether withered away, since there still remains the protection of "bourgeois right" which sanctifies actual inequality. For the complete extinction of the state, complete Communism is necessary.

HIGHER PHASE OF COMMUNIST SOCIETY

Marx continues:

In a higher phase of communist society, when the enslaving subordination of individuals in the division of labour has disappeared, and with it also the antagonism between mental and physical labour; when labour has become not only a means of living, but itself the first necessity of life; when, along with the all-round development of individuals, the productive forces too have grown, and all the springs of social wealth are flowing more freely—it is only at that stage that it will be possible to pass completely beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois rights, and for society to inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability; to each according to his needs!

Only now can we appreciate the full correctness of Engels' remarks in which he mercilessly ridiculed all the absurdity of combining the words "freedom" and "state." While the state exists there is no freedom. When there is freedom, there will be no state.

The economic basis for the complete withering away of the state is that high stage of development of Communism when the antagonism between mental and physical labour disappears, that is to say, when one of the principal sources of modern *social* inequality disappears—a source, moreover, which it is impossible to remove immediately by the mere conversion of the means of production into public property, by the mere expropriation of the capitalists.

This expropriation will make a gigantic development of the productive forces *possible*. And seeing how incredibly, even now, capitalism *retards* this development, how much progress could be made even on the basis of modern technique at the level it has reached, we have a right to say, with the fullest confidence, that the expropriation of the capitalists will inevitably result in a gigantic development of the productive forces of human society. But how rapidly this development will go forward, how soon it will reach the point of breaking away from the division of labour, of removing the antagonism between mental and physical labour, of transforming work into the "first necessity of life"—this we do not and *cannot* know.

Consequently, we have a right to speak solely of the inevitable withering away of the state, emphasising the protracted nature of this process and its dependence upon the rapidity of development of the *higher phase* of Communism; leaving quite open the question of lengths of time, or the concrete

forms of withering away, since material for the solution of such questions is *not available*.

The state will be able to wither away completely when society has realised the rule: "From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs," *i.e.*, when people have become accustomed to observe the fundamental rules of social life, and their labour is so productive, that they voluntarily work *according to their ability*. "The narrow horizon of bourgeois rights," which compels one to calculate, with the hard-heartedness of a Shylock, whether he has not worked half an hour more than another, whether he is not getting less pay than another—this narrow horizon will then be left behind. There will then be no need for any exact calculation by society of the quantity of products to be distributed to each of its members; each will take freely "according to his needs."

From the bourgeois point of view, it is easy to declare such a social order "a pure Utopia," and to sneer at the Socialists for promising each the right to receive from society, without any control of the labour of the individual citizen, any quantity of truffles, automobiles, pianos, etc. Even now, most bourgeois "savants" deliver themselves of such sneers, thereby displaying at once their ignorance and their self-seeking defence of capitalism.

Ignorance—for it has never entered the head of any Socialist to "promise" that the highest phase of Communism will arrive; while the great Socialists, in *foreseeing* its arrival, presupposed both a productivity of labour unlike the present and a person not like the present man in the street, capable of spoiling, without reflection, like the seminary students in Pomyalovsky's book, the stores of social wealth, and of demanding the impossible.

Until the "higher" phase of Communism arrives, the Socialists demand the *strictest* control, *by society and by the state*, of the quantity of labour and the quantity of consumption; only this control must *start* with the expropriation of the capitalists, with the control of the workers over the capitalists, and must be carried out, not by a state of bureaucrats, but by a state of *armed workers*. . . .

And here we come to that question of the scientific difference between Socialism and Communism, upon which Engels touched in his above-quoted discussion on the incorrectness of the name "Social-Democrat." The political difference between the first, or lower, and the higher phase of Communism will in time, no doubt, be tremendous; but it would be ridiculous to emphasise it now, under capitalism, and only, perhaps, some isolated Anarchist could invest it with primary importance. . . .

But the scientific difference between Socialism and Communism is clear. What is generally called Socialism was termed by Marx the "first" or lower

phase of Communist society. In so far as the means of production become *public* property, the word "Communism" is also applicable here, providing we do not forget that it is *not* full Communism. The great significance of Marx's elucidations consists in this: that here, too, he consistently applies materialist dialectics, the doctrine of evolution, looking upon Communism as something which evolves *out of* capitalism. Instead of artificial, "elaborate," scholastic definitions and profitless disquisitions on the meaning of words (what Socialism is, what Communism is), Marx gives an analysis of what may be called stages in the economic ripeness of Communism.

In its first phase or first stage Communism *cannot* as yet be economically ripe and entirely free of all tradition and of all taint of capitalism. Hence the interesting phenomenon of Communism retaining, in its first phase, "the narrow horizon of bourgeois rights." Bourgeois rights, with respect to distribution of articles of *consumption*, inevitably presupposes, of course, the existence of the *bourgeois state*, for rights are nothing without an apparatus capable of *enforcing* the observance of the rights.

Consequently, for a certain time not only bourgeois rights, but even the bourgeois state remains under Communism, without the bourgeoisie!

This may look like a paradox, or simply a dialectical puzzle for which Marxism is often blamed by people who would not make the least effort to study its extraordinarily profound content.

But, as a matter of fact, the old surviving in the new confronts us in life at every step, in nature as well as in society. Marx did not smuggle a scrap of "bourgeois" rights into Communism of his own accord; he indicated what is economically and politically inevitable in a society issuing *from the womb* of capitalism.

Democracy is of great importance for the working class in its struggle for freedom against the capitalists. But democracy is by no means a limit one may not overstep; it is only one of the stages in the course of development from feudalism to capitalism, and from capitalism to Communism.

Democracy means equality. The great significance of the struggle of the proletariat for equality, and the significance of equality as a slogan, are apparent, if we correctly interpret it as meaning the abolition of *classes*. But democracy means only *formal* equality. Immediately after the attainment of equality for all members of society *in respect of* the ownership of the means of production, that is, of equality of labour and equality of wages, there will inevitably arise before humanity the question of going further from formal equality to real equality, *i.e.*, to realising the rule, "From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs." By what stages, by means of what practical measures humanity will proceed to this higher aim

—this we do not and cannot know. But it is important to realise how infinitely mendacious is the usual bourgeois presentation of Socialism as something lifeless, petrified, fixed once for all, whereas in reality, it is *only* with Socialism that there will commence a rapid, genuine, real mass advance, in which first the *majority* and then the whole of the population will take part—an advance in all domains of social and individual life.

Democracy is a form of the state—one of its varieties. Consequently, like every state, it consists in organised, systematic application of force against human beings. This on the one hand. On the other hand, however, it signifies the formal recognition of the equality of all citizens, the equal right of all to determine the structure and administration of the state. This, in turn, is connected with the fact that, at a certain stage in the development of democracy, it first rallies the proletariat as a revolutionary class against capitalism, and gives it an opportunity to crush, to smash to bits, to wipe off the face of the earth the bourgeois state machinery—even its republican variety: the standing army, the police, and bureaucracy; then it substitutes for all this a *more* democratic, but still a state machinery in the shape of armed masses of workers, which becomes transformed into universal participation of the people in the militia.

Here “quantity turns into quality”: *such* a degree of democracy is bound up with the abandonment of the framework of bourgeois society, and the beginning of its Socialist reconstruction. If *every one* really takes part in the administration of the state, capitalism cannot retain its hold. In its turn, capitalism, as it develops, itself creates *prerequisites* for “every one” *to be able* really to take part in the administration of the state. Among such prerequisites are: universal literacy, already realised in most of the advanced capitalist countries, then the “training and disciplining” of millions of workers by the huge, complex, and socialised apparatus of the post-office, the railways, the big factories, large-scale commerce, banking, etc., etc.

With such *economic* prerequisites it is perfectly possible, immediately, within twenty-four hours after the overthrow of the capitalists and bureaucrats, to replace them, in the control of production and distribution, in the business of *control* of labour and products, by the armed workers, by the whole people in arms. (The question of control and accounting must not be confused with the question of the scientifically educated staff of engineers, agronomists and so on. These gentlemen work today, obeying the capitalists; they will work even better tomorrow, obeying the armed workers.)

Accounting and control—these are the *chief* things necessary for the organising and correct functioning of the *first phase* of Communist society. *All* citizens are here transformed into hired employees of the state, which is made up of the armed workers. *All* citizens become employees and workers

of *one* national state "syndicate." All that is required is that they should work equally, should regularly do their share of work, and should receive equal pay. The accounting and control necessary for this have been *simplified* by capitalism to the utmost, till they have become the extraordinarily simple operations of watching, recording and issuing receipts, within the reach of anybody who can read and write and knows the first four rules of arithmetic.

When the *majority* of the people begin everywhere to keep such accounts and maintain such control over the capitalists (now converted into employees) and over the intellectual gentry, who still retain capitalist habits, this control will really become universal, general, national; and there will be no way of getting away from it, there will be "nowhere to go."

The whole of society will have become one office and one factory, with equal work and equal pay.

But this "factory" discipline, which the proletariat will extend to the whole of society after the defeat of the capitalists and the overthrow of the exploiters, is by no means our ideal, or our final aim. It is but a *foothold* necessary for the radical cleansing of society of all the hideousness and foulness of capitalist exploitation, *in order to advance further*.

From the moment when all members of society, or even only the overwhelming majority, have learned how to govern the state *themselves*, have taken this business into their own hands, have "established" control over the insignificant minority of capitalists, over the gentry with capitalist leanings, and the workers thoroughly demoralised by capitalism—from this moment the need for any government begins to disappear. The more complete the democracy, the nearer the moment when it begins to be unnecessary. The more democratic the "state" consisting of armed workers, which is "no longer a state in the proper sense of the word," the more rapidly does *every* state begin to wither away.

For when *all* have learned to manage, and independently are actually managing by themselves social production, keeping accounts, controlling the idlers, the gentlefolk, the swindlers and similar "guardians of capitalist traditions," then the escape from this national accounting and control will inevitably become so increasingly difficult, such a rare exception, and will probably be accompanied by such swift and severe punishment (for the armed workers are men of practical life, not sentimental intellectuals, and they will scarcely allow any one to trifle with them), that very soon the *necessity* of observing the simple, fundamental rules of every-day social life in common will have become a *habit*.

The door will then be wide open for the transition from the first phase of Communist society to its higher phase, and along with it to the complete withering away of the state.

EDUARD BERNSTEIN

AFTER the repeal of the antisocialist law in 1890 the German Social-Democratic party emerged into the open and took an active part in government. In addition, economic prosperity was breaking down fixed class barriers and making it possible for many individual workers to rise to new stations, thus apparently refuting, or at least blurring the edges of, the Marxist prophecy. The task of closing the gap between the revolutionary formulas embodied in the *Communist Manifesto* and the new situation of social fluidity of classes and active class collaboration was taken up by the formulation of "revisionist" socialism by Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932).

The main burden of Bernstein's argument rests upon his criticism of Marx's analysis of the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation, a theory which Bernstein believed could continue to be supported in his own day only on the basis of falsification of the facts. In place of this theory that "progress depends on the deterioration of social conditions," Bernstein offered the notion that the prospects of working-class amelioration depended upon "the growth of social wealth and of the social productive forces, in conjunction with general social progress, and, particularly, in conjunction with the intellectual and moral advance of the working classes themselves."

Such an interpretation meant for Bernstein a reformulation of socialist tactics and policies. He rejected the tactics of unremitting class conflict and suggested that it be replaced by a policy of collaboration with all "progressive" forces, whether or not such forces were rooted in the proletariat. His "evolutionary" or "gradualist" version of socialism deviated from the orthodox Marxist dependence on the ability of a revolutionized state to take over large-scale industry; Bernstein put his trust rather in the gradual movement towards a co-operative scheme of production. While he does not reject a theoretical allegiance to the ultimate aim of socialism, he emphasized that it need hardly be an ever-present factor in the day-to-day experience of socialist practice, and that, indeed, such an inflexible principle (the inheritance from the Utopian elements in Marx) may become dangerous when it leads to the neglect of or contempt for the facts.

Bernstein's program was rejected by the majority of the German Social-Democratic party, led by Karl Kautsky. Bernstein was one of the leaders of the minority of the Social Democrats who early in 1916 refused to approve further military expenditure. In the last analysis, the struggle in German socialism did not stem from the disagreements of Kautsky and Bernstein, but from the division of opinion between the Social Democrats who supported the war, the "Independent Socialists," who opposed it, and the "Spartacists," led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, who advocated the Leninist policy of turning the imperialist war into a civil war.

The following selection is from a letter Bernstein wrote to the Stuttgart Congress of the Social-Democratic party in 1898. It was reprinted in the preface to *Evolution*.

tionary Socialism (New York, 1911), a translation by Edith C. Harvey of *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie*¹ (1899).



EVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISM

. . . IT HAS been maintained in a certain quarter that the practical deductions from my treatises would be the abandonment of the conquest of political power by the proletariat organized politically and economically. That is quite an arbitrary deduction, the accuracy of which I altogether deny.

I set myself against the notion that we have to expect shortly a collapse of the bourgeois economy, and that social democracy should be induced by the prospect of such an imminent, great, social catastrophe to adapt its tactics to that assumption. That I maintain most emphatically.

The adherents of this theory of a catastrophe base it especially on the conclusions of the *Communist Manifesto*. This is a mistake in every respect.

The theory which the *Communist Manifesto* sets forth of the evolution of modern society was correct as far as it characterized the general tendencies of that evolution. But it was mistaken in several special deductions, above all in the estimate of the *time* the evolution would take. The last has been unreservedly acknowledged by Friedrich Engels, the joint author with Marx of the *Manifesto*, in his preface to the *Class War in France*. But it is evident that if social evolution takes a much greater period of time than was assumed, it must also take upon itself *forms* and lead to forms that were not foreseen and could not be foreseen then.

Social conditions have not developed to such an acute opposition of things and classes as is depicted in the *Manifesto*. It is not only useless, it is the greatest folly to attempt to conceal this from ourselves. The number of members of the possessing classes is to-day not smaller but larger. The enormous increase of social wealth is not accompanied by a decreasing number of large capitalists but by an increasing number of capitalists of all degrees. The middle classes change their character but they do not disappear from the social scale.

The concentration in productive industry is not being accomplished even to-day in all its departments with equal thoroughness and at an equal rate. In a great many branches of production it certainly justifies the forecasts of the socialist critic of society; but in other branches it lags even to-day behind them. The process of concentration in agriculture proceeds still more slowly. Trade statistics show an extraordinarily elaborated graduation of enterprises

¹*The Assumptions of Socialism and the Tasks of Social Democracy.*

in regard to size. No rung of the ladder is disappearing from it. The significant changes in the inner structure of these enterprises and their inter-relationship cannot do away with this fact.

In all advanced countries we see the privileges of the capitalist bourgeoisie yielding step by step to democratic organizations. Under the influence of this, and driven by the movement of the working classes which is daily becoming stronger, a social reaction has set in against the exploiting tendencies of capital, a counteraction which, although it still proceeds timidly and feebly, yet does exist, and is always drawing more departments of economic life under its influence. Factory legislation, the democratization of local government, and the extension of its area of work, the freeing of trade unions and systems of co-operative trade from legal restrictions, the consideration of standard conditions of labour in the work undertaken by public authorities—all these characterize this phase of the evolution.

But the more the political organizations of the modern nations are democratized the more the needs and opportunities of great political catastrophes are diminished. He who holds firmly to the catastrophic theory of evolution must, with all his power, withstand and hinder the evolution described above, which, indeed, the logical defenders of that theory formerly did. But is the conquest of political power by the proletariat simply to be by a political catastrophe? Is it to be the appropriation and utilization of the power of the State by the proletariat exclusively against the whole non-proletarian world?

He who replies in the affirmative must be reminded of two things. In 1872 Marx and Engels announced in the preface to the new edition of the *Communist Manifesto* that the Paris Commune had exhibited a proof that "the working classes cannot simply take possession of the ready-made State machine and set it in motion for their own aims." And in 1895 Friedrich Engels stated in detail in the preface to *War of the Classes* that the time of political surprises, of the "revolutions of small conscious minorities at the head of unconscious masses" was to-day at an end, that a collision on a large scale with the military would be the means of checking the steady growth of social democracy and of even throwing it back for a time—in short, that social democracy would flourish far better by lawful than by unlawful means and by violent revolution. And he points out in conformity with this opinion that the next task of the party should be "to work for an uninterrupted increase of its vote" or to carry on a slow *propaganda of parliamentary activity*.

Thus Engels, who, nevertheless, as his numerical examples show, still somewhat overestimated the rate of process of the evolution! Shall we be told that he abandoned the conquest of political power by the working classes, be-

cause he wished to avoid the steady growth of social democracy secured by lawful means being interrupted by a political revolution?

If not, and if one subscribes to his conclusions, one cannot reasonably take any offense if it is declared that for a long time yet the task of social democracy is, instead of speculating on a great economic crash, "to organize the working classes politically and develop them as a democracy and to fight for all reforms in the State which are adapted to raise the working classes and transform the state in the direction of democracy."

That is what I have said in my impugned article and what I still maintain in its full import. As far as concerns the question propounded above it is equivalent to Engel's dictum, for democracy is, at any given time, as much government by the working classes as these are capable of practising according to their intellectual ripeness and the degree of social development they have attained. Engels, indeed, refers at the place just mentioned to the fact that the *Communist Manifesto* has "proclaimed the conquest of the democracy as one of the first and important tasks of the fighting proletariat."

In short, Engels is so thoroughly convinced that the tactics based on the presumption of a catastrophe have had their day, that he even considers a revision of them necessary in the Latin countries where tradition is much more favourable to them than in Germany. "If the conditions of war between nations have altered," he writes, "no less have those for the war between classes." Has this already been forgotten?

No one has questioned the necessity for the working classes to gain the control of government. The point at issue is between the theory of social cataclysm and the question whether with the given social development in Germany and the present advanced state of its working classes in the towns and the country, a sudden catastrophe would be desirable in the interest of the social democracy. I have denied it and deny it again, because in my judgment a greater security for lasting success lies in a steady advance than in the possibilities offered by a catastrophic crash.

And as I am firmly convinced that important periods in the development of nations cannot be leapt over I lay the greatest value on the next tasks of social democracy, on the struggle for the political rights of the working man, on the political activity of working men in town and country for the interests of their class, as well as on the work of the industrial organization of the workers.

In this sense I wrote the sentence that the movement means everything for me and that what is *usually* called "the final aim of socialism" is nothing; and in this sense I write it down again to-day. Even if the word "usually" had not shown that the proposition was only to be understood conditionally, it was obvious that it *could* not express indifference concerning the final carry-

ing out of socialist principles, but only indifference—or, as it would be better expressed, carelessness—as to the form of the final arrangement of things. I have at no time had an excessive interest in the future, beyond general principles; I have not been able to read to the end of any picture of the future. My thought and efforts are concerned with the duties of the present and the nearest future, and I only busy myself with the perspectives beyond so far as they give me a line of conduct for suitable action now.

The conquest of political power by the working classes, the expropriation of capitalists, are no ends in themselves but only means for the accomplishment of certain aims and endeavours. As such they are demands in the programme of social democracy and are not attacked by me. Nothing can be said beforehand as to the circumstances of their accomplishments; we can only fight for their realization. But the conquest of political power necessitates the possession of political *rights*; and the most important problem of tactics which German social democracy has at the present time to solve, appears to me to be to devise the best ways for the extension of the political and economic rights of the German working classes. . . .

FABIANISM: GEORGE BERNARD SHAW

WITH THE defeat of the Chartist Movement in 1848, British radicalism turned to the peaceful pursuits of trade unionism, and it was only in the 1880's that discontent once again sought political channels of expression. In 1881, H. M. Hyndman published his *England for All*, based (without acknowledgment) on Marx's theories and, in the same year, he formed the revolutionary Social Democratic Federation.

The reformist Fabian Society made its appearance three years later, in 1884. It had sprung from an idealistic discussion society called The Fellowship of the New Life. At the outset the Fabian Society was dominated by Utopians and Anarchists, but the vague speculations concerning the "reconstruction of society in accordance with the highest moral possibilities" were soon replaced by a severely practical and vigorously parliamentary socialism. This conversion to socialist gradualism was the work of the "Fabian Old Gang," a small number of young, still unknown intellectuals who joined the Fabian Society within the first three years of its existence and soon dominated it. The leading figures in this group were George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950), the economist Sidney Webb (1859-1947), and the social psychologist Graham Wallas (1858-1932).

The philosophy of the Fabian Society was an amalgam of the thought of its chief members. The Fabians regarded themselves as the heirs of liberalism. As Sidney Webb wrote in 1894: "The Socialists are the Benthamites of this generation." But other streams of thought, too, particularly Christian Socialism and Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*, can be discerned in the Fabian advocacy of gradual socialization of rent and of the means of production, and the improvement of man by means of slow, constitutional reforms leading eventually to Socialism.

The Fabian Society never aspired to large membership but chose instead to function as a compact discussion and research club, with branches all over the British Isles. Its chief activities consisted in sponsoring public debates, publishing informative pamphlets on a wide variety of subjects (the famous "Fabian Tracts"), and persuading important educators or public officials of the virtues of socialism. This latter tactic, known as "permeation," was later abandoned in favor of political action, and Fabians played a major role in the founding of the Independent Labour party in 1893, and later the Labour party proper. Indeed, when the Labour party was reorganized in 1918, its new program, *Labour and the New Social Order*, was drafted by Sidney Webb.

Despite its overwhelmingly middle-class membership (the first Fabian Tract, *Why Are the Many Poor?*, was written by one W. L. Phillips, a housepainter and, in 1884, the only worker in this socialist society) and its small size, the intellectual influence of the Fabians on British working class politics has been considerable. Most of the program of the British Labour party was first expounded in Fabian tracts and worked out in the Fabian research bureaus, and most of the leaders of the party—including Clement Attlee and Herbert Morrison—are veterans of the society.

The following selection, by George Bernard Shaw, is from the essay "Transition," one of a collection published in 1889 under the title *Fabian Essays in Socialism*, a highly successful volume edited by Shaw. Among the other contributors were Sidney Webb, Annie Besant, and Graham Wallas.



TRANSITION

. . . LET us commence by glancing at the Middle Ages. There you find, theoretically, a much more orderly England than the England of to-day. Agriculture is organised on an intelligible and consistent system in the feudal manor or commune; handicraft is ordered by the guilds of the towns. Every man has his class, and every class its duties. Payments and privileges are fixed by law and custom, sanctioned by the moral sense of the community, and revised by the light of that moral sense whenever the operation of supply and demand disturbs their adjustment. Liberty and Equality are unheard of; but so is Free Competition. The law does not suffer a laborer's wife to wear a silver girdle; neither does it force her to work sixteen hours a day for the value of a modern shilling. Nobody entertains the idea that the individual has any right to trade as he pleases without reference to the rest. When the townsfolk, for instance, form a market, they quite understand that they have not taken that trouble in order to enable speculators to make money. If they catch a man buying goods solely in order to sell them a few hours later at a higher price, they treat that man as a rascal; and he never, as far as I have been able to ascertain, ventures to plead that it is socially beneficent, and indeed a pious duty, to buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest. If he did, they would probably burn him alive, not altogether inexcusably. As to Protection, it comes naturally to them.

This Social Order, relics of which are still to be found in all directions, did not collapse because it was unjust or absurd. It was burst by the growth of the social organism. Its machinery was too primitive, and its administration too naïve, too personal, too meddlesome to cope with anything more complex than a group of industrially independent communes, centralised very loosely, if at all, for purely political purposes. Industrial relations with other countries were beyond its comprehension. . . . A Frenchman or a Scotchman was a natural enemy; a Muscovite was a foreign devil: the relationship of a negro to the human race was far more distant than that of a gorilla is now admitted to be. Thus, when the discovery of the New World began that economic revolution which changed every manufacturing town into a mere booth in

the world's fair, and quite altered the immediate objects and views of producers, English adventurers took to the sea in a frame of mind peculiarly favorable to commercial success. They were unaffectedly pious, and had the force of character which is only possible to men who are founded on convictions. At the same time, they regarded piracy as a brave and patriotic pursuit, and the slave trade as a perfectly honest branch of commerce, adventurous enough to be consistent with the honor of a gentleman, and lucrative enough to make it well worth the risk. When they stole the cargo of a foreign ship, or made a heavy profit on a batch of slaves, they regarded their success as a direct proof of divine protection. The owners of accumulated wealth hastened to "venture" their capital with these men. Persons of all the richer degrees, from Queen Elizabeth downward, took shares in the voyages of the merchant adventurers. The returns justified their boldness; and the foundation of the industrial greatness and the industrial shame of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was laid; modern Capitalism, thus arising in enterprises for which men are now, by civilised nations, hung or shot as human vermin. And it is curious to see still, in the commercial adventurers of our own time, the same incongruous combination of piety and rectitude with the most unscrupulous and revolting villainy. We all know the merchant princes whose enterprise, whose steady perseverance, whose high personal honor, blameless family relations, large charities, and liberal endowment of public institutions mark them out as very pillars of society; and who are nevertheless grinding their wealth out of the labor of women and children with such murderous rapacity that they have to hand over the poorest of their victims to sweaters whose sole special function is the evasion of the Factory Acts. . . .

With the rise of foreign trade and Capitalism, industry so far outgrew the control, not merely of the individual, but of the village, the guild, the municipality, and even the central government, that it seemed as if all attempt at regulation must be abandoned. Every law made for the better ordering of business either did not work at all, or worked only as a monopoly enforced by exasperating official meddling, directly injuring the general interest, and reacting disastrously on the particular interest it was intended to protect. The laws, too, had ceased to be even honestly intended, owing to the seizure of political power by the capitalist classes, which had been prodigiously enriched by the operation of economic laws which were not then understood. Matters reached a position in which legislation and regulation were so mischievous and corrupt, that anarchy became the ideal of all progressive thinkers and practical men. The intellectual revolt formally inaugurated by the Reformation was reinforced in the eighteenth century by the great industrial revolu-

tion which began with the utilisation of steam and the invention of the spinning jenny. Then came chaos. The feudal system became an absurdity, when its basis of communism with inequality of condition had changed into private property with free contract and competition rents. The guild system had no machinery for dealing with division of labor, the factory system, or international trade: it recognized in competitive individualism only something to be repressed as diabolical. . . .

The desperate effort of the human intellect to unravel this tangle of industrial anarchy brought modern political economy into existence. . . . Political economy soon declared for industrial anarchy; for private property; for individual recklessness of everything except individual accumulation of riches; and for the abolition of all the functions of the State except those of putting down violent conduct and invasions of private property. . . .

. . . The greater economists [however] did not admit that the alternative to state regulation was anarchy; they held that Nature had provided an all-powerful automatic regulator in Competition; and that by its operation self-interest would evolve order out of chaos if only it were allowed its own way. They loved to believe that a right and just social order was not an artificial and painfully maintained legal edifice, but a spontaneous outcome of the free play of the forces of Nature. . . . And whilst they were dazzled by the prodigious impulse given to production by the industrial revolution under competitive private enterprise, they were at the same time, for want of statistics, so optimistically ignorant of the condition of the masses, that we find David Hume, in 1766, writing to Turgot that "no man is so industrious but he may add some hours more in the week to his labor; and scarce anyone is so poor but he can retrench something of his expense." No student ever gathers from a study of the individualist economists that the English proletariat was seething in horror and degradation whilst the riches of the proprietors were increasing by leaps and bounds.

The historical ignorance of the economists did not, however, disable them for the abstract work of scientific political economy. All their most cherished institutions and doctrines succumbed one by one to their analysis of the laws of production and exchange. With one law alone—the law of rent—they destroyed the whole series of assumptions upon which private property is based. The apriorist notion that among free competitors wealth must go to the industrious and poverty be the just and natural punishment of the lazy and improvident, proved as illusory as the apparent flatness of the earth. Here was a vast mass of wealth called economic rent, increasing with the population, and consisting of the differences between the product of the national industry as it actually was and as it would have been if every acre of land in

the country had been no more fertile or no more favorably situated than the very worst acre from which a bare living could be extracted: all quite incapable of being assigned to this or that individual or class as the return to his or its separate exertions: all purely social or common wealth, for the private appropriation of which no permanently valid and intellectually honest excuse could be made. . . . Ricardo pointed out—I quote his own words—that “the whole surplus produce of the soil, after deducting from it only such moderate profits as are sufficient to encourage accumulation, must finally rest with the landlord.”

It was only by adopting a preposterous theory of value that Ricardo was able to maintain that the laborer, selling himself for wages to the proprietor, would always command his cost of production, *i.e.*, his daily subsistence. Even that slender consolation vanished later on. . . . Private property, in fact, left no room for newcomers. Malthus pointed this out, and urged that there should be no newcomers, that the population should remain stationary. But the population took exactly as much notice of this modest demand for stagnation, as the incoming tide took of King Canute’s ankles. Indeed the demand was the less reasonable since the power of production per head was increasing faster than the population (as it still is), the increase of poverty being produced simply by the increase and private appropriation of rent. After Ricardo had completed the individualist synthesis of production and exchange, a dialectical war broke out. Proudhon had only to skim through a Ricardian treatise to understand just enough of it to be able to shew that political economy was a *reductio ad absurdum* of private property instead of a justification of it. . . . Karl Marx, without ever giving up the Ricardian value theory, seized on the blue books which contained the true history of the leaps and bounds of England’s prosperity, and convicted private property of wholesale spoliation, murder, and compulsory prostitution; of plague, pestilence, and famine; battle, murder, and sudden death. This was hardly what had been expected from an institution so highly spoken of. Many critics said that the attack was not fair: no one ventured to pretend that the charges were not true. The facts were not only admitted; they had been legislated upon. Social Democracy was working itself out practically as well as academically. . . .

What the achievement of Socialism involves economically, is the transfer of rent from the class which now appropriates it to the whole people. Rent being that part of the produce which is individually unearned, this is the only equitable method of disposing of it. There is no means of getting rid of economic rent. So long as the fertility of the land varies from acre to acre, and the number of persons passing by a shop window per hour varies from street to street, with the result that two farmers or two shopkeepers of exactly equal

intelligence and industry will reap unequal returns from their year's work, so long will it be equitable to take from the richer farmer or shopkeeper the excess over his fellow's gain which he owes to the bounty of Nature or the advantage of situation, and divide that excess of rent equally between the two. If the pair of farms or shops be left in the hands of a private landlord, he will take the excess, and instead of dividing it between his two tenants, live on it himself idly at their expense. The economic object of Socialism is not, of course, to equalise farmers and shopkeepers in couples, but to carry out the principle over the whole community, by collecting all rents and throwing them into the national treasury. As the private proprietor has no reason for clinging to his property except the legal power to take the rent and spend it on himself—this legal power being in fact what really constitutes him a proprietor—its abrogation would mean his expropriation. The socialisation of rent would mean the socialisation of the sources of production by the expropriation of the present private proprietors, and the transfer of their property to the entire nation. This transfer, then, is the subject matter of the transition to Socialism, which began some forty-five years ago, as far as any phase of social evolution can be said to begin at all.

It will be at once seen that the valid objections to Socialism consist wholly of practical difficulties. On the ground of abstract justice, Socialism is not only unobjectionable, but sacredly imperative. . . . The first practical difficulty is raised by the idea of the entire people collectively owning land, capital, or anything else. Here is the rent arising out of the people's industry; here are the pockets of the private proprietors. The problem is to drop that rent, not into those private pockets, but into the people's pocket. Yes; but where is the people's pocket. Who is the people? what is the people? Tom we know, and Dick; also Harry; but solely and separately, as individuals; as a trinity they have no existence. Who is their trustee, their guardian, their man of business, their manager, their secretary, even their stakeholder? The Socialist is stopped dead at the threshold of practical action by this difficulty until he bethinks himself of the State as the representative and trustee of the people. Now if you will just form a hasty picture of the governments which called themselves States in Ricardo's day, consisting of rich proprietors legislating either by divine right or by the exclusive suffrage of the poorer proprietors, and filling the executives with the creatures of their patronage and favoritism; if you look beneath their oratorical parliamentary discussions, conducted with all the splendor and decorum of an expensive sham fight; if you consider their class interests, their shameless corruption, and the waste and mismanagement which disgraced all their bungling attempts at practical business of any kind, you will understand why Ricardo, clearly as he saw the

economic consequences of private appropriation of rent, never dreamt of State appropriation as a possible alternative. . . .

When State officials obtained their posts by favoritism and patronage, efficiency on their part was an accident, and politeness a condescension. When they retained their posts without any effective responsibility to the public, they naturally defrauded the public by making their posts sinecures, and insulted the public when, by personal inquiry, it made itself troublesome. But every successfully conducted private business establishment was an example of the ease with which public ones could be reformed as soon as there was the effective will to find out the way. Make the passing of a sufficient examination an indispensable preliminary to entering the executive; make the executive responsible to the government, and the government responsible to the people; and State departments will be provided with all the guarantees for integrity and efficiency that private-money-hunting pretends to. Thus the old bugbear of State imbecility did not terrify the Socialist: it only made him a Democrat. . . . We have the distinctive term Social Democrat, indicating the man or woman who desires through Democracy to gather the whole people into the State, so that the State may be trusted with the rent of the country, and finally with the land, the capital, and the organisation of the national industry—with all the sources of production, in short, which are now abandoned to the cupidity of irresponsible private individuals.

The benefits of such a change as this are so obvious to all except the existing private proprietors and their parasites, that it is very necessary to insist on the impossibility of effecting it suddenly. The young Socialist is apt to be catastrophic in his views—to plan the revolutionary programme as an affair of twenty-four lively hours, with Individualism in full swing on Monday morning, a tidal wave of the insurgent proletariat on Monday afternoon, and Socialism in complete working order on Tuesday. A man who believes that such a happy despatch is possible, will naturally think it absurd and even inhuman to stick at bloodshed in bringing it about. He can prove that the continuance of the present system for a year costs more suffering than could be crammed into any Monday afternoon, however sanguinary. This is the phase of conviction in which are delivered those Socialist speeches which make what the newspapers call “good copy,” and which are the only ones they as yet report. Such speeches are encouraged by the hasty opposition they evoke from thoughtless persons, who begin by tacitly admitting that a sudden change is feasible, and go on to protest that it would be wicked. The experienced Social Democrat converts his too ardent follower by first admitting that if the change could be made catastrophically it would be well worth making, and then proceeding to point out that as it would involve a readjust-

ment of productive industry to meet the demand created by an entirely new distribution of purchasing power, it would also involve, in the application of labor and industrial machinery, alterations which no afternoon's work could effect. You cannot convince any man that it is impossible to tear down a government in a day; but everybody is convinced already that you cannot convert first and third class carriages into second class; rookeries and palaces into comfortable dwellings; and jewellers and dressmakers into bakers and builders, by merely singing the "Marseillaise." . . . I need not enlarge on the point: the necessity for cautious and gradual change must be obvious to everyone here, and could be made obvious to everyone elsewhere if only the catastrophists were courageously and sensibly dealt with in discussion.

What then does a gradual transition to Social Democracy mean specifically? It means the gradual extension of the franchise; and the transfer of rent and interest to the State, not in one lump sum, but by instalments. Looked at in this way, it will at once be seen that we are already far on the road, and are being urged further by many politicians who do not dream that they are touched with Socialism—nay, who would earnestly repudiate the touch as a taint. Let us see how far we have gone. In 1832 the political power passed into the hands of the middle class; and in 1838 Lord John Russell announced finality. Meanwhile, in 1834, the middle class had swept away the last economic refuge of the workers, the old Poor Law, and delivered them naked to the furies of competition.¹ Ten years turmoil and active emigration followed; and then the thin end of the wedge went in. The Income Tax was established; and the Factory Acts were made effective. The Income Tax (1842), which is on individualist principles an intolerable spoliative anomaly, is simply a forcible transfer of rent, interest, and even rent of ability, from private holders to the State without compensation. It excused itself to the Whigs on the ground that those who had most property for the State to protect should pay *ad valorem* for its protection. The Factory Acts swept the anarchic theory of the irresponsibility of private enterprise out of practical politics; made employers accountable to the State for the well-being of their employees; and transferred a further instalment of profits directly to the worker by raising wages. . . . The workers rapidly organized themselves in Trades Unions, which were denounced then for their tendency to sap the manly independence which had formerly characterized the British workman, and which are to-day held up to him as the self-helpful perfection of that manly independence. . . . The value of Trade Unionism in awakening the social conscience of the skilled

¹ The general impression that the old Poor Law had become an indefensible nuisance is a correct one. All attempts to mitigate Individualism by philanthropy instead of replacing it by Socialism are foredoomed to confusion.

workers was immense, though to this there was a heavy set-off in its tendency to destroy their artistic conscience by making them aware that it was their duty to one another to discourage rapid and efficient workmanship by every means in their power. An extension of the franchise, which was really an instalment of Democracy, and not, like the 1832 Reform Bill, only an advance towards it, was gained in 1867; and immediately afterwards came another instalment of Socialism in the shape of a further transfer of rent and interest from private holders to the State for the purpose of educating the people. In the meantime, the extraordinary success of the post-office, which, according to the teaching of the Manchester school, should have been a nest of incompetence and jobbery, had not only shewn the perfect efficiency of State enterprise when the officials are made responsible to the class interested in its success, but had also proved the enormous convenience and cheapness of socialistic or collectivist charges over those of private enterprise. . . .

After 1875, leaping and bounding prosperity, after a final spurt during which the Income Tax fell to twopence, got out of breath, and has not yet recovered it. . . . Education began to intensify the sense of suffering, and to throw light upon its causes in dark places. . . . Numbers of young men, pupils of Mill, Spencer, Comte, and Darwin, roused by Mr. Henry George's "Progress and Poverty," left aside evolution and freethought; took to insurrectionary economics; studied Karl Marx; and were so convinced that Socialism had only to be put clearly before the working-classes to concentrate the power of their immense numbers in one irresistible organization, that the Revolution was fixed for 1889—the anniversary of the French Revolution—at latest. I remember being asked satirically and publicly at that time how long I thought it would take to get Socialism into working order if I had my way. I replied, with a spirited modesty, that a fortnight would be ample for the purpose. When I add that I was frequently complimented on being one of the more reasonable Socialists, you will be able to appreciate the fervor of our conviction, and the extravagant levity of our practical ideas. The opposition we got was uninstructional: it was mainly founded on the assumption that our projects were theoretically unsound but immediately possible, whereas our weak point lay in the case being exactly the reverse. However, the ensuing years sifted and sobered us. "The Socialists," as they were called, have fallen into line as a Social Democratic party, no more insurrectionary in its policy than any other party. . . .

First, then, as to the consummation of Democracy. Since 1885 every man who pays four shillings a week rent can only be hindered from voting by anomalous conditions of registration which are likely to be swept away very shortly. This is all but manhood suffrage. However, I may leave adult suffrage

out of the question, because the outlawry of women, monstrous as it is, is not a question of class privilege, but of sex privilege. To complete the foundation of the democratic State, then, we need manhood suffrage, abolition of all poverty disqualifications, abolition of the House of Lords, public payment of candidature expenses, public payment of representatives, and annual elections. These changes are now inevitable, however unacceptable they may appear to those of us who are Conservatives. They have been for half a century the commonplaces of Radicalism. We have next to consider that the State is not merely an abstraction: it is a machine to do certain work; and if that work be increased and altered in its character, the machinery must be multiplied and altered too. Now, the extension of the franchise does increase and alter the work very considerably; but it has no direct effect on the machinery. At present the State machine has practically broken down under the strain of spreading democracy, the work being mainly local and the machinery mainly central. Without efficient local machinery the replacing of private enterprise by State enterprise is out of the question; and we shall presently see that such replacement is one of the inevitable consequences of Democracy. A democratic State cannot become a *Social*-Democratic State unless it has in every centre of population a local governing body as thoroughly democratic in its constitution as the central Parliament. This matter is also well in train. In 1888 a Government avowedly reactionary passed a Local Government Bill which effected a distinct advance towards the democratic municipality. It was furthermore a Bill with no single aspect of finality anywhere about it. Local Self-Government remains prominent within the sphere of practical politics. When it is achieved, the democratic State will have the machinery for Socialism.

And now, how is the raw material of Socialism—otherwise the Proletarian man—to be brought to the Democratic State machinery? Here again the path is easily found. . . . The phenomenon of economic rent has assumed prodigious proportions in our great cities. The injustice of its private appropriation is glaring, flagrant, almost ridiculous. In the long suburban roads about London, where rows of exactly similar houses stretch for miles countrywards, the rent changes at every few thousand yards by exactly the amount saved or incurred annually in travelling to and from the householder's place of business. The seeker after lodgings, hesitating between Bloomsbury and Tottenham, finds every advantage of situation skimmed off by the landlord with scientific precision. As lease after lease falls in, houses, shops, goodwills of businesses which are the fruits of the labor of lifetimes, fall into the maw of the ground landlord. Confiscation of capital, spoliation of households, annihilation of incentive, everything that the most ignorant and credulous fundholder ever

charged against the Socialist, rages openly in London, which begins to ask itself whether it exists and toils only for the typical duke and his celebrated jockey and his famous racehorse. . . . This economic pressure is reinforced formidably by political opinion in the workmen's associations. Here the moderate members are content to demand a progressive Income Tax, and the extremists are all for Land Nationalisation. The cry for such taxation cannot permanently be resisted. And it is very worthy of remark that there is a new note in the cry. Formerly taxes were proposed with a specific object—as to pay for a war, for education, or the like. Now the proposal is to tax the landlords in order to get some of *our* money back from them—take it from them first and find a use for it afterwards. . . .

. . . The quick starvation of the unemployed, the slow starvation of the employed who have no relatively scarce special skill, the unbearable anxiety or dangerous recklessness of those who are employed to-day and unemployed to-morrow, the rise in urban rents, the screwing down of wages by pauper immigration and home multiplication, the hand-in-hand advance of education and discontent, are all working up to explosion point. It is useless to prove by statistics that most of the people are better off than before, true as that probably is, thanks to instalments of Social Democracy. Yet even that is questionable; for it is idle to claim authority for statistics of things that have never been recorded. Chaos has no statistics; it has only statisticians; and the ablest of them prefaces his remarks on the increased consumption of rice by the admission that “no one can contemplate the present condition of the masses without desiring something like a revolution for the better.” The masses themselves are being converted so rapidly to that view of the situation, that we have Pan-Anglican Synods, bewildered by a revival of Christianity, pleading that though Socialism is eminently Christian, yet “the Church must act safely as well as sublimely.” During the agitation made by the unemployed last winter (1887-8), the Chief Commissioner of Police in London started at his own shadow, and mistook Mr. John Burns for the French Revolution, to the great delight of that genial and courageous champion of his class. . . . But whilst we are pointing the moral and adorning the tale according to our various opinions, an actual struggle is beginning between the unemployed who demand work and the local authorities appointed to deal with the poor. In the winter, the unemployed collect around red flags, and listen to speeches for want of anything else to do. They welcome Socialism, insurrectionism, currency craze—anything that passes the time and seems to express the fact that they are hungry. The local authorities, equally innocent of studied economic views, deny that there is any misery; send leaders of deputations to the Local Government Board, who promptly send them back to the guardians;

try bullying; try stoneyards; try bludgeoning; and finally sit down helplessly and wish it were summer again or the unemployed at the bottom of the sea. Meanwhile the charity fund, which is much less elastic than the wages fund, overflows at the Mansion House, only to run dry at the permanent institutions. So unstable a state of things cannot last. The bludgeoning, and the shocking clamor for bloodshed from the anti-popular newspapers will create a revulsion among the humane section of the middle class. The section which is blinded by class prejudice to all sense of social responsibility, dreads personal violence from the working-class with a superstitious terror that defies enlightenment or control. Municipal employment must be offered at last. This cannot be done in one place alone: the rush from other parts of the country would swamp an isolated experiment. Wherever the pressure is, the relief must be given on the spot. . . .

We now foresee our municipality equipped with land and capital for industrial purposes. At first they will naturally extend the industries they already carry on, road making, gas works, tramways, building, and the like. It is probable that they will for the most part, regard their action as a mere device to meet a passing emergency. The Manchester School will urge its Protectionist theories as to the exemption of private enterprise from the competition of public enterprise, in one supreme effort to practise for the last time on popular ignorance of the science which it has consistently striven to debase and stultify. For a while the proprietary party will succeed in hampering and restricting municipal enterprise; in attaching the stigma of pauperism to its service; in keeping the lot of its laborers as nearly as possible down to private competition level in point of hard work and low wages. But its power will be broken by the disappearance of that general necessity for keeping down the rates which now hardens local authority to humane appeals. The luxury of being generous at someone else's expense will be irresistible. The ground landlord will be the municipal milch cow; and the ordinary ratepayers will feel the advantage of sleeping in peace, relieved at once from the fear of increased burdens and of having their windows broken, and their premises looted by hungry mobs, nuclei of all the socialism and scoundrelism of the city. They will have just as much remorse in making the landlord pay as the landlord has had in making them pay—just as much and no more. And as the municipality becomes more democratic, it will find landlordism losing power, not only relatively to democracy, but absolutely. . . .

Private property, by cheapening the laborer to the utmost in order to get the greater surplus out of him, lowers the margin of human cultivation, and so raises the "rent of ability." The most important form of that rent is the profit of industrial management. The gains of a great portrait painter or

fashionable physician are much less significant, since these depend entirely on the existence of a very rich class of patrons subject to acute vanity and hypochondriasis. But the industrial organiser is independent of patrons: instead of merely attracting a larger share of the product of industry to himself, he increases the product by his management. The market place of such ability depends upon the relation of the supply to the demand: the more there is of it the cheaper it is: the less, the dearer. Any cause that increases the supply lowers the price. Now it is evident that since a manager must be a man of education and address, it is useless to look ordinarily to the laboring class for a supply of managerial skill. Not one laborer in a million succeeds in raising himself on the shoulders of his fellows by extraordinary gifts, or extraordinary luck, or both. The managers must be drawn from the classes which enjoy education and social culture; and their price, rapidly as it is falling with the spread of education and the consequent growth of the "intellectual proletariat," is still high. It is true that a very able and highly-trained manager can now be obtained for about £800 a year, provided his post does not compel him to spend two-thirds of his income on what is called "keeping up his position," instead of on his own gratification. Still, when it is considered that laborers receive less than £50 a year, and that the demand for laborers is necessarily vast in proportion to the demand for able managers, nay, that there is an inverse ratio between them, since the manager's talent is valuable in proportion to quantity of labor he can organise, it will be admitted that £800 a year represents an immense rent of ability. But if the education and culture which are a practically indispensable part of the equipment of competitors for such posts were enjoyed by millions instead of thousands, that rent would fall considerably. Now the tendency of private property is to keep the masses mere beasts of burden. The tendency of Social Democracy is to educate them, to make men of them. Social Democracy would not long be saddled with the rents of ability which have during the last century made our born captains of industry our masters and tyrants instead of our servants and leaders. It is even conceivable that rent of managerial ability might in course of time become negative,² astonishing as that may seem to the many persons who are by this time so hopelessly confused amid existing anomalies, that the proposition that "whosoever of you will be the chiefest, shall be servant of all," strikes them rather as a Utopian paradox than as the most obvious and inevitable of social arrangements. The fall in the rent of ability will, however, benefit not only the municipality, but also its remaining private

² That is, the manager would receive less for his work than the artisan. Cases in which the profits of the employer are smaller than the wages of the employee are by no means uncommon in certain grades of industry where small traders have occasion to employ skilled workmen.

competitors. Nevertheless, as the prestige of the municipality grows, and as men see more and more clearly what the future is to it, able organisers will take lower salaries for municipal than for private employment; whilst those who can beat even the municipality at organising, or who, as professional men, can deal personally with the public without the intervention of industrial organisation, will pay the rent of their places of business either directly to the municipality, or to the private landlord whose income the municipality will absorb by taxation. Finally, when rents of ability had reached their irreducible natural level, they could be dealt with by a progressive Income Tax in the very improbable case of their proving a serious social inconvenience.

It is not necessary to go further into the economic detail of the process of the extinction of private property. Much of the process as sketched here may be anticipated by sections of the proprietary class successively capitulating, as the net closes about their special interests, on such terms as they may be able to stand out for before their power is entirely broken.

We may also safely neglect for the moment the question of the development of the House of Commons into the central government which will be the organ for federating the municipalities, and nationalising inter-municipal rents by an adjustment of the municipal contributions to imperial taxation: in short, for discharging national as distinct from local business. One can see that the Local Government Board of the future will be a tremendous affair; that foreign States will be deeply affected by the reaction of English progress; that international trade, always the really dominant factor in foreign policy, will have to be reconsidered from a new point of view when profit comes to be calculated in terms of net social welfare instead of individual pecuniary gain; that our present system of imperial aggression, in which under pretext of exploration and colonisation, the flag follows the filibuster and trade follows the flag, with the missionary bringing up the rear, must collapse when the control of our military forces passes from the capitalist class to the people; that the disappearance of a variety of classes with a variety of what are now ridiculously called "public opinions" will be accompanied by the welding of society into one class with a public opinion of inconceivable weight; that this public opinion will make it for the first time possible effectively to control the population; that the economic independence of women, and the supplanting of the head of the household by the individual as the recognized unit of the State, will materially alter the status of children and the utility of the institution of the family; and that the inevitable reconstitution of the State Church on a democratic basis may, for example, open up the possibility of the election of an avowed Free-thinker like Mr. John Morley or Mr. Bradlaugh to the deanery of Westminster. All these things are mentioned

only for the sake of a glimpse of the fertile fields of thought and action which await us when the settlement of our bread and butter question leaves us free to use and develop our higher faculties.

This, then, is the humdrum programme of the practical Social Democrat to-day. There is not one new item in it. All are applications of principles already admitted, and extensions of practices already in full activity. All have on them that stamp of the vestry which is so congenial to the British mind. None of them compel the use of the words Socialism or Revolution: at no point do they involve guillotining, declaring the Rights of Man, swearing on the altar of the country, or anything else that is supposed to be essentially un-English. And they are all sure to come—landmarks on our course already visible to far-sighted politicians even of the party which dreads them.

Let me, in conclusion, disavow all admiration for this inevitable, but sordid, slow, reluctant, cowardly path to justice. I venture to claim your respect for those enthusiasts who still refuse to believe that millions of their fellow creatures must be left to sweat and suffer in hopeless toil and degradation, whilst parliaments and vestries grudgingly muddle and grope towards paltry instalments of betterment. The right is so clear, the wrong so intolerable, the gospel so convincing, that it seems to them that it *must* be possible to enlist the whole body of workers—soldiers, policemen, and all—under the banner of brotherhood and equality; and at one great stroke to set Justice on her rightful throne. Unfortunately, such an army of light is no more to be gathered from the human product of nineteenth century civilisation than grapes are to be gathered from thistles. But if we feel glad of that impossibility; if we feel relieved that the change is to be slow enough to avert personal risk to ourselves; if we feel anything less than acute disappointment and bitter humiliation at the discovery that there is yet between us and the promised land a wilderness in which many must perish miserably of want and despair: then I submit to you that our institutions have corrupted us to the most dastardly degree of selfishness. The Socialists need not be ashamed of beginning as they did by proposing militant organisation of the working-classes and general insurrection. The proposal proved impracticable; and it has now been abandoned—not without some outspoken regrets—by English Socialists. But it still remains as the only finally possible alternative to the Social Democratic programme.

GEORGES SOREL

GEORGES SOREL (1847–1922) was until 1892 a respectable bourgeois, the Chief Engineer of Highways and Bridges for the French government and a recipient of a ribbon of the Legion of Honor. After 1892 he devoted himself exclusively to writing, and in his *Reflections on Violence* (1906) contributed the testament of revolutionary syndicalism. This two-sidedness was characteristic. Sorel was during his lifetime and has been since his death many things to many men. The sources of his thought are as varied as Marx, Proudhon, and Bergson. He was at one time a defender of Dreyfus and in his later days a convinced anti-Semite. Content at one time to accept the alliance of democratic and socialist thought, he became later an ever more outspoken enemy of democracy, and, in his endeavor to effect an alliance of radicals and reactionaries against democracy, was friendly with extreme royalists. Aligned with proletarian elements he nevertheless was not unsympathetic to attempts to translate his philosophy into bourgeois terms. And while Lenin called him “that notorious muddlehead,” he looked with favor (though always pessimistically) on the Russian Revolution.

Despite the fact that so many divergent tendencies are discernible in Sorel's thought, there is a basic strain that draws his major works together. Sorel represented himself as a philosopher of pessimism. Antagonistic to the optimistic meliorism implicit in the eighteenth-century idea of progress, his *Illusions du progrès* (1908) attempted to exhibit the moral emptiness of that belief by analyzing the economic conditions out of which it grew and which it was intended to represent. The keynote of Sorel's pessimism is found in an attitude of acceptance of human weakness, of the inevitability of struggle and of suffering as the condition of mankind's march towards deliverance. Such a philosophy of conduct seemed to Sorel to be the necessary basis of that thoroughgoing moral regeneration of men and of society without which any social change is only illusory. In the last analysis, Sorel's radical critique of traditional liberalism and socialism is that of a moralist, and his attachment to pessimism is founded upon his belief that it is only out of a profoundly rooted acceptance of suffering that such moral qualities as heroism and genuine creative power can emerge. Social change, for Sorel, must partake of the qualities of a conversion.

It is in such a context that Sorel worked out his characteristic contribution to social theory—the idea of the “myth.” The motive force for moral regeneration must lie in a myth. “Men who are participating in a great social movement always picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph.” Without such a myth no social change has moral character. Only the irrational and unquestioning acceptance of an impelling ideal recognized frankly as a myth can have fruitful consequences with regard to social movements.

The specific soil for such an all-impelling myth Sorel found in the proletarian syndicates. In the wave of strikes that swept France during the Waldeck-Rousseau ministry he discerned intimations of the grander vision in which the proletarian movement took specific shape—violence, enlightened by the idea of the general strike, “as a pure and simple manifestation of the sentiment of the class war.” The

myth of the general strike was for Sorel the be-all and end-all of the socialist idea.

Sorel did not countenance indiscriminate acts of violence, and, indeed, his alignment with the syndicalists was shaken by their sporadic acts of sabotage. Only those acts were truly creative, that is *violent*, which were impelled by the myth of the general strike. Sorel meant by violence simply the creative power of direct action and revolt as against the parliamentary temporizing of those he loved to describe as "worthy progressives" and as distinguished from the more technical force of the bourgeoisie. Nor did Sorel look upon proletarian violence as being salutary only with regard to the proletariat. The myth of the general strike, while specifically proletarian in source, would, he thought, rehabilitate all the elements of capitalistic society.

Sorel's philosophy is a compound of many of the streams of thought current in his day. He regarded Proudhon as a precursor of his moralistic critique of contemporary society. "No writer has defined more forcibly than Proudhon the principles of that morality which modern times have in vain sought to realize." He was impressed by Eduard von Hartmann's philosophy of the "Unconscious," a compound of Hegel and Schopenhauer, and he believed that capitalism could be understood in these terms as the play of blind and irrational forces. It was this same notion of mystical evolutionism that Sorel found in Marx after disengaging Marx's moral idealism from his unprofitable pretension to a "scientific socialism." Sorel considered the kernel of Marxism to be the conception of class struggle, but felt it important to remove from that idea any claim to scientific prediction of the future. In the *Reflections on Violence* Sorel fuses Marx with the intuitionism he took (in his own way) from Henri Bergson, by whom he was very much impressed.

The *Reflections* gave vigorous expression to the syndicalist faith in direct action, the enmity felt towards the state as such, and the regard for a pluralist form of industrial organization, placing "the forces of production in the hands of *free men*, i.e., of men who will be capable of running the workshop created by capitalism without any need of master." However, his preoccupation with questions of salvation removed him from the main endeavors of rank and file syndicalists. On the whole, Sorel's philosophy found its most fertile soil in Italy where it was cross-fertilized by sources indigenous to the Italian tradition. Sorel himself regarded France as being especially propitious for his ideas and was disappointed when the faith in the general strike waned in France. In fact, in his last days, he lost much of his faith in the syndicalist myth and returned for comfort to the "myths" of Christianity. The following passage is from *Reflections on Violence* (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1950), translated from the French by T. E. Hulme and J. Roth, and reprinted here with the permission of the publisher.



REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE

ACCORDING TO Marx, capitalism, by reason of the innate laws of its own nature, is hurrying along a path which will lead the world of to-day, with the

inevitability of the evolution of organic life, to the doors of the world of to-morrow. This movement comprises a long period of capitalistic construction, and it ends by a rapid destruction, which is the work of the proletariat. Capitalism creates the heritage which Socialism will receive, the men who will suppress the present régime, and the means of bringing about this destruction, at the same time that it preserves the results obtained in production. Capitalism begets new ways of working; it throws the working class into revolutionary organizations by the pressure it exercises on wages; it restricts its own political basis by competition, which is constantly eliminating industrial leaders. Thus, after having solved the great problem of the organization of labour, to effect which Utopians have brought forward so many naïve or stupid hypotheses, capitalism provokes the birth of the cause which will overthrow it, and thus renders useless everything that Utopians have written to induce enlightened people to make reforms; and it gradually ruins the traditional order, against which the critics of the idealists had proved themselves to be so deplorably incompetent. . . . Without any co-ordinated plan, without any directive ideas, without any ideal of a future world, it is the cause of an inevitable evolution; it draws from the present all that the present can give towards historical development; it performs in an almost mechanical manner all that is necessary, in order that a new era may appear, and that this new era may break every link with the idealism of the present times, while preserving the acquisitions of the capitalistic economic system.

Socialists should therefore abandon the attempt (initiated by the Utopians) to find a means of inducing the enlightened middle class to prepare the *transition to a more perfect system of legislation*; their sole function is that of explaining to the proletariat the greatness of the revolutionary part they are called upon to play. By ceaseless criticism the proletariat must be brought to perfect their organizations; they must be shown how the embryonic forms which appear in their unions¹ may be developed, so that, finally, they may build up institutions without any parallel in the history of the middle class; that they may form ideas which depend solely on their position as producers in large industries, and which owe nothing to middle-class thought; and that they may acquire *habits of liberty* with which the middle class nowadays are no longer acquainted.

This doctrine will evidently be inapplicable if the middle class and the proletariat do not oppose each other implacably, with all the forces at their disposal; the more ardently capitalist the middle class is, the more the prole-

¹ [The French is *sociétés de résistance*. What is meant is the syndicate, considered principally as a means of combining workmen against the employers.—*Trans. Note.*]

tariat is full of a warlike spirit and confident of its revolutionary strength, the more certain will be the success of the proletarian movement. . . .

It is often urged, in objection to the people who defend the Marxian conception, that it is impossible for them to stop the movement of degeneration which is dragging both the middle class and the proletariat far from the paths assigned to them by Marx's theory. They can doubtless influence the working classes, and it is hardly to be denied that strike violences do keep the revolutionary spirit alive; but how can they hope to give back to the middle class an ardor which is spent?

It is here that the rôle of violence in history appears to us as singularly great, for it can, in an indirect manner, so operate on the middle class as to awaken them to a sense of their own class sentiment. Attention has often been drawn to the danger of certain acts of violence which compromised *admirable social works*, disgusted employers who were disposed to arrange the happiness of their workmen, and developed egoism where the most noble sentiments formerly reigned.

To repay with *black ingratitude* the *benevolence* of those who would protect the workers, to meet with insults the homilies of the defenders of human fraternity, and to reply by blows to the advances of the propagators of social peace—all that is assuredly not in conformity with the rules of fashionable Socialism . . . , but it is a very practical way of indicating to the middle class that they must mind their own business and only that.

I believe also that it may be useful to thrash the orators of democracy and the representatives of the Government, for in this way you insure that none shall retain any illusions about the character of acts of violence. But these acts can have historical value only if they are the *clear and brutal expression of the class war*: the middle classes must not be allowed to imagine that, aided by cleverness, social science, or high-flown sentiments, they might find a better welcome at the hands of the proletariat.

The day on which employers perceive that they have nothing to gain by works which promote social peace, or by democracy, they will understand that they have been ill-advised by the people who persuaded them to abandon their trade of creators of productive forces for the noble profession of educators of the proletariat. Then there is some chance that they may get back a part of their energy, and that moderate or conservative economics may appear as absurd to them as they appeared to Marx. In any case, the separation of classes being more clearly accentuated, the proletarian movement will have some chance of developing with greater regularity than to-day. . . .

Every time that we attempt to obtain an exact conception of the ideas be-

hind proletarian violence we are forced to go back to the notion of the general strike. . . .

The *new school*, which calls itself Marxist, Syndicalist, and revolutionary, declared in favor of the idea of the general strike as soon as it became clearly conscious of the true sense of its own doctrine, of the consequences of its activity, and of its own originality. It was thus led to leave the old official, Utopian, and political tabernacles, which hold the general strike in horror, and to launch itself into the true current of the proletarian revolutionary movement; for a long time past the proletariat had made adherence to the principle of the general strike the *test* by means of which the Socialism of the workers was distinguished from that of the amateur revolutionaries.

Parliamentary Socialists can only obtain great influence if they can manage, by the use of a very confused language, to impose themselves on very diverse groups; for example, they must have working-men constituents simple enough to allow themselves to be duped by high-sounding phrases about future collectivism; they are compelled to represent themselves as profound philosophers to stupid middle-class people who wish to appear to be well informed about social questions; it is very necessary also for them to be able to exploit rich people who think that they are earning the gratitude of humanity by taking shares in the enterprises of Socialist politicians. . . .

Against this noisy, garrulous, and lying Socialism, which is exploited by ambitious people of every description, which amuses a few buffoons, and which is admired by decadents—revolutionary Syndicalism takes its stand, and endeavors, on the contrary, to leave nothing in a state of indecision; its ideas are honestly expressed, without trickery and without mental reservations; no attempt is made to dilute doctrines by a stream of confused commentaries. Syndicalism endeavors to employ methods of expression which throw a full light on things, which put them exactly in the place assigned to them by their nature, and which bring out the whole value of the forces in play. Oppositions, instead of being glozed over, must be thrown into sharp relief if we desire to obtain a clear idea of the Syndicalist movement; the groups which are struggling one against the other must be shown as separate and as compact as possible; in short, the movements of the revolted masses must be represented in such a way that the soul of the revolutionaries may receive a deep and lasting impression.

These results could not be produced in any very certain manner by the use of ordinary language; use must be made of a body of images which, *by intuition alone*, and before any considered analyses are made, is capable of evoking as an undivided whole the mass of sentiments which corresponds to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against mod-

ern society. The Syndicalists solve this problem perfectly, by concentrating the whole of Socialism in the drama of the general strike; there is thus no longer any place for the reconciliation of contraries in the equivocations of the professors; everything is clearly mapped out, so that only one interpretation of Socialism is possible. This method has all the advantages which "integral" knowledge has over analysis, according to the doctrine of Bergson; and perhaps it would not be possible to cite another example which would so perfectly demonstrate the value of the famous professor's doctrines.

The possibility of the actual realization of the general strike has been much discussed; it has been stated that the Socialist war could not be decided in one single battle. To the people who think themselves cautious, practical, and scientific the difficulty of setting great masses of the proletariat in motion at the same moment seems prodigious; they have analyzed the difficulties of detail which such an enormous struggle would present. It is the opinion of the Socialist-sociologists, as also of the politicians, that the general strike is a popular dream, characteristic of the beginnings of a working-class movement; we have had quoted against us the authority of Sidney Webb, who has decreed that the general strike is an illusion of youth, of which the English workers—whom the monopolists of sociology have so often presented to us as the depositaries of the true conception of the working-class movement—soon rid themselves.

That the general strike is not popular in contemporary England, is a poor argument to bring against the historical significance of the idea, for the English are distinguished by an extraordinary lack of understanding of the class war; their ideas have remained very much dominated by medieval influences: the guild, privileged, or at least protected by laws, still seems to them the ideal of working-class organization; it is for England that the term *working-class aristocracy*, as a name for the trades unionists, was invented, and, as a matter of fact, trades unionism does pursue the acquisition of legal privileges. (This is seen, for example, in the efforts made by the trades unions to obtain laws absolving them from the civil responsibilities of their acts.) We might therefore say that the aversion felt by England for the general strike should be looked upon as strong presumptive evidence in favor of the latter by all those who look upon the class war as the essence of Socialism.

Moreover, Sidney Webb enjoys a reputation for competence which is very much exaggerated; all that can be put to his credit is that he has waded through uninteresting blue-books, and has had the patience to compose an extremely indigestible compilation on the history of trades unionism; he has a mind of the narrowest description, which could only impress people unaccustomed to reflection. Those who introduced his fame into France knew

nothing at all about Socialism; and if he is really in the first rank of contemporary authors of economic history, as his translator affirms, it is because the intellectual level of these historians is rather low; moreover, many examples show us that it is possible to be a most illustrious professional historian and yet possess a mind something less than mediocre.

Neither do I attach any importance to the objections made to the general strike based on considerations of a practical order. The attempt to construct hypotheses about the nature of the struggles of the future and the means of suppressing capitalism, on the model furnished by history, is a return to the old methods of the Utopists. There is no process by which the future can be predicted scientifically, nor even one which enables us to discuss whether one hypothesis about it is better than another; it has been proved by too many memorable examples that the greatest men have committed prodigious errors in thus desiring to make predictions about even the least distant future. (The errors committed by Marx are numerous and sometimes enormous. . . .)

And yet without leaving the present, without reasoning about this future, which seems for ever condemned to escape our reason, we should be unable to act at all. Experience shows that the *framing of a future, in some indeterminate time*, may, when it is done in a certain way, be very effective, and have very few inconveniences; this happens when the anticipations of the future take the form of those myths, which enclose with them, all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a party or of a class, inclinations which recur to the mind with the insistence of instincts in all the circumstances of life; and which give an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action by which, more easily than by any other method, men can reform their desires, passions, and mental activity. We know, moreover, that these social myths in no way prevent a man profiting by the observations which he makes in the course of his life, and form no obstacle to the pursuit of his normal occupations. (It has so often been remarked that English or American sectarians whose religious exaltation was fed by the apocalyptic myths were often none the less very practical men.)

The truth of this may be shown by numerous examples.

The first Christians expected the return of Christ and the total ruin of the pagan world, with the inauguration of the kingdom of the saints, at the end of the first generation. The catastrophe did not come to pass, but Christian thought profited so greatly from the apocalyptic myth that certain contemporary scholars maintain that the whole preaching of Christ referred solely to this one point. The hopes which Luther and Calvin had formed of the religious exaltation of Europe were by no means realized; these fathers of the Reformation very soon seemed men of a past era; for present-day Protestants they

belong rather to the Middle Ages than to modern times, and the problems which troubled them most occupy very little place in contemporary Protestantism. Must we for that reason deny the immense result which came from their dreams of Christian renovation? It must be admitted that the real developments of the Revolution did not in any way resemble the enchanting pictures which created the enthusiasm at its first adepts; but without those pictures would the Revolution have been victorious? Many Utopias were mixed up with the Revolutionary myth, because it had been formed by a society passionately fond of imaginative literature, full of confidence in the "science," and very little acquainted with the economic history of the past. These Utopias came to nothing; but it may be asked whether the Revolution was not a much more profound transformation than those dreamed of by the people who in the eighteenth century had invented social Utopias. In our own times Mazzini pursued what the wiseacres of his time called a mad chimera; but it can no longer be denied that, without Mazzini, Italy would never have become a great power, and that he did more for Italian unity than Cavour and all the politicians of his school.

A knowledge of what the myths contain in the way of details which will actually form part of the history of the future is then of small importance; they are not astrological almanacs; it is even possible that nothing which they contain will ever come to pass,—as was the case with the catastrophe expected by the first Christians. In our own daily life, are we not familiar with the fact that what actually happens is very different from our preconceived notion of it? And that does not prevent us from continuing to make resolutions. Psychologists say that there is heterogeneity between the ends in view and the ends actually realized: the slightest experience of life reveals this law to us, which Spencer transferred into nature, to extract therefrom his theory of the multiplication of effects.

The myth must be judged as a means of acting on the present; any attempt to discuss how far it can be taken literally as future history is devoid of sense. *It is the myth in its entirety which is alone important:* its parts are only of interest in so far as they bring out the main idea. No useful purpose is served, therefore, in arguing about the incidents which may occur in the course of a social war, and about the decisive conflicts which may give victory to the proletariat; even supposing the revolutionaries to have been wholly and entirely deluded in setting up this imaginary picture of the general strike, this picture may yet have been, in the course of the preparation for the Revolution, a great element of strength, if it has embraced all the aspirations of Socialism, and if it has given to the whole body of Revolutionary thought a precision and a rigidity which no other method of thought could have given.

To estimate, then, the significance of the idea of the general strike, all the methods of discussion which are current among politicians, sociologists, or people with pretensions to political science, must be abandoned. Everything which its opponents endeavor to establish may be conceded to them, without reducing in any way the value of the theory which they think they have refuted. The question whether the general strike is a partial reality, or only a product of popular imagination, is of little importance. All that it is necessary to know is, whether the general strike contains everything that the Socialist doctrine expects of the revolutionary proletariat.

To solve this question we are no longer compelled to argue learnedly about the future; we are not obliged to indulge in lofty reflections about philosophy, history, or economics; we are not on the plane of theories, and we can remain on the level of observable facts. We have to question men who take a very active part in the real revolutionary movement amidst the proletariat, men who do not aspire to climb into the middle class and whose mind is not dominated by corporative prejudices. These men may be deceived about an infinite number of political, economical, or moral questions; but their testimony is decisive, sovereign, and irrefutable when it is a question of knowing what are the ideas which most powerfully move them and their comrades, which most appeal to them as being identical with their socialistic conceptions, and thanks to which their reason, their hopes, and their way of looking at particular facts seem to make but one indivisible unity.

Thanks to these men, we know that the general strike is indeed what I have said: the *myth* in which Socialism is wholly comprised, *i.e.*, a body of images capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modern society. Strikes have engendered in the proletariat the noblest, deepest, and most moving sentiments that they possess; the general strike groups them all in a co-ordinated picture, and, by bringing them together, gives to each one of them its maximum of intensity; appealing to their painful memories of particular conflicts, it colors with an intense life all the details of the composition presented to consciousness. We thus obtain that intuition of Socialism which language cannot give us with perfect clearness—and we obtain it as a whole, perceived instantaneously. . . .

[The] class war . . . is the point of departure for all Socialistic thought and stands in such great need of elucidation, since sophists have endeavored to give a false idea of it.

Marx speaks of society as if it were divided into two fundamentally antagonistic groups; observation, it has often been urged, does not justify this division,

and it is true that a certain effort of will is necessary before we can find it verified in the phenomena of everyday life.

The organization of a capitalistic workshop furnishes a first approximation, and piece-work plays an essential part in the formation of the class idea; in fact, it throws into relief the very clear opposition of interests about the price of commodities; the workers feel themselves under the thumb of the employers in the same way that peasants feel themselves in the power of the merchants and the money-lenders of the towns; history shows that no economic opposition has been more clearly felt than the latter; since civilization has existed, country and town have formed two hostile camps. Piece-work also shows that in the wage-earning world there is a group of men somewhat analogous to the retail shopkeepers, possessing the confidence of the employer, and not belonging to the proletariat class.

The strike throws a new light on all this; it separates the interests and the different ways of thinking of the two groups of wage-earners—the foremen clerks, engineers, etc., as contrasted with the workmen who alone go on strike—much better than the daily circumstances of life do; it then becomes clear that the administrative group has a natural tendency to become a little aristocracy; for these people, State Socialism would be advantageous, because they would go up one in the social hierarchy.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

THE PHILOSOPHY of Nietzsche (1844–1900) is a reexamination of the historic ideals of European civilization, carried through on the basis of a highly critical response to the democratic, leveling tendencies of industrial society and argued with the help of a reinterpretation of Darwinian evolution. Spencer and his followers used the theory of evolution as an apology for minimal interference with the “natural” processes of society; for they believed that the struggle for existence must necessarily eliminate undesirable types of individuals and societies and so achieve perfection automatically. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, evolution was the process in which not the inherently splendid and noble creatures survive, but only those whose traits run true to a monotonous norm. The natural outcome of evolution is therefore the gradual disappearance of things of genuine value and the emergence of dull mediocrity.

On this assumption the natural or automatic course of history is unproductive of values; and Nietzsche’s entire philosophy—his frequently violent language, his condemnation of Christianity, democracy, and socialism, and his advocacy of a radical aristocratism—is a heroic attempt to remedy this condition. He proposed, first, the rejection of sentimentally held values, such as humility, protection of the weak, or habits of humdrum industry, which rest on the supposition that the mere survival of masses of undistinguished individuals is the paramount good; second, the acceptance of great men performing splendid deeds as the highest end-product of history; and third, the “liberation” of such men for the sake of achieving this goal.

The main burden of Nietzsche’s “transvaluation of all values” is carried by his analysis of historic epochs and institutions. In his first work, for example, he attempted to assess Greek civilization by distinguishing three strains in it: the Dionysiac unrestrained but tragic participation in life; the Apollonian harmonious rendering of human passions in measured artistic form; and the Socratic substitution of an ascetic intellectualism and a pale optimism for the passionate pursuit of aristocratic excellence. The glory of ancient Greece for Nietzsche was the perfect union of Dionysos and Apollo as illustrated by the fusion of music and clarifying speech in the Greek drama. Socratism, like Buddhism, Christianity, the Reformation, the French Revolution, and middle-class democracy were therefore historic misfortunes. They represented the revolt of slave morality (the morality of the herd, concerned primarily with achieving safety and colorless equality) against the morality of the master class (the morality of strong, proud, and unusual individuals, who are the true creators of noble values). But the course of history must be redirected toward the deliberate creation of such great souls or supermen. Using as his protagonist the figure of a half-mythical Persian prophet, Nietzsche formulated this ideal in his *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (1883–86) and also indicated the obstacles which must be removed before it could be realized. In a healthy society, he insisted, the aristocracy must regard itself as

the highest justification of the community, not as a means to ameliorating the lot of the latter. "It should therefore accept with good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, *for its sake*, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is *not* allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher *existence*: like those sun-seeking climbing plants of Java which encircle an oak so long and so often with their arms, until at last, high above it, but supported by it, they can unfold their tops in the open light, and exhibit their happiness."

Nietzsche made much of the need for courageous planned activity, and it is in considerable measure because of his heroic voluntarism that he became an influential figure. Mankind must mold its destiny, gladly accepting the suffering which the struggle for human values entails and being alive to the fact that nature is not a friendly agent. The supreme test of the courage of his supermen was their readiness to affirm life, in spite of the fact that evolution is periodic and there is an eternal recurrence in things—in spite of the fact, therefore, that not only must we work for the achievement of our ideals but also must contemplate their destruction. Nietzsche has been often interpreted as an apologist for deliberate brutality against the defenseless, for pan-Germanic nationalism, and for the permanent enslavement of the majority of men to the "blond beasts" who were the civilizers of mankind. Much of his language certainly supports such a reading, and there is no doubt that he has been many things to many men and movements. Yet his animus was directed primarily against the smug optimism of his own society, and he had nothing but contempt for those who held power in it—the satisfied leaders of industry, the breeders of race hatreds, the scheming politicians, and the military bullies. Even though he insisted that his supermen were to be the goal of civilization and not the means for raising the standard of living, he also asserted that an individual, whether slave or master, is of importance only to the extent that he contributes to the fullness and strength of the life of the race.

The following paragraphs are taken from Nietzsche's work left unfinished in 1888, *The Will to Power* (translated from the German by Anthony M. Ludovici in the *Complete Works*, ed. O. Levy; Edinburgh, T. N. Foulis, 1909–23), in which he planned a systematic presentation of his thought.



THE WILL TO POWER

255. All virtues should be looked upon as physiological *conditions*: the principal organic functions, more particularly, should be considered necessary and good. All virtues are really refined *passions* and elevated physiological conditions.

Pity and philanthropy may be regarded as the developments of sexual relations,—justice as the development of the passion for revenge,—virtue as the love of resistance, the will to power,—honour as an acknowledgment of an equal, or of an equally powerful, force.

373. *The origin of moral values.*—Selfishness has as much value as the physiological value of him who possesses it. Each individual represents the whole course of Evolution, and he is not, as morals teach, something that begins at his birth. If he represent the *ascent* of the line of mankind, his value is, in fact, very great; and the concern about his maintenance and the promoting of his growth may even be extreme. (It is the concern about the promise of the future in him which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right to egoism.) If he represent *descending* development, decay, chronic sickening, he has little worth: and the greatest fairness would have him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as possible from the well-constituted. In this case society's duty is to *suppress egoism* (for the latter may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid, and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A morality and a religion of "love," the *curbing* of the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of envy,—feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the botched,—and it even deifies them under the ideal of humanity, of obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty, of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness, the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross."

The preponderance of an altruistic way of valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon examination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth much," simply a psychological valuation; more plainly still: it is the feeling of impotence, of the lack of the great self-asserting impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation gets translated, according to the particular culture of these classes, into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion "value" hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of power and of self-confidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the bungled

and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society: when, however, the Socialist, the Anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their existence is something for which some one must be *guilty*, they are very closely related to the Christian, who also believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched constitution when he has found some one whom he can hold *responsible* for it. The instinct of *revenge* and *resentment* appears in both cases here as a means of enduring life, as a self-preservative measure, as is also the favour shown to *altruistic* theory and practice. The *hatred of egoism*, whether it be one's own (as in the case of the Christian), or another's (as in the case of the Socialists), thus appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge; and also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct of the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity. . . . At bottom, as I have already suggested, the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is yet another self-preservative instinct on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological circumstances.

When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his inadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying;—if he were more at ease he would take jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders the "world"—and does not even except himself. But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find relief in slander.

274. *Whose will to power is morality?*—The common factor of all European history since the time of *Socrates* is the attempt to make the *moral values* dominate all other values, in order that they should not be only the leader and judge of life, but also of: (1) knowledge, (2) Art, (3) political and social aspirations. "Amelioration" regarded as the only duty, everything else used as a *means* thereto (or as a force distributing, hindering, and endangering its realisation, and therefore to be opposed and annihilated . . .).—A similar movement to be observed in *China* and *India*.

What is the meaning of this *will to power on the part of moral values*, which has played such a part in the world's prodigious evolutions?

Answer:—Three powers lie concealed behind it: (1) The instinct of the *herd* opposed to the strong and the independent; (2) the instinct of all *sufferers*

and all *abortions* opposed to the happy and well-constituted; (3) the instinct of the mediocre opposed to the exceptions.—*Enormous advantage of this movement*, despite the cruelty, falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped it along (for the history of the *struggle of morality with the fundamental instincts of life* is in itself the greatest piece of immorality that has ever yet been witnessed on earth . . .).

276. The whole of the morality of Europe is based upon the values *which are useful to the herd*: the sorrow of all higher and exceptional men is explained by the fact that everything which distinguishes them from others reaches their consciousness in the form of a feeling of their own smallness and egregiousness. It is the *virtues* of modern men which are the causes of pessimistic gloominess; the mediocre, like the herd, are not troubled much with questions or with conscience—they are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are noted examples.)

The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more completely it is condemned.

353. *A criticism of the good man.*—Honesty, dignity, dutifulness, justice, humanity, loyalty, uprightness, clean conscience—is it really supposed that, by means of these fine-sounding words, the qualities they stand for are approved and affirmed for their own sake? Or is it this, that qualities and states indifferent in themselves have merely been looked at in a light which lends them some value? Does the worth of these qualities lie in themselves, or in the use and advantage to which they lead (or to which they seem to lead, to which they are expected to lead)?

I naturally do not wish to imply that there is any opposition between the *ego* and the *alter* in the judgment: the question is, whether it is the *results* of these qualities, either in regard to him who possesses them or in regard to environment, society, "humanity," which lend them their value; or whether they have a value in themselves. . . . In other words: is it *utility* which bids men condemn, combat, and deny the opposite qualities (duplicity, falseness, perversity, lack of self-confidence, inhumanity)? Is the essence of such qualities condemned, or only their consequences? In other words: were it *desirable* that there should exist no men at all possessed of such qualities? *In any case, this is believed.* . . . But here lies the error, the short-sightedness, the monocularism of *narrow egoism*.

Expressed otherwise: would it be desirable to create circumstances in which the whole advantage would be on the side of the just—so that all those with opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and would slowly become extinct?

At bottom, this is a question of taste and of *aesthetics*: should we desire the

most honourable types of men—that is to say, the greatest bores—alone to subsist? the rectangular, the virtuous, the upright, the good-natured, the straightforward, and the “blockheads”?

If one can imagine the total suppression of the huge number constituting the “others,” even the just man himself ceases from having a right to exist,—he is, in fact, no longer necessary,—and in this way it is seen that coarse utility alone could have elevated such an *insufferable* virtue to a place of honour.

Desirability may lie precisely on the other side. It might be better to create conditions in which the “just man” would be reduced to the humble position of a “useful instrument”—an “ideal gregarious animal,” or at best a herdsman: in short, conditions in which he would no longer stand in the highest sphere, which requires *other qualities*.

280. The instinct of the herd values the *juste milieu*¹ and the *average* as the highest and most precious of all things: the spot where the majority is to be found, and the air that it breathes there. In this way it is the opponent of all order of rank; it regards a climb from the level to the heights in the same light as a descent from the majority to the minority. The herd regards the *exception*, whether it be above or beneath its general level, as something which is antagonistic and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing with the exceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to become guardians, herdsman, and watchmen—in fact, to become their *head-servants*: thus they convert a danger into a thing which is useful. In the middle, fear ceases: here a man is alone with nothing; here there is not much room even for misunderstandings; here there is equality; here a man's individual existence is not felt as a reproach, but as the *right* existence; here contentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only towards the exceptions; to be an exception is to be a sinner.

281. If, in compliance with our communal instincts, we make certain regulations for ourselves and forbid certain acts, we do not of course, in common reason, forbid a certain kind of “existence,” nor a certain attitude of mind, but only a particular application and development of this “existence” and “attitude of mind.” But then the idealist of virtue, the *moralist*, comes along and says: “God sees into the human heart! What matters it that ye abstain from certain acts: ye are not any better on that account!” Answer: Mr. Longears and Virtue-Monger, we do not want to be better at all, we are quite satisfied with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not *harm* one another—and that is why we forbid certain actions when they take a particular direction—that is, to say, when they are against our own interests: but that does not alter the fact that when these same actions are directed against the enemies of our community—against you, for instance—we are at a loss to know how to pay them

¹ [Happy mean.]

sufficient honour. We educate our children up to them; we develop them to the fullest extent. Did we share that "god-fearing" radicalism which your holy craziness recommends, if we were greenhorns enough to condemn the source of those forbidden "acts" by condemning the "heart" and the "attitude of mind" which recommends them, that would mean condemning our very existence, and with it its greatest prerequisite—an attitude of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with all our soul. By our decrees we prevent this attitude of mind from breaking out and venting itself in a useless way—we are prudent when we prescribe such laws for ourselves; we are also *moral* in so doing. . . . Have you no idea—however vague—what sacrifices it has cost us, how much self-control, self-subjection, and harness it has compelled us to exercise? We are vehement in our desires; there are times when we even feel as if we could devour each other. . . . But the "communal spirit" is master of us: have you observed that this is almost a definition of morality?

282. *The weakness of the gregarious animal* gives rise to a morality which is precisely similar to that resulting from the weakness of the decadent man: they understand each other; they *associate* with each other (the great decadent religions always rely upon the support of the herd). The gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature; but it is incapable of taking any initiative; it must have a "leader"—the priests understand this. . . . The state is not subtle, not secret enough; the art of "directing consciences" slips its grasp. How is the gregarious animal infected with illness by the priest?

283. *The hatred directed against the privileged in body and spirit*: the revolt of the ugly and bungled souls against the beautiful, the proud, and the cheerful. The weapons used: contempt of beauty, of pride, of happiness: "There is no such thing as merit," "The danger is enormous: it is right that one *should* tremble and feel ill at ease," "Naturalness is evil; it is right to oppose all that is natural—even 'reason'" (all that is anti-natural is elevated to the highest place).

It is again the *priests* who exploit this condition, and who win the "people" over to themselves. "The sinner" over whom there is more joy in heaven than over "the just person." This is the struggle against "paganism" (the pang of conscience, a measure for disturbing the harmony of the soul).

The hatred of the mediocre for the *exceptions*, and of the herd for its independent members. (Custom actually regarded as "morality.") The revulsion of feeling *against* "egotism": that only is worth anything which is done "for another." "We are all equal";—against the love of dominion, against "dominion" in general;—against privilege;—against sectarians, free-spirits, and sceptics;—against philosophy (a force opposing mechanical and automatic in-

instincts); in philosophers themselves—"the categorical imperative," the essential nature of morality, "general and universal."

284. The qualities and tendencies which are *praised*: peacefulness, equity, moderation, modesty, reverence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity, honesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resignation, pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice, generosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy, good nature, industry.

We must ascertain to what extent *such qualities* are conditioned as means to the attainment of certain desires and *ends* (often an "*evil*" end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance, *intellectuality*): or as the expressions of certain states of need—that is to say, as *preservative measures* (as in the case of citizens, slaves, women, etc.).

In short, every one of them is not *considered "good" for its own sake*, but rather because it approximates to a standard prescribed either by "society" or by the "herd," as a means to the ends of the latter, as necessary for their preservation and enhancement, and also as the result of an actual *gregarious instinct* in the individual; these qualities are thus in the service of an instinct which is *fundamentally different* from these *states of virtue*. For the herd is *antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless* to the outside world; it is full of a love of dominion and of feelings of mistrust, etc.

In the "herdsman" this *antagonism* comes to the *fore*: he must have qualities which are *the reverse of* those possessed by the herd.

The mortal enmity of the herd towards all *order of rank*: its instinct is in favour of the *leveller* (Christ). Towards all *strong individuals (the sovereigns)* it is hostile, unfair, intemperate, arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless, deceitful, envious, revengeful.

285. My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides—that is to say, against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and against those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the herd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They have no creative power.

The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevolence with which the just man fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which the great innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal security and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies the gregarious nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgment on the part of the "comfortable" ones rigs itself out in the most beautiful words—and thus "morality" is born. Let any one observe, however, the *hatred of the herd* for all truthful men.

286. Let us not deceive ourselves! When a man hears the whisper of the *moral imperative in his breast*, as altruism would have him hear it, he shows

thereby that he belongs to the *herd*. When a man is conscious of the opposite feelings,—that is to say, when he sees his danger and his undoing in disinterested and unselfish actions,—then he does not belong to the herd.

287. My philosophy aims at a new *order of rank*: not at an individualistic morality. The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd—but not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their actions, as do also the independent ones or the beasts of prey, etc.

647. *Against Darwinism*.—The use of an organ does *not* explain its origin, on the contrary! During the greater part of the time occupied in the formation of a certain quality, this quality does not help to preserve the individual; it is of no use to him, and particularly not in his struggle with external circumstances and foes.

What is ultimately “useful”? It is necessary to ask, “Useful for what?”

For instance, that which promotes the *lasting powers* of the individual might be unfavourable to his strength or his beauty; that which preserves him might at the same time fix him and keep him stable throughout development. On the other hand, a *deficiency*, a state of *degeneration*, may be of the greatest possible use, inasmuch as it acts as a stimulus to other organs. In the same way, a *state of need* may be a condition of existence, inasmuch as it reduces an individual to that modicum of means which, though it *keeps him together*, does not allow him to squander his strength.—The individual himself is the struggle of parts (for nourishment, space, etc.): his development involves the *triumph*, the *predominance*, of isolated parts; the *wasting away*, or the “development into organs,” of other parts.

The influence of “environment” is nonsensically *overrated* in Darwin: the essential factor in the process of life is precisely the tremendous inner power to shape and to create forms, which merely *uses, exploits* “environment.”

The new forms built up by this inner power are not produced with a view to any end; but, in the struggle between the parts, a new form does not exist long *without* becoming related to some kind of semi-utility, and, according to its use, develops itself ever more and more perfectly.

684. *Anti-Darwin*.—The *domestication of man*: what definite value can it have, or has domestication in itself a definite value?—There are reasons for denying the latter proposition.

Darwin's school of thought certainly goes to great pains to convince us of the reverse: it would fain prove that the influence of domestication may be profound and fundamental. For the time being, we stand firmly as we did before; up to the present no results save very superficial modification or *degeneration* have been shown to follow upon domestication. And everything that *escapes* from the hand and discipline of man, returns almost immediately

to its original natural condition. The type remains constant, man cannot "*dénaturer la nature*."

Biologists reckon upon the struggle for existence, the death of the weaker creature, and the survival of the most robust, most gifted combatant; on that account they imagine a *continuous increase in the perfection of all creatures*. We, on the contrary, have convinced ourselves of the fact, that in the struggle for existence, accident serves the cause of the weak quite as much as that of the strong; that craftiness often supplements strength with advantage; that the *prolificness* of a species is related in a remarkable manner to that species' *chances of destruction*. . . .

Natural Selection is also credited with the power of slowly effecting unlimited metamorphoses: it is believed that every advantage is transmitted by heredity, and strengthened in the course of generations (when heredity is known to be so capricious that . . .); the happy adaptations of certain creatures to very special conditions of life, are regarded as the result of *surrounding influences*.

Nowhere, however, are examples of *unconscious selection* to be found (absolutely nowhere). The most different individuals associate one with the other; the extremes become lost in the mass. Each vies with the other to maintain his kind; those creatures whose appearance shields them from certain dangers, do not alter this appearance when they are in an environment quite devoid of danger. . . . If they live in places where their coats or their hides do not conceal them, they do not adapt themselves to their surroundings in any way.

The *selection of the most beautiful* has been so exaggerated, that it greatly exceeds the instincts for beauty in our own race! As a matter of fact, the most beautiful creature often couples with the most debased, and the largest with the smallest. We almost always see males and females taking advantage of their first chance meeting, and manifesting no taste or selectiveness at all.—Modification through climate and nourishment—but as a matter of fact unimportant.

There are no *intermediate forms*.—

The growing evolution of creatures is assumed. All grounds for this assumption are entirely lacking. Every type has its *limitations*: beyond these evolution cannot carry it.

My general point of view.—First proposition: Man as a species is *not* progressing. Higher specimens are indeed attained; but they do not survive. The general level of the species is not raised.

Second proposition: Man as a species does not represent any sort of progress compared with any other animal. The whole of the animal and plant world

does not develop from the lower to the higher . . . but all simultaneously, haphazardly, confusedly, and at variance. The richest and most complex forms—and the term “higher type” means no more than this—perish more easily: only the lowest succeed in maintaining their apparent imperishableness. The former are seldom attained, and maintain their superior position with difficulty; the latter are compensated by great fruitfulness.—In the human race, also, the *superior specimens*, the happy cases of evolution, are the first to perish amid the fluctuations of chances for and against them. They are exposed to every form of decadence: they are extreme, and, on that account alone, already decadents. . . . The short duration of beauty, of genius, of the Caesar, is *sui generis*: such things are not hereditary. The *type* is inherited, there is nothing extreme or particularly “happy” about a type. . . . It is not a case of a particular fate, or of the “evil will” of Nature, but merely of the concept “superior type”: the higher type is an example of an incomparably greater degree of complexity—a greater sum of co-ordinated elements: but on this account disintegration becomes a thousand times more threatening. “Genius” is the sublimest machine in existence—hence it is the most fragile.

Third proposition: The domestication (culture) of man does not sink very deep. When it does sink far below the skin it immediately becomes degeneration (type: the Christian). The “wild” man (or, in normal terminology, the *evil* man) is a reversion to Nature—and, in a certain sense, he represents a recovery, a *cure* from the effects of “culture.” . . .

753. I am opposed to Socialism, because it dreams ingenuously of “goodness, truth, beauty, and equal rights” (anarchy pursues the same ideal, but in a more brutal fashion).

I am opposed to parliamentary government and the power of the press, because they are the means whereby cattle become masters.

754. The arming of the people means in the end the arming of the mob.

755. Socialists are particularly ridiculous in my eyes, because of their absurd optimism concerning the “good man” who is supposed to be waiting in their cupboard, and who will come into being when the present order of society has been overturned and has made way for natural instincts. But the opposing party is quite as ludicrous, because it will not see the act of violence which lies beneath every law, the severity and egoism inherent in every kind of authority. “I and my kind will rule and prevail. Whoever degenerates will be either expelled or annihilated.”—This was the fundamental feeling of all ancient legislation. The idea of a higher order of man is hated much more profoundly than monarchs themselves. Hatred of aristocracy always uses hatred of monarchy as a mask.

854. In this age of universal suffrage, in which everybody is allowed to sit in

judgment upon everything and everybody, I feel compelled to re-establish the order of rank.

855. Quanta of power alone determine rank and distinguish rank: nothing else does.

856. *The will to power.*—How must those men be constituted who would undertake this transvaluation? The order of rank as the order of power: war and danger are the prerequisites which allow of a rank maintaining its conditions. The prodigious example: man in Nature—the weakest and shrewdest creature making himself master, and putting a yoke upon all less intelligent forces.

857. I distinguish between the type which represents ascending life and that which represents decay, decomposition and weakness. Ought one to suppose that the question of rank between these two types can be at all doubtful? . . .

858. The modicum of power which you represent decides your rank; all the rest is cowardice.

859. The advantages of standing detached from one's age.—Detached from the two movements, that of individualism and that of collectivist morality; for even the first does not recognise the order of rank, and would give one individual the same freedom as another. My thoughts are not concerned with the degree of freedom which should be granted to the one or to the other or to all, but with the degree of power which the one or the other should exercise over his neighbor or over all; and more especially with the question to what extent a sacrifice of freedom, or even enslavement, may afford the basis for the cultivation of a *superior* type. In plain words: *how could one sacrifice the development of mankind* in order to assist a higher species than man to come into being.

860. *Concerning rank.*—The terrible consequences of "equality"—in the end everybody thinks he has the right to every problem. All order of rank has vanished.

861. It is necessary for *higher* men to declare war upon the masses! In all directions mediocre people are joining hands in order to make themselves masters. Everything that pampers, that softens, and that brings the "people" or "woman" to the front, operates in favour of universal suffrage—that is to say, the dominion of *inferior* men. But we must make reprisals, and draw the whole state of affairs (which commenced in Europe with Christianity) to the light of day and to judgment.

862. A teaching is needed which is strong enough to work in a *disciplinary* manner; it should operate in such a way as to strengthen the strong and to paralyse and smash up the world-weary.

The annihilation of declining races. The decay of Europe. The annihilation

of slave-tainted valuations. The dominion of the world as a means to the rearing of a higher type. The annihilation of the humbug which is called morality (Christianity as a hysterical kind of honesty in this regard: Augustine, Bunyan). The annihilation of universal suffrage—that is to say, that system by means of which the lowest natures prescribe themselves as a law for higher natures. The annihilation of mediocrity and its prevalence. (The one-sided, the individuals—peoples; constitutional plenitude should be aimed at by means of the coupling of opposites; to this end race-combinations should be tried.)

898. *The strong of the future.*—To what extent necessity on the one hand and accident on the other have attained to conditions from which a *stronger species* may be reared: this we are now able to understand and to bring about consciously; we can now create those conditions under which such an elevation is possible.

Hitherto education has always aimed at the utility of society: *not* the greatest possible utility for the future, but the utility of the society actually extant. What people required were “instruments” for this purpose. Provided the *wealth of forces were greater*, it would be possible to think of a draft being made upon them, the aim of which would not be the utility of society, but some future utility.

The more people grasped to what extent the present form of society was in such a state of transition as sooner or later to be *no longer able to exist for its own sake*, but only as a means in the hands of a stronger race, the more *this task would have to be brought forward*.

The increasing belittlement of man is precisely the impelling power which leads one to think of the cultivation of a *stronger race*: a race which would have a surplus precisely there where the dwarfed species was weak and growing weaker (will, responsibility, self-reliance, the ability to postulate aims for one's self).

The means would be those which history teaches: *isolation* by means of preservative interests which would be the reverse of those generally accepted; exercise in transvalued valuations; distance as pathos; a clean conscience in what to-day is most despised and most prohibited.

The *levelling* of the mankind of Europe is the great process which should not be arrested; it should even be accelerated. The necessity of *cleaving gulfs of distance*, of the *order of rank*, is therefore imperative; but not the necessity of retarding the process above mentioned.

This *levelled-down* species requires justification as soon as it is attained: its justification is that it exists for the service of a higher and sovereign race which stands upon it and can only be elevated upon its shoulders to the task

which it is destined to perform. Not only a ruling race whose task would be consummated in ruling alone: but a race with *vital spheres* of its own, with an overflow of energy for beauty, bravery, culture, and manners, even for the most abstract thought; a yea-saying race which would be able to allow itself every kind of great luxury—strong enough to be able to dispense with the tyranny of the imperatives of virtue, rich enough to be in no need of economy or pedantry; beyond good and evil; a forcing-house for rare and exceptional plants.

954. A certain question constantly recurs to us; it is perhaps a seductive and evil question; may it be whispered into the ears of those who have a right to such doubtful problems—those strong souls of to-day whose dominion over themselves is unswerving: is it not high time, now that the type “gregarious animals” is developing ever more and more in Europe, to set about rearing, thoroughly, artificially, and consciously, an opposite type, and to attempt to establish the latter’s virtues? And would not the democratic movement itself find for the first time a sort of goal, salvation, and justification, if some one appeared who availed himself of it—so that at last, beside its new and sublime product, slavery (for this must be the end of European democracy), that higher species of ruling and Caesarian spirits might also be produced, which would stand upon it, hold to it, and would elevate themselves through it? This new race would climb aloft to new and hitherto impossible things, to a broader vision, and to its task on earth.

955. The aspect of the European of to-day makes me very hopeful. A daring and ruling race is here building itself up upon the foundation of an extremely intelligent, gregarious mass. It is obvious that the educational movements for the latter are not alone prominent nowadays.

956. The same conditions which go to develop the gregarious animal also force the development of the leaders.

967. The question, and at the same time the task, is approaching with hesitation, terrible as Fate, but nevertheless inevitable: how shall the earth as a whole be ruled? And to what end shall man as a whole—no longer as a people or as a race—be reared and trained?

Legislative moralities are the principal means by which one can form mankind, according to the fancy of a creative and profound will: provided, of course, that such an artistic will of the first order gets the power into its own hands, and can make its creative will prevail over long periods in the form of legislation, religions, and morals. At present, and probably for some time to come, one will seek such colossally creative men, such really great men, as I understand them, in vain: they will be lacking, until, after many disappointments, we are forced to begin to understand why it is they are lacking, and

that nothing bars with greater hostility their rise and development, at present and for some time to come, than that which is now called *the* morality in Europe. Just as if there were no other kind of morality, and could be no other kind, than the one we have already characterised as herd-morality. It is this morality which is now striving with all its power to attain to that green-meadow happiness on earth, which consists in security, absence of danger, ease, facilities for livelihood, and, last but not least, "if all goes well," even hopes to dispense with all kinds of shepherds and bell-wethers. The two doctrines which it preaches most universally are "equality of rights" and "pity for all sufferers"—and it even regards suffering itself as something which must be got rid of absolutely. That such ideas may be modern leads one to think very poorly of modernity. He, however, who has reflected deeply concerning the question, how and where the plant man has hitherto grown most vigorously, is forced to believe that this has always taken place under the opposite conditions; that to this end the danger of the situation has to increase enormously, his inventive faculty and dissembling powers have to fight their way up under long oppressing and compulsion, and his will to life has to be increased to the unconditioned will to power, to over-power: he believes that danger, severity, violence, peril in the street and in the heart, inequality of rights, secrecy, stoicism, seductive art, and devilry of every kind—in short, the opposite of all gregarious desiderata—are necessary for the elevation of man. Such a morality with opposite designs, which would rear man upwards instead of to comfort and mediocrity; such a morality, with the intention of producing a ruling caste—the future lords of the earth—must, in order to be taught at all, introduce itself as if it were in some way correlated to the prevailing moral law, and must come forward under the cover of the latter's words and forms. But seeing that, to this end, a host of transitionary and deceptive measures must be discovered, and that the life of a single individual stands for almost nothing in view of the accomplishment of such lengthy tasks and aims, the first thing that must be done is to rear *a new kind* of man in whom the duration of the necessary will and the necessary instincts is guaranteed for many generations. This must be a new kind of ruling species and caste—this ought to be quite as clear as the somewhat lengthy and not easily expressed consequences of this thought. The aim should be to prepare a *transvaluation of values* for a particularly strong kind of man, most highly gifted in intellect and will, and, to this end, slowly and cautiously to liberate in him a whole host of slandered instincts hitherto held in check: whoever meditates about this problem belongs to us, the free spirits—certainly not to that kind of "free spirit" which has existed hitherto: for these desired practically the reverse. To this order, it seems to me, belong, above all, the pessimists

of Europe, the poets and thinkers of a revolted idealism, in so far as their discontent with existence in general must *consistently* at least have led them to be dissatisfied with the man of the present; the same applies to certain insatiably ambitious artists who courageously and unconditionally fight against the gregarious animal for the special rights of higher men, and subdue all herd-instincts and precautions of more exceptional minds by their seductive art. Thirdly and lastly, we should include in this group all those critics and historians by whom the discovery of the Old World, which has begun so happily—this was the work of the *new* Columbus, of German intellect—will be courageously *continued* (for we still stand in the very first stages of this conquest). For in the Old World, as a matter of fact, a different and more lordly morality ruled than that of to-day; and the man of antiquity, under the educational ban of his morality, was a stronger and deeper man than the man of to-day—up to the present he has been the only well-constituted man. The temptation, however, which from antiquity to the present day has always exercised its power on such lucky strokes of Nature, *i.e.*, on strong and enterprising souls, is, even at the present day, the most subtle and most effective of anti-democratic and anti-Christian powers, just as it was in the time of the Renaissance.

958. I am writing for a race of men which does not yet exist: for “the lords of the earth.”

1062. If the universe had a goal, that goal would have been reached by now. If any sort of unforeseen final state existed, that state also would have been reached. If it were capable of any halting or stability of any “being,” it would only have possessed this capability of becoming stable for one instant in its development; and again becoming would have been at an end for ages, and with it all thinking and all “spirit.” The fact of “intellects” being in a *state of development* proves that the universe can have no goal, no final state, and is incapable of being. But the old habit of thinking of some purpose in regard to all phenomena, and of thinking of a directing and creating deity in regard to the universe, is so powerful, that the thinker has to go to great pains in order to avoid thinking of the very aimlessness of the world as intended.

1066. . . . If the universe may be conceived as a definite quantity of energy, as a definite number of centres of energy,—and every other concept remains indefinite and therefore useless,—it follows therefrom that the universe must go through a calculable number of combinations in the great game of chance which constitutes its existence. In infinity, at some moment or other, every possible combination must once have been realised; not only this, but it must have been realised an infinite number of times. And inasmuch as between every one of these combinations and its next recurrence every other possible

combination would necessarily have been undergone, and since every one of these combinations would determine the whole series in the same order, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the universe is thus shown to be a circular movement which has already repeated itself an infinite number of times, and which plays its game for all eternity. . . .

1067. And do ye know what "the universe" is to my mind? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This universe is a monster of energy, without beginning or end; a fixed and brazen quantity of energy which grows neither bigger nor smaller, which does not consume itself, but only alters its face; as a whole its bulk is immutable, it is a household without either losses or gains, but likewise without increase and without sources of revenue, surrounded by nonentity as by a frontier. It is nothing vague or wasteful, it does not stretch into infinity; but is a definite quantum of energy located in limited space, and not in space which would be anywhere empty. It is rather energy everywhere, the play of forces and force-waves, at the same time one and many, agglomerating here and diminishing there, a sea of forces storming and raging in itself, for ever changing, for ever rolling back over incalculable ages to recurrence, with an ebb and flow of its forms, producing the most complicated things out of the most simple structures; producing the most ardent, most savage, and most contradictory things out of the quietest, most rigid, and most frozen material, and then returning from multifariousness to uniformity, from the play of contradictions back into the delight of consonance, saying yea unto itself, even in this homogeneity of its courses and ages; for every blessing itself as something which recurs for all eternity,—a becoming which knows not satiety, or disgust, or weariness:—this, my Dionysian world of eternal self-creation, of eternal self-destruction, this mysterious world of twofold voluptuousness; this, my "Beyond Good and Evil," without aim, unless there is an aim in the bliss of the circle, without will, unless a ring must by nature keep goodwill to itself,—would you have a name for my world? A *solution* of all your riddles? Do ye also want a light, ye most concealed, strongest and most undaunted men of the blackest midnight?—*This world is the Will to Power—and nothing else!* And even ye yourselves are this will to power—and nothing besides!

POPE PIUS XI

THE ENCYCLICAL *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931) was written on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Pope Leo XIII's famous Encyclical *On the Condition of Labor* (*Rerum Novarum*).

Leo XIII's Encyclical began by defending the right of private property against socialist doctrine. "The main tenet of Socialism, the community of goods, must be utterly rejected." It then condemned the idea of an inevitable and natural class conflict. In place of these socialistic ideas, Leo XIII asserted the state's duty to legislate for the public welfare as well as for private rights. In the name of Catholic charity as well as of distributive justice, the Encyclical defined the objectives of "public remedial measures": "to safeguard the dignity of labor, to reduce the hours of labor, to keep women and children out of factories, to guarantee a living wage." Then it outlined what "employers and workmen may themselves effect" and advocated as "the most important of all" the growth of labor unions.

The remainder and body of the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*¹ was a program for building up Catholic labor unions by means of which the church may be enabled to promote the worker's rights, not in the spirit of class conflict, but by cultivating religion and morality, charity, and respect for human rights. The letter ended with an appeal to those laborers who "have either given up their faith altogether or whose lives are at variance with its precepts" not to be "fooled by empty promises," not to "belong to an Association . . . in which there exists, in place of charity and love, that internal strife which always accompanies unresigned and irreligious poverty. Broken in spirit and worn down in body, how many of them would gladly free themselves from this galling slavery! But human respect, or the dread of starvation, makes them afraid to take the step. To such as these, Catholic Associations are of incalculable service, helping them out of their difficulties, inviting them to companionship, and receiving the repentant to a shelter in which they may securely trust."

Quadragesimo Anno attempts to state a "more precise application and amplification of Leo's doctrine" in view of "the new needs of our age and the changed conditions of society" and in view of the "controversies even among Catholics, not always of a peaceful character" concerning the interpretation of the Encyclical. Chief among these changed circumstances was the fact that Catholic Center parties and Christian Labor Unions were no longer able to operate as they could during Leo XIII's reign, and that, therefore, some more precise and distinctive social philosophy for Catholics had to be found. Pius XI was obliged to emphasize the social side of property, to urge the need for a reconstruction of the economic order, and to find some common ground for "mitigated socialism" (as opposed to atheistic communism) and the "reform of society according to Christian principles."

¹ [Of New Things.]

QUADRAGESIMO ANNO

. . . YOU KNOW, Venerable Brethren and Beloved Children, you know full well the admirable teaching which has made the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* forever memorable. In this document the Supreme Shepherd, grieving for the misery and wretchedness pressing unjustly on such a large proportion of mankind, boldly took in his own hands the cause of workingmen, surrendered, isolated and helpless, to the hard-heartedness of employers and the greed of unchecked competition. He sought help neither from Liberalism nor Socialism. The former had already shown its utter impotence to find a right solution of the social question, while the latter would have exposed human society to still graver dangers by offering a remedy much more disastrous than the evil it designed to cure. The Sovereign Pontiff approached the subject in the exercise of his manifest rights, deeply conscious that he was the chief guardian of religion and the chief dispenser of all that closely appertains to it, for the question at issue was one to which no solution could be found apart from the intervention of religion and of the Church. Basing his doctrine solely upon the unchangeable principles drawn from right reason and divine revelation, he indicated and proclaimed with confidence and as one having power, the relative rights and mutual duties of the rich and of the poor, of capital and of labor, and at the same time the part that was to be taken by the Church, by the State and by the persons immediately concerned. . . .

And now that the solemn commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of *Rerum Novarum* is being enthusiastically celebrated in every country, but particularly in the Holy City, to which Catholic workingmen are gathering from all sides, We deem it opportune, Venerable Brethren and Beloved Children, first, to recall the great benefits which this Encyclical has brought to the Catholic Church and to the world at large; secondly, to vindicate the social and economic doctrine of so great a master against certain doubts which have arisen, and to develop more fully some of its points; finally after arraiging modern economics and examining the nature of Socialism, to expose the root of the present social disorder, and to point out the only salutary cure, a reform of Christian morals. Such are the three topics to the treatment of which the present Letter is dedicated. . . .

With regard to the civil power, Leo XIII boldly passed beyond the restrictions imposed by Liberalism, and fearlessly proclaimed the doctrine that the civil power is more than the mere guardian of law and order, and that it must

strive with all zeal "to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the commonwealth, should be such as of themselves to realize public well-being and private prosperity." It is true, indeed, that a just freedom of action should be left to individual citizens and families; but this principle is only valid as long as the common good is secure and no injustice is entailed. The duty of rulers is to protect the community and its various elements; in protecting the rights of individuals they must have special regard for the infirm and needy. . . .

We do not, of course, deny that even before the Encyclical of Leo, some rulers had provided for the more urgent needs of the working classes, and had checked the more flagrant acts of injustice perpetrated against them. But after the Apostolic Voice had sounded from the Chair of Peter throughout the world, the leaders of the nations became at last more fully conscious of their obligations, and set to work seriously to promote a broader social policy.

In fact, the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* completely overthrew those tottering tenets of Liberalism which had long hampered effective interference by the government. It prevailed upon the peoples themselves to develop their social policy more intensely and on truer lines, and encouraged the élite among Catholics to give such efficacious help and assistance to rulers of the State that in legislative assemblies they were not infrequently the foremost advocates of the new policy. Furthermore, not a few recent laws dealing with social questions were originally proposed to the suffrages of the people's representatives by ecclesiastics thoroughly imbued with Leo's teaching, who afterwards with watchful care promoted and fostered their execution.

As a result of these steady and tireless efforts, there has arisen a new branch of jurisprudence unknown to earlier times, whose aim is the energetic defense of those sacred rights of the workingman which proceed from his dignity as a man and as a Christian. These laws concern the soul, the health, the strength, the housing, workshops, wages, dangerous employments, in a word, all that concerns the wage-earners, with particular regard to women and children. Even though these regulations do not agree always and in every detail with the recommendations of Pope Leo, it is none the less certain that much which they contain is strongly suggestive of *Rerum Novarum*, to which in large measure must be attributed the improved condition of the workingmen.

In the last place, the wise Pontiff pointed out that employers and workmen may of themselves effect much in the matter. We are treating by means of such organizations as afford opportune aid to those who are in distress and which draw the two classes more closely together. Among these he attributed prime importance to societies consisting either of workingmen alone, or of working-

men and employers together. He devotes much space to describing and commending these societies and expounds with remarkable prudence their nature, reason and opportunities, their rights, duties and laws.

The lesson was well timed. For at that period rulers of not a few nations were deeply infected with Liberalism and regarded such unions of workingmen with disfavor, if not with open hostility. While readily recognizing and patronizing similar corporations amongst other classes, with criminal injustice they denied the innate right of forming associations to those who needed them most for self-protection against oppression by the more powerful. There were even Catholics who viewed with suspicion the efforts of the laboring classes to form such unions, as if they reflected the spirit of Socialistic or revolutionary agitators.

Worthy of all praise, therefore, are the directions authoritatively promulgated by Leo XIII, which served to break down this opposition and dispel these suspicions. They have a still higher distinction, however, that of encouraging Christian workingmen to form unions according to their several trades, and of teaching them how to do it. Many were thus confirmed in the path of duty, in spite of the vehement attractions of Socialist organizations, which claimed to be the sole defenders and champions of the lowly and the oppressed. . . .

Associations of employers and captains of industry, which Our Predecessor so earnestly pleaded for, did not meet with the same success; they are, We regret to say, still few in number. The reason for this must not be entirely attributed to want of good will, but to other and far more serious obstacles, whose nature and gravity We know and appreciate to the full. There are, however, well founded hopes that these obstacles also will shortly be removed. We hail even now with deep joy of soul certain experiments, far from negligible, which have been made in this regard, for the future. . . .

Descending now to details, We commence with ownership, or the right of property. You are aware, Venerable Brethren and Beloved Children, how strenuously Our Predecessor of happy memory defended the right of property against the teachings of the Socialists of his time, showing that the abolition of private ownership would prove to be not beneficial, but grievously harmful to the working classes. Yet, since there are some who falsely and unjustly accuse the Supreme Pontiff and the Church as upholding, both then and now, the wealthier classes against the proletariat, and since controversy has arisen among Catholics as to the true sense of Pope Leo's teaching, We have thought it well to defend from calumny the Leonine doctrine in this matter, which is also the Catholic doctrine, and to safeguard it against false interpretations.

First, let it be made clear beyond all doubt that neither Leo XIII, nor those theologians who have taught under the guidance and direction of the Church, have ever denied or called in question the twofold aspect of ownership, which is individual or social accordingly as it regards individuals or concerns the common good. Their unanimous contention has always been that the right to own private property has been given to man by nature or rather by the Creator Himself, not only in order that individuals may be able to provide for their own needs and those of their families, but also that by means of it, the goods which the Creator has destined for the human race may truly serve this purpose. Now these ends cannot be secured unless some definite and stable order is maintained.

There is, therefore, a double danger to be avoided. On the one hand, if the social and public aspect of ownership be denied or minimized, the logical consequence is Individualism, as it is called; on the other hand, the rejection or diminution of its private and individual character necessarily leads to some form of Collectivism. To disregard these dangers would be to rush headlong into the quicksands of Modernism with its moral, juridical and social order, which We condemned in the Encyclical Letter issued at the beginning of Our Pontificate. . . .

History proves that the right of ownership, like other elements of social life, is not absolutely rigid, and this doctrine We Ourselves have given utterance to on a previous occasion in the following terms: "How varied are the forms which the right of property has assumed! First, the primitive form used amongst rude and savage peoples, which still exists in certain localities even in our own day; then, that of the patriarchal age; later came various tyrannical types (We use the word in its classical meaning); finally, the feudal and monarchic systems down to the varieties of more recent times."

"It is plain, however, that the State may not discharge this duty in an arbitrary manner. Man's natural right of possessing and transmitting property by inheritance must be kept intact and cannot be taken away by the State from man. Hence, the domestic household is antecedent, as well in idea as in fact, to the gathering of men into a community." . . .

At the same time a man's superfluous income is not left entirely to his own discretion. We speak of that portion of his income which he does not need in order to live as becomes his station. On the contrary, the grave obligations of charity, beneficence and liberality which rest upon the wealthy are constantly insisted upon in telling words by Holy Scripture and the Fathers of the Church.

However, the investment of superfluous income in searching favorable opportunities for employment, provided the labor employed produces results

which are really useful is to be considered, according to the teaching of the Angelic Doctor an act of real liberality particularly appropriate to the needs of our time.

The original acquisition of property takes place by first occupation and by industry, or, as it is called, specification. This is the universal teaching of tradition and the doctrine of Our Predecessor, despite unreasonable assertions to the contrary, and no wrong is done to any man by the occupation of goods unclaimed and which belong to nobody. The only form of labor, however, which gives the workingman a title to its fruits is that which a man exercises as his own master, and by which some new form or new value is produced.

Altogether different is the labor one man hires out to another, and which is expended on the property of another. To it apply appositely the words of Leo XIII: "It is only by the labor of workingmen that States grow rich." Is it not indeed apparent that the huge possessions which constitute human wealth are begotten by and flow from the hands of the workingman, toiling either unaided or with the assistance of tools and machinery which wonderfully intensify his efficiency? . . .

Now the natural law, or rather, God's Will manifested by it, demands that right order be observed in the application of natural resources to human need; and this order consists in everything having its proper owner. Hence it follows that unless a man apply his labor to his own property, an alliance must be formed between his toil and his neighbor's property, for each is helpless without the other. This was what Leo XIII had in mind when he wrote: "Capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital." It is therefore entirely false to ascribe the results of their combined efforts to either party alone; and it is flagrantly unjust that either should deny the efficacy of the other and seize all the profits.

Capital, however, was long able to appropriate to itself excessive advantages; it claimed all the products and profits and left to the laborer the barest minimum necessary to repair his strength and to ensure the continuation of his class. For by an inexorable economic law, it was held, all accumulation of riches must fall to the share of the wealthy, while the workingman must remain perpetually in indigence or reduced to the minimum needed for existence. It is true that the actual state of things was not always and everywhere as deplorable as the Liberalistic tenets of the so-called Manchester School might lead us to conclude; but it cannot be denied that a steady drift of economic and social tendencies was in this direction. These false opinions and specious axioms were vehemently attacked, as was to be expected, and by others also than merely those whom such principles deprived of their innate right to better their condition.

The cause of the harassed workingman was espoused by the intellectuals, as they are called, who set up in opposition to this fictitious law another equally false moral principle: that all products and profits, excepting those required to repair and replace invested capital, belong by every right to the workingman. This error, more subtle than that of the Socialists who hold that all means of production should be transferred to the State, or, as they term it, socialized, is for that reason more dangerous and apt to deceive the unwary. It is an alluring poison, consumed with avidity by many not deceived by open Socialism. . . .

Now, not every kind of distribution of wealth and property amongst men is such that it can at all, and still less can adequately, attain the end intended by God. Wealth, therefore, which is constantly being augmented by social and economic progress, must be so distributed amongst the various individuals and classes of society that the common good of all, of which Leo XIII spoke, be thereby promoted. In other words, the good of the whole community must be safeguarded. By these principles of social justice one class is forbidden to exclude the other from a share in the profits. This sacred law is violated by an irresponsible wealthy class who, in the excess of their good fortune, deem it a just state of things that they should receive everything and the laborer nothing; it is violated also by a propertyless wage-earning class who demand for themselves all the fruits of production, as being the work of their hands. Such men, vehemently incensed against the violation of justice by capitalists, go too far in vindicating the one right of which they are conscious; they attack and seek to abolish all forms of ownership and all profits not obtained by labor, whatever be their nature or significance in human society, for the sole reason that they are not acquired by toil. In this connection it must be noted that the appeal made by some to the words of the Apostle, "If any man will not work, neither let him eat," is as inept as it is unfounded. The Apostle is here passing judgment on those who refuse to work though they could and ought to do so; he admonishes us to use diligently our time and our powers of body and mind, and not to become burdensome to others as long as we are able to provide for ourselves. In no sense does he teach that labor is the sole title which gives a right to a living or to profits.

Each class, then, must receive its due share, and the distribution of created goods must be brought into conformity with the demands of the common good and social justice, for every sincere observer is conscious that the vast differences between the few who hold excessive wealth and the many who live in destitution constitute a grave evil in modern society. . . .

It is true that there is a formal difference between pauperism and proletarianism. Nevertheless, the immense number of propertyless wage-earners

on the one hand, and the superabundant riches of the fortunate few on the other, is an unanswerable argument that the earthly goods so abundantly produced in this age of industrialism are far from rightly distributed and equitably shared among the various classes of men.

Every effort, therefore, must be made that at least in future a just share only of the fruits of production be permitted to accumulate in the hands of the wealthy, and that an ample sufficiency be supplied to the workingmen. The purpose is not that these become slack at their work, for man is born to labor as the bird to fly, but that by thrift they may increase their possessions and by the prudent management of the same may be enabled to bear the family burden with greater ease and security, being freed from that hand-to-mouth uncertainty which is the lot of the proletarian. Thus they will not only be in a position to support life's changing fortunes, but will also have the reassuring confidence that when their lives are ended, some little provision will remain for those whom they leave behind them. . . .

[Those] who hold that the wage contract is essentially unjust, and that in its place must be introduced the contract of partnership, are certainly in error. They do a grave injury to Our Predecessor, whose Encyclical not only admits this contract, but devotes much space to its determination according to the principles of justice.

In the present state of human society, however, We deem it advisable that the wage contract should, when possible, be modified somewhat by a contract of partnership, as is already being tried in various ways to the no small gain both of the wage-earners and of the employers. In this way wage-earners are made sharers of some sort in the ownership, or the management, or the profits.

In estimating a just wage, not one consideration alone but many must be taken into account. According to the wise words of Leo XIII: "Before deciding whether wages are fair, many things have to be considered."

In this way he refuted the irresponsible view of certain writers who declare that this momentous question can easily be solved by the application of a single principle, and that not even a true one.

Entirely false is the principle, widely propagated today, that the worth of labor and therefore the equitable return to be made for it, should equal the worth of its net result. Thus the right to the full product of his toil is claimed for the wage-earner. How erroneous this is appears from what We have written above concerning capital and labor. . . .

In the first place, the wage paid to the workingman must be sufficient for the support of himself and of his family. It is right indeed that the rest of the family contribute according to their power towards the common maintenance,

as in the rural home or in the families of many artisans and small shopkeepers. But it is wrong to abuse the tender years of children or the weakness of woman. Mothers will above all devote their work to the home and the things connected with it; intolerable, and to be opposed with all Our strength, is the abuse whereby mothers of families, because of the insufficiency of the father's salary, are forced to engage in gainful occupations outside the domestic walls to the neglect of their own proper cares and duties, particularly the education of their children. . . .

When We speak of the reform of the social order it is principally the State We have in mind. Not indeed that all salvation is to be hoped for from its intervention, but because on account of the evil of Individualism, as We called it, things have come to such a pass that the highly developed social life which once flourished in a variety of prosperous institutions organically linked with each other, has been damaged and all but ruined, leaving thus virtually only individuals and the State. Social life lost entirely its organic form. The State, which now was encumbered with all the burdens once borne by associations rendered extinct by it, was in consequence submerged and overwhelmed by an infinity of affairs and duties.

It is indeed true, as history clearly proves, that owing to the change in social conditions, much that was formerly done by small bodies can nowadays be accomplished only by large corporations. None the less, just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to the community at large what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so, too, it is an injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies. This is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, unshaken and unchangeable, and it retains its full truth today. Of its very nature the true aim of all social activity should be to help individual members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them. . . .

Now this is the primary duty of the State and of all good citizens: to abolish conflict between classes with divergent interests, and thus foster and promote harmony between the various ranks of society.

The aim of social legislation must therefore be the re-establishment of vocational groups. Society today still remains in a strained and therefore unstable and uncertain state, being founded on classes with contradictory interests and hence opposed to each other, and consequently prone to enmity and strife. Labor, indeed, as has been well said by Our Predecessor in his Encyclical, is not a mere chattel, since the human dignity of the workingman must be recognized in it, and consequently it cannot be bought and sold like any piece of merchandise. None the less the demand and supply of labor divides men on

the labor market into two classes, as into two camps, and the bargaining between these parties transforms this labor market into an arena where the two armies are engaged in combat. To this grave disorder which is leading society to ruin a remedy must evidently be applied as speedily as possible. But there cannot be question of any perfect cure, except this opposition be done away with, and well ordered members of the social body come into being anew, vocational groups namely, binding men together not according to the position they occupy in the labor market, but according to the diverse functions which they exercise in society. For as nature induces those who dwell in close proximity to unite into municipalities, so those who practice the same trade or profession, economic or otherwise, combine into vocational groups. These groups, in a true sense autonomous, are considered by man to be, if not essential to civil society, at least its natural and spontaneous development. . . .

Just as the unity of human society cannot be built upon class warfare, so the proper ordering of economic affairs cannot be left to free competition alone. From this source have proceeded in the past all the errors of the "Individualistic" school. This school, ignorant or forgetful of the social and moral aspects of economic matters, teaches that the State should refrain in theory and practice from interfering therein, because these possess in free competition and open markets a principle of self-direction better able to control them than any created intellect. Free competition, however, though within certain limits just and productive of good results, cannot be the ruling principle of the economic world. . . . More lofty and noble principles must therefore be sought in order to control this supremacy sternly and uncompromisingly: to wit, social justice and social charity. . . .

Within recent times, as all are aware, a special syndical and corporative organization has been inaugurated which, in view of the subject of the present Encyclical, demands of Us some mention and opportune comment.

The State here grants legal recognition to the syndicate or union, and thereby confers on it some of the features of a monopoly, for in virtue of this recognition, it alone can represent respectively workingmen and employers, and it alone can conclude labor contracts and labor agreements. Affiliation to the syndicate is optional for everyone; but in this sense only can the syndical organization be said to be free, since the contribution to the union and other special taxes are obligatory for all who belong to a given branch, whether workingmen or employers, and the labor contracts drawn up by the legal syndicate are likewise obligatory. It is true that it has been authoritatively declared that the legal syndicate does not exclude the existence of unrecognized trade associations.

The corporations are composed of representatives of the unions of work-

ingmen and employers of the same trade or profession, and as true and genuine organs and institutions of the State they direct and co-ordinate the activities of the unions in all matters of common interest. Strikes and lock-outs are forbidden. If the contending parties cannot come to an agreement, public authority intervenes.

Little reflection is required to perceive the advantage of the institution thus summarily described; peaceful collaboration of the classes, repression of Socialist organizations and efforts, the moderating influence of a special ministry.

But in order to overlook nothing in a matter of such importance, and in the light of the general principles stated above, as well as that of which We are now about to formulate, We feel bound to add that to Our knowledge there are some who fear that the State is substituting itself in the place of private initiative, instead of limiting itself to necessary and sufficient help and assistance. It is feared that the new syndical and corporative institution possesses an excessively bureaucratic and political character, and that, notwithstanding the general advantages referred to above, it risks serving particular political aims rather than contributing to the initiation of a better social order. . . .

However, all that We have taught about reconstructing and perfecting the social order will be of no avail without a reform of manners. Of this, history affords the clearest evidence. At one period there existed a social order which, though by no means perfect in every respect, corresponded nevertheless in a certain measure to right reason according to the needs and conditions of the times. That this order has long since perished is not due to the fact that it was incapable of development and adaptation to changing needs and circumstances, but rather to the wrong-doing of men. Men were hardened in excessive self-love and refused to extend that order, as was their duty, to the increasing numbers of the people; or else, deceived by the attractions of false liberty and other errors, they grew impatient of every restraint that endeavored to throw off all authority.

It remains for Us then to turn Our attention to the actual condition of the economic order and to its bitterest adversary and accuser: We mean Socialism. On these We shall pronounce a frank and just sentence; shall examine more closely the root of the present grave evils, and shall indicate the first and most necessary remedy, which lies in a reform of morals.

Since the time of Leo XIII important changes have taken place both in economic conditions and in regard to Socialism. . . .

Leo XIII's whole endeavor was to adjust [the] economic régime to the standards of true order; whence it follows that the system itself is not to be condemned. And surely it is not vicious of its very nature; but it violates right order whenever capital so employs the working or wage-earning classes as to

divert business and economic activity entirely to its own arbitrary will and advantage without any regard to the human dignity of the workers, the social character of economic life, social justice and the common good. . . .

In the first place . . . it is patent that in our days not alone is wealth accumulated, but immense power and despotic economic domination is concentrated in the hands of a few, and that those few are frequently not the owners, but only the trustees and directors of invested funds, who administer them at their good pleasure.

This power becomes particularly irresistible when exercised by those who, because they hold and control money, are able also to govern credit and determine its allotment, for that reason supplying so to speak, the life-blood to the entire economic body, and grasping, as it were, in their hands the very soul of production, so that no one dare breathe against their will.

This accumulation of power, the characteristic note of the modern economic order, is a natural result of limitless free competition which permits the survival of those only who are the strongest, which often means those who fight most relentlessly, who pay least heed to the dictates of conscience.

This concentration of power has led to a threefold struggle for domination. First, there is the struggle for dictatorship in the economic sphere itself; then, the fierce battle to acquire control of the State, so that its resources and authority may be abused in the economic struggles. Finally, the clash between States themselves.

This latter arises from two causes:—Because the nations apply their power and political influence, regardless of circumstances, to promote the economic advantages of their citizens; and because, vice versa, economic forces and economic domination are used to decide political controversies between peoples.

You assuredly know, Venerable Brethren and Beloved Children, and you lament the ultimate consequences of this Individualistic spirit in economic affairs. Free competition is dead; economic dictatorship has taken its place. . . .

The remedies for these great evils We have exposed in the second part of the present Encyclical, where We explicitly dwelt upon their doctrinal aspect. It will, therefore, be sufficient to recall them briefly here. Since the present economic régime is based mainly upon capital and labor, it follows that the principles of right reason and Christian social philosophy regarding capital, labor and their mutual co-operation must be accepted in theory and reduced to practice. In the first place, due consideration must be had for the double character, individual and social, of capital and labor, in order that the dangers of Individualism and of Collectivism be avoided. The mutual relations between capital and labor must be determined according to the laws of the strictest justice, called commutative justice, supported however by Christian charity. Free

competition and still more economic domination must be kept within just and definite limits, and must be brought under the effective control of the public authority, in matters appertaining to this latter's competence. The public institutions of the nations must be such as to make the whole of human society conform to the common good, *i.e.*, to the standard of social justice. If this is done, the economic system, that most important branch of social life, will necessarily be restored to sanity and right order.

Since the days of Leo XIII, Socialism too, the great enemy with which his battles were waged, has undergone profound changes, no less than economics. At that time Socialism could fairly be termed a single system, which defended certain definite and mutually coherent doctrines. Nowadays it has in the main become divided into two opposing and often bitterly hostile camps, neither of which, however, has abandoned the principle peculiar to Socialism, namely, opposition to the Christian Faith.

One section of Socialism has undergone approximately the same change through which, as We have described, the capitalistic economic régime has passed; it has degenerated into Communism. Communism teaches and pursues a twofold aim: Merciless class warfare and complete abolition of private ownership; and this it does, not in secret and by hidden methods, but openly, frankly, and by every means, even the most violent. To obtain these ends, Communists shrink from nothing and fear nothing; and when they have attained power it is unbelievable, indeed it seems portentous how cruel and inhuman they show themselves to be. Evidence for this is the ghastly destruction and ruin with which they have laid waste immense tracts of Eastern Europe and Asia, while their antagonism and open hostility to Holy Church and to God Himself are, alas! but too well known and proved by their deeds. We do not think it necessary to warn upright and faithful children of the Church against the impious and nefarious character of Communism. But We cannot contemplate without sorrow the heedlessness of those who seem to make light of these imminent dangers and with stolid indifference allow the propagation far and wide of those doctrines which seek by violence and bloodshed the destruction of all society. Even more severely must be condemned the foolhardiness of those who neglect to remove or modify such conditions as exasperate the minds of the people, and so prepare the way for the overthrow and ruin of the social order.

The other section, which has retained the name of Socialism, is much less radical in its views. Not only does it condemn recourse to physical force; it even mitigates and moderates to some extent class warfare and the abolition of private property. It does not reject them entirely. It would seem as if Socialism were afraid of its own principles and of the conclusion drawn there-

from by the Communists, and in consequence were drifting towards the truth which Christian tradition has always held in respect; for it cannot be denied that its programs often strikingly approach the just demands of Christian social reformers.

It recedes somewhat from class war and the extinction of ownership.

Class war, provided it abstains from enmities and mutual hatred, is changing gradually to an honest discussion of differences, based upon the desire of social justice. If this is by no means the blessed social peace which we all long for, it can be and must be an approach towards mutual co-operation of vocational groups. The war declared against private ownership has also abated more and more. In such a way that nowadays it is not really the possession of the means of production which is attacked but that type of social rulership, which, in violation of all justice, has been seized and usurped by the owners of wealth. This rulership in fact belongs, not to the individual owners, but to the State.

If these changes continue, it may well come about that gradually the tenets of mitigated Socialism will no longer be different from the program of those who seek to reform human society according to Christian principles.

For it is rightly contended that certain forms of property must be reserved to the State, since they carry with them an opportunity of domination too great to be left to private individuals without injury to the community at large.

Just demands and desires of this kind contain nothing opposed to Christian truth, nor are they in any sense peculiar to Socialism. Those therefore who look for nothing else, have no reason for becoming Socialists.

It must not be imagined however that all the Socialist sects or factions which are not Communist have in fact or in theory uniformly returned to this reasonable position. For the most part they do not reject class warfare and the abolition of property, but merely are more moderate in regard to them. Now, when false principles are thus mitigated and in some sense waived, the question arises, or is unwarrantably proposed in certain quarters, whether the principles of Christian truth also could not be somewhat moderated and attenuated, so as to meet Socialism, as it were, halfway upon common ground. Some are engaged by the empty hope of gaining in this way the Socialists to our cause. But such hopes are vain. Those who wish to be apostles amongst the Socialists should preach the Christian truth whole and entire, openly and sincerely, without any connivance with error. If they wish in truth to be heralds of the Gospel, let their endeavor be to convince Socialists that their demands, in so far as they are just, are defended much more cogently by the principles of Christian faith, and are promoted much more efficaciously by the power of Christian charity. . . .

. . . We pronounce as follows: whether Socialism be considered as a doctrine, or as a historical fact, or as a movement, if it really remain Socialism, it cannot be brought into harmony with the dogmas of the Catholic Church, even after it has yielded to truth and justice in the points We have mentioned; the reason being that it conceives human society in a way utterly alien to Christian truth.

According to Christian doctrine, Man, endowed with a social nature, is placed here on earth in order that he may spend his life in society, and under an authority ordained by God, that he may develop and evolve to the full all his faculties to the praise and glory of his Creator; and that, by fulfilling faithfully the duties of his station, he may attain to temporal and eternal happiness. Socialism, on the contrary, entirely ignorant of or unconcerned about this sublime end both of individuals and of society, affirms that living in community was instituted merely for the sake of advantages which it brings to mankind.

Goods are produced more efficiently by a suitable distribution of labor than by the scattered efforts of individuals. Hence the Socialists argue that economic production, of which they see only the material side, must necessarily be carried on collectively, and that because of this necessity men must surrender and submit themselves wholly to society with a view to the production of wealth. Indeed, the possession of the greatest possible amount of temporal goods is esteemed so highly, that man's higher goods, not excepting liberty, must, they claim, be subordinated and even sacrificed to the exigencies of efficient production. They affirm that the loss of human dignity, which results from these socialized methods of production, will be easily compensated for by the abundance of goods produced in common and accruing to the individual who can turn them at his will to the comforts and culture of life. Society, therefore, as the Socialist conceives it, is, on the one hand, impossible and unthinkable without the use of compulsion of the most excessive kind: on the other it fosters a false liberty, since in such a scheme no place is found for true social authority, which is not based on temporal and material advantages, but descends from God alone, the Creator and Last End of all things.

If, like all errors, Socialism contains a certain element of truth (and this the Sovereign Pontiffs have never denied), it is nevertheless founded upon a doctrine of human society peculiarly its own, which is opposed to true Christianity. "Religious Socialism," "Christian Socialism," are expressions implying a contradiction in terms. No one can be at the same time a sincere Catholic and a true Socialist. . . .

THE OXFORD CONFERENCE

FOR AT LEAST two generations individual Protestant clergymen and laymen have been urging social reform and have been developing gradually a "social gospel," the central aim of which is to enlist the churches in the cause of "bringing in the Kingdom of God" on earth. And many churches have carried on this work institutionally. By the beginning of the twentieth century the movement, though not universally acknowledged, had gained momentum in practically all Protestant churches. In the United States a group of Protestant social workers united in 1903 to form the National Federation of Churches and Christian Workers. Simultaneously there was a growing sense of the need for inter-church coöperation and federation. Under the leadership of some of the episcopal churches an ecumenical movement took shape and is still growing, whose aim is to bring about some kind of union or federation for all Christian churches. Both the ideal of uniting the non-Roman churches and the ideal of the Social Gospel were represented in the formation (1908) of The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America.

At its first meeting the Federal Council (which continued the social work of the National Federation mentioned above) accepted a statement called "The Social Creed of the Churches," and this statement was widely used by inter-denominational bodies as well as by the churches. It stood for the following: "equal rights and complete justice for all," the right of workers to "opportunity for self-maintenance" and "protection against the hardships often resulting from the swift crises of industrial change," industrial arbitration, protection against occupational dangers and diseases, abolition of child labor, regulation of working conditions for women, suppression of "sweating," reduction of hours of labor, one day of rest in seven, minimum wage provisions, "equitable division of the products of industry," social insurance and "the abatement of poverty."

In 1932, at the height of the Great Depression, the Federal Council and the major Protestant Churches adopted a revised statement which was considerably more detailed in its program and more radical in its attitude towards social questions than the "creed" of 1908. Among other things the statement called for "hearty support of a planned economic system in which maximum social values shall be sought." It demanded "that cooperation shall supplant competition as the fundamental method"; and considered "industrial democracy as a goal comparable to that of political democracy." The statement even lent support to the idea that industry should bear the costs of the problems which it creates (such as insecurity, unemployment, occupational diseases, and poverty in old age).

In 1937 a World Ecumenical Conference was held at Oxford, in which the American Federal Council was an active participant. It prepared and passed, among other reports, a statement of social aims which is even more elaborate and a little more radical than the 1932 statement. Selections from this statement are here reprinted from the volume *The Oxford Conference*, ed. J. H. Oldham (Chicago, Willett, Clark and Co., 1937).

*REPORT OF THE SECTION ON CHURCH,
COMMUNITY AND STATE IN RELATION
TO THE ECONOMIC ORDER*

I. THE BASIS OF THE CHRISTIAN CONCERN FOR THE ECONOMIC ORDER

THE CHRISTIAN church approaches the problems of the social and economic order from the standpoint of her faith in the revelation of God in Christ. In the life and death of our Lord, God is revealed as a just God who condemns sin and as a merciful God who redeems sinners. The nature and will of God as thus revealed form the basis of human existence and the standard of human conduct. The chief end of man is to glorify God, to honor and love him, in work and life as in worship. This love involves the obligation to love our neighbors as ourselves, a second commandment which Jesus declared to be like unto the first. . . .

The commandment of love therefore always presents possibilities for individuals beyond the requirements of economic and social institutions. There is no legal, political or economic system so bad or so good as to absolve individuals from the responsibility to transcend its requirements by acts of Christian charity. Institutional requirements necessarily prescribe only the minimum. Even in the best possible social system they can only achieve general standards in which the selfishness of the human heart is taken for granted and presupposed. But the man who is in Christ knows a higher obligation which transcends the requirements of justice—the obligation of a love which is the fulfillment of the law.

The love which is the fulfillment of the law is, however, no substitute for law, for institutions or for systems. Individual acts of charity within a given system of government or economics may mitigate its injustices and increase its justice. But they do not absolve the Christian from seeking the best possible institutional arrangement and social structure for the ordering of human life. Undue emphasis upon the higher possibilities of love in personal relations, within the limits of a given system of justice or an established social structure, may tempt Christians to allow individual acts of charity to become a screen for injustice and a substitute for justice. Christianity becomes socially futile if it does not recognize that love must will justice and that the Christian is under an obligation to secure the best possible social and economic structure, in so far as such structure is determined by human decisions.

The relation of the commandment of love to the justice of political and

economic systems is twofold. It is an ideal which reaches beyond any possible achievements in the field of political relations, but it is nevertheless also a standard by which various schemes of justice may be judged. In attempting to deal with political and economic problems, the Christian must therefore be specially on his guard against two errors.

The one is to regard the realities of social justice incorporated in given systems and orders as so inferior to the law of love that the latter cannot be a principle of discrimination among them but only a principle of indiscriminate judgment upon them all. This error makes Christianity futile as a guide in all those decisions which Christians, like other people, must constantly be making in the political and economic sphere. Practically, it gives the advantage to established systems as against the challenge of new social adventures and experiments; for it tempts Christians to make no decisions at all, and such efforts to reserve decision become in practice decisions in favor of the status quo.

The other error is to identify some particular social system with the will of God or to equate it with the kingdom of God. When conservatives insist on such an identification in favor of the status quo, they impart to it a dangerous religious sanction which must drive those who challenge it into a secular revolt against religion itself. If, on the other hand, this identification is made in the interests of a new social order, it will lead to the same complacency which the critic deprecates in the old social situation. Every tendency to identify the kingdom of God with a particular social structure or economic mechanism must result in moral confusion for those who maintain the system and in disillusionment for those who suffer from its limitations. The former will regard conformity with its standards as identical with the fulfillment of the law, thus falling into the sin of pharisaism. The latter will be tempted to a cynical disavowal of the religion because it falsely gives absolute worth to partial values and achievements. Both errors are essentially heretical from the point of view of Christian faith. The one denies the reality of the kingdom of God in history; the other equates the kingdom of God with the processes of history. In the one case, the ultimate and eternal destiny of human existence, which transcends history, is made to support an attitude of indifference toward historical social issues; in the other case, the eternal destiny of human existence is denied or obscured. The law of love which is the standard of the Christian life is properly to be regarded as being at the same time a present reality and an ultimate possibility. It is not only a criterion of judgment in all the fateful decisions which men must make in history, but also an indictment against all historical achievements.

As a criterion of judgment upon the relative merits of economic arrange-

ments and social structures, the law of love gives positive guidance in terms of justice, even though it transcends the realities of all possible social structures. The obligation to love our neighbors as ourselves places clearly under condemnation all social and economic systems which give one man undue advantage over others. It must create an uneasy conscience (for example) in all Christians who are involved in a social system which denies children, of whatever race or class, the fullest opportunity to develop whatever gifts God has given them and makes their education depend upon the fortuitous circumstance of a father's possession or lack of means to provide the necessary funds. It must challenge any social system which provides social privileges without reference to the social functions performed by individuals, or which creates luxury and pride on the one hand and want and insecurity on the other. It makes the conscience of Christians particularly uneasy in regard to the deprivation of basic security for large masses of human beings.

2. ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION

. . . The present economic situation . . . is a product of the emancipation of the individual from the social and cultural restrictions of the Middle Ages. In so far as the spirit and the institutions of the feudal order and of the guild system had restrained, in spite of their religious and cultural creativity, the free development of human potentialities, the dawning of the capitalist age must be considered a definite step forward in the progress of humanity. This is true of the intellectual as well as of the political and economic achievements of that age. The system of free enterprise is responsible for that industrial development which, for the first time in human history, has made it possible to overcome the natural scarcity of economic resources by successive technological improvements. Despite the vast increase of the world's population, it has raised to a considerable degree the general standard of consumption. By the mechanization of industry it has reduced the physical labor of the manual workers. For the first time in history it has brought all parts of the world into interdependence with one another and has made the idea of the unity of mankind a fact of common experience.

It was thought at one time that the development of this new economic order would not only improve the material conditions of life but would also establish social justice. This expectation was rooted in the belief that a pre-established harmony would so govern the self-interest of individuals as to create the greatest possible harmony in society as a whole. "Each man, seeking his own, would serve the commonweal." Today this belief is largely discredited. The attempt of human reason to create an autonomous and universal culture has resulted in a variety of independent and specialized cultural activities

which are not related to any one organizing principle and which consequently lack that unity which we believe can be realized only through the penetration of the whole by the spirit of religion. The absence of this spiritual center from the economic order has involved the progressive dissipation of the spiritual inheritance of Western life. The same forces which have produced material progress have often enhanced inequalities, created permanent insecurity and subjected all members of modern society to the domination of so-called independent economic "laws." The competitive superiority of large-scale production has gone far to destroy the old traditional society of craftsmen and farmers and thereby has created a society which is characterized in many countries by the concentration of wealth on the one hand and the existence of large urban masses on the other. The progressive mechanization of industry has periodically thrown large numbers of workers into long periods of unemployment. The cycle of industrial fluctuations has caused a tremendous waste of productive power and, in consequence, "poverty in the midst of plenty."

At the same time the human side of economic life has been profoundly affected. Broadly speaking, capitalistic production has not escaped the danger of treating human labor as a commodity to be bought at the lowest possible price and to be utilized to the greatest possible extent. The predominance of the profit motive has tended to deprive the worker of the social meaning of his work and has encouraged hostility between the members of different groups in their economic relationships. . . .

A consequence of this development of capitalism was the rise of socialism and communism. These movements represent a protest against the evil results of the capitalist economic order from those who suffered chiefly from it. In several countries this protest allied itself with a radical denial of Christianity, the church and belief in God. This denial is *partly* due to the fact that the churches had become deeply involved in the social and cultural attitudes of the wealthier members of society, upon whom they were frequently dependent politically and economically. As the churches did not detach themselves from these alliances a disastrous chasm opened between those who were struggling for social justice but on nonreligious or antireligious grounds, and those who stood for the Christian faith but did not seem to recognize existing injustices. This is one of the reasons why victorious communism persecutes the Christian churches, denounces religion as a tool of reaction and seeks to eradicate it; and why in other countries the ruthless persecution of communists and socialists is either tolerated without protest or supported by Christians and churches.

Facing this situation the Christian churches must first of all acknowledge and repent for their blindness to the actual situation; for this blindness is partly

responsible for such hostility as exists between themselves and the radical movements which aim at social justice. The churches must not regard an attack directed against themselves as an attack directed against God. They must acknowledge that God has spoken to their conscience through these movements by revealing through them the real situation of millions of their members. On the other hand, the churches must continue resolutely to reject those elements in the actual development of communism which conflict with the Christian truth: the *utopianism* which looks for the fulfillment of human existence through the natural process of history and presupposes that improvement of social institutions will automatically produce improvement in human personalities; the *materialism* which derives all moral and spiritual values from economic needs and economic conditions and deprives the personal and cultural life of its creative freedom; and, finally, the *disregard for the dignity of the individual* in which communism may differ theoretically, but does not differ practically, from other contemporary totalitarian movements.

3. POINTS AT WHICH THE CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF LIFE IS CHALLENGED

. . . It seems to us that the moral and spiritual nature of man, according to the Christian understanding of that nature, is affronted by the assumptions and operation of the economic order of the industrialized world in four respects to which we wish to draw special attention.

(a) *The Enhancement of Acquisitiveness.* That economic order results, in the first place, in a serious danger that the finer qualities of the human spirit will be sacrificed to an overmastering preoccupation with a department of life which, though important on its own plane, ought to be strictly subordinated to other more serious aspects of life. We are warned by the New Testament that riches are a danger to their possessors, and experience would appear to confirm that diagnosis. It is not possible to serve both God and Mammon. When the necessary work of society is so organized as to make the acquisition of wealth the chief criterion of success, it encourages a feverish scramble for money, and a false respect for the victors in the struggle which is as fatal in its moral consequences as any other form of idolatry. In so far as the pursuit of monetary gain becomes the dominant factor in the lives of men, the quality of society undergoes a subtle disintegration. That such a society should be the scene of a perpetual conflict of interests, sometimes concealed, sometimes overt, between the economic groups composing them, is not surprising. Men can cooperate only in so far as they are united by allegiance to a common purpose which is recognized as superior to their sectional interests.

As long as industry is organized primarily not for the service of the community but with the object of producing a purely financial result for some of its members, it cannot be recognized as properly fulfilling its social purpose.

(b) *Inequalities.* The second feature of the economic system which challenges the conscience of Christians is the existence of disparities of economic circumstance on a scale which differs from country to country, but in some is shocking, in all considerable. Not only is the product of industry distributed with an inequality so extreme (though the extent of this inequality also varies considerably from country to country) that a small minority of the population are in receipt of incomes exceeding in the aggregate those of many times their number, but—even more seriously—the latter are condemned throughout their lives to environmental evils which the former escape, and are deprived of the opportunities of fully developing their powers which are accessible, as a matter of course, to their more fortunate fellows. It is no part of the teaching of Christianity that all men are equally endowed by nature or that identical provision should be made for all, irrespective of difference of capacity and need. What Christianity does assert is that all men are children of one Father, and that, compared with that primary and overwhelming fact, the differences between the races, nationalities and classes of men, though important on their own plane, are external and trivial. Any social arrangement which outrages the dignity of man by treating some men as ends and others as means, any institution which obscures the common humanity of men by emphasizing the external accidents of birth or wealth or social position, is *ipso facto* anti-Christian. . . .

(c) *Irresponsible Possession of Economic Power.* A third feature of the existing situation which is repugnant to the Christian conscience consists in the power wielded by a few individuals or groups who are not responsible to any organ of society. This gives the economic order in many countries some resemblance to a tyranny, in the classical sense of that term, where rulers are not accountable for their actions to any superior authority representing the community over whom power is exercised. At the top of this hierarchy are the leaders of the world of finance, whose decisions raise and lower the economic temperature. Below them are the controllers of certain great key industries, the conduct and policy of which vitally affect the lives of millions of human beings. Below them again are a mass of economic undertakings, large and small, the masters of which exercise power over the few hundred or few thousand persons dependent on each of them. The power which these latter wield is qualified at many points by trade unionism and by the law. On the whole, however, the action both of trade unionism and of the state has been confined hitherto to establishing and maintaining certain minimum standards.

Almost the whole field of economic strategy, which in the long run determines what standards can be maintained, escapes their control.

Economic like political autocracy is attended doubtless by certain advantages. However, it is liable to produce both in individuals and in society a character and an outlook on life which it is difficult to reconcile with any relationship that can be described as Christian. It tends to create in those who wield authority, and in the agents through whom they exercise it, a dictatorial temper which springs not from any defect of character peculiar to them but from the influence upon them of the position they occupy. The effect of excessive economic power on those over whom it is exercised is equally serious. Often it makes them servile; fear of losing their jobs, and a vague belief that in the end the richer members of society always hold the whip hand, tends to destroy their spiritual virility. Often, again, it makes them bitter and cynical; they feel that force, not justice, rules their world, and they are tempted to dismiss as insincere cant words which imply a different view.

(d) *The Frustration of the Sense of Christian Vocation.* A profound conflict has arisen between the demand that the Christian should be doing the will of God in his daily work, and the actual kinds of work which Christians find themselves forced to do within the economic order. With regard to the worker and employee, there is the fact that most of them are *directly* conscious of working for the profit of the employer (and for the sake of their wages) and only *indirectly* conscious of working for any public good; while this fact may in some cases be only part of the mechanism by which the work is done for the public good, the difficulty in some degree remains. Again, there is the fact that at present many workers must produce things which are useless or shoddy or destructive. Finally, one other form of work which seems clearly to be in conflict with the Christian's vocation is salesmanship of a kind which involves deception—the deception which may be no more than insinuation and exaggeration, but which is a serious threat to the integrity of the worker.

But even more serious is the constant threat of unemployment. This produces a feeling of extreme insecurity in the minds of masses of the people. Unemployment, especially when prolonged, tends to create in the mind of the unemployed person a sense of uselessness or even of being a nuisance, and to empty his life of any meaning. This situation cannot be met by measures of unemployment assistance, because it is the lack of significant activity which tends to destroy his human self-respect.

4. CHRISTIAN DECISIONS IN RESPONSE TO THIS CHALLENGE

It was pointed out in the first section of this report that the message of the gospel is not addressed, as has sometimes been suggested, to the individual alone. Christianity is emphatically a social religion. Its teaching is directed to

men not as units isolated from their fellows but as members of groups and communities. It insists that the only life in which human beings can find peace and happiness is that of service and self-sacrifice. It asserts that the relations of men to one another are part of their relation to God. It emphasizes that, if the former are not what the Christian conscience would approve, then the latter necessarily share their corruption. "If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how shall he love God whom he hath not seen?"

These relations are, of course, of many different kinds. But in the case of the majority of men they are determined more directly and more continuously by the action of economic interests than by any other single force. It is clearly the duty of Christians, therefore, to test by the canons of their faith not merely their individual conduct and the quality of their private lives, but also the institutional framework of organized society. In so far as they are true to their creed, they cannot either take the economic system for granted or dismiss it as irrelevant to the life of the spirit. They are bound to require it to present its moral credentials; to examine those credentials in the light of Christian doctrine as to the nature of God and man; and, in so far as the system fails to satisfy that criterion, to use every effort to amend or to supersede it. If detachment is incumbent on Christians in reaching their conclusions, courage in stating and energy in acting on them are no less among their duties.

Whatever agreements may be reached by Christians concerning their responsibility for seeking to eradicate those features of the economic order which challenge the Christian conscience, it is an historic fact, which we can hardly expect to obviate in the future, that men who belong to the Christian church and who are united by common religious convictions differ in the conception and in the execution of their political obligations. The profoundest difference at the present time in many countries seems to be between those who believe that the challenges to the Christian faith outlined in the previous section can be met within the framework of a system of private enterprise, and those who demand the supplanting of that system by one primarily based upon the social ownership of the means of production. But even within these two general divisions of opinion, other differences of great importance about the precise means of improving the present system, or about the tempo and the degree of reconstruction needed, have revealed themselves in the work of this conference. These differences are an accurate reflection, we believe, of similar differences in the whole church. . . .

Among the various proposals for reform or reconstruction of the economic system several deserve special mention here. Within terms of the present system, the various proposals may be generally reduced to two: (a) Those which

look toward exerting a greater degree of social and political control upon, and demanding a greater degree of social responsibility from, the holders of great economic power. (b) Those which seek to equalize the inequalities of economic society by heavy taxation on the one hand and by social legislation on the other. Every modern industrial nation has adopted these two social policies to a greater or less degree. A third policy, that of seeking to prevent the centralization of power by government destruction of monopoly and by government support of small farmers, small traders, etc., is less popular in all industrial nations than it was some decades ago. All these policies point to a recognition that the chief dangers of a system of private enterprise are irresponsible power and inequality.

Among those who believe in the transformation or reconstruction of a system of private enterprise to one of social ownership, there are wide varieties of conviction on the means and tempo of this process of reconstruction. There is a general hope that this can be done by gradual process and through the resources of democratic political forms. Nevertheless some feel that, however desirable it may be to make all social decisions through the democratic process, there is no way of guaranteeing the acquiescence of minorities, upon which the democratic process depends. They point out that in moments of great social crisis every society must deal with the possibility that minorities, whether conservative or radical, may defy rather than submit to the will of the majority. But recent Russian history offers such telling examples of the danger of irresponsible political power, supplanting irresponsible economic power when the democratic control of power is destroyed, that the determination of the nations which still possess democratic forms to preserve and maintain them has been greatly reinforced. . . .

The Christian church is a fellowship in Christ which transcends differences of judgment and divergencies of action in relation to the concrete economic situation. Further, if only Christians are brought to repentance in the light of the Christian message, they can never maintain that attitude of fanatical hatred toward members of other groups which is now so common in the world. They and their opponents are both sinners in the presence of God, and the recognition of this fact, in social as well as in personal terms, would itself be a great constructive contribution toward moderating the bitterness of the struggle between social groups.

5. CHRISTIAN TEACHING IN RELATION TO THE ECONOMIC ORDER

. . . We must begin by recognizing that there are some factors in economic life which are more clearly within the province of the church and concerning which more light can be gained from the Christian message than others, and

that there are many matters of judgment in particular situations which involve chiefly expert knowledge. Recognizing, then, the importance of attempting to mark out as clearly as possible the precise areas within which the Christian can expect to receive light from the Christian faith and within which the teaching of the church as church in regard to economic life should be carried on, we proceed to suggest three such areas. In presenting these areas we are suggesting what might be the framework of the Christian message in relation to the economic order in the next decade.

(1) *Christian teaching should deal with ends, in the sense of long-range goals, standards and principles in the light of which every concrete situation and every proposal for improving it must be tested.* It is in the light of such ends and principles that the four characteristics of the existing economic order discussed in section two stand out as challenges to the Christian church. There are differences in theory concerning the way in which these ends are related to the Christian faith. Some would be very careful not to call these ends Christian and yet they would recognize that they are ends which *Christians* should seek in obedience to God.

We suggest five such ends or standards, by way of example, as applicable to the testing of any economic situation.

(a) Right fellowship between man and man being a condition of man's fellowship with God, every economic arrangement which frustrates or restricts it must be modified—and in particular such ordering of economic life as tends to divide the community into classes based upon differences of wealth and to occasion a sense of injustice among the poorer members of society. To every member of the community there must be made open a worthy means of livelihood. The possibilities of amassing private accumulations of wealth should be so limited that the scale of social values is not perverted by the fear and the envy, the insolence and the servility, which tend to accompany extreme inequality.

(b) Regardless of race or class every child and youth must have opportunities of education suitable for the full development of his particular capacities, and must be free from those adventitious handicaps in the matter of health and environment which our society loads upon large numbers of the children of the less privileged classes. In this connection, the protection of the family as a social unit should be an urgent concern of the community.

(c) Persons disabled from economic activity, whether by sickness, infirmity or age, should not be economically penalized on account of their disability, but on the contrary should be the object of particular care. Here again the safeguarding of the family is involved.

(d) Labor has intrinsic worth and dignity, since it is designed by God

for man's welfare. The duty and the right of men to work should therefore alike be emphasized. In the industrial process, labor should never be considered a mere commodity. In their daily work men should be able to recognize and fulfill a Christian vocation. The workingman, whether in field or factory, is entitled to a living wage, wholesome surroundings and a recognized voice in the decisions which affect his welfare as a worker.

(e) The resources of the earth, such as the soil and mineral wealth, should be recognized as gifts of God to the whole human race and used with due and balanced consideration for the needs of the present and future generations.

The implications of even one of these standards, seriously taken, will involve drastic changes in economic life. Each one of them must be made more definite in terms of the problems which face particular communities.

Closely connected with the foregoing paragraphs is the whole question of property—so closely indeed that any action on the part of the community which affects property rights will also affect the application of the standards mentioned. This is a sphere in which Christian teaching on ends and principles in relation to economic life could have immediate results if it were translated into actual economic decisions. Christian thought has already supplied a background which is of great importance, but it has not been brought into effective relationship with the development of the institutions of property under modern economic conditions. This subject should be given close attention by any agencies for further study which may be established in the future. Meanwhile we suggest a few of the directions along which Christian thought should move.

(a) It should be reaffirmed without qualification that all human property rights are relative and contingent only, in virtue of the dependence of man upon God as the giver of all wealth and as the creator of man's capacities to develop the resources of nature. This fundamental Christian conviction must express itself both in the idea of stewardship or trusteeship and in the willingness of the Christian to examine accumulations of property in the light of their social consequences.

(b) The existing system of property rights and the existing distribution of property must be criticized in the light of the largely nonmoral processes by which they have been developed, and criticism must take account of the fact that every argument in defense of property rights which is valid for Christian thinking is also an argument for the widest possible distribution of these rights.

(c) It should further be affirmed that individual property rights must never be maintained or exercised without regard to their social consequences

or without regard to the contribution which the community makes in the production of all wealth.

(d) It is very important to make a clear distinction between various forms of property. The property which consists in personal possessions for use, such as the home, has behind it a clearer moral justification than property in the means of production and in land which gives the owners power over other persons. All property which represents social power stands in special need of moral scrutiny, since power to determine the lives of others is the crucial point in any scheme of justice. The question must always be asked whether this is the kind of power which can be brought under adequate social control or whether it is of the type which by its very nature escapes and evades social control. Industrial property in particular encourages the concentration of power; for it gives the owner control over both the place and the instruments of labor and thus leaves the worker powerless so far as property relations are concerned, allowing him only the organized strength of his union and his political franchise to set against the power of ownership. Property in land on a large scale may represent a similar power over those who are forced to rent it for a livelihood. There are consequently forms of feudal land ownership in Europe, in some states of America and in the Orient, which are frequent sources of social injustice. On the other hand property in land which does not extend beyond the capacity of one family to cultivate—the small freehold which determines a large part of the agriculture of the Western world—belongs to a unique category. The small freeholder may find it increasingly difficult to compete against mechanized large-scale production and to make a living without being overdriven. But on the other hand there is a special justification for this type of property, since it gives freedom to perform a social function without the interference of capricious power and without the exercise of power over others. Furthermore, there is a more organic relation between owner and property in agricultural land than in any type of industrial ownership. Small-scale property in industry and in retail trade possesses some of these same characteristics in a lesser degree. Yet there is always the danger that small-scale productive property, whether in land, industry or trade, may tempt the owner, in his competition with more powerful productive units, to exploit his own family and the other workers employed, especially since in any given case the latter may be too few to organize effectively.

(2) *The message of Christianity should throw a searchlight on the actual facts of the existing situation, and in particular reveal the human consequences of present forms of economic behavior.* It is this which saves statements of principles from being platitudes. The kind of critical analysis which is set

forth in section two must be a part of the message of the church. Here it is important not to impute motives or to denounce individuals (except where special circumstances call for such denunciation) but to present facts in such a way that they speak for themselves to the individual conscience. What in isolation seems to be purely destructive criticism is a necessary part of the total processes by which constructive change is brought about. . . .

(3) *This searchlight of the Christian message can also make clear the obstacles to economic justice in the human heart, and especially those that are present in the hearts of people within the church.* It is not enough that individual Christians become good in their intentions or become changed in their conscious motives. What is needed is the kind of self-knowledge which will help Christians to understand how far their attitudes are molded by the position which they hold in the economic order. Self-knowledge is no less important than knowledge of external conditions, and more important than the knowledge of the sins of others.

Christians must come to understand how far they really do seek, in spite of all pretensions to the contrary, a world in which they and their group are on top, how far their opinions on economic issues are controlled by the interests of the group or class to which they belong, how far they are deceived by false slogans and rationalizations, how far they are callous to "evil at a distance" or to evil experienced by another national or class group than their own—evil to which they may consent, for which they may vote, or by which they may profit. Here, again, the important activity is not to denounce, but to help people to that self-knowledge which comes from the perspective of the Christian emphasis upon sin, so that they will condemn themselves.

The various parts of the church must at this point be guided in the relative emphasis they place on different forms of self-deception by the character of their constituencies. Those parts of the church which contain chiefly the comfortable middle classes should create an atmosphere in which it is most likely that the peculiarly middle class illusions will be punctured. There is, for example, in these classes a tendency to take the present property system for granted and to regard as unjust changes which alter the present distribution of property or the present rights of owners. The kind of Christian teaching about property which is outlined above is at this stage of special importance for these classes.

These classes must also come to see how onesided those conceptions of Christianity are which assume that because Christianity is a spiritual religion economic conditions do not greatly matter, or that it is enough to leave it to the grace of God to save souls in all varieties of external circumstances. Justice may at this stage be embodied in the distribution of bread, but for that rea-

son the quest for justice is not less spiritual. Moreover, it is unseemly for people to be complacent in the face of existing obstacles to the personal development of others, obstacles which they have not themselves experienced. To be complacent in this way because of a religious belief concerning the soul or God is to turn religion into an opiate for the conscience.

Also it is important in some countries that Christians in the comfortable middle classes be helped to realize that they are controlled by class interests quite as much as the workers or farmers, and that in some countries where organizations of workers and farmers are not far advanced they are themselves even more controlled by class interests than these other groups. The assumption that the interests of the middle classes are identical with the interests of the community is an illusion which unconsciously blinds many of the most sincere Christians and makes them unfair and self-righteous in their attitude toward those classes which at present are the chief sufferers from the economic order.

At the proper time and in the proper place the teaching of the church should also create an atmosphere in which the illusions of the working classes and other groups can readily be punctured. It is an illusion, for example, to suppose that the interests of the industrial workers are identical with those of the community.

What is important is that each group, in the most effective ways possible, be brought under the criticism which is implicit in Christian faith. In relationships between classes, we tend at present to see only the mote in our brother's eye. Christians have a special obligation, as they ought to have a special gift for this purpose, to try to interpret separate groups in society to one another. Barriers have to be broken through before they can be broken down. Self-sacrifice and compassion are good, but they are not, for example, what the poor today want of the well-to-do. Without the understanding mind which is able to think and feel the position of the other man, suspicion and distrust cannot be broken down. This power of delicate discernment and sensibility is rare in the world, because it is, in truth, a God-given grace and as such should be the peculiar contribution of the church to the making of true community.

Self-knowledge is a necessary condition for Christian repentance. The church should be able to bring about this condition of repentance because at the heart of its gospel it has a conception of human nature which should make men naturally suspicious of their own motives and which should thus lead them to put a strong burden of proof on themselves when their decisions coincide with their own economic advantage. In some cases it can also be said that the church (and this would mean especially the clergy) has some degree

of detachment from the immediate pressure of the interests of economic groups and should be able to see the world from the point of view of more than one group. That this is true at present to only a small degree is itself one of the most tragic and sinful factors in the life of the church.

In the next decade those who are responsible for guiding the life of the church must seek, by means of these and other forms of teaching, to bring under moral control the attitude of their members in economic relationships—just as they have always sought to bring under moral control the attitude of their members in direct personal relationships. This task will involve far more than preaching. It must become an integral part of the whole life and atmosphere of the church. The church as a worshiping community must relate its acts of repentance and dedication to the economic order in which its members live. Emphasis must here be placed upon the importance of teaching children and young people before the crusts formed by class and convention close their minds. The training of the clergy must include preparation for this kind of teaching.

JOHN DEWEY

JOHN DEWEY (1859-1952) regarded liberalism, taken as a continuous political and social movement, as being renewed continually by particular struggles against particular oppressive institutions. At any given time and place the demand for liberty is the demand for the release of particular energies, and the practical meaning of the ideal is fixed in different ways in different cultural contexts. Because of the tendency of men to establish their specific programs as permanent truths, however, there persists to this day a version of liberalism that grew out of the struggle in England and America for the release of productivity from mercantilist restrictions. The guiding ideal of such liberalism is the negative one of the absence of restraint, and the aim is the maintenance of the system of *laissez-faire*.

Dewey recognizes and is committed to another aspect of liberalism, which he considers to be equally basic with the negative elements in the liberal tradition. The release of individual powers demanded in contemporary society seems to him to depend upon the effective formulation of a positive idea of liberty involving an active program of public planning and control. For such a program he found a source in the liberal idealism stimulated by T. H. Green, as well as in the utilitarian method of testing social policy in terms of general social consequences.

Dewey's liberalism is distinguished from that of his forerunners by virtue of his emphasis on a method of social action patterned after experimental methods. It is not a generalization of the particular conclusions concerning liberties to be drawn from a special situation: it is rather a recognition of the traditional regard of liberals for a progressive freeing of men and the connection of that struggle with free inquiry. In this way Dewey believes he has combined the best elements in the two classic formulations of liberty,—the view of liberty as the absence of restraint and the view of liberty as perfect obedience to perfect law. His liberalism is a striking combination of a principled and long-range attachment to a free and flexible method and a democratic concern in creating specific liberties for as many as possible.

Dewey's philosophy of democracy is different from that of most of his predecessors of the nineteenth century by virtue of the greater importance he attaches to experimental thinking as an integral factor in making democracy work. Liberty and equality are not for him separable from fraternity, for by fraternity (in the sense of cooperative, shared inquiry) liberty and equality can be gradually achieved. They are not the endowments of individuals, but the fruits of democratic society. The democratic process of spreading public responsibility over progressively wider areas demands the extensive fostering of the powers of free thought and independent judgment. The democratic process is for Dewey the more generous communication of experience and sharing of services; from such a progressive extension of participation comes increased responsibility, and interests thus become genuinely public. "The increasing acknowledgment that

goods exist and endure only through being communicated and that association is the means of conjoint sharing lies back of the modern sense of humanity and democracy. . . . Democracy . . . is but a name for the fact that human nature is developed only when its elements take part in directing things which are common, things for the sake of which men and women form groups—families, industrial companies, governments, churches, scientific associations and so on.”

Dewey’s repeated emphasis is that democracy needs to be more than a form of government, that it must be a way of life dependent on the degree to which individuals are themselves democratic, that is to say, in proportion to their commitment to methods of voluntary association and agreement and to mutual consultation. In the final analysis, the justification of democracy “as the truly human way of living” is in the similarity it bears to the experimental method, and its effectiveness rests upon the ability to assimilate that method to everyday problems. “It is of the nature of science not so much to tolerate as to welcome diversity of opinion, while it insists that inquiry brings the evidence of observed facts to bear to effect a consensus of conclusions—and even then to hold the conclusion subject to what is ascertained and made public in further new inquiries. I would not claim that any existing democracy has ever made complete or adequate use of scientific method in deciding upon its policies. But freedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom of communication, the distribution of what is found out to every individual as the ultimate intellectual consumer, are involved in the democratic as in the scientific method.”

For the realization of his ideals Dewey relies less on government than on “voluntary associations.” Schools, laboratories, unions, lobbies, any coöperative attempt at achieving some common good—not to be possessed as an exclusive property, but to be shared with still wider groups—these are the institutions of democracy. Government is democratic insofar as it is the servant of these many groups with their diversified interests, regulating them in the sense of preventing reciprocal frustration of interests. Thus Dewey arrives at a pluralistic socialism, a community of associated interests and goods, held together less by state control and ownership than by publicity of interests and sharing of responsibilities.

The first of the following selections appeared in the magazine section of the *Sunday Times*, February 23, 1936. It was Dewey’s restatement in summary form of the views expressed in his *Liberalism and Social Action*, which had appeared some months earlier. Dewey’s conception of democracy came at least in part from his experience with educational practice and administration and has in turn contributed tremendously to the reshaping of educational aims and methods. The second selection is taken from his speech before the National Education Association, 1937, and was published in *School and Society*, April, 1937, under the title *Democracy and Educational Administration*.



LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION

LIBERALISM as a conscious and aggressive movement arose in Great Britain as two different streams flowed into one. One of these streams was the humanitarian and philanthropic zeal that became so active late in the eighteenth century and that in various forms is still a mighty current. It was expressed in the feeling that man is his brother's keeper and that the world is full of suffering and evil that are caused by failure to recognize this fact. . . .

The other great stream that entered into the formation of liberalism sprang from the stimulus to manufacturing and trade that came from the application of steam to industry. The great intellectual leader of this moment was Adam Smith. . . . While the two streams came together, they never coalesced. Although the humanitarian movement expressed itself most actively in personal and voluntary effort, it was far from averse to employing governmental agencies to achieve its reforms. Most of them, in fact, like abolition of the slave trade, prison reform, removal of abuses attending the labor of women and children, could not be effected without some intervention on the part of government.

The whole movement toward what is known as social legislation with its slogan of social justice derives from this source and involves more and more appeal to governmental action. Hence there was from the beginning an inner split in liberalism. Any attempt to define liberalism in terms of one or the other of its two strains will be vehemently denied by those attached to the other strain.

Historically, the split was embodied in the person of one of the chief representatives of nineteenth-century liberalism, Jeremy Bentham. Whether he was aware of it or not, his leading principle, that of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, was derived from the philanthropic and humanitarian movement. But when it came to the realization of this goal, he ranked himself, with some exceptions, such as public health and public education, with laissez-faire liberalism.

He was strong for political action to reform abuses of judicial procedure, of law-making and methods of electing law-makers, but he regarded the abuses to be corrected as the product of the failure of government in the past to confine itself to its proper sphere. When the abuses of governmental action by government were once removed, he believed that the free play of individual initiative and effort would furnish the sure road to progress and to producing the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

As I have indicated, the inner breach in liberalism has never been healed. On the Continent, so-called liberal parties have been almost universally the political representatives of big industry, banking and commerce. In Great Britain, true to the spirit of tradition and compromise so strong in English affairs, liberalism has been a mixture of the two strains, leaning now in one direction and now in another.

In the United States liberalism has been identified largely with the idea of the use of governmental agencies to remedy evils from which the less-fortunate classes suffer. It was "forward-looking" in the Progressive movement; it lies, nominally at least, behind Square Deals and New Deals. It has favored employer-liability acts, laws regulating hours and conditions of labor, anti-sweatshop legislation, supplementation of private charity by public relief and public works, generous appropriations for public schools, graded higher taxation of larger incomes and of inheritances; in general, when there has been a conflict between labor and employers it has sided with labor.

Its philosophy has rarely been clear cut. But so far as it has had a philosophy it has been that government should regularly intervene to help equalize conditions between the wealthy and the poor, between the overprivileged and the underprivileged. For this reason liberals of the other, or *laissez-faire*, school have always attacked it as pink socialism, as disguised radicalism; while at the present time the favorite charge is that it is instigated, of all places in the world, from Moscow.

As a matter of fact, up to this time in this country political liberalism has never attempted to change the fundamental conditions of the economic system or to do more than ameliorate the estate in which the mass of human beings live. For this reason liberalism at present is under more violent attack from radicals than from conservatives. In the mouth of radicals liberalism is a term of hissing and reproach.

In spite of the extreme clash, both schools of liberalism profess devotion to the same ultimate ideal and goal. The slogan of both schools is the utmost possible liberty of the individual. The difference between them concerns the province in which liberty and individuality are most important and the means by which they are to be realized. One has only to read any outgiving of the adherents of *laissez-faire* liberalism to see that it is the liberty of the entrepreneur in business undertakings which they prize and which they come close to identifying with the heart of all liberty.

To the spokesmen of the Liberty League and to ex-President Hoover in his doctrine of rugged individualism, any governmental action that interferes with this particular kind of liberty is an attack upon liberty itself. The rug-

gedness, independence, initiative and vigor of individuals upon which they set chief store is that of the individuals who have come to the top in the existing economic system of finance capitalism. They are exposed to the charge of identifying the meaning of liberty and of rugged individualism with the maintenance of the system under which they have prospered.

The charge is given force by the fact that they have for the most part supported the system of protective tariffs, against which original *simon-pure* laissez-faire liberals directed some of their most violent attacks. The author of the phrase "rugged individualism" used the government to come to the aid of industry when it was in straits by means of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and, as far as I know, the opponents of governmental intervention made no protest in this flagrant case of governmental interference with the free course of private industry.

The most vocal spokesmen for this special form of liberty have never attacked land monopoly and if they think at all about Henry George, think of him as one of the subversive and dangerous radicals. They have themselves built up financial and industrial systems so concentrated as to be semi-monopolies or monopolies proper.

Liberals of the other school are those who point to things like those just mentioned and who assert that the system of industry for private profit without regard to social consequences has had in fact a most unfavorable effect upon the real liberty of the mass of individuals.

Their conception of what I called the province of liberty and individuality is broader and more generous than is that of those who come forward as the self-appointed champions of liberty. They think that liberty is something that affects every aspect and phase of human life, liberty of thought, of expression, of cultural opportunity, and that it is not to be had, even in the economic sphere, without a degree of security that is denied to millions by the present economic system.

They point out that industry, banking and commerce have reached a point where there is no such thing as merely private initiative and enterprise. For the consequences of private business enterprise affect so many persons and in such deep and enduring ways that all business is affected with a public interest. Since the consequences of business are social, society must itself look after, by means of increased organized control, the industrial and financial causes of these consequences.

There is, accordingly, no doubt in my own mind that laissez-faire liberalism is played out, largely because of the fruits of its own policies. Any system that cannot provide elementary security for millions has no claim to the title

of being organized in behalf of liberty and the development of individuals. Any person and any movement whose interest in these ends is genuine and not a cover for personal advantage and power must put primary emphasis in thought and action upon the means of their attainment.

At present those means lie in the direction of increased social control and increased collectivism of effort. Humane liberalism in order to save itself must cease to deal with symptoms and go to the causes of which inequalities and oppressions are but the symptoms. In order to endure under present conditions, liberalism must become radical in the sense that, instead of using social power to ameliorate the evil consequences of the existing system, it shall use social power to change the system.

Radicalism in the minds of many, however, both among its professed adherents and its bitter enemies, is identified with a particular method of changing the system. To them, it means the change of the present system by violent overthrow. Radicalism of this sort is opposed to liberalism and liberalism is opposed to it. For liberalism both by its history and by its own nature is committed to democratic methods of effecting social change.

The idea of forcing men to be free is an old idea, but by nature it is opposed to freedom. Freedom is not something that can be handed to men as a gift from outside, whether by old-fashioned dynastic benevolent despotisms or by new-fashioned dictatorships, whether of the proletarian or of the Fascist order. It is something which can be had only as individuals participate in winning it, and this fact, rather than some particular political mechanism, is the essence of democratic liberalism.

The denial of the democratic method of achieving social control is in part the product of sheer impatience and romantic longing for a short-cut which if it were taken would defeat its own end. It is in part the fruit of the Russian revolution, oblivious of the fact that Russia never had any democratic tradition in its whole history and was accustomed to dictatorial rule in a way that is foreign to the spirit of every Western country. In part, it is the product of the capture of the machinery of democratic legislation and administration by the dominant economic power, known for short as plutocracy or "the interests."

Discontent with democracy as it operates under conditions of exploitation by special interests has justification. But the notion that the remedy is violence and a civil war between classes is a counsel of despair. If the method of violence and civil war be adopted the end will be either fascism, open and undisguised, or the common ruin of both parties to the struggle. The democratic method of social change is slow; it labors under many and serious handicaps imposed by the undemocratic character of what passes for democ-

racy. But it is the method of liberalism, with its belief that liberty is the means as well as the goal and that only through the development of individuals in their voluntary cooperation with one another can the development of individuality be made secure and enduring.

DEMOCRACY

. . . DEMOCRACY is much broader than a special political form, a method of conducting government, of making laws and carrying on governmental administration by means of popular suffrage and elected officers. It is that, of course. But it is something broader and deeper than that. The political and governmental phase of democracy is a means, the best means so far found, for realizing ends that lie in the wide domain of human relationships and the development of human personality. It is, as we often say, though perhaps without appreciating all that is involved in the saying, a way of life, social and individual. The key-note of democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the living of men together: which is necessary from the standpoint of both the general social welfare and the full development of human beings as individuals.

Universal suffrage, recurring elections, responsibility of those who are in political power to the voters, and the other factors of democratic government are means that have been found expedient for realizing democracy as the truly human way of living. They are not a final end and a final value. They are to be judged on the basis of their contribution to an end. It is a form of idolatry to erect means into the end which they serve. Democratic political forms are simply the best means that human wit has devised up to a special time in history. But they rest back upon the idea that no man or limited set of men is wise enough or good enough to rule others without their consent; the positive meaning of this statement is that all those who are affected by social institutions must have a share in producing and managing them. The two facts that each one is influenced in what he does and enjoys and in what he becomes by the institutions under which he lives, and that therefore he shall have, in a democracy, a voice in shaping them, are the passive and active sides of the same fact.

The development of political democracy came about through substitution of the method of mutual consultation and voluntary agreement for the method of subordination of the many to the few enforced from above. Social arrangements which involve fixed subordination are maintained by coercion. The coercion need not be physical. There have existed, for short periods, benevolent

despotisms. But coercion of some sort there has been; perhaps economic, certainly psychological and moral. The very fact of exclusion from participation is a subtle form of suppression. It gives individuals no opportunity to reflect and decide upon what is good for them. Others who are supposed to be wiser and who in any case have more power decide the question for them and also decide the methods and means by which subjects may arrive at the enjoyment of what is good for them. This form of coercion and suppression is more subtle and more effective than is overt intimidation and restraint. When it is habitual and embodied in social institutions, it seems the normal and natural state of affairs. The mass usually become unaware that they have a claim to a development of their own powers. Their experience is so restricted that they are not conscious of restriction. It is part of the democratic conception that they as individuals are not the only sufferers, but that the whole social body is deprived of the potential resources that should be at its service. The individuals of the submerged mass may not be very wise. But there is one thing they are wiser about than anybody else can be, and that is where the shoe pinches, the troubles they suffer from.

The foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities of human nature; faith in human intelligence and in the power of pooled and cooperative experience. It is not belief that these things are complete but that if given a show they will grow and be able to generate progressively the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide collective action. Every autocratic and authoritarian scheme of social action rests on a belief that the needed intelligence is confined to a superior few, who because of inherent natural gifts are endowed with the ability and the right to control the conduct of others; laying down principles and rules and directing the ways in which they are carried out. It would be foolish to deny that much can be said for this point of view. It is that which controlled human relations in social groups for much the greater part of human history. The democratic faith has emerged very, very recently in the history of mankind. Even where democracies now exist, men's minds and feelings are still permeated with ideals about leadership imposed from above, ideas that develop in the long early history of mankind. After democratic political institutions were nominally established, beliefs and ways of looking at life and of acting that originated when men and women were externally controlled and subjected to arbitrary power, persisted in the family, the church, business and the school, and experience shows that as long as they persist there, political democracy is not secure.

Belief in equality is an element of the democratic credo. It is not, however, belief in equality of natural endowments. Those who proclaimed the idea of

equality did not suppose they were enunciating a psychological doctrine, but a legal and political one. All individuals are entitled to equality of treatment by law and in its administration. Each one is affected equally in quality if not in quantity by the institutions under which he lives and has an equal right to express his judgment, although the weight of his judgment may not be equal in amount when it enters into the pooled result to that of others. In short, each one is equally an individual and entitled to equal opportunity of development of his own capacities, be they large or small in range. Moreover, each has needs of his own, as significant to him as those of others are to them. The very fact of natural and psychological inequality is all the more reason for establishment by law of equality of opportunity, since otherwise the former becomes a means of oppression of the less gifted.

While what we call intelligence be distributed in unequal amounts, it is the democratic faith that it is sufficiently general so that each individual has something to contribute, whose value can be assessed only as it enters into the final pooled intelligence constituted by the contributions of all. Every authoritarian scheme, on the contrary, assumes that its value may be assessed by some *prior* principle, if not of family and birth or race and color or possession of material wealth, then by the position and rank a person occupies in the existing social scheme. The democratic faith in equality is the faith that each individual shall have the chance and opportunity to contribute whatever he is capable of contributing and that the value of his contribution be decided by its place and function in the organized total of similar contributions, not on the basis of prior status of any kind whatever.

I have emphasized in what precedes the importance of the effective release of intelligence in connection with personal experience in the democratic way of living. I have done so purposely because democracy is so often and so naturally associated in our minds with freedom of *action*, forgetting the importance of freed intelligence which is necessary to direct and to warrant freedom of action. Unless freedom of individual action has intelligence and informed conviction back of it, its manifestation is almost sure to result in confusion and disorder. The democratic idea of freedom is not the right of each individual to *do* as he pleases, even if it be qualified by adding "provided he does not interfere with the same freedom on the part of others." While the idea is not always, not often enough, expressed in words, the basic freedom is that of freedom of *mind* and of whatever degree of freedom of action and experience is necessary to produce freedom of intelligence. The modes of freedom guaranteed in the Bill of Rights are all of this nature: Freedom of belief and conscience, of expression of opinion, of assembly for discussion and confer-

ence, of the press as an organ of communication. They are guaranteed because without them individuals are not free to develop and society is deprived of what they might contribute. . . .

There is some kind of government, of control, wherever affairs that concern a number of persons who act together are engaged in. It is a superficial view that holds government is located in Washington and Albany. There is government in the family, in business, in the church, in every social group. There are regulations, due to custom if not to enactment, that settle how individuals in a group act in connection with one another.

It is a disputed question of theory and practice just how far a democratic political government should go in control of the conditions of action within special groups. At the present time, for example, there are those who think the federal and state governments leave too much freedom of independent action to industrial and financial groups, and there are others who think the government is going altogether too far at the present time. I do not need to discuss this phase of the problem, much less to try to settle it. But it must be pointed out that if the methods of regulation and administration in vogue in the conduct of secondary social groups are non-democratic, whether directly or indirectly or both, there is bound to be an unfavorable reaction back into the habits of feeling, thought and action of citizenship in the broadest sense of that word. The way in which any organized social interest is controlled necessarily plays an important part in forming the dispositions and tastes, the attitudes, interests, purposes and desires, of those engaged in carrying on the activities of the group. For illustration, I do not need to do more than point to the moral, emotional and intellectual effect upon both employers and laborers of the existing industrial system. Just what the effects specifically are is a matter about which we know very little. But I suppose that every one who reflects upon the subject admits that it is impossible that the ways in which activities are carried on for the greater part of the waking hours of the day; and the way in which the share of individuals are involved in the management of affairs in such a matter as gaining a livelihood and attaining material and social security, can not but be a highly important factor in shaping personal dispositions; in short, forming character and intelligence.

In the broad and final sense all institutions are educational in the sense that they operate to form the attitudes, dispositions, abilities and disabilities that constitute a concrete personality. The principle applies with special force to the school. For it is the main business of the family and the school to influence directly the formation and growth of attitudes and dispositions, emotional, intellectual and moral. Whether this educative process is carried on in a predominantly democratic or non-democratic way becomes, therefore, a

question of transcendent importance not only for education itself but for its final effect upon all the interests and activities of a society that is committed to the democratic way of life. . . .

There are certain corollaries which clarify the meaning of the issue. Absence of participation tends to produce lack of interest and concern on the part of those shut out. The result is a corresponding lack of effective responsibility. Automatically and unconsciously, if not consciously, the feeling develops, "This is none of our affair; it is the business of those at the top; let that particular set of Georges do what needs to be done." The countries in which autocratic government prevails are just those in which there is least public spirit and the greatest indifference to matters of general as distinct from personal concern. Can we expect a different kind of psychology to actuate teachers? Where there is little power, there is correspondingly little sense of positive responsibility. It is enough to do what one is told to do sufficiently well to escape flagrant unfavorable notice. About larger matters, a spirit of passivity is engendered. In some cases, indifference passes into evasion of duties when not directly under the eye of a supervisor; in other cases, a carping, rebellious spirit is engendered. . . .

It still is also true that incapacity to assume the responsibilities involved in having a voice in shaping policies is bred and increased by conditions in which that responsibility is denied. I suppose there has never been an autocrat, big or little, who did not justify his conduct on the ground of the unfitness of his subjects to take part in government. . . . What the argument for democracy implies is that the best way to produce initiative and constructive power is to exercise it. Power, as well as interest, comes by use and practice. Moreover, the argument from incapacity proves too much. If it is so great as to be a permanent bar, then teachers can not be expected to have the intelligence and skill that are necessary to execute the directions given them. The delicate and difficult task of developing character and good judgment in the young needs every stimulus and inspiration possible. It is impossible that the work should not be better done when teachers have that understanding of what they are doing that comes from having shared in forming its guiding ideas. . . .

The fundamental beliefs and practices of democracy are now challenged as they never have been before. In some nations they are more than challenged. They are ruthlessly and systematically destroyed. Everywhere there are waves of criticism and doubt as to whether democracy can meet pressing problems of order and security. The causes for the destruction of political democracy in countries where it was nominally established are complex. But of one thing I think we may be sure. Wherever it has fallen it was too exclusively political in nature. It had not become part of the bone and

blood of the people in daily conduct of its life. Democratic forms were limited to Parliament, elections and combats between parties. What is happening proves conclusively, I think, that unless democratic habits of thought and action are part of the fiber of a people, political democracy is insecure. It can not stand in isolation. It must be buttressed by the presence of democratic methods in all social relationships. The relations that exist in educational institutions are second only in importance in this respect to those which exist in industry and business, perhaps not even to them. . . .

XII

EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY CURRENTS OF THOUGHT

HENRI BERGSON

HENRI BERGSON (1859-1941), the French philosopher, has had a considerable influence, not only because of the literary quality and persuasiveness of his work, but for weightier reasons tied up with the problem of human knowledge. Unlike James, who never found difficulty with the character of scientific inquiry as such and who objected only to its exclusion of faith and will, Bergson finds in science intrinsic limitations as a method of knowing; and in the eyes of many people, philosophers and laymen alike, he has been a spokesman for the various kinds of dissatisfaction that have arisen concerning the larger role of the scientific enterprise.

Bergson sees in science an efficient weapon for analyzing and dissecting, but thinks that it pays a price for this. He contends that a reality, to be analyzed, must be looked at "statically" and be broken up into elements; it cannot be grasped as a living, moving whole. Science must work with language (which includes the symbols of its formulae) and static language cannot deal adequately with changing reality. Hence scientific or symbolical knowing always to a certain extent distorts reality and is inferior to "intuitive" knowing. "Intuition" means for Bergson "the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible." Science gives us "points of view," intuition gives us the whole, in its dynamic immediacy and individuality. Scientific analysis is useful only after an intuitive grasp, for only then can "circling round" the object of knowledge be of genuine value. The great early modern scientists, Bergson concludes, based their analysis on metaphysical intuition, while later science lost track of the proper approach and succeeded only in multiplying abstractions, going so far as to explain the sciences of life, such as biology and psychology, in mechanical terms. In the following selections from *Creative Evolution* (1907; translated from the French by Arthur Mitchell, New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1911) Bergson tries to show why he believes that the mechanistic approach to evolution so characteristic of the later nineteenth century is inept.



CREATIVE EVOLUTION

THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTION of our intellect . . . is to be a light for our conduct, to make ready for our action on things, to foresee, for a given situation, the events, favorable or unfavorable, which may follow thereupon. Intellect therefore instinctively selects in a given situation whatever is like something already known; it seeks this out, in order that it may apply its principle that "like

produces like." In just this does the prevision of the future by common sense consist. Science carries this faculty to the highest possible degree of exactitude and precision, but does not alter its essential character. Like ordinary knowledge, in dealing with things science is concerned only with the aspect of *repetition*. Though the whole be original, science will always manage to analyze it into elements or aspects which are approximately a reproduction of the past. Science can work only on what is supposed to repeat itself—that is to say, on what is withdrawn, by hypothesis, from the action of real time. Anything that is irreducible and irreversible in the successive moments of a history eludes science. To get a notion of this irreducibility and irreversibility, we must break with scientific habits which are adapted to the fundamental requirements of thought, we must do violence to the mind, go counter to the natural bent of the intellect. But that is just the function of philosophy.

In vain, therefore, does life evolve before our eyes as a continuous creation of unforeseeable form: the idea always persists that form, unforeseeability and continuity are mere appearance—the outward reflection of our own ignorance. What is presented to the senses as a continuous history would break up, we are told, into a series of successive states. "What gives you the impression of an original state resolves, upon analysis, into elementary facts, each of which is the repetition of a fact already known. What you call an unforeseeable form is only a new arrangement of old elements. The elementary causes, which in their totality have determined this arrangement, are themselves old causes repeated in a new order. Knowledge of the elements and of the elementary causes would have made it possible to foretell the living form which is their sum and their resultant. When we have resolved the biological aspect of phenomena into physico-chemical factors, we will leap, if necessary, over physics and chemistry themselves; we will go from masses to molecules, from molecules to atoms, from atoms to corpuscles: we must indeed at last come to something that can be treated as a kind of solar system, astronomically. If you deny it, you oppose the very principle of scientific mechanism, and you arbitrarily affirm that living matter is not made of the same elements as other matter."—We reply that we do not question the fundamental identity of inert matter and organized matter. The only question is whether the natural systems which we call living beings must be assimilated to the artificial systems that science cuts out within inert matter, or whether they must not rather be compared to that natural system which is the whole of the universe. That life is a kind of mechanism I cordially agree. But is it the mechanism of parts artificially isolated within the whole of the universe, or is it the mechanism of the real whole? The real whole might well be, we conceive, an indivisible continuity. The systems we cut out within it would, properly speak-

ing, not then be *parts* at all; they would be *partial views* of the whole. And, with these partial views put end to end, you will not make even a beginning of the reconstruction of the whole, any more than, by multiplying photographs of an object in a thousand different aspects, you will reproduce the object itself. So of life and of the physico-chemical phenomena to which you endeavor to reduce it. Analysis will undoubtedly resolve the process of organic creation into an ever-growing number of physico-chemical phenomena, and chemists and physicists will have to do, of course, with nothing but these. But it does not follow that chemistry and physics will ever give us the key to life.

A very small element of a curve is very near being a straight line. And the smaller it is, the nearer. In the limit, it may be termed a part of the curve or a part of the straight line, as you please, for in each of its points a curve coincides with its tangent. So likewise "vitality" is tangent, at any and every point, to physical and chemical forces; but such points are, as a fact, only views taken by a mind which imagines stops at various moments of the movement that generates the curve. In reality, life is no more made of physico-chemical elements than a curve is composed of straight lines. . . .

The mechanistic explanations . . . hold good for the systems that our thought artificially detaches from the whole. . . . The essence of mechanical explanation, in fact, is to regard the future and the past as calculable functions of the present, and thus to claim that *all is given*. On this hypothesis, past, present and future would be open at a glance to a super-human intellect capable of making the calculation. Indeed, the scientists who have believed in the universality and perfect objectivity of mechanical explanations have, consciously or unconsciously, acted on a hypothesis of this kind. Laplace formulated it with the greatest precision: "An intellect which at a given instant knew all the forces with which nature is animated, and the respective situations of the beings that compose nature—supposing the said intellect were vast enough to subject these data to analysis—would embrace in the same formula the motions of the greatest bodies in the universe and those of the slightest atom: nothing would be uncertain for it, and the future like the past, would be present to its eyes." And Du Bois-Reymond: "We can imagine the knowledge of nature arrived at a point where the universal process of the world might be represented by a single mathematical formula, by one immense system of simultaneous differential equations, from which could be deduced, for each moment, the position, direction, and velocity of every atom of the world." Huxley has expressed the same idea in a more concrete form: "If the fundamental proposition of evolution is true, that the entire world, living and not living, is the result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of which the primi-

tive nebulosity of the universe was composed, it is no less certain that the existing world lay, potentially, in the cosmic vapor, and that a sufficient intellect could, from a knowledge of the properties of the molecules of that vapor, have predicted, say the state of the Fauna of Great Britain in 1869, with as much certainty as one can say what will happen to the vapor of the breath in a cold winter's day." In such a doctrine, time is still spoken of: one pronounces the word, but one *does* not think of the thing. For time is here deprived of efficacy, and if it *does* nothing, it *is* nothing. Radical mechanism implies a metaphysic in which the totality of the real is postulated complete in eternity, and in which the apparent duration of things expresses merely the infirmity of a mind that cannot know everything at once. But duration is something very different from this for our consciousness, that is to say, for that which is most indisputable in our experience. We perceive duration as a stream against which we cannot go. It is the foundation of our being, and, as we feel, the very substance of the world in which we live. It is of no use to hold up before our eyes the dazzling prospect of a universal mathematic; we cannot sacrifice experience to the requirements of a system. That is why we reject radical mechanism.

But radical finalism is quite as unacceptable, and for the same reason. The doctrine of teleology, in its extreme form, as we find it in Leibniz for example, implies that things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged. But if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time is useless again. As in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that *all is given*. Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism. It springs from the same postulate, with this sole difference, that in the movement of our finite intellects along successive things, whose successiveness is reduced to a mere appearance, it holds in front of us the light with which it claims to guide us, instead of putting it behind. It substitutes the attraction of the future for the impulsion of the past. But succession remains none the less a mere appearance, as indeed does movement itself. . . .

Our reason, incorrigibly presumptuous, imagines itself possessed, by right of birth or by right of conquest, innate or acquired, of all the essential elements of the knowledge of truth. Even where it confesses that it does not know the object presented to it, it believes that its ignorance consists only in not knowing which one of its time-honored categories suits the new object. In what drawer, ready to open, shall we put it? In what garment, already cut out, shall we clothe it? Is it this, or that, or the other thing? And "this," and "that," and "the other thing" are always something already conceived, already known. The idea that for a new object we might have to create a new concept, perhaps a new method of thinking, is deeply repugnant to us. . . .

Nowhere is the inadequacy of this method so obvious as in theories of life. If, in evolving in the direction of the vertebrates in general, of man and intellect in particular, life has had to abandon by the way many elements incompatible with this particular mode of organization and consign them, as we shall show, to other lines of development, it is the totality of these elements that we must find again and rejoin to the intellect proper, in order to grasp the true nature of vital activity. And we shall probably be aided in this by the fringe of vague intuition that surrounds our distinct—that is, intellectual—representation. For what can this useless fringe be, if not that part of the evolving principle which has not shrunk to the peculiar form of our organization, but has settled around it unasked for, unwanted? It is there, accordingly, that we must look for hints to expand the intellectual form of our thought; from there shall we derive the impetus necessary to lift us above ourselves. To form an idea of the whole of life cannot consist in combining simple ideas that have been left behind in us by life itself in the course of its evolution. How could the part be equivalent to the whole, the content to the container, a by-product of the vital operation to the operation itself? Such, however, is our illusion when we define the evolution of life as a “passage from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous,” or by any other concept obtained by putting fragments of intellect side by side. . . .

Before the evolution of life . . . the portals of the future remain wide open. It is a creation that goes on for ever in virtue of an initial movement. This movement constitutes the unity of the organized world—a prolific unity, of an infinite richness, superior to any that the intellect could dream of, for the intellect is only one of its aspects or products. . . .

The intellect is not made to think *evolution*, in the proper sense of the word—that is to say, the continuity of a change that is pure mobility. . . . Suffice it to say that the intellect represents *becoming* as a series of *states*, each of which is homogeneous with itself and consequently does not change. Is our attention called to the internal change of one of these states? At once we decompose it into another series of states which reunited, will be supposed to make up this internal modification. Each of these new states must be invariable, or else their internal change, if we are forced to notice it, must be resolved again into a fresh series of invariable states, and so on to infinity. Here again, thinking consists in reconstituting, and, naturally, it is with *given* elements, and consequently with *stable* elements, that we reconstitute. So that, though we may do our best to imitate the mobility of becoming by an addition that is ever going on, becoming itself slips through our fingers just when we think we are holding it tight.

Precisely because it is always trying to reconstitute, and to reconstitute with

what is given, the intellect lets what is *new* in each moment of a history escape. It does not admit the unforeseeable. It rejects all creation. That definite antecedents bring forth a definite consequent, calculable as a function of them is what satisfies our intellect. That a definite end calls forth definite means to attain it, is what we also understand. In both cases we have to do with the known which is combined with the known, in short, with the old which is repeated. Our intellect is there at its ease; and, whatever be the object, it will abstract, separate, eliminate, so as to substitute for the object itself, if necessary, an approximate equivalent in which things will happen in this way. But that each instant is a fresh endowment, that the new is ever upspringing, that the form just come into existence (although, *when once produced*, it may be regarded as an effect determined by its causes) could never have been foreseen—because the causes here, unique in their kind, are part of the effect, have come into existence with it, and are determined by it as much as they determine it—all this we can feel within ourselves and also divine, by sympathy outside ourselves, but we cannot think it, in the strict sense of the word, nor express it in terms of pure understanding. No wonder at that: we must remember what our intellect is meant for. The causality it seeks and finds everywhere expresses the very mechanism of our industry, in which we go on recomposing the same whole with the same parts, repeating the same movements to obtain the same result. The finality it understands best is the finality of our industry, in which we work on a model given in advance, that is to say, old or composed of elements already known. As to invention properly so called, which is, however, the point of departure of industry itself, our intellect does not succeed in grasping it in its *upspringing*, that is to say, in its indivisibility, nor in its *fervor*, that is to say, in its creativeness. Explaining it always consists in resolving it, it the unforeseeable and new, into elements old or known, arranged in a different order. The intellect can no more admit complete novelty than real becoming; that is to say, here again it lets an essential aspect of life escape, as if it were not intended to think such an object.

All our analyses bring us to this conclusion. But it is hardly necessary to go into such long details concerning the mechanism of intellectual working; it is enough to consider the results. We see that the intellect, so skilful in dealing with the inert, is awkward the moment it touches the living. Whether it wants to treat the life of the body or the life of the mind, it proceeds with the rigor, the stiffness and the brutality of an instrument not designed for such use. The history of hygiene or of pedagogy teaches us much in this matter. When we think of the cardinal, urgent and constant need we have to preserve our bodies and to raise our souls, of the special facilities given to

each of us, in this field, to experiment continually on ourselves and on others, of the palpable injury by which the wrongness of a medical or pedagogical practise is both made manifest and punished at once, we are amazed at the stupidity and especially at the persistence of errors. We may easily find their origin in the natural obstinacy with which we treat the living like the lifeless and think all reality, however fluid, under the form of the sharply defined solid. We are at ease only in the discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead. *The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life.*

Instinct, on the contrary, is molded on the very form of life. While intelligence treats everything mechanically, instinct proceeds, so to speak, organically. If the consciousness that slumbers in it should awake, if it were wound up into knowledge instead of being wound off into action, if we could ask and it could reply, it would give up to us the most intimate secrets of life. . . .

The concrete explanation, no longer scientific, but metaphysical, must be sought along quite another path, not in the direction of intelligence, but in that of "sympathy."

Instinct is sympathy. If this sympathy could extend its object and also reflect upon itself, it would give us the key to vital operations—just as intelligence, developed and disciplined, guides us into matter. For—we cannot too often repeat it—intelligence and instinct are turned in opposite directions, the former towards inert matter, the latter towards life. Intelligence, by means of science, which is its work, will deliver up to us more and more completely the secret of physical operations; of life it brings us, and moreover only claims to bring us, a translation in terms of inertia. It goes all round life, taking from outside the greatest possible number of views of it, drawing it into itself instead of entering into it. But it is to the very inwardness of life that *intuition* leads us—by intuition I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely.

That an effort of this kind is not impossible, is proved by the existence in man of an aesthetic faculty along with normal perception. Our eye perceives the features of the living being, merely as assembled, not as mutually organized. The intention of life, the simple movement that runs through the lines, that binds them together and gives them significance, escapes it. This intention is just what the artist tries to regain, in placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy, in breaking down, by an effort of intuition, the barrier that space puts up between him and his model. It is true that this aesthetic intuition, like external perception, only attains the individual. But we can conceive an inquiry turned in the same direction as art, which would take life *in general* for its object, just as physical science, in following to the end the direction pointed out by external perception, pro-

longs the individual facts into general laws. No doubt this philosophy will never obtain a knowledge of its object comparable to that which science has of its own. Intelligence remains the luminous nucleus around which instinct, even enlarged and purified into intuition, forms only a vague nebulosity. But, in default of knowledge properly so called, reserved to pure intelligence, intuition may enable us to grasp what it is that intelligence fails to give us, and indicate the means of supplementing it. On the one hand, it will utilize the mechanism of intelligence itself to show how intellectual molds cease to be strictly applicable; and on the other hand, by its own work, it will suggest to us the vague feeling, if nothing more, of what must take the place of intellectual molds. Thus, intuition may bring the intellect to recognize that life does not quite go into the category of the many nor yet into that of the one; that neither mechanical causality nor finality can give a sufficient interpretation of the vital process. Then, by the sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living, by the expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, it introduces us into life's own domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation. . . .

WILLIAM JAMES

THE AMERICAN philosopher and psychologist William James (1842–1910) was first trained in the biological sciences. As a young man, he was a disciple of Herbert Spencer, though he soon revolted from “simple-minded evolutionism.” In his *Principles of Psychology*, a landmark in the history of the subject, he showed how indispensable biological studies were, and how irrelevant theological explanations were, if psychology was to move in a scientific direction. James taught at Harvard from 1872 until his death. His frankness, wit, and “common-sensism” have always made him accessible in an unusual degree to the non-academic public; and it has often been remarked that, stylistically speaking, he ought to have been the novelist and his brother, Henry James, the philosopher.

Pragmatism, the view so much associated with James’s name, did not originate with him but with his friend Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). James’s version of pragmatism was different from that of Peirce, and subsequently so many other versions of the position arose, including those invented by uncritical accounts of it, that by now the term cannot be used without careful specification. In James, however, one central and persisting strain in pragmatism was given attractive formulation: all concepts, all ideas, whether in philosophic or any other type of thinking, must be defined or explained in terms of experience, if they are to have meaning; and all opinions or theories must be testable in experience, if they are to deserve the name of “true.” Peirce, James, and the other pragmatists differed, however, in their interpretation of the term “experience.” In the scope of this term James tended to include private experiences—feelings, volitions, emotions; whereas Peirce wished to restrict the term to experience in the scientific sense of what is publicly examinable. Both Peirce and James considered the natural sciences as embodying in practice the pragmatic plea for concreteness in thinking. But whereas Peirce was satisfied that science alone was the model for such thinking, James was not, and here entered all of his other grievances against the claims that were made, as well as the claims that he thought were made, for science in his day.

Especially did James revolt against the contention (illustrated by Karl Pearson in a previous selection) that what scientific method cannot investigate is not investigable, or that it is irrational to believe in what is outside the realm of critical inquiry. His conviction was that beliefs close to the heart of men had a warrant and deserved a credence to which the scientific attitude could not do justice. The existence in men of a “will to believe,” for example in the existence of a God, is in itself, he felt, a kind of evidence that justifies a right to believe; and where scientific thought can pronounce neither one way nor the other, it is not irrational to believe in the hoped-for alternative. Thus where a Huxley would have considered “agnosticism” the rational policy, James considered belief not only inevitable but closer to “practical rationality.” Other prag-

matists and positivists took the position that the entire question of the existence of a supernatural being beyond all possible human experience is not a genuine problem and should be ruled out by pragmatism as meaningless logically, no matter how significant it may be felt to be emotionally. As James understood pragmatism, however, religious and emotional experience is equally "experience," and the test of the meaning of concepts like "God" is whether the concept has "meaning for me." Since the work of Peirce and James, an immense share of philosophic activity has been devoted to the exploration of such concepts as "experience," "meaning," "truth," and "belief."

The selection which follows is from "Reflex Action and Theism," originally delivered as a lecture in 1881. Like the essay "The Will to Believe," it is contained in the volume *The Will to Believe* (New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1897).



THE WILL TO BELIEVE

REFLEX ACTION AND THEISM

IN A GENERAL WAY, all educated people know what reflex action means.

It means that the acts we perform are always the result of outward discharges from the nervous centres, and that these outward discharges are themselves the result of impressions from the external world, carried in along one or another of our sensory nerves. Applied at first to only a portion of our acts, this conception has ended by being generalized more and more, so that now most physiologists tell us that every action whatever, even the most deliberately weighed and calculated, does, so far as its organic conditions go, follow the reflex type. There is not one which cannot be remotely, if not immediately, traced to an origin in some incoming impression of sense. There is no impression of sense which, unless inhibited by some other stronger one, does not immediately or remotely express itself in action of some kind. . . .

The willing department of our nature, in short, dominates both the conceiving department and the feeling department; or, in plainer English, perception and thinking are only there for behavior's sake.

I am sure I am not wrong in stating this result as one of the fundamental conclusions to which the entire drift of modern physiological investigation sweeps us. If asked what great contribution physiology has made to psychology of late years, I am sure every competent authority will reply that her influence has in no way been so weighty as in the copious illustration, verification, and consolidation of this broad, general point of view.

I invite you, then, to consider what may be the possible speculative consequences involved in this great achievement of our generation. Already, it dominates all the new work done in psychology; but what I wish to ask is whether its influence may not extend far beyond the limits of psychology, even into those of theology herself. The relations of the doctrine of reflex action with no less a matter than the doctrine of theism is, in fact, the topic to which I now invite your attention.

We are not the first in the field. There have not been wanting writers enough to say that reflex action and all that follows from it give the *coup de grace* to the superstition of a God. . . .

Into this debate about his existence, I will not pretend to enter. I must take up humbler ground, and limit my ambition to showing that a God, whether existent or not, is at all events the kind of being which, if he did exist, would form *the most adequate possible object* for minds framed like our own to conceive as lying at the root of the universe. My thesis, in other words, is this: that *some* outward reality of a nature defined as God's nature must be defined, is the only ultimate object that is at the same time rational and possible for the human mind's contemplation. *Anything short of God is not rational, anything more than God is not possible*, if the human mind be in truth the triadic structure of impression, reflection, and reaction which we at the outset allowed.

Theism, whatever its objective warrant, would thus be seen to have a subjective anchorage in its congruity with our nature as thinkers; and, however it may fare with its truth, to derive from this subjective adequacy the strongest possible guaranty of its permanence. It is and will be the classic mean of rational opinion, the centre of gravity of all attempts to solve the riddle of life,—some falling below it by defect, some flying above it by excess, itself alone satisfying every mental need in strictly normal measure. Our gain will thus in the first instance be psychological. We shall merely have investigated a chapter in the natural history of the mind, and found that, as a matter of such natural history, God may be called the normal object of the mind's belief. Whether over and above this he be really the living truth is another question. If he is, it will show the structure of our mind to be in accordance with the nature of reality. . . .

What kind of a being would God be if he did exist? The word "God" has come to mean many things in the history of human thought, from Venus and Jupiter to the "Idee" which figures in the pages of Hegel. Even the laws of physical nature have, in these positivistic times, been held worthy of divine honor and presented as the only fitting object of our reverence. Of course, if our discussion is to bear any fruit, we must mean something more

definite than this. We must not call any object of our loyalty a "God" without more ado, simply because to awaken our loyalty happens to be one of God's functions. He must have some intrinsic characteristics of his own besides; and theism must mean the faith of that man who believes that the object of *his* loyalty has those other attributes, negative or positive, as the case may be. . . .

First, it is essential that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, he must be conceived under the form of a mental personality. The personality need not be determined intrinsically any further than is involved in the holding of certain things dear, and in the recognition of our dispositions toward those things, the things themselves being all good and righteous things. But, extrinsically considered, so to speak, God's personality is to be regarded, like any other personality, as something lying outside of my own and other than me, and whose existence I simply come upon and find. A power not ourselves, then, which not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and which recognizes us,—such is the definition which I think nobody will be inclined to dispute. Various are the attempts to shadow forth the other lineaments of so supreme a personality to our human imagination; various the ways of conceiving in what mode the recognition, the hearkening to our cry, can come. Some are gross and idolatrous; some are the most sustained efforts man's intellect has ever made to keep still living on that subtle edge of things where speech and thought expire. But, with all these differences, the essence remains unchanged. . . .

. . . Just as within the limits of theism some kinds are surviving others by reason of their greater practical rationality, so theism itself, by reason of its practical rationality, is certain to survive all lower creeds. Materialism and agnosticism, even were they true, could never gain universal and popular acceptance; for they both, alike, give a solution of things which is irrational to the practical third of our nature, and in which we can never volitionally feel at home. Each comes out of the second or theoretic stage of mental functioning, with its definition of the essential nature of things, its formula of formulas prepared. The whole array of active forces of our nature stands waiting, impatient for the word which shall tell them how to discharge themselves most deeply and worthily upon life. "Well!" cry they, "what shall we do?" "Ignoramus, ignorabimus!" says agnosticism. "React upon atoms and their concussions!" says materialism. What a collapse! The mental train misses fire, the middle fails to ignite the end, the cycle breaks down half-way to its conclusion; and the active powers left alone, with no proper object on which to vent their energy, must either atrophy, sicken, and die, or else by their pent-up convulsions and excitement keep the whole machinery in a fever

until some less incommensurable solution, some more practically rational formula, shall provide a normal issue for the currents of the soul.

Now, theism always stands ready with the most practically rational solution it is possible to conceive. Not an energy of our active nature to which it does not authoritatively appeal, not an emotion of which it does not normally and naturally release the springs. At a single stroke, it changes the dead blank *it* of the world into a living *thou*, with whom the whole man may have dealings. To you, at any rate, I need waste no words in trying to prove its supreme commensurateness with all the demands that department Number Three of the mind has the power to impose on department Number Two.

Our volitional nature must then, until the end of time, exert a constant pressure upon the other departments of the mind to induce them to function to theistic conclusions. No contrary formulas can be more than provisionally held. Infra-theistic theories must be always in unstable equilibrium; for department Number Three ever lurks in ambush, ready to assert its rights; and on the slightest show of justification it makes its fatal spring, and converts them into the other form in which alone mental peace and order can permanently reign.

The question is, then, *Can* departments One and Two, *can* the facts of nature and the theoretic elaboration of them, always lead to theistic conclusions? . . .

Here let me say one word about a remark we often hear coming from the anti-theistic wing: It is base, it is vile, it is the lowest depth of immorality, to allow department Number Three to interpose its demands, and have any vote in the question of what is true and what is false; the mind must be a passive, reactionless sheet of white paper, on which reality will simply come and register its own philosophic definition, as the pen registers the curve on the sheet of a chronograph. "Of all the cants that are canted in this canting age" this has always seemed to me the most wretched, especially when it comes from professed psychologists. As if the mind could, consistently with its definition, be a reactionless sheet at all! As if conception could possibly occur except for a teleological purpose, except to show us the way from a state of things our senses cognize to another state of things our will desires! As if "science" itself were anything else than such an end of desire, and a most peculiar one at that! And as if the "truths" of bare physics in particular, which these sticklers for intellectual purity contend to be the only uncontaminated form, were not as great an alteration and falsification of the simply "given" order of the world, into an order conceived solely for the mind's convenience and delight, as any theistic doctrine possibly can be!

Physics is but one chapter in the great jugglery which our conceiving faculty

is forever playing with the order of being as it presents itself to our reception. It transforms the unutterable dead level and continuum of the "given" world into an utterly unlike world of sharp differences and hierarchic subordinations for no other reason than to satisfy certain subjective passions we possess.

And, so far as we can see, the given world is there only for the sake of the operation. At any rate, to operate upon it is our only chance of approaching it; for never can we get a glimpse of it in the unimaginable insipidity of its virgin estate. To bid the man's subjective interests be passive till truth express itself from out the environment, is to bid the sculptor's chisel be passive till the statue express itself from out the stone. Operate we must! and the only choice left us is that between operating to poor or to rich results. The only possible duty there can be in the matter is the duty of getting the richest results that the material given will allow. The richness lies, of course, in the energy of all three departments of the mental cycle. Not a sensible "fact" of department One must be left in the cold, not a faculty of department Three be paralyzed; and department Two must form an indestructible bridge. It is natural that the habitual neglect of department One by theologians should arouse indignation; but it is most unnatural that the indignation should take the form of a wholesale denunciation of department Three. It is the story of Kant's dove over again, denouncing the pressure of the air. Certain of our positivists keep chiming to us, that, amid the wreck of every other god and idol, one divinity still stands upright,—that his name is Scientific Truth, and that he has but one commandment, but that one supreme, saying, *Thou shalt not be a theist*, for that would be to satisfy thy subjective propensities, and the satisfaction of those is intellectual damnation. These most conscientious gentlemen think they have jumped off their own feet,—emancipated their mental operations from the control of their subjective propensities at large and *in toto*. But they are deluded. They have simply chosen from among the entire set of propensities at their command those that were certain to construct, out of the materials given, the leanest, lowest, aridest result,—namely, the bare molecular world,—and they have sacrificed all the rest.

Man's chief difference from the brutes lies in the exuberant excess of his subjective propensities,—his pre-eminence over them simply and solely in the number and in the fantastic and unnecessary character of his wants, physical, moral, aesthetic, and intellectual. Had his whole life not been a quest for the superfluous, he would never have established himself as inexpugnably as he has done in the necessary. And from the consciousness of this he should draw the lesson that his wants are to be trusted; that even when their gratification seems farthest off, the uneasiness they occasion is still the best guide of his life, and will lead him to issues entirely beyond his present powers of reck-

oning. Prune down his extravagance, sober him, and you undo him. The appetite for immediate consistency at any cost, or what the logicians call the "law of parsimony,"—which is nothing but the passion for conceiving the universe in the most labor-saving way,—will, if made the exclusive law of the mind, end by blighting the development of the intellect itself quite as much as that of the feelings or the will. The scientific conception of the world as an army of molecules gratifies this appetite after its fashion most exquisitely. But if the religion of exclusive scientificism should ever succeed in suffocating all other appetites out of a nation's mind, and imbuing a whole race with the persuasion that simplicity and consistency demand a *tabula rasa*¹ to be made of every notion that does not form part of the *soi-disant*² scientific synthesis, that nation, that race, will just as surely go to ruin, and fall a prey to their more richly constituted neighbors, as the beasts of the field, as a whole, have fallen a prey to man. . . .

If any one fear that in insisting so strongly that behavior is the aim and end of every sound philosophy I have curtailed the dignity and scope of the speculative function in us, I can only reply that in this ascertainment of the *character* of Being lies an almost infinite speculative task. Let the voluminous considerations by which all modern thought converges toward idealistic or pan-psychic conclusions speak for me. Let the pages of a Hodgson, of a Lotze, of a Renouvier, reply whether within the limits drawn by purely empirical theism the speculative faculty finds not, and shall not always find, enough to do. But do it little or much, its *place* in a philosophy is always the same, and is set by the structural form of the mind. Philosophies, whether expressed in sonnets or systems, all must wear this form. The thinker starts from some experience of the practical world, and asks its meaning. He launches himself upon the speculative sea, and makes a voyage long or short. He ascends into the empyrean, and communes with the eternal essences. But whatever his achievements and discoveries be while gone, the utmost result they can issue in is some new practical maxim or resolve, or the denial of some old one, with which inevitably he is sooner or later washed ashore on the *terra firma* of concrete life again.

¹ [*Blank sheet*; that is, the notion is to be rejected.]

² [*So-called.*]

THE NEW PHYSICS

THE THEORY of relativity illustrates in an impressive way how consideration of experimental results may combine with reflections on the logical foundations of a science to produce a new physical theory. Certainly, both of these factors must be noted if the reasons for the adoption of relativity theory are to be understood.

By the close of the nineteenth century, the earlier hope, as expressed by Helmholtz, of explaining all natural phenomena in terms of the science of mechanics was abandoned by nearly all physicists. For it was generally admitted that if the facts of electromagnetism were to be incorporated into a coherent system of explanation, a set of ideas was required that was not supplied by classical mechanics. Classical mechanics is an example of what is often called "particle physics." According to the Newtonian assumptions, the behavior of a physical system can be explained by analyzing it into a set of particles, any two of which exert a force upon each other that is independent of the force between other particles and that acts instantaneously "at a distance" (for example, as gravitational forces are assumed to do). But such a mode of analysis was not found successful for electromagnetic phenomena. For the forces between electrically charged particles depend not only upon the distances between the particles but also upon their state of motion; and in order to describe these forces the notion of an electromagnetic field had to be introduced. According to this "field theory," the reaction of one particle in the field to the presence of others is construed as an electromagnetic impulse traveling with the speed of light; the behavior of the field is thus not analyzable into a series of *instantaneous* transactions between a discrete number of particles. In any event, James Clerk-Maxwell showed that with the help of the notion of an electromagnetic field, the findings of Coulomb, Ampère, and Faraday can be brought into a coherent scheme of explanation.

The field theory of Maxwell eventually took its place beside the particle theory of Newton as a well-established way of understanding a large domain of fact. The two theories were regarded as supplementary rather than as incompatible, and indeed serious attempts were made to exhibit mechanics as simply a special case of the theory of electromagnetism (thus subverting the traditional eminence of mechanics). Moreover, and quite independent of such attempts, at crucial points the two theories employed analogous if not identical assumptions: in the Newtonian theory an "absolute space" was postulated as the unique locus of all physical motions, while in the Maxwell theory an all-encompassing "luminiferous ether" was assumed as the medium in which electromagnetic waves are propagated in interstellar spaces. In fact, many physicists identified the absolute space of Newtonian mechanics with the pervasive ether of Maxwell's electrodynamics.

Two important conclusions were soon drawn from these assumptions. In the first place, the velocity of light relative to an observer moving *toward* a source

of light fixed in absolute space (for example, one of the "fixed stars") must be different from that relative to an observer moving *away* from the same source. And in the second place, the velocity of the earth relative to the ether (or absolute space) must be capable of determination, if the velocity of light from a specified stellar source is measured when the earth is moving in opposite directions to the source of light (for example, when the earth is at diametrically opposed positions in its orbit around the sun). However, the famous Michelson-Morley experiments devised for the purpose of confirming these conclusions yielded only negative results: the velocity of light appeared to be the same, whether the earth was moving toward or away from a fixed light source. Accordingly, the velocity of the earth itself (relative to the ether or absolute space) could be detected neither by purely mechanical experiments (which result is a well-known corollary of Newtonian principles) nor by electromagnetic ones.

Such, briefly, are some of the experimental facts which led to the development of relativity theory. But there were also logical or methodological reasons as well. In the first place, many physicists were acutely uncomfortable with the assumption of an absolute space or ether having the curious property that the velocity of a body relative to it could not possibly be detected by experimental means. For such an assumption appeared to be flatly incompatible with the requirement of every experimental science that its theories are warranted only if they are confirmed by experiment. The question was therefore raised (for instance, by Ernst Mach) whether the assumption of an absolute space is physically meaningful and whether theories of physics could not be constructed on less debatable assumptions.

But perhaps an even more basic issue had to be faced. An important feature of the fundamental laws of Newtonian mechanics is that they retain their validity when applied to a given phenomenon by two observers, each of whom is moving with a constant velocity relative to absolute space (and therefore relative to one another). Suppose, for example, that the motion of a planet is being studied by two physicists who are moving with different though uniform velocities relative to absolute space—that is, in more technical language, that the planet is referred to two distinct "frames of reference" moving with different constant velocities relative to absolute space. Then in spite of the fact that their frames of reference are in relative motion to one another, the two physicists will be able to formulate and predict the planetary motions equally well with the help of the Newtonian laws of motion. This and similar facts can be summarized by saying that the Newtonian laws retain their form (or are "invariant") for all frames of reference moving with uniform velocities relative to absolute space (and therefore to each other). And more generally, classical physics was constructed on the assumption that no formula expresses a law of nature unless it possesses this trait of invariance. But this essential postulate of scientific procedure was seriously jeopardized by the Michelson-Morley experiments, for they showed that the Newtonian theory and the Maxwell theory could not *both* satisfy the requirement of invariance under uniform relative velocity.

Einstein's Special Theory of relativity was devised in order to meet these difficulties. He carefully analyzed the conditions under which spatial and temporal measurements can be meaningfully made, and showed that by a suitable modifi-

cation of Newtonian assumptions a theory of mechanics as well as of electrodynamics can be formulated such that both fulfill the postulate of invariance. The Special Theory is thus concerned exclusively with physical systems whose relative velocities to each other and to absolute space are uniform. It has proved itself to be a remarkably fruitful system of ideas: it has led to important innovations in traditional conceptions of matter and energy, and has been experimentally confirmed in a large number of different domains.

However, many physicists (including Einstein) believed that invariance merely under uniform relative velocity is not a fully satisfactory criterion for a law of nature. Why should nature be especially concerned with systems in uniform relative velocities? Why should such a class of bodies provide privileged reference frames for formulating natural laws? Why not require, therefore, that the laws of physics be stated in a perfectly general way, so that their form remains invariant under any kind of relative motion—whether the relative motion be that of uniform or variable velocity, without reference to any privileged locus of motion such as absolute space? It was such considerations that led to the development of the General Theory of relativity. This more inclusive theory, which subsumes the Special Theory as a limiting case, requires the use of a system of geometry very different from that of Euclid, dispenses with the assumption of an absolute space, makes the notion of a physical field integral to mechanics, and entails many consequences for physical cosmology. However, though the available experimental evidence is in agreement with the General Theory of relativity, it has not been confirmed as fully as has the Special Theory. Nonetheless, the General Theory has introduced an impressive unity and coherence into contemporary conceptions of macroscopic phenomena.

It should be noted, finally, that the theory of relativity (whether Special or General) must not be confused with the age-old sceptical outlook, according to which objective knowledge is not attainable since allegedly "everything is relative." The theory of relativity is a *physical* theory, not a theory about the nature of knowledge, and rests upon quite different assumptions. For according to it, certain abstract features of physical interactions can be formulated precisely and with generality, so that the formulation remains valid no matter under what specialized conditions those interactions are investigated.

Although relativity theory involves many basic alterations in traditional physical conceptions, it represents what is at bottom only a consistent extension of ideas employed in classical physics. On the other hand, while quantum theory also exhibits fundamental continuities with preceding modes of analyzing physical phenomena, it displays features which are revolutionary innovations as well. But quantum theory did not spring into existence fully matured as did relativity theory; it has gone through a development in which three stages may be distinguished.

Modern quantum theory was born in 1900 when Max Planck introduced the fundamental idea that energy, like matter, is atomic, and always appears in quantities which are multiples of a basic unit (the quantum). This assumption was employed by Planck to account for certain hitherto unexplained facts of thermal radiation. The scope of application of the assumption was thus extremely modest at first, and was not intimately related to the main body of investigations

into radiation phenomena. A few years later, however, Einstein showed that the same assumption could explain certain striking effects (called the "photoelectric effect") that are produced when metal surfaces are illuminated by light beams of varying wave-length intensities—effects which were inexplicable in terms of classical electrodynamics. Physicists thus became gradually convinced that instead of being simply an extraneous if not transitory addition to radiation theory, Planck's assumption was destined to become an integral part of it—though no one at that time could have envisaged how radically the quantum idea would transform extant conceptions of the microscopic constitution of matter.

The quantum theory entered into its second stage of development when in 1913 Niels Bohr formulated a general theory of atomic structure, based consistently on Planck's assumption but incompatible with some of the fundamental ideas of classical electrodynamics. Bohr constructed his theory with the facts of spectroscopic analysis in mind. That analysis revealed that the discrete series of lines which appear in the spectra of the chemical elements follow one another in a numerically specifiable order. To account for this fact, Bohr adopted the conception of the internal structure of the atom developed by Rutherford, according to which an atom is a miniature solar system, electrons being the "planets" moving on elliptical orbits around the nucleus of the atom. However, in marked contrast both to the behavior of actual solar systems and to Rutherford's model of the atom, on Bohr's theory only some of the infinitely many *geometrically possible* orbits were *physically possible* paths for the electrons: only those orbits were taken to be physically possible whose distances from the nucleus satisfied certain conditions. Moreover, in contradiction to classical electrodynamics, Bohr supposed that as long as an electron remains in one of the possible orbits, it radiates no energy. On the other hand, an electron either emits or absorbs energy when it "jumps" from one orbit to another; and the quantity of energy emitted or absorbed is a multiple of the fundamental quantum of energy, and depends on the distances between the orbits.

The Bohr theory was highly successful in accounting for the major features of atomic spectra, and received further confirmation from the study of X-rays, the photoelectric effect, the thermal behavior of solids, and many other domains. Nevertheless, fatal difficulties soon began to accumulate. As experiments were progressively refined, it failed to explain certain characteristics of atomic spectra, and it also entailed predictions in disagreement with observation. Moreover, even when it could account for certain phenomena, its originally well-integrated assumptions had to be frequently supplemented by others which were not systematically related to the main ideas of the theory, so that it eventually became a set of loosely connected rather than unified principles.

The need for a more adequate and better integrated theory of radiation was met in 1926 by the new "quantum mechanics." This new theory was developed independently by Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schrödinger along distinct though equivalent mathematical lines. It marked the beginning of the third stage of evolution of quantum theory. The new quantum mechanics uses a highly abstract mathematical formalism, generally not familiar to nonprofessional students, and cannot be interpreted in terms of any customary visualizable models

of atomic structure. A partial reason for this is that quantum mechanics has been devised to bring into a coherent system experimental facts which suggest radiation to be both wave-like and particle-like—so that a consistent visual model of atomic structure would have to represent electrons as both waves and particles. Moreover, an important consequence of quantum mechanics is the so-called “Heisenberg Indeterminacy Principle” (or “Uncertainty Principle”). According to one version of this principle, it is not possible to specify for an electron a precise position and a simultaneously precise velocity—so that the behavior of electrons does not appear to be capable of formulation in strictly causal or deterministic laws such as classical physics employs. Evidently, therefore, electrons are not “individual things” in the usual sense of this characterization, and any attempt to supply a visual model of atomic structure consonant with quantum mechanics must inevitably be accompanied by paradox. However, a pictorial representation of quantum mechanics is strictly irrelevant to what it asserts, and though the ideas it contains may appear puzzling when such a representation is attempted for them, the technical sense and uses of the theory are entirely intelligible. In any case, quantum mechanics has been extraordinarily successful in systematizing and predicting vast ranges of natural phenomena, including many of those studied in biophysics, chemistry, and astrophysics, as well as atomic physics.

The following discussion of relativity and quantum theory is taken from Herbert Dingle's *Science and Human Experience* (London, Williams and Norgate, 1931). The author is Professor of Natural Philosophy at the Imperial College of Science and Technology, London.



HERBERT DINGLE: SCIENCE AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER IV: THE EXTREMITY OF ABSTRACTION—THE THEORY OF RELATIVITY

AT THE BEGINNING of the twentieth century . . . we find physics with a vast accumulation of data—of common experiences—many of which had been satisfactorily correlated with one another through the medium of the great abstractions (such as the laws of motion, gravitation, electro-magnetism and thermodynamics) and the great atomic and electronic hypothesis. Each of these instruments of correlation had been developed with magnificent success and seemed capable of meeting almost all requirements; only a very few experiences remained obstinately intractable. These experiences, however, have proved able profoundly to modify the whole double-sided scheme of physics. The Newtonian abstractions have had to yield to those of relativity, and the

atomic hypothesis has been transformed by the advent of the quantum theory. We will consider the nature of these modifications in turn.

I do not propose to give a formal account of the theory of relativity. That would be unnecessary for those already acquainted with it, and those who are not are doubtless sufficiently familiar with the phrases in which it is usually explained to make a repetition of them superfluous. Moreover, the details of the theory are not needed for our purpose: all that we are concerned with is the change of outlook which has led to its adoption.

. . . Newton's laws of motion are intelligible only if accelerated motion can be definitely distinguished from rest or uniform motion. Newton provided for this by postulating an absolute space and an absolute time in terms of which any type of motion could be unambiguously described. By "absolute" is meant complete homogeneousness and independence of all physical bodies or events. The Newtonian absolute space and time were like the Aristotelian heavens—ingenerable, incorruptible, unalterable, and unpassible, wholly indifferent to the events of Nature. What happened to-day would happen to-morrow; what happened here would happen there—provided the matter and forces of Nature were the same. Since a falling body moved farther in one second than in the previous second, a force must be acting on it; there could be no difference in the motion arising from the mere difference of time. Similarly, since bodies moved differently at the Earth's surface and at the distance of the Moon, the force of gravitation must be different in the two places; there could be no difference in the motions arising from the mere difference of place. With such conceptions the velocity of a body would be uniquely measured by the amount of absolute space passed over in a unit of absolute time.

Now it did not matter greatly, from Newton's point of view, whether the absolute velocity of any body could be definitely stated: all that was necessary was that such velocity was definitely conceivable. Motions are always of necessity measured with respect to some chosen standard of rest. If that standard of rest should happen to be at rest in absolute space, then the measured motions would be the absolute ones. If the standard was moving uniformly in absolute space, then all the measured motions would be liable to correction by the same quantity, and the motions of the bodies among themselves would be unaltered. If, finally, the chosen standard of rest were moving non-uniformly in absolute space, then all the measured motions would still be similarly liable to correction and the motions of the bodies among themselves would still be unaltered, but the whole system of bodies would be subject to a force, undetectable so long as the motion of the standard of rest was unknown. In practice, therefore, it did not matter whether the absolute motion of any body was

known or not. But what did matter was that the motion of one body with respect to another should be precisely assignable.

In Newton's absolute space and time this requirement was met. If two bodies moved with *absolute* velocities, U and V , in the same direction, then the velocity of one with respect to the other would be $U - V$. It followed that if two bodies moved with velocities U and V *relative to a third body*, the velocity of one with respect to the other would still be $U - V$. Hence all relative velocities were measurable, and therefore all relative accelerations and forces were detectable. The correlation of all observed motions could therefore be brought about without knowing the absolute motion of any body in the universe. The only essential purpose served by absolute space and time was that of giving a formula for the composition of observed motions. Space and time themselves were as ideal as the division of motion into a uniform and an accelerated part.

This definition of relative velocities was consistent with all experience obtained up to Newton's time, so there was no objection to adopting it. The theory of relativity became necessary when it transpired that for very high speeds it ceased to be applicable. If two bodies move with measured speeds U and V relative to a third body, and one of these velocities is comparable with the velocity of light, the measured velocity of one body relative to the other is not $U - V$, but a more complicated expression. This is simply a deduction from experiment. Hence the fundamental requirement of Newton's philosophy—namely, that knowledge shall begin and end in experiment—requires us to abandon the assumption of absolute space and time. We must take account of the fact that the measured space and time intervals between events—and therefore also the measured velocities of bodies—are different for observers in relative motion, and in the absence of an absolute space and time there is no means of deciding which observer's measurements are right. Velocity and acceleration have therefore no absolute meaning, force has no absolute meaning, and the whole Newtonian scheme breaks down because it is incapable of correlating our *common* experiences. It is satisfactory so long as it is applied by a set of observers relatively at rest, but the forces which such observers deduce will not correlate the experiences of others who are moving with respect to them.

We can, however, again find common ground if we unite space and time into a single whole, regarding time as a fourth dimension of space. This again is found by experiment and observation, and experiment and observation also determine the way in which space and time must be united in order to form an abstract medium which shall take the place of their individual selves and which shall be such that the course of Nature in it shall be observable con-

sistently by everyone. The achievement of Einstein is to describe the natural behaviour of bodies in space-time, and he has done so without requiring an artificial division of motion into a uniform and an accelerated part and without the assumption of any forces. His space-time is not homogeneous—it varies from one point to another—and the motion of bodies is such as to satisfy a very simple law. The laws of motion and gravitation thus become united; motions are described simply as they are, and in place of the three abstractions, space, time, and force, we have one, namely, space-time.

It might not be superfluous to linger for a moment on the distinction between absolute and relative space and time, in order to remove a common illusion. It is widely imagined that absolute space and time are facts of observation, and that the space-time of relativity is something hidden in Nature, the discovery of which affords one more example that things are not what they seem. The truth is, however, that absolute space and time, like space-time, are simply abstractions from observation. They are none of them “facts,” but space-time is preferable to absolute space and time separately because it allows the correlation of a range of facts with which the independent conceptions are powerless to deal. The abstract character of absolute space and time is easily recognisable apart from relativity altogether. Consider time, for example. When we say that two intervals of time—say, two successive days—are equal, we are making a completely arbitrary statement which we have no conceivable way of testing. The basis of our time-system is the *postulate* that the Earth rotates uniformly on its axis. There is no meaning in asking whether it *really* does so unless we adopt some more fundamental standard of time-reckoning which must be equally arbitrary. Hence there can be nothing absolute about any time system that we can in practice adopt. The assumption of the Newtonian philosophy is simply that, although it is unattainable, there is an absolute stream of time to which our practical time system approximates very closely. The principle of relativity, on the other hand, says that since absolute time is unattainable it is meaningless to suppose that there is such a thing. Both theories agree that absolute time is inaccessible to actual measurement and therefore is in no sense a fact of observation. The relativity view is preferred, as we have said, simply because it allows a rational correlation of observations which, on the Newtonian view, would be contradictory.

Thus we reach the greatest achievement of the method of abstraction that Science has yet seen. Not only gravitation, but the forces of electro-magnetism also can be dispensed with and the facts which called them into being described in terms of the properties of space-time. The law of conservation of energy also becomes a part of the scheme, and mass is identifiable with energy, so that the whole of the correlations which at the end of the nineteenth

century had been brought about by the method of abstraction, with the single exception of the second law of thermodynamics, are merged into one whole.

This wholly inadequate summary can, of course, give no clear impression of relativity considered as a physical theory, but it may serve to make possible an answer to the question: In what way have our ideas of the nature and scope of physical Science been modified by the principle of relativity? Considered in the very broadest way, the answer is: Not at all. Einstein has simply extended the sway of Newtonian principles over a region of phenomena which Newton never knew. He has started from the facts of observation and submitted his ideas to the test of further observations, by which they have been supported. He has used the Newtonian method of abstracting certain conceptions from the observations, and describing the observations themselves mathematically in terms of those conceptions. By the method of pure abstraction, therefore, he has correlated a much larger body of our common experience than was possible by the Newtonian mechanics, and has augmented our experiences also by those acquired in testing the validity of his scheme. In the broad sense, therefore, so far from having displaced Newton, Einstein has established Newton's principles over a much wider field than they covered before. There is nothing *ultimately* revolutionary in his work. It is just as much, and just as little, metaphysical as was Newton's; it is related to experience in just the same way as was Newton's. The only difference is that it is more comprehensive.

In becoming so, however, it has had to assume a completely new appearance. It uses abstractions of the same kind as Newton's, but they are entirely different abstractions. They are fewer and simpler, although, naturally, less familiar. Yet it is perhaps not impossible that they are more closely allied than we imagine to what our instincts might have told us of Nature if we had not inherited the Newtonian tradition. Newton took the trouble to explain time, space, place, and motion because, as he says, "the vulgar conceive those quantities under no other notions but from the relation they bear to sensible objects"—which is precisely the relativity conception of them. To Aristotle, again, space was not an infinite void, but "the boundary of the enclosing body on the side of the enclosed." Further, Einstein's abolition of the division of motion into a uniform and an accelerated part is essentially a rehabilitation of the Aristotelian maxim that "of one simple body, one sole simple motion can be natural," which Simplicius, in Galileo's *Dialogues*, urged against Copernicus. The all-important difference, however, between Einstein and Aristotle is that Aristotle was laying down an arbitrary principle, whereas Einstein is describing observations.

The net result of Einstein's great theory, then, is that we can now regard

the whole mechanical and electro-magnetic phenomena of Nature as a manifestation of the characteristics of one abstract medium—space-time, or ether, or whatever else we care to call it. The Newtonian conceptions of space, time, mass, gravitation, momentum, as well as energy and electric and magnetic forces, all take their places as specified peculiarities of this medium. To Newton, space and time were the stage on which the drama of forces and motions was played. To Einstein, the drama is merged into the stage; the play is the scenery. Abstraction can hardly go further. It has made the diverse phenomena of Nature into a universe, but at the expense of all individuality. The world is united, but featureless. Other methods must be employed if a more intimate knowledge of the relations between phenomena is to be obtained, and the method pre-eminently suitable for the purpose is that of hypothesis. We turn, therefore, to the second great development of this century, that of the atomic hypothesis, which is embodied in the quantum theory.

CHAPTER V: THE EXTREMITY OF HYPOTHESIS—THE QUANTUM THEORY

The details of the quantum theory, like those of relativity, are remote from our purpose; again we want only the essential character of the new development. We left the atom, it will be remembered, closely veiled from observation, but nevertheless somewhat arbitrarily accredited with Newtonian mass and extension and made the sport of Newtonian forces: a “billiard ball” was the orthodox symbol. At the very end of the nineteenth century, however, the utility of the atom for billiards was found to be quite illusory. In spite of its name it was broken to fragments, and the necessity arose of assigning to the parts the additional concept of electric charge. This was not a concept formed by Newton, but it had the authentic Newtonian character, and its bestowal on the parts of the atom permitted the correlation of a wider field of experience than that amenable to the billiard ball. A definite step forward had been taken by the use of Newtonian principles, albeit they were applied to hypotheses, which Newton abhorred.

The successor of the billiard ball eventually took the form of the solar system—an atom with a central Sun of positive electricity (an agglomeration of positive *protons* and negative *electrons*) surrounded by revolving planets which were simply electrons. Physicists were fond of billiards, however, and instead of giving up the conception of a billiard ball altogether they tacitly transferred it from the whole atom to the constituent protons and electrons. Furnished, therefore, with an atom whose *parts* could be manipulated, and having the additional conception of electric charges as centres of electric force to play with, they were very favourably situated for the incorporation of previously refractory experiences into the atomic scheme. In their rashness

they attempted to incorporate the phenomena of the emission and absorption of light, and the fat was in the fire.

The old billiard-ball conception had contrived to reach a venerable age through its humility: it made no attempt to deal with phenomena beyond its powers, and its absolute quiescence in face of them gave no indication at all of what kind of substitute would be likely to succeed where it was impotent. It did its humble work well, and so was retained in office. But the solar-system conception, young and eager, rushed in where the billiard ball feared to roll, and in so doing brought about its own destruction. It is here that we come to the significant part of the modern quantum theory.

The solar-system model of the atom showed a *prima facie* capacity for emitting and absorbing light (or, more generally, radiation) because its parts were electro-magnetic in character and radiation had already been interpreted as electro-magnetic wave motion. But a serious difficulty arose. A process of emission of radiation could be conceived readily enough, but by the established laws of electro-magnetism it inevitably required the almost immediate destruction of the atom by the mutual cancellation of its protons and electrons. A dilemma was therefore created. Either the solar-system model of the atom, to which the development of the atomic hypothesis had apparently inevitably led, or the laws of electro-magnetism, abstracted from phenomena, had to be left out of consideration if the atomic hypothesis was to be extended to include the interaction of matter with radiation. And physicists in general were willing to abandon neither.

Let us pause for a moment to look at the situation. We can see it clearly enough now, and the position does not appear nearly so desperate as it did at the time. As we have already said, atoms could be endowed with any properties so long as their consequent behaviour in bulk agreed with observation; they were under no obligation to accept characteristics which belonged to phenomena, and therefore there was no compulsion at all to subject them to the laws of electro-magnetism. Why, then, did physicists regard their insubordination to those laws with such concern?

It was simply that they did not realise the possibilities of hypotheses. The atoms, being hypothetical units, were in their hands to mould to the dictates of their imaginations, and they did not know their own freedom. They thought of atoms, not merely as hypotheses but as potential phenomena and therefore necessarily subject to the laws already established for phenomena by the method of abstraction. The process began, as we have seen, when atoms were first introduced into physics. At that time they were supplied instinctively with mass and the other Newtonian abstracted qualities, and the implication that they were potential phenomena took such hold of succeeding physicists

that by the twentieth century its arbitrariness needed a genius to perceive it. Fortunately, the genius, in the person of Niels Bohr, was at hand. Bohr retained the solar-system model of the atom, but absolved it from obedience to the laws of electro-magnetism.

This step of Bohr's was the most significant in physical science since the introduction of the hypothesis of atoms. What virtually it did was to establish the fact that the hypothetical atoms were pure conceptions, that they belonged essentially to a different category from the facts of observation. They were creatures of the imagination, to be formed into the image of our fancies and restricted by whatever laws we cared to prescribe, provided only that when they behaved in accordance with those laws they should produce phenomena. They were removed from the realm of experience and deposited in that of reason. This is the essence of the famous "quantum theory," though it is not the aspect under which it was first revealed and from which it derives its name.

Developments have succeeded one another with almost alarming rapidity, but from our point of view nothing fundamentally new has happened. The solar-system model, as we have hinted, has gone and a conception devoid of any pictorial aspect has taken its place, but that—if in so speaking we may disclaim any disrespect to the brilliant physicists who have organised the process—is but the ass's kick at the dead lion. Whatever formal doctrine physicists may profess, they exhibit in practice no more belief in the phenomenal reality of atoms than in the philosopher's stone. We might well leave the subject here, were it not that the more recent developments have been assigned a significance outside the realm of physics which it is important that we should consider. As briefly as possible, therefore, we will try to indicate what those developments are.

The electrons and protons, of which atoms are regarded as composed, are no longer thought of as billiard balls, although they retain some of the properties of those objects. Other properties which it is necessary to give them resemble those of waves, and if we wish to form mental pictures of them, we must unite in our minds the images of billiard balls and those of waves. But this is impossible—partly, for instance, because a billiard ball is sharply bounded and a wave is not. Hence we can form no such mental pictures. The natural meaning of this, in the light of our previous considerations, is that the conceptions of space and time (or space-time) abstracted from phenomena cannot be applied to them.

This is no great matter, however, provided that our conception of them is definite: if they cannot enter experience they may still remain rational. So far they have done so. We can represent them by symbols to which we can

ascribe mathematical properties, though not pictorial ones. By virtue of these mathematical properties their behaviour in various sets of circumstances can be worked out and a steadily growing volume of observations thereby correlated. At each absorption of a new fact into the scheme of correlation a modification in some degree of the conception of the atom may be required, and the whole course of development of the conception is determined by the necessity of correlating observations. Well might we feel, like Galileo, that we cannot find any bounds for our admiration how that reason is "able to commit such a rape upon the Sences as in despatch thereof to make herself mistress of our credulity."

The old atom was a "substance" and its behaviour a series of "actions": the new atom is a set of concepts and its behaviour can be indicated only by propositions or principles. One of these propositions, which has been introduced by Heisenberg as a fundamental one, is known as the "principle of indeterminacy" or "principle of uncertainty." I will use the latter term, as I want to speak of indeterminacy in a more general sense later. This principle gives something approaching a definite limit to the extent to which the ordinary concepts of "position" and "momentum" can be applied to ultimate particles such as the electron. An electron can be said quite definitely to have a position in space if we do not attempt to consider it as having momentum, and it can be said quite definitely to have a momentum, measured in the ordinary way in terms of mass, space, and time, if we do not attempt to consider it as having a position in space at any instant. If, however, we try to apply to it simultaneously the conceptions of momentum and instantaneous position in space, we are attempting the impossible; the electron is such that in relation to it the two concepts are mutually contradictory.

The principle of uncertainty states more than this, however. It states that if you try to force these concepts on the electron, you can do so if you are satisfied with a certain amount of vagueness. Thus, if, instead of stating the momentum with the absolute accuracy which is permissible when position is not considered, you are content to say that the momentum lies between certain limits, then the concept of position, pleased at the concession, condescends also to become applicable within certain limits; and the greater the degree of indefiniteness you are willing to allow in the specification of the momentum, the greater will be the precision with which the position can be specified. You can, therefore, state both the position and the momentum of an electron if you say only that each of them lies between certain limits; and, further, the product of the ranges of uncertainty of the two concepts is equal to or greater than a definite quantity—known as "Planck's constant," and represented by h .

It will repay us to spend a little time considering this principle, for it is not only an excellent illustration of the methods of modern physical thought, but also a result which is likely to direct the course of theoretical physics in the immediate future. It has been arrived at, of course, by its power of co-ordinating observations, but it claims its status of fundamentality by the application of the principle, familiar to students of relativity, that anything which is apparently of an observable character but yet is consistently concealed from us by Nature, must not be employed in any capacity for the purposes of physics. Such things are often called "unobservables," but because of certain qualifications which I will state immediately, I will refer to them as "inaccessibles." The qualifications are these: In the first place, the concealment must not be merely the result of a practical difficulty; it must be due to a kind of conspiracy between natural phenomena. Thus, the interior of the earth cannot be observed, but we need not on that account leave it out of consideration in discussing the propagation of earthquake shocks. Secondly, the concealment must be not only from direct observation, but also from deduction. An electron cannot be directly observed, but we employ it in physics. Its mass, for example, is deducible from certain experiments, although the electron cannot be directly weighed, and we therefore retain the conception of the mass of an electron. The absolute velocity of a body, on the other hand, although it appears perfectly susceptible of measurement, always eludes us because of a working together of natural laws to that end. Every experiment made to determine it has failed, not because of imperfect apparatus but because the effect looked for has always been automatically and exactly compensated for by an equal and opposite one. This is interpreted as an indication that such compensation is inevitable, that it arises from the nature of things, and so we dismiss absolute velocity from the scheme of physics and substitute the principle of relativity.

Now when we try to imagine an experiment which will give us simultaneously the momentum and position of an electron, we find we cannot do so. To take a partial example for simplicity: you can conceivably observe an electron only when it sends you light, and to send you light it must of necessity move. You can, therefore, observe its position only at the expense of a change of momentum, and therefore the initial momentum is inaccessible. If the electron does not move you cannot see it; if it does move it has lost the momentum you set out to observe. Hence the inaccessibility of the momentum arises not from practical difficulties but from the nature of observation itself. It is, therefore, regarded as an indication that the simultaneous specification of position and momentum of an electron is an illusory ideal: we must rule out of physics everything that presupposes it to have a meaning.

In so doing we must be ruthless. It is not sufficient to say that the electron *has* a simultaneous position and momentum but that we cannot find them out. We must say there is *no meaning* in the concepts when applied to electrons. The principle of uncertainty does not limit the accuracy of our measurements; it helps to define an electron. The "uncertainty" of our determination is not a human failing; it is a measure of some property of the electron which can properly be defined only in terms other than those appropriate to sensible matter. We approach a realm of pure conception with minds prepossessed by the abstractions of phenomenal physics. The straightforward course would be to clear our minds entirely of those preconceptions before entering the city gates, but that is a counsel of perfection. As human beings, the most that can be expected of us is that we shall be ready to shed them at the first indication that they are illegal and to substitute whatever conceptions the laws of the realm prescribe. The principle of uncertainty is a warning that the space and time abstractions are prohibited; it does not yet appear what should take their place.

Let us pause here a moment and try to realise what this means in terms of ordinary thought. If the reader is trying to picture in his mind what kind of thing that can be which does not occupy space or persist in time, he should at once stop; he is on the wrong track. That is something which no one can do; Heisenberg himself cannot do it. If the reader concludes from this that he cannot understand the trend of modern physics and may as well give up the attempt, he is again on the wrong track, because the trend of modern physics is not at all in the direction of forming mental pictures. If this is clearly recognised and kept in mind, I do not think the general course of the new developments presents any insuperable difficulty to the ordinary non-mathematical thinker.

Let us look at the matter in this way. Suppose a man, fully intelligent but with no knowledge of ordinary life at all, is suddenly placed on the Earth and set to make a study of clouds. He sees that a cloud is massive, opaque, white or grey in colour, has movement, changes shape, and so on. He is told, however, that certain small spots on the ground are connected with the cloud, and he is asked to find the connection. He ultimately arrives at the conception that the cloud is not continuous, as it appears to be, but is composed of myriads of small spherical droplets of clear transparent liquid. He has never experienced such things, and so cannot imagine what they are like, but he can assign to them properties—such as weight, volatility, reflecting and refracting powers with respect to light, and so on—which are quite at variance with his experience of the cloud, but which, nevertheless, when applied simultaneously to the members of an innumerable crowd of droplets, result in just the char-

acteristics observed in the cloud. His companions cannot at first understand what he is doing. They try to imagine these droplets, but they can do so no better than he can: their experience is of an opaque something floating in the air, and he speaks of transparent bodies falling to the ground. But if they cease to plague their imaginations and, regarding the unfamiliar words simply as symbols, calculate the behaviour of the multitude of droplets, they will find that, for example, opacity comes out in the end although each particle was assumed to be transparent. Substitute time and space for opacity and the unknown characteristics of atoms for transparency, and you have an analogy of the present position in physics. The ordinary person has no need to bother about the mathematical details, but I see no great difficulty in his understanding that unimaginable concepts, when properly defined and combined together according to definite rules, may result in collective properties corresponding to our ordinary experience.

It should be added that this, like all illustrations, is imperfect. Its chief defect is that, whereas the hypothesis of droplets could be verified by observing a shower of rain, electrons are inherently unobservable.

So far I have described the principle of uncertainty more or less in the customary way. I want to call attention now to one or two points in which the ordinary statements of the principle seem to me to be open to criticism. The rule of excluding inaccessibles from physics is often spoken of as if it were a fundamental philosophical principle: I think it is really only a rule of convenience. It supposes a kind of omniscience in us, by which the physical world is necessarily composed only of that which, with our present knowledge and means of observation, we can conceivably detect. If, however, an objector should say that there might be more things in Nature than are dreamed of in our philosophy, we can only reply that until we dream of them we shall assume, and act on the assumption, that they do not exist. This is perfectly justifiable so long as we realise that the objector also might be right.

The essentially pragmatic character of the rule is seen in a particularly interesting way in the principle of uncertainty. We speak of observing an electron. But an electron is in any case merely a concept, and the idea of observing a concept, being itself symbolical, can impart nothing but a still more subtle symbolism to a grave discussion of the mechanism of observation. For an electron is congenitally not a possible object of observation; it is a part of an ideal scheme of concepts which are designed to correlate observations of material bodies. What we really mean by saying that we cannot observe its position when its momentum is given is that the assumption that it is a picturable object, having a definite position, introduces confusion into the scheme of correlation.

The symbolical character of the principle is particularly heavily obscured in the statement, which is sometimes made, that you disturb an electron by looking at it. Even apart from the already mentioned symbolism of the expression, "looking at an electron," the statement is misleading, for it is not even this symbolic process that disturbs the electron, but the physical conditions which make the process possible. It is not *looking* at an electron that disturbs it, but *illuminating* it, whether you then look at it or not. The act of observation is subjective, and the statement in question suggests a degree of interaction of subjective and objective processes which is not inherent in the principle of uncertainty at all. The electron would still be moved out of its position in the atom in the act of emitting light, whether that light entered a person's eye or not; observation in the strict sense has nothing to do with the matter.

It might perhaps be suggested that, since this is so, the principle of uncertainty expresses merely a property of light, and that if in the course of time the human race develops a means of observation through another agency, the principle will cease to be true. If the electron were actually a proper object of observation, existing by its own right in an external world, I think this suggestion would be valid. We should still be justified in adopting the principle for convenience in the present state of physics, but we should have to give up the idea that it expresses anything fundamental about electrons. But actually the electron has been called into existence to correlate the observations that we have been able to make with our present faculties. The forms which it assumes and the laws under which it acts are shaped by the necessity of unifying those observations and no others. If we acquired a new sense, making possible experiences of a new type in addition to those we already possess, no doubt the properties assigned to electrons would be profoundly modified, and as likely as not the conception of an electron would have to be abandoned altogether. The electron is essentially a creature of the world as we know it, and therefore any statement we are led to make about electrons is not subject to adaptation to the conditions of a world we do not know.

Let us try to crystallise the salient points of this very intricate matter into a few sentences. The hypothetical atoms and their parts, which were at first instinctively subjected to the abstractions derived from the study of observed bodies, were liberated by Bohr and made recognisable as concepts capable of assuming any form and willing to serve under the sway of any principles which might be found necessary to enable them to correlate observations. Accordingly they have been released from the duty of presenting a spatio-temporal aspect, and in fundamental researches no attempt is made to conceive them in a pictorial form. The laws which shall govern them have not been

laid down, but some hint of the nature of those laws is given by the principle of uncertainty. This principle connects in a specified way the degrees of inapplicability to electrons of the concepts of momentum and position in space. It has been given fundamental importance by the principle that any notion which the nature of things as we know them does not allow us to arrive at by observation or deduction from observation, shall be removed from consideration in physics. As it relates to electrons, this principle simply says, in other words, that the assumption that electrons have simultaneously a definite position and momentum leads to contradictions in the scheme of concepts by which observations are correlated.

It will be seen from this that, as we have already remarked, the significant step, from the point of view of the nature of Science, was the liberation of the atomic hypothesis¹ from the abstractions of phenomena. The subsequent developments, though of profound physical importance, introduce no new element. We must now regard the whole atomic scheme as purely conceptual, and take care that we are not again enslaved by the idea that its elements are potentially observable. There are some who believe that the present non-picturable atom is only a temporary element of thought, and that the time will come when we shall again visualise an atomic model. It may be so, but the point is unimportant. The significant thing is that we are free to make the atom whatever we like for the purpose of correlating observations. If we can make it in the image of a machine, well and good; if not, well and good also. The form the atom assumes is a matter of detail; the liberty to conceive of it as we please is what matters.

Before we proceed to discuss the general significance of these new advances in physics we might profitably take a final comprehensive glance at the relativity and quantum theories in order to sum up the character of their so-called "unintelligibility." Relativity is an abstraction, and the quantum theory is a hypothesis. The apparent absurdity of relativity is entirely a matter of limited experience, and that of the quantum theory is entirely a matter of limited thought. Relativity teaches us that if we were to travel about the universe at high speed we would discover, on returning to the Earth, that a longer time had elapsed than our perfectly accurate clocks would indicate. We find that difficult to believe, but that is only because we have never travelled in such a way; if we could do so we should find the predicted result, and after a few repetitions we should cease to think it strange. We can say that with confidence because we have obtained the equivalent experience in

¹ I use "atomic hypothesis" as a general term for the whole of the modern "microscopic" physical theory. Strictly speaking, of course, the theory includes protons and electrons individually, as well as when they are associated into atoms, but the details of the scheme are so interdependent that they are best regarded as a whole, under a single name.

physical experiments, although the moving bodies involved are not human beings. But the fantastic character of the quantum theory is quite different. No possible extension of experience can make us familiar with an electron which does not occupy time and space,² for the electron is not something imaginable, but a pure thought-structure. It is therefore useless, and even positively harmful, to try to picture it. A more vivid imagination would help us to resolve the paradoxes of relativity, but it would simply hinder us in trying to resolve those of the quantum theory: what we need there is greater power of logical thought. Relativity teaches us about phenomena because the notions it deals with are abstracted from our experience of phenomena; it surprises us because it reveals possibilities of experience which we never contemplated. The quantum theory surprises us because it reveals *impossibilities* of experience which we never contemplated; we thought we were justified in extending to atoms the abstractions discussed in relativity, and we find that we were not. The combined effect of the two theories therefore, is to give us truer notions of the limitations of experience. It still remains for us to explore the possibilities of thought.

² Or space-time. It must be clearly understood that the supersession of space and time in atomic physics is totally distinct from their supersession in relativity. In relativity space and time are still employed as partial and variable aspects of the one absolute abstraction, space-time, which alone permits of the correlation of observations of persons in relative motion. But in atomic physics neither space and time separately nor space-time has any significance. The appropriate substitutes are not yet known.

SIGMUND FREUD

SIGMUND FREUD (1856-1939) has inspired and contributed to the growth of the science of man in three fields: the healing of psychoneurotic personality disorders, the investigation of the relations between culture and personality, and the coördination of information about psychological and bodily functions known as psychosomatic medicine. Trained as a physician, Freud studied hysteria under Charcot in Paris at the first clinic established for the treatment of mental disorders. He taught neuropathology at the university in Vienna, collaborated with Breuer in an epoch-making study of hysteria, and put into practice his own new science of psychoanalysis.

In the period 1880-1900 Freud was initially interested in the causes and removal of hysterical symptoms. He discovered that, by letting a patient recall and freely associate events in his early childhood, a shocking or traumatic event was finally discovered in the patient's environment, recognition of which removed the symptom. During this period Freud began his study of dreams and slips of speech as manifestations of the material and function of unconscious memory. In the period 1900-12 he changed his orientation from a stress on environment, in which an objective traumatic event was to be discovered as the cause of all psychoneurotic symptoms, to a biological basis. He now considered the cause of all symptoms to be the maldevelopment and frustration of satisfaction of the sex instinct. In the biological growth of the individual from earliest infancy he distinguished stages of normal development as to different areas of sensory pleasure, which he considered sexual, and objects through which pleasure was sought. Psychoneurotic symptoms were thought to be due to the failure to attain instinctual satisfaction according to this pattern of normal development. It was in the period 1912-26 that Freud expanded his first instinct theory and, at the same time, passed from the analysis of symptoms alone to the broader analysis of character. Largely due to his studies of war neuroses among soldiers of the first World War, he introduced the concept of a death instinct, which often becomes entangled with the life instinct. He also delineated three factors or functions of the personality: the id, made up of impulses which are unconscious or have been repressed from consciousness; the superego, made up of conscious and unconscious values which condemn and restrict the impulses of the id, and which arise from customs and taboos used in a culture largely for group survival; and the ego, which struggles to reconcile the demands of the id and the superego. Civilization, he thought, requires renunciation or sublimation of instinctual drives. He delineated basic types of character adjustment, each with its special set of motives and attitudes towards the world and itself.

Beginning in 1911 a number of Freud's best pupils and followers gradually differed from their master, largely on the basis of the latter's interpretation of instinct and his view that there is an irremediable conflict between individual instincts and culture. Alfred Adler, studying the struggles of personality in compensating for physical inferiority, considered that the primal drive is the

need for security and is expressed as will to power. Later Carl Jung broadened Freud's concept of sex into psychic energy, which need not be expressed anti-socially or self-destructively, and he presented a new set of basic types of character. Since 1926 O. Rank, W. Reich, S. Ferenczi, H. S. Sullivan, K. Horney and others have differed significantly from Freud as to the nature and function of the psychoanalytic interview. Their work represents a tendency away from Freud's biological determinism and towards an integration of psychoanalytic insights with environmental factors which vary according to cultural developments. As a result a number of specialists, such as K. Horney and E. Fromm, have presented altered concepts of character conflicts and general types.

Two enterprises, inspired by Freud more than any other single individual, are now becoming important in their own right and for what their future union may bring about in the integration of all the sciences of man. On the one hand, there has been an increasing rapprochement between psychoanalytic investigation of personality structure and the sciences of cultural anthropology and sociology, in an effort to understand the relation of subjective events and patterns of character to objective events and patterns in the culture. On the other hand, there has been the growth of psychosomatic medicine, which attempts to correlate character structure or personality type with the nature of physical symptoms. Scientists are looking forward to integration of information from these two major areas and the growth of what may be called "cultural medicine," a unified science of the health of man, his body, mind, emotions and culture.

Freud's persistent emphasis upon unconscious motivation of thought and action, and the significance of dream symbols in interpreting unconscious wishes, has not only influenced the interpretation of cultural phenomena such as religion, but has had an important effect upon literature and the visual arts. He has given us reason to hope for the time when, as Claude Bernard said in the middle of the nineteenth century, "the physiologist, the philosopher, and the poet would talk the same language, and understand each other"—and cooperate in the solution of common human problems.

The following selection is from five lectures given here by Freud in 1909 at Clark University. Originally in German, and translated by Harry W. Chase, they were published the following year in the *American Journal of Psychology*, and were soon translated into Dutch, Hungarian, Polish, and Russian.



THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

GRANTED that it is a merit to have created psychoanalysis it is not my merit. I was a student, busy with the passing of my last examinations, when another physician of Vienna, Dr. Joseph Breuer, made the first application of this method to the case of an hysterical girl (1880-82). We must now examine the

history of this case and its treatment, which can be found in detail in *Studien über Hysterie* [*Studies of Hysteria*] later published by Dr. Breuer and myself. . . .

Dr. Breuer's patient was a girl of twenty-one, of a high degree of intelligence. She had developed in the course of her two years' illness a series of physical and mental disturbances which well deserved to be taken seriously. She had a severe paralysis of both right extremities, with anaesthesia, and at times the same affection of the members of the left side of the body; disturbance of eye-movements, and much impairment of vision; difficulty in maintaining the position of the head, an intense *Tussis nervosa*,¹ nausea when she attempted to take nourishment, and at one time for several weeks a loss of the power to drink, in spite of tormenting thirst. Her power of speech was also diminished, and this progressed so far that she could neither speak nor understand her mother tongue; and, finally, she was subject to states of "absence," of confusion, delirium, alteration of her whole personality. These states will later claim our attention. . . .

The illness first appeared while the patient was caring for her father, whom she tenderly loved, during the severe illness which led to his death, a task which she was compelled to abandon because she herself fell ill. . . .

The physician, who through his studies has learned so much that is hidden from the laity, can realize in his thought the causes and alterations of the brain disorders in patients suffering from apoplexy or dementia, a representation which must be right up to a certain point, for by it he is enabled to understand the nature of each symptom. But before the details of hysterical symptoms, all his knowledge, his anatomical-physiological and pathological education, desert him. He cannot understand hysteria. He is in the same position before it as the layman. And that is not agreeable to any one, who is in the habit of setting such a high valuation upon his knowledge. Hystericals, accordingly, tend to lose his sympathy; he considers them persons who overstep the laws of his science, as the orthodox regard heretics; he ascribes to them all possible evils, blames them for exaggeration and intentional deceit, "simulation," and he punishes them by withdrawing his interest.

Now Dr. Breuer did not deserve this reproach in this case; he gave his patient sympathy and interest, although at first he did not understand how to help her. Probably this was easier for him on account of those superior qualities of the patient's mind and character, to which he bears witness in his account of the case.

His sympathetic observation soon found the means which made the first help possible. It had been noticed that the patient, in her states of "absence," of psychic alteration, usually mumbled over several words to herself. These

¹ [*Nervous cough.*]

seemed to spring from associations with which her thoughts were busy. The doctor, who was able to get these words, put her in a sort of hypnosis and repeated them to her over and over, in order to bring up any associations that they might have. The patient yielded to his suggestion and reproduced for him those psychic creations which controlled her thoughts during her "absences," and which betrayed themselves in these single spoken words. These were fancies, deeply sad, often poetically beautiful, day dreams, we might call them, which commonly took as their starting point the situation of a girl beside the sick-bed of her father. Whenever she had related a number of such fancies, she was, as it were, freed and restored to her normal mental life. This state of health would last for several hours, and then give place on the next day to a new "absence," which was removed in the same way by relating the newly created fancies. It was impossible not to get the impression that the psychic alteration which was expressed in the "absence" was a consequence of the excitations originating from these intensely emotional fancy-images. The patient herself, who at this time of her illness strangely enough understood and spoke only English, gave this new kind of treatment the name "talking cure," or jokingly designated it as "chimney sweeping."

The doctor soon hit upon the fact that through such cleansing of the soul more could be accomplished than a temporary removal of the constantly recurring mental "clouds." Symptoms of the disease would disappear when in hypnosis the patient could be made to remember the situation and the associative connections under which they first appeared, provided free vent was given to the emotions which they aroused. "There was in the summer a time of intense heat, and the patient had suffered very much from thirst; for, without any apparent reason, she had suddenly become unable to drink. She would take a glass of water in her hand, but as soon as it touched her lips she would push it away as though suffering from hydrophobia. Obviously for these few seconds she was in her absent state. She ate only fruit, melons and the like, in order to relieve this tormenting thirst. When this had been going on about six weeks, she was talking one day in hypnosis about her English governess, whom she disliked, and finally told, with every sign of disgust, how she had come into the room of the governess, and how that lady's little dog, that she abhorred, had drunk out of a glass. Out of respect for the conventions the patient had remained silent. Now, after she had given energetic expression to her restrained anger, she asked for a drink, drank a large quantity of water without trouble, and woke from hypnosis with the glass at her lips. The symptom thereupon vanished permanently."

Permit me to dwell for a moment on this experience. No one had ever cured an hysterical symptom by such means before, or had come so near under-

standing its cause. This would be a pregnant discovery if the expectation could be confirmed that still other, perhaps the majority of symptoms, originated in this way and could be removed by the same method. Breuer spared no pains to convince himself of this and investigated the pathogenesis of the other more serious symptoms in a more orderly way. Such was indeed the case; almost all the symptoms originated in exactly this way, as remnants, as precipitates, if you like, of affectively toned experiences, which for that reason we later called "psychic traumata." The nature of the symptoms became clear through their relation to the scene which caused them. They were, to use the technical term, "determined" (*determiniert*) by the scene whose memory traces they embodied, and so could no longer be described as arbitrary or enigmatical functions of the neurosis.

Only one variation from what might be expected must be mentioned. It was not always a single experience which occasioned the symptom, but usually several, perhaps many similar, repeated traumata co-operated in this effect. It was necessary to repeat the whole series of pathogenic memories in chronological sequence, and of course in reverse order, the last first and the first last. It was quite impossible to reach the first and often most essential trauma directly, without first clearing away those coming later. . . .

All the pathogenic impressions sprang from the time when she shared in the care of her sick father. "Once she was watching at night in the greatest anxiety for the patient, who was in a high fever, and in suspense, for a surgeon was expected from Vienna, to operate on the patient. Her mother had gone out for a little while, and Anna sat by the sick-bed, her right arm hanging over the back of her chair. She fell into a reverie and saw a black snake emerge, as it were, from the wall and approach the sick man as though to bite him. (It is very probable that several snakes had actually been seen in the meadow behind the house, that she had already been frightened by them, and that these former experiences furnished the material for the hallucination.) She tried to drive off the creature, but was as though paralyzed. Her right arm, which was hanging over the back of the chair, had 'gone to sleep,' become anaesthetic and paretic, and as she was looking at it, the fingers changed into little snakes with deaths-heads. (The nails.) Probably she attempted to drive away the snake with her paralyzed right hand, and so the anaesthesia and paralysis of this member formed associations with the snake hallucination. When this had vanished, she tried in her anguish to speak, but could not. She could not express herself in any language, until finally she thought of the words of an English nursery song, and thereafter she could think and speak only in this language." When the memory of this scene was revived in

hypnosis the paralysis of the right arm, which had existed since the beginning of the illness, was cured and the treatment ended.

When, a number of years later, I began to use Breuer's researches and treatment on my own patients, my experiences completely coincided with his. In the case of a woman of about forty, there was a tic, a peculiar smacking noise which manifested itself whenever she was laboring under any excitement, without any obvious cause. It had its origin in two experiences which had this common element, that she attempted to make no noise, but that by a sort of counter-will this noise broke the stillness. On the first occasion, she had finally after much trouble put her sick child to sleep, and she tried to be very quiet so as not to awaken it. On the second occasion, during a ride with both her children in a thunderstorm the horses took fright, and she carefully avoided any noise for fear of frightening them still more. I give this example instead of many others which are cited in the *Studien über Hysterie*.

Ladies and gentlemen, if you will permit me to generalize, as is indispensable in so brief a presentation, we may express our results up to this point in the formula: *Our hysterical patients suffer from reminiscences*. Their symptoms are the remnants and the memory symbols of certain (traumatic) experiences. . . .

They cannot escape from the past and neglect present reality in its favor. This fixation of the mental life on the pathogenic traumata is an essential, and practically a most significant characteristic of the neurosis. I will willingly concede the objection which you are probably formulating, as you think over the history of Breuer's patient. All her traumata originated at the time when she was caring for her sick father, and her symptoms could only be regarded as memory symbols of his sickness and death. They corresponded to mourning, and a fixation on thoughts of the dead so short a time after death is certainly not pathological, but rather corresponds to normal emotional behavior. I concede this: there is nothing abnormal in the fixation of feeling on the trauma shown by Breuer's patient. But in other cases, like that of the tic that I have mentioned, the occasions for which lay ten and fifteen years back, the characteristic of this abnormal clinging to the past is very clear, and Breuer's patient would probably have developed it, if she had not come under the "cathartic treatment" such a short time after the traumatic experiences and the beginning of the disease.

We have so far only explained the relation of the hysterical symptoms to the life history of the patient; now by considering two further factors which Breuer observed, we may get a hint as to the processes of the beginning of the illness and those of the cure. With regard to the first, it is especially to be

noted that Breuer's patient in almost all pathogenic situations had to suppress a strong excitement, instead of giving vent to it by appropriate words and deeds. In the little experience with her governess' dog, she suppressed, through regard for the conventions, all manifestations of her very intense disgust. While she was seated by her father's sick-bed, she was careful to betray nothing of her anxiety and her painful depression to the patient. When, later, she reproduced the same scene before the physician, the emotion which she had suppressed on the occurrence of the scene burst out with especial strength, as though it had been pent up all along. The symptom which had been caused by that scene reached its greatest intensity while the doctor was striving to revive the memory of the scene, and vanished after it had been fully laid bare. On the other hand, experience shows that if the patient is reproducing the traumatic scene to the physician, the process has no curative effect if, by some peculiar chance, there is no development of emotion. It is apparently these emotional processes upon which the illness of the patient and the restoration to health are dependent. We feel justified in regarding "emotion" as a quantity which may become increased, derived and displaced. So we are forced to the conclusion that the patient fell ill because the emotion developed in the pathogenic situation was prevented from escaping normally, and that the essence of the sickness lies in the fact that these "imprisoned" (*eingeklemmt*) emotions undergo a series of abnormal changes. In part they are preserved as a lasting charge and as a source of constant disturbance in psychical life; in part they undergo a change into unusual bodily innervations and inhibitions, which present themselves as the physical symptoms of the case. We have coined the name "hysterical conversion" for the latter process. Part of our mental energy is, under normal conditions, conducted off by way of physical innervation and gives what we call "the expression of emotions." Hysterical conversion exaggerates this part of the course of a mental process which is emotionally colored; it corresponds to a far more intense emotional expression, which finds outlet by new paths. If a stream flows in two channels, an overflow of one will take place as soon as the current in the other meets with an obstacle.

You see that we are in a fair way to arrive at a purely psychological theory of hysteria, in which we assign the first rank to the affective processes. . . . Through the study of hypnotic phenomena, the conception, strange though it was at first, has become familiar, that in one and the same individual several mental groupings are possible, which may remain relatively independent of each other, "know nothing" of each other, and which may cause a splitting of consciousness along lines which they lay down. Cases of such a sort, known

as "double personality" ("*double conscience*"), occasionally appear spontaneously. If in such a division of personality consciousness remains constantly bound up with one of the two states, this is called the *conscious* mental state, and the other the *unconscious*. In the well-known phenomena of so-called post hypnotic suggestion, in which a command given in hypnosis is later executed in the normal state as though by an imperative suggestion, we have an excellent basis for understanding how the unconscious state can influence the conscious, although the latter is ignorant of the existence of the former. In the same way it is quite possible to explain the facts in hysterical cases. . . .

. . . At about the same time that Breuer was using the "talking-cure" with his patient, M. Charcot began in Paris, with the hystericals of the Salpêtrière, those researches which were to lead to a new understanding of the disease. . . . Charcot had artificially reproduced those traumatic paralyses in hypnosis.

The great French observer, whose student I was during the years 1885-86, had no natural bent for creating psychological theories. His student, P. Janet, was the first to attempt to penetrate more deeply into the psychic processes of hysteria, and we followed his example, when we made the mental splitting and the dissociation of personality the central points of our theory. . . .

It was inevitable that my views should diverge widely and radically, for my point of departure was not, like that of Janet, laboratory researches, but attempts at therapy. Above everything else, it was practical needs that urged me on. The cathartic treatment, as Breuer had made use of it, presupposed that the patient should be put in deep hypnosis, for only in hypnosis was available the knowledge of his pathogenic associations which were unknown to him in his normal state. Now hypnosis, as a fanciful, and so to speak, mystical, aid, I soon came to dislike; and when I discovered that, in spite of all my effort, I could not hypnotize by any means all of my patients, I resolved to give up hypnotism and to make the cathartic method independent of it.

Since I could not alter the psychic state of most of my patients at my wish, I directed my efforts to working with them in their normal state. This seems at first sight to be a particularly senseless and aimless undertaking. The problem was this: to find out something from the patient that the doctor did not know and the patient himself did not know. How could one hope to make such a method succeed? The memory of a very noteworthy and instructive proceeding came to my aid, which I had seen in Bernheim's clinic at Nancy. Bernheim showed us that persons put in a condition of hypnotic somnambulism, and subjected to all sorts of experiences, had only apparently lost the memory of those somnambulant experiences, and that their memory of them could be awakened even in the normal state. If he asked them about their

experiences during somnambulism, they said at first that they did not remember, but if he persisted, urged, assured them that they did know, then every time the forgotten memory came back.

Accordingly I did this with my patients. When I had reached in my procedure with them a point at which they declared that they knew nothing more, I would assure them that they did know, that they must just tell it out, and I would venture the assertion that the memory which would emerge at the moment that I laid my hand on the patient's forehead would be the right one. In this way I succeeded, without hypnosis, in learning from the patient all that was necessary for a construction of the connection between the forgotten pathogenic scenes and the symptoms which they had left behind. This was a troublesome and in its length an exhausting proceeding, and did not lend itself to a finished technique. But I did not give it up without drawing definite conclusions from the data which I had gained. I had substantiated the fact that the forgotten memories were not lost. They were in the possession of the patient, ready to emerge and form associations with his other mental content, but hindered from becoming conscious, and forced to remain in the unconscious by some sort of a force. The existence of this force could be assumed with certainty, for in attempting to drag up the unconscious memories into the consciousness of the patient, in opposition to this force, one got the sensation of his own personal effort striving to overcome it. One could get an idea of this force, which maintained the pathological situation, from the resistance of the patient.

It is on this idea of *resistance* that I based my theory of the psychic processes of hystericals. It had been found that in order to cure the patient it was necessary that this force should be overcome. Now with the mechanism of the cure as a starting point, quite a definite theory could be constructed. These same forces, which in the present situation as resistances opposed the emergence of the forgotten ideas into consciousness, must themselves have caused the forgetting, and repressed from consciousness the pathogenic experiences. I called this hypothetical process "repression" (*Verdrängung*), and considered that it was proved by the undeniable existence of resistance.

But now the question arose: what were those forces, and what were the conditions of this repression, in which we were now able to recognize the pathogenic mechanism of hysteria? A comparative study of the pathogenic situations, which the cathartic treatment has made possible, allows us to answer this question. In all those experiences, it had happened that a wish had been aroused, which was in sharp opposition to the other desires of the individual, and was not capable of being reconciled with the ethical, aesthetic and personal pretension of the patient's personality. There had been a short

conflict, and the end of this inner struggle was the repression of the idea which presented itself to consciousness as the bearer of this irreconcilable wish. This was, then, repressed from consciousness and forgotten. The incompatibility of the idea in question with the "ego" of the patient was the motive of the repression, the ethical and other pretensions of the individual were the repressing forces. The presence of the incompatible wish, or the duration of the conflict, had given rise to a high degree of mental pain; this pain was avoided by the repression. This latter process is evidently in such a case a device for the protection of the personality.

I will not multiply examples, but will give you the history of a single one of my cases, in which the conditions and the utility of the repression process stand out clearly enough. Of course for my purpose I must abridge the history of the case and omit many valuable theoretical considerations. It is that of a young girl, who was deeply attached to her father, who had died a short time before, and in whose care she had shared—a situation analogous to that of Breuer's patient. When her older sister married, the girl grew to feel a peculiar sympathy for her new brother-in-law, which easily passed with her for family tenderness. This sister soon fell ill and died, while the patient and her mother were away. The absent ones were hastily recalled, without being told fully of the painful situation. As the girl stood by the bedside of her dead sister, for one short moment there surged up in her mind an idea, which might be framed in these words: "Now he is free and can marry me." We may be sure that this idea, which betrayed to her consciousness her intense love for her brother-in-law, of which she had not been conscious, was the next moment consigned to repression by her revolted feelings. The girl fell ill with severe hysterical symptoms, and, when I came to treat the case, it appeared that she had entirely forgotten that scene at her sister's bedside and the unnatural, egoistic desire which had arisen in her. She remembered it during the treatment, reproduced the pathogenic moment with every sign of intense emotional excitement, and was cured by this treatment. . . .

. . . We come to the conclusion, from working with hysterical patients and other neurotics, that they have not fully succeeded in repressing the idea to which the incompatible wish is attached. They have, indeed, driven it out of consciousness and out of memory, and apparently saved themselves a great amount of psychic pain, *but in the unconscious the suppressed wish still exists*, only waiting for its chance to become active, and finally succeeds in sending into consciousness, instead of the repressed idea, a disguised and unrecognizable surrogate-creation (*Ersatzbildung*), to which the same painful sensations associate themselves that the patient thought he was rid of through his repression. This surrogate of the suppressed idea—the symptom—is secure

against further attacks from the defenses of the ego, and instead of a short conflict there originates now a permanent suffering. We can observe in the symptom, besides the tokens of its disguise, a remnant of traceable similarity with the originally repressed idea; the way in which the surrogate is built up can be discovered during the psychoanalytic treatment of the patient, and for his cure the symptom must be traced back over the same route to the repressed idea. If this repressed material is once more made part of the conscious mental functions—a process which supposes the overcoming of considerable resistance—the psychic conflict which then arises, the same which the patient wished to avoid, is made capable of a happier termination, under the guidance of the physician, than is offered by repression. There are several possible suitable decisions which can bring conflict and neurosis to a happy end; in particular cases the attempt may be made to combine several of these. Either the personality of the patient may be convinced that he has been wrong in rejecting the pathogenic wish, and he may be made to accept it either wholly or in part; or this wish may itself be directed to a higher goal which is free from objection, by what is called sublimation (*Sublimierung*); or the rejection may be recognized as rightly motivated, and the automatic and therefore insufficient mechanism of repression be reinforced by the higher, more characteristically human mental faculties: one succeeds in mastering his wishes by conscious thought. . . .

I told you how when I gave up using hypnosis I pressed my patients to tell me what came into their minds that had to do with the problem we were working on, I told them that they would remember what they had apparently forgotten, and that the thought which irrupted into consciousness (*Einfall*) would surely embody the memory for which we were seeking. I claimed that I substantiated the fact that the first idea of my patients brought the right clew and could be shown to be the forgotten continuation of the memory. Now this is not always so; I represented it as being so simple only for purposes of abbreviation. In fact, it would only happen the first time that the right forgotten material would emerge through simple pressure on my part. If the experience was continued, ideas emerged in every case which could not be the right ones, for they were not to the purpose, and the patients themselves rejected them as incorrect. Pressure was of no further service here, and one could only regret again having given up hypnosis. In this state of perplexity I clung to a prejudice which years later was proved by my friend C. G. Jung of the University of Zürich and his pupils to have a scientific justification. I must confess that it is often of great advantage to have prejudices. I put a high value on the strength of the determination of mental processes, and I could not believe that any idea which occurred to the patient,

which originated in a state of concentrated attention, could be quite arbitrary and out of all relation to the forgotten idea that we were seeking. That it was not identical with the latter, could be satisfactorily explained by the hypothetical psychological situation. In the patients whom I treated there were two opposing forces: on the one hand the conscious striving to drag up into consciousness the forgotten experience which was present in the unconscious; and on the other hand the resistance which we have seen, which set itself against the emergence of the suppressed idea or its associates into consciousness. In case this resistance was nonexistent or very slight, the forgotten material could become conscious without disguise (*Entstellung*). It was then a natural supposition that the disguise would be the more complete, the greater the resistance to the emergence of the idea. Thoughts which broke into the patient's consciousness instead of the ideas sought for, were accordingly made up just like symptoms; they were new, artificial, ephemeral surrogates for the repressed ideas, and differed from these just in proportion as they had been more completely disguised under the influence of the resistances. These surrogates must, however, show a certain similarity with the ideas which are the object of our search, by virtue of their nature as symptoms; and when the resistance is not too intensive it is possible from the nature of these irruptions to discover the hidden object of our search. This must be related to the repressed thought as a sort of allusion, as a statement of the same thing in *indirect* terms. . . .

Ladies and gentlemen, it is very useful to designate a group of ideas which belong together and have a common emotive tone, according to the custom of the Zürich school (Bleuler, Jung and others), as a "complex." So we can say that if we set out from the last memories of the patient to look for a repressed complex, that we have every prospect of discovering it, if only the patient will communicate to us a sufficient number of the ideas which come into his head. So we let the patient speak along any line that he desires, and cling to the hypothesis that nothing can occur to him except what has some indirect bearing on the complex that we are seeking. If this method of discovering the repressed complexes seems too circumstantial, I can at least assure you that it is the only available one. . . .

This method of work with whatever comes into the patient's head when he submits to psychoanalytic treatment, is not the only technical means at our disposal for the widening of consciousness. Two other methods of procedure serve the same purpose, the interpretation of his dreams and the evaluation of acts which he bungles or does without intending to (*Fehl- und Zufallshandlungen*).

I might say, esteemed hearers, that for a long time I hesitated whether in-

stead of this hurried survey of the whole field of psychoanalysis, I should not rather offer you a thorough consideration of the analysis of dreams; a purely subjective and apparently secondary motive decided me against this. It seemed rather an impropriety that in this country, so devoted to practical pursuits, I should pose as "interpreter of dreams," before you had a chance to discover what significance the old and despised art can claim.

Interpretation of dreams is in fact the *via regia*² to the interpretation of the unconscious, the surest ground of psychoanalysis and a field in which every worker must win his convictions and gain his education. If I were asked how one could become a psychoanalyst, I should answer, through the study of his own dreams. With great tact all opponents of the psychoanalytic theory have so far either evaded any criticism of the *Traumdeutung*³ or have attempted to pass over it with the most superficial objections. If, on the contrary, you will undertake the solution of the problems of dream life, the novelties which psychoanalysis present to your thoughts will no longer be difficulties.

You must remember that our nightly dream productions show the greatest outer similarity and inner relationship to the creations of the insane, but on the other hand are compatible with full health during waking life. It does not sound at all absurd to say that whoever regards these normal sense illusions, these delusions and alterations of character as matter for amazement instead of understanding, has not the least prospect of understanding the abnormal creations of diseased mental states in any other than the lay sense. You may with confidence place in this lay group all the psychiatrists of to-day. Follow me now on a brief excursion through the field of dream problems.

In our waking state we usually treat dreams with as little consideration as the patient treats the irruptive ideas which the psychoanalyst demands from him. It is evident that we reject them, for we forget them quickly and completely. The slight valuation which we place on them is based, with those dreams that are not confused and nonsensical, on the feeling that they are foreign to our personality, and, with other dreams, on their evident absurdity and senselessness. Our rejection derives support from the unrestrained shamelessness and the immoral longings which are obvious in many dreams. Antiquity, as we know, did not share this light valuation of dreams. The lower classes of our people today stick close to the value which they set on dreams; they, however, expect from them, as did the ancients, the revelation of the future. I confess that I see no need to adopt mystical hypotheses to fill out the gaps in our present knowledge, and so I have never been able to find anything that supported the hypothesis of the prophetic nature of dreams. Many other things, which are wonderful enough, can be said about them.

² [Royal road.]

³ [Interpretation of dreams.]

And first, not all dreams are so foreign to the character of the dreamer, are incomprehensible and confused. If you will undertake to consider the dreams of young children from the age of a year and a half on, you will find them quite simple and easy to interpret. The young child always dreams of the fulfillment of wishes which were aroused in him the day before and were not satisfied. You need no art of interpretation to discover this simple solution, you only need to inquire into the experiences of the child on the day before (the "dream day"). Now it would certainly be a most satisfactory solution of the dream-riddle, if the dreams of adults, too, were the same as those of children, fulfillments of wishes which had been aroused in them during the dream day. This is actually the fact; the difficulties which stand in the way of this solution can be removed step by step by a thorough analysis of the dream.

There is, first of all, the most weighty objection, that the dreams of adults generally have an incomprehensible content, which shows wish-fulfillment least of anything. The answer is this: these dreams have undergone a process of disguise, the psychic content which underlies them was originally meant for quite different verbal expression. You must differentiate between the *manifest dream-content*, which we remember in the morning only confusedly, and with difficulty clothe in words which seem arbitrary, and the *latent dream-thoughts*, whose presence in the unconscious we must assume. This distortion of the dream (*Traumentstellung*) is the same process which has been revealed to you in the investigations of the creations (*symptoms*) of hysterical subjects; it points to the fact that the same opposition of psychic forces has its share in the creation of dreams as in the creation of symptoms.

The manifest dream-content is the disguised surrogate for the unconscious dream thoughts, and this disguising is the work of the defensive forces of the ego, of the resistances. These prevent the repressed wishes from entering consciousness during the waking life, and even in the relaxation of sleep they are still strong enough to force them to hide themselves by a sort of masquerading. The dreamer, then, knows just as little the sense of his dream as the hysterical knows the relation and significance of his symptoms. That there are latent dream-thoughts and that between them and the manifest dream-content there exists the relation just described—of this you may convince yourselves by the analysis of dreams, a procedure the technique of which is exactly that of psychoanalysis. You must abstract entirely from the apparent connection of the elements in the manifest dream and seek for the irruptive ideas which arise through free association, according to the psychoanalytic laws, from each separate dream element. From this material the latent dream thoughts may be discovered, exactly as one divines the concealed

complexes of the patient from the fancies connected with his symptoms and memories. From the latent dream thoughts which you will find in this way, you will see at once how thoroughly justified one is in interpreting the dreams of adults by the same rubrics as those of children. What is now substituted for the manifest dream-content is the real sense of the dream, is always clearly comprehensible, associated with the impressions of the day before, and appears as the fulfilling of an unsatisfied wish. The manifest dream, which we remember after waking, may then be described as a *disguised* fulfillment of *repressed* wishes.

It is also possible by a sort of synthesis to get some insight into the process which has brought about the disguise of the unconscious dream thoughts as the manifest dream-content. We call this process "dream-work" (*Traumarbeit*). This deserves our fullest theoretical interest, since here as nowhere else we can study the unsuspected psychic processes which are existent in the unconscious, or, to express it more exactly, *between* two such separate systems as the conscious and the unconscious. Among these newly discovered psychic processes, two, condensation (*Verdichtung*) and displacement or transvaluation, change of psychic accent (*Verschiebung*), stand out most prominently. Dream work is a special case of the reaction of different mental groupings on each other, and as such is the consequence of psychic fission. In all essential points it seems identical with the work of disguise, which changes the repressed complex in the case of failing repression into symptoms.

You will furthermore discover by the analysis of dreams, most convincingly your own, the unsuspected importance of the rôle which impressions and experiences from early childhood exert on the development of men. In the dream life the child, as it were, continues his existence in the man, with a retention of all his traits and wishes, including those which he was obliged to allow to fall into disuse in his later years. With irresistible might it will be impressed on you by what processes of development, of repression, sublimation and reaction there arises out of the child, with its peculiar gifts and tendencies, the so-called normal man, the bearer and partly the victim of our painfully acquired civilization. I will also direct your attention to the fact that we have discovered from the analysis of dreams that the unconscious makes use of a sort of symbolism, especially in the presentation of sexual complexes. This symbolism in part varies with the individual, but in part is of a typical nature, and seems to be identical with the symbolism which we suppose to lie behind our myths and legends. It is not impossible that these latter creations of the people may find their explanation from the study of dreams. . . .

From what has been said you can easily understand how the interpretation

of dreams, if it is not made too difficult by the resistance of the patient, can lead to a knowledge of the patient's concealed and repressed wishes and the complexes which he is nourishing. I may now pass to that group of everyday mental phenomena whose study has become a technical help for psychoanalysis.

These are the bungling of acts (*Fehlhandlungen*) among normal men as well as among neurotics, to which no significance is ordinarily attached; the forgetting of things which one is supposed to know and at other times really does know (for example the temporary forgetting of proper names); mistakes in speaking (*Versprechen*), which occur so frequently; analogous mistakes in writing (*Verschreiben*) and in reading (*Verlesen*), the automatic execution of purposive acts in wrong situations (*Vergreifen*) and the loss or breaking of objects, etc. These are trifles, for which no one has ever sought a psychological determination, which have passed unchallenged as chance experiences, as consequences of absent-mindedness, inattention and similar conditions. Here, too, are included the acts and gestures executed without being noticed by the subject, to say nothing of the fact that he attaches no psychic importance to them; as playing and trifling with objects, humming melodies, handling one's person and clothing and the like.

These little things, the bungling of acts, like the symptomatic and chance acts (*Symptom- und Zufallshandlungen*) are not so entirely without meaning as is generally supposed by a sort of tacit agreement. They have a meaning, generally easy and sure to interpret from the situation in which they occur, and it can be demonstrated that they either express impulses and purposes which are repressed, hidden if possible from the consciousness of the individual, or that they spring from exactly the same sort of repressed wishes and complexes which we have learned to know already as the creators of symptoms and dreams.

It follows that they deserve the rank of symptoms, and their observation, like that of dreams, can lead to the discovery of the hidden complexes of the psychic life. With their help one will usually betray the most intimate of his secrets. If these occur so easily and commonly among people in health, with whom repression has on the whole succeeded fairly well, this is due to their insignificance and their inconspicuous nature. But they can lay claim to high theoretic value, for they prove the existence of repression and surrogate creations even under the conditions of health. You have already noticed that the psychoanalyst is distinguished by an especially strong belief in the determination of the psychic life. For him there is in the expressions of the psyche nothing trifling, nothing arbitrary and lawless, he expects everywhere a widespread motivation, where customarily such claims are not made; more than

that, he is even prepared to find a manifold motivation of these psychic expressions, while our supposedly inborn causal need is satisfied with a single psychic cause. . . .

At this point you will be asking what the technique which I have described has taught us of the nature of the pathogenic complexes and repressed wishes of neurotics.

One thing in particular: psychoanalytic investigations trace back the symptoms of disease with really surprising regularity to impressions from the sexual life, show us that the pathogenic wishes are of the nature of erotic impulse-components (*Triebkomponente*), and necessitate the assumption that to disturbances of the erotic sphere must be ascribed the greatest significance among the etiological factors of the disease. This holds of both sexes.

I know that this assertion will not willingly be credited. Even those investigators who gladly follow my psychological labors, are inclined to think that I overestimate the etiological share of the sexual moments. They ask me why other mental excitations should not lead to the phenomena of repression and surrogate-creation which I have described. I can give them this answer; that I do not know why they should not do this, I have no objection to their doing it, but experience shows that they do not possess such a significance, and that they merely support the effect of the sexual moments, without being able to supplant them. . . .

The conduct of the patients does not make it any easier to convince one's self of the correctness of the view which I have expressed. Instead of willingly giving us information concerning their sexual life, they try to conceal it by every means in their power. Men generally are not candid in sexual matters. They do not show their sexuality freely, but they wear a thick overcoat—a fabric of lies—to conceal it, as though it were bad weather in the world of sex. And they are not wrong; sun and wind are not favorable in our civilized society to any demonstration of sex life. In truth no one can freely disclose his erotic life to his neighbor. But when your patients see that in your treatment they may disregard the conventional restraints, they lay aside this veil of lies, and then only are you in a position to formulate a judgment on the question in dispute. . . .

Now to proceed with the communication of our results. It is true that in another series of cases psychoanalysis at first traces the symptoms back not to the sexual, but to banal traumatic experiences. But the distinction loses its significance through other circumstances. The work of analysis which is necessary for the thorough explanation and complete cure of a case of sickness does not stop in any case with the experience of the time of onset of the disease, but in every case it goes back to the adolescence and the early childhood of

the patient. Here only do we hit upon the impressions and circumstances which determine the later sickness. Only the childhood experiences can give the explanation for the sensitivity to later traumata and only when these memory traces, which almost always are forgotten, are discovered and made conscious, is the power developed to banish the symptoms. We arrive here at the same conclusion as in the investigation of dreams—that it is the incompatible, repressed wishes of childhood which lend their power to the creation of symptoms. Without these the reactions upon later traumata discharge normally. But we must consider these mighty wishes of childhood very generally as sexual in nature.

Now I can at any rate be sure of your astonishment. Is there an infantile sexuality? you will ask. Is childhood not rather that period of life which is distinguished by the lack of the sexual impulse? No, gentlemen, it is not at all true that the sexual impulse enters into the child at puberty, as the devils in the gospel entered into the swine. The child has his sexual impulses and activities from the beginning, he brings them with him into the world, and from these the so-called normal sexuality of adults emerges by a significant development through manifold stages. It is not very difficult to observe the expressions of this childish sexual activity; it needs rather a certain art to overlook them or to fail to interpret them. . . .

Lay aside your doubts and let us evaluate the infantile sexuality of the earliest years. The sexual impulse of the child manifests itself as a very complex one, it permits of an analysis into many components, which spring from different sources. It is entirely disconnected from the function of reproduction which it is later to serve. It permits the child to gain different sorts of pleasure sensations, which we include, by the analogues and connections which they show, under the term sexual pleasures. The great source of infantile sexual pleasure is the auto-excitation of certain particularly sensitive parts of the body; besides the genitals are included the rectum and the opening of the urinary canal, and also the skin and other sensory surfaces. Since in this first phase of child sexual life the satisfaction is found on the child's own body and has nothing to do with any other object, we call this phase after a word coined by Havelock Ellis, that of "auto-eroticism." The parts of the body significant in giving sexual pleasure we call "erogenous zones." . . .

. . . We see very early in the child the impulse-components of *sexual pleasure*, or, as we may say, of the *libido*, which presupposes a second person as its object. These impulses appear in opposed pairs, as active and passive. The most important representatives of this group are the pleasure in inflicting pain (sadism) with its passive opposite (masochism) and active and passive exhibition-pleasure (*Schaulust*). From the first of these later pairs splits off

the curiosity for knowledge, as from the latter the impulse toward artistic and theatrical representation. Other sexual manifestations of the child can already be regarded from the viewpoint of object-choice, in which the second person plays the prominent part. The significance of this was primarily based upon motives of the impulse of self-preservation. The difference between the sexes plays, however, in the child no very great rôle. One may attribute to every child, without wronging him, a bit of the homosexual disposition.

The sexual life of the child, rich, but dissociated, in which each single impulse goes about the business of arousing pleasure independently of every other, is later correlated and organized in two general directions, so that by the close of puberty the definite sexual character of the individual is practically finally determined. The single impulses subordinate themselves to the overlordship of the genital zone, so that the whole sexual life is taken over into the service of procreation, and their gratification is now significant only so far as they help to prepare and promote the true sexual act. On the other hand, object-choice prevails over auto-eroticism, so that now in the sexual life all components of the sexual impulse are satisfied in the loved person. But not all the original impulse-components are given a share in the final shaping of the sexual life. Even before the advent of puberty certain impulses have undergone the most energetic repression under the impulse of education, and mental forces like shame, disgust and morality are developed, which, like sentinels, keep the repressed wishes in subjection. When there comes, in puberty, the high tide of sexual desire it finds dams in this creation of reactions and resistances. These guide the outflow into these so-called normal channels, and make it impossible to revivify the impulses which have undergone repression. . . .

The primitive object-choice of the child, which is derived from his need of help, demands our further interest. It first attaches to all persons to whom he is accustomed, but soon these give way in favor of his parents. The relation of the child to his parents is, as both direct observation of the child and later analytic investigation of adults agree, not at all free from elements of sexual accessory-excitation (*Miterregung*). The child takes both parents, and especially one, as an object of his erotic wishes. Usually he follows in this the stimulus given by his parents, whose tenderness has very clearly the character of a sex manifestation, though inhibited so far as its goal is concerned. As a rule, the father prefers the daughter, the mother the son; the child reacts to this situation, since, as son, he wishes himself in the place of his father, as daughter, in the place of the mother. The feelings awakened in these relations between parents and children, and, as a resultant of them, those among the children in relation to each other, are not only positively

of a tender, but negatively of an inimical sort. The complex built up in this way is destined to quick repression, but it still exerts a great and lasting effect from the unconscious. We must express the opinion that this with its ramifications presents the *nuclear complex* of every neurosis, and so we are prepared to meet with it in a not less effectual way in the other fields of mental life. The myth of King Œdipus, who kills his father and wins his mother as a wife is only the slightly altered presentation of the infantile wish, rejected later by the opposing barriers of incest. Shakespeare's tale of Hamlet rests on the same basis of an incest complex though better concealed. At the time when the child is still ruled by the still unrepressed nuclear complex, there begins a very significant part of his mental activity which serves sexual interest. He begins to investigate the questions of where children come from and guesses more than adults imagine of the true relations by deduction from the signs which he sees. Usually his interest in this investigation is awakened by the threat to his welfare through the birth of another child in the family, in whom at first he sees only a rival. Under the influence of the partial impulses which are active in him he arrives at a number of "infantile sexual theories," as that the same male genitals belong to both sexes, that children are conceived by eating and born through the opening of the intestine, and that sexual intercourse is to be regarded as an inimical act, a sort of overpowering.

But just the unfinished nature of his sexual constitution and the gaps in his knowledge brought about by the hidden condition of the feminine sexual canal, cause the infant investigator to discontinue his work as a failure. The facts of this childish investigation itself as well as the infant sex theories created by it are of determinative significance in the building of the child's character, and in the content of his later neuroses.

It is unavoidable and quite normal that the child should make his parents the objects of his first object-choice. But his *libido* must not remain fixed on these first chosen objects, but must take them merely as a prototype and transfer from these to other persons in the time of definite object-choice. The breaking loose (*Ablösung*) of the child from his parents is thus a problem impossible to escape if the social virtue of the young individual is not to be impaired. During the time that the repressive activity is making its choice among the partial sexual impulses and later, when the influence of the parents, which in the most essential way has furnished the material for these repressions, is lessened, great problems fall to the work of education, which at present certainly does not always solve them in the most intelligent and economic way. . . .

With the discovery of infantile sexuality and the tracing back of the neurotic symptoms to erotic impulse-components we have arrived at several

unexpected formulae for expressing the nature and tendencies of neurotic diseases. We see that the individual falls ill when in consequence of outer hindrances or inner lack of adaptability the satisfaction of the erotic needs in the sphere of reality is denied. We see that he then flees to sickness, in order to find with its help a surrogate satisfaction for that denied him. We recognize that the symptoms of illness contain fractions of the sexual activity of the individual, or his whole sexual life, and we find in the turning away from reality the chief tendency and also the chief injury of the sickness. We may guess that the resistance of our patients against the cure is not a simple one, but is composed of many motives. Not only does the ego of the patient strive against the giving up of the repression by which it has changed itself from its original constitution into its present form, but also the sexual impulses may not renounce their surrogate satisfaction so long as it is not certain that they can be offered anything better in the sphere of reality.

The flight from the unsatisfying reality into what we call, on account of its biologically injurious nature, disease, but which is never without an individual gain in pleasure for the patient, takes place over the path of regression, the return to earlier phases of the sexual life, when satisfaction was not lacking. This regression is seemingly a twofold one, a *temporal*, in so far as the *libido* or erotic need falls back to a temporally earlier stage of development, and a *formal*, since the original and primitive psychic means of expression are applied to the expression of this need. Both sorts of regression focus in childhood and have their common point in the production of an infantile condition of sexual life.

The deeper you penetrate into the pathogenic of neurotic diseases, the more the connection of neuroses with other products of human mentality, even the most valuable, will be revealed to you. You will be reminded that we men, with the high claims of our civilization and under the pressure of our repressions, find reality generally quite unsatisfactory and so keep up a life of fancy in which we love to compensate for what is lacking in the sphere of reality by the production of wish-fulfillments. In these phantasies is often contained very much of the particular constitutional essence of personality and of its tendencies, repressed in real life. The energetic and successful man is he who succeeds by dint of labor in transforming his wish fancies into reality. Where this is not successful in consequence of the resistance of the outer world and the weakness of the individual, there begins the turning away from reality. The individual takes refuge in his satisfying world of fancy. Under certain favorable conditions it still remains possible for him to find another connecting link between these fancies and reality, instead of permanently becoming a stranger to it through the regression into the infantile.

If the individual who is displeased with reality is in possession of that *artistic talent* which is still a psychological riddle, he can transform his fancies into artistic creations. So he escapes the fate of a neurosis and wins back his connection with reality by this round-about way. Where this opposition to the real world exists, but this valuable talent fails or proves insufficient, it is unavoidable that the *libido*, following the origin of the fancies, succeeds by means of regression in revivifying the infantile wishes and so producing a neurosis. The neurosis takes, in our time, the place of the cloister, in which were accustomed to take refuge all those whom life had undeceived or who felt themselves too weak for life. Let me give at this point the main result at which we have arrived by the psychoanalytic investigation of neurotics, namely, that neuroses have no peculiar psychic content of their own, which is not also to be found in healthy states; or, as C. G. Jung has expressed it, neurotics fall ill of the same complexes with which we sound people struggle. It depends on quantitative relationships, on the relations of the forces wrestling with each other, whether the struggle leads to health, to a neurosis, or to compensatory overfunctioning (*Ueberleistung*). . . .

Now what is the fate of the wishes which have become free by psychoanalysis, by what means shall they be made harmless for the life of the individual? There are several ways. The general consequence is, that the wish is consumed during the work by the correct mental activity of those better tendencies which are opposed to it. The repression is supplanted by a condemnation carried through with the best means at one's disposal. This is possible, since for the most part we have to abolish only the effects of earlier developmental stages of the ego. The individual for his part only repressed the useless impulse, because at that time he was himself still incompletely organized and weak; in his present maturity and strength he can, perhaps, conquer without injury to himself that which is inimical to him. A second issue of the work of psychoanalysis may be that the revealed unconscious impulses can now arrive at those useful applications which, in the case of undisturbed development, they would have found earlier. The extirpation of the infantile wishes is not at all the ideal aim of development. The neurotic has lost, by his repressions, many sources of mental energy whose contingents would have been very valuable for his character building and his life activities. We know a far more purposive process of development, the so-called *sublimation* (*Sublimierung*), by which the energy of infantile wish-excitations is not secluded, but remains capable of application, while for the particular excitations, instead of becoming useless, a higher, eventually no longer sexual, goal is set up. The components of the sexual instinct are especially distinguished by such a capacity for the sublimation and exchange of their sexual goal for

one more remote and socially more valuable. To the contributions of the energy won in such a way for the functions of our mental life we probably owe the highest cultural consequences. A repression taking place at an early period excludes the sublimation of the repressed impulse; after the removal of the repression the way to sublimation is again free.

We must not neglect, also, to glance at the third of the possible issues. A certain part of the suppressed libidinous excitation has a right to direct satisfaction and ought to find it in life. The claims of our civilization make life too hard for the greater part of humanity, and so further the aversion to reality and the origin of neuroses, without producing an excess of cultural gain by this excess of sexual repression. We ought not to go so far as to fully neglect the original animal part of our nature, we ought not to forget that the happiness of individuals cannot be dispensed with as one of the aims of our culture. The plasticity of the sexual-components, manifest in their capacity for sublimation, may cause a great temptation to accomplish greater culture-effects by a more and more far reaching sublimation. But just as little as with our machines we expect to change more than a certain fraction of the applied heat into useful mechanical work, just as little ought we to strive to separate the sexual impulse in its whole extent of energy from its peculiar goal. This cannot succeed, and if the narrowing of sexuality is pushed too far it will have all the evil effects of a robbery.

I do not know whether you will regard the exhortation with which I close as a presumptuous one. I only venture the indirect presentation of my conviction, if I relate an old tale, whose application you may make yourselves. German literature knows a town called Schilda, to whose inhabitants were attributed all sorts of clever pranks. The wiseacres, so the story goes, had a horse, with whose powers of work they were well satisfied, and against whom they had only one grudge, that he consumed so much expensive oats. They concluded that by good management they would break him of this bad habit, by cutting down his rations by several stalks each day, until he had learned to do without them altogether. Things went finely for a while, the horse was weaned to one stalk a day, and on the next day he would at last work without fodder. On the morning of this day the malicious horse was found dead; the citizens of Schilda could not understand why he had died. We should be inclined to believe that the horse had starved, and that without a certain ration of oats no work could be expected from an animal.

GEORGE SANTAYANA

GEORGE SANTAYANA, though generally acknowledged as one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century, has had few disciples. His thinking is an unusual combination of penetrating analysis, historical insight, and distinctively poetic expression. In his person, he was an essentially solitary figure. Born in 1863, and brought here as a child from Spain, he early acquired a mastery of the English language. He taught at Harvard from 1889 to 1912, and then retired to Europe, ultimately Italy (where he died in 1952), in order to spend the remainder of his life in leisurely contemplation and in the atmosphere of an older tradition which he had always preferred to the more turbulent American scene. Yet it was in America that his finest work, *The Life of Reason* in five volumes (1905-6), was conceived and produced. This enterprise sought to define and champion reason, exhibiting it as embedded in the most elemental human activities and as attaining its fruition in the institutions—the “ideal societies”—of religion, art, and science.

In the many books that subsequently flowed from his pen (including a novel, *The Last Puritan*, in 1936) Santayana tried to elaborate in various ways—and in such various ways that he inevitably incurred the charge of inconsistency—the principal theme of his thinking: on the one hand, that human values and ideals are natural products of a material and mechanical universe, and on the other hand, that such a universe can be understood as giving rise to the marvel of these values and ideals. Santayana almost alone outspokenly defended naturalism at a time when (the turn of the century) it was far more widely felt than it is now that naturalism must lack richness and imaginativeness as a world view. To Santayana the true worth of a human institution like religion lies not in the hopes and dogmas which it offers but in the moral values which it can achieve. Religion cannot pretend to pronounce literal truths, but it can serve as the great symbolizer of the ideals of man. It must cease to be a “false physics” and must become conscious of what, in spite of itself, its true function has always been, dramatically and poetically to celebrate the good. Thus the notion of “God” is not to be interpreted as designating a magical power or a miraculous and incomprehensible creator, but as a symbol of the highest goals of human aspiration.

Santayana always extolled Catholicism as a supreme vehicle for the religious imagination and as rich in symbolism and mythology. The result of this particular preference was a conception of institutional religion ultimately unacceptable both to Catholics and to philosophic naturalists, as well as to others for whom the religious attitude has meant a repudiation of the framework of historical religion. One wit has tried to sum up Santayana’s religious viewpoint as asserting that “there is no God, and Mary is his mother.”

Santayana’s philosophy is unmistakably reflected in his poetry and literary criticism, and it serves as the foundation of his incisive commentaries on life and thought in America, particularly his examination of “the genteel tradition.”

It is as a critic of certain tendencies which he felt to be in the ascendant at the dawn of the present century that Santayana speaks in the following selection from *Winds of Doctrine* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913). Irrationalism and "moral confusion" he saw invading society, philosophy, and art. The survey is as much a challenge to the reader's own capacity for appraising his age as it is an instrument for the reiteration of Santayana's guiding principles.



WINDS OF DOCTRINE

THE INTELLECTUAL TEMPER OF THE AGE

THE PRESENT AGE is a critical one and interesting to live in. The civilisation characteristic of Christendom has not disappeared, yet another civilisation has begun to take its place. We still understand the value of religious faith; we still appreciate the pompous arts of our forefathers; we are brought up on academic architecture, sculpture, painting, poetry, and music. We still love monarchy and aristocracy, together with that picturesque and dutiful order which rested on local institutions, class privileges, and the authority of the family. We may even feel an organic need for all these things, cling to them tenaciously, and dream of rejuvenating them. On the other hand the shell of Christendom is broken. The unconquerable mind of the East, the pagan past, the industrial socialistic future confront it with their equal authority. Our whole life and mind are saturated with the slow upward filtration of a new spirit—that of an emancipated, atheistic, international democracy.

These epithets may make us shudder; but what they describe is something positive and self-justified, something deeply rooted in our animal nature and inspiring to our hearts, something which, like every vital impulse, is pregnant with a morality of its own. In vain do we deprecate it; it has possession of us already through our propensities, fashions, and language. Our very plutocrats and monarchs are at ease only when they are vulgar. Even prelates and missionaries are hardly sincere or conscious of an honest function, save as they devote themselves to social work; for willy-nilly the new spirit has hold of our consciences as well. This spirit is amiable as well as disquieting, liberating as well as barbaric; and a philosopher in our day, conscious both of the old life and of the new, might repeat what Goethe said of his successive love affairs—that it is sweet to see the moon rise while the sun is still mildly shining.

Meantime our bodies in this generation are generally safe, and often com-

fortable; and for those who can suspend their irrational labours long enough to look about them, the spectacle of the world, if not particularly beautiful or touching, presents a rapid and crowded drama and (what here concerns me most) one unusually intelligible. The nations, parties, and movements that divide the scene have a known history. We are not condemned, as most generations have been, to fight and believe without an inkling of the cause. The past lies before us; the history of everything is published. Every one records his opinion, and loudly proclaims what he wants. In this Babel of ideals few demands are ever literally satisfied; but many evaporate, merge together, and reach an unintended issue, with which they are content. The whole drift of things presents a huge, good-natured comedy to the observer. It stirs not unpleasantly a certain sturdy animality and hearty self-trust which lie at the base of human nature.

A chief characteristic of the situation is that moral confusion is not limited to the world at large, always the scene of profound conflicts, but that it has penetrated to the mind and heart of the average individual. Never perhaps were men so like one another and so divided within themselves. In other ages, even more than at present, different classes of men have stood at different levels of culture, with a magnificent readiness to persecute and to be martyred for their respective principles. These militant believers have been keenly conscious that they had enemies; but their enemies were strangers to them, whom they could think of merely as such, regarding them as blank negative forces, hateful black devils, whose existence might make life difficult but could not confuse the ideal of life. No one sought to understand these enemies of his, nor even to conciliate them, unless under compulsion or out of insidious policy, to convert them against their will; he merely pelted them with blind refutations and clumsy blows. Every one sincerely felt that the right was entirely on his side, a proof that such intelligence as he had moved freely and exclusively within the lines of his faith. The result of this was that his faith was intelligent, I mean, that he understood it, and had a clear, almost instinctive perception of what was compatible or incompatible with it. He defended his walls and he cultivated his garden. His position and his possessions were unmistakable.

When men and minds were so distinct it was possible to describe and to count them. During the Reformation, when external confusion was at its height, you might have ascertained almost statistically what persons and what regions each side snatched from the other; it was not doubtful which was which. The history of their respective victories and defeats could consequently be written. So in the eighteenth century it was easy to perceive how many people Voltaire and Rousseau might be alienating from Bossuet and Fénelon.

But how shall we satisfy ourselves now whether, for instance, Christianity is holding its own? Who can tell what vagary or what compromise may not be calling itself Christianity? A bishop may be a modernist, a chemist may be a mystical theologian, a psychologist may be a believer in ghosts. For science, too, which had promised to supply a new and solid foundation for philosophy, has allowed philosophy rather to undermine its foundation, and is seen eating its own words, through the mouths of some of its accredited spokesmen, and reducing itself to something utterly conventional and insecure. It is characteristic of human nature to be as impatient of ignorance regarding what is not known as lazy in acquiring such knowledge as is at hand; and even those who have not been lazy sometimes take it into their heads to disparage their science and to outdo the professional philosophers in psychological scepticism, in order to plunge with them into the most vapid speculation. Nor is this insecurity about first principles limited to abstract subjects. It reigns in politics as well. Liberalism had been supposed to advocate liberty; but what the advanced parties that still call themselves liberal now advocate is control, control over property, trade, wages, hours of work, meat and drink, amusements, and in a truly advanced country like France control over education and religion; and it is only on the subject of marriage (if we ignore eugenics) that liberalism is growing more and more liberal. Those who speak most of progress measure it by quantity and not by quality; how many people read and write, or how many people there are, or what is the annual value of their trade; whereas true progress would rather lie in reading or writing fewer and better things, and being fewer and better men, and enjoying life more. But the philanthropists are now preparing an absolute subjection of the individual, in soul and body, to the instincts of the majority—the most cruel and unprogressive of masters; and I am not sure that the liberal maxim, “the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” has not lost whatever was just or generous in its intent and come to mean the greatest idleness of the largest possible population.

Nationality offers another occasion for strange moral confusion. It had seemed that an age that was levelling and connecting all nations, an age whose real achievements were of international application, was destined to establish the solidarity of mankind as a sort of axiom. The idea of solidarity is indeed often invoked in speeches, and there is an extreme socialistic party that—when a wave of national passion does not carry it the other way—believes in international brotherhood. But even here, black men and yellow men are generally excluded; and in higher circles, where history, literature, and political ambition dominate men’s minds, nationalism has become of late an omnivorous all-permeating passion. Local parliaments must be every-

where established, extinct or provincial dialects must be galvanised into national languages, philosophy must be made racial, religion must be fostered where it emphasises nationality and denounced where it transcends it. Man is certainly an animal that, when he lives at all, lives for ideals. Something must be found to occupy his imagination, to raise pleasure and pain into love and hatred, and change the prosaic alternative between comfort and discomfort into the tragic one between happiness and sorrow. Now that the hue of daily adventure is so dull, when religion for the most part is so vague and accommodating, when even war is a vast impersonal business, nationality seems to have slipped into the place of honour. It has become the one eloquent, public, intrepid illusion. Illusion, I mean, when it is taken for an ultimate good or a mystical essence, for of course nationality is a fact. People speak some particular language and are very uncomfortable where another is spoken or where their own is spoken differently. They have habits, judgments, assumptions to which they are wedded, and a society where all this is unheard of shocks them and puts them at a galling disadvantage. To ignorant people the foreigner as such is ridiculous, unless he is superior to them in numbers or prestige, when he becomes hateful. It is natural for a man to like to live at home, and to live long elsewhere without a sense of exile is not good for his moral integrity. It is right to feel a greater kinship and affection for what lies nearest to oneself. But this necessary fact and even duty of nationality is accidental; like age or sex it is a physical fatality which can be made the basis of specific and comely virtues; but it is not an end to pursue or a flag to flaunt or a privilege not balanced by a thousand incapacities. Yet of this distinction our contemporaries tend to make an idol, perhaps because it is the only distinction they feel they have left.

Anomalies of this sort will never be properly understood until people accustom themselves to a theory to which they have always turned a deaf ear, because, though simple and true, it is materialistic: namely, that mind is not the cause of our actions but an effect, collateral with our actions, of bodily growth and organisation. It may therefore easily come about that the thoughts of men, tested by the principles that seem to rule their conduct, may be belated, or irrelevant, or premonitory; for the living organism has many strata, on any of which, at a given moment, activities may exist perfect enough to involve consciousness, yet too weak and isolated to control the organs of outer expression; so that (to speak geologically) our practice may be historic, our manners glacial, and our religion palaeozoic. The ideals of the nineteenth century may be said to have been all belated; the age still yearned with Rousseau or speculated with Kant, while it moved with Darwin, Bismarck, and Nietzsche: and to-day, in the half-educated classes, among the religious or revolutionary

sects, we may observe quite modern methods of work allied with a somewhat antiquated mentality. The whole nineteenth century might well cry with Faust: "Two souls, alas, dwell in my bosom!" The revolutions it witnessed filled it with horror and made it fall in love romantically with the past and dote on ruins, because they were ruins; and the best learning and fiction of the time were historical, inspired by an unprecedented effort to understand remote forms of life and feeling, to appreciate exotic arts and religions, and to rethink the blameless thoughts of savages and criminals. This sympathetic labour and retrospect, however, was far from being merely sentimental; for the other half of this divided soul was looking ahead. Those same revolutions, often so destructive, stupid, and bloody, filled it with pride, and prompted it to invent several incompatible theories concerning a steady and inevitable progress in the world. In the study of the past, side by side with romantic sympathy, there was a sort of realistic, scholarly intelligence and an adventurous love of truth; kindness too was often mingled with dramatic curiosity. The pathologists were usually healers, the philosophers of evolution were inventors or humanitarians or at least idealists: the historians of art (though optimism was impossible here) were also guides to taste, quickeners of moral sensibility, like Ruskin, or enthusiasts for the irresponsibly beautiful, like Pater and Oscar Wilde. Everywhere in the nineteenth century we find a double preoccupation with the past and with the future, a longing to know what all experience might have been hitherto, and on the other hand to hasten to some wholly different experience, to be contrived immediately with a beating heart and with flying banners. The imagination of the age was intent on history; its conscience was intent on reform.

Reform! This magic word itself covers a great equivocation. To reform means to shatter one form and to create another; but the two sides of the act are not always equally intended nor equally successful. Usually the movement starts from the mere sense of oppression, and people break down some established form, without any qualms about the capacity of their freed instincts to generate the new forms that may be needed. So the Reformation, in destroying the traditional order, intended to secure truth, spontaneity, and profuseness of religious forms; the danger of course being that each form might become meagre and the sum of them chaotic. If the accent, however, could only be laid on the second phase of the transformation, reform might mean the creation of order where it did not sufficiently appear, so that diffuse life should be concentrated into a congenial form that should render it strong and self-conscious. In this sense, if we may trust Mr. Gilbert Murray, it was a great wave of reform that created Greece, or at least all that was characteristic and admirable in it—an effort to organise, train, simplify, purify, and make beau-

tiful the chaos of barbaric customs and passions that had preceded. The danger here, a danger to which Greece actually succumbed, is that so refined an organism may be too fragile, not inclusive enough within, and not buttressed strongly enough without against the flux of the uncivilised world. Christianity also, in the first formative centuries of its existence, was an integrating reform of the same sort, on a different scale and in a different sphere; but here too an enslaved rabble within the soul claiming the suffrage, and better equipped intellectual empires rising round about, seem to prove that the harmony which the Christian system made for a moment out of nature and life was partial and insecure. It is a terrible dilemma in the life of reason whether it will sacrifice natural abundance to moral order, or moral order to natural abundance. Whatever compromise we choose proves unstable, and forces us to a new experiment.

Perhaps in the century that has elapsed since the French Revolution the pendulum has had time to swing as far as it will in the direction of negative reform, and may now begin to move towards that sort of reform which is integrating and creative. The veering of the advanced political parties from liberalism to socialism would seem to be a clear indication of this new tendency. It is manifest also in the love of nature, in athletics, in the new woman, and in a friendly medical attitude towards all the passions. ⁴

In the fine arts, however, and in religion and philosophy, we are still in full career towards disintegration. It might have been thought that a germ of rational order would by this time have penetrated into fine art and speculation from the prosperous constructive arts that touch the one, and the prosperous natural and mathematical sciences that touch the other. But as yet there is little sign of it. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century painting and sculpture have passed through several phases, representatives of each naturally surviving after the next had appeared. Romanticism, half lurid, half effeminate, yielded to a brutal pursuit of material truth, and a pious preference for modern and humble sentiment. This realism had a romantic vein in it, and studied vice and crime, tedium and despair, with a very genuine horrified sympathy. Some went in for a display of archaeological lore or for exotic *motifs*; others gave all their attention to rediscovering and emphasising abstract problems of execution, the highway of technical tradition having long been abandoned. Beginners are still supposed to study their art, but they have no masters from whom to learn it. Thus, when there seemed to be some danger that art should be drowned in science and history, the artists deftly eluded it by becoming amateurs. One gave himself to religious archaism, another to Japanese composition, a third to barbaric symphonies of colour; sculptors tried to express dramatic climaxes, or inarticulate lyrical passion,

such as music might better convey; and the latest whims are apparently to abandon painful observation altogether, to be merely decorative or frankly mystical, and to be satisfied with the childishness of hieroglyphics or the crudity of caricature. The arts are like truant children who think their life will be glorious if they only run away and play for ever; no need is felt of a dominant ideal passion and theme, nor of any moral interest in the interpretation of nature. Artists have no less talent than ever; their taste, their vision, their sentiment are often interesting; they are mighty in their independence and feeble only in their works. . . .

Extremes meet, and the tendency to practical materialism was never wholly absent from the idealism of the moderns. Certainly, the tumid respectability of Anglo-German philosophy had somehow to be left behind; and Darwinian England and Bismarckian Germany had another inspiration as well to guide them, if it could only come to consciousness in the professors. The worship of power is an old religion, and Hegel, to go no farther back, is full of it; but like traditional religion his system qualified its veneration for success by attributing success, in the future at least, to what could really inspire veneration; and such a master in equivocation could have no difficulty in convincing himself that the good must conquer in the end if whatever conquers in the end is the good. Among the pragmatists the worship of power is also optimistic, but it is not to logic that power is attributed. Science, they say, is good as a help to industry, and philosophy is good for correcting whatever in science might disturb religious faith, which in turn is helpful in living. What industry or life are good for it would be unsympathetic to inquire: the stream is mighty; and we must swim with the stream. Concern for survival, however, which seems to be the pragmatic principle in morals, does not afford a remedy for moral anarchy. To take firm hold on life, according to Nietzsche, we should be imperious, poetical, atheistic; but according to William James we should be democratic, concrete, and credulous. It is hard to say whether pragmatism is come to emancipate the individual spirit and make it lord over things, or on the contrary to declare the spirit a mere instrument for the survival of the flesh. In Italy, the mind seems to be raised deliriously into an absolute creator, evoking at will, at each moment, a new past, a new future, a new earth, and a new God. In America, however, the mind is recommended rather as an unpatented device for oiling the engine of the body and making it do double work.

Trustful faith in evolution and a longing for intense life are characteristic of contemporary sentiment; but they do not appear to be consistent with that contempt for the intellect which is no less characteristic of it. Human intelligence is certainly a product, and a late and highly organised product, of evolu-

tion; it ought apparently to be as much admired as the eyes of molluscs or the antennae of ants. And if life is better the more intense and concentrated it is, intelligence would seem to be the best form of life. But the degree of intelligence which this age possesses makes it so very uncomfortable that, in this instance, it asks for something less vital, and sighs for what evolution has left behind. In the presence of such cruelly distinct things as astronomy or such cruelly confused things as theology it feels *la nostalgie de la boue*.¹ It was only, M. Bergson tells us, where dead matter oppressed life that life was forced to become intelligence; for this reason intelligence kills whatever it touches; it is the tribute that life pays to death. Life would find it sweet to throw off that painful subjection to circumstance and bloom in some more congenial direction. M. Bergson's own philosophy is an effort to realise this revulsion, to disintegrate intelligence and stimulate sympathetic experience. Its charm lies in the relief which it brings to a stale imagination, an imagination from which religion has vanished and which is kept stretched on the machinery of business and society, or on small half-borrowed passions which we clothe in a mean rhetoric and dot with vulgar pleasures. Finding their intelligence enslaved, our contemporaries suppose that intelligence is essentially servile; instead of freeing it, they try to elude it. Not free enough themselves morally, but bound to the world partly by piety and partly by industrialism, they cannot think of rising to a detached contemplation of earthly things, and of life itself and evolution; they revert rather to sensibility, and seek some by-path of instinct or dramatic sympathy in which to wander. Having no stomach for the ultimate, they burrow downwards towards the primitive. But the longing to be primitive is a disease of culture; it is archaism in morals. To be so pre-occupied with vitality is a symptom of anaemia. When life was really vigorous and young, in Homeric times for instance, no one seemed to fear that it might be squeezed out of existence either by the incubus of matter or by the petrifying blight of intelligence. Life was like the light of day, something to use, or to waste, or to enjoy. It was not a thing to worship; and often the chief luxury of living consisted in dealing death about vigorously. Life indeed was loved, and the beauty and pathos of it were felt exquisitely; but its beauty and pathos lay in the divineness of its model and in its own fragility. No one paid it the equivocal compliment of thinking it a substance or a material force. Nobility was not then impossible in sentiment, because there were ideals in life higher and more indestructible than life itself, which life might illustrate and to which it might fitly be sacrificed. Nothing can be meaner than the anxiety to live on, to live on anyhow and in any shape; a spirit with any honour is not willing to live except in its own way, and a spirit with any wisdom is not over-eager to live at all. In those days men recognised im-

¹ [*Yearning for mud, that is, the primeval slime.*]

mortal gods and resigned themselves to being mortal. Yet those were the truly vital and instinctive days of the human spirit. Only when vitality is low do people find material things oppressive and ideal things unsubstantial. Now there is more motion than life, and more haste than force; we are driven to distraction by the ticking of the tiresome clocks, material and social, by which we are obliged to regulate our existence. We need ministering angels to fly to us from somewhere, even if it be from the depths of protoplasm. We must bathe in the currents of some non-human vital flood, like consumptives in their last extremity who must bask in the sunshine and breathe the mountain air; and our disease is not without its sophistry to convince us that we were never so well before, or so mightily conscious of being alive.

When chaos has penetrated so far into the moral being of nations they can hardly be expected to produce great men. A great man need not be virtuous, nor his opinions right, but he must have a firm mind, a distinctive, luminous character; if he is to dominate things, something must be dominant in him. We feel him to be great in that he clarifies and brings to expression something which was potential in the rest of us, but which with our burden of flesh and circumstances we were too torpid to utter. The great man is a spontaneous variation in humanity; but not in any direction. A spontaneous variation might be a mere madness or mutilation or monstrosity; in finding the variation admirable we evidently invoke some principle of order to which it conforms. Perhaps it makes explicit what was preformed in us also; as when a poet finds the absolutely right phrase for a feeling, or when nature suddenly astonishes us with a form of absolute beauty. Or perhaps it makes an unprecedented harmony out of things existing before, but jangled and detached. The first man was a great man for this latter reason; having been an ape perplexed and corrupted by his multiplying instincts, he suddenly found a new way of being decent, by harnessing all those instincts together, through memory and imagination, and giving each in turn a measure of its due; which is what we call being rational. It is a new road to happiness, if you have strength enough to castigate a little the various impulses that sway you in turn. Why then is the martyr, who sacrifices everything to one attraction, distinguished from the criminal or the fool, who do the same thing? Evidently because the spirit that in the martyr destroys the body is the very spirit which the body is stifling in the rest of us; and although his private inspiration may be irrational, the tendency of it is not, but reduces the public conscience to act before any one else has had the courage to do so. Greatness is spontaneous; simplicity, trust in some one clear instinct, are essential to it; but the spontaneous variation must be in the direction of some possible sort of order; it must exclude and leave behind what is incapable of being moralised. How,

then, should there be any great heroes, saints, artists, philosophers, or legislators in an age when nobody trusts himself, or feels any confidence in reason, in an age when the word *dogmatic* is a term of reproach? Greatness has character and severity, it is deep and sane, it is distinct and perfect. For this reason there is none of it to-day.

There is indeed another kind of greatness, or rather largeness of mind, which consists in being a synthesis of humanity in its current phases, even if without prophetic emphasis or direction: the breadth of a Goethe, rather than the fineness of a Shelley or a Leopardi. But such largeness of mind, not to be vulgar, must be impartial, comprehensive, Olympian; it would not be greatness if its miscellany were not dominated by a clear genius and if before the confusion of things the poet or philosopher were not himself delighted, exalted, and by no means confused. Nor does this presume omniscience on his part. It is not necessary to fathom the ground or the structure of everything in order to know what to make of it. Stones do not disconcert a builder because he may not happen to know what they are chemically; and so the unsolved problems of life and nature, and the Babel of society, need not disturb the genial observer, though he may be incapable of unravelling them. He may set these dark spots down in their places, like so many caves or wells in a landscape, without feeling bound to scrutinise their depths simply because their depths are obscure. Unexplored they may have a sort of lustre, explored they might merely make him blind, and it may be a sufficient understanding of them to know that they are not worth investigating. In this way the most chaotic age and the most motley horrors might be mirrored limpidly in a great mind, as the Renaissance was mirrored in the works of Raphael and Shakespeare; but the master's eye itself must be single, his style unmistakable, his visionary interest in what he depicts frank and supreme. Hence this comprehensive sort of greatness too is impossible in an age when moral confusion is pervasive, when characters are complex, undecided, troubled by the mere existence of what is not congenial to them, eager to be not themselves; when, in a word, thought is weak and the flux of things overwhelms it.

Without great men and without clear convictions this age is nevertheless very active intellectually; it is studious, empirical, inventive, sympathetic. Its wisdom consists in a certain contrite openness of mind; it flounders, but at least in floundering it has gained a sense of possible depths in all directions. Under these circumstances, some triviality and great confusion in its positive achievements are not unpromising things, nor even unamiable. These are the *Wanderjahre* of faith; it looks smilingly at every new face, which might perhaps be that of a predestined friend; it chases after any engaging stranger; it even turns up again from time to time at home, full of a new tenderness for all

it had abandoned there. But to settle down would be impossible now. The intellect, the judgment are in abeyance. Life is running turbid and full; and it is no marvel that reason, after vainly supposing that it ruled the world, should abdicate as gracefully as possible, when the world is so obviously the sport of cruder powers—vested interests, tribal passions, stock sentiments, and chance majorities. Having no responsibility laid upon it, reason has become irresponsible. Many critics and philosophers seem to conceive that thinking aloud is itself literature. Sometimes reason tries to lend some moral authority to its present masters, by proving how superior they are to itself; it worships evolution, instinct, novelty, action, as it does in modernism, pragmatism, and the philosophy of M. Bergson. At other times it retires into the freehold of those temperaments whom this world has ostracised, the region of the non-existent, and comforts itself with its indubitable conquests there. This happened earlier to the romanticists . . . although their poetic and political illusions did not suffer them to perceive it. It is happening now, after disillusion, to some radicals and mathematicians like Mr. Bertrand Russell, and to others of us who, perhaps without being mathematicians or even radicals, feel that the sphere of what happens to exist is too alien and accidental to absorb all the play of a free mind, whose function, after it has come to clearness and made its peace with things, is to touch them with its own moral and intellectual light, and to exist for its own sake.

These are but gusts of doctrine; yet they prove that the spirit is not dead in the lull between its seasons of steady blowing. Who knows which of them may not gather force presently and carry the mind of the coming age steadily before it?

MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO

POET, NOVELIST, and philosophic essayist, and at one time Professor of Greek in the University of Salamanca, Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936) was a major figure in Spanish letters as well as a spectacular political personality. For attacking the dictatorial Primo de Rivera regime, he was exiled to the Canary Islands, but was granted an amnesty as a result of great popular support. Later he became a leading spokesman of the revolutionary movement which in 1931 succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy and establishing the Spanish Republic.

In his thinking, Unamuno is a suggester and not a formulator, and a suggester of feelings, passions, and attitudes rather than of ideas. A perfect representative of religious romanticism in a twentieth-century context, he exhibits the characteristic distrust of systems and abstractions as static threats to life. His favorite theme is the war between "the truth thought and the truth felt," between "veracity and sincerity." As a lover of eloquent contradictions and subtle meanings, he abounds in expressions like "to seek consolation in disconsolation," "to enjoy the flesh of one's own soul," and "to kill in oneself both life and death." Spanish nationalism and Catholicism in Unamuno are not orthodox loyalties but instruments of his belligerent individualism and of his impulse to shock and arouse. That Don Quixote should be his ideal is understandable, and it is equally understandable and revealing that he should assign to the Don the mission of "awakening sleeping souls" and of "crying aloud in the wilderness."

If, in the name of both Spain and himself, Unamuno is an opponent of "modern civilization"—of science, technology, and the tendency toward group and socialized action, he is at the same time a representative *par excellence* of other and equally fundamental tendencies of the century—the love of paradox, the exploration of the hidden self, the impatience and fear of rational inquiry, and the preference for religious attitudes of a personal character. The following selection is from one of Unamuno's leading works, *The Tragic Sense of Life*, published in 1913 and translated from the Spanish by J. E. Crawford Fritch (London, The Macmillan Co., 1921).



THE TRAGIC SENSE OF LIFE

A FEW YEARS after Our Lord Don Quixote had journeyed through Spain, Jacob Böhm declared in his *Aurora* that he did not write a story or history related to him by others, but that he himself had had to stand in the battle, which he found to be full of heavy strivings, and wherein he was often struck down to the ground like all other men; and a little further on he adds: "Although I must become a spectacle of scorn to the world and the devil, yet my hope is in God concerning the life to come; in Him will I venture to hazard it and not resist or strive against the Spirit. Amen." And like this Quixote of the German intellectual world, neither will I resist the Spirit.

And therefore I cry with the voice of one crying in the wilderness, and I send forth my cry from this University of Salamanca, a University that arrogantly styled itself *omnium scientiarum princeps*,¹ and which Carlyle called a stronghold of ignorance and which a French man of letters recently called a phantom University; I send it forth from this Spain—"the land of dreams that become realities, the rampart of Europe, the home of the knightly ideal," to quote from a letter which the American poet Archer M. Huntington sent me the other day—from this Spain which was the head and front of the Counter-Reformation in the sixteenth century. And well they repay her for it!

In the fourth of these essays I spoke of the essence of Catholicism. And the chief factors in *de-essentializing* it—that is, in de-Catholicizing Europe—have been the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Revolution, which for the ideal of an eternal, ultra-terrestrial life, have substituted the ideal of progress, of reason, of science, or, rather, of Science with the capital letter. And last of all, the dominant ideal of to-day, comes Culture.

And in the second half of the nineteenth century, an age essentially unphilosophical and technical, dominated by a myopic specialism and by historical materialism, this ideal took a practical form, not so much in the popularization as in the vulgarization of science—or, rather, of pseudo-science—venting itself in a flood of cheap, popular, and propagandist literature. Science sought to popularize itself as if it were its function to come down to the people and subserve their passions, and not the duty of the people to rise to science and through science to rise to higher heights, to new and profounder aspirations.

All this led Brunetière to proclaim the bankruptcy of science, and this science—if you like to call it science—did in effect become bankrupt. And as it failed to satisfy, men continued their quest for happiness, but without finding

¹ [First among all the sciences.]

it, either in wealth, or in knowledge, or in power, or in pleasure, or in resignation, or in a good conscience, or in culture. And the result was pessimism.

Neither did the gospel of progress satisfy. What end did progress serve? Man would not accommodate himself to rationalism; the *Kulturkampf*² did not suffice him; he sought to give a final finality to life. . . . And the famous *maladie du siècle*,³ which announced itself in Rousseau and was exhibited more plainly in Senancour's *Obermann* than in any other character, neither was nor is anything else but the loss of faith in the immortality of the soul, in the human finality of the Universe. . . .

All this is the consequence, I repeat, of the Renaissance and the Reformation, which, although apparently they lived in a state of internecine war, were twin-brothers. The Italians of the Renaissance were all of them Socinians; the humanists, with Erasmus at their head, regarded Luther, the German monk, as a barbarian, who derived his driving force from the cloister, as did Bruno and Campanella. But this barbarian was their twin-brother, and though their antagonist he was also the antagonist of the common enemy. All this, I say, is due to the Renaissance and the Reformation, and to what was the offspring of these two, the Revolution, and to them we owe also a new Inquisition, that of science or culture, which turns against those who refuse to submit to its orthodoxy the weapons of ridicule and contempt. . . .

The real and concrete truth, not the methodical and ideal, is: *homo sum, ergo cogito*.⁴ To feel oneself a man is more immediate than to think. But, on the other hand, History, the process of culture, finds its perfection and complete effectivity only in the individual; the end of History and Humanity is man, each man, each individual. *Homo sum, ergo cogito; cogito ut sim Michael de Unamuno*.⁵ The individual is the end of the Universe.

And we Spaniards feel this very strongly, that the individual is the end of the Universe. . . .

. . . We must look for the hero of Spanish thought, not in any actual flesh-and-bone philosopher, but in a creation of fiction, a man of action, who is more real than all the philosophers—Don Quixote. There is undoubtedly a philosophical Quixotism, but there is also a Quixotic philosophy. May it not perhaps be that the philosophy of the Conquistadores, of the Counter-Reformers, of Loyola, and above all, in the order of abstract but deeply felt thought, that of our mystics, was in its essence, none other than this? What was the mysticism of St. John of the Cross but a knight-errantry of the heart in the divine warfare?

² [Fight for civilization.]

³ [Disease of the age.]

⁴ [I am a man, therefore I think (reversing Descartes).]

⁵ [I think in order that I may be Miguel de Unamuno.]

And the philosophy of Don Quixote cannot strictly be called idealism; he did not fight for ideas. It was of the spiritual order; he fought for the spirit. . . .

And the speculative or meditative Quixotism is, like the practical Quixotism, madness, a daughter-madness to the madness of the Cross. And therefore it is despised by the reason. At bottom, philosophy abhors Christianity, and well did the gentle Marcus Aurelius prove it.

The tragedy of Christ, the divine tragedy, is the tragedy of the Cross, Pilate, the sceptic, the man of culture, by making a mockery of it, sought to convert it into a comedy; he conceived the farcical idea of the king with the reed sceptre and crown of thorns, and cried "Behold the man!" But the people, more human than he, the people that thirsts for tragedy, shouted, "Crucify him! crucify him!" And the human, the intra-human, tragedy is the tragedy of Don Quixote, whose face was dabbled with soap in order that he might make sport for the servants of the dukes and for the dukes themselves, as servile as their servants. "Behold the madman!" they would have said. And the comic, the irrational, tragedy is the tragedy of suffering caused by ridicule and contempt.

The greatest height of heroism to which an individual, like a people, can attain is to know how to face ridicule; better still, to know how to make oneself ridiculous and not to shrink from the ridicule. . . .

It was with a very profound insight that Benedetto Croce, in his philosophy of the spirit in relation to esthetics as the science of expression and to logic as the science or pure concept, divided practical philosophy into two branches—economics and ethics. He recognizes, in effect, the existence of a practical grade of spirit, purely economical, directed towards the singular and unconcerned with the universal. Its types of perfection, of economic genius, are Iago and Napoleon, and this grade remains outside morality. And every man passes through this grade, because before all else he must wish to be himself, as an individual, and without this grade morality would be inexplicable, just as without esthetics logic would lack meaning. And the discovery of the normative value of the economic grade, which seeks the hedonic, was not unnaturally the work of an Italian, a disciple of Machiavelli, who speculated so fearlessly with regard to *virtù*, practical efficiency, which is not exactly the same as moral virtue.

But at bottom this economic grade is but the rudimentary state of the religious grade. The religious is the transcendental economic or hedonic. Religion is a transcendental economy and hedonistic. That which man seeks in religion, in religious faith, is to save his own individuality, to eternalize it, which he achieves neither by science, nor by art, nor by ethics. God is a neces-

sity neither for science, nor art, nor ethics; what necessitates God is religion. And with an insight that amounts to genius our Jesuits speak of the grand business of our salvation. Business—yes, business; something belonging to the economic, hedonistic order, although transcendental. We do not need God in order that He may teach us the truth of things, or the beauty of them, or in order that He may safeguard morality by means of a system of penalties and punishments, but in order that He may save us, in order that He may not let us die utterly. And because this unique longing is the longing of each and every normal man—those who are abnormal by reason of their barbarism or their hyperculture may be left out of the reckoning—it is universal and normative.

Religion, therefore, is a transcendental economy, or, if you like, metaphysic. Together with its logical, esthetic, and ethical values, the Universe has for man an economic value also, which, when thus made universal and normative, is the religious value. We are not concerned only with truth, beauty, and goodness: we are concerned also and above all with the salvation of the individual, with perpetuation, which those norms do not secure for us. That science of economy which is called political teaches us the most adequate, the most economical way of satisfying our needs, whether these needs are rational or irrational, beautiful or ugly, moral or immoral—a business economically good may be a swindle, something that in the long run kills the soul—and the supreme human *need* is the need of not dying, the need of enjoying for ever the plenitude of our own individual limitation. And if the Catholic eucharistic doctrine teaches that the substance of the body of Jesus Christ is present whole and entire in the consecrated Host, and in each part of it, this means that God is wholly and entirely in the whole Universe and also in each one of the individuals that compose it. And this is, fundamentally, not a logical, nor an esthetic, nor an ethical principle, but a transcendental economic or religious principle. And with this norm, philosophy is able to judge of optimism and pessimism. *If the human soul is immortal, the world is economically or hedonistically good; if not, it is bad.* And the meaning which pessimism and optimism give to the categories of good and evil is not an ethical sense, but an economic or hedonistic sense. Good is that which satisfies our vital longing and evil is that which does not satisfy it.

Philosophy, therefore, is also the science of the tragedy of life, a reflection upon the tragic sense of it. An essay in this philosophy, with its inevitable internal contradictions and antinomies, is what I have attempted in these essays. And the reader must not overlook the fact that I have been operating upon myself; that this work partakes of the nature of a piece of self-

surgery, and without any other anesthetic than that of the work itself. The enjoyment of operating upon myself has ennobled the pain of being operated upon. . . .

Yes, I know, I know very well, that it is madness to seek to turn the waters of the river back to their source, and that it is only the ignorant who seek to find in the past a remedy for their present ills; but I know too that everyone who fights for any ideal whatever, although his ideal may seem to lie in the past, is driving the world on to the future, and that the only reactionaries are those who find themselves at home in the present. Every supposed restoration of the past is a creation of the future, and if the past which it is sought to restore is a dream, something imperfectly known, so much the better. The march, as ever, is towards the future, and he who marches is getting there, even though he march walking backwards. And who knows if that is not the better way!

I feel that I have within me a medieval soul, and I believe that the soul of my country is medieval, that it has perforce passed through the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Revolution—learning from them, yes, but without allowing them to touch the soul, preserving the spiritual inheritance which has come down from what are called the Dark Ages. And Quixotism is simply the most desperate phase of the struggle between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance which was the offspring of the Middle Ages.

And if some accuse me of subserving the cause of Catholic reaction, others perhaps, the official Catholics. . . . But these, in Spain, trouble themselves little about anything, and are interested only in their own quarrels and dissensions. And besides, poor folk, they have neither eyes nor ears!

But the truth is that my work—I was going to say my mission—is to shatter the faith of men here, there, and everywhere, faith in affirmation, faith in negation, and faith in abstention from faith, and this for the sake of faith in faith itself; it is to war against all those who submit, whether it be to Catholicism, or to rationalism, or to agnosticism; it is to make all men live the life of inquietude and passionate desire. . . .

Don Quixote made himself ridiculous; but did he know the most tragic ridicule of all, the inward ridicule, the ridiculousness of a man's self to himself, in the eyes of his own soul? Imagine Don Quixote's battlefield to be his own soul; imagine him to be fighting in his soul to save the Middle Ages from the Renaissance, to preserve the treasure of his infancy; imagine him an inward Don Quixote, with a Sancho, at his side, inward and heroical too—and tell me if you find anything comic in the tragedy.

And what has Don Quixote left, do you ask? I answer, he has left himself, and a man, a living and eternal man, is worth all theories and all philosophies.

Other peoples have left chiefly institutions, books; we have left souls; St. Teresa is worth any institution, any *Critique of Pure Reason*. . . .

And again we shall be asked: What has Don Quixote bequeathed to *Kultur*? I answer: Quixotism, and that is no little thing! It is a whole method, a whole epistemology, a whole esthetic, a whole logic, a whole ethic—above all, a whole religion—that is to say, a whole economy of things eternal and things divine, a whole hope in what is rationally absurd.

For what did Don Quixote fight? For Dulcinea, for glory, for life, for survival. Not for Iseult, who is the eternal flesh; not for Beatrice, who is theology; not for Margaret, who is the people; not for Helen, who is culture. He fought for Dulcinea, and he won her, for he lives. . . .

The mortal Don Quixote, in dying, realized his own comicalness and bewept his sins; but the immortal Quixote, realizing his own comicalness, superimposes himself upon it and triumphs over it without renouncing it.

And Don Quixote does not surrender, because he is not a pessimist, and he fights on. He is not a pessimist, because pessimism is begotten by vanity, it is a matter of fashion, pure intellectual snobbism, and Don Quixote is neither vain nor modern with any sort of modernity (still less is he a modernist), and he does not understand the meaning of the word "snob" unless it be explained to him in old Christian Spanish. Don Quixote is not a pessimist, for since he does not understand what is meant by the *joie de vivre*⁶ he does not understand its opposite. Neither does he understand futurist fooleries. In spite of Clavileño, he has not got as far as the aeroplane, which seems to tend to put not a few fools at a still greater distance from heaven. Don Quixote has not arrived at the age of the tedium of life, a condition that not infrequently takes the form of that topophobia so characteristic of many modern spirits, who pass their lives running at top speed from one place to another, not from any love of the place to which they are going, but from hatred of the place they are leaving behind, and so flying from all places: which is one of the forms of despair.

But Don Quixote hears his own laughter, he hears the divine laughter, and since he is not a pessimist, since he believes in life eternal, he has to fight, attacking the modern, scientific, inquisitorial orthodoxy in order to bring in a new and impossible Middle Age, dualistic, contradictory, passionate. Like a new Savonarola, an Italian Quixote of the end of the fifteenth century, he fights against this Modern Age that began with Machiavelli and that will end comically. He fights against the rationalism inherited from the eighteenth century. Peace of mind, reconciliation between reason and faith—this, thanks to the providence of God, is no longer possible. The world must be as Don Quixote wishes it to be, and inns must be castles, and he will fight with it

⁶ [*Joy of living*.]

and will, to all appearances, be vanquished, but he will triumph by making himself ridiculous. And he will triumph by laughing at himself and making himself the object of his own laughter.

"Reason speaks and feeling bites," said Petrarch; but reason also bites and bites in the inmost heart. And more light does not make more warmth. "Light, light, more light!" they tell us that the dying Goethe cried. No, warmth, warmth, more warmth! for we die of cold and not of darkness. It is not the night kills, but the frost. We must liberate the enchanted princess and destroy the stage of Master Peter.

But God! may there not be pedantry too in thinking ourselves the objects of mockery and in making Don Quixotes of ourselves? Kierkegaard said that the regenerate desire that the wicked world should mock at them for the better assurance of their own regeneracy, for the enjoyment of being able to bemoan the wickedness of the world.

The question is, how to avoid the one or the other pedantry, or the one or the other affectation, if the natural man is only a myth and we are all artificial.

Romanticism! Yes, perhaps that is partly the word. And there is an advantage in its very lack of precision. Against romanticism the forces of rationalist and classicist pedantry, especially in France, have latterly been unchained. Romanticism itself is merely another form of pedantry, the pedantry of sentiment? Perhaps. In this world a man of culture is either a dilettante or a pedant: you have to take your choice. Yes, René and Adolphe and Obermann and Lara, perhaps they were all pedants. . . . The question is to seek consolation in disconsolation.

The philosophy of Bergson, which is a spiritualist restoration, essentially mystical, medieval, Quixotesque, has been called a *demi-mondaine* philosophy. Leave out the *demi*; call it *mondaine*, mundane. Mundane—yes, a philosophy for the world and not for philosophers, just as chemistry ought to be not for chemists alone. The world desires illusion—either the illusion antecedent to reason, which is a poetry, or the illusion subsequent to reason, which is religion. And Machiavelli has said that whosoever wishes to delude will always find someone willing to be deluded. Blessed are they who are easily befooled! A Frenchman, Jules de Gaultier, said that it was the privilege of his countrymen *n'être pas dupe*—not to be taken in. A sorry privilege! . . .

And in this critical century, Don Quixote, who has also contaminated himself with criticism, has to attack his own self, the victim of intellectualism and of sentimentalism, and when he wishes to be most spontaneous he appears to be most affected. And he wishes, unhappy man, to rationalize the irrational and irrationalize the rational. And he sinks into the despair of the critical century whose two greatest victims were Nietzsche and Tolstoi.

And through this despair he reaches the heroic fury of which Giordano Bruno spoke—that intellectual Don Quixote who escaped from the cloister—and becomes an awakener of sleeping souls, as the ex-Dominican said of himself—he who wrote: “Heroic love is the property of those superior natures who are called insane not because they do not know, but because they over-know.” . . .

What, then, is the new mission of Don Quixote, to-day, in this world? To cry aloud, to cry aloud in the wilderness. But though men hear not, the wilderness hears, and one day it will be transformed into a resounding forest, and this solitary voice that goes scattering over the wilderness like seed, will fructify into a gigantic cedar, which with its hundred thousand tongues will sing an eternal hosanna to the Lord of life and of death.

And now to you, the younger generation, bachelor Carrascos of a Europeanizing regenerationism, you who are working after the best European fashion, with scientific method and criticism, to you I say: Create wealth, create nationality, create art, create science, create ethics, above all create—or rather, translate—*Kultur*, and thus kill in yourselves both life and death. Little will it all last you! . . .

XIII

EUROPEAN SOCIETY BETWEEN TWO WARS

JEAN JAURÈS

THE THIRD REPUBLIC lost one of its greatest statesmen and the French socialist movement its greatest leader when Jean Jaurès (born at Castres in the *département* of Tarn in 1859) was shot in the back of the head by an unbalanced youth on July 31, 1914. Two days later, on August 2, general mobilization was proclaimed in France, and Europe was swept into the holocaust which Jaurès had desperately sought to avert. His assassin had been incited by the chauvinistic right-wing press, which for the past month had been openly advocating the murder of "Herr" Jaurès.

Trained in philosophy at the École Normale, Jaurès had resigned his professorship at the University of Toulouse when, at the age of twenty-six, he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1885 as an independent republican. By 1893 his theoretical interest in Marxism and his deep practical concern for the welfare of the underprivileged had led him to call himself a socialist. During the next five years he emerged as a parliamentary orator and tactician of the first rank. By 1898, when the Dreyfus Affair broke over France, he had achieved a personal ascendancy in the French socialist movement and had done much to bring about greater unity among its various factions. Jaurès threw himself heart and soul into the struggle to secure justice for Captain Dreyfus, refusing to accept defeat even when his party refused to follow him (on the ground that socialists were under no obligation to defend a bourgeois army officer). He lost his seat in Parliament as a result of his defense of the "traitor" Dreyfus, though he regained it again in 1902 after Dreyfus' vindication and retained it to the end of his life. His part in the "Affair" was second only to that of Zola, and the triumph of the Dreyfusard cause made Jaurès a national figure, the idol of young intellectuals and the hero of all republicans and liberals. His prestige redounded to the benefit of his party, which notably increased its strength in the Chamber as a result of Jaurès' demonstration that a socialist could be a sincere and effective defender of the democratic cause.

A prodigious worker all his life, Jaurès had managed during the most hectic months of the crisis, to plan a twenty-volume *Histoire socialiste de la France* which began to appear in 1900, and to complete five volumes of the work himself between 1898 and 1902. This history—praised for its accurate and original scholarship by no less an authority than Aulard—was intended to prepare the workers of France for their future political responsibilities in much the same way that the *Encyclopédie* of the eighteenth century had educated the bourgeoisie for its revolutionary role in the generation before 1789. Jaurès also became a pioneer in adult education with his organization of "popular universities" where workers could attend evening lectures given *gratis* by qualified professors and other intellectuals who had volunteered to bring general culture to the masses.

Jaurès was never belligerently anticlerical, and he was more a pantheist than a materialist. He greatly admired Marx, but he also retained strong loyalties to Hegel, Kant, Renan, and Michelet. He agreed, however, with the bourgeois republicans that French democracy would never be safe until Church and State

were made completely separate, and that clerical influence in education must consequently be ended once and for all. Hence he played a leading part in the achievement of these purposes through the laws depriving religious congregations of their right to teach and through the abrogation (in 1905) of the Concordat with the Papacy which had been in effect since 1801. In 1904 Jaurès founded *L'Humanité* as a daily newspaper speaking officially for French socialism, and he remained its editor until his death. At the International Socialist Congress of Amsterdam in 1905 he came into conflict with the leadership of the powerful German wing of the Second International, and the influence of the latter was strong enough to defeat his motion to approve of socialist participation in bourgeois governments which were committed to the defense of democratic institutions. Jaurès loyally carried out the resolution even though it meant a considerable sacrifice of strength for the French party and the loss of some of its ablest leaders.

Beginning with the Moroccan crisis of 1905 Jaurès grew more and more alarmed by the upsurge of competitive militarism, chauvinistic nationalism, and insatiable imperialism on all sides. Though he never ceased to express his deeply patriotic devotion to France, he was convinced that the working class had no vital interests at stake in the sordid rivalries that were coming, as he thought, to divide the capitalists of Europe into two hostile camps. He hoped that the socialist movement, expressing the international solidarity of the workers, might stand as an effective barrier blocking the path to war. By insisting in each country that the government submit its case to arbitration, and by refusing to answer the call to the colors until such an offer had been made by their own country and refused by the enemy, Jaurès believed that the workers could hold in check the warlike propensities of munitions makers and recklessly ambitious militarists. An integral part of this ten-year struggle to preserve the peace was his carefully worked out proposal to substitute a democratic but highly trained militia for the existing bureaucratic and rigidly disciplined army dominated by a reactionary General Staff whose consuming ambition was to secure *revanche* (revenge) for the French defeat in 1870. He urged this reform from 1910 onward, advocating its adoption as much in the interests of flexible strategy and effective military defense as in the interests of peace.

The following selections, which include Jaurès' proposed Army Reorganization Bill and some of his commentary concerning it, are taken from *Democracy and Military Service*, edited by G. G. Coulton (London, Simpkin, 1916), which is an abbreviated translation from the French of Jaurès' *L'Armée nouvelle* (1910).



ARMY REORGANIZATION BILL

1. All able-bodied citizens from 20 to 45 are bound to help in national defense. From 20 to 34 they are in the first line, thence until 40, in the reserve; thence until 45, in the Territorial army.

2. The citizens of the Active army will be organized in divisions corre-

sponding to the regions of recruitment. Each division will include infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers.

3. The recruiting is done by districts; the citizens are drafted into units corresponding with their districts of domicile: these limits may only be slightly extended for cavalry, artillery and engineers.

4. The education of the army will be in three steps: (*a*) preparatory (boys and youths), (*b*) recruit school, and (*c*) periodical after-trainings.

5. *Preparatory*, for boys from 10 to 20. This education will be more than a mere anticipation of military drill and maneuvers. It will be, above all, an education in health and activity, by gymnastics, marchings, rhythmical drill, games of skill and swiftness, and musketry-drill.

This physical education will be directed and controlled (1) by the officers (commissioned and non-commissioned) of the units to which the boys will be drafted, (2) by masters of public and private schools, (3) by local doctors and (4) by a Council of Promotion. This Council, of 30 members, shall be elected in the regimental district by universal suffrage and shall comprise representatives of all four arms. . . .

The families of the boys and youths under exercises shall be warned that notes will be taken of the pupils' punctuality and zeal. Habitual negligence will be punished by different penalties on a cumulative scale, notably by being debarred (at least for a time) from all public functions and by being kept longer than the rest in the Recruit School. Prizes, on the other hand, will be offered for the best pupils.

6. *Recruit School*. Youths of 20 will be called for six months to the nearest garrison-town to learn company, squadron, or battery maneuvers. This work may be done in two instalments, but always within the limits of one year. The times shall be so chosen as to permit open-air drill and maneuvers on all sorts of ground.

7. *After-training*. In the 13 years of active service which they have yet to render, these soldiers shall be called out eight times for exercises and maneuvers. These will be alternately (*a*) minor maneuvers, lasting 10 days and covering a fairly narrow radius; (*b*) grand maneuvers, lasting 21 days, covering a wider radius and including instruction-camps.

Besides these compulsory maneuvers, the Officers and Councils will try to arrange as much voluntary marching and rifle-practice as possible.

Each soldier keeps his uniform and kit at home, and is personally responsible for them. Armories will be kept up, under guard of the civil and military authorities, in the towns or chief villages of the district.

In the Departments near the Eastern frontier, every soldier shall have his arms at home. Depots of artillery and cavalry shall be distributed about these

districts, and a close network of communications of every kind—railways, steam-trams, motor-cars—shall be instituted, in order that all the citizens of that region, by an immediate mobilization, may serve as a covering force for the general concentration. Aviation centers will also be created; and recruits from the whole of France, after a preliminary instruction of three months, may be called to do their remaining three months in the instruction-camps of these Eastern districts.

8. *Promotion.* The officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, will be divided into two classes—professional and civil. There will be no professional non-commissioned officers except the recruit-school instructors.

After three months of recruit-school, the smartest and best-educated recruits will be prepared to become non-coms. This choice will be made by the instructors, assisted by delegates of a Regimental Council. This Council will be composed of (a) the corps-commander, (b) representative officers of different ranks, and (c) members of the Council of Promotion (which is elected by universal suffrage). These candidates, if they are still approved after the first three months' preparation at the recruit-school, will be sent for another three months to a non-commissioned officers' school, and employed as corporals or sergeants either in their own or in a neighboring unit.

No recruit may decline such an appointment; if there are not enough voluntary candidates, the authorities may select recruits to fill the gaps.

Those who are in training at this non-com. school will receive daily pay equivalent to their loss of time. When promoted to non-com. rank, they shall be sufficiently indemnified for the time that they spend at their duties. In every public employment their rank shall give them a certain seniority. Private employers (who will be formed into Divisionary Associations) will be bound to give them employment suitable to their aptitudes. At the age of fifty, they will be entitled to a pension. Moreover, promotion will be so arranged that non-coms. may obtain seniority, and that a considerable proportion may rise to sub-lieutenant or lieutenant.

9. One-third of the commissioned officers shall be professional soldiers.

Labor organizations of all kinds—trades unions, benefit and cooperative societies—are authorized to contribute toward the expenses of such sons of their own members as have passed the necessary examinations and can study for promotion to the rank of officer.

Students who have passed the Bachelor examination shall be admitted by competition to sections of military studies created in the six most important universities, so that each main region of France shall have a section of its own. Such candidates must first have gone through their six months' recruit-school.

These studies shall last four years and shall be specialized for different branches of the army. These military students shall be taught as far as possible in conjunction with the other university students, in history, philosophy, political economy and science. They will use the neighboring recruit-schools to learn the habit of command. They shall receive a daily allowance from the State, until the end of their course.

If their families are poor, these also shall receive an allowance. After these four years, they shall be gazetted sub-lieutenants. Their university years shall be counted for seniority, in order to hasten their promotion to captain. Before each fresh promotion, they must again follow a special preparatory course of at least twenty days at the university which shall prescribe the subjects of study.

The duty of these professional officers shall be to assist the teachers and the delegates of the Council of Promotion in the aforesaid preparatory training of boys and youths; also, to help in the training of civilian officers.

The officers shall be admitted by competition to a higher military school in which they will secure advantages for further promotion, and which will prepare them for the General Staff. This higher military school, one of whose duties will be to coordinate the teaching in the universities, will give successive courses of instruction in each of the universities which has a military department.

10. Two-thirds of the officers will be civilians, chosen from among the civilian sergeants and attached to their Territorial unit, or to a neighboring unit.

A certificate of military studies, securing seniority for promotion to higher rank, will be given to any citizen who has followed special courses of study, either at the university or at the capital of his department. No man may receive a diploma as doctor, lawyer, engineer or teacher if he has not obtained this certificate of military study.

The civilian officers will receive pay. They will also enjoy a right of seniority in the different public departments in which they work. At fifty they may claim a pension. No non-commissioned officer may refuse a commission. If the number or the quality of voluntary candidates is insufficient, the authorities will have power to fill the vacancies. . . .

15. The Minister of War will aim at utilizing the whole Active army as a first-line army and will keep this object in view in all arrangements for districts of mobilization, for means of transport and for commissariat.

16. The Army thus constituted has one single object—to protect the independence and the soil of France against all aggression. All war is criminal if it is not manifestly defensive; and it can be manifestly and certainly de-

fensive only if our Government proposes to the foreign Government with which we are in dispute to settle that dispute by arbitration.

17. Any Government which plunges into war without having publicly and loyally proposed arrangement by arbitration shall be held to have committed treason against France and humanity and to be a public enemy of our country and of the human race. Any Parliament which has consented to this act shall be guilty of felony and legally dissolved. The constitutional and national duty of all citizens will then be to overthrow this Government and replace it by a Government acting in good faith, which, while perfectly safeguarding national independence, shall offer the foreign power either to forestall or to stop hostilities by a sentence of arbitration.

18. The French Government is herewith invited to complete treaties of arbitration with all countries represented at the Court of the Hague and to regulate procedure for arbitration in agreement with those countries.

THE NEW ARMY

IT IS FROM the point of view of National Defense and International Peace that I propose to begin explaining the plan for the organization of the State upon a socialistic basis, which I shall submit to Parliament in a succession of Bills.

It is imperative, both for Socialism and for the Nation, to define what the military institutions and the external policy of Republican France should be. In order to hasten and to accomplish its evolution towards entire social justice, to inaugurate, or even to prepare, a new order in which labor shall be organized and supreme, France needs above all things peace and security. We must not allow her to be tempted into the sinister diversion of foreign adventures; on the other hand, we must protect her from the threat of foreign violence.

The first problem, therefore, with which a great party of Social Reform has to deal is this:

How can we best secure the chances of peace for France and for the uncertain world which surrounds her? And if, in spite of her efforts and her wish for peace, she is attacked, how can we best secure the chances of safety, the means of Victory?

It would be childish and futile to propose a great program, a great sustained and systematic project of reform to a Country which is not its own master, which is ever at the mercy of adventurers within who are anxious to fish in troubled waters, or exposed to aggressors from without, and hence always under the threat, and on the brink, of War.

To ensure peace by a plain policy of wisdom, moderation and rectitude, by

the definitive repudiation of all aggressive enterprises, by the loyal acceptance and practice of the new methods of international law which are capable of solving conflicts without violence; on the other hand, to ensure peace, courageously, by the establishment of a defensive organization so formidable that every thought of aggression is put out of the mind of even the most insolent and rapacious: these are the highest aims of the Socialist Party. Indeed, I ought rather to say that they are the very condition of its action and of its life. It is not enough that we should aim equally and simultaneously at international peace and national independence; we must persuade the whole country, the whole democracy, of the sincerity and the strength of our aims. For how can we invite and persuade the Nation to a bold policy of social reform if it has reason to think that its very existence is menaced by our doctrines? In order to perform the task of higher justice at which Socialism aims France needs the whole of her life, that is, the whole of her liberty: and how shall the sap rise to the fruit of the tree if the roots are injured? Above all, how can the Socialist Party speak with authority in proposing that form of national defense which seems to us most efficacious, if there is a doubt in the mind of one single individual as to whether we have a real interest in national defense itself? . . .

[Socialism] must not content itself with vague formulas in favor of a Militia System, but must show precisely the strong system of organization at which it aims. Socialism must prove this by the conduct of its advocates and by their propaganda among the working-classes, by their assiduity and their zeal in the living work of military education, in the gymnastic societies and the Rifle Clubs, in those field exercises which are so much more valuable than the sterile mechanism of the barrack square. *They must show, in fine, by their joyous activity that, while they fight Militarism and War, it is not from timid egotism or a cowardly servility and indolence, and that they are as resolved and ready to secure the full working of a thoroughly popular and defensive military system as they are to beat down the breeders of strife. If they act in this manner they may defy all slander, and they will carry with them, not only the strength which their historic country has garnered through the ages, but the ideal strength of a new country, the Motherland of Labor and of Justice. . . .*

There is only one social rôle which France can fill in the world to-day, which can give universal value to her actions and inspire the souls of Frenchmen with a higher emotion in which the life of France shall vibrate in accord with the life of humanity. That rôle is to help the workers of France to achieve the rights of property with the whole strength of the Republican Democracy. It is to help the World to the attainment of peace by an emphatic repudiation

of all aggressive thought, and by an ardent propaganda in favor of arbitration and equity. The People, defending itself against aggression and acting as the champion of this ideal, would feel inspired with the nobility of a great national tradition and the grandeur of a human hope, and this great concentration of moral power would radiate Victory.

At the same time there is no need that officers should swallow any particular scheme of Social Organization. The point is that they should understand and appreciate the wealth of moral driving power which is to be found in the Socialism of the Working Classes, who aim both at national liberty and the solidarity of mankind. For without the driving power derived from such a faith and from such ideals it will be impossible for the officers adequately to fulfil their own mission, which is to protect the Mother country from every threat of attack from without.

In order to appreciate the advantages of the military system which Socialism puts forward, and which aims at identifying the Army with the Nation, the officer class must understand that the strength of the Army as an instrument of defense lies in its close union with the people, which represents productive labor and is inspired by the energy of its ideals. Thus they will understand the value of that diplomacy of peace which the working class desires to found on certain clearly defined lines.

In fact, the organization of national defense and the organization of international peace are but two different aspects of the same great task. For whatever adds to the defensive strength of France increases the hope of peace, and whatever success France attains in organizing peace on the basis of law and founding it upon arbitration and right will add to its own defensive strength. This is the reason why I put forward my projects for the organization of defense and the organization of peace as parts of the same scheme. I am not working simply for the propagation of ideas and the creation of mental tendencies. I am not devoting myself merely to the task of preaching a doctrine; my object is not merely to sweep away misunderstandings which tend to injure both the noble Country which I love and the great Party which I serve. I aim at a practical result, which is enormously important both for the present and for the future. . . .

If General Foch, and the officers whose teacher he is, will think the matter over, they will see that we have come to a critical moment for their conscience and their intellect. It is absurd and retrograde to attribute a thoroughly and essentially national character to wars kindled by the greed of rival capitalist groups. Our officers themselves must take a definite side in this great social and moral drama which the age is unrolling. They must not only realize in their minds but also proclaim in public that a policy which sets

two nations by the ears for the sake of Colonial competition or stock-exchange speculations is an infamous and fatal policy. They must proclaim publicly, as officers, that troops cannot be expected to fight with the necessary dash when they are dragged to butchery for such an ignoble traffic as this. There are only two possibilities of truly national war nowadays. If a nation which wants peace and which proves its wish for peace—a nation which has no thought of aggression or robbery—is assailed by predatory and adventurous governments in quest of some colossal plunder or some startling diversion from their domestic difficulties, then we get a truly national war. Or, again, if a people were to carry out at home, without armed proselytism, some great social reform which should provoke the fears of neighboring oligarchies and should impel them to attempt to quench this revolution in blood. Then, but in no other cases, can we call a war really national. . . .

The best way of protecting every region of France is to protect France herself. Our army, in order to secure full liberty for decisive maneuvers and for the victory which shall at last free us, may be obliged to abandon some part of our territory for a time. Yet this would be better, in the long run, even for the districts thus abandoned, than to cling so closely to the frontier as to lose all chance of a great victory. In a truly democratic and popular France, in which army affairs were understood by the general public, it would be possible to appeal to the highest intelligence of the nation. How are we to break the shock of the enemy's onset? We must have two millions of French citizens in the very first line; and this enormous mass must have free play to combine for attack when the time comes. As soon as our General Staff, animated by a thoroughly republican, popular and national spirit, has understood this, then they will persuade all their fellow-citizens to let France have full liberty of maneuver. The enemy would then have to move slowly and cautiously; for the country would have made full preparations against invasion; and he would therefore meet the resistance which would most embarrass him. He would then have to reckon neither with a limited resistance nor, on the other hand, with a compact and motionless resistance of our whole forces. He would find us resisting, not only in full force, but also with a suppleness of movement which would add to his difficulties as much as our vast numbers would add to them.

We must have a new system with more elasticity and freedom and life than the present: only thus can we command the real interest of the people. We must have a system which develops all citizens better, both physically and morally; it must give us firmer certainty and a fresh pledge of the people's will for peace. Remember that governments will be far less ready to dream of adventurous foreign policies if the mobilization of the army is the mobiliza-

tion of the nation itself. France must adopt this policy and thus take a step forward beyond all other nations, seeing that she can do so without risk; for such a system would rather strengthen than weaken her defensive force. Then the other nations will have to follow suit. Germany in especial—whatever may be her political and social reasons for putting nearly all her force and hope into her first-line army—will be compelled, in her turn, to organize and to wield masses of soldiers no less vast than the masses maneuvered by democratic France. She may begin by laughing at us; but, sooner or later, she will have to take us seriously; and then (as her own General Falkenhaus puts it) she will be obliged to deepen the sources of her army and to depend more seriously upon the older men. Then, Germany, in turn, will gain greater defensive power against invasion and less power of aggressive militarism. This will bring to Europe a new era; it will bring hopes of justice and peace which will help the French proletariat to understand the sense, the interest and the necessity of our proposals. Meanwhile we labor with passion but with perseverance to realize this scheme, since it forms part of the vast plan of social reform which in these days must be in the thoughts of all good citizens, of all good Frenchmen.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

THE FIRST great revolution in Russia came in March, 1917. The country had been at war with Germany for two and a half years. During this period a number of defeats resulted in the loss of Poland and part of the Baltic provinces, destroyed a large part of the Russian armies, and brought bitter privations to the home front.

As a consequence, dissatisfaction with the tsarist regime spread among all classes of the population. The soldiers, often without boots and rifles, yearned for peace and home; the peasants, hungry and short of hands, wanted their sons back again; the factory workers, who were being thrown out of work for lack of materials, found no bread in the shops; the middle classes were dissatisfied with the tsarist administration, and were afraid that the Court might make a separate peace with Germany in order to strengthen its position.

On March 11, 1917, a strike in Petrograd flared into revolution, which quickly spread throughout the country as the people began to depose tsarist officials and as the soldiers got rid of their tsarist officers. A provisional government was set up under Prince Lvov. This government, however, did not go far enough for the workers and peasantry. Lvov wanted to continue the war on the Allied side and even to preserve the monarchy after having clipped away its former absolutist powers. This did not satisfy the people, whose desire for bread, peace, and land remained deep and unsatisfied. Under these circumstances the arrival of Lenin in Russia on April 16 was of extreme importance. Lenin, a professional revolutionary, had spent a long exile in Switzerland. From this point of vantage he had carried on bitter opposition to the war, and had continued to organize the Russian Communist party, which, he said, must prepare itself to take power.

Thus began a series of bitter clashes between the Provisional Government, on the one hand, and the Soviets, on the other. The Soviets were committees and councils set up by the factory workers and soldiers to organize administration after the collapse of the tsarist regime. In this struggle, of course, the Communists played a large part. It culminated in a general rising in Petrograd on the part of soldiers, sailors, and factory workers. The Provisional Government was deposed and power passed into the hands of the Communist party and the Soviets.

In a series of decrees, of which those reprinted here are among the most important, the new government proclaimed the measures which were to be the foundations of the new regime. By appealing to the widest mass of the population, to the hunger for bread, peace, and land, they ensured that the government would receive the support of the overwhelming mass of the soldiers and peasantry. This is the secret of the revolution's success.

The Military Revolutionary Committee (whose Proclamation is the first of the selections below) was an organ of the Petrograd Soviet. It was set up specially for the purpose of organizing and carrying out the uprising of November against the Provisional Government. The "Declaration of the Rights of the Russian People" was worked out by Josef Stalin, People's Commissar for Na-

nationalities. Russia was composed of millions of people at many different levels of culture, speaking hundreds of different languages. Under the tsarist regime there had been much rivalry and bitterness between peoples composing the Empire; and many nationalities, such as the Poles and Finns, had been held in subjection for centuries. The new government aimed to put an end to this friction and to unite all nationalities in defense of the regime.

The decrees on the nationalization of industry, finance, and land, are at the heart of Soviet economic policy. They remain as the foundations upon which subsequent Soviet power was developed, expressing the socialist doctrine that the means of production—whether factories, soil, or subsoil wealth—shall be the inalienable property of the state and shall be developed by it in accordance with a master economic plan. Article eleven of the land nationalization decree laid the basis for the development of collective farms. Under this decree great estates were held intact and operated by state-employed labor directed by specialists. By 1919 several thousand collectives were in existence, and in subsequent years the whole country would be covered with them.

The texts of the decrees are taken from John Reed, *Ten Days That Shook the World* (New York, International Publishers, 1919); J. Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918* (Stanford University Press, 1934); and J. F. Scott and A. Baltzly, *Readings in European History Since 1814* (New York, F. S. Crofts and Co., 1931).



PROCLAMATION OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE (NOVEMBER 8, 1917)

To All Army Committees and All Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies.

The Petrograd garrison has overturned the Government of Kerensky, which had risen against the Revolution and the People. . . . In sending this news to the Front and the country, the Military Revolutionary Committee requests all soldiers to keep vigilant watch on the conduct of officers. Officers who do not frankly and openly declare for the Revolution should be immediately arrested as enemies.

The Petrograd Soviet interprets the programme of the new Government as: immediate proposals of a general democratic peace, the immediate transfer of great landed estates to the peasants, and the honest convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The people's revolutionary Army must not permit troops of doubtful morale to be sent to Petrograd. Act by means of arguments, by

means of moral suasion—but if that fails, halt the movement of troops by implacable force.

The present order must be immediately read to all military units of every branch of the service. Whoever keeps the knowledge of this order from the soldier-masses . . . commits a serious crime against the Revolution, and will be punished with all the rigour of revolutionary law.

Soldiers! For peace, bread, land, and popular government! . . .

DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE (NOVEMBER 15, 1917)

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION of the workers and peasants has begun under the common banner of deliverance.

The peasants have been freed from the yoke of the great landed proprietors, for there is no more private property in land—it is abolished.

The soldiers and sailors have been freed from the power of autocratic generals; the generals henceforth will be elected and removable at pleasure. The workers have been freed from the caprices and the arbitrariness of the capitalists, for starting from today control will be established by the workers over the workshops and the factories.

There remain but the peoples of Russia, who have been forbearing and have bided their time under the yoke and the arbitrariness, and whom it is necessary immediately to enfranchise and liberate.

In the epoch of Czarism, the peoples of Russia were aroused against each other. The results of this policy are known: massacres and pogroms on one side, enslaving of peoples on the other.

There can be no return to this shameful policy. Today it must be replaced by a voluntary and honest policy of union of the peoples of Russia.

In the epoch of imperialism, after the February revolution, when power passed into the hands of the Cadet bourgeoisie, the policy of incitation was replaced by a dastardly policy of distrust of the peoples of Russia, a policy of chicanery and provocation covering itself by the words of "liberty" and of "equality" of peoples. The results of this policy are known: increase of the antagonism between nationalities, lack of mutual confidence.

This unworthy policy of lies and mistrust, of chicanery and provocation must be definitely ended. It must be replaced today by an open and honest policy, leading to a complete mutual confidence of the peoples of Russia.

It is only thanks to such a confidence that the honest and solid union of all the peoples of Russia can be formed.

It is only thanks to such a union that the workers and peasants of Russia can be welded into a revolutionary force capable of defending itself against every attack on the part of the imperialist and annexationist bourgeoisie.

Starting on this principle, the first congress of soviets, in the month of June of this year, proclaimed the right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination.

The second congress of soviets in the month of October last confirmed this right in a more decisive and more precise fashion.

Executing the will of these soviets, the council of the people's commissaries has resolved to be guided in the question of nationalities by the following principles:

1. The equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.
2. The right of the peoples of Russia to dispose of their own fate, even to separation and the establishment of an independent state.
3. Abolition of all privileges and limitations, national or religious.
4. Free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting Russian territory.

Decrees will be prepared immediately after the creation of a commission on nationalities.

In the name of the Russian Republic,

The People's Commissary for Nationalities:

IOUSSIF DJOUGACHVILI STALIN

The President of the Council of the People's Commissaries:

V. ULIANOV

NATIONALIZATION OF BANKS (DECEMBER 27, 1917)

IN THE INTERESTS of a proper organization of the national economy, a thorough eradication of bank speculation and a complete emancipation of the toiling masses from exploitation by the banking capitalists, and in order to found a single unified State Bank for the Russian Republic which shall serve the interests of the people and the poorest classes, the Central Executive Committee decrees that:

1. Banking is hereby declared a state monopoly.
2. All existing private joint-stock banks and other banking houses are to become a part of the State Bank.
3. Assets and liabilities of establishments in the process of liquidation will be assumed by the State Bank.
4. The manner of the amalgamation of private banks with the State Bank will be determined by a special decree.

5. The temporary management of private banks is intrusted to the Council of the State Bank.
6. The interests of small depositors will be fully protected.

*THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF LAND
SOCIALIZATION (FEBRUARY 19, 1918)*

Article 1. All private ownership of land, minerals, waters, forests, and natural resources within the boundaries of the Russian Federated Soviet Republic is abolished forever.

Article 2. Henceforth all the land is handed over without compensation (open or secret) to the toiling masses for their use.

Article 3. With the exceptions indicated in this decree the right to the use of the land belongs to him who cultivates it with his own labor.

Article 4. The right to the use of the land cannot be limited on account of sex, religion, nationality, or citizenship.

Article 5. All minerals, forests, water, and other natural resources (depending on their importance) are placed at the disposition of the uезд, gubernia, regional, or federal Soviets to be controlled by them. The methods of utilizing and managing the above resources will be determined by special decree.

Article 6. All privately owned live stock, agricultural implements, and buildings of estates that are worked by hired labor shall be taken over by the land departments of the uезд, gubernia, regional, and federal Soviets without compensation.

Article 7. All buildings referred to in Article 6 and others that are of economic value, together with the agricultural enterprises attached (to these buildings), pass without compensation to the uезд, gubernia, regional, and federal Soviets.

Article 8. All persons unable to work and who are deprived of the means of livelihood in consequence of this decree may, on presenting a certificate from the local courts and land departments of the Soviet Government, receive a pension (as long as they live or until they are of age) equivalent to that of a soldier. This will obtain until a general decree is promulgated concerning the insurance of citizens unable to work.

Article 9. The distribution of agricultural land among the toilers is in the hands of the land departments of the village, volost, uезд, gubernia, regional, and federal Soviets.

Article 10. The administration of the land reserve in each republic is in the hands of the main land departments (of the republics) and the federal Soviet.

Article 11. In addition to effecting an equitable distribution of the agricultural land among the toiling agricultural population and a more efficient utilization of the national resources, the local and federal land departments have also the following duties: (a) to create conditions favorable to the development of the productive forces of the country by increasing the productivity of the soil, to develop scientific farming, and to raise the general level of agricultural knowledge among the land toilers; (b) to create a reserve of agricultural land; (c) to develop agricultural enterprises such as horticulture, apiculture, market-gardening, stock raising, dairying, etc.; (d) to hasten in certain areas the transition from a less productive to a more productive system of land cultivation by effecting a better distribution of the agricultural population; (e) to encourage the collective system of agriculture at the expense of individual farming, the former being more economical and leading to socialistic economy. . . .

Article 21. Land is given in the first place to those who wish to cultivate it not for personal profit but for the benefit of the community.

Article 22. For those who engage in agriculture for their own benefit the following order of apportioning the land will be observed:

In the first place, the land will be given to local agriculturists who have little or no land, and to hired farm laborers. The land is to be distributed in equal shares.

In the second place, it will be given to newcomers, i.e., agriculturists who arrive at a given locality after the publication of this law.

In the third place, it will be given to non-agricultural elements in the order in which they are registered by the land department of the local Soviets.

Note: In making the allotments of land, preference will be given to agricultural associations over individual farmers.

DECREE NATIONALIZING INDUSTRIES (JUNE 20, 1918)

IN ORDER to contend more effectively against economic disorganization and the disorder of provisioning, and to facilitate the dictatorship of the poor, working class, the Council of People's Commissaries decrees as follows:

Article 1. All industrial and commercial establishments hereinafter listed, with their capital and assets of any kind or description, are declared the property of the Russian Federated Socialist Republic.

[Here follows a list that includes these industries: mineral, metallurgical,

textile, electrical, lumber, tobacco, rubber, glassware, ceramics, leather, cement, steamships, public utilities, railroads, paper, candles, soap, etc.]

Article 2. The appropriate sections of the Supreme Council of National Economy (Vesenkha) are instructed to elaborate, organize and set up as quickly as possible the administration of the nationalized establishments, in conformity with the decrees already promulgated on this subject, and under the general direction of the Praesidium of the S.C.N.E. . . .

Article 3. Pending the issuance of separate, special instructions from the S.C.N.E. concerning each establishment, the establishments hereby declared the property of the R.S.F.S.R. are to be considered as leased without rent to whomsoever was the proprietor before nationalization; the former management and the proprietors are to finance the said establishments as before and to enjoy the profits therefrom.

Article 4. From the time of publication of this decree the directors and other responsible administrators of the nationalized establishments are responsible to the Soviet Republic for the safekeeping and preservation, as well as the regular functioning, of these enterprises. Persons who abandon their positions without first obtaining the consent of the Council of National Economy, or who neglect their duties in the functioning of the establishments, will not only be held accountable to the R.S.F.S.R. to the amount of their property, but will incur a criminal responsibility in the courts.

Article 5. Without exception, all the technical personnel, the personnel of the workers, administrators, directors, etc., are declared to be in the service of the R.S.F.S.R., and are to receive from the profits, and on the schedules, of the establishment the compensation which they received before the present decree nationalizing the industries was issued. Any person belonging to the technical or administrative personnel of a nationalized establishment who abandons his place shall answer for it before the revolutionary tribunal and shall be judged with all the severity of the law.

Article 6. All personal payments and accounts of administrators . . . and proprietors of nationalized establishments will be stopped pending the publication of reports making known the state of the balance sheets and the assets of each establishment.

Article 7. The administrations of all nationalized establishments are required to prepare as quickly as possible their balance sheets for July 1st, 1918.

Article 8. The S.C.N.E. is instructed to elaborate as quickly as possible and to make known to the respective establishments, detailed instructions for the organization of their administration and for the programs of workers' organizations in connection with the putting in effect of this decree.

Article 9. Establishments belonging to consumers' cooperatives, to such associations and their branches, shall not become the property of the Republic.

Article 10. The present decree shall go into effect as soon as it is signed.

The President of the Council of Commissars:

V. ULIANOV

Business Director of the Council of People's Commissars:

V. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

Secretary of the Council:

N. GORBUNOV

People's Commissars:

Tsiriup

Nagin

Rykov

THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION

IT IS A TRAGEDY of our times that German liberalism came to fruition in 1919 under circumstances of national disgrace and foreign duress. Following the failure of 1848, German liberals did try to put constitutional checks upon the Prussian monarchy and the military, but they succumbed in the 1860s to the national success of German armies and of Bismarck's diplomacy. In Germany's Second Empire, there was a popular legislature, the Reichstag, but it was subordinated to the monarch and the princes; the ministers were not responsible to it, and it could not originate any legislation, although it could veto or amend the laws which were proposed.

In the first World War, all groups in Germany supported the army and the Emperor in the beginning. As the struggle wore on, however, dissatisfactions increased, and the liberal opposition became more articulate. Yet the Emperor and the army, sure that military success in this war, as in 1866, would silence liberal criticism, refused to grant concessions until it was too late. Their promise of a responsible ministry in the summer of 1918 did not absolve them from responsibility for the war. And when President Wilson refused to treat with any but a government which, by his standards, represented the will of the people, there was no alternative for the Germans but to establish a liberal republic.

When the Kaiser fled and revolts flared up all over Germany in November, 1918, the government went by default to a coalition of Social Democrats, Liberals, and Catholics. These groups called for the election of a constitutional convention, which met at Weimar from February to the end of July, 1919, and drew up the constitution, parts of which are reprinted below.

The new constitution established Germany as a parliamentary republic with an elected president and a ministry responsible to a legislature chosen by universal suffrage. These characteristics indicate the extent to which German liberals shared fundamental ideas with liberals elsewhere. The constitution also contained some novel features, such as an Economic Council, a provision that new territories might be incorporated only with the consent of the inhabitants, and a promise that all national minorities would be protected. Otherwise the Weimar constitution was based primarily upon two German precedents.

The German constitution of 1871 was the model for the new government. There was to be an elected president instead of an emperor, a *Reichsrat* instead of the *Bundesrat*, and a *Reichstag*.¹ The federal nature of the state was preserved, the major difference being that the *Reichstag* was very carefully set at the center, instead of the periphery, of the new government. And care was taken to show that the new government was the legal and constitutional successor to the old. The second part of the constitution, the statement of individual rights, was taken largely from the declaration drawn up at Frankfurt in 1848 (see pp. 529 ff., above).

Those who supported the new republic were a majority of the German people. But they were constantly hampered in their efforts to make democracy

¹ A *national council* instead of the *Federal Council*, and a *national assembly*, or *parliament*.

work by the opposition of conservative nationalists on the right and communists on the left. Moreover, before it was fairly started, the Weimar Republic had to accept the onerous treaty of Versailles, with the result that it became, at its very inception, associated in the minds of many people with national humiliation. Add to these factors the German authoritarian tradition, the lack of experience with the democratic principles of compromise and conciliation, and the economic hardships of subsequent years, and one sees in outline the strains and stresses under which republican government broke down in 1933.



THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC, 1919

Part I: Structure and Tasks of the Federation

SECTION I: THE FEDERATION AND THE STATES

Article 1. The German Federation is a republic.

Supreme power emanates from the people.

Article 2. The federal territory consists of the territories of the German states. Other territories may be incorporated in the Federation by federal law, if their populations desire it in the exercise of the right of self-determination.

Article 4. The rules of international law, universally recognised, are deemed to form part of German federal law and, as such, have obligatory force.

Article 6. The Federation alone has power to legislate upon the following subjects, viz.

- (1) Foreign relations.
- (2) Colonial affairs.
- (3) Nationality, freedom of settlement, immigration, emigration, and extradition.
- (4) Organisation of the defence force.
- (5) Coinage.
- (6) Customs and internal free-trade.
- (7) Postal and telegraph services, including the telephone service.

Article 17. Every state must have a republican constitution. The representatives of the people must be elected by the universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage of all German subjects, men and women, in accordance with the principle of proportional representation. Each state government requires the confidence of the state parliament.

The principles governing the elections of representatives of the people apply also to communal elections. The right of voting thereat may, however, be made by a state law to depend upon a residential qualification of not more than a year.

SECTION II: THE REICHSTAG

Article 20. The Reichstag is composed of the representatives of the German people.

The deputies are, each of them, representatives of the whole people. They are subject to their conscience alone and not bound by instructions.

Article 22. The representatives are elected by the universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage of all men and women over twenty years of age in accordance with the principle of proportional representation. Election day must be a Sunday or a public holiday.

All details will be regulated by the Federal Election Law.

Article 23. The Reichstag is elected for four years. The general election must be held at the latest on the sixtieth day after that period has elapsed.

The Reichstag assembles for the first time not later than on the thirtieth day after the election.

Article 25. The President of the Federation may dissolve the Reichstag, but only once for any one cause.

The general election is held not later than on the sixtieth day after dissolution.

SECTION III: THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATION AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Article 41. The President of the Federation is elected by the whole German people.

Every German who has completed his thirty-fifth year is eligible.

Details will be laid down in a federal law.

Article 43. The President of the Federation remains in office for seven years. Re-election is permitted.

Before the expiration of that term the President of the Federation may be removed from office, upon the motion of the Reichstag, by a vote of the people. The resolution must be carried in the Reichstag by a two-thirds' majority. By such a resolution the President of the Federation is at once suspended from the further exercise of his office. The refusal of the people to sanction his removal from office is equivalent to re-election and carries with it the dissolution of the Reichstag.

Criminal proceedings may not be instituted against the President of the Federation without the consent of the Reichstag.

Article 48. If a state fails to perform the duties imposed upon it by the federal constitution or by federal law, the President of the Federation may enforce performance with the aid of the armed forces.

If public order and security are seriously disturbed or endangered within the Federation, the President of the Federation may take all necessary steps for their restoration, intervening, if need be, with the aid of the armed forces. For the said purpose he may suspend for the time being, either wholly or in part, the fundamental rights described in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, 153.

The President of the Federation has to inform the Reichstag without delay of any steps taken in virtue of the first and second paragraphs of this article. The measures to be taken are to be withdrawn upon the demand of the Reichstag.

Where delay is dangerous a state government may take provisional measures of the kind described in paragraph 2 for its own territory. Such measures are to be withdrawn upon the demand of the President of the Federation or of the Reichstag.

All details will be regulated by a federal statute.

SECTION VII: ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Article 102. Judges are independent and subject to the law only.

Article 103. The ordinary jurisdiction is exercised by the Supreme Federal Court of Judicature and by the courts of the states.

Article 105. Exceptional courts are forbidden. No one may be withdrawn from his lawful judge. The legal provisions as to military courts and courts-martial are not hereby affected. Military courts of honour are abolished.

Article 107. There must be administrative courts, in virtue of laws, both in the Federation and in the states for the protection of the individual against orders and decrees of the administrative authorities.

Part II: Fundamental Rights and Duties of Germans

SECTION I: THE INDIVIDUAL

Article 109. All Germans are equal before the law.

Men and women have in principle the same political rights and duties.

Privileges and disadvantages of birth or rank within the sphere of public law are to be abolished. Titles of nobility are considered to form part of the name only; they may no longer be conferred,

Titles may be conferred only when descriptive of an office or calling; academic degrees are not hereby affected.

Orders and decorations may not be conferred by the state.

No German may accept a title or an order from a foreign government.

Article 114. Personal freedom is inviolable. No restraint or deprivation of personal liberty by the public power is admissible, unless authorised by law.

Persons in custody are to be informed, at the latest on the following day, by what authority and upon what grounds they were ordered to be deprived of their liberty, and they must at once be given an opportunity to raise objections against such deprivation.

Article 115. The residence of every German is a sanctuary for him and inviolable. Exceptions are admitted in virtue of the laws only.

Article 116. No one may be punished for an act unless such act was legally punishable at the time when it was committed.

Article 117. The secrecy of correspondence, as well as the secrecy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications is inviolable. Exceptions may be admitted by federal law only.

Article 118. Every German is entitled within the limits of the general law freely to express his opinions by word of mouth, writing, printing, pictorial representation, or otherwise. No condition of work or employment may curtail this right, and no one may put him to a disadvantage for having made use of this right.

There is no censorship, but the law may otherwise provide as regards cinematographic performances. Legislative measures are also permitted for the purpose of combating base and pornographic publications and for the protection of the young in public shows and representations.

SECTION III: RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS BODIES

Article 137. There is no State Church.

Freedom of association is guaranteed to religious bodies. The union of religious bodies within federal territory is subject to no restrictions.

Every religious body orders and administers its affairs independently within the limits of the law applicable to all. It confers its offices without the co-operation of the state or of the civil community.

Religious bodies are incorporated according to the general provisions of the civil law.

Religious bodies that have hitherto been public corporations continue as such. On their proposition other religious bodies are to be granted the same privilege if by their constitution and membership they offer a guarantee of

permanence. If several such religious bodies, being public corporations, form a union, that union is likewise a public corporation.

Such religious bodies as are public corporations are entitled, subject to the provisions of the state laws, to levy taxes on the basis of the civil tax-rolls.

Associations formed for the cultivation in common of a world philosophy are placed on the same footing as religious bodies.

It is for the state legislatures to enact such provisions, if any, as may be necessary to give effect to these principles.

SECTION IV: EDUCATION AND SCHOOLS

Article 148. In every school the educational aims must be moral training, public spirit, personal and vocational fitness, and, above all, the cultivation of German national character and of the spirit of international reconciliation.

In public school teaching care is to be taken not to wound the susceptibilities of those holding different opinions.

Politics and civics and technical education are subjects of instruction in the schools. When leaving school, each pupil has handed to him a copy of the constitution.

Popular education, including university extension teaching, is to be furthered by the Federation, the states and the local communities.

SECTION V: ECONOMIC LIFE

Article 153. Property is guaranteed by the constitution. The content and limits of the right of property are defined by the laws.

Expropriation is admissible only in the public interest and so far as authorised by law. It is accompanied by adequate compensation unless a federal law otherwise determines. In disputes about the amount of compensation the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts may be invoked unless a federal law otherwise determines. Expropriation by the Federation as against states, local communities and associations serving public interests is admissible only if accompanied by compensation.

Property entails responsibilities. It should be put to such uses as to promote at the same time the common good.

Article 163. Every German is under a moral obligation, without prejudice to his personal liberty, to exercise his mental and physical powers in such a way as the welfare of the community requires.

Every German shall be given a chance to earn a living by economic labour. In so far as no suitable work can be found for him, provision is made for his support. All details will be regulated by special federal laws.

THE GREAT DEPRESSION

AT FIRST SIGHT the Great Depression of 1929 appears to be merely another of the more or less regularly periodic crises which have marked the history of capitalism. And yet in many respects the Great Depression differed from preceding economic dislocations. In intensity it exceeded any of its predecessors, except possibly the depression of the 1890s. It lasted longer, recovery was slower, and unlike earlier depressions it affected virtually the whole world. It neither originated in one country nor were its repercussions confined to any particular nation. From the very outset it was an international phenomenon which hit all nations, including the Soviet Union. (The first Russian Five-Year Plan was based upon certain expectations as to imports of foreign capital goods for which Russia intended to pay by the proceeds of her exports. The depression abroad led to a contraction of Russian exports which made it impossible to carry out the import plan and thus endangered the fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan as a whole.) In the United States alone, the decline of output and employment was estimated to have caused a loss of perhaps 200 billion dollars in terms of potential national income (from 1929 to 1937).

However, it would be a mistake to measure the consequences of the Great Depression merely in terms of dollars and cents. Economic depressions not only have a disruptive effect upon economic life but affect adversely the state of public health, mortality, crime, alcoholism, the marriage rate, and so on. Even more far-reaching are the psychological effects of economic fluctuations and their broader political and international effects. It will probably never be possible to evaluate accurately the social losses which result from the fact that economic instability and recurrent unemployment imply a frustration of the hopes of millions of individuals in each country. It is in this sense that it is possible to say that the Great Depression of 1929 was a turning point in the economic and political history of Europe. Europe and, indeed, the world, are still preoccupied with remedying the economic and political damage caused by this social crisis and its repercussions. Without the depression of the 1930s it is impossible to account for the growth of European fascism and the success of the Nazi movement in Germany. The latter can be fully explained only in the light of the experiences of prolonged unemployment which hit the German people after the postwar inflation wiped out whatever savings had been accumulated by the middle class. In fact there exists a significant correlation between the number of unemployed or the number of bankruptcies and the number of votes for the Nazi party in the pre-Hitler elections to the German Reichstag.

The following selection is designed to illustrate some of the economic and psychological effects of the Great Depression. It is from William H. Beveridge, *Full Employment in a Free Society* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1945).

*SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE: FULL EMPLOYMENT
IN A FREE SOCIETY*

THE GREAT DEPRESSION of 1931-32 was in itself of the same type as previous depressions. Although more severe than anything previously experienced and though its effects in Britain were increased by structural unemployment due to the secular decline of overseas demand, the cyclical movement from 1929 to 1938 is a lineal descendant of the successive fluctuations which have brought insecurity to all advanced industrial countries with an unplanned market economy ever since industry took its modern form. So far as the United States is concerned, there is no reason for confidence or even for hope that the economic system which produced this depression, if left to itself, will fail to reproduce similar depressions in future. So far as Britain is concerned, while there was after the first World War a special factor of failure of overseas demand, there is equally no assurance that other special factors will not recur and if added to cyclical fluctuation will produce intolerable unemployment.

Though it is clear that unemployment between the two wars in Britain and in America was worse than it was before the first World War, we are not in a position really to say how bad things were before 1914 because there is no full record. . . .

While the main evil of unemployment is in its social and human effects upon the persons unemployed and upon the relations between citizens, the purely material loss of material wealth involved in it is serious. If the unused labour resources of Britain between the two wars could have been brought into use it would have been possible without any further change to increase the total output of the community by approximately one-eighth. . . .

Statistics of unemployment are not just statistics. Economic arguments about unemployment are not arguments in the air. In my first study of unemployment thirty-five years ago, I illustrated the statistical record and the economic argument by an extract from the life story of one of the early labour leaders and Members of Parliament, Mr. Will Crooks. The story is so little out of date while fear of unemployment remains, that it may fitly be repeated here. It tells how, after tramping in search of work from London to Liverpool and back again, Crooks decided to try to find work outside his own trade of cooper. He went down to the docks, where by the aid of a friendly foreman he got occasional jobs as a casual labourer.

One typical day of tramping for work in London he described to me thus:

"I first went down to the riverside at Shadwell. No work to be had there. Then I called at another home and got two slices of bread in paper and walked eight miles to a cooper's yard in Tottenham. All in vain. I dragged myself back to Clerkenwell. Still no luck. Then I turned homewards in despair. By the time I reached Stepney I was dead beat.

"That year I know I walked in London till my limbs ached again. I remember returning home once by way of Tidal Basin, and turning into Victoria Docks so utterly exhausted that I sank down on a coil of rope and slept for hours."

Work came at last in an unexpected way. He was returning home after another empty day when he hailed a carman and asked for a lift.

"All right, mate, jump up," was the response.

As they sat chatting side by side, the carman learned that his companion was seeking work.

"What's yer trade?" he enquired.

"A cooper."

"Why, the governor wants a cooper."

So instead of dropping off at Poplar, Crooks accompanied the carman to the works. . . . That work was a stepping-stone to another and better job at Wandsworth. . . . Crooks was never out of work again in his life. . . .

Nothing wearies one more than walking about hunting for employment which is not to be had. It is far harder than real work. The uncertainty, the despair, when you reach a place only to discover that your journey is fruitless are frightful. I've known a man say: "Which way shall I go to-day?" Having no earthly idea which way to take, he tosses up a button. If the button comes down on one side he tracks east; if on the other, he tracks west.

In repeating this story, in 1909, I added the comment, "Nothing can better illustrate the waste of time, energy and shoe leather involved in the personal search for employment. This is the lottery which industrial disorganization makes of the workman's life. This is the process as to which comfortable ignorance has so often assured us: 'The men know where to look for work all right, they know. Lord bless you! *they* know!'"

To-day the same or worse statistics could be illustrated by countless human tales, from many sources:

The depression and apathy which finally settles down in many of the homes of these long-unemployed men lies at the root of most of the problems which are connected with unemployment. It is one of the reasons why they fail to get back to work. It is one of the reasons why the majority of them "have not the heart" for clubs or activities of other kinds, and it is one of the reasons why their homes seem so poverty stricken. "I don't know how it is," said a young married woman in Blackburn, "but these last few years since I've been out of the mills I don't seem able to take trouble, somehow; I've got no spirit for anything. But I didn't use to be like that." One of us who saw her had little doubt "how it was." The woman

looked thin and ill, and it was clear that what food there was was going to the children. . . .

My chief trouble is the monotony of a long spell of unemployment . . . monotonous and insufficient food and having nothing to do all day after the garden is done, kill all a man's interest in life. . . . Perhaps I miss cigarettes most, and I hate being chained to the home most. There is no substitute for work. . . . There is nothing I can do to keep myself efficient; odd repairs in a house are no substitute for constructional work on a steam engine. (A skilled millwright aged 49.)

The wife works while I look after the home. . . . I earned good wages (£4 a week) for years and we had saved fifty pounds when I lost my job. We have none of that fifty pounds to-day. . . . Any long spell of unemployment leaves you with little to be proud of and much to be ashamed of. Our child is still too young to realize that it is her mother who works. We carefully keep her from knowing it. (A skilled wire-drawer aged 32.)

My husband is a good man and he does a lot for me in the house. . . . But he is a changed man these last two years. He never complains, but I wish he would. It makes me unhappy to find him becoming quieter and quieter, when I know what he must be feeling. If I had someone to talk to about my troubles I should feel much better. But having to keep them to myself, as my husband does, makes everything so much worse. We quarrel far more now than we have ever done in our lives before. We would both rather be dead than go on like this. . . . He has been out of work so long now that I do not think that he will get his Old Age Pension when he is sixty-five for he will not have enough stamps on his Health Insurance Cards. . . . That will be our greatest disappointment. (A Derbyshire miner's wife aged 66, he being 62.)

The passages just quoted describe people past their first youth or with domestic ties that might limit their availability for work. But the statistics of unemployment are not confined to such people. They cover many tens of thousands in the first flush of manhood and womanhood. From a survey of *Disinherited Youth*, made under the auspices of the Carnegie United Kingdom Trustees during the years 1936-9, the following passages are taken:

From the very start of their industrial life, at fourteen, they had experienced unemployment, so that even the youngest of them at age eighteen, were personalities that had matured, during those very important and impressionable four years against a background of unemployment, in some cases slight, in other cases entirely devoid of any pattern of work as a part of life. (Page 65.)

One young man described his feeling while unemployed as "living death." Many more may have felt this, but could not express it. Unemployment due to conditions of world trade, or technological changes in industrial organization, meant nothing to them. Such explanations left them cold. What mattered to most of them was that they were fit and able for work and wanted it badly, not so much as an end

in itself as a means to an end. They needed the money, their homes needed the money, and it would be money earned by their own effort. One young wife put it thus: "Somehow when it's money that your man has worked for, it goes further."

Unemployment was a new and strange feature in the lives of a few. They were anxious and alert. They expressed their youthful impatience with the slow moving queues and hurriedly left the Employment Exchange after "signing on." Others, however, had acquired the art of patience. They had longer and more frequently recurring experiences of unemployment. With drooping shoulders and slouching feet they moved as a defeated and dispirited army. They gave their names, signed the necessary forms and shuffled out of the Exchange. This, twice a week, was the only disciplined routine with which they had to comply. (Pages 5-6.)

I am still unemployed and have no prospects. I have come to the stage when I think I will never find employment. I am glad you still take an interest in me as it is good to know someone is interested in the welfare of the unemployed. (Page 6, W.B., aged 22.)

I was an apprentice engineer and during the depression (1931) I was paid off. I got the offer of my job back but I was working then as a labourer and getting 30s. a week. I just couldn't go back to my apprentice's wage of 15s. I'm sorry now that I didn't. (Page 13.)

To tell you the truth I don't look for work now. You've got about as much chance of picking up a job nowadays as of winning the Irish Sweep. (Page 14.)

A number of the men married during the period of the Enquiry. One talked with them first as single men and then, later, as married men, and the urge to make fresh attempts "for the wife's sake" was noticeable. But one or two short spells of temporary or casual employment soon brought about a change of attitude. The young wife soon found that this fluctuation between a few days' wages and a few day's unemployment allowance instead of a regular, if minimum, weekly sum for total unemployment, upset any plan of expenditure she might make. One young mother told how, when her husband got the offer of a job, she had immediately to go and get him a pair of heavy working boots and pay them up by instalments. He thought the job would last at least a fortnight and with two weeks' pay she could manage to pay them up in full. The job lasted four days. It took her many weeks to return to her planned budget. Such a simple happening as this throws light on part of the reason for the married man's unemployment. (Page 27.)

The central problem of the lives of most of these young men is one of maintenance of self-respect. Rightly, they feel a need to take their places in society, achieving in their own right the means of living. Much of their conduct, irrational and unreasonable to outward seeming, becomes understandable if regarded in its perspective, as part of a struggle for the retention of self-respect. The attitude of many men who refuse training—a problem discussed in a later chapter—has its origin here; similarly, their resentment at being "messed about" can be understood for what it

really is—an essay in self-respect. They have no function in society. They are the unwanted hangers-on of a community in the life of which they are unable to play their full part. (Page 80.)

The facts that in certain parts of Britain even young adaptable people could find no employment and the disastrous effects upon them of prolonged idleness have been described already as among the worst blots on our record between the two wars. In the United States the position was no better: "The difficulty of youth in finding jobs has emerged as one of the most serious problems of depression. It is estimated that youth constituted a third of all the unemployed during the thirties and that at least one-third of all the employable youth were unable to find jobs." This estimate of wasted youth in the United States is no hasty judgment; it is confirmed by numerous local surveys. The record of where youth stands in free democracies in times of peace is in poignant contrast to what is required of youth in war, and to the call to youth made by the German dictator in preparing war. By this judgment of uselessness that is passed so widely on adaptable youth, the unplanned market economy of the past in Britain and in America must itself be judged and stands condemned.

Statistics of unemployment mean rows of men and women, not of figures only. The three million or so unemployed of 1932 means three million lives being wasted in idleness, growing despair and numbing indifference. Behind these three million individuals seeking an outlet for their energies and not finding it, are their wives and families making hopeless shift with want, losing their birth-right of healthy development, wondering whether they should have been born. Beyond the men and women actually unemployed at any moment, are the millions more in work at that moment but never knowing how long that work or any work for them may last. Unemployment in the ten years before this war meant unused resources in Britain to the extent of at least £500,000,000 per year. That was the additional wealth we might have had if we had used instead of wasting our powers. But the loss of material wealth is the least of the evils of unemployment, insignificant by comparison to the other evils. Even with that loss, Britain was still one of the richest countries of the world. If that unemployment could have been divided evenly over the whole people as leisure, we should have been as rich and altogether happier; we should have had a standard of living with which few countries could compare. The greatest evil of unemployment is not the loss of additional material wealth which we might have with full employment. There are two greater evils: first, that unemployment makes men seem useless, not wanted, without a country; second, that unemployment makes men live in fear and that from fear springs hate.

So long as chronic mass unemployment seems possible, each man appears as the enemy of his fellows in a scramble for jobs. So long as there is a scramble for jobs it is idle to deplore the inevitable growth of jealous restrictions, of demarcations, of organized or voluntary limitations of output, of resistance to technical advance. By this scramble are fostered many still uglier growths—hatred of foreigners, hatred of Jews, enmity between the sexes. Failure to use our productive powers is the source of an interminable succession of evils. When that failure has been overcome, the way will be open to progress in unity without fear.

The necessity of preventing the return of mass unemployment is a recurrent theme in nearly all that has been written on reconstruction problems in Britain after the war, from whatever angle it is written. "Unemployment such as darkened the world between the two wars, must not recur." "There must be no return to the disastrous waste of man-power which characterized the period between the wars." "This is the issue which in the years after the war, more than any other, will make or break the reputation of any minister of any government." Yet, as Sir John Anderson remarked exactly a year ago when discussing Assumption C of the Beveridge Report, "There is no question whether we can achieve full employment; we must achieve it. It is the central factor which will determine the pattern of national life after the war, including, perhaps, the fate of democratic institutions." The same thoughts find utterance in America: "Never again will doles and subsistence levels be tolerated." "The liberty of a democracy is not safe if its business system does not provide employment and produce and distribute goods in such a way as to sustain an acceptable standard of living."

The necessity of preventing after this war a return to the mass unemployment between the two wars is formally admitted by all. The possibility of doing so, if we are prepared to will the means as well as the end, is not open to reasonable doubt. Depressions of trade are not like earthquakes or cyclones; they are man-made. In the course of relieving unemployment, all industrial countries, but particularly Britain, have acquired much knowledge as to its causes. Though there remain some unsolved problems, the conditions without which mass unemployment cannot be prevented are known and the main lines for remedial action are clear. Finally, the experience of the two wars has shown that it is possible to have a human society in which every man's effort is wanted and none need stand idle and unpaid.

The doubt is not as to the possibility of achieving full employment but as to the possibility of achieving it without the surrender of other things that are even more precious. Some things which are more precious than full employment, that is to say, some of the essential British liberties, are surrendered

in war. But it can be shown that this surrender is required by the special nature of the war objective, and not by the full employment which is incidental to war. This surrender of essential liberties would not be required for full employment in peace and should be refused. The Policy for Full Employment set out in this Report preserves all the essential British liberties; it rejects rationing, which forbids the free spending of personal income; it rejects direction of men and women to compulsory tasks; it rejects prohibition of strikes and lock-outs. The policy preserves also other liberties which, if less essential, are deeply rooted in Britain, including collective bargaining to determine wages, and private enterprise in a large sector of industry; it preserves these lesser liberties, subject to the degree of responsibility with which they are exercised. The policy preserves possibility of change, the springs of progress and the way to rising standards of life. It is not open to the criticism that it would destroy essential liberties or lead to stagnation. Is it open to any other serious objection? It will be convenient to name some of the possible objections and give brief answers.

There are some who will say that full employment, combined with unemployment insurance, will remove the incentive of effort which depends on fear of starvation. The answer is that for civilized human beings ambition and desire for service are adequate incentives. It may be that cattle must be driven by fear. Men can and should be led by hope. The policy set out in this Report is not one of stagnation or forced equality. It does not give security for life in a particular job; it gives only the opportunity of exercising one's gifts and energies in generous rather than in ungenerous rivalry with one's fellows.

There are some who will say that the great development of State activity involved in the policy proposed here will destroy the "little man," that is to say the small, independent business. The answer is that the policy does nothing of the sort, unless risk of bankruptcy in trade depressions is essential to the existence and happiness of the "little man." The policy is simply one of setting up sufficient demand. It involves, as an implication, control of monopolies to prevent exploitation of the demand and supervision of large concerns in order to plan investment. It does not touch the "little man" at all; he can work to meet the demand like any other. He will find more scope than before, once strong demand has eliminated the slumps in which so many small businesses in the past have come to grief.

There are some who will object to the proposals of this Report on the ground that they involve an extension of the activities of Government and a consequent increase in the number of civil servants. That the proposals do involve action by Government in fields which in the past have been left wholly to

private enterprise is true; the justification for this lies in the failures of the past. In certain industries men may find themselves working directly for the community in place of being the employees of a monster business corporation. In all industries, the managers of large undertakings may find themselves both regulated and assisted in keeping what they do—in investment, in the location of industry, in price policy—in accord with national interest. But there is nothing in all the proposals of this Report to involve greater interference in the private lives of the mass of the people. On the contrary, not only will all the war time restrictions on consumption and choice of work vanish with war, but many of the previous interferences with private lives will be ended. There will be no unemployment assistance subject to a means test; the 8,000 officials of the Unemployment Assistance Board in 1938 will become unnecessary for that work. So, too, a substantial proportion of the 28,000 peace-time officials of the Ministry of Labour, that is to say, those engaged in paying or calculating unemployment benefit, will find that occupation gone, though it may be hoped that most of these will render still better service in preventing unemployment by organizing the labour market. A full employment policy involves more public control over a limited class of business undertakers, and less control over the private lives of the mass of the people. It may in the end mean fewer bureaucrats, not more.

There may be some who will say that in the emphasis laid in this Report on the need for organizing the labour market the Report treats labour as a commodity, in conflict with the opening declaration of the Charter adopted by the International Labour Conference in Philadelphia in May, 1944. There is no conflict. The Philadelphia declaration that labour is not a commodity cannot mean that men should not be free to sell their labour as men sell commodities. In a free community the right to sell or to refrain from selling one's labour by hand or brain and to bargain as to the terms on which it should be used is essential. This makes important the question of how those who desire to sell their labour and those who, whether for private profit or as representatives of a public authority, desire to buy the labour, shall be brought together. In concerning itself with these matters, the Report does not treat men themselves as a commodity; it treats them, as the Philadelphia declaration demands, as an end and not as a means; it proposes a fundamental difference to be established between the position of those who desire to sell their labour and the position of all other sellers. Only for labour should the market always be a seller's market. It should not be that always for any particular commodity.

There are some who will say that the policy of this Report subordinates the individual to the State. The answer is that this criticism directly reverses the truth. If the State is regarded as more important than the individual, it may

be reasonable to sacrifice the individual in mass unemployment to the progress and prosperity of his more fortunate fellows, as he is sacrificed in war by the dictators for their power and dominion or that of the race. If, on the other hand, the State is regarded as existing for the individual, a State which fails, in respect of many millions of individuals, to ensure them any opportunity of service and earning according to their powers or the possibility of a life free from the indignities and inquisitions of relief, is a State which has failed in a primary duty. Acceptance by the State of responsibility for full employment is the final necessary demonstration that the State exists for the citizens—for all the citizens—and not for itself or for a privileged class.

There are some who will say that the policy of this Report is a mere palliative which will block the way to further reforms like socialism or communism. The answer is that the policy does not block the way to these or other reforms, if they are good in themselves. It is a policy directed against one particular evil and includes steps which must be taken under any economic system which preserves essential liberties, in order to deal with that evil. The case for socialization of the means of production must be argued in the main on other grounds, of efficiency of production or of social justice. The Policy for Full Employment is in essence that the State takes responsibility for seeing that while any human needs are unsatisfied, they are converted into effective demand. This leaves open to argument on its merits the question whether production to meet that effective demand should be undertaken under conditions of private enterprise guided by profit, or of social enterprise working directly for use, or of a combination of these methods. . . .

Twice in this century the onset of cyclical depression has been arrested by the outbreak of war, just after the culmination of an upward movement of the trade cycle. After the boom of 1913 employment had already begun to fall in 1914. After the half-hearted boom of 1937 employment fell in 1938. In each case an incipient depression was stopped or reversed, but it needed a war to bring this about. The test of statesmanship in the near future lies in finding a way to avoid depressions without plunging into war.

That is the aim and hope of this Report. We cure unemployment for the sake of waging war. We ought to decide to cure unemployment without war. We cure unemployment in war, because war gives us a common objective that is recognized by all, an objective so vital that it must be attained without regard to cost, in life, leisure, privileges or material resources. The cure of unemployment in peace depends on finding a common objective for peace that will be equally compelling on our efforts. The suggestion of this Report is that we should find that common objective in determination to make a Britain free of the giant evils of Want, Disease, Ignorance and Squalor. We

cure unemployment through hate of Hitler; we ought to cure it through hate of these giant evils. We should make these in peace our common enemy, changing the direction and the speed rather than the concentration and strength of our effort. Whether we can do this, depends upon the degree to which social conscience becomes the driving force in our national life. We should regard Want, Disease, Ignorance and Squalor as common enemies of all of us, not as enemies with whom each individual may seek a separate peace, escaping himself to personal prosperity while leaving his fellows in their clutches. That is the meaning of social conscience; that one should refuse to make a separate peace with social evil. Social conscience, when the barbarous tyranny abroad has ended, should drive us to take up different arms in a new war against Want, Disease, Ignorance, and Squalor at home.

Want, arising mainly through unemployment and other interruptions of earnings, to a less extent through large families, is the subject of my earlier Report on Social Insurance. It could, without question, be abolished by the whole-hearted acceptance of the main principles of that Report. The worst feature of Want in Britain shortly before this war was its concentration upon children. Wages were not and probably could not be adjusted in any way to family responsibilities; the various social insurance schemes for providing income when wages failed either ignored family responsibilities entirely—as in health insurance or workmen's compensation—or made inadequate provision for them—as in unemployment insurance. By consequence there followed a sinister concentration of Want on those who would suffer from it most helplessly and most harmfully. Nearly half of all the persons discovered in Want by the social surveys of British cities between the wars were children under fifteen. Nearly half of all the working-class children in the country were born into Want. It is certain on general principles and can be shown by experiment that the bodies and minds of children respond directly and automatically to better environment, that the citizens of the future will grow up taller, stronger, abler, if in childhood all of them have had good feeding, clothing, housing and physical training. Want and its concentration on children between the wars represented a destruction of human capital none the less real because it did not enter into any economic calculus. The decision to destroy Want should be taken at once, for its own sake, to free Britain from a needless scandal and a wasting sore. That decision would deliver at the same time the first blow in the war against Idleness. The redistribution of income that is involved in abolishing Want by Social Insurance and children's allowances will of itself be a potent force in helping to maintain demand for the products of industry, and so in preventing unemployment.

Disease is in part a subject of my earlier Report on Social Insurance and Al-

lied Services. But on this side the Report is limited to proposing that medical treatment of all kinds should be secured to all persons, free of all charge on treatment, and to discussing some of the general issues involved in the proposal. The acceptance of this proposal, announced by the Government in the Parliamentary Debate on that Report in February, 1943, forms the starting-point of the White Paper on the National Health Service which was published in March, 1944. This White Paper, outlining for discussion with the medical profession, the hospitals and the local authorities concerned, a scheme for the organization of a comprehensive health service free for all, opens the way to a revolution in the health of the people. Removal of any economic barrier between patient and treatment is an essential negative step for bringing avoidable disease to an end. But while essential, it is only a small part of all that is required. There is needed an immense positive extension both of preventive treatment and of curative treatment, through more and more hospitals, more and more doctors, dentists and other practitioners. There is needed, as an essential part of the attack on disease, a good policy of nutrition carried through by the wisdom of the State in using science. Here is a large field for communal outlay, using resources for purposes of high priority, in preserving the health and vigour of all.

Ignorance is an evil weed, which dictators may cultivate among their dupes, but which no democracy can afford among its citizens. Attack on it involves an immense programme of building schools, training and employing teachers, providing scholarships to fit opportunity to young ability wherever it is found. The first essential steps for that have been taken in the framing and introduction of the new Education Bill; there remains the task of pressing the attack on Ignorance with vigour and speed on all fronts. Learning should not end with school. Learning and life must be kept together throughout life; democracies will not be well governed till that is done. Later study should be open to all, and money, teaching and opportunities must be found for that as well. In the development of education lies the most important, if not the most urgent, of all the tasks of reconstruction. The needs of civilized men are illimitable, because they include the wise, happy enjoyment of leisure.

Squalor means the bad conditions of life for a large part of our people which have followed through the unplanned disorderly growth of cities, through our spoiling more and more country by building towns without building good towns, through our continuing to build inadequate, ill-equipped homes that multiply needlessly the housewife's toil. The greatest opportunity open in this country for raising the general standard of living lies in better housing, for it is in their homes and in the surroundings of their homes that the greatest disparities between different sections of the community persist to-day.

Better housing means not merely better houses but houses in the right environment, in the right relation to places of work and recreation and communal activity. Town and country planning must come before housing, and such planning, as one enquiry after another has shown, is impossible, until we resolve justly but firmly the problem of land values. Here is the greatest urgency of all. The attack on Squalor cannot wait, but it must be a planned attack. The war will leave a yawning gap, which must be filled without delay by building more homes. We must have housing at once but we must have town and country planning before housing.

The Policy for Full Employment outlined in this Report is a policy of spending and doing. It is a policy of common action. If we attack with determination, unity and clear aim the four giant evils of Want, Disease, Ignorance and Squalor, we shall destroy in the process their confederate—the fifth giant of Idleness enforced by mass unemployment. The carrying out of the policy depends on the positive acceptance of a new responsibility by the State, that of ensuring adequate demand for the products of industry, however industry itself may be organized. The policy preserves all the essential British liberties; it uses Britain's political advantages to carry through a task which can be carried through only by the power of the State. These political advantages are great and should be used. The constitution of Britain concentrates in the Government of the day the great power without which the problems of a great society cannot be solved. It makes the use of that power subject to continual scrutiny by the citizens and their representatives, and the power itself to recall; the essence of democracy is effective means of changing the Government without shooting. Finally, Britain has a public service, central and local, second to none in the world for efficiency, integrity and devotion to duty. Through these advantages, Britain has a chance of showing, sooner and more easily than any other large nation, that democracy can order peace as well as war better than the dictators do. The British people can win full employment while remaining free.

But they have to win it, not wait for it. Full employment, like social security, must be won by a democracy; it cannot be forced on a democracy or given to a democracy. It is not a thing to be promised or not promised by a Government, to be given or withheld as from Olympian heights. It is something that the British democracy should direct its Government to secure, at all costs save the surrender of the essential liberties. Who can doubt that full employment is worth winning, at any cost less than surrender of those liberties? If full employment is not won and kept, no liberties are secure, for to many they will not seem worth while.

XIV

TOTALITARIAN LIFE AND POLITICS

BENITO MUSSOLINI

BENITO MUSSOLINI, the son of a blacksmith and of a schoolteacher, was born in 1883. He was successively a schoolteacher, an unemployed laborer, the editor of the leading Socialist daily, the founder of the "anti-Socialist" Fascist Party, the dictator of Italy, the arbiter of Europe's dramatic parley at Munich, and a puppet of Hitler in the rapidly shrinking remainders of German-occupied Italy.

Before World War I he had led the extreme revolutionary wing of Socialism to a split with the "reformists," who advocated some degree of collaboration with the government and the nation rather than internationalistic class struggle. He was in turn expelled from the party when he advocated Italy's participation in the war against Germany and Austria, and founded a new organization (Fascis of Revolutionary Action: January, 1915) of which his new daily, *Il Popolo d'Italia*, became the organ. By the end of the war he had drawn much closer to the nationalist movement and party, which later was absorbed in his own National Fascist Party, founded in 1919. The party engaged in a struggle against the left-wing Socialist, Communist, and Populist (Christian-Socialist) parties, which was marked by acts of violence on both sides. While still proclaiming the "popular" and "anti-bourgeois" character of his movement, Mussolini was now deriving most of his support from conservative elements.) In October, 1922, the "march on Rome" of his illegal military formations (Blackshirts) enabled him to capture the power, not without the concurrence of the Savoy monarchy. Then, from 1922 to 1940, Mussolini built up what he called a "totalitarian" state, and led it to clamorous if superficial imperialistic triumphs in the face of the hesitant policy of the "democracies." He crushed all organized opposition, which had brought him close to defeat in 1923-24, and wasted away in the pursuit of megalomaniac ambitions the meager resources of his country, which he had found on the way to recovery from the exertions of World War I. The performance of Italian troops in World War II bared the political and military weakness of the regime and caused its collapse, already foreshadowed by the great strikes in March, 1943, in the larger centers of northern Italy. In July, 1943, with Sicily already invaded by the Allied troops, the king whom Mussolini had made an emperor ousted and imprisoned his no longer successful premier. Rescued by German troops, Il Duce vainly attempted to rally Italian support by a nominal return to the "social republic." His last regime crumbled under the combined blows of Allied troops and Italian Partisan forces. He himself was shot in April, 1945, by Partisans who recognized him as he was trying to escape to Switzerland disguised as a German soldier.

Nothing is harder than defining Mussolini's ideas. It is true that one of the two selections that follow is an article appearing in the Italian *Encyclopedia* and signed by Mussolini, wherein a "theory" of Fascism is outlined somewhat systematically. (The article was actually prepared by a philosopher, Giovanni Gentile, who later was to be killed by an unknown opponent of Fascism.) But the

article is merely a rationalization of an already existing movement. Mussolini himself was in turn a supporter of anticlericalism and of the Vatican, of philo-Semitism and of racial anti-Semitism, of anti-Germanism and of alliance with Germany, of disarmament and of militarism.

Probably the writer who had the deepest influence on him was George Sorel (1847-1922), a Frenchman of equally inconsistent tendencies who pointed out in the "myth" the motive force for the social regeneration of a people. "In order that a man may suppress the tendencies against which morality struggles," said Sorel, "he must have in himself some source of conviction which must dominate his whole consciousness, and act before the calculations of reflection have time to enter his mind."

A myth was necessary to Mussolini in order to conquer the "decadent democracies" he despised. Like a Renaissance *condottiere*,¹ Mussolini was cynical enough to fight for whatever cause might lead him to power—and probably he was imaginative enough to believe in the idea that opportunism had led him to choose. Corporativism was one of the myths with which he toyed for a long time. The "Charter of Labor," providing for compulsory arbitration of industrial conflicts by representatives of both the employers and the laborers under the presidency of a neutral judge, was issued in 1927. But it was only in 1933 that the Corporations were formed—the second selection is part of Mussolini's speech on occasion of their foundation—and the powerless Chamber of Deputies was not replaced by a Chamber of the Fasces and the Corporations until December, 1938. A superficial observer, only, might have believed that this system fulfilled the program of the English Guild Socialists and of many Catholic thinkers for a truly corporative state. The arbitrators and the representatives, like all public authorities under the Fascist regime, were arbitrarily chosen by the government and did not really represent the laborers and the employers in whose name they spoke.

Italy was the first country to be ruled by Fascism; the name itself recalled the fasces of the Roman lictors and implied a claim to regeneration of Italy's ancient world empire. Many of the early supporters of Fascism were ultranationalists, disappointed by Italy's small place in the world and more particularly by what seemed the failure of both Italian socialists and foreign public opinion to recognize the contribution of the Italian armed forces in World War I. Fascism ultimately led to disaster, but in its days of success greatly enhanced the prestige of the country. Demands for expansion were also made more urgent by the pressure of a growing population, since the war and, later, laws restricting immigration to the United States and other countries deprived the landless laborer and the unemployed worker from his usual outlet abroad. Mussolini endeavored to increase this pressure by laws intended to keep the birth rate at a high level, thereby creating new pretexts for further demands. Many left-wing elements were attracted to Fascism by its early program, which in 1919 included extension of electoral franchise to the women, abolition of the Senate (whose members were appointed by the king), a constituent assembly to decide whether a republican form of government should be adopted, confiscation of ecclesiastical property, and a capital levy which would have eliminated the larger fortunes. Though the later policy of Fascism was the very negation of this program, a number of

¹ *Adventurer*.

former socialists continued to be entranced by Mussolini's constant lip service to "the pursuit of a better social justice." On the other hand, immoderate fear of a bolshevik revolution converted to Fascism a large number of wealthy bourgeois and aristocrats, even though the revolution by 1921 was clearly out of the question in Italy. Other adherents were adventure-loving youths and unprincipled mobsters.

Even so, the Fascist Party, unlike Hitler's followers in Germany, never obtained substantial popular support while the choice was open. In the last free elections (1921) only thirty-odd Fascist candidates obtained seats in a House of Representatives which included more than 500 members. After the march on Rome, Mussolini gradually suppressed all political liberties and ordered many tens of thousand sentences for political "crimes." Success increased the number of the converts, and the Concordat with the Pope (1929) brought to Mussolini the support of the Catholic hierarchy, though not always that of the lower clergy. Yet it is doubtful that he ever could count on the unqualified allegiance of the majority of his people. Paradoxically enough, he probably attained the largest popular support at the time of the Ethiopian war, which inaugurated the series of "totalitarian" aggressions. Though the war itself was not popular, skillful propaganda made many Italians feel that the "have" nations were conspiring to choke a "have-not" people reaching for much-needed breathing space. But the Spanish war, where Fascist troops were defeated by the Italian anti-fascist "Garibaldi" legion at Guadalajara, was resented by the nation, and the alliance with Germany and the anti-Semitic laws alienated from Mussolini many of his hitherto staunchest supporters.

It was inevitable that Fascism, having crushed opposition at home, should lead to war. All of Mussolini's activity was aimed at preparing the Italians morally and materially for imperialistic expansion. He worked toward this aim almost openly, by preaching the worship of the State and of heroic adventure; by stressing the Roman imperial tradition and the need to enlarge the borders of an overcrowded fatherland; by drilling even the children in almost military organizations and subjecting the adults to iron discipline; by promoting agricultural self-sufficiency and intensifying the search for minerals indispensable for war; by increasing the size of the armed forces and by fostering Fascist movements in other states which might later prove valuable allies. The most surprising fact is that the democracies failed to see the danger, and their leaders often chose to praise the man who had "stopped bolshevism" and who had "made trains run on schedule." Beneath a brilliant exterior of Fascist public works planned to impress the foreign visitor, there were poverty-stricken masses and a dissatisfied intellectual class.

The first selection is from Volume XIV of the Italian *Encyclopedia* (1932); the second selection is from a speech delivered in 1933.



THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF FASCISM

WHEN, in the now distant March of 1919, I summoned a meeting at Milan through the columns of the *Popolo d'Italia* of the surviving members of the Interventionist Party who had themselves been in action, and who had followed me since the creation of the Fascist Revolutionary Party (which took place in the January of 1915), I had no specific doctrinal attitude in my mind. I had a living experience of one doctrine only—that of Socialism, from 1903-4 to the winter of 1914—that is to say, about a decade: and from Socialism itself, even though I had taken part in the movement first as a member of the rank and file and then later as a leader, yet I had no experience of its doctrine in practice. My own doctrine, even in this period, had always been a doctrine of action. A unanimous, universally accepted theory of Socialism did not exist after 1905, when the revisionist movement began in Germany under the leadership of Bernstein, while under pressure of the tendencies of the time, a Left Revolutionary movement also appeared, which though never getting further than talk in Italy, in Russian Socialistic circles laid the foundations of Bolshevism. Reformation, Revolution, Centralization—already the echoes of these terms are spent—while in the great stream of Fascism are to be found ideas which began with Sorel, Péguy, with Lagardelle in the “Mouvement Socialiste,” and with the Italian trades-union movement which throughout the period 1904-14 was sounding a new note in Italian Socialist circles (already weakened by the betrayal of Giolitti) through Olivetti's *Pagine Libere*, Orano's *La Lupa*, and Enrico Leone's *Divenire Sociale*.

After the War, in 1919, Socialism was already dead as a doctrine: it existed only as a hatred. There remained to it only one possibility of action, especially in Italy, reprisals against those who had desired the War and who must now be made to “expiate” its results. The *Popolo d'Italia* was then given the subtitle of “The newspaper of ex-service men and producers,” and the word producers was already the expression of a mental attitude. Fascism was not the nursling of a doctrine worked out beforehand with detailed elaboration; it was born of the need for action and it was itself from the beginning practical rather than theoretical; it was not merely another political party but, even in the first two years, in opposition to all political parties as such, and itself a living movement. The name which I then gave to the organization fixed its character. And yet, if one were to re-read, in the now dusty columns of that date, the report of the meeting in which the *Fasci Italiani di combattimento*²

² [Italian combatant groups.]

were constituted, one would there find no ordered expression of doctrine, but a series of aphorisms, anticipations, and aspirations which, when refined by time from the original ore, were destined after some years to develop into an ordered series of doctrinal concepts, forming the Fascist political doctrine—different from all others either of the past or the present day.

"If the bourgeoisie," I said then, "think that they will find lightning-conductors in us, they are the more deceived; we must start work at once. . . . We want to accustom the working-class to real and effectual leadership, and also to convince them that it is no easy thing to direct an industry or a commercial enterprise successfully. . . . We shall combat every retrograde idea, technical or spiritual. . . . When the succession to the seat of government is open, we must not be unwilling to fight for it. We must make haste; when the present régime breaks down, we must be ready at once to take its place. It is we who have the right to the succession, because it was we who forced the country into the War, and led her to victory. The present method of political representation cannot suffice, we must have a representation direct from the individuals concerned. It may be objected against this program that it is a return to the conception of the corporation, but that is no matter. . . . Therefore, I desire that this assembly shall accept the revindication of national trades-unionism from the economic point of view." . . .

And above all, Fascism, the more it considers and observes the future and the development of humanity quite apart from political considerations of the moment, believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. It thus repudiates the doctrine of Pacifism—born of a renunciation of the struggle and an act of cowardice in the face of sacrifice. War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it. All other trials are substitutes, which never really put men into the position where they have to make the great decision—the alternative of life or death. Thus a doctrine which is founded upon this harmful postulate of peace is hostile to Fascism. And thus hostile to the spirit of Fascism, though accepted for what use they can be in dealing with particular political situations, are all the international leagues and societies which, as history will show, can be scattered to the winds when once strong national feeling is aroused by any motive—sentimental, ideal, or practical. . . .

Such a conception of life makes Fascism the complete opposite of that doctrine, the base of so-called scientific and Marxian Socialism, the materialist conception of history; according to which the history of human civilization can be explained simply through the conflict of interests among the various

social groups and by the change and development in the means and instruments of production. That the changes in the economic field—new discoveries of raw materials, new methods of working them, and the inventions of science—have their importance no one can deny; but that these factors are sufficient to explain the history of humanity excluding all others is an absurd delusion. Fascism, now and always, believes in holiness and in heroism; that is to say, in actions influenced by no economic motive, direct or indirect. And if the economic conception of history be denied, according to which theory men are no more than puppets, carried to and fro by the waves of chance, while the real directing forces are quite out of their control, it follows that the existence of an unchangeable and unchanging class-war is also denied—the natural progeny of the economic conception of history. And above all Fascism denies that class-war can be the preponderant force in the transformation of society. These two fundamental concepts of Socialism being thus refuted, nothing is left of it but the sentimental aspiration—as old as humanity itself—towards a social convention in which the sorrows and sufferings of the humblest shall be alleviated. But here again Fascism repudiates the conception of “economic” happiness, to be realized by Socialism and, as it were, at a given moment in economic evolution to assure to everyone the maximum of well-being. Fascism denies the materialist conception of happiness as a possibility, and abandons it to its inventors, the economists of the first half of the nineteenth century: that is to say, Fascism denies the validity of the equation, well-being=happiness, which would reduce men to the level of animals, caring for one thing only—to be fat and well-fed—and would thus degrade humanity to a purely physical existence.

After Socialism, Fascism combats the whole complex system of democratic ideology, and repudiates it, whether in its theoretical premises or in its practical application. Fascism denies that the majority, by the simple fact that it is a majority, can direct human society; it denies that numbers alone can govern by means of a periodical consultation, and it affirms the immutable, beneficial, and fruitful inequality of mankind, which can never be permanently leveled through the mere operation of a mechanical process such as universal suffrage. The democratic régime may be defined as from time to time giving the people the illusion of sovereignty, while the real effective sovereignty lies in the hands of other concealed and irresponsible forces. Democracy is a régime nominally without a king, but it is ruled by many kings—more absolute, tyrannical, and ruinous than one sole king, even though a tyrant. This explains why Fascism, having first in 1922 (for reasons of expediency) assumed an attitude tending towards republicanism, renounced this point of

view before the march to Rome; being convinced that the question of political form is not today of prime importance, and after having studied the examples of monarchies and republics past and present reached the conclusion that monarchy or republicanism are not to be judged, as it were, by an absolute standard; but that they represent forms in which the evolution—political, historical, traditional, or psychological—of a particular country has expressed itself. . . .

Fascism has taken up an attitude of complete opposition to the doctrines of Liberalism, both in the political field and the field of economics. There should be no undue exaggeration (simply with the object of immediate success in controversy) of the importance of Liberalism in the last century, nor should what was but one among many theories which appeared in that period be put forward as a religion for humanity for all time, present and to come. Liberalism only flourished for half a century. . . .

Fascism uses in its construction whatever elements in the Liberal, Social, or Democratic doctrines still have a living value; it maintains what may be called the certainties which we owe to history, but it rejects all the rest—that is to say, the conception that there can be any doctrine of unquestioned efficacy for all times and all peoples. Given that the nineteenth century was the century of Socialism, of Liberalism, and of Democracy, it does not necessarily follow that the twentieth century must also be a century of Socialism, Liberalism, and Democracy: political doctrines pass, but humanity remains; and it may rather be expected that this will be a century of authority, a century of the Left, a century of Fascism. For if the nineteenth century was a century of individualism (Liberalism always signifying individualism) it may be expected that this will be the century of collectivism, and hence the century of the State. . . .

In 1929, at the first five-yearly assembly of the Fascist régime, I said:

"For us Fascists, the State is not merely a guardian, preoccupied solely with the duty of assuring the personal safety of the citizens; nor is it an organization with purely material aims, such as to guarantee a certain level of well-being and peaceful conditions of life; for a mere council of administration would be sufficient to realize such objects. Nor is it a purely political creation, divorced from all contact with the complex material reality which makes up the life of the individual and the life of the people as a whole. The State, as conceived of and as created by Fascism, is a spiritual and moral fact in itself, since its political, juridical, and economic organization of the nation is a concrete thing: and such an organization must be in its origins and development a manifestation of the spirit. The State is the guarantor of security both

internal and external, but it is also the custodian and transmitter of the spirit of the people, as it has grown up through the centuries in language, in customs, and in faith. And the State is not only a living reality of the present, it is also linked with the past and above all with the future, and thus transcending the brief limits of individual life, it represents the immanent spirit of the nation. The forms in which States express themselves may change, but the necessity for such forms is eternal. It is the State which educates its citizens in civic virtue, gives them a consciousness of their mission and welds them into unity; harmonizing their various interests through justice, and transmitting to future generations the mental conquests of science, of art, of law and the solidarity of humanity. It leads men from primitive tribal life to that highest expression of human power which is Empire: it links up through the centuries the names of those of its members who have died for its existence and in obedience to its laws, it holds up the memory of the leaders who have increased its territory and the geniuses who have illumined it with glory as an example to be followed by future generations. When the conception of the State declines, and disunifying and centrifugal tendencies prevail, whether of individuals or of particular groups, the nations where such phenomena appear are in their decline." From 1929 until today, evolution, both political and economic, has everywhere gone to prove the validity of these doctrinal premises. . . .

For Fascism, the growth of empire, that is to say the expansion of the nation, is an essential manifestation of vitality, and its opposite a sign of decadence. Peoples which are rising, or rising again after a period of decadence, are always imperialist; any renunciation is a sign of decay and of death. Fascism is the doctrine best adapted to represent the tendencies and the aspirations of a people, like the people of Italy, who are rising again after many centuries of abasement and foreign servitude. But empire demands discipline, the coordination of all forces and a deeply felt sense of duty and sacrifice: this fact explains many aspects of the practical working of the régime, the character of many forces in the State, and the necessarily severe measures which must be taken against those who would oppose this spontaneous and inevitable movement of Italy in the twentieth century, and would oppose it by recalling the outworn ideology of the nineteenth century—repudiated wheresoever there has been the courage to undertake great experiments of social and political transformation: for never before has the nation stood more in need of authority, of direction, and of order. If every age has its own characteristic doctrine, there are a thousand signs which point to Fascism as the characteristic doctrine of our time. For if a doctrine must be a liv-

ing thing, this is proved by the fact that Fascism has created a living faith; and that this faith is very powerful in the minds of men, is demonstrated by those who have suffered and died for it.

Fascism has henceforth in the world the universality of all those doctrines which, in realizing themselves, have represented a stage in the history of the human spirit.

THE CORPORATE STATE

. . . ON OCTOBER 16 of the Tenth Year, before the thousands of Party officers gathered in the Piazza Venezia at Rome for the celebration of the tenth anniversary, I asked: Is this crisis that has tortured us for four years—we have now lived through one month of the fifth—is this crisis *in* our system or *of* it? A grave question, a question which can not be answered immediately. To answer it, it is necessary to reflect, to reflect long and to arm oneself with facts. Today I reply: The crisis has penetrated the system so profoundly that it has become a crisis *of* the system. It is no longer a mere lesion, it is a constitutional disease. Today we can assert that the capitalistic method of production has been superseded, and with it the theory of liberal economics that illustrated and defended it.

I want to trace for you in broad outline the history of capitalism in the last century, which might be called the century of capitalism. But first of all, what is capitalism? We do not need to confuse capitalism and the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie is something else. It is a mode of being that may be great or petty, heroic or philistine. Capitalism, on the contrary, is a particular type of production, it is a system of industrial production. In its perfect expression capitalism is a system of mass production for mass consumption, by mass finances, that is, by issuing incorporated capital, both national and international. Capitalism is therefore industrial and has not shown great importance in the field of agriculture.

I would distinguish three periods in the history of capitalism: the dynamic period, the static period, and the decadent period. The dynamic period extends from 1830 to 1870. It coincides with the introduction of the power-loom and the appearance of the steam-engine, the rise of the factory. The factory is the typical manifestation of industrial capitalism. This is the period of big margins, and hence the law of free competition and the struggle of all against all had full play. The fallen and the dead are picked up by the Red Cross. In this period, too, there are crises, but they are clinical crises, not long or universal. . . .

What took place in America we should perhaps not call heroic. That is a

word we must reserve for affairs of a strictly military nature; but the conquest of the Far West was certainly difficult and exacting and had the risks and the losses of a great conquest.

This dynamic period of capitalism lasted from the appearance of the steam-engine to the opening of the Suez Canal. Forty years. During these forty years the State was an onlooker, took no part, and the theorists of liberalism said to it: You have only one duty—to see that your existence should not even be suspected in the realm of economics. The better the government, the less it concerns itself with the problems of the economic system. Hence the economic system in all its manifestations was limited only by the penal code and the code of commerce.

But after 1870 this period changes. No longer the struggle for existence, free competition, survival of the strongest. We notice the first symptoms of weariness and decline in the capitalistic world. The era of cartels, of syndicates, of consortiums, of “trusts.” . . .

Having arrived at this point, super-capitalism draws its inspiration and its justification from a Utopian dream, the dream of unlimited consumption. The ideal of super-capitalism would be the standardization of human life from the cradle to the grave. Super-capitalism would like to have all babies born uniform in size so that cradles could be standardized; they want all children to like the same toys; they want all men to wear the same livery, all to read the same books, all to have the same tastes in the movies, all, in short, to become a so-called utilitarian machine. This is not a caprice, but it is the logic of events, for only in this way can super-capitalism project its plans. When did capitalistic enterprise cease to be an economic fact? When its dimensions made of it a social fact.

And this is precisely the moment in which capitalistic enterprise, finding itself in difficulty, pitched itself straight into the arms of the State, and this is the moment in which State intervention was born and since when it has become more and more necessary. And those who had ignored it, now sought it frantically. We have reached the point where if in all the nations of Europe the State should go to sleep for twenty-four hours, that interval would be enough to precipitate disaster. There is no longer any economic field in which the State can not interfere. If, purely hypothetically, we wanted to give way to this current capitalism, we should fly into State capitalism, which is nothing else but State socialism up-side-down; we should arrive in one way or another at the exercise of national economy!

This is the crisis of the capitalistic system taken in its universal significance. But for us there is a specific crisis which we face particularly as Italians and Europeans. It is a European crisis, typically European. Europe is no longer

the continent that directs human civilization. To this dramatic conclusion men must come who think for themselves and for others. There was a time when Europe was the political, spiritual, and economic leader of the world. Politically dominant by means of her political institutions. Spiritually by means of all that the spirit of Europe had produced throughout the centuries. Economically because it was the only continent completely industrialized. But, across the Atlantic, a great industrial and capitalistic enterprise has developed. In the Far East is Japan which, having made a contact with Europe through the war of 1905, is encroaching on the big markets of the West. Here is the political problem. I talk of politics here because this Assembly, too, is strictly political. Europe can still try to regain the leadership of universal civilization if she finds a "minimum" of political unity. We must carry on as heretofore. Europe's political goal can not be achieved unless certain grave injustices are first rectified.

We have come to an extremely serious point in this situation: the League of Nations has lost everything that gave it political significance or historical importance. Even the country that invented it has failed to join it. Russia, the United States, Japan, and Germany are absent. This League of Nations was founded on one of those principles that sound very beautiful at first but when considered and analyzed and taken apart reveal their absurdity. What other diplomatic means exist that can re-establish contacts among the nations? Locarno? Locarno is another matter. Locarno has nothing to do with disarmament; that is no way out. A great silence has reigned of late concerning the Four Power Pact. Nobody talks of it, but everybody thinks about it. It is precisely for this reason that we do not intend to start over again or to speed up a situation that is bound to mature logically and inevitably.

Let us ask ourselves now: Is Italy a capitalistic nation? You have never asked this question? If by capitalism one means that totality of manners, customs, and technical progress now common to all the nations, it can be said that Italy, too, is capitalistic. But if we go into the subject and examine the situation from a statistical point of view, that is, from the mass of different economic groups of our population, we have the facts in the case which will permit us to say that Italy is not a capitalistic nation in the current meaning of that word.

April 21, 1931 there were 2,943,000 farmers on their own land; 858,000 tenant-farmers. There were 1,631,000 share-croppers; and the other farmers, farm-hands, and agricultural day-laborers numbered 2,475,000. The total of the population directly and immediately dependent on agriculture is 7,900,000. There are 523,000 industrialists; 841,000 merchants; 724,000 artisans, dependent or independent; 4,283,000 wage earners; 849,000 domestic servants and

porters; the armed forces of the state number 541,000, including, of course, the police force. In the professions and liberal arts there are 553,000; public and private office employees, 905,000. The total in this and the above groups is 17,000,000. There are few landed proprietors and large landowners in Italy—201,000; 1,945,000 students; 11,244,000 housewives. Then there is the item called other non-professional occupations—1,295,000—an item which can be interpreted in various ways.

You see at once from this picture that the economic life of Italy is varied, complex, and can not be defined according to one pattern. Furthermore the industrialists, who make up the imposing number of 523,000, almost all operate either small or medium-sized concerns. The small concern may go from a minimum of 50 employees to a maximum of 500. From 500 to five or six thousand is the medium-sized industry; above that is big industry, and only here and there does Italian industry overflow into super-capitalism.

This survey demonstrates also how wrong Karl Marx was, who, following his own apocalyptic schemes, pretended that human society could be divided into two classes neatly distinguished from each other and eternally irreconcilable. Italy, in my opinion, must remain a nation of mixed economy, with a strong agriculture, which is the base of all, inasmuch as it is true that what little revival of industry there has been of late has been due, according to the unanimous opinion of those who have studied the matter, to the respectable yields of agriculture in these years. A healthy small or medium sized industry, a bank that does not engage in speculation, a commerce that performs its irreplaceable duty of distributing merchandise to consumers rapidly and reasonably.

In my statements presented last evening, the Corporation is defined as we understand it and intend to create it, and its purposes too are defined. I said the Corporation was created in view of the development of the wealth, the political power, and the welfare of the Italian people. These three elements interact. Political power creates wealth, and wealth in its turn reinforces political power.

I want to call your attention to what I said was the aim of the Corporation, the welfare of the Italian people. It is necessary that at any given time these institutions which we have created should be felt and recognized directly by the masses as instruments through which they can raise their standard of living. It is necessary that at a given time the workman and the farm-laborer should be able to say to himself: if today my status is improved, I owe it to the institutions which the Fascist Revolution has created. In all societies there is inevitable poverty. There is a group of persons who live on the margin of society; special institutions deal with them. However, that which should

trouble us is the poverty of strong and honest men who are earnestly looking for work in vain. We must see to it that Italian workmen, in whom we are interested as Italians, workmen, and Fascists, feel that we are not creating institutions only to give form to our doctrines, but we are creating institutions that must sometime show positive, concrete, practical, and tangible results. . . .

On January 13, 1923, when the Grand Council was created, superficial thinkers may have thought, only one more institute. On the contrary. On that day we buried political liberalism. With the Militia, the armed guard of the Party and the Revolution, with the establishment of the Grand Council, the supreme organ of the Revolution, we dealt the death-blow to the whole theory and practice of liberalism; we definitely set out on the road of revolution.

Today we are burying economic liberalism. The corporation will function on economic ground as the Grand Council and the Militia function on political ground. Corporatism is economics disciplined and therefore controlled, for discipline without control is unthinkable. Corporatism supersedes socialism and supersedes liberalism; it creates a new synthesis.

One fact is symptomatic—a fact we have perhaps thought too little about: that the decline of capitalism coincides with the decline of socialism. All the socialist parties in Europe are in fragments. I am not speaking only of Italy and Germany, but also of the other countries. Evidently these two phenomena—I do not claim that they are necessarily connected logically—were nevertheless historically simultaneous. This is why the corporate economy takes its rise at the very juncture in history when those two concurrent phenomena, capitalism and socialism, have given all they can give. From each we inherit what was vital in it. We have rejected the theory of the economic man, the liberal theory, and we go up in the air every time we hear anybody talk of labor as a commodity. The economic man does not exist; the whole man exists, being political, economic, and religious, saint and soldier. Today we are taking a decisive new step in the path of the Revolution. . . .

There is no doubt that, given the general crisis of capitalism, some of the solutions of Corporatism will become imperative everywhere. But to carry on a complete, full, integral, revolutionary Corporatism three conditions are necessary. A single party which flanks economic discipline with political discipline and which is over and above conflicting interests, binding all together in a common faith. This is not enough. After a single party you have to have a totalitarian state, that is, a state that absorbs within itself, in order to transform and invigorate them, all the energy, all the interests, all the hopes of a people. This is still not enough. The third and last and most important condition: there must be a time of the highest moral vigor.

We live in this time of high moral vigor. This is why, step by step, we give strength and consistency to all our dreams, translating all our doctrine into fact. How can it be denied that this our Fascist period is one of the highest moral vigor? Nobody can deny it. These are the times when arms have been crowned with victory, when human institutions are being regenerated, when lands are being redeemed and cities founded.

ARTUR MOELLER VAN DEN BRUCK

THE POLITICAL and social chaos which followed defeat in World War I left many Germans disillusioned and with no sense of direction. The institutions to which they had anchored their ideals and ambitions were swept away. Militarism was defeated and monarchy discredited; their colonies, alliances, their power and prestige were gone. Only faith in Germany and Germany's unique destiny remained.

This disaster needed explaining. Some Germans believed that the German mistake had been the failure to adopt Western liberalism, and they put their hope in the Weimar Republic. Others blamed the enemy, Versailles, perfidious allies, or traitors within the gates. Still others blamed Germany's lack of unity, the absence of a sense of cohesion and oneness among the German people, and the political and social forms that fostered division.

Among the latter was Artur Moeller van den Bruck (1876-1925), who called himself a "revolutionary conservative." He despised liberalism because it set the individual before the *Volks*.¹ He hated England, and the West. He inveighed against the "boisterous mediocrity of the bourgeoisie who behave so shamefully." He attacked Marxism because the theory of class war divided and weakened the nation. He saw in Germany's multiplicity of political parties the symbol of German decay. For government by coalition or compromise he had only contempt.

Upon his release from military service in the first World War, Moeller wrote *Das dritte Reich*,² first published in 1923. In it, he proposed the establishment of a third party to be above parties, whose program would be national and social, embracing and uniting all German people. Only thus, he thought, could Germany's destiny be fulfilled, and Germany's Third Empire be established—a somewhat obscure successor to the Holy Roman Empire and that of Bismarck. Although Moeller's book is replete with phraseology and ideology common to Nazi works, the Nazis themselves considered him "bloodless and artificial."

Moeller was a mystic, a student of Hegel, an admirer of Nietzsche, and apparently none too sure of himself. "Germans," he wrote, "are only too prone to abandon themselves to self-deception. The thought of a 'Third Reich' might well be the most fatal of all the illusions to which they have ever yielded. . . . Germany might perish of her Third Reich dream. . . . The beast in man is threatening."

How right he was, he never knew. Perhaps he was afraid of his own idea. Or perhaps he despaired of ever realizing it. He killed himself in 1925.

The following excerpts are taken from a condensed translation by E. O. Lorimer (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1934).



¹ *People*.

² *The Third Reich*.

THE THIRD REICH

THE ATTEMPT this book makes was not possible from any party standpoint; it ranges over all our political problems, from the extreme Left to the extreme Right. It is written from the standpoint of a Third Party, which is already in being. Only such an attempt could address itself to the nation while attacking all the parties; could reveal the disorder and discord into which the parties have long since fatefully fallen and which has spread from them through our whole political life; could reach that lofty spiritual plane of political philosophy which the parties have forsaken, but which must for the nation's sake be maintained, which the conservative must preserve and the revolutionary must take by storm.

Instead of government by party we offer the ideal of the *Third Empire*. It is an old German conception and a great one. It arose when our First Empire fell; it was early quickened by the thought of a millennium; but its underlying thought has always been a future which should be not the end of all things but the dawn of a German Age in which the German People would for the first time fulfil their destiny on earth.

In the years which followed the collapse of our Second Empire, we have had experience of Germans; we have seen that the nation's worst enemy is herself: her trustfulness, her casualness, her credulity, her inborn, fate-fraught, apparently unshakable, optimism. The German people were scarcely defeated—as never a people was defeated before in history—than the mood asserted itself: "We shall come up again all right!" We heard German fools saying: "We have no fears for Germany!" We saw German dreamers nod their heads in assent: "Nothing can happen to me!" . . .

There are Germans who assure us that the Empire which rose out of the ruins on the Ninth of November is already the Third Empire, democratic, republican, logically complete. These are our opportunists and eudaemonists. There are other Germans who confess their disappointment but trust to the "reasonableness" of history. These are our rationalists and pacifists. They all draw their conclusions from the premises of their party-political or utopian wishes, but not from the premises of the reality which surrounds us. They will not realize that we are a fettered and maltreated nation, perhaps on the very verge of dissolution. Our reality connotes the triumph of all the nations of the earth over the German nation; the primacy in our country of parliamentism after the western model—and party rule. If the *Third Empire* is ever to come

it will not beneficently fall from heaven. If the *Third Empire* is to put an end to strife it will not be born in a peace of philosophic dreaming. The *Third Empire* will be an empire of organization in the midst of European chaos. The occupation of the Ruhr and its consequences worked a change in the minds of men. It was the first thing that made the nation think. It opened up the possibility of liberation for a betrayed people. It seemed about to put an end to the "policy of fulfilment" which had been merely party politics disguised as foreign policy. It threw us back on our own power of decision. It restored our will. Parliamentism has become an institution of our public life, whose chief function would appear to be—in the name of the people—to enfeeble all political demands and all national passions. . . .

A suspicion broods over the country that the nation has suffered betrayal.

Not the betrayal of Versailles. That is sufficiently self-evident: the Fourteen Points became the four hundred and forty articles of the Peace Treaty, signed and sealed by the Founder of Peace ⁸ himself.

These other betrayals arose from the abuse of ideals for a selfish end. Our enemies saw that they could not do better for themselves than by persuading us to abandon, in the cause of peace, a war which we had not yet won; they saw that it would be best of all if they could induce some Germans themselves to persuade us into accepting these ideals. Whether we concentrate attention on the betrayers or the betrayed, we find ourselves in a peculiar atmosphere where high-falutin' principles are talked of: while a deal is being put through.

Our opponents exploited this peculiar atmosphere for their own advantage and to our injury. The atmosphere to which we allude is charged with a dangerous mental infection, the carriers of which enjoy an immunity which enables them to ruin their victim. It is the disintegrating atmosphere of liberalism, which spreads moral disease amongst nations, and ruins the nation whom it dominates. This deadly liberalism is not to be conceived as being the prerogative of any one political party. It originated in a general European party to which it owes its name, but it subsequently exercised its baneful influence on all parties and blurred the distinctions between them: it created the familiar figure of the professional party leader.

The principle of liberalism is to have no fixed principle and to contend that this is in itself a principle. . . .

Modern liberalism had its roots where the individual shook off the conventions of the middle ages. The liberal afterwards claimed to have freed himself from them. This freedom of his was an illusion.

The conventions of the middle ages were achievements, the achievements of

⁸ [President Wilson.]

Church and State, the constructive Gothic achievements which for ten centuries prevented the disintegration of the ancient world. These were the mighty achievements which denoted what—on an immensely smaller scale and applied to far more trivial things—is now styled “progress.” The men to whom these achievements were due, were rooted in these conventions, which also were of their creation. The conventions of the middle ages were the mighty foundations of mighty activities. No one prated of liberty, because everyone creatively possessed it: as will in action.

A disintegrating generation succeeded to this great inheritance. Humanism brought men the consciousness of human dignity. The renaissance imposed on individualism moderation, form, a classic attitude. The men of the renaissance drew from the literature of classical antiquity the forces which they felt they required as models. In the certain assurance that life must have a firm foundation if it was not to fall asunder, the men of the renaissance made a last effort at linking up with the past.

Men retain their creative power, however, only as long as the nations are creative. The nations were now developing a society which was divorced from the people. Monumental art was yielding its place to mere decoration. Recent centuries have achieved results in chemistry, mathematics, astronomy and most lately in sociology. But they have not produced men with the insight to see that all these are only partial glimpses into nature. They have made scientific research an end in itself, which is to turn an imaginary searchlight on to an imagined truth. This they have called enlightenment.

Man was committed to his reason, and reason was self-sufficient. Revelation was replaced by experiment. Men no longer perceived and felt; they only observed. They no longer drew dogmatic conclusions as faith had done. They no longer drew visionary conclusions like the mystic. They drew no idealist conclusions like the humanists; they drew critical conclusions: “there are no inborn ideas”—“there is no God”—“man is not free.” Negatives all! “What discoveries!” they cried. They failed to see that they were tilting only against nomenclature, while the phenomena remained. They did not dream that all their speculations dealt only with the foreground of things while the background remained more and more incomprehensible. In the pride of his reason the man of enlightenment claimed the right to cast adrift from all conventions. He did so, reckless of the consequence. He committed life to a reason abandoned to her own devices. He knew what he was doing. Or did he not? He did the reasonable thing. Or not? We must ask of the liberals who as the party of enlightenment took over the justification of the age of reason. . . .

Marx had offered to men accustomed for tens of centuries to live for and

by ideas, the lure of his materialist thought and his materialist conception of history. Movements, however, beget counter-movements. When Marxism was swamped in democratic chaos, Nietzsche with his conception of aristocracy came again to the fore.

Nietzsche foresaw an age of intense reflection that would set in after "the terrible earthquake." But he warned us that it would be an age of "new questions," eternal questions as he wished them heroically understood, conservative questions as we should rather call them. And amongst these questions he reckoned the proletarian question. Nietzsche was of course the enemy of everything that was amorphous mass and not subordination, order, organization. He felt himself to be the rehabilitation of rank amongst men in an age "of universal suffrage, that is to say where everyone has the right to sit in judgment on everybody and everything." He spoke of "the terrible consequences of equality" and said "our whole sociology recognizes no instinct but that of the herd: that is to say the sum total of cyphers where every cypher has an equal right, nay a duty, to be a cypher."

Nietzsche knew that democracy is only the superficial phenomenon of a dying society. The proletariat on the other hand was intimately related to the problem of the renewal of the human race from below. He said of the German people that they had no To-day, but only a Yesterday and a Tomorrow. He saw that this future must somehow include the proletariat and he recognized that socialism (not the mere doctrine of socialism, but a vital socialism that is the expression of an uplift of humanity) was an elemental problem that could neither be evaded nor ignored.

There are two sides to socialism: on the negative side a complete levelling of human values would lead to their complete devaluation; on the positive side it might form the substructure of a new system of new values. Nietzsche saw first the negative side when he explained the nihilist movement (in which he included the socialistic) as the moral, ascetic legacy of Christianity; Christianity being for him "the will to deny life." On its other side, however, socialism is the will to accept life. Its demand is: a real place in the world for the proletariat—a material place of course, for as yet the proletariat knows nothing of ideals—a place in an economically-regulated world, since the proletariat as yet lives a merely animal existence. But Nietzsche's final thought is of a millennium. He envisages not the abrogation of law but its fulfilment; and he sees the state as the guarantor of law. "That the feeling for social values should for the moment predominate," he notes, "is natural and right: a substructure must be established which will ultimately make a stronger race possible. . . . The lower species must be conceived as the humble basis on which a higher species can take its stand and can live for its own tasks." . . .

It is intolerable that the nation should have permanently under its feet a proletariat that shares its speech, its history and its fate, without forming an integral part of it. The masses are quick to perceive that they cannot fend for themselves, that someone must take charge of them. But individuals rise from the masses and raise the masses with them. These new individuals—and still more their sons and their sons' sons—bring to the nation proletarian forces, at first materialist and amorphous enough, but which later, as they become incorporated into the life of the nation and absorb its spirit, are shaped and spiritualized. Such was Nietzsche's conception of the proletariat. He thought of its duties as well as its rights. He was thinking of human dignity when he adjured the working man to remember: "Workmen must learn to feel as soldiers do. A regular salary, but no wages." Or, as he expresses it elsewhere: "There must be no relation between pay and accomplishment. Each individual, according to his gifts, must be so placed that he does the best that it is in him to do." Himself an aristocrat, he gave a nobler interpretation to communism when he foresaw a future "in which the highest good and the highest happiness is common to the hearts of all," when he prophesied and extolled "a time when the word 'common' shall cease to carry a stigma." For equality—with the terrible levelling-down that it implies—Nietzsche thus substituted equality of rights on a higher, and more moral plane. He demanded that the proletariat should be given the right of entry into that kingdom of values which had hitherto been barred to him. He recognized only one measure for human values and he demanded that the proletariat also should attain it. . . .

The Third Party wills the Third Empire.

The Third Party stands for the continuity of history.

The Third Party is the party of all who wish to see Germany preserved for the German people. . . .

To-day we call this resolution not conservative but nationalist.

This nationalist will desires to conserve all that in Germany is worth conserving. It wills to preserve Germany for Germany's sake; and it knows what it wills.

The nationalist does not say, as the patriot does, that Germany is worth preserving because she is German. For him the nation is not an end in itself.

The nationalist's dreams are of the future. He is a conservative because he knows that there can be no future which has not its roots in the past. He is also a politician because he knows that past and future can only be secure if the nation is secure in the present.

But his thoughts range beyond the present. If we concentrate exclusively

on the past, we might easily imagine that German history is closed. It is nowhere written that a people has a right to life eternal. For every people the hour at length strikes when they perish either by murder or by suicide. No more glorious end could be conceived for a great people than to perish in a World War where a world in arms overcame one single country. . . .

Our old, enduring mission is a continuation of the task of Austria, and Prussia and the Bismarckian Empire. We can only fulfil our task towards the east if we feel our rear protected in the West. Our most immediate and most German task is to make ourselves free. Fr. W. Foerster called Bismarck the greatest blunder in our history. But Bismarck, the founder of our Second Empire survives his work, and lives to be the founder also of Germany's Third Empire. . . .

Time and history have liquidated the state. Only the nation remains: only from the nation can a new mystery spring: the love of country.

The state that has fallen had made patriotism an item in our educational curriculum. In the cultural decay of the nineteenth century, however, more especially of the Wilhelmine period, education was degraded more and more to serve the ends of career, of social position, of economic advantage. Hence the inevitable failure of our patriotic education.

The crumbling state threatened to bury the nation in its ruins. But there has arisen a hope of salvation: a conservative-revolutionary movement of nationalism. It seeks to save the nation's life; it seeks to make good what had been omitted: to permit the nation to take a share in determining its own destinies.

Nationalism seeks to secure for the nation a democratic participation in which the proletarian shall also have a share.

The ideals of a nationalist movement differ as greatly from the ideals of a merely formal democracy as from the ideals of a class-conscious proletariat—above all in this: that it is a movement from above and not from below. Participation implies consciousness of the values which are to be shared. This consciousness can never be imparted unless a movement of ready acceptance comes from below; it must, however, be imparted from above.

The democrat, who always leans towards cosmopolitan points of view, and still more the proletarian who hankers after international trains of thought, both like to toy with the thought that there exists a neutral sphere in which the differences between the values of one people and of another vanish. The nationalist on the other hand holds that its own peculiar values are the most characteristic and precious possession of a nation, the very breath of its being. These give a nation form and personality; they cannot be transferred or interchanged.

In no country are the values so mysterious; so incomprehensible and uncomprehended as in Germany: so imperfectly-developed, fragmentary and yet complete; now most intimate confessions, now wild stormings of heaven; tender or powerful; earth-born or sublime; utterly realistic or entirely space-defying; to all appearance the expression of irreconcilables and incompatibles. But in no country are they more closely and fatefully bound up with the history of the nation: they are the countenance and the mirror and the tragic confession of the German who has created them amidst the contradictions of his history—not for himself, but for the nation.

In no country have these values tended so definitely towards a unity—a unity which we have never enjoyed since our First Empire, a unity which in our Second Empire we failed to achieve—

A unity which it must be the task of our Third Empire to establish. The antitheses of our history will remain, but it is reserved for our Third Empire to bring our values to their fulfilment.

We must have the strength to live in antitheses.

German history is full of fresh starts for new goals.

We never reached any goal. When we did reach one of the goals we had set ourselves, we reached it accidentally and with a bound and for a moment, only to fall back from it the more completely. But we pulled ourselves together and chose another goal—frequently an old one over again—and tried again with new strength. . . .

The greatness of a man is: to be something more than his mere self.

The greatness of a nation is: to be something greater than itself, to be able to communicate something of itself; to possess something that it can communicate.

In this ambition all great Germans fulfilled their tasks on earth, and left the issue to eternity. They often did not emphasise their German nationality in their work; yet it was there: enshrined, unintentionally, securely, self-evidently, and they could rest secure that its influence would not belie it. But if they were asked whence their strength came to which their work was owed, they forthwith confessed their German nationality. And when their people were in danger they rallied to them.

Side by side with this, however, there has always existed a fatal German weakness to fall under the spell of foreign modes of thought, to prefer foreign opinions to our own and to run off to salute the flag of every foreign philosophy. German ideologues talk to-day of a supernational mission by which they mean a renunciation of nationality—and boast of this betrayal as something characteristically German. These are the people who as revolu-

tionaries confused the idea of political peace with the philosophical ideal of world peace. Even to-day, after the experiences of the Ruhr and the Rhine and Saar, there are German communists so hardened in their enlightened world-revolutionary doctrines that they will not admit that the class war idea is not only "national in form" (which Marx admitted), but also (which Marx repudiated as bourgeois) "national in content."

Engels spoke of the "spirit of servility" which still clung to us from the days of our many petty states, and he hoped that a revolution would cure us of it. He was thinking of this spirit of servility as something in our domestic politics: a spirit of vassalage which a free people no longer owed to princes who had forfeited their royalty. It would be a most desirable result of the Revolution if it could teach us to think of this spirit of servility in relation to our foreign politics: a false spirit of admiration which we now owe to no other nation—since ten of them stood against us and seven and twenty of them betrayed us. It would be good if this experience made us humbler towards ourselves and haughtier in our bearing to the foe.

We have had our warning—an experience unique in our history. We know that we can only live with our supernational mission if we as a nation are secure. All our values owe their origin to the German nation's fight for spiritual and intellectual self-preservation. If we had not maintained ourselves politically as a nation we should never have possessed anything to communicate to other nations; we should have been scattered and crushed at other nations' will. If our credulity is such as to let us still trust the European benevolence of our enemies our fate is sealed.

The thought of enduring peace is in very truth the thought of the Third Empire.

But it must be fought for, and the Empire must be maintained. . . .

German nationalism is the champion of the Final Empire: ever promised, never fulfilled.

It is the peculiar prerogative of the German people for which other peoples vie with us. In the World War the peoples fought against the Empire-for-the-sake-of-the-empire, the Empire-for-the-sake-of-world-hegemony, in which we claimed our very material share. Each of these nations wanted an empire of its own: a sphere and empire of Latin or Anglo-Saxon or Pan-Slav thought. They annihilated our material empire. They still tremble before its political shadow.

But they had to leave our Empire standing. There is only *One Empire*, as there is only *One Church*. Anything else that claims the title may be a state or a community or a sect. There exists only *the Empire*.

German nationalism fights for the possible Empire. The German nationalist to-day as a German remains for ever a mystic, as a politician he has turned sceptic.

He knows that nations can only realize the idea committed to their charge in proportion as they maintain themselves and assert themselves in history.

The German nationalist is in no danger of falling under the spell of ideology for the sake of ideology. He sees through the humbug of the fine words with which the peoples who conquered us ascribed a world mission to themselves. He knows that within the radius of these peoples' civilization, which they so complacently describe as western, humanity has not risen but has sunk.

In the midst of this sinking world, which is the victorious world of to-day, the German seeks his salvation. He seeks to preserve those imperishable values, which are imperishable in their own right. He seeks to secure their permanence in the world by recapturing the rank to which their defenders are entitled. At the same time he is fighting for the cause of Europe, for every European influence that radiates from Germany as the centre of Europe.

We are not thinking of the Europe of To-day which is too contemptible to have any value. We are thinking of the Europe of Yesterday and whatever thereof may be salvaged for To-morrow. We are thinking of the Germany of All Time, the Germany of a two-thousand-year past, the Germany of an eternal present which dwells in the spirit, but must be secured in reality and can only so be politically secured.

The ape and tiger in man are threatening. The shadow of Africa falls across Europe. It is our task to be guardians on the threshold of values.

ADOLF HITLER

IN THE EARLY nineteenth century the loudest ministers of the worship of the German nation and state were romantic liberals, mostly from the western cities. With the foundation of the Second Reich "by iron and blood," nationalism became more conservative and more frankly militaristic under the direction of the Prussian upper class and of the growing industrial plutocracy. It remained for Hitler's National Socialist (Nazi) forces, recruited above all from the lower middle class, to unify all of the German people under brutal discipline, to enlarge the Third Reich far beyond the hopes of the intellectuals of 1848, and to win for Germany a fleeting domination over the whole of Europe through a display of military force and unprecedented cruelty. Most of the Nazi leaders in the early period were from southern Germany and the Rhineland; Hitler himself was born in Austria, in 1889. He is said to have committed suicide in an underground shelter of the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, while Russian troops were storming the city and American, British and French troops were converging on it. A few days later (May 7, 1945), Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allied forces.

As late as 1928 it would have been hard to foresee that the National Socialist German Workers' Party, then holding only 12 seats in a House of more than 600 members, was to gain 230 seats in the free elections of July, 1932, and was to become the master of Germany a few months later. Its founder, an unsuccessful painter and building artisan before 1914 and a corporal in World War I, had been discredited by the dismal failure of an attempted revolt against the Weimar Republic in 1923. While serving a mild term of honorable seclusion he had begun writing a book of political reflections—*Mein Kampf*—of which the first volume appeared in 1925 and was coolly received on account of its frank advocacy of savage violence, political dishonesty, and unrestricted imperialism. His argumentation was oversimplified, distorted and rhetorical. His followers were mostly unemployed white-collar workers, unsuccessful intellectuals, demobilized soldiers and adventurers with dubious records. Yet the very flaws of his style and the shabbiness of his retinue attracted to him the growing, half-educated multitudes who had been ruined by the war, by the inflation of 1923 and the deflation thereafter, and now by the great depression of 1929. To these discomfited men he pointed out one chief enemy and scapegoat, the Jews; to a nation smarting under defeat he denounced one guilty group, the leftist betrayers of the undefeated army; and he was louder than anybody else in attacking Versailles and the "war-guilt lie." His hatred of the Communists (though not of the proletarians as such) and his call for armed revenge persuaded many wealthy industrialists to finance him and many army officers to hope in him as the Führer, the Leader. He attained the supreme power in a legal way, when Field Marshal Hindenburg, World War I hero and now senile President of the Weimar Republic, made him Reich Chancellor (January 30, 1933).

Hitler lost no time in transforming his parliamentary premiership into a one-party despotic rule. After Hindenburg's death in 1934, the Nazis abolished the office of President, and Hitler assumed the latter's powers. Irreducible opponents were beaten or murdered, and the still large mass of neutral or hesitant Germans was won over with skilled propaganda and controlled with a formidable machinery of party and police. The few who remained aloof were soon convinced by Hitler's success. The Nazi organization was derived in part from the Italian Fascist experience, but it was much more ruthless, and could be built faster on the pre-existing basis of military efficiency in Germany. Everything was subordinated to the greater glory of the German Führer and Master Race. Great parades roused the enthusiasm of the crowds when Hitler spoke with his bombastic eloquence. The Party was only the framework for the "totalitarian" organization of daily life, which tended to create a strong and numerous people of potential soldiers. It was a hard discipline, but it had its pleasant aspects, such as the sport activities of the "Strength through Joy" and the Youth movements, the encouragement of unrestricted love between "pure Aryans," and the total employment which was insured by the feverish activity of war factories. This activity created for a few years the impression of a quick economic recovery while the other countries were still struggling with the depression.

It is perhaps not surprising that the democracies were unmoved by the suppression of the fragile German democracy. The judicial murder of a Communist charged with burning the palace of the Reichstag (which had been actually set on fire by Nazi agents), the gangster-like shooting on Hitler's order of his own personal friends in the "purge" of June, 1934, the persecution of the Jews, and the creation of frightful concentration camps for dissidents did not affect the democracies directly. Hitler's declared hatred of Communist Russia was rather agreeable to conservative elements all over the world. But it is more strange that Hitler was allowed openly to rearm, to desert the League of Nations, and to proclaim the right of the German "Herrenvolk" to rule the world. His attempt to annex Austria in 1934 after abetting the murder of its Chancellor was not frustrated by the democracies but by Mussolini, who had grown wary of his too rapidly thriving friend. When Hitler repudiated all treaty limitations on German armaments (March 16, 1935), Great Britain, France and Italy concluded an agreement which, bolstered as it was by a Franco-Russian defensive alliance, might have put an end to Nazi expansion. Soon after, however, England concluded a separate naval agreement with Germany, and Mussolini was thrown into the arms of Hitler through the sanctions adopted by the League in a half-hearted attempt at preventing him from conquering Ethiopia, a member of the League.

There followed a series of treaty violations by Germany: remilitarization of the Rhineland (1936), seizure of Austria (1938), forceful annexation of the Czechoslovakian German-speaking region of the Sudeten (1938), incorporation into the Reich of the remaining part of Bohemia and Moravia (1939), annexation of the Lithuanian province of Klaipeda (Memel) formerly belonging to Germany (1939). In the same period, Fascist and Nazi military assistance enabled Franco to overthrow the Spanish Republic, and Italy conquered Albania (1939). Every new German annexation was preceded by a cleverly contrived "atrocities" cam-

paign, and followed by Hitler's solemn pledge that Germany would make no new demands, since she had now reannexed to the Reich all territories ethnically German. The repetition of pledges and aggressions did not discourage the Western democracies from trying "appeasement" of Hitler, while the United States limited herself to verbal protests. The greatest humiliation of the democracies occurred at Munich (September, 1938) when Great Britain and France preserved peace at the price of yielding to Hitler's peremptory demands for the Sudeten area. Henceforth the Western democracies began to prepare for what appeared to be the inevitable war; but their actual preparations were slow and inadequate, and the capitulation disgusted Russia, which had been excluded from the Munich parleys. Poland, whose dictator Pilsudski had concluded in 1934 a ten-year nonaggression pact with Hitler, was clearly earmarked for the next German attack. She accepted the overtures of Great Britain and France for a defensive alliance, but refused to let Russian troops cross her territory in case of a common war against Germany. Ultimately Russia concluded a nonaggression pact with Hitler (August, 1939). This was all that Hitler awaited to invade Danzig and the Polish "corridor" (September 1, 1939). It was no longer possible for Great Britain and France to avoid war. They declared it on September 3.

The events of World War II defy summary description. A later selection in the present chapter gives some evidence of the methods adopted by the Germans in occupied countries. Here we can only note that the armed forces continued to fight for Hitler to the last. A serious threat to the Führer's life came soon after the Allied landing in Normandy, when a small group of officers with a few civilians tried to murder Hitler and thereby put an end to a clearly hopeless struggle. But even when the disintegration of the German army and the advance of the Allies would have made political underground resistance possible, there was only one such attempt worth mentioning, at Munich. Most of the German anti-Nazi elements had been killed, put in concentration camps, or driven into exile.

The selection that follows is from a speech by Hitler addressed to the German workers and delivered on December 10, 1940, at the Rheinmetall-Borsig armament works in Berlin.



TO THE GERMAN WORKERS

FELLOW COUNTRYMEN, WORKERS OF GERMANY: Nowadays I do not speak very often. In the first place I have little time for speaking, and in the second place I believe that this is a time for action rather than speech. We are involved in a conflict in which more than the victory of only one country or the other is at stake; it is rather a war of two opposing worlds. I shall try to give you, as

far as possible in the time at my disposal, an insight into the essential reasons underlying this conflict. I shall, however, confine myself to Western Europe only. The peoples who are primarily affected—eighty-five million Germans, forty-six million Britishers, forty-five million Italians, and about thirty-seven million Frenchmen—are the cores of the states who were or still are opposed in war. If I make a comparison between the living conditions of these peoples the following facts become evident:

Forty-six million Britishers dominate and govern approximately sixteen million square miles of the surface of the earth. Thirty-seven million Frenchmen dominate and govern a combined area of approximately four million square miles. Forty-five million Italians possess, taking into consideration only those territories in any way capable of being utilized, an area of scarcely one hundred and ninety thousand square miles. Eighty-five million Germans possess as their living space scarcely two hundred and thirty-two thousand square miles. That is to say: eighty-five million Germans own only two hundred and thirty-two thousand square miles on which they must live their lives and forty-six million Britishers possess sixteen million square miles.

Now, my fellow countrymen, this world has not been so divided up by Providence or Almighty God. This allocation has been made by man himself. The land was parcelled out for the most part during the last three hundred years, that is, during the period in which, unfortunately, the German people were helpless and torn by internal dissension. . . .

The second people that failed to receive their fair share in this distribution, namely the Italians, experienced and suffered a similar fate. Torn by internal conflicts, devoid of unity, split up into numerous small states, this people also dissipated all their energy in internal strife. Nor was Italy able to obtain even the natural position in the Mediterranean which was her due. . . .

You all know the situation in which we found ourselves eight years ago. Our people were on the verge of collapse. Seven million were unemployed. About six and a half million were on part-time work; our economic system was threatened by disintegration; agriculture faced ruination; trade and industry were at a standstill and shipping was paralyzed. It was easy to foresee the time when the seven million unemployed would necessarily become eight, nine or ten millions. The number of working people became fewer and fewer, while on the other hand the number of unemployed—who had to be kept on relief—became greater and greater. In other words, even those who were still working could not benefit from the fruits of their labor to the fullest extent, for each had to support a non-worker besides himself. Whether this was done by social legislation or in the form of charity made no difference. When a

worker has to nourish and support another who does not work, neither will have enough in the long run. There will be too little to live on, even though they do not starve.

For us, therefore, national unity was one of the essential conditions if we were to coordinate the powers inherent in the German nation properly, to make the German people conscious of their own greatness, realize their strength, recognize and present their vital claims, and seek national unity by an appeal to reason.

I know that I have not been successful everywhere. For nearly fifteen years of my struggle I was the target of two opposing sides. One side reproached me: "You want to drag us who belong to the intelligentsia and to the upper classes down to the level of the others. That is impossible. We are educated people. In addition to that, we are wealthy and cultured. We cannot accept this."

These people were incapable of listening to reason; even today there are some who cannot be converted. However, on the whole the number of those who realize that the lack of unity in our national structure would sooner or later lead to the destruction of all classes, has become greater and greater.

I also met with opposition from the other side. They said: "We have our class consciousness." However I was obliged to take the stand that in the existing situation we could not afford to make experiments. It certainly would have been simple to eliminate the intelligentsia. Such a process could be carried out at once. But we would have to wait fifty or perhaps a hundred years for the gap to refill—and such a period would mean the destruction of the nation. For how can our people, its three hundred and sixty per square mile, exist at all if they do not employ every ounce of brain power and physical strength to wrest from their soil what they need? This distinguishes us from the others. In Canada, for example, there are 2.6 persons per square mile; in other countries perhaps 16, 18, 20 or 26 persons. Well, my fellow countrymen, no matter how stupidly one managed one's affairs in such a country, a decent living would still be possible.

Here in Germany, however, there are 360 persons per square mile. The others cannot manage with 26 persons per square mile, but we must manage with 360. This is the task we face. That is why I expressed this view in 1933: "We *must* solve these problems and, therefore, we *shall* solve them." Of course that was not easy; everything could not be done immediately. . . .

It has been a tremendous task. The establishment of a German community was the first item on the program in 1933. The second item was the elimination of foreign oppression as expressed in the Treaty of Versailles, which also prevented our attaining national unity, forbade large sections of our people

to unite and robbed us of our possessions in the world, our German colonies.

The second item on the program was, therefore, the struggle against Versailles. No one can say that I express this opinion for the first time today. I expressed it, my fellow countrymen, in the days following the Great War when, still a soldier, I made my first appearance in the political arena. My first address was a speech against the collapse, against the Treaty of Versailles, and for the reestablishment of a powerful German Reich. That was the beginning of my work. What I have brought about since then does not represent a new aim but the oldest aim. It is the primary reason for the conflict in which we find ourselves today. The rest of the world did not want our inner unity, because they knew that, once it was achieved, the vital claim of our masses could be realized. They wanted to maintain the dictate of Versailles in which they saw a second peace of Westphalia. However, there is still another reason. I have stated that the world was unequally divided. American observers and Englishmen have found a wonderful expression for this fact: They say there are two kinds of peoples—the “haves” and the “have-nots.” “We, the British, are the ‘haves.’ It is a fact that we possess sixteen million square miles. And we Americans are also ‘haves,’ and so are we Frenchmen. The others—they are simply the ‘have-nots.’ He who *has* nothing *receives* nothing. He shall remain what he is. He who has is not willing to share it.”

All my life I have been a “have-not.” At home I was a “have-not.” I regard myself as belonging to them and have always fought exclusively for them. I defended them and, therefore, I stand before the world as their representative. I shall never recognize the claim of the others to that which they have taken by force. Under no circumstances can I acknowledge this claim with regard to that which has been taken from us. It is interesting to examine the life of these rich people. In this Anglo-French world there exists, as it were, democracy, which means the rule of the people by the people. Now the people must possess some means of giving expression to their thoughts or their wishes. Examining this problem more closely, we see that the people themselves have originally no convictions of their own. Their convictions are formed, of course, just as everywhere else. The decisive question is who enlightens the people, who educates them? In those countries, it is actually capital that rules; that is, nothing more than a clique of a few hundred men who possess untold wealth and, as a consequence of the peculiar structure of their national life, are more or less independent and free. They say: “Here we have liberty.” By this they mean, above all, an uncontrolled economy, and by an uncontrolled economy, the freedom not only to acquire capital but to make absolutely free use of it. That means freedom from national control or control by the people both in

the acquisition of capital and in its employment. This is really what they mean when they speak of liberty. These capitalists create their own press and then speak of the "freedom of the press."

In reality, every one of the newspapers has a master, and in every case this master is the capitalist, the owner. This master, not the editor, is the one who directs the policy of the paper. If the editor tries to write other than what suits the master, he is ousted the next day. This press, which is the absolutely submissive and characterless slave of the owners, molds public opinion. Public opinion thus mobilized by them is, in its turn, split up into political parties. The difference between these parties is as small as it formerly was in Germany. You know them, of course—the old parties. They were always one and the same. In Britain matters are usually so arranged that families are divided up, one member being a conservative, another a liberal and a third belonging to the labor party. Actually, all three sit together as members of the family, decide upon their common attitude and determine it. A further point is that the "elected people" actually form a community which operates and controls all these organizations. For this reason, the opposition in England is really always the same, for on all essential matters in which the opposition has to make itself felt, the parties are always in agreement. They have one and the same conviction and through the medium of the press mold public opinion along corresponding lines. One might well believe that in these countries of liberty and riches, the people must possess an unlimited degree of prosperity. But no! On the contrary, it is precisely in these countries that the distress of the masses is greater than anywhere else. Such is the case in "rich Britain."

She controls sixteen million square miles. In India, for example, a hundred million colonial workers with a wretched standard of living must labor for her. One might think perhaps, that at least in England itself every person must have his share of these riches. By no means! In that country class distinction is the crassest imaginable. There is poverty—incredible poverty—on the one side, and equally incredible wealth on the other. They have not solved a single problem. The workmen of that country which possesses more than one-sixth of the globe and of the world's natural resources dwell in misery, and the masses of the people are poorly clad. In a country which ought to have more than enough bread and every sort of fruit, we find millions of the lower classes who have not even enough to fill their stomachs, and go about hungry. A nation which could provide work for the whole world must acknowledge the fact that it cannot even abolish unemployment at home. For decades this rich Britain has had two and a half million unemployed; rich America, ten to thirteen millions, year after year; France six, seven and eight hundred thousand. . . .

It is self-evident that where this democracy rules, the people as such are not taken into consideration at all. The only thing that matters is the existence of a few hundred gigantic capitalists who own all the factories and their stock and, through them, control the people. The masses of the people do not interest them in the least. They are interested in them just as were our bourgeois parties in former times—only when elections are being held, when they need votes. Otherwise, the life of the masses is a matter of complete indifference to them.

To this must be added the difference in education. Is it not ludicrous to hear a member of the British Labor Party—who, of course, as a member of the Opposition is officially paid by the government—say: “When the war is over, we will do something in social respects.”

It is the members of Parliament who are the directors of the business concerns—just as used to be the case with us. But we have abolished all that. A member of the Reichstag cannot belong to a Board of Directors, except as a purely honorary member. He is prohibited from accepting any emolument, financial or otherwise. This is not the case in other countries.

They reply: “That is why our form of government is sacred to us.” I can well believe it, for that form of government certainly pays very well. But whether it is sacred to the mass of the people as well is another matter.

The people as a whole definitely suffer. I do not consider it possible in the long run for one man to work and toil for a whole year in return for ridiculous wages, while another jumps into an express train once a year and pockets enormous sums. Such conditions are a disgrace. On the other hand, we National Socialists equally oppose the theory that all men are equals. Today, when a man of genius makes some astounding invention and enormously benefits his country by his brains, we pay him his due, for he has really accomplished something and been of use to his country. However, we hope to make it impossible for idle drones to inhabit this country.

I could continue to cite examples indefinitely. The fact remains that two worlds are face to face with one another. Our opponents are quite right when they say: “Nothing can reconcile us to the National Socialist world.” How could a narrow-minded capitalist ever agree to my principles? It would be easier for the Devil to go to church and cross himself with holy water than for these people to comprehend the ideas which are accepted facts to us today. But we have solved our problems. . . .

My dear friends, if I had stated publicly eight or nine years ago: “In seven or eight years the problem of how to provide work for the unemployed will be solved, and the problem then will be where to find workers,” I should have harmed my cause. Every one would have declared: “The man is mad. It is

useless to talk to him, much less to support him. Nobody should vote for him. He is a fantastic creature." Today, however, all this has come true. Today, the only question for us is where to find workers. That, my fellow countrymen, is the blessing which work brings.

Work alone can create new work; money cannot create work. Work alone can create values, values with which to reward those who work. The work of one man makes it possible for another to live and continue to work. And when we have mobilized the working capacity of our people to its utmost, each individual worker will receive more and more of the world's goods.

We have incorporated seven million unemployed into our economic system; we have transformed another six millions from part-time into full-time workers; we are even working over-time. And all this is paid for in cash in Reichsmarks which maintained their value in peacetime. In wartime we had to ration its purchasing capacity, not in order to devalue it, but simply to earmark a portion of our industry for war production to guide us to victory in the struggle for the future of Germany. . . .

You know, my comrades, that I have destroyed nothing in Germany. I have always proceeded very carefully, because I believe—as I have already said—that we cannot afford to wreck anything. I am proud that the revolution of 1933 was brought to pass without breaking a single windowpane. Nevertheless, we have wrought enormous changes.

I wish to put before you a few basic facts: The first is that in the capitalistic democratic world the most important principle of economy is that the people exist for trade and industry, and that these in turn exist for capital. We have reversed this principle by making capital exist for trade and industry, and trade and industry exist for the people. *In other words, the people come first.* Everything else is but a means to this end. When an economic system is not capable of feeding and clothing a people, then it is bad, regardless of whether a few hundred people say: "As far as I am concerned it is good, excellent; my dividends are splendid."

However, the dividends do not interest me at all. Here we have drawn the line. They may then retort: "Well, look here, that is just what we mean. You jeopardize liberty."

Yes, certainly, we jeopardize the liberty to profiteer at the expense of the community, and, if necessary, we even abolish it. British capitalists, to mention only one instance, can pocket dividends of 76, 80, 95, 140 and even 160 per cent from their armament industry. Naturally they say: "If the German methods grow apace and should prove victorious, this sort of thing will stop."

They are perfectly right. I should never tolerate such a state of affairs. In

my eyes, a 6 per cent dividend is sufficient. Even from this 6 per cent we deduct one-half and, as for the rest, we must have definite proof that it is invested in the interest of the country as a whole. In other words, no individual has the right to dispose arbitrarily of money which ought to be invested for the good of the country. If he disposes of it sensibly, well and good; if not, the National Socialist state will intervene. . . .

In Germany, the people, without any doubt, decide their existence. They determine the principles of their government. In fact it has been possible in this country to incorporate many of the broad masses into the National Socialist Party, that gigantic organization embracing millions and having millions of officials drawn from the people themselves. This principle is extended to the highest ranks.

For the first time in German history, we have a state which has absolutely abolished all social prejudices in regard to political appointments as well as in private life. I myself am the best proof of this. Just imagine: I am not even a lawyer, and yet I am your Fuehrer! . . .

Opposed to this there stands a completely different world. In that world the highest ideals are the struggle for wealth, for capital, for family possessions, for personal egoism; everything else is merely a means to such ends. Two worlds confront each other today. We know perfectly well that if we are defeated in this war it would not only be the end of our National Socialist work of reconstruction, but the end of the German people as a whole. For without its powers of coordination, the German people would starve. Today the masses dependent on us number 120 or 130 millions, of which 85 millions alone are our own people. We remain ever aware of this fact.

On the other hand, that other world says: "If we lose, our world-wide capitalistic system will collapse. For it is we who save hoarded gold. It is lying in our cellars and will lose its value. If the idea that work is the decisive factor spreads abroad, what will happen to us? We shall have bought our gold in vain. Our whole claim to world dominion can then no longer be maintained. The people will do away with their dynasties of high finance. They will present their social claims, and the whole world system will be overthrown."

I can well understand that they declare: "Let us prevent this at all costs; it must be prevented." They can see exactly how our nation has been reconstructed. You see it clearly. For instance, there we see a state ruled by a numerically small upper class. They send their sons to their own schools, to Eton. We have Adolf Hitler Schools or national political educational establishments. On the one hand, the sons of plutocrats, financial magnates; on the other, the children of the people. Etonians and Harrovians exclusively in leading positions over there; in this country, men of the people in charge of the State.

These are the two worlds. I grant that one of the two must succumb. Yes, one or the other. But if we were to succumb, the German people would succumb with us. If the other were to succumb, I am convinced that the nations will become free for the first time. We are not fighting individual Englishmen or Frenchmen. We have nothing against them. For years I proclaimed this as the aim of my foreign policy. We demanded nothing of them, nothing at all. When they started the war they could not say: "We are doing so because the Germans asked this or that of us." They said, on the contrary: "We are declaring war on you because the German system of Government does not suit us; because we fear it might spread to our own people." For that reason they are carrying on this war. They wanted to blast the German nation back to the time of Versailles, to the indescribable misery of those days. But they have made a great mistake.

If in this war everything points to the fact that gold is fighting against work, capitalism against peoples, and reaction against the progress of humanity, then work, the peoples and progress will be victorious. Even the support of the Jewish race will not avail the others.

I have seen this coming for years. What did I ask of the other world? Nothing but the right for Germans to reunite and the restoration of all that had been taken from them—nothing which would have meant a loss to the other nations. How often have I stretched out my hand to them? Ever since I came into power. I had not the slightest wish to rearm.

For what do armaments mean? They absorb so much labor. It was I who regarded work as being of decisive importance, who wished to employ the working capacity of Germany for other plans. I think the news is already out that, after all, I have some fairly important plans in my mind, vast and splendid plans for my people. It is my ambition to make the German people rich and to make the German homeland beautiful. I want the standard of living of the individual raised. I want us to have the most beautiful and the finest civilization. I should like the theatre—in fact, the whole of German civilization—to benefit all the people and not to exist only for the upper ten thousand, as is the case in England.

The plans which we had in mind were tremendous, and I needed workers in order to realize them. Armament only deprives me of workers. *I made proposals to limit armaments. I was ridiculed. The only answer I received was "no." I proposed the limitation of certain types of armament. That was refused. I proposed that airplanes should be altogether eliminated from warfare. That also was refused. I suggested that bombers should be limited. That was refused.* They said: "That is just how we wish to force our regime upon you."

I am not a man who does things by halves. If it becomes necessary for me to defend myself, I defend myself with unlimited zeal. When I saw that the same old warmongers of the World War in Britain were mobilizing once more against the great new German revival, I realized that this struggle would have to be fought once more, that the other side did not want peace. . . .

When this war is ended, Germany will set to work in earnest. A great "Awake!" will sound throughout the country. Then the German nation will stop manufacturing cannon and will embark on peaceful occupations and the new work of reconstruction for the millions. Then we shall show the world for the first time who is the real master, capitalism or work. Out of this work will grow the great German Reich of which great poets have dreamed. It will be the Germany to which every one of her sons will cling with fanatical devotion, because she will provide a home even for the poorest. She will teach everyone the meaning of life.

Should any one say to me: "These are mere fantastic dreams, mere visions," I can only reply that when I set out on my course in 1919 as an unknown, nameless soldier I built my hopes of the future upon a most vivid imagination. Yet all has come true.

What I am planning or aiming at today is nothing compared to what I have already accomplished and achieved. It will be achieved sooner and more definitely than everything already achieved. The road from an unknown and nameless person to Fuehrer of the German nation was harder than will be the way from Fuehrer of the German nation to creator of the coming peace.

I had to fight and struggle for fifteen years for your confidence. Today, thanks to your confidence, I fight and struggle for Germany. Some day we shall once more struggle together in confidence for this great Reich of peace, work, prosperity and culture which we intend to establish and shall establish. Thank you.

FASCISM IN ACTION

ADOLF HITLER declared once that he saw no harm in the crimes of Attila, since Attila's name and exploits have left a deep mark in history. At the time, this statement was greeted with incredulity rather than horror. Events have proved that he meant what he said. The only possible terms of comparison with the Nazi atrocities in occupied countries and in Germany itself are found in the annals of Attila, Jenghiz Khan, or Tamerlane. But the Nazis were more efficient. Hundreds of thousands of Stormtroops and Gestapo men carried out with sadistic joy the orders of Hitler; millions of German soldiers obeyed without discussion, and sometimes outdid the directions of their chiefs.

The mark of Fascism in action is deep throughout Europe, and it will take a long time before the moral and material ruin left by the German "New Order" can be repaired. The Nazi concentration camps, torture houses, and gas chambers were inspected by thousands of Allied soldiers and civilians; press correspondents and motion picture newsreels revealed the facts to the American public. General Patton, a tough soldier and a hero of Sicily, Normandy and the battle of Germany, was unable to bear the sight of one of the German murder camps. But the entire civilian population of many German cities had been aware of the crimes being committed at a few miles' distance, and only a few persons expressed any disapproval to Allied officers who later questioned them. The fact that these atrocities did not deter the overwhelming majority of the population from remaining favorable to Hitler's regime was one of the most distressing phenomena revealed in the wake of World War II.

The following selection is part of the indictment, in an international trial, of both individuals and organizations. The individuals indicted included men like Hermann Goering, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hjalmar Schacht, and Alfred Rosenberg, all high in the Nazi state; and the organizations, not only such groups as the dread Gestapo (Secret State Police) and the "S.S." (*Schutzstaffeln*, a group of special guards), but even the General Staff and High Command of the German armed forces.

The trial was set up by an International Military Tribunal, established jointly by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France, with the purpose of collecting the evidence and prosecuting the major surviving Nazi leaders. "Unless we write the record of this [Nazi] movement with clarity and precision," Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States, reported to President Truman "we cannot blame the future if in days of peace it finds incredible the accusatory generalities uttered during the war. We must not forget that when the Nazi plans were boldly proclaimed they were so extravagant that the world refused to take them seriously. We must establish incredible events by credible evidence." The tribunal discarded as a defense the claim of obedience to superior orders when the defendant had discretion because of rank or the latitude of his orders, or when he voluntarily participated in a "criminal or conspiratorial organization." The principle of immunity of a head

of state also was rejected. Justice Jackson pointed out that "findings in the main trial that an organization is criminal in nature will be conclusive in any subsequent proceedings against individual members."

Some important precedents were established by the tribunal, to wit that "atrocities and offenses against persons or property constituting violations of International Law," "atrocities and persecutions on racial or religious grounds," "invasions of other countries and initiation of wars of aggression" are crimes. The American Chief of Counsel declared that "it was the universal feeling of our people that out of this war should come unmistakable rules and workable machinery from which any who might contemplate another era of brigandage would know that they would be held personally responsible and would be personally punished."

The selection that follows is taken from the U.S. State Department publication *Trial of War Criminals* (Washington, 1945).



INDICTMENT OF NAZI INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

Count One—The Common Plan or Conspiracy

STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE

ALL THE DEFENDANTS, with divers other persons, during a period of years preceding 8th May, 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, instigators or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal, and, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, are individually responsible for their own acts and for all acts committed by any persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy. The common plan or conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes against Peace, in that the defendants planned, prepared, initiated and waged wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances. In the development and course of the common plan or conspiracy it came to embrace the commission of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the defendants determined upon and carried out, ruthless wars against countries and populations, in violation of the rules and customs of war, including as typical and systematic means by which the wars were prosecuted, murder, ill-treatment, deportation for slave labor and for other purposes of civilian populations of

occupied territories, murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of persons on the high seas, the taking and killing of hostages, the plunder of public and private property, the wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, and devastation not justified by military necessity. The common plan or conspiracy contemplated and came to embrace as typical and systematic means, and the defendants determined upon and committed, Crimes against Humanity, both within Germany and within occupied territories, including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against civilian populations before and during the war, and persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, in execution of the plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal wars, many of such acts and persecutions being violations of the domestic laws of the countries where perpetrated. . . .

Count Two—Crimes against Peace

STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE

ALL THE DEFENDANTS, with divers other persons, during a period of years preceding 8th May, 1945, participated in the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances.

PARTICULARS OF THE WARS PLANNED, PREPARED, INITIATED AND WAGED

(A) The wars referred to in the Statement of Offense in this Count Two of the Indictment and the dates of their initiation were the following: against Poland, 1st September, 1939; against the United Kingdom and France, 3rd September, 1939; against Denmark and Norway, 9th April, 1940; against Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, 10th May, 1940; against Yugoslavia and Greece, 6th April, 1941; against the U. S. S. R., 22nd June, 1941; and against the United States of America, 11th December, 1941. . . .

Count Three—War Crimes

STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE

All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1st September, 1939, and 8th May, 1945, in Germany and in all those countries and territories occupied by the German armed forces since 1st September, 1939, and in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on the High Seas.

All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and executed

a common plan or conspiracy to commit War Crimes as defined in Article 6 (b) of the Charter. This plan involved, among other things, the practice of "total war" including methods of combat and of military occupation in direct conflict with the laws and customs of war, and the commission of crimes perpetrated on the field of battle during encounters with enemy armies, and against prisoners of war, and in occupied territories against the civilian population of such territories.

The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and by other persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons when committing the said War Crimes performed their acts in execution of a common plan and conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated as leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices.

These methods and crimes constituted violations of international conventions, of internal penal laws and of the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations, and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct.

(A) MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS OF OR IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND ON THE HIGH SEAS

Throughout the period of their occupation of territories overrun by their armed forces, defendants, for the purpose of systematically terrorizing the inhabitants, murdered and tortured civilians, and ill-treated, them, and imprisoned them without legal process.

The murders and ill-treatment were carried out by divers means, including shooting, hanging, gassing, starvation, gross over-crowding, systematic under-nutrition, systematic imposition of labor tasks beyond the strength of those ordered to carry them out, inadequate provision of surgical and medical services, kickings, beatings, brutality and torture of all kinds, including the use of hot irons and pulling out of finger nails and the performance of experiments by means of operations and otherwise on living human subjects. In some occupied territories the defendants interfered with religious services, persecuted members of the clergy and monastic orders, and expropriated church property. They conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles and Gypsies and others.

Civilians were systematically subjected to tortures of all kinds, with the object of obtaining information. Civilians of occupied countries were sub-

jected systematically to "protective arrests" whereby they were arrested and imprisoned without any trial and any of the ordinary protections of the law, and they were imprisoned under the most unhealthy and inhumane conditions.

In the concentration camps were many prisoners who were classified "Nacht und Nebel." These were entirely cut off from the world and were allowed neither to receive nor to send letters. They disappeared without trace and no announcement of their fate was ever made by the German authorities. . . .

Such murder and ill-treatment took place in concentration camps and similar establishments set up by the defendants, and particularly in the concentration camps set up at Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Breendonck, Grini, Natzweiler, Ravensbrück, Vught and Amersfoort, and in numerous cities, towns and villages, including Oradour sur Glane, Trondheim and Oslo.

Crimes committed in France or against French citizens took the following forms:—

Arbitrary arrests were carried out under political or racial pretexts; they were both individual and collective; notably in Paris (round-up of the 18th Arrondissement by the Field Gendarmerie, round-up of the Jewish population of the 11th Arrondissement in August, 1941, round-up of Jewish intellectuals in December, 1941, round-up in July, 1942); at Clermont-Ferrand (round-up of professors and students of the University of Strasbourg, who were taken to Clermont-Ferrand on 25th November, 1943); at Lyons, at Marseilles (round-up of 40,000 persons in January, 1943); at Grenoble (round-up on 24th December, 1943); at Cluny (round-up on 24th December, 1944); at Figeac (round-up in May, 1944); at Saint Pol de Leon (round-up in July, 1944); at Locminé (round-up on 3rd July, 1944); at Eyzieux (round-up in May, 1944) and at Moussey (round-up in September, 1944). These arrests were followed by brutal treatment and tortures carried out by the most diverse methods, such as immersion in icy water, asphyxiation, torture of the limbs, and the use of instruments of torture, such as the iron helmet and electric current, and practiced in all the prisons of France, notably in Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Rennes, Metz, Clermont-Ferrand, Toulouse, Nice, Grenoble, Annecy, Anas, Bethune, Lille, Loos, Valenciennes, Nancy, Troyes and Caen, and in the torture chambers fitted up at the Gestapo centers.

In the concentration camps, the health regime, and the labor regime, were such that the rate of mortality (alleged to be from natural causes) attained enormous proportions, for instance:—

1. Out of a convoy of 230 French women deported from Compiègne to Auschwitz in January, 1943, 180 died of exhaustion by the end of four months.

2. 143 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 23rd March and 6th May, 1943, in Block 8 at Dachau.
3. 1,797 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 21st November, 1943, and 15th March, 1945, in the Block at Dora.
4. 465 Frenchmen died of general debility in November, 1944, at Dora.
5. 22,761 deportees died of exhaustion at Buchenwald between 1st January, 1943, and 15th April, 1945.
6. 11,560 detainees died of exhaustion at Dachau Camp (most of them in Block 30 reserved for the sick and infirm) between 1st January and 15th April, 1945.
7. 780 priests died of exhaustion at Mauthausen.
8. Out of 2,200 Frenchmen registered at Flossenburg Camp, 1,600 died from supposedly natural causes.

Methods used for the work of extermination in concentration camps were:—bad treatment, pseudo-scientific experiments (sterilization of women at Auschwitz and at Ravensbrück, study of the evolution of cancer of the womb at Auschwitz, of typhus at Buchenwald, anatomical research at Natzweiler, heart injections at Buchenwald, bone grafting and muscular excisions at Ravensbrück, etc.), gas chambers, gas wagons and crematory ovens. Of 228,000 French political and racial deportees in concentration camps, only 28,000 survived.

In France also systematic extermination was practiced, notably at Asq on 1st April, 1944, at Colpo on 22nd July, 1944, at Buget sur Tarn on 6th July, 1944, and on 17th August, 1944, at Pluvignier on 8th July, 1944, at Rennes on 8th June, 1944, at Grenoble on 8th July, 1944, at Saint Flour on 10th June, 1944, at Ruisnes on 10th July, 1944, at Nîmes, at Tulle, and at Nice, where, in July, 1944, the victims of torture were exposed to the population, and at Oradour sur Glane where the entire village population was shot or burned alive in the church.

The many charnel pits give proof of anonymous massacres. Most notable of these are the charnel pits of Paris (Cascade du Bois de Boulogne), Lyons, Saint Genies Laval, Besançon, Petit Saint Bernard, Aulnat, Caen, Port Louis, Charleval, Fontainebleau, Bouconne, Gabaudet, L'hermitage Lorges, Morlaas, Bordelongue, Signe.

In the course of a premeditated campaign of terrorism, initiated in Denmark by the Germans in the latter part of 1943, 600 Danish subjects were murdered and, in addition, throughout the German occupation of Denmark, large numbers of Danish subjects were subjected to torture and ill-treatment of all sorts. In addition, approximately 500 Danish subjects were murdered, by torture and otherwise, in German prisons and concentration camps.

In Belgium between 1940 and 1944 tortures by various means, but identical in each place, were carried out at Brussels, Liège, Mons, Ghent, Namur, Antwerp, Tournai, Arlon, Charleroi and Dinant.

At Vught, in Holland, when the camp was evacuated about 400 persons were murdered by shooting.

In Luxembourg, during the German occupation, 500 persons were murdered and, in addition, another 521 were illegally executed, by order of such special tribunals as the so-called "Sondergericht." Many more persons in Luxembourg were subjected to torture and mistreatment by the Gestapo. Not less than 4,000 Luxembourg nationals were imprisoned during the period of German occupation, and of these at least 400 were murdered.

Between March, 1944, and April, 1945, in Italy, at least 7,500 men, women and children, ranging in years from infancy to extreme old age were murdered by the German soldiery at Civitella, in the Ardeatine Caves in Rome, and at other places. . . .

About 1,500,000 persons were exterminated in Maidanek and about 4,000,000 persons were exterminated in Auschwitz, among whom were citizens of Poland, the U. S. S. R., the United States of America, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, France and other countries.

In the Lwow region and in the city of Lwow the Germans exterminated about 700,000 Soviet people, including 70 persons in the field of the arts, science and technology, and also citizens of the U. S. A., Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Holland, brought to this region from other concentration camps.

In the Jewish ghetto from 7th September, 1941, to 6th July, 1943, over 133,000 persons were tortured and shot.

Mass shooting of the population occurred in suburbs of the city and in the Livenitz forest.

In the Ganov camp 200,000 peaceful citizens were exterminated. The most refined methods of cruelty were employed in this extermination, such as disembowelling and the freezing of human beings in tubs of water. Mass shootings took place to the accompaniment of the music of an orchestra recruited from the persons interned.

Beginning with June, 1943, the Germans carried out measures to hide the evidence of their crimes. They exhumed and burned corpses, and they crushed the bones with machines and used them for fertilizer.

At the beginning of 1944 in the Ozarichi region of the Bielorussian S. S. R., before liberation by the Red Army, the Germans established three concentration camps without shelters, to which they committed tens of thousands of persons from the neighboring territories. They brought many people to these

camps from typhus hospitals intentionally, for the purpose of infecting the other persons interned and for spreading the disease in territories from which the Germans were being driven by the Red Army. In these camps there were many murders and crimes.

In the Estonian S. S. R. they shot tens of thousands of persons and in one day alone, 19th September, 1944, in Camp Kloga, the Germans shot 2,000 peaceful citizens. They burned the bodies on bonfires.

In the Lithuanian S. S. R. there were mass killings of Soviet citizens, namely: in Panerai at least 100,000; in Kaunas more than 70,000; in Alitus about 60,000; in Prenai more than 3,000; in Villiampol about 8,000; in Mariampol about 7,000; in Trakai and neighboring towns 37,640.

In the Latvian S. S. R. 577,000 persons were murdered.

As a result of the whole system of internal order maintained in all camps, the interned persons were doomed to die.

In a secret instruction entitled "the internal regime in concentration camps," signed personally by Himmler in 1941 severe measures of punishment were set forth for the internees. Masses of prisoners of war were shot, or died from the cold and torture. . . .

(E) PLUNDER OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

The Defendants ruthlessly exploited the people and the material resources of the countries they occupied, in order to strengthen the Nazi war machine, to depopulate and impoverish the rest of Europe, to enrich themselves and their adherents, and to promote German economic supremacy over Europe.

The Defendants engaged in the following acts and practices, among others:

1. They degraded the standard of life of the people of occupied countries and caused starvation, by stripping occupied countries of foodstuffs for removal to Germany.

2. They seized raw materials and industrial machinery in all of the occupied countries, removed them to Germany and used them in the interest of the German war effort and the German economy.

3. In all the occupied countries, in varying degrees, they confiscated businesses, plants and other property.

4. In an attempt to give color of legality to illegal acquisitions of property, they forced owners of property to go through the forms of "voluntary" and "legal" transfers.

5. They established comprehensive controls over the economies of all of the occupied countries and directed their resources, their production and their labor in the interests of the German war economy, depriving the local populations of the products of essential industries.

6. By a variety of financial mechanisms, they despoiled all of the occupied

countries of essential commodities and accumulated wealth, debased the local currency systems and disrupted the local economies. They financed extensive purchases in occupied countries through clearing arrangements by which they exacted loans from the occupied countries. They imposed occupation levies, exacted financial contributions, and issued occupation currency, far in excess of occupation costs. They used these excess funds to finance the purchase of business properties and supplies in the occupied countries.

7. They abrogated the rights of the local populations in the occupied portions of the USSR and in Poland and in other countries to develop or manage agricultural and industrial properties, and reserved this area for exclusive settlement, development, and ownership by Germans and their so-called racial brethren.

8. In further development of their plan of criminal exploitation, they destroyed industrial cities, cultural monuments, scientific institutions, and property of all types in the occupied territories to eliminate the possibility of competition with Germany.

9. From their program of terror, slavery, spoliation and organized outrage, the Nazi conspirators created an instrument for the personal profit and aggrandizement of themselves and their adherents. They secured for themselves and their adherents:

- (a) Positions in administration of business involving power, influence and lucrative perquisites.
- (b) The use of cheap forced labor.
- (c) The acquisition on advantageous terms of foreign properties, business interests, and raw materials.
- (d) The basis for the industrial supremacy of Germany.

These acts were contrary to International Conventions, particularly Articles 46 to 56 inclusive of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter. . . .

Count Four—Crimes against Humanity

STATEMENT OF THE OFFENSE. . . .

(A) MURDER, EXTERMINATION, ENSLAVEMENT, DEPORTATION AND OTHER INHUMANE ACTS COMMITTED AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATIONS BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR

For the purposes set out above, the defendants adopted a policy of persecution, repression, and extermination of all civilians in Germany who were,

or who were believed to [be], or who were believed likely to become, hostile to the Nazi Government and the common plan or conspiracy described in Count One. They imprisoned such persons without judicial process, holding them in "protective custody" and concentration camps, and subjected them to persecution, degradation, despoilment, enslavement, torture and murder.

Special courts were established to carry out the will of the conspirators; favored branches or agencies of the State and Party were permitted to operate outside the range even of nazified law and to crush all tendencies and elements which were considered "undesirable." The various concentration camps included Buchenwald, which was established in 1933 and Dachau, which was established in 1934. At these and other camps the civilians were put to slave labor, and murdered and ill-treated by divers means, including those set out in Count Three above, and these acts and policies were continued and extended to the occupied countries after the 1st September, 1939, and until 8th May, 1945.

(B) PERSECUTION ON POLITICAL, RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUNDS IN EXECUTION OF AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMMON PLAN MENTIONED IN COUNT ONE

As above stated, in execution of and in connection with the common plan mentioned in Count One, opponents of the German Government were exterminated and persecuted. These persecutions were directed against Jews. They were also directed against persons whose political belief or spiritual aspirations were deemed to be in conflict with the aims of the Nazis.

Jews were systematically persecuted since 1933; they were deprived of their liberty, thrown into concentration camps where they were murdered and ill-treated. Their property was confiscated. Hundreds of thousands of Jews were so treated before the 1st September, 1939.

Since the 1st September, 1939, the persecution of the Jews was redoubled; millions of Jews from Germany and from the occupied Western Countries were sent to the Eastern Countries for extermination.

Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the production of evidence of other cases are as follows:

The Nazis murdered amongst others Chancellor Dollfuss, the Social Democrat Breitscheid and the Communist Thaelmann. They imprisoned in concentration camps numerous political and religious personages, for example Chancellor Schuschnigg and Pastor Niemöller.

In November, 1938 by orders of the Chief of the Gestapo, anti-Jewish demonstrations all over Germany took place. Jewish property was destroyed, 30,000 Jews were arrested and sent to concentration camps and their property confiscated.

Under Paragraph VIII A, above, millions of the persons there mentioned as having been murdered and ill-treated were Jews.

Among other mass murders of Jews were the following:

At Kislovodsk all Jews were made to give up their property: 2,000 were shot in an anti-tank ditch at Mineraliye Vodi: 4,300 other Jews were shot in the same ditch.

60,000 Jews were shot on an island on the Dvina near Riga.

20,000 Jews were shot at Lutsk.

32,000 Jews were shot at Sarny.

60,000 Jews were shot at Kiev and Dniepropetrovsk.

Thousands of Jews were gassed weekly by means of gas-wagons which broke down from overwork.

As the Germans retreated before the Soviet Army they exterminated Jews rather than allow them to be liberated. Many concentration camps and ghettos were set up in which Jews were incarcerated and tortured, starved, subjected to merciless atrocities and finally exterminated.

About 70,000 Jews were exterminated in Yugoslavia. . . .

THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION OF 1936

THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION adopted on December 5, 1936, was widely heralded by Stalin and his associates as signifying a "victory for Socialism" in the Soviet Union, and as the "groundwork for a transition to Communism." Like the first union constitution of 1923 it provided for a bicameral parliament. The new Supreme Soviet, with one chamber popularly elected and the other representing the many nationalities making up the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was to be the highest legislative body of the Union. Executive state power of the U.S.S.R. was vested in a Council of Peoples Commissars, which was responsible to the Supreme Soviet. The Constitution acknowledged the principle of federal autonomy of its sixteen Soviet Socialist Republics, and even guaranteed them the right of secession. Universal suffrage, freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly were proclaimed. Guaranteed also were so-called "economic rights": the "right to work," the "right to rest and leisure," and the "right to education," regardless of nationality or race. In contrast to earlier Soviet constitutions which had been based upon an open ballot and had been overtly discriminatory disfranchisement, the 1936 constitution extended constitutional rights to all citizens.

As soon became evident, however, constitutional guarantees of political activity were bestowed only upon the Communist Party, the "vanguard of the working people." "Freedom for several parties," in Stalin's words, "can exist only in a society in which there are antagonistic classes, whose interests are mutually hostile and irreconcilable. . . . In the U.S.S.R. there is ground for only one party." Moreover, vast purges of Party, State, and Army preceded and followed the adoption of the Constitution, strengthening Stalin's autocratic control of state machinery. The two chief authors of the Constitution, Bukharin and Radek, themselves later were to be convicted of treason; the former was executed and the latter condemned to penal servitude.

Important changes have been incorporated in the Constitution in recent years. During the war years, the "revolutionary" title of People's Commissar was replaced by the traditional "Minister." In 1944, the constituent republics were permitted to have their own departments (ministries) of foreign affairs; Byelorussia and the Ukraine, by means of this device, were sponsored for membership in the new United Nations organization, and were admitted—giving the Soviet Union two additional "automatic" votes in the organization's General Assembly.

Selections from the Constitution follow.



CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY

Article 1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

Article 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies, which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the landlords and capitalists and the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat, constitute the political foundation of the USSR.

Article 3. In the USSR all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Article 4. The socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production firmly established as a result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, constitute the economic foundation of the USSR.

Article 5. Socialist property in the USSR exists either in the form of state property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of cooperative and collective-farm property (property of a collective farm or property of a cooperative association).

Article 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, post, telegraph and telephones, large state-organized agricultural enterprises (state farms, machine and tractor stations and the like) as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of the dwelling houses in the cities and industrial localities are state property, that is, belong to the whole people.

Article 7. Public enterprises in collective farms and cooperative organizations, with their livestock and implements, the products of the collective farms and cooperative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of the collective farms and cooperative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the public, collective farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small plot of land attached to the dwelling and, as its personal property, a subsidiary establishment on the plot, a dwelling-house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements—in accordance with the statutes of the agricultural *artel*.

Article 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them for their use free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

Article 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy, which is the predominant form of economy in the USSR, the law permits the small private economy of individual peasants and handicraftsmen based on their personal labor and precluding the exploitation of the labor of others.

Article 10. The rights of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling-houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils and articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

Article 11. The economic life of the USSR is determined and directed by the state national economic plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material conditions of the working people and raising their cultural level, of consolidating the independence of the USSR and strengthening its defensive capacity.

Article 12. In the USSR work is a duty and a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle:

"He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the USSR is that of socialism:

"From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE

Article 13. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a federal state, formed on the basis of the voluntary association of Soviet Socialist Republics having equal rights, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic

The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic

The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic

The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic

The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic

The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic

The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic

The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic

The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic

The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic

The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic

The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic

The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Article 14. The jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as represented by its highest organs of state authority and organs of government, covers:

- (a) Representation of the Union in international relations, conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states;
- (b) Questions of war and peace;
- (c) Admission of new republics into the USSR;
- (d) Control over the observance of the Constitution of the USSR and ensuring conformity of the Constitutions of the Union Republics with the Constitution of the USSR;
- (e) Confirmation of alternations of boundaries between Union Republics;
- (f) Confirmation of the formation of new Territories and Regions and also of new Autonomous Republics within Union Republics;
- (g) Organization of the defense of the USSR and direction of all the armed forces of the USSR;
- (h) Foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly;
- (i) Safeguarding the security of the state;
- (j) Establishment of the national economic plans of the USSR;
- (k) Approval of the single state budget of the USSR, as well as of the taxes and revenues which go to the all-Union, Republican and local budgets;
- (l) Administration of the banks, industrial and agricultural establishments and enterprises and trading enterprises of all-Union importance;
- (m) Administration of transport and communications;
- (n) Direction of the monetary and credit system;
- (o) Organization of state insurance;
- (p) Raising and granting of loans;
- (q) Establishment of the basic principles for the use of land as well as for the use of natural deposits, forests and waters;
- (r) Establishment of the basic principles in the spheres of education and public health;
- (s) Organization of a uniform system of national economic statistics;
- (t) Establishment of the principles of labor legislation;
- (u) Legislation on the judicial system and judicial procedure; criminal and civil codes;
- (v) Laws on citizenship of the Union; laws on the rights of foreigners;
- (w) Issuing of all-Union acts of amnesty.

Article 15. The sovereignty of the Union Republics is limited only within the provisions set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR. Outside

of these provisions, each Union Republic exercises state authority independently. The USSR protects the sovereign rights of the Union Republics.

Article 16. Each Union Republic has its own Constitution, which takes account of the specific features of the Republic and is drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the USSR.

Article 17. To every Union Republic is reserved the right freely to secede from the USSR.

THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Article 30. The highest organ of state authority of the USSR is the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Article 31. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR exercises all rights vested in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution, in so far as they do not, by virtue of the Constitution, come within the jurisdiction of organs of the USSR that are accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, that is, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the People's Commissariats of the USSR.

Article 32. The legislative power of the USSR is exercised exclusively by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Article 33. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR consists of two Chambers: the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.

Article 34. The Soviet of the Union is elected by the citizens of the USSR according to electoral areas on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 of the population.

Article 35. The Soviet of Nationalities is elected by the citizens of the USSR according to Union and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Regions and national areas on the basis of twenty-five deputies from each Union Republic, eleven deputies from each Autonomous Republic, five deputies from each Autonomous Region and one deputy from each national area.

Article 36. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is elected for a term of four years.

THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY OF THE UNION REPUBLICS

Article 57. The highest organ of state authority of a Union Republic is the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic.

Article 58. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic is elected by the citizens of the Republic for a term of four years.

The basis of representation is established by the Constitution of the Union Republic.

Article 59. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic is the sole legislative organ of the Republic.

Article 60. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic:

(a) Adopts the Constitution of the Republic and amends it in conformity with Article 16 of the Constitution of the USSR;

(b) Confirms the Constitutions of the Autonomous Republics forming part of it and defines the boundaries of their territories;

(c) Approves the national economic plan and also the budget of the Republic;

(d) Exercises the right of amnesty and pardon of citizens sentenced by the judicial organs of the Union Republic.¹

THE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Article 64. The highest executive and administrative organ of state authority of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Article 65. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR is responsible to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and accountable to it; and in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet it is responsible and accountable to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Article 66. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation, and supervises their execution.

Article 67. Decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR are binding throughout the territory of the USSR.

Article 68. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR:

(a) Coordinates and directs the work of the All-Union and Union-Republican People's Commissariats of the USSR and of other institutions, economic and cultural, under its administration;

(b) Adopts measures to carry out the national economic plan and the state budget, and to strengthen the credit and monetary system;

(c) Adopts measures for the maintenance of public order, for the protection of the interests of the state, and for the safeguarding of the rights of citizens;

¹ [Article 60 was amended in 1944 by the addition of (e) and (f) as follows: "(e) Establishes the representation of the Union Republic in international relations." "(f) Establishes the procedure for creating Republican military formations."]

(d) Exercises general guidance in respect of relations with foreign states;
 (e) Fixes the annual contingent of citizens to be called up for military service and directs the general organization and development of the armed forces of the country;

(f) Sets up, whenever necessary, special committees and central administrations under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for matters concerning economic, cultural and defense organization and development.

Article 69. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR has the right, in respect of those branches of administration and economy which come within the jurisdiction of the USSR, to suspend decisions and orders of the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics and to annul orders and instructions of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Article 70. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and consists of:

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR;
 The Vice-Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR;
 The Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the USSR;
 The Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission;
 The People's Commissars of the USSR;
 The Chairman of the Committee on Arts;
 The Chairman of the Committee on Higher Education;
 The Chairman of the Board of the State Bank.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS

Article 118. Citizens of the USSR have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises, and the abolition of unemployment.

Article 119. Citizens of the USSR have the right to rest and leisure.

The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the reduction of the working day to seven hours for the overwhelming majority of the workers, the institution of annual vacations with full pay for workers and employees and the provision of a wide network of sanatoriums, rest homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

Article 120. Citizens of the USSR have the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or loss of capacity to work.

This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance of

workers and employees at state expense, free medical service for the working people and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

Article 121. Citizens of the USSR have the right to education.

This right is ensured by universal, compulsory elementary education; by education, including higher education, being free of charge; by the system of state stipends for the overwhelming majority of students in the universities and colleges; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language, and by the organization in the factories, state farms, machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.

Article 122. Women in the USSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life.

The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education, and by state protection of the interests of mother and child, pre-maternity and maternity leave with full pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

Article 123. Equality of rights of citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, is an infeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law.

Article 124. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the USSR is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

Article 125. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law:

- (a) Freedom of speech;
- (b) Freedom of the press;
- (c) Freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
- (d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

Article 126. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the USSR are ensured the right to unite in public organizations—trade unions, cooperative associations, youth organizations, sport and defense organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically most conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state.

Article 127. Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

Article 128. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

Article 129. The USSR affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

Article 130. It is the duty of every citizen of the USSR to abide by the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to observe the laws, to maintain labor discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

Article 131. It is the duty of every citizen of the USSR to safeguard and strengthen public, socialist property as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperous and cultured life of all the working people.

Persons committing offenses against public, socialist property, are enemies of the people.

Article 132. Universal military service is law.

Military service in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is an honorable duty of the citizens of the USSR.

Article 133. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Treason to the country—violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the state, espionage—is punishable with all the severity of the law as the most heinous of crimes.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Article 134. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies—of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics,

the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Territories and Regions, the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics, the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Autonomous Regions, area, district, city and rural (Stanitsa, village, hamlet, kishlak, aul) Soviets of Working People's Deputies—are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

Article 135. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the USSR who have reached the age of eighteen, irrespective of race or nationality, religion, educational and residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

Article 136. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

Article 137. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

Article 138. Citizens serving in the Red Army have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

Article 139. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Working People's Deputies, from rural and city Soviets of Working People's Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.

Article 140. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.

Article 141. Candidates for election are nominated according to electoral areas.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Article 142. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time in the manner established by law upon decision of a majority of the electors.

JOSEF STALIN

UNLIKE LENIN, and unlike his own principal rival Leon Trotsky, Josef Stalin (1879-1953) did not come from middle class forebears, but was born the son of a poor Georgian cobbler. He was originally intended for the Orthodox priesthood, but was expelled for insubordination and radicalism in 1896 from a Georgian theological seminary in Tiflis. After the age of fifteen, when he joined an underground revolutionary movement of Marxists, Stalin remained a fighter; his assumed name (his real name was Djugashvili) means "man of steel." In 1903, after the split within the Russian Social Democratic party, Stalin joined with the Bolshevik, or revolutionary majority, wing. He first met Lenin in 1905, and subsequently Stalin engaged in a relentless struggle against the tsarist regime. Before the outbreak of World War I he was imprisoned and exiled to Siberia on four occasions. In 1910, he helped found the party's newspaper, *Pravda*. More prominent Bolsheviks like Lenin and Trotsky spent years of exile abroad before and during World War I, but Stalin never followed their example and he ventured into Western Europe on only a few occasions to attend secret revolutionary meetings. While not negligible, his role in the October Revolution of 1917 was less prominent than later official Soviet biographies have asserted. His intellectual contributions to Marxist theory were inferior to those of his early Politburo colleagues. In the first Council of Commissars after the Revolution, Stalin received the modest and obscure post of Commissar of Nationalities, while his rival, Trotsky, as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and organizer of the Red Army, emerged beside Lenin as the second most powerful figure of the Revolution.

Stalin, an indefatigable administrator, became Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist party in 1922, a position of decisive importance, and held it until his death. Control of the party apparatus placed him in a decisively strategic position in the struggle for power which followed Lenin's death in 1924. While Trotsky later charged that Lenin's last will had urged that Stalin not be chosen his successor, Stalin quickly overshadowed all his rivals. Trotsky, coming to view Stalin as a "rightist" for his then lenient policies toward the peasantry and for his rejection of intensified revolutionary activities abroad, sank into impotence, was dismissed as War Commissar and exiled, in 1929, to die in Mexico at the hands of an assassin in 1940.

Stalin's victory over his opposition—involving the liquidation of many of his "Old Bolshevik" associates in the 1930s—had a decisive effect upon the subsequent course of Russian history. Challenging Trotsky's doctrine of relentless world revolution, Stalin preached, in the early 'thirties, the doctrine of "socialism in one country." This, as Stalin himself often asserted, did not mean abandoning the goal of world revolution, but rather meant that the victory of "socialism" in the Soviet Union was an indispensable prerequisite for "hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries." While the Communist International—the world organization of Communist parties—remained in existence until its dissolution in 1943, the Russian Bolshevik party assumed virtual domination over its counter-

parts abroad, and used them increasingly for the purposes of Soviet Russian foreign policy. The vast program of Soviet industrialization and agricultural collectivization under Stalin's Five Year Plans rapidly transformed a backward and agrarian Russia into a powerful industrial nation.

But this vast economic transformation took heavy human toll. Several million Russian peasants—obdurately resisting these drastic measures—perished of hunger between 1930 and 1932, and millions more were deported, imprisoned, or shot. The "dictatorship of the proletariat"—theoretically a prelude to the establishment of a classless, stateless socialist society—was intensified during the 'thirties as the Soviet state strengthened and increasingly relied upon instruments of terror and coercion to achieve its objectives. The day of the "withering away" of the state was indefinitely postponed until the time when all internal and external enemies had been overcome. In the late 'thirties many internal opponents of the Stalin regime, including old-time party members, were charged with high treason and executed after mass trials. Stalin's chief remaining rivals in the Politburo, Zinoviev and Kamenev, were removed and liquidated, and high Red Army officers fell as well.

Faced with the external threat of German and Japanese aggression in Europe and Asia, Stalin's Russia emerged from its revolutionary isolationism in the mid-'thirties, as self-styled champion of "collective security." Sponsoring "Popular Fronts" formed of Communist parties and liberal and leftist groups abroad, joining the League of Nations, and allying itself with France, the Soviet Union temporarily abandoned its professed goal of world revolution and espoused policies of collaboration with the Western democracies. But this shift abruptly reversed itself in 1939 when Stalin signed with Nazi Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact and embarked upon a program of forcible annexations in Eastern Europe and of benevolent assistance to Nazi Germany, now involved in war with the Western democracies. Later, after Hitler's treacherous invasion of Russia, Stalin took his place beside Roosevelt and Churchill as a leader of the victorious coalition in World War II. The Soviet system successfully withstood four years of wartime invasion and devastation, and Russia emerged in 1945 as one of three "super-powers" which dominated the peace.

Stalin himself shared in the fruits of victory. Retaining official and actual party leadership, he acquired, after 1939, top positions in the government, becoming generalissimo (a title created especially for him), premier, minister of armed forces of the Soviet Union and, shortly before his death, chairman of the council of ministers of the Soviet Union. Touted in official Soviet circles as Marxist theoretician, scientist, music and art critic, and infallible prophet of Bolshevik world revolution, within the orbit of established Communism Stalin never was successfully challenged except by Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito, in 1948. Six Soviet cities were named after him, and two mountain peaks. He died in March, 1953, and was succeeded as premier by Georgi Malenkov.

The following is a selection from the abridged text of Stalin's report to the Special Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets, delivered on November 25, 1936, during discussion of the new constitution.

THE NEW SOVIET CONSTITUTION

THE CONSTITUTION COMMISSION was to introduce changes into the Constitution operating at present, which was adopted in 1924, taking into account the changes in the life of the U.S.S.R. in the direction of socialism brought about in the period from 1924 to our days.

What changes have occurred in the life of the U.S.S.R. during the period 1924-1936?

That was the first period of the New Economic Policy, when Soviet power permitted a certain revival of capitalism, along with the general development of socialism, when it calculated that, in the process of competition between the two economic systems—the capitalist and the socialist—it would organize the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist system.

The task was, in the process of this competition, to consolidate the position of socialism, to attain the liquidation of the capitalist elements and consummate the victory of the socialist system as the basic system of national economy.

At that time our industry presented an unenviable picture, especially heavy industry. True, it was recovering little by little, but it had not yet raised its output to anywhere near the pre-war level.

It was based on the old, backward, scanty technique. It was developing, of course, in the direction of socialism. At that time the share of the socialist sector formed about 80 per cent of our industry. But still the sector of capitalism held at least 20 per cent of industry in its hands.

Our agriculture presented a still more unenviable picture. It is true that the landlord class had already been done away with, but as compared to that class, the agricultural capitalist kulak class still formed a rather important force.

Agriculture as a whole at that time resembled a boundless ocean of small individual peasant farms with their backward medieval technique. There were in formation isolated points and little islands in this ocean, collective farms and state farms which, strictly speaking, were not yet of any really serious importance in our national economy.

The collective farms and state farms were weak, while the kulaks were still in their strength. At that time we did not talk about the liquidation of kulaks, but of restricting them.

The same thing can be said of the goods turnover of the country. The socialist sector of goods turnover amounted to some 50-60 per cent, no more, while all the rest was occupied by merchants, speculators and other private traders.

Such was the picture of our economy in 1924.

What have we in 1936?

While previously we had the first period of the New Economic Policy, the beginning of the New Economic Policy, a certain revival of capitalism, today we have the end of the New Economic Policy, the period of the complete liquidation of capitalism in all spheres of national economy.

Let us start from the fact that our industry during this period has grown into a gigantic force. Now it is no longer possible to call it weak and badly equipped technically. On the contrary, it is now based on new, rich and modern technique, with a strongly developed heavy industry and still more strongly developed machine-building industry.

Most important is the fact that capitalism has been completely expelled from the sphere of our industry, and the socialist form of production is now the system which alone dominates the sphere of our industry.

The fact that in volume of production our present socialist industry exceeds pre-war industry more than seven-fold cannot be regarded as a trifle.

In the sphere of agriculture, instead of an ocean of small individual peasant farms with weak technique and a preponderance of kulaks, we now have mechanized production conducted on the largest scale anywhere in the world, equipped with modern technique in the form of an all-embracing system of collective and state farms.

Everyone knows the kulaks in agriculture have been liquidated and that the small individual peasant farm sector with its backward medieval technique now occupies an insignificant place. The share of individual farms in agriculture, as far as sown area is concerned, now comprises no more than two to three per cent.

One cannot but note the fact that the collective farms now have at their disposal 316,000 tractors with a total of 5,700,000 horsepower, and, together with the state farms, they possess over 400,000 tractors with 7,580,000 horsepower.

As for distribution throughout the country, the merchants and speculators are now completely expelled from this sphere. The whole field of distribution is now in the hands of the state, the cooperative societies and the collective farms.

A new Soviet trade has come into being and it is a trade without speculators, a trade without capitalists.

THE NEW SOCIETY

Thus the complete victory of the socialist system in all spheres of the national economy is now a fact. This means that exploitation of man by man

is abolished—liquidated—while the socialist ownership of the implements and means of production is established as the unshakable basis of our Soviet society.

As a result of all these changes in the national economy of the U.S.S.R., we have now a new socialist economy, knowing neither crises nor unemployment, neither poverty nor ruin, and giving to the citizens every possibility to live prosperous and cultured lives.

Such, in the main, are the changes which took place in our economy during the period from 1924 to 1936. Corresponding to these changes in the sphere of the economy of the U.S.S.R., the class structure of our society has also changed. As is known, the landlord class had already been liquidated as a result of the victorious conclusion of the Civil War.

As for the other exploiting classes, they share the fate of the landlord class. The capitalist class has ceased to exist in the sphere of industry. The kulak class has ceased to exist in the sphere of agriculture. The merchants and speculators have ceased to exist in the sphere of distribution. In this way, all exploiting classes are proved to have been liquidated.

The working class has remained. The peasant class has remained. The intellectuals have remained. But it would be mistaken to think these social groups have undergone no changes during this period, that they remained what they were, say, in the period of capitalism.

Take, for example, the working class of the U.S.S.R. It is often called "the proletariat" through old habit. But what is the proletariat? The proletariat is a class exploited by the capitalists.

But as is well known, the capitalist class is already liquidated in our country, the implements and means of production have been taken from the capitalists and transferred to the leading power of the state, which is the working class.

Consequently, there no longer exists a capitalist class which could exploit the working class.

Consequently our working class is not only not bereft of the implements and means of production, but, on the contrary, possesses them in conjunction with the whole people. And since it possesses these and the capitalist class is liquidated, all possibility of exploiting the working class is precluded. Is it possible after this to call our working class a "proletariat"?

It is clearly impossible. Marx said:

"In order that the proletariat may emancipate itself, it must smash the capitalist class, take the implements and means of production from the capitalists and abolish the conditions of production which create the proletariat."

Can it be said that the working class of the U.S.S.R. has already achieved these conditions for its emancipation?

Undoubtedly it can and should be said.

What does this mean? It means that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. has become transformed into an entirely new class, into the working class of the U.S.S.R., which has abolished the capitalist system of economy and has established the socialist ownership of implements and means of production and is directing Soviet society along the path to communism. As you see, the working class of the U.S.S.R. is an entirely new working class, freed from exploitation and having no counterpart in the history of mankind.

Now, let us pass to the question of the peasantry. It is customary to say that the peasantry is a class of small producers, with atomized members, scattered over the face of the whole country, plowing their lonely furrows on their small farms with backward technique, slaves of private property, exploited with impunity by landlords, kulaks, merchants, speculators, usurers, etc. Indeed, the peasantry in capitalist countries, bearing in mind the main mass, is such a class.

Can it be said that our present-day peasantry, the Soviet peasantry, in the mass, resembles such a peasantry?

No, this cannot be said. We no longer have such a peasantry in our country. Our Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry. We no longer have landlords and kulaks, merchants and usurers to exploit peasants. Consequently our peasantry is a peasantry freed from exploitation. Further, the overwhelming majority of our peasantry is collective farm peasantry, *i.e.*, it bases its work and its possessions not on individual labor and backward technique but on collective labor and modern technique.

Finally, the economy of our peasantry is not based on private property but on collective property, which grew up on the basis of collective labor. As you see, the Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry, having no counterpart in the history of mankind.

Finally, let us pass to the question of the intellectual, the question of engineering and technical workers, the workers on the cultural front, office employees generally, etc. They too have undergone great changes during the past period. There is no longer the old conservative intelligentsia which tried to place itself above classes, but, in fact, as a mass, served the landlords and capitalists. Our Soviet intelligentsia is bound by all its roots to the working class and the peasantry.

First, the composition of the intelligentsia has changed. The offspring of the nobility and of the bourgeoisie comprise a small percentage of our

Soviet intelligentsia. Eighty to ninety per cent of the Soviet intelligentsia come from the working class, the peasantry and other strata of the toiling population.

Finally, the very nature of the activities of the intelligentsia changes. Formerly it had to serve the rich classes, for it could do nothing else. Now it must serve the people, for the exploiting classes have ceased to exist. And precisely for that reason it is now an equal member of Soviet society, in which, pulling together jointly with the workers and peasants, it is building the new classless socialist society.

As you see, this is an entirely new working class intelligentsia, for which you will not find a counterpart in any country on the globe.

Such are the changes which have taken place in the recent period in the class structure of Soviet society.

What do these changes signify?

They signify, first, that the dividing line between the working class and the peasantry, as well as that between these classes and the intelligentsia, is becoming obliterated and that the old class exclusiveness is disappearing. This means that the distance between these social groups is more and more diminishing.

They signify, secondly, that the economic contradictions between these social groups is subsiding, is becoming obliterated.

They signify, finally, that the political contradictions between them are also subsiding, becoming obliterated.

Such is the position concerning the changes in the sphere of class structure in the U.S.S.R.

The picture of the changes in social life in the U.S.S.R. would be incomplete without a few words regarding the changes in another sphere. I have in mind the sphere of national interrelations within the U.S.S.R. As is well known, the Soviet Union comprises about sixty nations, national groups and nationalities. The Soviet state is a multi-national state. Clearly the question of the interrelations among peoples of the U.S.S.R. cannot but be of first rate importance to us.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed, as is well known, in 1922 at the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. It was formed on the principles of equality and free will of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Constitution now in force, adopted in 1924, is the first Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

That was a period when the relations among the peoples had not yet been settled, as they should have been, when the survivals of mistrust towards the Russians had not yet disappeared, when the centrifugal forces still continued

to operate. Under these conditions it was necessary to establish fraternal co-operation of peoples on the basis of economic, political and military mutual aid, uniting them in one union, a multi-national state.

The Soviet power could not but see the difficulties of this. It had before it the unsuccessful experiments and unfortunate experience of multi-national states in bourgeois countries. It had before it the abortive experience of old Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless it decided to make the experiment of creating a multi-national state, for it knew that a multi-national state which came into being on the basis of socialism is bound to pass every possible test. Fourteen years have passed since then, a period sufficiently long to verify the experiment. What is the result?

The period that has passed undoubtedly shows that the experiment in forming a multi-national state created on the basis of socialism has been entirely successful. This is an undoubted victory of Lenin's national policy.

How is this victory to be explained?

The very absence of the exploiting classes which are the principal organizers of strife among the nationalities, the absence of exploitation, breeding mutual distrust and fanning nationalist passions, the fact that the power is held by the working class, which is the enemy of all enslavement and the faithful bearer of ideas of internationalism, the materialization in reality of mutual aid of the peoples in all fields of economic and social life, and finally the high development of the national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., culture that is national in form and socialist in content—as a result of all these and similar factors, the peoples of the U.S.S.R. have radically changed their characteristics. Their feeling of mutual distrust has disappeared. The feeling of mutual friendship has developed, and thus fraternal cooperation of the peoples has been established in the system of a single union state.

As a result, we now have a fully formed multi-national socialist state, which has passed all tests and which has a stability which any national state in any part of the world may well envy.

Such are the changes that have taken place during the past period in the sphere of relationships among the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. Such is the sum total of the changes in the sphere of economic and social-political life in the U.S.S.R. which have taken place in the period from 1924 to 1936.

THE NEW CONSTITUTION

How are these changes in the life of the U.S.S.R. reflected in the draft of the new Constitution?

In other words, what are the main specific features of the draft Constitution submitted for consideration at the present congress?

The Constitution Commission was instructed to introduce changes in the text of the 1924 Constitution. The work of the Constitution Commission resulted in a new text of a Constitution, in a draft of a new Constitution for the U.S.S.R.

In drafting the new Constitution, the Constitution Commission took as a point of departure that the Constitution must not be confused with a program. That means, there is an essential difference between a program and a constitution. Whereas a program speaks of what does not yet exist, and of what should still be achieved and won in the future, a constitution deals with the present.

Two examples for illustration:

Our Soviet society succeeded in achieving socialism, in the main, and has created a socialist order, *i.e.*, has achieved what is otherwise called among Marxists the first or lower phase of communism, that is, socialism.

It is known that the fundamental principle of this phase of communism is the formula: "From each according to his abilities; to each according to his deeds."

Should our Constitution reflect this fact, the winning of socialism?

Should it be based on this victory?

Undoubtedly it should. It should because for the U.S.S.R. socialism is something already achieved, already won.

But Soviet society has not yet succeeded in bringing about the highest phase of communism where the ruling principle will be the formula: "From each according to his abilities; to each according to his needs," although it sets itself the aim of achieving the materialization of this higher phase, full communism, in the future.

Can our Constitution be based on the higher phase? On communism which does not yet exist and which has still to be won?

No, it cannot, unless it wants to become a program or a declaration about future conquests.

Such is the framework our Constitution presents at this historical moment.

Thus the draft of the new Constitution sums up the path already traversed, sums up the gains already achieved. Consequently it is the record and legislative enactment of what has been achieved and won in fact.

This constitutes the first specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

To continue:

The constitutions of bourgeois countries are usually taken as a point of departure for the conviction that the capitalist system is unshakable. The main bases of these constitutions form the principles of capitalism, and are its

principal mainstays, namely: private ownership of land, forests, factories, shops and other implements and means of production; exploitation of man by man and the existence of exploiters and exploited; insecurity for the toiling majority at one pole of society and luxury for the non-toiling but well-secured minority at the other pole, etc.

They rest on these and similar mainstays of capitalism. They reflect them, they fix them by legislation.

Unlike these, the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. proceeds from the fact of the abolition of the capitalist system, from the fact of the victory of the socialist system in the U.S.S.R.

The main foundation of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is formed of the principles of socialism and its chief mainstays, already won and put into practice, namely, the socialist ownership of land, forests, factories, shops and other implements and means of production; abolition of exploitation and exploiting classes; abolition of poverty for the majority and luxury for the minority; abolition of unemployment; work as an obligation and duty and the honor of every able-bodied citizen according to the formula: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat," *i.e.*, the right of every citizen to receive guaranteed work; the right to rest and leisure; the right to education, etc.

The draft of the new Constitution rests on these.

To continue: Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed from the premise that society consists of antagonistic classes, of classes which own wealth and classes which do not own wealth; that whatever party comes to power in the state guidance of society (dictatorship) must belong to the bourgeoisie; that the constitution is needed to consolidate the social order desired by and for the advantage of the propertied classes.

Unlike the bourgeois constitutions, the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. proceeds from the fact that antagonistic classes no longer exist in our society, that our society consists of two friendly classes: the workers and peasants, that precisely these toiling classes are in power, that the state guidance of society (dictatorship) belongs to the working class as the advanced class of society, that the Constitution is needed to consolidate the social order desired by and of advantage to the toilers.

Such is the third specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

To continue: Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed from the premise that nations and races cannot be equal, that there are nations with full rights and nations not possessing full rights; that in addition there is a third category of nations or races, for example, in colonies, which have still fewer rights than those which do not possess full rights. This means that at bottom all these constitutions are nationalistic, *i.e.*, constitutions of ruling nations.

As distinct from these constitutions the draft of the New Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is, on the contrary, profoundly international. It proceeds from the premise that all nations and races have equal rights. It proceeds from the premise that color or language differences, differences in cultural level or the level of state development as well as any other difference among nations and races, cannot serve as grounds for justifying national inequality of rights.

It proceeds from the premise that all nations and races irrespective of their past or present position, irrespective of their strength or weakness, must enjoy equal rights in all spheres, economic, social, state and the cultural life of society.

Such is the fourth feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

The fifth specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution is its consistent and fully sustained democracy.

From the viewpoint of democracy, the bourgeois constitutions may be divided into two groups. One group of constitutions openly denies or virtually negates equality of the rights of citizens and democratic liberties. The other group of constitutions willingly accepts and even advertises democratic principles, but in doing so makes such reservations and restrictions that democratic rights and liberties prove to be utterly mutilated.

They talk about equal suffrage for all citizens but immediately limit it by residential, educational and even by property qualifications. They talk about equal rights of citizens, but immediately make the reservation that this does not apply to women, or only partly applies to them, etc.

A specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is that it is free from such reservations and restrictions.

Active and passive citizens do not exist for it; for it all citizens are active. It recognizes no difference in the rights of men and women, "of fixed abode" and "without fixed abode," with property or without property, educated or uneducated.

For it all citizens are equal in their rights. Neither property status nor national origin, nor sex, nor official standing, but only the personal capabilities and personal labor of every citizen determine his position in society.

Finally, there is one other specific feature in the draft of the new Constitution.

Bourgeois constitutions usually limit themselves to recording the formal rights of citizens without concerning themselves about the conditions for exercising these rights, about the possibility of exercising them, the means of exercising them. They speak about equality of citizens but forget that *real* equality between master and workman, between landlord and peasants, is impossible if the former enjoy wealth and political weight in society, while

the latter are deprived of both; if the former are exploiters and the latter are exploited.

Or again: they speak of free speech, freedom of assemblage and of the press, but forget that all these liberties may become empty sound for the working class if the latter is deprived of the possibility of having at its command suitable premises for meetings, good printshops, sufficient quantity of paper, etc.

A specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution is that it does not limit itself to recording formal rights of citizens, but transfers the center of gravity to questions of the guarantee of these rights, to the question of the means of exercising them.

It does not merely proclaim the equality of the rights of citizens but ensures them by legislative enactment of the fact of liquidation of the regime of exploitation, by the fact of liberation of citizens from any exploitation.

It not only proclaims the right to work, but ensures it by legislative enactment of the fact of non-existence of crises in Soviet society, and the fact of abolition of unemployment. It not merely proclaims democratic liberties but guarantees them in legislative enactments by providing definite material facilities.

It is clear, therefore, that the democracy of the new Constitution is not the "usual" and "generally recognized" democracy in general, but socialist democracy.

Such are the principal specific features of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Such is the reflection in the draft of the new Constitution of the mutations and changes in economic and social-political life in the U.S.S.R. which were brought about in the period from 1924 to 1936. . . .

[Stalin here considers the arguments of several groups of critics.]

Finally, there is one more group of critics. Whereas the preceding group charges that the draft Constitution renounced the dictatorship of the working class, this group, on the contrary, charges that the draft makes no change in the existing position of the U.S.S.R.; that it leaves the dictatorship of the working class intact, does not provide for freedom of political parties, and preserves the present leading position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. And, at the same time, this group of critics believes that the absence of freedom for parties in the U.S.S.R. is an indication of the violation of the fundamental principles of democracy.

I must admit the draft of the new Constitution really does leave in force the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, and also leaves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.

If our venerable critics regard this as a shortcoming of the draft Constitution, this can only be regretted. We Bolsheviks, however, consider this as a

merit of the draft Constitution. As for freedom for various political parties, we here adhere to somewhat different views.

The party is part of the class, its vanguard section. Several parties and consequently freedom of parties can only exist in a society where antagonistic classes exist whose interests are hostile and irreconcilable, where there are capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, kulaks and poor peasants.

But in the U.S.S.R. there are no longer such classes as capitalists, landlords, kulaks, etc. In the U.S.S.R. there are only two classes, workers and peasants, whose interests not only are not antagonistic but, on the contrary, amicable. Consequently there are no grounds for the existence of several parties, and therefore for the existence of freedom of such parties in the U.S.S.R. There are grounds for only one party, the Communist Party, in the U.S.S.R. Only one party can exist, the Communist Party, which boldly defends the interests of the workers and peasants to the very end. And there can hardly be any doubt about the fact that it defends the interests of these classes.

They talk about democracy. But what is democracy? Democracy in capitalist countries where there are antagonistic classes is in the last analysis the democracy for the strong, democracy for the propertied minority. Democracy in the U.S.S.R., on the contrary, is democracy for all. But from this it follows that the principles of democracy are violated not by the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. but by the bourgeois constitutions.

That is why I think that the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the only thoroughly democratic constitution in the world.

And that is how matters stand with regard to the bourgeois criticism of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

XV

THE PROBLEM OF WORLD PEACE

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

DESPITE CONFLICTS among the European powers during the nineteenth century, an "international order" of sorts had existed in the long period of relative peace between 1815 and 1914. After the Napoleonic wars Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria had sought to act in "concert" to make the peace, to put down liberal and nationalist revolts, and to resolve conflicts among themselves. This "concert system" of the European chancelleries operated spasmodically; through international congresses and conferences it achieved such results as the establishment and neutralization of Belgium, the settlement of crises attending the protracted decay of the Ottoman Empire, and the partition of Africa. But as a means of preventing war and settling disputes, the concert system seemed to have serious limitations. No formal, international machinery existed to insure the convening of the powers when crises did arise, nor did any accepted rules of international law exist to restrain international aggression. Bismarck's wars against Denmark in 1860, against Austria in 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 were neither prevented nor followed by any formal functioning of the concert. The system failed to prevent the Crimean War of 1856. By 1905, the European alliance system had woven the fabric of "power politics" into two separate systems: Germany-Austria-Italy on the one hand and Britain-France-Russia on the other. The crisis following the Sarajevo assassination of Archduke Ferdinand saw no convening of the great powers to stave off a general European conflict.

Schemes for international organizations to outlaw and prevent war had absorbed the imagination of such philosophers of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment as Immanuel Kant and the Abbe de Saint-Pierre. But during the first World War, powerful popular pressure for a permanent League of Nations emerged in Britain, France, the United States, and Germany. The first concrete proposals for such a League, made in England by the Fabian socialists, attracted wide attention in liberal and pacifist circles in 1916. In the still neutral United States, a League to Enforce the Peace, espousing similar ideas, was established in the same year and won support not only from President Wilson but from such influential Republicans as Henry Cabot Lodge and Nicholas Murray Butler. Wilson, when publishing his Fourteen Points in January, 1917, openly urged the formation of a postwar league of nations. At the Paris Peace Conference, the victorious Allied powers, including the United States, agreed to establish a League, and its Covenant was embodied in the final Versailles Treaty. A permanent Council, dominated by the great powers, and an Assembly composed of all member states were established with powers to investigate and to recommend solutions of international disputes and, if necessary, to invoke "sanctions" against such transgressors of the peace who sought to violate the "territorial integrity and existing political independence" of any League member.

The League had not been exclusively the creature of Woodrow Wilson's type-writer, but it owed much to his powerful support, and its future effectiveness depended in large measure upon American participation. The American Senate's

rejection of the Treaty and the Covenant wrought heavy damage to the League at birth, destroying its claim to "universality." Defeated Germany was not admitted until 1926, and even after that, powerful German officials and widespread nationalist circles viewed the "Geneva Experiment" as a creature of the Allied powers designed to perpetuate the *Diktat* of Versailles. Soon, after Hitler's seizure of power, Germany quit the League. Soviet Russia—a pariah among the nations—officially viewed the organization as an instrument of bourgeois capitalist states, and remained aloof until 1934, when she sought membership to help meet the growing threat of Nazi and Japanese power in Europe and Asia.

Devoid of any attributes of supranational authority, the League from birth depended upon the willingness of its member states effectively to preserve the peace. In years of relative international tranquility in the 'twenties, minor crises were resolved by speedy Council action. But the League failed to deal successfully with any serious disputes among its great power members. Japan's China adventure—begun in 1931 in clear violation of the Covenant—was not followed by League sanctions. In 1935, limited economic sanctions were imposed upon Fascist Italy after her invasion of Ethiopia, but proved entirely inadequate. After 1935 the League took no measures to resist Germany's destruction of the Versailles Treaty. By 1939, upon the outbreak of World War II, the "Geneva experiment" sank into obscurity.

Failing in the political sphere, the League of Nations did make measurable but unspectacular achievements in such fields as health, labor affairs, supervision of colonial peoples in the so-called Mandates of Africa and Asia, opium control, and scientific and cultural affairs. But its political failure cast doubt upon the notion that purely "institutional" panaceas adequately could lessen power conflicts among nation states and prevent war.

The League formally ended its own existence in April, 1946, shortly after the organization of its successor, the United Nations.



THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Preamble

The High Contracting Parties,

In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security;

By the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war;

By the prescription of open, just, and honourable relations between nations;

By the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments;

And by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another;
Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

*The Covenant*¹

ARTICLE I (MEMBERSHIP)

1. The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.

2. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval, and air forces and armaments.

3. Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

ARTICLE 2 (EXECUTIVE MACHINERY)

The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.

ARTICLE 3 (ASSEMBLY)

1. The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the League.

2. The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place as may be decided upon.

3. The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

¹ [The Covenant of the League constituted Part I of the treaties of peace between the Allies and Germany (June 28, 1919), Austria (September 10, 1919), Bulgaria (November 27, 1919), and Hungary (June 4, 1920).]

4. At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three Representatives.

ARTICLE 4 (COUNCIL)

1. The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,² together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece shall be members of the Council.

2. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League whose representatives shall always be members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council.

2 bis.³ The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules dealing with the election of the nonpermanent members of the Council, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term of office and conditions of re-eligibility.

3. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

4. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

5. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a Member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League.

6. At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative.

ARTICLE 5 (VOTING AND PROCEDURE)

1. Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

² [The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan.]

³ [All amendments to the original Covenant are in italics.]

2. All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.

3. The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

ARTICLE 8 (REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS)

1. The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

3. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

4. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

5. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

6. The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval, and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.

ARTICLE 9 (PERMANENT MILITARY COMMISSION)

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Arts. 1 and 8 and on military, naval, and air questions generally.

ARTICLE 10 (GUARANTEES AGAINST AGGRESSION)

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case

of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

ARTICLE II (ACTION IN CASE OF WAR OR DANGER OF WAR)

1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

ARTICLE 12 (DISPUTES TO BE SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION OR INQUIRY)

1. The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration *or judicial settlement* or to inquiry by the Council and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators *or the judicial decision*, or the report by the Council.

2. In any case under this Article, the award of the arbitrators *or the judicial decision* shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

ARTICLE 13 (ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES)

1. The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration *or judicial settlement*, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration *or judicial settlement*.

2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration *or judicial settlement*.

3. *For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, established*

in accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.

4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award *or decision* that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against any Member of the League that complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award *or decision*, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

ARTICLE 14 (PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE)

The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

ARTICLE 15 (DISPUTES NOT SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION)

1. If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration *or judicial settlement* in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

2. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case, with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

3. The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

4. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

5. Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members

thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

7. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

8. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

9. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.

10. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

ARTICLE 16 ("SANCTIONS" OF THE LEAGUE)

1.⁴ Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have com-

⁴ *When sufficient ratifications have been received this paragraph will be replaced by the following four:*

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Arts. 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, and to prohibit all intercourse at least between persons resident within their territories and persons resident within the territory of the covenant-breaking State and, if they deem it expedient, also between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and to prevent all financial, commercial or personal intercourse at least between persons resident within the territory of that State and persons resident within the territory of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not, and, if they deem it expedient, also between the nationals of that State and the nationals of any other State whether a Member of the League or not.

It is for the Council to give an opinion whether or not a breach of the Covenant has taken

mitted an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

ARTICLE 17 (DISPUTES WITH NON-MEMBERS)

1. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of Membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provision of Articles 12-16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

2. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute. In deliberations on this question in the Council, the votes of Members of the League alleged to have resorted to war and of Members against whom such action was directed shall not be counted.

The Council will notify to all Members of the League the date which it recommends for the application of the economic pressure under this Article.

Nevertheless, the Council may, in the case of particular Members, postpone the coming into force of any of these measures for a specified period where it is satisfied that such a postponement will facilitate the attainment of the object of the measures referred to in the preceding paragraph, or that it is necessary in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience which will be caused to such Members.

tute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

3. If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE 18 (REGISTRATION AND PUBLICATION OF ALL FUTURE TREATIES)

Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

ARTICLE 19 (REVIEW OF TREATIES)

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

ARTICLE 20 (ABROGATION OF INCONSISTENT OBLIGATIONS)

1. The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

2. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

ARTICLE 21 (ENGAGEMENTS THAT REMAIN VALID)

Nothing in the Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

ARTICLE 22 (MANDATORIES, CONTROL OF COLONIES AND TERRITORIES)

1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly

governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

3. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

6. There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

8. The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

ARTICLE 23 (SOCIAL ACTIVITIES)

Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League:

(a) Will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organisations;

(b) Undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control;

(c) Will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;

(d) Will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;

(e) Will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind;

(f) Will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

ARTICLE 26 (AMENDMENTS)

1.⁵ Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by

⁵ *When sufficient ratifications have been received this Article will read:*

Amendments to the present Covenant the text of which shall have been voted by the Assembly on a three-fourths majority, in which there shall be included the votes of all the Members of the Council represented at the meeting, will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives composed the Council when the vote was taken and by the majority of those whose Representatives form the Assembly.

If the required number of ratifications shall not have been obtained within twenty-two months after the vote of the Assembly, the proposed amendment shall remain without effect.

The Secretary-General shall inform the Members of the taking effect of an amendment.

Any Member of the League which has not at that time ratified the amendment is free to notify the Secretary-General within a year of its refusal to accept it, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly.

2. No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

THE UNITED NATIONS

THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, signed on June 26, 1945, by fifty-one states, did not emerge full blown from the San Francisco Conference. The United Nations were transformed from a wartime coalition into a peacetime organization by a series of developments, including the Atlantic Charter (1941), the United Nations Declaration (1942), the Moscow Conference of 1943, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944), and the Yalta Conference (1945). While a long and terrible war against a common enemy probably accounts for the impetus and direction given to this transition, the Charter also draws upon accumulated human experience, in particular the League of Nations and the activities of private groups such as the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace.

Formal recognition of the "necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization" was achieved at the Moscow Conference, and the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations were the first step toward this end. After two years of study by the State Department of the United States and consultation among the powers, representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, China, and the United States agreed on tentative proposals which were to serve as a basis of discussion at a later plenary conference of all "peace-loving states." It is notable that the forty-five middle and small powers were given opportunity to discuss, criticize, and amend the preliminary draft produced by the Great Powers. A similar opportunity was not afforded in the case of the League.

Basic features of the Dumbarton draft were carried over into the Charter: the structural outline as embodied in the Security Council, the Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Military Staff Committee; sovereign equality of states as the basis of the organization, and the stress on voluntary cooperation; the joining of responsibility and power in the frank acceptance of important inequalities between great and small powers—chiefly in the form of the requirement of unanimity among the permanent members (the United States, Great Britain, the USSR, China, and France) of the Council; and the rendering available of any type of coercion necessary to carry out the Council's decisions.

But the San Francisco Conference contributed significant changes both in content and emphasis. The "veto" question was clarified by a special Big Five statement on June 8, 1945, which was later incorporated in Article 27. Addition of a preamble and an international court served to highlight welfare and justice as guiding principles of the new body. The process of "humanizing" the earlier proposals was also reflected in the mention of fundamental rights, expansion of the role of the Assembly, and elevation of the Economic and Social Council to one of "the principal organs" even though it was still to be "under the authority of the Assembly."

On paper at least, the Charter had several obvious advantages over the League Covenant. It gave the Security Council executive power to impose military and economic sanctions to prevent aggression or suppress a breach of the peace. There was ample opportunity for *continuous* consultation among the powers within the

framework of the organization. The obligations of the members were more extensive and more clearly expressed than they were in the Covenant. Disarmament, a prime objective of the League, was subordinated to the larger purpose of mobilizing force for peace.

The Charter (selections from which follow) assumed that the five permanent Council members would cooperate in maintaining international peace and security. This did not prove to be the case. Early Big Power disagreements in the United Nations over immediate post-war issues, for example, the activities of Soviet, French and British troops in Iran, Syria-Lebanon and Indonesia respectively, were followed by even more serious ones. While "Western" voting strength predominated in the Security Council, Soviet "vetoes" blocked Council action on many substantive issues. Beset with the "power politics" it had assumed would be "done away with," the Security Council failed to establish its "police force," to establish an international program for atomic energy regulation and control, and became, in many respects, a "sounding board" rather than a conference table for its members. The center of gravity in the organization drifted into the General Assembly, where the "veto" did not apply, but where "enforcement" action to maintain the peace could not be undertaken. While faith in the United Nations had dwindled in the early 'fifties, it nevertheless had managed—in Korea—to take the first effective international "sanctions" against an aggressor; and its specialized agencies continued to play a significant role in world postwar economic recovery and development. But the major powers—including the United States—no longer put great reliance upon this "universal" international organization, striving, rather, to guarantee their security and vital interests through regional blocs and alliances.



CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

We the peoples of the United Nations determined

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
and for these ends

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,
have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1. The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2. The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II: MEMBERSHIP

Article 3. The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

Article 4. 1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 5. A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6. A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER III: ORGANS

Article 7. 1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

CHAPTER IV: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Composition

Article 9. 1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.

2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

Functions and Powers

Article 10. The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11. 1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

Article 12. 1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any

dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 13. 1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

a. promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;

b. promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. The further responsibilities, functions, and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

Article 14. Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Article 17. 1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.

2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.

3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.

Voting

Article 18. 1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions

shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure

Article 22. The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Composition

Article 23. 1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members, however, three shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 24. 1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in

carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25. The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 26. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Voting

Article 27. 1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Procedure

3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29. The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 30. The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

Article 31. Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32. Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33. 1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34. The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35. 1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36. 1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37. 1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE,
BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39. The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40. In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41. The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42. Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43. 1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute

to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44. When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45. In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46. Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47. 1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48. 1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49. The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50. If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

CHAPTER VIII: REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52. 1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53. 1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54. The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER IX: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

Article 55. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;

b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and

c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56. All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate ac-

tion in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 57. 1. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.

2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.

Article 58. The Organization shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies.

Article 59. The Organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 60. Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.

CHAPTER X: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Composition

Article 61. 1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of eighteen Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.

2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, six members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. At the first election, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be chosen. The term of office of six members so chosen shall expire at the end of one year, and of six other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.

4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 62. 1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations

with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.

2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence.

4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.

Article 63. 1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.

2. It may coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.

Article 64. 1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular reports from the specialized agencies. It may make arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly.

2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.

Article 65. The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

Article 66. 1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connection with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.

2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.

3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

CHAPTER XII: INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

Article 75. The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of

such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

Article 76. The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

- a. to further international peace and security;
- b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
- c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
- d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

Article 77. 1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

- a. territories now held under mandate;
 - b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
 - c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.
2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 78. The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

Article 79. The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

Article 80. 1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship

agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

Article 81. The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

Article 82. There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

Article 83. 1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.

2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.

3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84. It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85. 1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

CHAPTER XIII: THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Composition

Article 86. 1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:

- a. those Members administering trust territories;
- b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and
- c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

Functions and Powers

Article 87. The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

- a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;
- b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;
- c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and
- d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Article 88. The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

CHAPTER XIV: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Article 92. The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court

of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

Article 93. 1. All Members of the United Nations are *ipso facto* parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 94. 1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

Article 95. Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future.

Article 96. 1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.

CHAPTER XVIII: AMENDMENTS

Article 108. Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Article 109. 1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds

vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

THE ATOMIC BOMB

THE THEORETICAL possibility of nuclear fission had been explored by scientists long before the circumstances of World War II led to the actual creation of the atomic bomb. Intensive government-sponsored research and a vast expenditure of money brought the bomb to the test stage at Alamogordo, N.M., on July 16, 1945. Atomic bombing missions were then directed against Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945). Japan capitulated soon afterward. The selections below are from eyewitness accounts of the Alamogordo test and the Nagasaki raid. They were written by William L. Laurence, one of the science editors of the *New York Times*, and were published in the *Times* on September 26 and September 9, 1945, respectively.



THE ATOMIC BOMB

I

THE ATOMIC AGE began at exactly 5:30 Mountain War Time on the morning of July 16, 1945, on a stretch of semi-desert land about fifty airline miles from Alamogordo, N.M., just a few minutes before the dawn of a new day on this earth.

At that great moment in history, ranking with the moment in the long ago when man first put fire to work for him and started on his march to civilization, the vast energy locked within the hearts of the atoms of matter was released for the first time in a burst of flame such as had never before been seen on this planet, illuminating earth and sky for a brief span that seemed eternal with the light of many supersuns.

The elemental flame, first fire ever made on earth that did not have its origin in the sun, came from the explosion of the first atomic bomb. It was a full-dress rehearsal preparatory to use of the bomb over Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and other Japanese military targets had Japan refused to accept the Potsdam Declaration for her surrender.

The rehearsal marked the climax in the penultimate act of one of the greatest dramas in our history and the history of civilized man—a drama in which our scientists, with the Army Corps of Engineers as director, were working against time to create an atomic bomb ahead of our German enemy.

The collapse of Germany marked the end of the first act of this drama.

The successful completion of our task, in the greatest challenge by man against nature so far, brought down the curtain on the second act. The grand finale came three weeks afterward over the skies of Japan with a swift descent of the curtain on the greatest war in history.

The atomic flash in New Mexico came as a great affirmation to the prodigious labors of our scientists during the past four years. . . . It came as the affirmative answer to the until then unanswered question: "Will it work?"

With the flash came a delayed roll of mighty thunder, heard, just as the flash was seen, for hundreds of miles. . . . It was like the grand finale of a mighty symphony of the elements, fascinating and terrifying, uplifting and crushing, ominous, devastating, full of great promise and great forebodings.

I watched the birth of the Era of Atomic Power from the slope of a hill in the desert land of New Mexico, on the northwestern corner of the Alamogordo Air Base, about 125 miles southwest of Albuquerque. The hill, named Compania Hill for the occasion, was twenty miles to the northwest of Zero, the code name given to the spot chosen for lighting the first atomic fire on this planet. The area embracing Zero and Compania Hill, twenty-four miles long and eighteen miles wide, had the code name Trinity.

I joined a caravan of three buses, three automobiles and a truck carrying radio equipment at 11 P.M. Sunday, July 15, at Albuquerque. There were about ninety of us in that strange caravan, traveling silently and in utmost secrecy through the night on probably as unusual an adventure as any in our day. . . .

The end of our trail was reached after we had covered about five and one-fifth miles on the dirt road. Here we saw the first signs of life since we had left Albuquerque about three hours earlier, a line of silent men dressed in helmets. A little further ahead a detachment of military police examined our special credentials.

We descended and looked about us. The night was still pitch black save for an occasional flash of lightning in the eastern sky, outlining for a brief instant the range of Sierra Oscura directly ahead of us. We were in the middle of the New Mexico desert, miles away from nowhere, not a sign of life, not even a blinking light on the distant horizon. This was to be our caravansary until the zero hour.

From a distance to the southeast the beam of a searchlight probed the clouds. This gave us our first sense of orientation. The bombing test site, Zero, was a little to the left of the searchlight beam, twenty miles away. With the darkness and the waiting in the chill of the desert the tension became almost unbearable. .

We gathered around in a circle to listen to directions on what we were to

do at the time of the "shot," directions read aloud by the light of a flashlight:

"At a short signal of the siren at minus five minutes to zero "all personnel whose duties did not specifically require otherwise" were to prepare "a suitable place to lie down on."

At a long signal of the siren at minus two minutes to zero "all personnel whose duties did not specifically require otherwise" were to "lie prone on the ground immediately, the face and eyes directed toward the ground and with the head away from Zero."

"Do not watch for the flash directly," the directions read, "but turn over after it has occurred and watch the cloud. Stay on the ground until the blast wave has passed (two minutes)."

"At two short blasts of the siren, indicating the passing of all hazard from light and blast, all personnel will prepare to leave as soon as possible."

"The hazard from blast is reduced by lying down on the ground in such a manner that flying rocks, glass and other objects do not intervene between the source of blast and the individual. Open all car windows."

"The hazard from light injury to eyes is reduced by shielding the closed eyes with the bended arms and lying face down on the ground. If the first flash is viewed a 'blind spot' may prevent your seeing the rest of the show."

"The hazard from ultraviolet light injuries to the skin is best overcome by wearing long trousers and shirts with long sleeves."

David Dow, assistant to the scientific director of the Atomic Bomb Development Center, handed each of us a flat piece of colored glass used by arc welders to shield their eyes. Dr. Edward Teller of George Washington University cautioned us against sunburn. Someone produced sunburn lotion and passed it around.

It looked eerie seeing a number of our highest ranking scientists seriously rubbing sunburn lotion on their faces and hands in the pitch blackness of the night, twenty miles away from the expected flash. These were the men who, more than anybody, knew the potentialities of atomic energy on the loose. It gave one an inkling of their confidence in their handiwork.

The bomb was set on a structural steel tower 100 feet high. Nine miles away to the southwest was the base camp. This was G.H.Q. for the scientific high command of which Professor Kenneth T. Bainbridge of Harvard University was field commander. Here were erected barracks to serve as living quarters for the scientists, a mess hall, a commissary, a Post Exchange and other buildings. Here the vanguard of the atomists, headed by Professor J. R. Oppenheimer of the University of California, scientific director of the atomic bomb project, lived like soldiers at the front, supervising the enormously complicated details involved in the epoch-making tests. . . .

At the Base Camp was a dry, abandoned reservoir about 500 feet square, surrounded by a mound of earth about eight feet high. Within this mound bulldozers dug a series of slit trenches, each about three feet deep, seven feet wide and about twenty-five feet long.

At a command over the radio at zero minus one minute all observers at Base Camp, about 150 of the "Who's Who" in science and the armed forces, lay down "prone on the ground" in their pre-assigned trenches, "face and eyes directed toward the ground and with the head away from Zero."

Three other posts had been established, south, north and west of Zero, each at a distance of 10,000 yards (5.7 miles). These were known, respectively, as South-10,000, North-10,000 and West-10,000, or S-10, N-10 and W-10. Here the shelters were much more elaborate, wooden structures, their walls reinforced by cement, buried under a massive layer of earth.

S-10 was the control center. Here Professor Oppenheimer, as scientific commander in chief, and his field commander, Professor Bainbridge, issued orders and synchronized the activities of the other sites. Here the signal was given and a complex of mechanisms was set in motion that resulted in the greatest burst of energy ever released by man on earth up till that time.

No switch was pulled, no button pressed, to light this first cosmic fire on this planet. At forty-five seconds to zero, set for 5:30 o'clock, young Dr. Joseph L. McKibben of the University of California, at a signal from Professor Bainbridge, activated a master robot that set off a series of other robots. Moving "electronic fingers" writ and moved on, until at last strategically spaced electrons moved to the proper place at the proper split second.

The forty-five seconds passed and the moment was zero.

At our observation post on Compania Hill the atmosphere had grown tenser as the zero hour approached. We had spent the first part of our stay partaking of an early morning picnic breakfast that we had taken along with us. It had grown cold in the desert and many of us, lightly clad, shivered. Occasionally a drizzle came down, and the intermittent flashes of lightning made us turn apprehensive glances toward Zero.

We had had some disturbing reports that the test might be called off because of the weather. The radio we had brought along for communication with Base Camp kept going out of order and when we had finally repaired it some blatant band would drown out the news we wanted to hear.

We knew there were two specially equipped B-29 Superfortresses high overhead to make observations and recordings in the upper atmosphere, but we could neither see nor hear them. We kept gazing through the blackness.

Suddenly at 5:29:50, as we stood huddled around our radio, we heard a

voice ringing through the darkness, sounding as though it had come from above the clouds:

"Zero minus ten seconds!"

A green flare flashed out through the clouds, descended slowly, opened, grew dim and vanished into the darkness.

The voice from the clouds boomed out again:

"Zero minus three seconds!"

Another green flare came down. Silence reigned over the desert. We kept moving in small groups in the direction of Zero. From the east came the first faint signs of dawn.

And just at that instant there rose from the bowels of the earth a light not of this world, the light of many suns in one.

It was a sunrise such as the world had never seen, a great green super-sun climbing in a fraction of a second to a height of more than 8,000 feet, rising ever higher until it touched the clouds, lighting up earth and sky all around with a dazzling luminosity.

Up it went, a great ball of fire about a mile in diameter changing colors as it kept shooting upward, from deep purple to orange, expanding, growing bigger, rising as it was expanding, an elemental force freed from its bonds after being chained for billions of years.

For a fleeting instant the color was unearthly green, such as one sees only in the corona of the sun during a total eclipse.

It was as though the earth had opened, and the skies had split. One felt as though he had been privileged to witness the Birth of the World—to be present at the moment of Creation when the Lord said: Let There be Light.

On that moment hung eternity. Time stood still. Space contracted into a pinpoint.

To another observer, Prof. George B. Kistiakowsky, of Harvard, the spectacle was "the nearest thing to Doomsday that one could possibly imagine."

"I am sure," he said, "that at the end of the world—in the last milli-second of the earth's existence—the last man will see what we saw!"

A great cloud rose from the ground and followed the trail of the Great Sun.

At first it was a giant column that soon took the shape of a supramundane mushroom. For a fleeting instant it took the form of the Statue of Liberty magnified many times.

Up it went, higher, higher, a giant mountain born in a few seconds instead of millions of years, quivering convulsively.

It touched the multi-colored clouds, pushed its summit through them, kept rising until it reached a height of 41,000 feet, 12,000 feet higher than the earth's highest mountain.

All through this very short but extremely long time-interval not a sound was heard. I could see the silhouettes of human forms, motionless in little groups, like desert plants in the dark.

The new-born mountain in the distance, a giant among pygmies against the background of the Sierra Oscuro range, stood leaning at an angle against the clouds, a vibrant volcano spouting fire to the sky.

Then out of the great silence came a mighty thunder. For a brief interval the phenomena we had seen as light repeated themselves in terms of sound.

It was the blast from thousands of blockbusters going off simultaneously at one spot.

The thunder reverberated all through the desert, bounced back and forth from the Sierra Oscuros, echo upon echo. The ground trembled under our feet as in an earthquake.

A wave of hot wind was felt by many of us just before the blast and warned us of its coming.

The Big Boom came about 100 seconds after the Great Flash—the first cry of a new-born world. It brought the silent, motionless silhouettes to life, gave them a voice.

A loud cry filled the air. The little groups that hitherto had stood rooted to the earth like desert plants broke into a dance, the rhythm of primitive man dancing at one of his fire festivals at the coming of spring.

They clapped their hands as they leaped from the ground—earth-bound man symbolizing a new birth in freedom—the birth of a new force that for the first time gives man means to free himself from the gravitational pull of the earth that holds him down.

The dance of the primitive man lasted but a few seconds, during which an evolutionary period of about 10,000 years had been telescoped. Primitive man was metamorphosed into modern man—shaking hands, slapping each other on the back, laughing like happy children.

The sun was just rising above the horizon as our caravan started on its way back to Albuquerque and Los Alamos. It rose to see a new thing under the sun, a new era in the life of man.

We looked at it through our dark lenses to compare it with what we had seen.

"The sun can't hold a candle to it!" one of us remarked.

II

WITH THE ATOMIC BOMB MISSION TO JAPAN, Aug. 9 (Delayed)—We are on our way to bomb the mainland of Japan. Our flying contingent consists of three specially designed B-29 "Superforts," and two of these carry no bombs.

But our lead plane is on its way with another atomic bomb, the second in three days, concentrating in its active substance an explosive energy equivalent to 20,000 and, under favorable conditions, 40,000 tons of TNT. . . .

I watched the assembly of this man-made meteor during the past two days, and was among the small group of scientists and Army and Navy representatives privileged to be present at the ritual of its loading in the "Superfort" last night, against a background of threatening black skies torn open at intervals by great lightning flashes.

It is a thing of beauty to behold, this "gadget." In its design went millions of man-hours of what is without doubt the most concentrated intellectual effort in history. Never before had so much brain-power been focused on a single problem.

This atomic bomb is different from the bomb used three days ago with such devastating results at Hiroshima.

I saw the atomic substance before it was placed inside the bomb. By itself it is not at all dangerous to handle. It is only under certain conditions, produced in the bomb assembly, that it can be made to yield up its energy, and even then it gives only a small fraction of its total contents—a fraction, however, large enough to produce the greatest explosion on earth.

The briefing at midnight revealed the extreme care and the tremendous amount of preparation that had been made to take care of every detail of the mission, to make certain that the atomic bomb fully served the purpose for which it was intended. Each target in turn was shown in detailed maps and in aerial photographs. Every detail of the course was rehearsed—navigation, altitude, weather, where to land in emergencies. It came out that the Navy had submarines and rescue craft, known as Dumbos and Superdumbos, stationed at various strategic points in the vicinity of the targets, ready to rescue the fliers in case they were forced to bail out.

The briefing period ended with a moving prayer by the chaplain. We then proceeded to the mess hall for the traditional early morning breakfast before departure on a bombing mission.

A convoy of trucks took us to the supply building for the special equipment carried on combat missions. This included the "Mae West," a parachute, a lifeboat, an oxygen mask, a flak suit and a survival vest. We still had a few hours before take-off time, but we all went to the flying field and stood around in little groups or sat in jeeps talking rather casually about our mission to the Empire, as the Japanese home islands are known hereabouts. . . .

We took off at 3:50 this morning and headed northwest on a straight line for the Empire. The night was cloudy and threatening, with only a few stars here and there breaking through the overcast. The weather report had

predicted storms ahead part of the way but clear sailing for the final and climactic stages of our odyssey.

We were about an hour away from our base when the storm broke. Our great ship took some heavy dips through the abysmal darkness around us but it took these dips much more gracefully than a large commercial airliner, producing a sensation more in the nature of a glide than a "bump," like a great ocean liner riding the waves, except that in this case the air waves were much higher and the rhythmic tempo of the glide much faster. . . .

On we went through the night. We soon rode out of the storm and our ship was once again sailing on a smooth course straight ahead, on a direct line to the Empire.

Our altimeter showed that we were traveling through space at a height of 17,000 feet. The thermometer registered an outside temperature of 33 degrees below zero centigrade, about 30 below Fahrenheit. Inside our pressurized cabin the temperature was that of a comfortable air-conditioned room, and a pressure corresponding to an altitude of 8,000 feet. Captain Bock cautioned me, however, to keep my oxygen mask handy in case of emergency. This, he explained, might mean either something going wrong with the pressure equipment inside the ship or a hole through the cabin by flak.

The first signs of dawn came shortly after 5 o'clock. Sergeant Curry, who had been listening steadily on his earphones for radio reports, while maintaining a strict radio silence himself, greeted it by rising to his feet and gazing out the window. . . .

By 5:50 it was real light outside. We had lost our lead ship, but Lieutenant Godfrey, our navigator, informs me that we had arranged for that contingency. We have an assembly point in the sky above the little island of Yakoshima, southeast of Kyushu, at 9:10. We are to circle there and wait for the rest of our formation. . . .

Somewhere beyond these vast mountains of white clouds ahead of me there lies Japan, the land of our enemy. In about four hours from now one of its cities, making weapons of war for use against us, will be wiped off the map by the greatest weapon ever made by man. In one-tenth of a millionth of a second, a fraction of time immeasurable by any clock, a whirlwind from the skies will pulverize thousands of its buildings and tens of thousands of its inhabitants.

Our weather planes ahead of us are on their way to find out where the wind blows. Half an hour before target time we will know what the winds have decided.

Does one feel any pity or compassion for the poor devils about to die? Not when one thinks of Pearl Harbor and of the Death March on Bataan.

Captain Bock informs me that we are about to start our climb to bombing altitude.

He manipulates a few knobs on his control panel to the right of him and I alternately watch the white clouds and ocean below me and the altimeter on the bombardier's panel. We reached our altitude at 9 o'clock. We were then over Japanese waters, close to their mainland. Lieutenant Godfrey motioned to me to look through his radar scope. Before me was the outline of our assembly point. We shall soon meet our lead ship and proceed to the final stage of our journey.

We reached Yakushima at 9:12 and there, about 4,000 feet ahead of us, was The Great Artiste with its precious load. I saw Lieutenant Godfrey and Sergeant Curry strap on their parachutes and I decided to do likewise.

We started circling. We saw little towns on the coastline, heedless of our presence. We kept on circling, waiting for the third ship in our formation.

It was about 9:56 when we began heading for the coastline. Our weather scouts had sent us code messages, deciphered by Sergeant Curry, informing us that both the primary target as well as the secondary were clearly visible.

The winds of destiny seemed to favor certain Japanese cities that must remain nameless. We circled about them again and again and found no opening in the thick umbrella of clouds that covered them. Destiny chose Nagasaki as the ultimate target.

We had been circling for some time when we noticed black puffs of smoke coming through the white clouds directly at us. There were fifteen bursts of flak in rapid succession, all too low. Captain Bock changed his course. There soon followed eight more bursts of flak, right up to our altitude, but by this time were too far to the left.

We flew southward down the channel and at 11:33 crossed the coastline and headed straight for Nagasaki about 100 miles to the west. Here again we circled until we found an opening in the clouds. It was 12:01 and the goal of our mission had arrived.

We heard the prearranged signal on our radio, put on our arc-welder's glasses and watched tensely the maneuverings of the strike ship about half a mile in front of us.

"There she goes!" someone said.

Out of the belly of The Great Artiste what looked like a black object went downward.

Captain Bock swung around to get out of range; but even though we were turning away in the opposite direction, and despite the fact that it was broad daylight in our cabin, all of us became aware of a giant flash that broke

through the dark barrier of our arc-welder's lenses and flooded our cabin with intense light.

We removed our glasses after the first flash, but the light still lingered on, a bluish-green light that illuminated the entire sky all around. A tremendous blast wave struck our ship and made it tremble from nose to tail. This was followed by four more blasts in rapid succession, each resounding like the boom of cannon fire hitting our plane from all directions.

Observers in the tail of our ship saw a giant ball of fire rise as though from the bowels of the earth, belching forth enormous white smoke rings. Next they saw a giant pillar of purple fire, 10,000 feet high, shooting skyward with enormous speed.

By the time our ship had made another turn in the direction of the atomic explosion the pillar of purple fire had reached the level of our altitude. Only about forty-five seconds had passed. Awe-struck, we watched it shoot upward like a meteor coming from the earth instead of from outer space, becoming ever more alive as it climbed skywards through the white clouds. It was no longer smoke, or dust, or even a cloud of fire. It was a living thing, a new species of being, born right before our incredulous eyes.

At one stage of its evolution, covering millions of years in terms of seconds, the entity assumed the form of a giant square totem pole, with its base about three miles long, tapering off to about a mile at the top. Its bottom was brown, its center was amber, its top white. But it was a living totem pole, carved with many grotesque masks grimacing at the earth.

Then, just when it appeared as though the thing had settled down into a state of permanence, there came shooting out of the top a giant mushroom that increased the height of the pillar to a total of 45,000 feet. The mushroom top was even more alive than the pillar, seething and boiling in a white fury of creamy foam, sizzling upward and then descending earthward, a thousand Old Faithful geysers rolled into one.

It kept struggling in an elemental fury, like a creature in the act of breaking the bonds that held it down. In a few seconds it had freed itself from its gigantic stem and floated upward with tremendous speed, its momentum carrying into the stratosphere to a height of about 60,000 feet.

But no sooner did this happen when another mushroom, smaller in size than the first one, began emerging out of the pillar. It was as though the decapitated monster was growing a new head.

As the first mushroom floated off into the blue it changed its shape into a flowerlike form, its giant petal curving downward, creamy white outside, rose-colored inside. It still retained that shape when we last gazed at it from a distance of about 200 miles.

GEORGE SANTAYANA

GEORGE SANTAYANA is not generally considered a political and social philosopher. But throughout his long career as a thinker he was keenly aware of politics in the wide sense in which Aristotle originally used the term, and of the moral context of human action in a society, in a community, in civilization. His five-volume work *The Life of Reason* contained one volume entitled *Reason in Society*, in which he distinguished the natural society of war, industry and government, the free society of friends, and the ideal society, or society of ideas. In *Reason in Art* he put art, too, in the context of wider human happiness. Throughout many of his works one felt certain political overtones, a suspicion of democracy, a sense for a social order, as in Plato, determined by the informed wisdom of a directive group of knowledgeable leaders, a mistrust of the confusions, the complications of an international industrialism and of a surface, and on the whole, meaningless liberalism.

Dominations and Powers appeared almost at the end of Santayana's long life, two years before his death at the age of eighty-nine. In intent it is a systematic work, and there is in it an essential order, though it consists actually of a large miscellany of essays written at various times over a period of thirty years. But while some of the separate pieces seem fragments and divagations, they add up to a systematic point of view and are a considered exposition of Santayana's philosophy of society. His theory of politics is marked by a Hobbesian realism, a Platonic theory of aristocracy and wisdom, and a controlling sense of the paramount reality of power and its radiations in human affairs.

All governments, he says, are powers; dominations are alien powers, or powers that threaten a power already current and entrenched. The true student of politics must go, Santayana explains, more deeply into the roots of nature and the psyche than what is usually studied in politics and anthropology. He must explore the basic conditions of power in the individual life and in the association of psyches which is society. He must explore the generative order which grows out of basic human impulses and needs—such as generate, for example, the family. By the militant order Santayana intends “all voluntary associations that cross the generative order of society; not military bands only, but all political parties, religious sects, and parasitical arts. . . . Allegiance to the generative order . . . dictates perpetual war, trade and colonisation. . . . [Pure] philosophy and religion propose the domination of reason, but to little purpose; since they radically ignore or misrepresent the generative and militant orders that inevitably underlie spiritual life.”

There is a “growth in the jungle,” an order that arises in chaos, a type or trope of society. Other types arise, power comes to dominate over power. Peace is an uneasy equilibrium. Santayana surveys meditatively the rise and fall of many types of society; he mistrusts “sentimental democracy, doctrinaire liberalism.” He envisages the possibility of scientific and disinterested intelligence ordering mankind according to a pattern of informed wisdom. But he is aware that even this is a

dream, and an unstable one. The passions will break out, the patterns will break; established patterns of power will be threatened, and destroyed; new ones will arise. That is what is happening violently in our own times, and Santayana takes a long view beyond this twilight of one civilization to the dawn and ultimate twilight of still another.

The following selection is from Santayana's *Dominations and Powers* (copyright 1950, 1951 by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York) and is used by permission of the publishers.



DOMINATIONS AND POWERS

THE CONTROL exercised by society over its members has two forms: one, the control exercised by government, with explicit laws sanctioned by military force; the other, the social control by natural contagion, cooperation, or suasion. In civilised countries non-official societies are not allowed to use force in dominating either their own members or outsiders whom they may wish to annex or to destroy; but originally parental and tribal authority extended over everything equally, and punished cruelly any contradiction of its traditional, vague, but ferocious principles.

Yet secretly these principles had rational sources in two different quarters. On the one hand there was really a kindred direction and vocation of vital liberty in all men which, in so far as it existed, inwardly prompted them to live together, join in the same labours, share the same pleasures and dangers, and emulate one another in the same liberal arts. But this friendly side of social cohesion and control was crossed and almost obliterated by the most terrible punishments and prohibitions; often superstitious, and yet often symbolising the inexorable nature of things, conditioning the direction of vital liberty in men no less than good fortune in asserting that liberty.

Now the indignation caused by the cruelty of governments falls often on the person or office of the ruler, when his intentions and the political principle of his action are blameless. If it was the prevalent false notions about causes and effects in nature that imposed the measures the ruler adopted he would have acted against his will. So when Agamemnon in the story sacrificed his daughter, he did not prove himself an unnatural father or a bad king; on the contrary, it was his duty to the allies whom he was leading against Troy that overcame with difficulty his horror at his own crime. If the irresponsible dreams of the prophet or priestess of some oracle could truly discover the causes of winds and calms, the self-sacrifice of Iphigenia and the tragic act

of her father would both have been heroic and even rational. Not rational absolutely, but politically: for absolutely neither the expedition to Troy nor any other human undertaking could be anything but an irrational and unnecessary commitment. Yet granted a living nation armed for a crusade, the general chosen to lead it is politically committed to that duty and to all arts requisite to carrying it out.

A relative rationality hides also in other parts of this fable. That the winds should blow at the arbitrary fancy of the gods is simply a poetic way of expressing at once our ignorance of any cause or law for the winds, and our dire need, if we are sailors, of their favour and their mercy. And if there are gods that govern the winds, primitive man, imitating his habitual practices in his cults as in a dream, will beg and bribe those gods for their assistance. It was a savage but intelligible notion that the supreme bribe should be a victim's life. That the virgin goddess of moonlight and of the chase, being the patroness of Aulis, should command the winds there, and should require a virgin as an offering, are poetic accidents or refinements. So the goddess is sometimes said to have substituted at the last moment a young doe for the king's daughter. Myth, where science is absent, has to take its place; and the philosopher is satisfied if the myth inspires a kindred sentiment and an analogous behaviour to that which the true facts, if known, would have inspired. A wise priesthood will insensibly remould its fables and its maxims so as to keep both humility and courage alive in the people, taught to bow to the conditions of human life on earth without ever surrendering their own vital demands.

These are indeed the two authorities that by their interplay determine the forms and the rational variations of morals: the *authority of things*, that permit, prevent, reward, or punish our actions; and *the authority of primal Will* within us, that chooses our path and discriminates between success and disaster in our careers.

Other men or other interests than those that a government serves form, from its point of view, a part of the world of things; for alien minds or intelligible movements are simply, for government, natural conditions with which it has to count in achieving its designs. Governments, however, are composed of men whose whole soul is probably not absorbed in statecraft, so that individually and even collectively they may bend the purely economic art of government to serving other than political purposes. Princes have sometimes been ecclesiastics and sometimes saints; and in both cases they are apt to employ their whole temporal power to serve cultural or religious aspirations; and if their people have the same mixed interests, they may applaud that policy. Nevertheless it is an abandonment of rational politics, and involves confusion and probably deterioration, if not ruin, in the liberal arts or sciences.

thus taken under government wing and rendered official, if not actually compulsory.

This is not to say that if the people, or some part of them, spontaneously develop some form of fine art, philosophy, or religion, the government is not rationally bound to defend and encourage that expression of vital freedom. As a form of life and action the practice of any art enters into the vortex of material social currents that aid or impede one another in the world; and these a government, if it would serve the vital liberty of all, must seek to harmonise. It will impose restrictions, and appoint places and occasions to which the special activities of each private society or liberal art must be confined so as not to encroach on its neighbours. In doing this the government only announces beforehand, to each private enterprise, the material circumstances in which it will have to be carried on; it will anchor buoys in the shallows and build lighthouses on the dangerous reefs; it will circumvent the defeats or hardships that nature imposes on ignorant or rash action by using or pointing out timely material means of defence or escape or safe advance.

Government in this way becomes the rational art of minimising the inevitable conflicts of primal irrational Wills against one another and against the forces of nature at large. If government attempts to go further and to approve one set of irrational Wills and forbid another, it becomes itself the agent of a particular irrational Will; and instead of speaking for all Wills that move in its domains, and showing each of the best terms it can make with Circumstances, it becomes itself a particular net of Circumstances hostile to all other Wills, instead of wise friend to them all.

In other words, a rational government is one that speaks to its people in the name of the nature of things, and acts by that authority. Its criterion and method must be a scientific criterion and a scientific method. Therefore the members of a rational government would never be prophets, reformers, agitators, politicians, or demagogues, never persons elected by majority votes, but educated and trained in the science and art of government: persons able to discern the possibility or impossibility of human ambitions. Such persons might have to be, like the Roman ruling class, all soldiers; but besides the requisite military capacity they should be experts in economics. Yet in modern times, rather perhaps than soldiers, they should be anthropologists, medical men, and scientific psychologists; for it is the psyche that is the agent in politics. Such a government would hear sympathetically and understand perfectly the grievances and the claims of all social and private interests; but it should never follow blindly the policy of any party or sect, possessed, as such a government would be, of distinct institutes and experienced masters of all economic affairs and, as it were, psychiatrists of nations; and the traditions

and experience of that government, up to any given date, would sufficiently suggest to it what reforms and what new institutions would be worth trying at each new juncture in public affairs.

Such a scientific regimen, if established anywhere, would doubtless be only local and peculiar to an exceptionally gifted and moralised community; yet the very nature of rational economy could perfectly well extend its authority to other nations or even over the whole world. And this political possibility, which is also a rational ideal, brings us back to the first principle of rationality in government: that it should protect and encourage vital liberty, in whatever quarter or form circumstances render its expression possible in action.

The authority of this government would be autocratic but not totalitarian; for it would speak for the material conditions imposed by nature on the realisation of any ideal without dictating to any person or society what its ideal should be. Its own aim would be only to prevent conflicting desires from becoming material conflicts, fatal to both sides; while by being temporarily content with what could be obtained peaceably, nothing alien would have to be hated and crushed, but order could be preserved, and a quiet hibernation secured for the seed of every native aspiration. This is the discipline that reason, when alive enough, imposes on the individual psyche that breeds it, and might eventually impose on the world, if the world could develop a political organ of reason, an enlightened and disinterested government.

The difficulty is that intelligence, though often keen enough, instead of establishing order among the irrational passions, vital or frivolous, that distract the psyche, hastens as soon as born to devise ingenious ways of satisfying one or another of those passions, regardless of the others in the man himself or in his neighbours; and this rape of intelligence is no less violent in those liberal arts that possess an internal rationality, such as logic, mathematics, music, and poetry. It would be ridiculous for a serious scientific direction of society to meddle with these things. It would only protect them from actual assault by possible fanatics of a different school.

A rational government of this kind would entirely cease to cause enthusiasm or hatred in the public. We should hardly recognise it as touching politics; and that would be one of its advantages. The hot bloods and the ambitious talents would turn to the separate irrational rival forms of culture, and preach and work for some reform in some one of them; but they would be prevented by the police in the service of that uninteresting government from smashing one another's idols or breaking one another's heads. The tempests would all be cerebral, and would not hurt anyone but the militant hotheads who raised them. . . .

The virtue of liberalism is a sort of intellectual kindness or courtesy to all

possible wills. Yet what a melancholy kindness is this, to leave the inoffensive liberal helpless before unkindness! Government needs to be based on the principle that men are by nature fundamentally helpless and automatic. They are not wicked expressly or prevailingly, but only when it happens; and they have benevolent impulses too, as the existence of society and of liberalism sufficiently proves. But all living creatures become wicked under pressure. Absolute singleness of purpose cannot but be ruthless; it is ruthless initially, because it has no eye for any contrary interest; and it becomes ruthless again deliberately in the end, because all contrary interests seem odious and sinful to its fanaticism.

In such a world, beneficence cannot be all-comprehensive. The Church was right, as usual, in maintaining the doctrine of eternal damnation. Love, even infinite love, cannot save or applaud everybody; and any definite beneficence—giving soup to beggars while burning heretics—is condemned to be heartless beyond the circumference of its charity.

Moreover, as if aware of this latent doom, tolerated people are never conciliated. They live on, but the aroma of their life is lost. When, as in England, institutions are at once conservative and progressive, they seem to reconcile loyalty with convenience; but if we look beneath the surface, and beneath the sham acquiescence of all parties, we see that such a society is continually transforming what it inherits. The old house, just because it is still inhabited, must be continually patched and modernised, until little remains of it but the name and the invisible foundations. The true past, if some accident now suddenly calls it up like a ghost, appears strangely foreign, disquieting, and disagreeable; and the shreds of antiquity which may survive in legal nomenclature, in education, or in religion take on a modern aspect, half humorous like a jolly judge in his dusty wig, and half stiffly false, like a High Church bishop in his fresh cope and mitre. There is at best a superficial continuity; but the present fills that masquerade with its crude business, speaks those archaic words in an affected voice that publishes their archaism, and allows no implication of their old force to disturb their modernness and freedom. It is a triumph of progress under the mask of conservatism. Decorum takes the place of discipline; the latest view and the nearest interest dominate as if by divine right.

The historian who is not a bookworm, but studies the past in order to enlighten the present with a sense of direction in its ambitions and of the possible range of its rational hopes, will shudder at the folly of this political myopia. The brutes indeed survive by following the call of the moment, and it would be felt by them as an indignity worse than any free struggle to be compelled to suspend their impulses and to abandon their simple and free life. But they survive only because they keep to their special hunting grounds

and breeding seasons; and their independence turns and turns in a narrow circuit where it has some chance, though no certainty, of being able to turn a number of times. Liberalism revives in civilised man this instinctive self-trust and this preference for struggle over subjection; but civil life is highly conditioned and its sphere of action is wide and variable. Before the plain man could judge wisely any political policy he would have to dominate that public field of action intellectually, comparing and balancing all the interests and dangers involved in public affairs; and what is even harder, he would have to dominate his own strongest inclinations, and perpetually postpone or dismiss the satisfaction of his passions. And if, by a heroic self-discipline he became reconciled to a decent poverty and a special form of economic drudgery, would he not at least expect all his fellow citizens to accept the same fate? For if he allowed some of them to be guides to the others and to cultivate the more speculative or artistic possibilities of their nature, would he not have saved civilisation by abandoning liberalism?

This paradox may seem absurd, when liberals are the most civilised and culture-loving of beings; the ripe, in fact the over-ripe, fruit of a civilisation of which they relish all the intellectual and artistic achievements; but coming when that civilisation has spent its force and is rapidly declining, they are full of scorn for its conventions now become empty and its principles proved false. Their love of civilisation is highly critical, and they wish to reform it. But, alas! this wish to *reform* a decaying civilisation is itself singularly naive; it is fundamentally ignorant, under all the plumes and furbelows of a superficial omniscience. They do not see that the peace they demand was secured by the discipline and the sacrifices that they deplore, that the wealth they possess was amassed by appropriating lands and conducting enterprises in the high-handed manner which they denounce, and that the fine arts and refined luxuries they revel in arise in the service of superstitions that they deride and despotisms that they abhor.

They were no doubt right in the nineteenth century to be confident that the world was moving towards the destruction of traditional institutions, privileges, and beliefs; but the first half of the twentieth century has already made evident that their own wealth, taste, and intellectual liberty will dissolve also in some strange barbarism that will think them a good riddance.

The concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life exhaust and kill the sweets they feed upon; and a lava-wave of primitive blindness and violence must perhaps rise from below to lay the foundations for something differently human and similarly transient. . . .

War in its sheer malice is the worst disorder possible; nevertheless, being declared and continuous, the disruptive action of the enemy becomes a great

lesson in the rational ordering of one's own conduct. The enemy is in that respect like any dangerous natural force—floods, pests, or storms at sea—against which the arts of government and defence were originally devised; and war therefore very much strengthens and tightens order within the lines of each belligerent. Yet to destroy this order in the enemy, to disperse his forces and annihilate his power, is precisely the purpose of war; so that there is a kind of formal contradiction or irony in it, heightening and concentrating order here, in order to produce anarchy there. For civilised war is a struggle between governments, not between peoples. On submission, the enemy population is to be spared, assisted, and perhaps annexed, which is the greatest but most unwelcome compliment that one people can pay to another. At any rate a very strict order is at once to be established among the vanquished and prolonged afterwards under a treaty of peace. So that the systematic effort to create disorder in the enemy ranks is only incidental and provisional; what is to be disorganised is merely the power of the enemy to interfere with one's own organisation.

Yet the dust, the thunder, the carnage, and the ruin of war seem to make visible some deeper disorder, some suicidal madness in the human race. And it often is so. There may be rational wars, as there are rational surgical operations; not only preventive wars, such as only a very exorbitant power or very Machiavellian government is like to undertake, but wars arising by the accidental outbreak of latent antagonisms. The war will be rational, on one side or on both, if the true interests of the nation would suffer more by avoiding it than by waging it. This is a dubious calculation, and seldom made in cold blood; almost always a wind of excitement and ambition, at the very thought of war, fans the embers into flame; and the conflagration . . . is likely to prove a disaster all round. There is a sort of subterranean chaos, sometimes bursting through the crust of civilisation; and something in the individual heart rejoices at that eruption, feels that at last the moment has come to break through its own crust, and build itself, as well as the world, on some different plan. Not a better plan, since there is no deeper organism to pronounce on the matter or to have any stake in it; but simply a relief from this plan, from this routine and this morality, from these surroundings, and these prospects. It is what Descartes called the infinity of the will, contrasted with the finitude of reason; but perhaps we might more accurately say that it is the indetermination of matter, or of protoplasm, contrasted with the definite organisation of powers and habits in man. A sort of self-hatred and self-contempt: a wild throw for something different, and a deep, dark impulse to challenge and to destroy everything that has the impertinence to exist. . . .

It is said: "Wars have always existed, therefore they will always exist."

Such empirical prophecies are, in form, utterly fallacious. Their substantial truth, if they are true, hangs on the assumption, which may be true or false, that the same nature, cosmic and human, is at work in all ages. We may safely say: "All former men have died, therefore all future men will die too": because all future men will be animals bred out of a seed and endowed organically for reproduction, not for immortality. Any other sort of being would not be a man. Our inference is justified, not empirically, but by the nature that we find proper to mankind. If, on the other hand, anyone had said in antiquity: "Parents have always sacrificed their firstborn; therefore they will always do so," that prophet would have been mistaken. That which caused parents to sacrifice their firstborn was not an integral part of the mechanism of reproduction; it was not involved in fatherhood as death is involved in animal life. Mankind could accordingly survive, and survive better, without that sacrifice.

Empirical science is valid only when it is a method of observing and testing the constitution of nature; it is utterly worthless, or positively superstitious, when it connects surface appearances directly; because appearances do not depend on one another, and their sequences are never, in fact, exactly repeated.

The question therefore is: Has there always been war in the world because war is involved in the nature of men, and in their inevitable relations? Or is war due to some adventitious circumstance, to some falsely stimulated passion, similar to the superstitious fear that led primitive man to imagine that by sacrificing the firstborn the whole tribe might be saved?

I reply: Endless conflict arrested at some temporary equilibrium is essential to all forces meeting in the same field: either the forces are not distinguished, and there are no units of which we can trace the history, or the equilibrium (which always exists in nature) is only a pause between two blows or between two battles. In this sense Heraclitus said the last and the first word: War is the parent of all things. It is also the destroyer of all things; because physical things are unstable by nature, and ironically sustained by a balance of power essentially hostile to their specific being. But there are endless eddies and backwaters and meanderings in this treacherous flux. Often the alternative forces are unconscious and the issue placid: there is no regret for what is excluded, because it was never desired or conceived; and all life seems to flow for a while unanimously in the victorious direction. The old historians were right, and history is a tale of wars: but the modern historians are right too, because in the midst of those wars, and behind the firing-line, the arts of peace are able to flourish.

Spiritual things, too, in which the moralist is ultimately interested, escape in their own sphere the curse of competition and of living by one another's

death. It is only in respect to their material organs that they are rivals; and the more the mind is emancipated from concern for the body, the less it suffers and the less it fears the encroachment of foreign things, because to pure intellect nothing is foreign.

But this escape from war is upward, in an intellectual dimension, into an impalpable world. The question for politics is rather this: Need the forces that decide the course of history take the form of armies advancing to capture or to destroy one another?

And to this question the answer is surely No: because the decision can be made more directly, antecedently and perhaps insensibly, by the very forces that would secure victory in war, if war broke out. Why fight if the issue of the conflict can be foreseen, and the conditions of peace can be imposed and accepted beforehand, without the convulsed attempt at mutual destruction? The wisdom and the fatigue that accept peace at the end might, with a little more reasonableness, accept peace at the beginning. What prevents is only ignorance, rage, and frivolity; and these passions may be, and are, modified in governments and even in peoples, on certain occasions. When numbers, wealth, energy, and discipline are all on one side, resistance would seem unreasonable; and yet it is often in such desperate cases that war is waged most stubbornly and heroically; because beneath and beyond all rational considerations there is the instinct of the hunted animal to flee, and if possible to turn, and to die fighting. Reason can never persuade anybody to change his nature; and the mere prospect of death, however certain, never prevents life from going on automatically to the last gasp. There are irreconcilables; and even if the more organised groups of them are exterminated by the ruling powers, a sprinkling or margin of irreconcilables will always spring up like weeds in the garden; they will be called criminals or heretics, and they will continue to carry on a desperate private war against society. Nevertheless, since these domestic rebels are outlaws, and in theory are to be eliminated, the force engaged in suppressing them is the police rather than the army; and the perennial conflict of society with them is not called war. . . .

Wars fought in the dark, between governments both hoping for victory, are gambles; and they enlist the same passions as gambling for money. There is not only avarice, or more probably debt and destitution, but even more prominently there is love of excitement, faith in one's luck, and eagerness to try a system said to work miracles. Such war is barbarous, not only for being cruel and wrathful, but for being hysterical. The herd instinct at work produces frenzy in individuals otherwise sane. There is a rush of a thousand hearts in a vague cause, simply because it has become the common cause.

Here is an occasion for the wise ruler to prove his skill. Nature has given

him a pliant instrument; all are ready to fight and die for the common cause, and nobody knows what the common cause is. He can define that cause as he pleases. He can decide what shall be the common purpose for which his unanimous people will take the field. If he does not decide, or does so foolishly, very probably his unanimous people will take the field for nothing. In divining some notable advantage that might result from this blind conflict, and setting up that possibility as the object to attain, he not only rationalises an irrational movement, but trains the people to set their hearts on a public good; because nothing endears itself so much to us as that for which we are making unreasonable sacrifices. In this way the eloquence of leaders, grafted on practical commitments and automatic emotions in the people, can fix ideals like national independence or glory, for which nations may be ready to wage enthusiastic wars so long as the nations exist. And very often they exist as nations only by virtue of those superimposed unnecessary interests. Did official eloquence and military discipline leave modern nations alone for a moment they might break up into local units, or be merged in larger empires, without any material inconvenience, and perhaps with advantage to the intensity and fruitfulness of their domestic cultures.

The blind wars waged between nations out of national rivalry are therefore easily preventable, in so far as the nations themselves are artificial units. If the organisation which makes them units, and enables them to fight one another, were destroyed, wars of that character and on that scale would be rendered impossible.

In the end, however, we come to the natural units, economic or moral. Moral units are groups of similar minds speaking the same language, having the same religion and arts, and stimulating by social sympathy and applause the genius native to their members. Economic units, on the contrary, are formed by the interdependence of dissimilar arts; they extend as far as do economic exchanges; they are unconscious systems of cooperation, like that which makes insects contribute to the reproduction of flowers.

Moral units, if they could be purely moral, would not be bellicose, because no injury and no real diminution of dignity is caused to one spiritual good by the mere existence of other spiritual goods. But in this world nothing is merely moral. Moral realities must have a physical basis; and, through their physical basis, they may become competitive. The existence of a different language or religion, just beyond the frontier, or even in the bosom of one's own household, then becomes a danger and an offence. Moral units appeal to the secular arm; and we have wars perhaps begun in self-defence, but often carried on by fanaticism. It is the most legitimate self-defence to resist interference with one's moral traditions; but it is fanaticism to desire that

there should nowhere exist any moral traditions but one's own. Between this self-defence or love of vital liberty and this fanaticism the hearts of heroes and apostles are divided. There is in almost all, I think, some admixture of both elements.

Economic units also wage frequent wars, sometimes intelligently, but more often and more largely with a suicidal blindness. When economic units are simple and closed, as in some agricultural island with only home manufactures and no foreign commerce, there is no occasion for war, since there are no enemies; and to break up the world again into such isolated units would be a means of securing peace between them. Even when commercial relations are more complicated, economic systems may exist side by side without conflicting, if they cover separate fields. But fields in this world are not easily separable; there will be rivalry for colonies and ports and raw materials and markets; and there will be occasional piracy and pillage turning that rivalry into aggression. But the ensuing war will probably not very much enrich the victor in ruining the vanquished; because the threads of industrial interconnection are many and largely invisible, and any important local breakage will derange the whole world of commerce.

In so complex a matter no one is sure of his diagnosis; and it will rather be some non-economic motive that will inspire even one's economic policy. Often the units called economic, like Labour or the Proletariat, are not really economic but moral units. They are composed of similar persons, not of interdependent activities. A war of one social class against all others may be successful in destroying the enemy classes, the social types detested by the fanatic who will have only his own social type in the world; but that moral victory will not enrich the surviving class economically. On the contrary, unless variety of moral types and of ways of living is somehow re-introduced, the qualitative riches of the community will be terribly diminished and reduced to the lowest common denominator; the principle being that no one shall enjoy anything that everybody may not enjoy with him. . . .

The distinction between Dominations and Powers being moral, we may expect to find it present in the heart of the individual; indeed its source and seat cannot be other than the heart. If vital impulse had not become conscious in the passions (and conscious especially by feeling them thwarted) the models for a Domination and for a Power would never have appeared. We might have been moving mechanically under pressure from our fellows, like grains in a quicksand or snow-flakes in an avalanche; and we should never have minded it, unless some vital impulse within the single flake or the single grain had resisted that pressure or strained to push even harder and move even faster. So children and rustics endure political revolutions without

knowing what the word means, or caring to know, if their daily routine is not disturbed; so many things of no consequence are talked about by the bigwigs! Yet children and rustics feel intensely the difference between Powers and Dominations in their private lives. They live surrounded and smothered by unintelligible fatalities; and they feel themselves brimful of suppressed powers for which they have no name. Their ignorance is in one sense wise; it anticipates the ultimate decrees of fortune in this world.

Sophisticated classes and governments, on the contrary, see too many possibilities to resign themselves to their troubles by repeating a few old tragic proverbs. They, with their superior intelligence and knowledge of the world, can easily see at each step how to clear the path before them. As to the result, when it appears, they will decide what to try next. Life for them shall be no wretched routine, pulling the same heavy ferry across the same dull stream from birth to death. It shall be a perpetually fresh adventure. Why be dominated by the past or the future, when both are now only imagined? Yet when they deride imagination as attention wasted on absent things, they are abandoning the function of imagination in directing the present. They have indeed become incapable of directing themselves, and are dominated by futilities, never being interested in anything but the morning's news and the day's accidents. If they had time to reflect, they might feel as helpless and as ignorant as do the rustics and the children.

This predicament sets the problem for rational politics and I believe involves the solution. Human beings are subjected, from birth up, to a Domination contrary to their caprices: to leave a new-born child entirely free and alone would be infanticide. For their own good (if existence is a good) children must pass years under an imposed regimen, dark to them in its motives and origin, but sometimes welcome, and hardly to be defied without disaster. When they are well nursed it is not so much the things that are done to them that annoy them, as the moments when those things are forced upon them or snatched away: for initially in any automatic life innovation appears formless and inconsistent. Children want to repeat what they have once succeeded in doing; and only the tempo of their routine is different from that of their parents or of change in the social weather. For this reason they are driven to play, and to like impossible stories: the real world is too hard to live in, and it is a relief to imagine another where everything happens more as it should. Only in the holidays, in the pauses of compulsory life, can they be free and happy.

This is a first solution, that suggests itself when the pressure of circumstances is not too crushing and continuous, and there is plenty of time and energy for play. But it is not a true solution: only a false escape from the

problem. False I call it and not merely partial: because even in play and in the holidays the problem recurs. The material of fancy wears thin; or the rules of the game spoil your freedom; or your opponents, who ought to have been there only to serve your sport, become real enemies and bullies. Later if your play-life becomes a passion, at cards, in racing, in politics, in love, in religion, you may find yourself more deeply involved, more harassed, more utterly defeated than you need have been in the working world.

Yet there is a simpler way, avoiding those moral vicissitudes, that leads the young mind back from play to reality. The pride of knowing may drive away the pleasure of making believe. Real things reward the respect that we show them, and imagination is as much excited by them as in any dream; moreover, our direct sketches from nature, if less inventive and dispersed, are more consecutive. A mind capable of discipline can therefore transpose itself ideally to the side of surrounding objects, and learn to live their life rather than only that of the human body, in its animal absolutism. To that extent domination is abolished by taking the tyrant's part. Yet this solution also is false: because if a man really took the part of things against his humanity, he would have attempted to kill himself while still living. He cannot have it both ways. Either the daemon of things actually takes the place of his human soul; or this soul smoulders in him, dishonoured and sadly starved by that inhuman gaoler. Your perfect pragmatist therefore would not have eluded domination by things, but would have cheerfully died of it.

The ignominy of the childish life, when domination is most galling, lies in being subject to casual commands and vindictive punishments, mitigated by forbidden sweets. Compulsion and prohibition then seem to cover everything, and leave no room for unclouded freedom. Freedom then must be rebellious, as if Powers were essentially tyrants; whereas we know that they become such only through a reversible relation which they bear to often reversible wills in their enemies. The true problem is therefore not how to abolish any natural Powers, but how to establish a sufficient harmony between them, so that they may support one another, or at least avoid contact, where harmony is impossible. The human soul may then develop its ideal life, as far as possible, in dynamic union with the world; and since such union involves difference, no soul need ever attempt to impose its language or habits upon other parts of nature, nor to renounce or deny the originality of its own ideas and pleasures. . . .

Liberty habitually exercised presupposes peace; but the price of peace, as men are actually constituted, is the suppression of almost all their liberties. The history of liberalism, now virtually closed, illustrates this paradox. The individual expected to be morally emancipated; he panted to live in the

paradise of anarchy. But this paradise is metaphysical only; to enter it you must love war and peril and change and irresponsibility and the mystic joys of mere being. A sober, thrifty, kindly liberal would shudder at such a prospect; his promised land must be peaceful, cooperative, and safe. He counts on progress, and is intent on building up a future that shall be always freer and freer, but also richer and better ordered.

Order, for a liberal, means only peace; and the hope of a profound peace was one of the chief motives in the liberal movement. The traditional order, which was pregnant with all sorts of wars, civil, foreign, religious, and domestic, was to be relaxed precisely for the sake of peace. The people, the sects, the young, and the intellectuals were everywhere restive and ripe for revolt; the threatened conflicts in Church and State, in industry and morals would be odious, and in any case fatal to the old order. Better, then, relax that order in time, and yield gracefully and peaceably to the inevitable. When we have conceded everything that anybody clamours for, everyone will be satisfied; and then if any picturesque remnant of the traditional order is left standing, we shall at last be able to enjoy it safely and with a good conscience. Swimming in the holiday pond of a universal tolerance, we may confidently call our souls our own. Impossible that such harmless liberty should arouse hostility in any quarter. Originality will no longer need to be shy, and offer excuses; heresy will be protected forever against social obloquy. What more justification could there be for anything than that somebody likes it, and why should anybody else wish to object to it for him? So, all grievances being righted and everyone quite free, we hoped in the nineteenth century to remain for ever in unchallengeable enjoyment of our private property, our private religions, and our private morals.

But there was a canker in this rose. The dearest friend and ally of the liberal was the reformer; perhaps even his own inmost self was a prepotent Will, not by any means content with being let alone, but aspiring to dominate everything. Why were all those traditional constraints so irksome? Why were all those old ideas so ridiculous? Because I had a Will of my own to satisfy and an opinion of my own to proclaim. Relaxing the order of society, so as to allow me to live, is by no means enough, if the old absurdities and the old institutions continue to flourish. They offend me by existing; they are odious and intolerable. No pond is large enough for this celestial swan, my divine animus; no backing out and self-effacement, no scurry into backwaters will save the ducks and geese from annihilation. How should I live safe or happy in the midst of such creatures? And to call our cohabitation peace, when they so trouble my soul, would be a mockery.

Merely to relax order and to be more and more tolerant will not therefore

secure peace, unless this liberal peace works as a magic sedative, and gently destroys the possibility of discontent. Such was perhaps the secret expectation of liberal statesmen. Open every door, let in the light and air, smile upon the Red Indian in his feathers and the Chinaman in his pigtail, and the diffused and placid twilight of goodwill would bathe the moral universe for ever. Everybody would be happy at home, like the Englishman having his solitary tea in his garden; and all wars would be at an end because, at heart, there would be nothing left to fight for. Good will and mutual acquaintance would gradually rub off those remaining differences. The Chinaman would voluntarily cut off his pigtail; the Red Indian would desire not the white man's scalp but a cloth cap for his own head; and the Englishman would find it more convenient to take his tea in a teashop, no longer knowing any solitude or any garden. Toleration would have proved the euthanasia of differences. Everybody would be free to be what he liked, and no one would care to be anything but what pleased everybody. . . .

In politics conscious rationality begins with the economic arts which would become wholly rational if they were organised exclusively in view of their utility and employed materials, time, and labour as economically as possible. In reality, as already pointed out, there is often a margin of spontaneous interest and initiative in doing things, which makes work partly liberal art; and besides, as men are not machines, they inevitably waste time and materials; both workmen and employers lounge a good deal and are more numerous than necessary, as are the clerks, salesmen, auxiliaries of every description, and hangers-on from senior partners to office boys; for they all think that the business exists to employ them and not they to carry on the business. In this way, while the machine threatens to mechanise mankind, old human nature does its best to humanise the machine.

The automatic equilibrium essential to health also helps in another sphere to soften the severity of reason. For sometimes reason tends to substitute pure method or simplicity or symmetry, with their empty magic, for the natural impulses of the artist; impulses that reason might have enlightened if they were misled by appearances or if they were themselves as yet inarticulate.

Many philosophers and politicians indeed tell us that they already possess *a priori* an adequate knowledge of what human needs and capacities are, and that they are really identical in everybody. The contrasts and conflicts in society, and in each man, they attribute to the absence or perversity of education. All men, they say, *must* find the same moral political and scientific regimen, communism, or constitutional democracy, or the One True Religion, perfectly satisfying. If they hesitate or condemn all such regimens, it *must* be because they are ignorant of the facts and of their own true good.

I think that these philosophers and politicians have good knowledge of themselves. They are born dogmatists and congenitally militant. But this disposition of theirs, at once intolerant and uneasy, blinds them to the actual radical diversity among men. This they cannot admit because, if admitted, it would prove them to be born tyrants. If this word "tyrant" is taken for a term of reproach, they can never be convicted of it in their own courts; but if taken to signify the superman, they will claim it with pride. They say we are all super-animals, either fallen from heaven or about to make a heaven for ourselves on earth.

It is often the boldest minds that, inspired by some political or religious dream, impose needless duties and taboos upon one another. A government that would be rational, on the contrary, would imitate the modesty of the physician that recommends only what can enable us to escape or to overcome the assaults that natural accidents may make upon us. Only that while government imposes instead of recommending its legal diet, it may also invite us to meet opportunities open to our powers. In both directions, however, it only forestalls and discovers for us the dumb beckonings of fortune. All else a rational government would leave to the special genius of each free society and each free individual. In suggesting such a division of moral labour, order where the conditions are known, liberty where imagination makes its own laws, I am far from expecting that such a division will actually be made; nor, if by chance the thousand forces at work ever fell into this arrangement, do I imagine that it would last long. Reason is itself a method of imaginative thought. It insinuates itself with difficulty even into economic arts, by virtue of the regularity of natural processes, to which action has to adapt itself; but it lives happy and safe only in ideal constructions, mathematical or poetical.

Fondly, then, as I might regard a final peace between order and liberty, secured by the rational separation of their spheres, yet I can imagine far more clearly, and not without some merriment, the shouts of joy with which one or another passion or irrepressible faith would hasten to break that agreement.

I picture to myself, almost in the clouds, a many-pavilioned International Institute of Rational Economy, faultless in architecture and appointments, like an Oxford set upon the Rock of Gibraltar. All strength and all learning to keep the world in the right path: what could be more satisfying? But at the foot of this citadel there would have to be a commercial and industrial town, with its own self-government and factions. There might be riots and revolutions there, too insignificant and local to demand international control. And in the spiral roads, or steep stairs, or funiculars that led to the citadel there might sometimes be scuffles between town and gown, or academic arguments, even more dangerous to moral peace. Nor would that be the greatest danger.

Little knots of critical spirits would be formed in that high nursery of wisdom itself and would whisper their heresies in corners, or run down to join the demonstrations in the town square; for even supposing justice enforced in international relations, who could prevent local tyranny and deadly stagnation in free cities or free Churches? Moreover, economic order could not be maintained in the great world at long range by the International Institute without expeditionary forces of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and police, and all the holders of scholarships, experts, and young professors at that central nursery of peace would have begun by seeing military and inquisitorial service at the outposts of the Institute all over the world; they would all have seen something of the unregenerate edges of civilisation, and of political conspiracy at the heart of it. Imagination in some of these future guardians of universal peace would have been impressed by the lawless spirit they had come to root out. It may have seemed more human than the rational economy they were going to enforce. The excitement of lawlessness may have visited them in dreams. Why not try it in real life? Why not decamp to the mountains or run away to sea? Good luck might cast them on the smallest of islands in the widest of oceans where they might run about naked under the mangoes or paddle out boldly in double canoes beyond the horizon to capture and bring home each his innocent and loving bride. How much prouder they would be at having been ravished at sight by a young stranger than our spectacled sister-students who, after being wall-flowers on show for years, marry some elderly cousin!

But not all those emancipated minds would have been so selfishly pleasure-loving and, alas! so short-sighted! In rushing down from their Peace-Force Barracks, some of them would not have forgotten to fling open the cages of all the animals in the Zoological Gardens which, as an aid to understanding mankind, studded the flanks of that mountain. What new life they would bring to those unhappy brothers of theirs! Soon the old jungle and the old forests would teem with every sort of free creature, feeding, breeding, and fighting without respite! And the feasts would not be conventional like a dinner after a foxhunt, but truly royal, truly primitive, with the stag or boar or suckling-pigs on the table; and they themselves would sit like Nimrods enthroned and magnificently draped in the skins of their leopards and their lions, or like trappers or archers in a mountain camp, sporting the feathers of their quarry.

Other young pupils of Rational Economy might not have had time to shake off the dulcet diction of their former pedagogues; and they might attempt modestly to change the subject. "But how sad," they might murmur, "how sad to think that for so long we should have done that cruel wrong to our fellow-creatures by condemning them to undeserved captivity in dismal bare cells—so like our own, alas! in that prison!—with no outlook except on an

artificial garden, with asphalt walks and arc-lights, when they were meant to range freely over wild and boundless spaces! Yes, and what's worse, we have condemned them to be fed on scanty, horrible, monotonous rations, thrown at them (think of the ignominy of this!) at precisely stated hours, while a crowd of grinning cockneys stare at them and poke them with umbrellas!" As if our common Mother Nature had not commanded them to gorge their fill whenever and wherever they found what they wanted; and as for finding it, to have faith and to trust in *Her!*"

It would be to misread the moral of this fable simply to approve one party, the constitutional and rational, or the other party, the militant and romantic; or to propose a third regimen, no less absolute and universal in intention. The study of human behaviour and opinion would then have taught us nothing, except perhaps that we must put up with them, whatever they choose to be. If we wish to draw some moral from experience we must assume that we are living in a world where our behaviour has causes and consequences that recede in all directions until they become irrelevant to our interests; but at closer quarters they can be traced in terms of the sensations and ideas that events excite in us. In these terms we can observe or learn from history and general report what sort of conduct will further our interests and what sort will ruin them; so that the question at once becomes not what we like best, but whether any part, and how much, of what we think we should like we can possibly secure. In a word, we shall be able to distinguish wisdom from folly.

Knowledge of the world and of what is possible in it, though it may discourage some vices, will not solve for us the question of what is our true good. For what the world can offer, when tried, may seem to us vanity. There is therefore another sphere, that of potential goods, which each man may evoke according to the warmth and richness of his imagination; and if he has any integrity or moral strength he will easily discern where his chosen treasure lies. Whether it is attainable in the world or not will not shake his allegiance: it is based on a native bent in his soul without which he would cease to be himself.

It follows from the evolution of the psyche through plants and animals that its treasure is at each stage different; and in man I think it is generally alien domination that makes anyone mistake his vocation. Strictly there is a complete impossibility, even between brothers, to conceive each other's inner man. The catalogue of possible virtues is limited only by the capacity of the cataloguer. But existence imposes limitation and idiosyncrasy even on the imagination and the Will . . . ; and how should any of us, with his inevitable bias, pronounce which moral vocation is "the best"? Comparison can only be

made with reference to a chosen good, chosen by chance; and wisdom lies not in pronouncing what sort of good is best but in understanding each good within the lives that enjoy it as it actually is in its physical complexion and in its moral essence.

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